# Hermeneutics of Objectivity II.

**Tragedy of Scholastic Aristotelianism**

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**(Logo)**

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The preceding interpretation investigated the emergence of modern metaphysics. It followed the history of important gigantomachies concerning the substance, which took place in Late Antiquity and the Falsafa. The musical nature of truth, led by the archegetic dative (*dativus archegeticus*), was transformed into the principal dative (*dativus principalis*) of the first philosophy and then into the metaphysical dative of Aristotelian philosophy (*dativus metaphysicus*). The parousia of the archegetic dative takes place in the full presence of the divine *a/lētheia* guared by the Muses. Apollonian semeiotics concerns the wholeness of being (Heraclitus, B 93); the first philosophers decribed it in the kind of direct intuition that remins of ancient mysteries (ἐποπτεία). Writers of Greek tragedy handed down their insight (θεωρία) to the politically minded Greek community. The truth of the first philosophy is shown by a well-known saying of Heraclitus, which we interpret by the archaic hermeneutics: “To those who are up and awake (τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν), the world presents itself as one and common (ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι), that is, in full presence of the archegetic dative. But those who remain in darkness, they go the way which is proper to individual beings (εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι, Heraclitus, B 89). Socrates took Apollonian truth for the most valuable item, not sophistic arguments. The new concept of truth as metaphysical *veritas* came into the world in the Platonic turn of thinking. The previous whole of Being became a subjectively justified individual idea (OBJ I, ch. 1.1). The truth as metaphysical correctness makes the essence of Western thinking after the Platonic turn. The idea creates the artificial light of intellect that illuminates the dark cave of troglodytes. Before the light of ideas, in this mythological cave there was only an uncertain fire of technology built on manual skill. In that modern Platonic cave, the eternal light of new intellect began to shine. The new light of intellect is built on the exactness of mathematics. The metaphysics found a new place of knowledge (*ortus scientiarum*). The truth of the world was shifted to the enlightened subject. The new myth ensures the metaphysical appropriation of truth as subjectively grasped correctness (τὸ ἀληθὲς, *verum*, OBJ I, ch. 1). The connection of Platonic idea to the mathematical harmony founded new type of academic mysteries and established a new vision of the world. The soul of *illuminati* recognizes the world even before the subjects in question saw the light of the real world. An immeasurable technical advantage of the idea is the fact that it instantly and everywhere returns the academic *illuminatus* to the world iluminated by the new kind of intellect that is proper to him (*eís ídion*). Those modern “idiots” are at home wherever they build their own world; in the last times of the Anthropocene it is the whole Earth. The origin of the archaic knowledge was in prophesying that presented rhapsodic and tragic truth in a musical way (*die Sage*).[[1]](#footnote-1) The musical revelation of truth refers to the commencement of the historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) in the mode of Apollonian truth and its semblance (*a/lētheia*). The modernity led by Plato appropriated the truth in an epochal new way (*Ereignis*). Plato’s Socrates went from the fairy-tale cave to the highest idea, and after the conquest of the ideal world, this *illuminatus* returned to the world of technicians in the disguise of an academic pedagogue. The odyssey of Socrates’s metaphysical doppelganger goes to the idea of the Good; he returns to industrious troglodytes to intruct them in order to build up the New Age of metaphysics. Such an improbable academic tale established the fundamental myth of modernity. Metaphysics found the new beginning of truth in the bearer of truth rather than in the wholeness of the being of being. The subjective appropriation of truth created the appearance of a common world peculiar to academic subjects. The introduction of metaphysics created a new gigantomachy of the substance, which was given by the dispute that relates to the essence of the first science. The metaphysical dative determined by the Platonic mathematical idea does not have the same conception of truth as the metaphysical dative determined by the Aristotelian real substance.

The hermeneutic follows the effect of the archaic dative still working in metaphysics. The first part has shown how a new subject of cognition emerged in the environment of Avicenna’s metaphysics; Averroes took it for an nonsense. The modernists are objective individuals who see the world through subjectively given trajectory of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn,* OBJ I, ch. 1). The cognizing subject irradiates the new world by the light of its intellect, the new world is composed of isolated substances. Thus, academic *illuminati* always return to the world that is ideally and substantially proper to metaphysics (*eís ídion*). Ideal blindness to the original unity of the cosmos established the new epoch of Western education that has been led by Heraclitus’s “idiots” and Parmenides’s “double-headed” people ever since. According to Parmenides, the path of double-headed men goes there and back in a subjective, i.e., chaotic way (παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος, B 6.9). After the decline of Delphi and divine mysteries, the musically bestowed seeing of the present whole of Being no longer shaped the history of thought. The myth of the Platonic cave opened the modern epoch in the dialogue *The Republic*. The exit of Platonic Socrates from the modernists’ cave and his return created a pedagogic and mythopoetic white lie that has been fundamental to Western education ever since. The pious but pedagogically necessary lie followed Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* (*pia mendacia*, *Metam*. 9.711). The queen turned the newly born girl into a boy, Plato turned the last archaic philosopher into the first modernist. The simulacrum of Socrates as the first academic and metaphysical *illuminatus* replaced the real adyton of Delphi as well as Apollonian and Pythian message proclaimed to real Socrates. The philosophical fairy tale provides the founding myth of metaphysics through the ideal conception of truth as *veritas*. The legacy of the pseudo-Socrates locked in the metaphysical pantheon is kept alive by countless guardians of academic truth and education (OBJ I, ch. 1.1). Metaphysical castration of Socrates in the mode of divine comedy secures him the immortal fame among modernists and eternal academic recognition. The simulacrum of Socrates as a metaphysician called into being the epoch of Heidegger’s abandonment of Being (*Seinsverlassenheit*). Modern technicians of power are led by the subjective simulacrum of truth; guardians of academic freedom replaced the original democratic polis established by the victory in the Persian Wars by the modern tyranny. Socrates risked his life in the Athenian Agora for the real community of political aristocrats of mind, to convince fellow citizens of divine value of archaic wisdom. After his death and after the demise of Greek tragedians, Muses staged new tragedy of the West. The archegetic dative of mysteries (*dativus archegeticus*) and later the principal dative of the first philosophy (*dativus principalis*) became the untruth of the Platonic mythology that founded the modernity. In this hidden form, they continue to work in Apollonian historicity of Western thought. The new logos was employed in the form of the metaphysical dative. The transformation of truth by goddess Apate created an epochal new correspondence of the isolated substance and the enlightened intellect. The new version of the first philosophy is given in the mode of the metaphysical dative created by Aristotle. The historiality (*Geschichte*) of metaphysics begins with the displacement of the original phenomenon of historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) that is given in virtue of musical and tragic truth. After the epoch of tragedy writers, Aristophanes’s comedy and irony of Platonic dialogues took place. The effect of the wise philosophers nevertheless continues to exist, since the history of philosophical thought exists in its original *Lichtung* of truth and deception. The wise pay attention to the original effect of historicity through the Socratic search for truth within the framework of original *scholé*. These personalities, in the course of centuries, make together the Heraclitean koinonia of the common world mentioned above. It is built on Apollonian semeiotics of unconcealed sense of historicity. The musical hermeneutics is led by the God Apollo and by the goddess Athena. Both divine powers were involved in the musical figure of truth in the final victorious dispute with the Erinyes in the Athenian Agora, which Aeschylus conveys in his drama *Eumenides* (Umlauf 2008). But the struggle of the sages for the musical and tragic figure of truth did not reconcile the subjectively mad Furies for the time being in such an effective way as Aeschylus succeeded in doing at the end of his drama.

Thinking of modern philosophers followed the simulacrum of Socratic wisdom in order to passe into a new kind of divine comedy called “metaphysics.” The reflection of moderns left the original way how the wholeness of Being is given for the friendly thinking (*Andenken* of Heidegger) done by sage mortals. Metaphysics as the first philosophy separated itself from the previous form of the first philosophy that has for ever upholded the musical form of truth. The movement of truth in the mode of abandonment of being (*Seinsverlassenheit*) and epochal fallacy of thinking (*Irre*) can be guaranteed only by the human subject. After the sacrifice of Socrates as the new Iphigenia, a new era of the hidden Trojan war started that is now fought out in digital form. The nihilistic metaphysics, which is connected to databases and academic indexes, almost completely plundered the original form of philosophical wisdom. The death of the wisest of men sent goddesses of Vengeance with academic education into philosophy and into the political community. These Furies operate nihilistic thinking until today. Philosophical gigantomachy concerning the substance represents the basic event of the new Trojan war, which is fought by the academics on a global level. By the victory of the objective metaphysics, the metaphysics founded by Aristotle fell into oblivion. This ended the direct historical impact of the first substance in philosophical thought. Modernity suspended the hyparchical statute of the first real substance for true thinking and sent the first substance to the Lethe. The objective conception of metaphysics in the Late Antiquity and in the Falsafa suspended the validity of the metaphysical dative. Therefore, the project of Aristotelian *quidditas* (τό τί ἦν εἶναι) became obscure (OBJ, ch. 1.1). The introduction of truth as *veritas* was done in the mode of logical, and by no means metaphysical necessity. That new kind of abstraction initiated the epoch of full oblivion of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The repression of the tragic wisdom proceeds in the destructive mode of Freudian unconscious mechanism *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil* (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). In the epoch of metaphysics radically changed the Trojan war of philosophers concerning the unconcealed presence of Being (*alētheia*). The bastion of the first philosophy having been plundered, the battle is fought but for objective cognition of the substance. The events of the Trojan struggle for substance passed into the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of contemporary philosophical nihilism.

The term “metaphysics” became a synonym for everything that is useless, speculative and somehow intellectually queer the contemporary epoch of intellectual perplexity. The original figure of Aristotelian truth as correspondence of reality and intellect became fully objective history in the mode of truth as deconstruction (“post-truths”). Such a metaphysical miracle is produced by a new version of the post-Socratic academic *sholē*. The divine manna and nectar come to academic guardians of truth through a point system that makes globally index of truth through the technical performance of objective sciences. The contemporary academic guardians of objective knowledge feed one percent of the neoliberal oligarchs to satisfy their Olympian lifestyle. This one percent of the ruling *illuminati* guards the secular mystery of nihilistic economy that operates on virtual debts. Postmodern knowledge, and therefore power, is based on the nihilism of metaphysical illusion. But today, in real terms, half of the wealth accumulated by people on the Earth belongs to this one percent of the ruling class. Taken in a nutshell, the tragicomic epoch of modern gigantomachy concerns the peculiar substance of the third kind called “capital” (OBJ III, ch. 5.1.3). The hermeneutics of the first part analyzed this capital tragicomedy through the Apollonian semantics given in Aristotle’s notion of intellectual stupidity or “ignorance” (ἀπαιδευσία, *Met*. 1006a6). The effect of Apollonian semeiotic in the epoch of metaphysics is given by the fact that every epochal turn of thinking evokes in secret the original commencement of Being and thinking. The ignorance guided by the Furies runs in the mode of objective *modus ponens* because the goddesses of Vengeance fulfill the task assigned by Apollonian Muses. The divine comedy led by ambiguous Muses as Apollonian rulers of truth and untruth changed into a tragicomedy of objectivity enacted by the objectively non-existent Furies. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. The hidden semeiotics of Muses is given by the objective museum, whereas postmodern Furies are running extermination and labor camps, proxy wars, and other bestialities of the colonial and imperial present times. Modernity created an objective form of metaphysical nihilism. Nietzsche was one of the great minds that shook the postmodern *Arbor Porphyriana*.[[2]](#footnote-2) After the death of modern God in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the tragicomedy of virtual simulacra of all kinds of thought became the new religion of the West. The mythological seeing of the world was unmasked in the preceding part of the interpretation as the fundamental error of Western thinking in the mode of Heidegger’s *Irrtum*. Through the displacement of the tragic figure of truth and finally of the whole of metaphysics, it came to global effect of contemporary nihilism. It represents for the time being the last form of the hermeneutic triad of historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), historiality (*Geschichte*) and history (*Historie*).

The previous part has shown that the objective determination of being in the Falsafa carries in itself a principally conflictual and dichotomous character revealed through the gigantomachy of the substance. The interpretation of the divine comedy of metaphysics went through transformations of the work *Categories* in teaching of Neoplatonic interpreters between the 3rd and the 7th century. Those followers of Porphyry created a new figure of metaphysics full of substances of the third kind to make a compromise between categorical and transcendental determinations of substance. Neoplatonists from Plotinus’s school changed the conception of substance, body, and time and space. The first figure of objectivity emerged through fundamental projects of metaphysics in the Persian Falsafa. Gigantomachy of Avicenna and Averroes determined the fate of metaphysics in the Latin West. The first part of the archaeology of objectivity showed the way in which the gigantomachy of substance proceeded in the Baghdad School of Wisdom (*Bajt al-Hikma*) until the decline of the Falsafa. At the beginning of the 13th century, the end of the classical era of divine comedy occurs, leaving the stage for objective tragicomedy of Western metaphysics. This most important metaphysical period of the West took place from the 10th century until Averroes’s death (†1198). The battle concerning the substance was won by unwise modernists, such as Avicenna. Theologians that guarded tribal traditions and emerging scriptural corpus of the Koran excommunicated the school of the first Western *Modernorum*. Unfortunately, they destroyed critical Aristotelians, like Averroes, as well. The thinkers of the *Kalām*, in the tragic mode of divine comedy, abolished the Falsafa, and with it the Aristotelian true branch (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The dispute between the Platonists and the Aristotelians concerned the death of modern God in Western philosophy. This dispute over the conception of truth in the Baghdad School of Wisdom initiated the contemporary nihilism of Western thought in the mode of Heidegger’s “Beginning” (*Beginn*). The new epoch of forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) divided Europe in two different civilizations. Today’s Islamic East and Latin West are connected under the leadership of Furies in a tragic manner, that is, only by technical and economic vision of the world that is made in the mode of objective *veritas*. The objective cognition is interesting in the fact that observed things and phenomena in Avicennism need for their own being an additional, subjectively given reason for existence. The things exist in and for themselves; they receive a new form of objective being since they are taken in the objective worldview. The investigated reality got a metaphysical reason to exist, which Leibniz formulated explicitly in the theorem of the Sufficient Reason (*ratio sufficiens*, ch. 3.5). The doubling of being into a real thing and its objective beingness creates a new kind of being as *tertium ens*. Classical metaphysics is based on Aristotelian form of the first science and on the logic of the Excluded Third. Such metaphysics has no possibility to accomplish an objective justification of actually existing things. The thing exists singularly and actually in the reality and their cognition is given universally and potentially in the intellect. The human intellect exists only in the body, because it is a faculty of the soul, and this is the immaterial form of physically existing person. According to Aristotle, nothing of a third kind can exist between these two fundamental conditions of being (external versus recognized first substance). Such a being would not possess any possibility of being. Only the real substance exists: the physical body, the living biological substance, the mortal human being recognizing with the help of the senses, the immortal cosmic intelligence or the Immovable Mover. The real thing exists really and their existence determines categorically given scientific cognition in the soul. The meaning of the world in the thinking represents only an accident with regard to really existing things. The cognition is directly bound to the real thing by causal effect on human senses and on human intellect. Entities of the third kind have no real carrier. This mythological subject was created by academicians dwelling in the Platonic cave. These legends narrated by guardians of Neoplatonic truth are sophisticated, attractive, instructive and beautiful. Just as at the time of Socrates’s talk about political efficiency and education, there exists today a real and objective reason why it is necessary to pay well sophist poets, orators and educators of the youth, such as Protagoras was. But from the metaphysical point of view based on Aristotelian first substance, these mythological stories about objective substances are untrue.

The realm of objectively determined *tertium ens* has no causal connection with reality. Therefore, modern knowledge cannot be based on Aristotelian truth as correspondence of reality and knowledge. Aristotelian *quidditas* arises in mind through the action of the metaphysical dative. Classical Aristotelians refused to give things a sufficient reason for existence during the most significant philosophical battles over substance in the 13th century. Scholastic metaphysics in the school of the first Averroism fundamentally criticized modern doppelgangers of reality. Any objectively valid reason for existence can be attached to things that exist in the world *per se*, *simpliciter* and *absolute*. According to the classical Aristotelianism, only a complete madman could do such a stupidity. The connoisseurs of Aristotle reminded and still remind the contemporaries of the famous sentence from the writing *Physics* about ridiculousness of those who wanted to prove the existence of the real world of the first substances (*Phys*. 193a3). Critical scientists investigate the real world and they want to be metaphysically wise. Therefore, hermeneutics cannot adopt prejudices and errors of Neoplatonism and modernist Falsafa. They caused the emergence of objectivity and then they incorporated it into modern rationality in the form of *via Modernorum* and *metaphysica generalis*. The authoritatively instituted objectivity introduced a new cognition of the world, God and man. The modern Cartesian subject, which originated with Avicenna, finds a fundament of existence in itself.

Following chapters of the second and the third tome examine medieval figures of this gigantomachy. The original form of objectivity in every examined figure of metaphysics, we call it by the term “*matrix*.” The Latin term “*matrix*” defines in the doctrine of Neoplatonists and Valentinian Gnostics effects of the hidden commencement in its original nature that is given in the Pythagorean foursome *(Bythos et Sige, Nus et Veritas*).[[3]](#footnote-3) Gnostics lived at the beginning of Christianity and witnessed the decline of ancient mysteries. They created the modern parody of ancient mysteries. Those technicians of divine simulacra knew well that the archaic commencement exists and works in secret, also in their epoch of confused minds as well. But they preferred the subjective poetry to the divine truth. The matrices show the hidden historial way in which the phenomenon of objectivity passed through the gigantomachy of the substance done in Late Antiquity and in the Falsafa into the historiality (*Geschichte*) of scholastic philosophy, theology and science. Objectivity represents a metaphysical form of modern gnosis, which was created by “divine men” such as Jamblichus and modern *illuminati* as Simplicius on the basis of Plotins and Porphyry’ Neoplatonism. This struggle over the mythopoetic truth and falsity of substance was adopted in the Falsafa. Avicenna and Averroes developed the legacy of Alfarabi’s metaphysics. Alfarabi reconciled Aristotle’s substance and Plato’s idea for the first time in the West. Latin Scholasticism took up understanding of being that these two fundamental projects of the Falsafa contain. The first gigantomachy took place in the schools of Neoplatonism. The transformation of Aristotelianism in Falsafa was accomplished in early and later Scholasticism. Done in this way, the objective figure of thinking in Latin West was formed. After the archaeological interpretation of Late Antiquity and Falsafa, it is necessary to study the transformations of substance in the Latin West until the 14th century. The second and third parts of the study examine six basic matrices that accomplish the revelation of objectivity in the Scholasticism. These epochs of modern Gnostic thinking correspond to six days of the mythological creation of the objective world (*hexaemereon*).

* The first matrix shows the dispute between the Aristotelian (Abelard) and the Neoplatonic concept of truth (Anselm) in the Latin West. Through false synthesis of both schools, the first vision of the world in the mode of objectivity emerged (Gilbertus Porretanus). That worldview was developed in the Porretan schools influenced by Avicenna (*Nominales*).
* The second matrix follows the transformations of Scholasticism in the years 1220–50. Gigantomachy of the substance transmitted by the Falsafa passed through conflictual relationship to Averroes’s metaphysics, which at that time arrived to the Latin West. The school of the “first Averroism“ took it as a starting point of thought. The school of the “second Averroism“ rejected it and preferred Avicenna’s project of metaphysics.
* The third matrix interprets the revelation of *tertium ens* in Latin commentaries on Aristotle’s writing *De anima* in 1250–77. The intellectual part of the soul functions as a new substance and it is created by set of objective form and matter (Rufus, Bonaventure, Pecham). This view is rejected by all Aristotelians from the school of the first Averroism (Albert, Bacon, Aquinas). The controversy of Latin Averroism prepared the ontotheological basis of new being, since it grounded *tertium ens* in an absolute way, also directly in the divine intellect.
* The fourth matrix describes authoritative and theological codification of new worldview. It was done by the Paris and Oxford condemnation of Aristotelianism in March 1277. The new *tertium ens* became a part of the divine being and it got ontotheological legitimacy due to the will of the modern demiurge (Bonaventura, Olivi). Siger of Brabant, as the greatest connoisseur of Averroes, stopped the progress of objectivity at the University of Paris for about ten years. His dispute with Thomas Aquinas about hypostatized character of the intellect shows the way in which objectivity left the phase of historial concealment (*Angang*) and began openly to form the history of the West (*Beginn*).
* The fifth matrix shows the foundation of objective being in the second beginning of metaphysics (Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus). The concept of objective being received a categorical determination in years 1280–90 that contradicts original meaning of the writing *Categories*. Objectivity in the concept of Duns Scotus became a recognized category of thought and received metaphysical validity in the context of newly formed *veritas*. The last representative of classical critical Aristotelianism was William Ockham. After his academic exile from Oxford, the rule of postmodern metaphysics as objective forgetfulness of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*) was instituted.
* The sixth matrix shows the consequences of the dispute between the first and the second Averroism in the field of ethics and political theories. At the beginning of the 14th century, the West entered the epoch of postmodern form of objectivity, which represents the nihilistic form of metaphysics. The objective being lost the preceding problematic character and became a recognized matter of thought. The conclusion of this work summarizes the conception of the person and its objective simulacrum, which brought into being the tragicomic figure of Western humanism in the mode of the objective Oedipus complex.

Let us now briefly summarize the whole procedure of the archaeology of objectivity. The exegesis examines the Platonic and Aristotelian substance in its historial formation. The archaic unconcealedness (*alētheia*) becomes clear by means of six matrices. They describe the configuration of objective *tertium ens* in epochal moments when meaning of being is revealed in a new way. This mythological creation of the objective world in six days gives the overall picture of metaphysical stupidity concerning the objective reason (“*Irre*”). The course of the objective Trojan war fought by academics is presented as a metaphysical figure of hermeneutic triad of historicity, historiality and history. After the victory of *Modernorum* at the beginning of the 14th century, an epoch of dogmatization and banalization of objectivity occurred. The Trojan war was won, the classical Aristotelianism was plundered and the global division of the objectively given booty began. In the figure of a unitary ontology since Suárez, metaphysics completed original historicity of objectivity. The objectivity became a positive fact of thinking; the metaphysics turned into the ontology; the being of the third kind received the global and nihilistic logos. The metaphysics sent the thinking of the first and the second Averroism into the epochal conceived Lethe through the Freudian protective mechanism of “inversion into the opposite” (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). The dispute about the so-called Averroism became a philosophical, authoritarian and ideological instrument that performed an objective *damnatio memoriae* of the schools of classical and modern Aristotelianism. The peripeties of the dispute about the so-called Averroism and the so-called twofold conception of truth can be traced to the 16th century, which is not the aim of this work.

Hermeneutic archaeology principally separates the scholastic path of modernism, established in the second half of the 13th century, from the postmodernism and the contemporary epoch of metaphysical nihilism, inaugurated by Friedrich Nietzsche. We will not examine the postmodern and nihilistic figure of objectivity any more. We will mention both forms *ad hoc*, when their figure has been determined by scholastic modernity. We find the postmodern figure of objectivity in its *veritas* in the work of René Descartes and his followers. These authors completed the turn of objectivity from the original certainty hidden in modern God to the evident certainty given in the thinking subject. The truth of objectivity is guaranteed by the cogito and its investigation of itself and the world in the mode of reflexive evidence. This form of objectivity was followed by objective mathematics (Leibniz), which was completed by the critical project of transcendental objectivity (Kant). Then came the arrival of objectivity as a historial movement of spirit (Hegel) and the destruction of objectivity, which is given in German idealism (Nietzsche). Marx's philosophy no longer sees objectivity in philosophy, but in economics. Marx diagnoses exactly the tragicomic of German idealism, which he characterized as ideological seeing of the world. The metaphysical nihilism of the present reduced objectivity to language games and to the movement of the difference of the foundational structures of arbitrarily given meaning (Derrida, Rorty). The ideological vision of the world in the contemporary global nihilism is initiated by the neoliberal group of banksters and *illuminati*. They have almost completely bought the politics and academic thinking of the West through virtual debt and money produced *ex nihilo*. After the six days of creation of objective nihilism, a one percent of blissful troglodytes under the leadership of Furies can finally make their way to Elysian fields of their virtual dominions. After the creation of the world in six days, Yahweh also rested on the seventh day. But unlike today’s global slave traders, he proclaimed the Sabbath for all people.

Today’s figure of objectivity is given mainly in the planetary ruling economy, which is subordinated to instrumental reason as the last epochal spawn of postmodernism. The crisis of objectivity given in the nihilistic figure of reason was witnessed by both world wars, the various critiques of instrumental rationality raised in the 20th century, the present crisis of science and the postmodern effort to deconstruct any metaphysically and logocentrically anchored sense. In the nihilistic epoch, objectivity reaches a critical phase when it determines the fate of the planet in the epoch appropriately designated by the term “Anthropocene.” Aeschylus’s trilogy called “*The Oresteia*” is about the moment when the victorious Agamemnon, returning home from the war for Troy, is slain by his wife Clytemnestra and her lover Aigisthus. Tyrannical and irrational objectivity is already dead, which is a good thing in itself. Unfortunately, there are not enough citizens of the world to arrange the trial at the Areopagus in such a wise way, to send academic goddesses of Revenge in their subjective form finally into the beyond, as ritually satisfied powers (*The Eumenides*). Archaic hermeneutics follows the original path of philosophical wisdom. These demonic powers, connected with contemporary tyrants, deserve their temple and cult in philosophical Attica even today, because they are dangerous worldwide. Standing in the epoch of objective fallacy and error, critical hermeneutics must clarify the question of the original truth and meaning of objectivity.

# 1. Twofold Concept of Truth and Intellect (Matrix I)

The triad of historicity, historiality and history got a new meaning after Averroes’s *epokhē*, which since Neoplatonism is comparable in terms of effects only with the transformation given by Avicenna’s objective vision of the world. The first matrix of objectivity analyzed the specific mode of forgetfulness of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*), which Averroes found in Avicenna. The metaphysics of Avicenna illuminated the whole of being from behind through the *intellectus agens* of the cosmic spheres. Due to the connection with human cognitive faculties, it forms a new form of objective cognition in the act of *intellectus adeptus*. The Commentator disapproved the faulty metaphysics of Avicenna by interpreting its obscurity. Averroes handed down to the West new concept of metaphysics and new analysis of cognition. Gigantomachy of the falsafa created the first matrix of objectivity by the fact that the unconcealment (*alētheia*) of the first substance received both determinations. Aristotle’s metaphysics got the objective form through Avicenna’s metaphysics. This event of thinking and being changed the history of the West. The unconcealment of being as pure beingness (*ens inquantum ens*) introduced in the framework of Falsafa, founded a new event of being (*Ereignis*). The new metaphysics of substance led to the objectivist concealment of being in the later *via Modernorum* established by modern Avicennists. On the other hand, it made realist unconcealment of being in the philosophy made by followers of Averroes. The following epoch of Western metaphysics exposes both meaning of being according to Averroes and the original form of the metaphysical error, which is given by eclipse of the first substance in Avicenna. Latin Scholasticism took over this dispute, because the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and dialogues of Plato were interpreted through both commentators of Falsafa. The contemporary gigantomachy around substance is given between Avicennist phenomenology of Husserl and existential Aristotelianism of Heidegger.

The first matrix must interpret the first form of gigantomachy around substance in the Latin West that is determined in its initial phase by Avicenna’s metaphysics. The hermeneutics of objectivity distinguish two phases of development in early Scholasticism. They are closed by the publication of Blund’s pioneering work *Tractatus de anima* (c. 1200). The first phase of the dispute over rightly conceived Aristotelianism examines categorical predication within the framework of grammar and logic in early Scholasticism, which is influenced by either Neoplatonism or Aristotelianism. Abélard uncompromisingly defends the determination of truth as correspondence, according to Latin translations of the Aristotelian corpus handed down by Boethius. Neoplatonism is represented by Anselm of Canterbury, who creates a new concept of truth as *rectitudo*. Neoplatonic definition of truth created a new kind of atomic substance of the third kind. The new form of *tertium ens* appeared in the subsequent phase, when Avicenna’s philosophy was received by Gilbert Porretanus and his school after the year 1180. The first Western modernists, in the school of *Nominales*, changed Aristotle’s determination of the first substance into a Porretan individual being (*individuum*). The late Scholasticism opened a new round of dispute with the modernists after the decline of the original schools of *Nominales*. The question of “nominalism” took up as the main theme the dispute over universals (Courtenay 2008, 39–80). Blund’s work *Tractatus de anima* brought about the main correction of modernism. It transmitted to the West the authentic Aristotelianism according to Abélard, and, moreover, it was based on the writing *De anima*. Blund’s defense of Aristotelianism prepared the ground for reception of Averroes’s metaphysics, which came into the Latin West after the year 1220. Blund’s students from the school of the first Averroism rejected in 1225 the objective vision of the world made by Avicennist *Modernorum*. They opened a new round of gigantomachy of the substance.

## 1.1 Latin Gigantomachy Concerning the Substance (Anicius Boethius)

The importance of Boethius for the Latin West is comparable to Porphyry’s work *Isagoge* for the preceding period of the Late Antiquity (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Boethius’s definitions of genre, species, and quantity shaped the further development of Scholasticism both towards objectivity and to authentic Aristotelianism. Let us now return to the debate between Avicenna and Averroes, which influenced the fate of Scholasticism with respect to the *tertium ens*. Boethius’s translation of *Isagoge* establishes for the Latin West the primacy of the actual being against its conceptualization. The exposure of being from the direction of the real thing is given according to the work *Categories*. Boethius’s position is strictly Aristotelian. The universal predicates ask how things are given in thought (*quale quiddam est*), and do not clarify the being of the concrete thing in reality (*non in eo quod quid est*).[[4]](#footnote-4) The hyparchical nature of the first substance (*hoc animal*) is universally predicated on the level of the new single thing, which is universally conceived as the resulting minimal unit of universal significance (*totum*). This minimal unity is found at the end of Porphyry’s Tree. The dispute about the determination of the term “*totum autem hoc animal*” (*In Porph. Isag*. III.10) plays an important role in the disputes in the 12th and 13th centuries. This twofold determination of the single thing (*totum autem-hoc animal*) became a principled philosophical problem. Late Antiquity and Neoplatonic Scholasticism found a new categorical predication for universal terms by placing them at the level of the individual. The meaning of substance in the *Isagoge* changed in principle. The definition of whole (*totum*) then refers in undifferentiated way to the first substance and to the individual, in the mode of the newly conceived univocity. According to the *Isagoge*, the meaning of universally predicated second substance as a genus has similarity only in the framework of analogy with the hylemorphic composition (ἀναλόγου συνέστηκεν τοῦ γένους, *Isag*. 11.15). The categorial predication changed into dialectical division of universals. The composition of universals and essential determinations of being creates only analogical similarity, which Boethius accurately translated into Latin (*similiter consistit genere*).[[5]](#footnote-5) The genus predicated within the framework of abstract dialectics and synthesis forms a new unity of meaning at the level of the ultimate universal destiny of “human being.” Modernity is totally fascinated by this kind of individual. The universal atomic substance arises in the framework of difference between the universals of genus and species. The individual such as “Socrates,” is placed at the end of the universal division of the species within the framework of the Tree of Porphyry. Therefore, it differs from the current first substance by its minimal, merely universally given beingness. The specific being of the individual given only in thought therefore forms but an analogical similarity with the first real substance. The whole of meaning (*totum*) summarized in the universal meaning “man” cannot be predicated univocally in this universal form, but only analogically. Translation of the *Isagoge* therefore considers the term “*homo*” to be merely equivocal. Something different is the hyparchical predication of *totum* as first substance that in the mode of imposition that entails the real existence of the first substance. The real cognition of the second substance is determined by the categorical predication. This determination is made in the *Second Analytics* by the scientific deduction (*demonstratio*), that is, with respect to the causality of the real first substances. The ambivalent conception of *totum* concerns the individual as *tertium ens*, which includes the substance and the body of the third kind. This metaphysical *Irrtum* prevailed in the Latin West with the same tenacity as the new forms of *tertium ens* in Neoplatonism and Falsafa.

Scholasticism not only had at its disposal Boethius’s translation of the *Isagoge*, but the tradition of the Neoplatonic Falsafa handed down by Avicenna. The universal determination in the framework of genus and species began to expand through Avicenna’s metaphysics and amphibolic predication into the hyparchical status, which is given in the *Categories* only in terms of the first substance. Simplicius’ interpretation of the *Categories* shifted Porphyry’s ambivalent term of indivisible substance (ἄτομος οὐσία) to a new status at the level of species (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The matter and the quantity became in the late antiquity a new form of the being of the third kind. The universality of the genus conceives matter univocally as a Neoplatonic bodily extension (*extensio*), which was realized for the first time by Simplicius and his followers (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Avicenna followed the determination “substance—*individuum*” by the conception of the *tertium ens* within the framework of the Neoplatonic interpretation. The category of genus and species created in the system of Avicenna’s metaphysics a universal determination of the body of the third kind on the level of the generically conceived individual thing (*hoc esse tantum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). For Avicenna, abstractly conceived matter was given the same status as the species, which is determined by a superordinate form. The objective matter of the third kind enables an extension of the species toward lower form of bodies.[[6]](#footnote-6) The quotation shows that extension of genus and species goes to the very special kind of body is considered at the level of the materially given thing. This is a typical amphibolic predication of Neoplatonism, which the modernist Falsafa took over from Elias’s commentary on the *Isagoge* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). Such an ontological perspective of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) concerns objective being that is found again in the Latin term “*exsistere*.“ Rufus of Cornwall introduces Avicenna’s extension of genus and species into the individual as a new way of objectively given “exsistence“ when the univocal hypostasis in thought passes into reality and vice versa (ch. 3.3.2). The transition from universality to reality enabled a new categorical predication in Late Antiquity and in the Falsafa. The well-known Tree of Porphyry had division only at the level of universals and only in the mode of analogical similarity to the first substance that could not establish univocal categorial predication. In the new conception of *tertium ens*, which was considered as a hyparchical first substance, the division and synthesis of the universal essences and hypostases took on a new meaning in the context of *Arbor Porphyriana*. The first substance that exists as a physical substance only in reality, became a new universal genus determined within the framework of abstractly specific matter and corporeality due to the univocal predication made according to the Tree of Porphyry. The generic substance of the third kind produces an objectively determined singular thing at the end of the division of universals. The new division of universals is combined with the body of the third kind, in order to establish an objectively defined atomic substance (*individuum*). After the decline of Aristotelian metaphysical abstraction, one can no longer distinguish this individual from the first substance. In the logical and essential abstraction, the individual and the first substance carry only a homonymic meaning, which is mistakenly considered as univocal identity.

Averroes resolutely rejected the body of the third kind. The metaphysics built on the metaphysical dative excludes any mixture of the first and the second substance. Averroes does not explore the first principles of being in the abstract mode “*ens inquantum ens*” like Avicenna. He analyzes the “substance *qua* substance” according to *Physics* and *Metaphysics* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The critique of Neoplatonic definition of body and corporeality forms the basic pattern of his metaphysics and the theory of cognition according to the CMDA. We have cited the key quotations from this work that fundamentally rejected the existence of universals outside of human thought. The rejection of the autonomous status of universals in the manner of the first substance, we find it already in Averroes’s Middle Commentary on *Metaphysics*. The writing *Epitome* defends Porphyry’s difference between the first and the second substance. According to Averroes, the rejection of Avicenna’s Neoplatonic conception of genus as *tertium ens* is based on the physics of real bodies. The real bodies possess properties which belong only to the first substance, e.g., the motion, the impact and the identity of the body given by the matter.[[7]](#footnote-7) The conclusion of the quotation rejects the autonomous statute of universals, because the metaphysical determination of being proceeds only from real substances. Physics confirms the false metaphysics of *Modernorum*, which is the core of Averroes’s criticism of Avicenna. We find the same attitude later in the Great Commentary on the *Metaphysics* and further in the writing CMDA. The hypostatized effect of the first substance made by newly defined middle member of syllogism (*medium*) will play a key role in Grosseteste’s interpretation of the *Second Analytics* (ch. 3.1.1). The Latin West continues the eclipse of the first substance, which is accomplished in Avicenna’s metaphysics. The *individuum* became a thing predicated at the level of the first substance (*hoc animal*) and received the statute of the first substance through the categorical predication of species and individuals. These objective simulacra of the first substance received a new sense within the framework of the special kind of univocity. It creates the new kind of categorial predication, which the Middle Ages took over from Avicenna.

The second view of the emergence of objectivity follows the change in the development of meaning (*significatio*) constituted by Boethius. Modernity arises because it overlooked the difference between symbol and sign, which mentioned the original Aristotelian determination of language (*De interpretatione* 16a3–8). The modern nature of signification was created on the base of linguistic fallacy. Boethius’s translation in “*Commentarii in librum Aristotelis* Περὶ ἐρμενείας” no longer distinguishes literally twofold determination of signification. The original Greek text clearly defines the difference between “symbols” (σύμβολα) and “signs” (σημεία). Latin translation did not conceptually distinguish those two meanings and combined them into one expression called “*notae*.” The translation created a fatal ambiguity with respect to the original, which clearly distinguishes between *sūmbolon* and *semeíon*.

“Spoken words are symbols (σύμβολα, *notae*) of soul’s movements and written words are symbols of spoken words. Just as all people do not have the same writing, so their language is not the same; but things, of which the speech and writing are the primary signs (σημεία πρώτων, *primorum notae*), those are common to all, namely, as mental occurrences (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, *passio animae*) and as facts, whose imitation (ὁμοιώματα, *similitudines*) these expressions are, namely, of things.” [[8]](#footnote-8)

Activity of the soul produces at the level of abstraction the first signification, which bears a univocal character for all human beings (ταὐτὰ πᾶσι ὁμοιώματα). The signs are adequately related to the world of first substances at the level of intentional reception of the intellect (*species intelligibilis*) by formally given univocity (ὁμοιώματα ... πράγματα ταὐτά). The similarity clearly shows the primacy of the metaphysical dative. The existence of the real thing determines cognition in the mode of the original semantic unit that represents the past character of the first substance. This is indirectly contained in the cognition by following cognitive order (ὁμοιώματα—παθήματα—σημεία πρώτων—σύμβολα). Metaphysical semantics (and no longer Apollonian semeiotics) constitutes the fundamental level of meaning, thanks to the intentional cognition of the real world. The first substance acts formally and causally on animal and human cognition, which the writing *De anima* investigates. The emergence of meaning corresponds to the truth as *veritas*, that is, as the correspondence of things and intellect. Therefore, the cognition of the world starts with the intentionality and abstraction in the soul (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς). Thanks to the causality given in the mental act of cognition, the basis for the subsequent primary agreement arises. Language is primarily oriented towards the real thing (σημεῖα πρώτων). The emergence of semantic similarity is given by effective and formal causality. It is intentionally brought about by twofold diaphanum, therefore being settled at this level, it is common to all humans (ὁμοιώματα). The process of symbolization (σύμβολα) of mental acts begins at the level of the word established by human convention. According to *De anima*, Aristotelian symbolization begins at the second level of the intellectual diaphanum as *species intelligibilis*, which connects us to the real world on a general level (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The metaphysical semantics based on acts of recognition in the soul follows the metaphysical dative. The imposition of meaning as *quidditas* (τό τί ἦν εἶναι; OBJ I, ch. 1.1) fundamentally distinguishes the metaphysical semantics of original signs (*sémeia*), which are common to all humans, from symbolization by linguistic and other symbols (*sūmbola*). It is evident that the definition follows exactly two levels of mediation of intentionality, which the commentary CMDA clearly stated (*esse spirituale1–2*). The synthetic ability on the sensual level (*sensus communis*) is common to all humans and animals; symbolization, on the other hand, corresponds to the human intellect, which is given on the higher, immaterial level of cognition (*intellectio*). Aristotelian definition of language clearly explains why the life world enables communication between humans and animals. Symbolization has arisen through meaning, which has arisen through cultural or other arrangements, and is given by words, signals, signs, and symbols. The first signification is primary and formally the same for all living beings (*esse spirituale1*), the second is secondary and differentiated by cultural and linguistic agreement (*esse spirituale2*). Therefore, the symbolization by human language is not common to all human beings. Conversely, it is true that all bees of the world understand each other quite well, due to the direct connection of the first intentionality related to the sense organs. This fundamental distinction into the metaphysical semantics of the common world and the cultural symbolization of this common world has been lost in contemporary objective semiotics based on the meaning of the sign as *tertium ens*. Boethius’s translation combined the *sūmbola* and *sémeia* into one meaning (*notae*). He established a Pythian *Lichtung* of truth and untruth that founded postmodern semiotics, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of language. Boethius, as a connoisseur of Aristotle and Porphyry, knew very well that the hyparchical (i.e., semantic) position of the first substance establishes the causality of cognition. Thus, the first level of meaning proceeds in the causal universal mode of the *primae notae*. This is not the case of the secondary symbolic signification, which is arbitrarily determined by the given language. The second level is not directly determined by effective and formal causality, which is given by the diaphanum in the act of cognition from the direction of the external thing.

Let us now define the metaphysical dative according to *De interpretatione*. The real thing exists in the past character of the unique being. But the apophantic dative holds this absent and unique being of the real thing in its universal signification, which is taken up first “semantically” in the common intentionality and then “symbolically” expressed in the human language. The simulacrum of erroneously mixed *notae* came in the epoch of forgetfulness of being under active leadership of academic Furies. The modern *furor interpretandi* of poorly educated philosophers in the Latin West, in the mode of Aristotelian *apaideusía*, combined both levels of signification and symbolization into a common and therefore false metaphysical and logical meaning. The integration of the level of metaphysical signification and cultural symbolization into an objective meaning of the linguistic sign shaped the problematic path of modernity. The Aristotelian *sūmbolon* changed into an objective simulacrum because modernity absolutized the meaning of language as another form of *tertium ens*. The erroneous apprehension of classical semantics as postmodern semiotics blocked the metaphysical access to reality, which is common to all human beings. Language became an omnipotent instrument in the age of objective simulacra and blocked the metaphysical access to reality. There is no imposition of meaning due to the intentionality of the exposure of the sense of being from the front (*esse spirituale1*), which founds a common world of sense. The basic twofold meaning of semantics in *De interpretatione* became extinct in contemporary analytic and hermeneutic philosophy, which worships the omnipotence of language in the age of metaphysical nihilism. Boethius clearly distinguished both levels by the primary position of metaphysical semantics (*primae notae*). Modern and postmodern successors abolished that primary imposition. Real things, after all, have a completely different mode of existence than our language. The original level of common human cognition is not in speech, but in the semantic process of formally build perception and intentional production of meaning that concerns of commonly lived world of life. The primary semantic correspondence was defended by the CMDA through the interpretation of the threefold formal mediation with the help of the *perspicuum* and through the twofold figure of *diaffonum* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4).

The new nature of signification and predication came from the fact that Boethius’ interpretation of *De interpretatione* placed the accent on subjective meaning of the sign. In the Latin translation and interpretation of *De interpretatione*, the definition of signification was linked to the sign as such (*interpretatio est vox significativa per se ipsam aliquid significans*; ibid, p. 32.11). La phrase “*per se ipsam significans*” lost the connection with the real process of cognition, which is given by the imposition of the meaning from the first substance. Taken in Aristotelian perspective, it is quite correct, because the second level of signification as symbolic language already acts quite autonomously. The signification was hyparchically determined in *Categories*, that is, by actuality of the first substance. A properly created imposition at the level of general intentionality establishes the second level of supposition determined by the symbolization of human language. Signification in the modus “*per se ipsam*” is now tied exclusively to the sign as such that creates meaning and to the human capacity to understand that sign. But these nuances can only be understood by a critical metaphysics that, like the Commentator, distinguishes between the dual nature of the intellect and thus the dual nature of language as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. The act of signification given *per se* provides the first *Lichtung* for the modern concept of truth, which is given outside the process of cognition connected to the real world. Boethius abolished on lexical level (and not at all in his philosophy) the difference between the imposition and supposition of meaning. The imposition is made from the direction of the first substance and by the exposure of sense from the front. Supposition means that the general term stands for (*supponit pro*) any universal meaning. In this case, the signification in the mode “*per se ipsam*” means that universal meaning is autonomous and it does not need the external reality to be expressive and meaningful. However, univocal predication and scientific proof are established only in virtue of the imposition, since there must be causally given correspondence of knowledge and the reality. The commentary on *De interpretatione* established an ambivalent conception of signification because it combined both modes in the mode of ambiguity, as was the case in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. The terminus “*notae*” and the definition of the sign given “*per se*” shrouded the process of semantic correspondence. The metaphysical relation to reality founded by means of the metaphysical dative has become unclear. The modern definition of the sign does not need a triadic structure of the sign, which is in the original of *De interpretatione* 16a3‒8. The cognizing human creates the common semantic meaning of the world by agreement of the thing and the intellect. This intentional sense of the human life world is expressed symbolically in the order of language. The metaphysical, semantically given unity of the world fell out of the process of the modernly conceived signification. The veritative binding of semantics to reality is causally ensured by receptive components of intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). The receptive intellect universally ensures the reception of the external world, which is at first sensually recognized. This key function of *intellectus possibilis* was revealed by Alfarabi, rejected by Avicenna and precisely restored by Averroes. Aristotle’s and Boethius’s translation draw attention in the very next sentence (*De int*. 16a9) to the fact that the quoted passage from *De int*. 16a3–8 must be read in connection with the writing *De anima* (*de his quidem dictum est in his quæ sunt dicta de anima*; ibid, p. 3.11–12). Aristotelians paid quite close attention to the internal hierarchy and dependence of the argumentation in *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The latter interpretation of signification of Modernism and Postmodernism bypassed those important distinctions translated by Boethius. The original ambivalence became a new sophistical clarity; the fundamental line of argumentation of writing *De anima* and *De interpretatione* was annulled. Western thinking lost at the very beginning of its own way the authentic connection to the substance and to the founding event (*Ereignis*) which determines the agreement between the real thing and its cognition. This particular event determined, in the form of metaphysical Lethe, the epochal *Lichtung* of Latin metaphysics with regard to the first substance. Modernity displaced the original meaning of the metaphysical dative, which is given by connection “*semeía prótón – homoiómata.*” The new cause of meaning is no longer the first substance as subject, but human subject and his language. The new order of the world arises by exposing the being from behind, that is, from the perspectice of the human subject. The question of subjective truth (*verum*) is reduced to modern certainty and correctness (*certum, rectum*). The subjective *veritas* ties primarily to the correctness of the subject’s action and to the certainty given by this action. The human subject imitates demiurgic dispositions and the will of the divine demiurge in the mode of certainty and rightness. The introduction of demiurgic analogy gave rise to a new ontotheological system of metaphysics. Anselm of Canterbury, through this concept of signification, introduces the Neoplatonic concept of truth as *rectitudo*. He renewed Avicenna′s nature of truth associated with the certainty of thought in the human subject. Truth determined by the subject tied to changed concept of meaning finally established a new metaphysic within the framework of *via Modernorum*.

The third step follows the development of *tertium ens* as substantial form of quantity and volume that are set in the framework of mathematical analogy. The whole dispute begins with the nominal determination of being as grammatically given nouns. The grammar teacher Priscian, in the second half of the 5th century, defines the nominal meaning of the noun in the framework of rhetorical discourse.[[9]](#footnote-9) Priscian related the basic definition of the noun (*proprium*) undifferentiated to the noun and the quality (*proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare*). The definition incorporates both the general theory of signification given in the introduction of *De interpretatione* and the categorial predication from the writing *Categories*, which ties in the definition to the noun and to the accident of quality. The blending of both teaching concerning *Categories* and *De interpretatione* passed into scholastic grammar. Equivocal “categorial” predication emerged, which falsely claimed to be Aristotelian categorial univocity. The classical definition determining the nominal status of substance (*substantiam significare*) was remade in debates during the first half of the 12th century. At that time, the status of logical judgment (*enuntiabile*) was redefined in the context of a categorical predication.[[10]](#footnote-10) Bernard of Chartres (†1124) codified the difference between Priscian and Aristotle in the double meaning of signification related to the substance (*significatio substantialis*) and the accidental (*significatio accidentalis*). The accidental signification received hypostatized status, which was determined independently of the second substance. The predication outside the hyparchical status of the first substance triggered a new dispute about the status of the first and second substance. The first phase of this controversy was described in the introductory section, regarding the twofold nature of substance in the writing *Isagoge*. The signification in the teaching of Neoplatonic grammarians replaced the categorical bond between the first and the second substance. They hypostatized the sign as such, according to Boethius’s definition given above (*per se ipsam significans*).

The first change towards the nominalist view contained in Priscian’s definition includes an anonymous commentary on the *Institutiones*, written at the end of the 11th century under the title *Glosulae*. The author deliberately extends the conception of substance outside Aristotelian categories and outside Priscian’s definition thanks to the new concept of “*quantitas*” (Mews 1992). The transformation of accidents towards a new being of the third kind shows a similar development as in the case of Avicenna’s univocal status of genus, which became superior even to the first substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). A classic example of accidental determination of quantity is provided by the *Categories*, where the primary determination of whiteness is related to the second substance (*Cat*. 3b19). Boethius’s quoted commentary on the *Categories* adds a new, absolutely conceived determination (*qualitas per se*) to the actual and categorical determination of whiteness (*determinatio circa substantiam qualitatis*).[[11]](#footnote-11) This new, *per se* given determination of whiteness was consciously excluded by Boethius from the both individually and categorically given substance. As far as Boethius was concerned, this verbal, *per se* given determination of quality did not play a major role for him. The system of categorial predication *per prius* and *per posterius* was established according to the *Categories* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3) and did not allow any determination of being of the third kind. But the nomination introduced by him, given for the category of quantity named *simpliciter*, will have a great future in the later schools of *Nominales*. The new differentiation of grammatical meaning is given in the commentary on Priscian’s grammar called *Notae Dunelmenses*. The author (it is probably William of Champaux, †1121) sees a contradiction between the name and reality.[[12]](#footnote-12) The author brought into the act of denomination a hidden meaning, which had not existed there before. The meaning arises in one way (*aliter*) grammatically and in the other way (*aliter*) within the relation to reality. Thus, the signification of substance separated from its hyparchical function given by the relation to reality, and the category of substance acquired an autonomous meaning. Through this dilemma begins the further development of metaphysics, which follows the interpretation of the wiriting *Isagoge* according to Avicenna. This direction was resolutely rejected by Averroes. The Latin West repeated the preceding gigantomachy concerning the substance, but in a new historical configuration.

## 1.2 Truth as *rectitudo* (Anselm of Canterbury)

The dispute between Abelard and the school of *Nominales* represents the first fundamental dispute in the Latin West, when the statute of substance and of truth were in play. We leave the title “*Nominales*” in Latin to separate this school from unclear designation of so-called Nominalists. The theory of truth as a correspondence proposed by Aristotelian Abelard contrasts with the view of Anselm of Canterbury (†1109). He became a key figure in the next round of the dispute over substance. When two people say the same thing, it need not mean the same thing, as the dispute over the definition of truth between Abelard and Anselm shows. The work *Dialogus de veritate* (about 1083) initiated Neoplatonic hierarchy of forms. God incorporates the certainty of being that guarantees truth as eternal rightness of essences. From that higher level of truth proceeds the contingent truth at the level of creation, as the correspondence of human cognition and existing things. The correctness is not primarily related to the human cognition, but to autonomous values set in the framework of the divine order. The following quotation from the conversation between the Master and the Disciple represents the *Lichtung* of the future objectivity, because it establishes a new determination of truth.

“Master: Everything is truly so (*vero est*), as it should be (*quod debet esse*), as it is correctly given (*recte est*). Disciple: It cannot be otherwise. Master: Then everything that is, there is rightly given. Disciple: There can be no other conclusion. Master: Truth and rightness are given in the essence of things (*in rerum essentia*), because things really are what they are in the highest truth (*quod sunt in summa veritate*). Then it is certain that truth is the rightness of things (*certum est veritatem rerum esse rectitudinem*).” [[13]](#footnote-13)

The things are called into existence by the will of the Creator. Existence of things forms truth as validation of their existence (*quod debet esse, recte est*). The truth consists in the fact that the created things are what they are in reality. The production of creation grounds the first determination of deontological truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. The meaning and the truth do not come from first substances in reality, but from God. It is a typical case of the exposure of being from behind. The scenario of new metaphysics is set in the framework of ontotheology that is a scholastic version of Neoplatonism. The truth as *veritas* is connected with the new role of the subject. Heidegger presented it for the first version of metaphysics in the Plato’s doctrine of truth (OBJ I, ch. 1). The ultimate guarantor of deontological truth (*debet esse*) determined by God is not the correspondence of real thing and intellect, but the fullness of being taken into the view of the highest truth (*quod sunt in summa veritate*). The ideal template of this ontotheological construction of truth existed in the Falsafa through al-Kindīs participation of beings in the supreme Good (*ifāda*; OBJ I, ch. 2.1). Anselm uses the same model for the creation of objectivity in the scholasticism as the Neoplatonic school of Falsafa represented by al-Kindī and Avicenna. The existence of things is given in God as the supreme truth. This primary fullness of being in God provides the necessary certainty for truth given as rightness of things (*certum est veritatem rerum esse rectitudinem*). Truth as *rectitudo* is detached from the process of sensual cognition. It became the measure of the fullness of creation, which is given in ever higher and therefore also more truthful hierarchy of essences considered directly in the being of the existing (*veritas et rectitudo idcirco sunt in rerum essentia*). Truth as *rectitudo* received a similar primacy over *veritas* as Platonic idea of the Good over the idea of the Being. Aristotelian theory of truth as correspondence has only secondary importance in comparison to the fullness of ontotheological truth of Being in itself. The debate between the Master and the Disciple shows that the definition of truth establishes a fundamental difference between eternal rightness and accidental truth. The concept of truth is tied to Aristotelian conception of truth (*veritas*) but indirectly; the Neoplatonic nature of truth as an unchanging measure (*rectitudo*) determines the rightness of accidental things. Anselm’s work incorporates the truth according to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* into the new definition.[[14]](#footnote-14) The first proposition connects the correctness and the truth (*hoc rectitudinem et veritatem*) in the framework of signification related to actual being of things (*significat esse quod est*). Truth is bound to predication within the framework of the correctly formed logical judgment (*rectitudo et veritas enuntiationis*). Both terms determine the definition of truth in terms of Aristotelian truth as deductive judgment based on the existence of things (*enuntiatio*). The truth of the scientific judgment (*veritas enuntiationis*) has a meaning given in the language. The last level of truth determines *ad hoc* given statements that refer to accidental things recognized in the empiric way. In contrast to senses, the truth as deontological *rectitudo* resides in the eternal realm. It is related to the Neoplatonic Good, which has the normative and sovereign character as the ultimate measure of all that exists. Neoplatonist Anselm places the Aristotelian definition of truth in the order of contingent truths. He put truth as *rectitudo* in the realm of permanent values associated with the divine order.[[15]](#footnote-15) The correctness stands in the order of being on the level of the eternal truths (*secundum rectitudinem, quæ semper est*). The first proposition of the quotation excludes the fullness of truth as *rectitudo* for the material things because they come into existence in an accidental way (*non est rectitudo in significatione, quia tunc incipit esse*). Created entities have a primary signification in thought and truth as agreement between thing and reason; but they lack the eternal truth. The higher truth as *rectitudo* determines the lower signification (*significatio tunc fit secundum rectitudinem*). The place of categorical predication *per prius* is exactly reversed from the order set in *Categories*. Hyparchical predication rests in divine Being as the sovereign measure of truth. Anselm, in agreement with Avicenna, relates *rectitudo*-truth primarily to meaning (*recta significatio est*) that establishes truth in itself (*constat esse rectitudinem*). Truth is given directly in itself, by means of the direct contemplation of the eternal essence in the mode of Avicenna’s “*equinitas tantum”* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Again, the Neoplatonic interpretation of truth according to *Met*. 1026a33–b2) can be seen, where being and univoc predicated truth are on the same level (OBJ I, ch. 2.1). Moreover, the definition included in the concept of *rectitudo* extended the concept of truth beyond the existential propositions. These are categorically conceived, that is, bound to the being and non-being of things in reality. The definition of truth, according to mystical Augustianism, is directly linked to the act of understanding and to the meaning of words.

Anselm, independently of Avicenna’s system and at the same time, established a similar form of metaphysics in the Latin West. Put in the framework of the truth as *rectitudo*, he the sense of being was separated from sensual experience. Anselm fulfilled the program of Avicenna’s *denudatio*. Anselm opted for the truth of things in their archetypal rightness given by the divine creative will. Truth as *rectitudo* received a metaphysical statute within the ontotheological construction given by the Neoplatonic ideal of all existing things (*manifestum est earum omnium unam solam esse rectitudinem*; *Dialogus de Veritate*, 486C). Avicenna, in order to establish rightness and certainty on a divine level, did not use demiurgic will like Anselm, but the purely philosophical concept of second intentionality and comitation (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Both Falsafa and Scholastic Neoplatonists agree that meaning arises in the archetypal sphere of the divine will and intellect, where the normative being of the world is constituted. Subsequent and merely contingent existence of things in reality has a universal, eternal, and necessary warrant to justify the individual act of existing. Leibniz updates this view through the principle of sufficient reason for postmodernism. Anselm’s conception of truth inaugurated in the Latin West the process of eclipse of the first substance because of the demiurgic will of the subject (*Seinsvergessenheit*). A new branch of Neoplatonism arose in the Western scholasticism that followed the legacy of Falsafa. It advocates the truth as a direct illumination of the intellect given by disclosure of being from behind. The eclipse of the first substance in the mode of Anselm’s modern *Irrtum* was criticized in principle by the Aristotelian Abelard, who also rejected Anselm’s purely nominal *significatio* for the correspondence theory of truth. The following chapter analyzes his brilliant distinction of categorical statements according to the imposition and supposition. Truth as *rectitudo* given by the supposition of meaning established beyond real things has for Abelard only an equivocal value. The supposition of such a meaning remains merely at the level of the word (*oratio*, *nominatio*). A meaning determined only from thought has no univocal meaning, as it is necessary for categorial determination on the level of the second substance. The actuality of the first substance alone establishes the univocal determination of truth due to the imposition of meaning from reality to the second substance.

The key step to the objectively conceived substance of the third kind is contained in Anselm’s writing *Monologion* (1076). The chapter 65 defines the difference between the inner being of the divine Trinity and its expressions towards creation. In the Falsafa, the rector of the university in Baghdad at that time, the Jacobite Christian Ibn Adi (OBJ I, ch. 2.2) dealt with a similar problem. Anselm has to determine the character of similarity (*similitudo*) between the Creator and the creation in such a way to save the divine unknowability, and at the same time to bring it into the knowable relation towards us.[[16]](#footnote-16) The hermeneutics is interested in the difference between the notions “*proprietas expressa*” and “*proprietas designata*.” We do not see God as he exists for his own sake (*non videmus per suam proprietatem*). Therefore, we do not know his internal properties, which are directly bound to his substance (*per essentiae suae proprietatem expressa*). But we are able to perform, in the order of language and similarity, the proper designation of divine properties albeit in the mode of dissimilarity (*per aliud designata*). Expressivity describes God as a thing in itself; designation determines God in his phenomenality for us. This gave rise to a new variant of “*esse ad*” in the Latin West, which was introduced in the Falsafa by Ibn Adi. The modernists transferred the similarity of God and creation in the mode of “*proprietas designata”* into a new form of syllogism, where the middle member is given purely universally and outside the relation to the real substance. The difference between expressivity and designation completes the eclipse of the first substance. It became as unknowable in its essence as God is in his being. Anselm defines the first substance in the mode of truth as rightness and certainty only with the help of the essence (*per essentiae proprietatem expressa*), which is contained as pure knowledge in thinking. La connaissance of the real world took up the demiurgic divine truth as the *conditio sine qua non* for natural connaisance in the philosophy and sciences. The next generations of modernists translated this ontotheology directly in the concept of Aristotelian science. The introduction of Oxfordian Fallacy resulted in a complete eclipse of the first substance in modern metaphysics (ch. 3.1.1). Rufus of Cornwall let the divine inconceivability to determine the first substance given in reality, which became as unknowable as God (*ipsam ineffabilem persistere*, ch. 3.3.4). Expressivity separated from the unrecognizable first substance given in reality, see Kant’s notion of “*Noumenon*.” The first substance was predicated with the help of universally given hypostatized properties. Rufus makes the insight into such mystical first substance the next version of the objective being (*scibile*, ch. 3.3.2). Anselm’s followers in the first half of the 13th century no longer needed first substance as defined in the writing *Categories*. Modernists reduced hyparchical substance to a collection of accidents and various transcendental entities created *ad hoc*. The designation of the first substance is accomplished by the collection of hypostatized accidents unrelated to the second substance. This modern designation of the atomic substance of the third kind is later determined by the terms “*collectio”* and “*collecta*,” which emerges at the end of the 12th century in the Porretan school of *Nominales* (ch. 1.5). The collection of various properties and cognitions replaced the hyparchical function of the first substance in the school of *Modernorum*. Modern correctness (*rectitudo*) guarantees the divine and later only the human subject. The next generation of Avicennists including postmodern Descartes and Husserl ignored the existence of the first substance. They define the first substance with the help of direct seeing of its essence and by exact descriptions of their gnostic visions. The postmodern essence came into being in the framework of the noematic collection and definitely displaced the first real substance. Neoplatonic modernism and postmodernism shifted the definition of truth beyond hyparchical relation determined by the existing real thing. Neoplatonic univocally conceived essence was inserted into the analogy of the divine and the human will. It combined the *significatio* and the categorial *enuntiatio* into the schema of ontotheology. The truth as *rectitudo* refers in a univocal way both to the statute of the species and to the existence of the first substance. It has been replaced by collection of various kinds of *tertium ens*. The truth tied to the occurrence and predication of the first substance was first displaced by Anselm and especially by his followers in Porretan schools. Averroes defined Avicennist modernity by the term “obscurity” (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). He used this term to describe the eclipse of the first substance among contemporaries who continued the interpretation of atomic substance according to the Neoplatonic line of Porphyry (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The dispute between Anselm and Abelard repeats this gigantomachy about substance in the Latin West. Abelard strictly adheres to *Metaphysics* and *Organon* in interpreting the truth, since he needs a correspondence between reason and real existing things. The modern form of metaphysics is given for the first time in Anselm by the fact that the Aristotelian correspondence between reason and the concrete existing thing (*hoc aliquid*) had become a partial untruth. It had been replaced by the higher truth of mystical Augustianism and Neoplatonism. Due to the contingency of the first substance, it was necessary to establish an eternal and permanent truth as demiurgic and voluntaristic rightness of the ultimate subject that exists beyond accidental being of actual things. By virtue of his absolutely or relatively given will and existence, the divine or human subject, through creative activity, guarantees the claim of existent entities to be true in the mode of *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. The will of the demiurge has primary character for the determination of the objective being. It replaced the primary position of the real first existing substance in *Categories*. The foundation of the truth is not established from the first substance, but from the divine and human demiurge subject. The new place of truth in the subject (*ortus scientiarum*) created a new hermeneutic triad “*veritas—certitudo—rectitudo*,” which defines the *Ge-Stell* of being in a new way (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). For the classical metaphysics, one single determination of the truth was sufficient to keep the correspondence; the modernity needs three determinations of the truth and all of them are highly problematic. The metaphysics gets the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth on the basis of the first principles that make foundation of mystical and later objective view (*certitudo*). It reflects as a mirror (*speculum*) the cosmic order (*rectitudo*). Such speculative similarity of two demiurgic subjects is proclaimed as modern *veritas*. Done in such a way, the historial determination of metaphysics was accomplished in the mode of Heidegger’s *Irrtum*.

Anselm gives the answer of truth as rightness (*rectitudo*) according to Seneca’s *voluntas recta*, in the realm of morality as active cognition. Truth is determined by the question of the good as the object of the will. The conformity of the will to the divine Good represents a different form of truth than the Aristotelian cognition of the real world in the framework of the intellect. The freedom of the will is not inserted in the relation to the ruling intellect, as it is in Aristotelianism. According to Anselm, something as true is not primarily determined by the Aristotelian definition of truth as correspondence between sensory and intellectual cognition and the thing. The definition of the will in the *Nicomachean Ethics* respects the cognition of intellect and directs it to singular dimensions of the good, which is practically cognized and desired with respect to us (λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ, *E.N*. 1140b5). The will does not determine itself because it needs the intellect to be determined. The intellectual cognition adequately predicates the unique being of the real thing. Truth as Averroes’s *proportio* takes the cognition as determinacy of the intellect and the senses based on the real causality given at the level of the first substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The Latin Neoplatonism conceived the will universally with regard to God and to man and thus gave another dimension to the eclipse of the first substance. Instead of the passively discerning intellect, the actively creative subject enters the scene. Modernity keeps its own certainty to give to the truth the definitive and ultimate measure. The measure of truth as rightness is determined by the divine, later only by the human will in the mode of its unrestricted or restricted *potestas*. What the sovereign will orders that must be done precisely in that way; therefore, all things created by this kind of deontology are necessarily true. The introduction of the will as deontological and ontological category determines the nature of what every being should be with regard to demiurgic desire of an supreme subject. The entity that exists and is recognized in its *quidditas*, has become a secondary case. Anselm inaugurated the epoch of the eclipse of the first substance in the Latin West. This confirms the above-mentioned deontological definition of truth-*rectitudo* (*quod debet esse, recte est*). Truth is primarily determined by the demiurgic will and not by real existence of things. The Western subject, under the leadership of Christian, mystic and pious Furies became the mythological creator of truth. The following matrices show that this deontology of truth as rightness was first created by modern God. After his death in the 19th century, postmodern *illuminati* became the only guardians of mythological truth. The elevation of the will to the guarantor of truth is contained in the dialogue *De libero arbitrio*, in which Anselm linked the human will to the truth. This willed rightness subsists in the human will, as well as in the world and in God.

“And therefore any freedom is a certain capacity to power (*potestas*); this freedom of the will is the possibility of serving the rightness of the will, and this because of the truth that is contained in the freedom of the will.” [[17]](#footnote-17)

The possibility of truth is given directly in human freedom as the fundamental possibility of man (*omnis libertas est potestas*). The fullness of freedom is defined in the possibility of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). Free will is what it wants to be and is not limited by anything else. Its limitation is given only by the Creator, who has shaped the nature of the will so that Augustine’s mystical *voluntas* is immanently directed towards God as the supreme Good (*propter ipsam rectitudinem*). The ipseity of the will constitutes the identity of the person in the sense of its original truthfulness. Ipseity based on the rightness of the will contains the core of the sovereignty of the Western subject. That kind of will has the capacity to be true in itself in view of the rightness freely found (*potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis*). The rightness of the free will establishes conformity to truth, which is given as conformity to reality. Anselm’s voluntaristic determination of truth as rightness is not given in terms of the cognition of the first substance, but in terms of the demiurgic figure of the creative will. Human or divine will contains in itself the essential demiurgic truth. Such truth is immanent because of the reference to God and it exists without relation to anything else. The theory of truth based on the immanently right will represent a fundamental change in the concept of truth set in the framework of correspondence theory according to Aristotle. Anselm gives full demiurgic freedom and truth only to God. God’s will is absolutely creative and establishes the normative character of moral truth, which retains its validity in all circumstances, i.e., even outside the *ad hoc* given predicative truth as *veritas*. The truth of modernity, following on from Anselm’s heritage, is determined by the inner relation of the will related to itself and its own rightness. Finally, the moral, philosophical, and theological definition of truth as rightness is entirely subjective and thus also freely given, which the Franciscan Olivi has elaborated (OBJ III, ch. 5.1.2). Anselm anchors the Neoplatonic conception of truth, which, after Avicenna’s importation into the Latin West, was invoked by the founders of objectivity in the second third of the thirteenth century.

The ontotheological constitution of truth caused even double ambiguity concerning the classical definition of Aristotelian *veritas*. First, Anselm blurred the distinction between truth given as a categoric statement (*enuntiatio*) and merely nominal meaning of the word (*significatio*). New predication got the validity by omitting the real relations of first substances. Its fundament is the demiurgic sovereignty of the divine will. Second, as far as the definition of truth as *rectitudo* is concerned, true statement is established already on the level of nominally given word. The definition of truth at the level of verbal assertion is dogmatic in its nature. Such kind of truth can be made but in the framework of ontotheology because it is linked to the eternal and immutable divine will. This twofold ambiguous definition of truth established a new relation of intellect to reality that is conceived in Neoplatonic terms. The truth as *rectitudo* makes meaning of the world to be exposed from behind, that is, from the direction of the divine judgment and will. This kind of truth was adopted by Porretans in the schools of *Logica Modernorum* and finally by the first Latin objectivists around the year 1240. The truth as *rectitudo* makes the correspondence between hypostatized species and pure forms, and not on the level of real substance. It asserted itself immediately in the next generation, thanks to Gilbert de La Porrée as eminent representative of the cathedral school from Laon. Abelard had left this Neoplatonic school at the very beginning of his intellectual career. The dispute between the univocity of Abelard and Anselm’s ambivalent theory of signification and ambivalent conception of truth opens the subsequent conflict between the first and the second Averroism, which will be shown in the further matrices. The logical schools inspired by Porretans abolished Aristotelian predication based on the causality of first substances. Because of an unclear correspondence, the first modernity of the Latin West no longer distinguished between the imposition of meaning from the direction of real substances and the supposition given merely from the direction of the intellect. Verbal assertions got an absolute meaning, and their supposition separated itself from the real world. New signification has been derived from the “substance—*individuum*” which pretends to be the first real substance. This being of the third kind became a mythological source of objective meaning. The ontotheological absolution of thinking from the first substance got the central position in the modern metaphysics, which led to the foundation of Western objectivity.

## 1.3 Truth as *adaequatio* (Peter Abelard)

Abelard’s letter to an unknown bishop, written sometime around 1120 under the sign G. (PL 178, 357–72), shows the first philosophical dispute about *tertium ens* in the Latin West. The bishop G. was asked to find competent ecclesiastical judges to decide in the controversy between Abelard and his former teacher Roscelin. The interpretation of *Isagoge* was again at stake and Abelard stood against Roscelin (†1225) and against Gilbert de La Porrée (†1154). Let us return to the beginning of this confrontation concerning the cognition of reality, which erupted anew after the year 1250. Boethius, in his work *Liber de divisione*, establishes the difference between the first substance existing *simpliciter* in reality and its cognition in mind. The first substance cannot be divided in reality because its existence is given *per se*. The division with the help of the universals in the framework of the Tree of Porphyry is possible, but it entails a different order of being than the thing existing in reality. What is indivisible in reality can be universally divisible by the people in Europe or in Africa. The analyzed part of the writing *Isagoge* has shown that the whole (*totum*) summarized in the term “man” (*homo*) expresses only analogical similarity between the singular and the universal nature of being (ch. 1.1). The same proceeding applies to the soul, because it exists as a form of the body and at the same time it is the place where the universals arise thanks to the act of intellectual cognition. The real human being cannot be divided, on the contrary to abstract faculties of the soul. Boethius made the first distinction between two formulations of the soul, existential and universal.[[18]](#footnote-18) He separated the determination of the soul as real unity (*totum*) and distinguished this whole from the formally and abstractly conceived faculties of the soul (*partes enim hae animae*). First, there is an indivisible entity that ensures the act of unique subsistence of the soul (*totum integrum*). This soul in this body is not a generically given unity of any parts (*non est anima horum genus*). Secondly, there is a formal perspective concerning acts of the soul given either in the framework of abstracted parts (*partes animae*) or of abstracted potency and abilities (*in aliqua potestate et virtute*). Given such a case, it is possible to divide the soul within universal determination of specific faculties and potentialities, because they form the totality of abstracted properties (*totius divisionis*). From the preceding analysis, it is evident that this twofold signification of unity (*totum*) cannot be taken univocally. Boethius linked the determination of the soul to classical difference between the first substance given *per se* and categorical determinations of the second substance. These determinations are made in the framework of Aristotelian division (διαίρεσις) that considers universally given *genus* and *species* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The same difference was present in the philosophy of Averroes that separated the notion of intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The soul as entelechic form of this body is not the same thing as formally determined genus of the soul in the intellect. The history of Western objectivity and later Averroism begins with the confrontation between Abelard and his critics concerning the nature of metaphysics. The meaning of terms “*totum universale*” and “*totum integrum*” made the point of fundamental discord (Jolivet 1992). The standpoint of metaphysical truth and untruth (*Lichtung*) that established the objectivity in Latin West is hidden in the dispute concerning the clarification of both terms. Modernists in Neoplatonic cathedral schools resorted to ecclesiastical power to impose a new kind of *tertium ens*. Abelard resolutely defended Aristotelianism of Porphyry, let us quote his writing *Dialectica*.

“These differences establish the meaning of the real Socrates and the man in general, such as being rational, being mortal, and others, which, however, are universal qualities and not singular determinations. Therefore, the first kind of rationality makes substantial property of real Socrates and not that of human being in general. Therefore, all forms that make individual properties of real substances, also belong to species due to their specific determinations. Therefore, they cannot have a unique character in the reality, even if all calumniators claim this.” [[19]](#footnote-19)

Abelard claims that general determinations of the second substance have universal nature and they are separated from singular things in reality (*universales sunt, non singulares*). The first substance has no differences; it exists as a whole and it is indivisible. The formal determinations (*rationalitas, mortalitas*) do not refer to existential determinations of real Socrates (*non homini*), but entail generic and species definitions made out on the level of the second substance (*Socrati substantialis est*). Universal notions describe “Socrates” in the universal mode, which is fundamentally different from singular and actual existence of the first substance. The act of subsistence in reality makes one entity to be different from the other. The singular thing does not contain differences thanks to substantial simplicity and due to the act of unique existence. The definition of individual being taken in universal form does not involve actual first substances, but general meaning presented in the framework of species (*substantiales etiam sint speciebus secundum species*). Abelard excludes every kind of univocity concerning the first and the second substance, which would establish some form of *tertium ens*. His position corresponds to definition of the first hyparchical substance in the *Categories* and in the *Metaphysics* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The notion of the first and second substance cannot be univocal because their determination has a different value. Either the substance exists as a universal entity in the Tree of Porphyry or as a single thing in its actual existence that is given outside of human mind. Abelard says clearly to all intellectual manipulators (*absque omni calumnia*) that all differences within the Tree of Porphyry refer to *species* and *genus*, where a different kind of differentiation takes place. It does not contain causal effects between actual substances existing in reality. The writing *Dialectic* maintains the fundamental difference between two concepts of indivisible entity, because there is twofold nature of being (*aliud secundum substantiam, aliud secundum formam*).[[20]](#footnote-20) The categorial determination of unity exists with regard to the first substance (*'totum' autem aliud secundum substantiam*). The first actual substance establishes atomic, i.e., not further divisible general meaning in mind (*individuum*). It is different from the unique reality of the external thing, which exists for its own sake (*substantia*). That critical philosopher read Porphyry’s *Isagoge* as brilliantly as Boethius did. Abelard knew well that the second substance is given universally and univocally at the level of *genus*. It keeps but analogy and resemblance to the hylemorphic composition (*proportionaliter consistit genere*; *In Porph. Isag*. III. 10). The differentiation given in thought and the differences between real things represent two different forms of existence that must be upheld in the true predication (*secundum utrumque dicitur*). When we speak about the first substance, we mean the existing thing; when we speak about the individual, we mean a universal that has almost no meaning of its own. The difference between the abstract individual and the real substance has a principled value for the critical scholasticism. Objectively thinking *illuminati* educated in the school of Avicenna see a being of the third kind instead; they imagine that they mean the hyparchical first substance. Abelard makes part of classical metaphysics school founded by Boethius. He read Aristotle through genuine Aristotelianism and not through Neoplatonism. The univocal determination of substance guards integral whole of the thing that is understood as the imposition of hyparchical meaning that concerns reality (*secundum comprehensionem quantitatis, quod dicitur integrum*). This imposition of meaning is expressed as *univoce* taken categoric supposition of substantial general determination in the context of universal meaning (*secundum diffusionem communis essentiae, quod universale est*). The notion “*totum integrum*” taken in such an exclusive value, makes it evident that the corpse is not a human being. The man (*homo*) is predicated from the point of view of the imposition of meaning determined by hyparchical and first real substance. After the introduction of Averroes’s philosophy in the Latin West, new controversy tried to solve determination of the term “*totum autem—hoc animal*” that was issued by Boethius (ch. 1.1). The difference between “*totum integrum*” and “*totum universale*” has fundamental character as far as the gigantomachy concerning substance in the Latin West was concerned. After the year 1220, Blund’s school redefines a similar dispute about the status of the corpse, taking the side of freshly imported Averroes’s writing contesting Avicenna’s metaphysics (ch. 2.2.1). Hermeneutics take Abelard to be a contemporary of Averroes, and not only in a purely historic sense.

The hermeneutics of objectivity established the first historical form of modern *Irrtum* (Heidegger) in the early Scholasticism. From now on, it has begun the era of the forgetfulness of being concerning the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The difference between general predication and actual existence of the thing necessarily led Abelard to adopt a different concept of truth than in Anselm’s philosophy. Abelard refused one univocal truth defined in the framework of dubious ontotheology. He introduced strict distinction between the speech given only verbally (*oratio*) and the categorical statement (*enuntiatio*) based on a categorical predication related to existing things in the world. Abelard therefore did not accept the Augustinian primacy of the will. The definition of truth on the basis of sound and natural reason must be primarily a philosophical and not a theological matter. Citing Boethius, Abelard advocates classical theory of the will, which is determined from the direction of intellectual understanding of the good. The good, in turn, is determined by exposure of being from the front, since the first meaning comes from the sensual cognition. The human volition needs intellectual recognition of some good to be activated.[[21]](#footnote-21) Abelard defends the Aristotelian theory of truth, which had been handed over to the West by Averroes in the mode of *proportio* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The writing *Dialectic* rejects merely nominally founded meaning, because the imposition of meaning from reality is not the same as an act of supposition in mind. There is twofold determination of indivisible entities, since meaning in thought and existence in reality establish two different kinds of predication. The house has a unique being as the first substance in reality; but the meaning of the house signifies universally and potentially. From the point of view of signification, these are two entirely different operations that are distinguished by terms *impositio* and *suppositio*. The imposition of meaning goes from the direction of the real thing to abstracting intellect. The thing in hyparchical mode per prius grounds fundamental relation to reality in the mode of similarity. Let us recall original difference in *De int*. 16a3–8 between the primacy of the imposition of meaning, existence of real things and their secondary symbolization in language (ch. 1.1). The triadic structure of signification proceeds from cognition defined according to *De anima*. Meaning arises from intentionality given in the soul that is based on formal causality. Intentional cognition made by *intellectus possibilis* is formally given in the same way in all human beings. It establishes original similarity of things and intellect (ὁμοιώματα). That primary sense of the world is accomplished in the framework of universally intended meaning (σημεία πρώτων). Intentions of reality are the same for everybody, thanks to threefold mediation of *diaphanum* that is based on potentially given causality. But on the next level of synthesis, there is a different symbolization established on individual and linguistic level. In contrast to *Modernorum*, Abelard read the writing *De interpretatione* according to Aristotle’s indication, that is, as related to the treatise *De anima*. The imposition and the supposition concerns either the single real entity (*totum integrum*), or the universal concept in mind (*totum universale*). There is no identity of the first and the second substance, but only a similarity of them, because both substances possess generically different modes of existence. True correspondence of categorical statements concern but specifically and generically created second substance. The imposition is not the supposition. The omission of these fundamentals that founded classical metaphysics led to gross errors of modernists. Predication must follow the direction, from where it comes to the generation of first meaning in the intellect (*Vor-blickbahn*).

“It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the term ‘to make a meaning’ (*significare*) is applied in different ways. Either it is meant in such a way that meaning arises in thought (*intellectum generat*); or in another way, when expressions are truthfully assigned to the things about which they are stated (*modo vero circa omnia quibus est impositum*). This imposition must be upheld at the first place because it is the primary and proper terminus for signification…” [[22]](#footnote-22)

Only the exposure of meaning coming from the front, from the direction of the first substance, establishes a kind of categorical predication that is required for scientific proof. True statement follows Aristotelian metaphysical dative, because the past character of the existing thing must be adequately upheld in the predication. Once again, the twofold type of categorical predication is at play in the twofold mode *per prius* and per posterius (*Cat*. 2a14–15). The distinction between the categorical and nominal predication established the important difference between the imposition of meaning from the direction of the first substance (*substantia significata*) and the supposition. Supposition is given in the framework of merely verbal signification (*vox substantiam significatam*). Logical meaning based on supposition (*aequivoce*) is not metaphysical meaning based on imposition (*univoce*). We find this analysis of language in Abelard’s commentary on *Categories*. It is found in the second part of his *Logic* recommended for philosophical beginners (*Logica ingredientibus*). The difference concerns the determination of being in terms of hylemorphic substance (*complexum*) or its universal meaning (*incomplexum*).[[23]](#footnote-23) We cannot state the truth about things on the level of judgment rooted in reality (*secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur*), but only the truth concerning facts given in the intellect. Then the imposition of meaning is of fundamental importance, because it can be conceived either from the direction of things in reality or from the direction of their meaning made in mind. The univocal predication entails only the imposition, since it is made by exposure of universal signification taken from the front, from the direction of the first substance.

“Therefore it is evident that second substances mean univocally first substances (*secundae substantiae de primis univoce praedicantur*). The naming and the definition are given as substance and so it makes the difference.” [[24]](#footnote-24)

The first substances establish univocal signification of second substances, and the definition maintains that fact by specific difference of both kinds of substance. The univocal predication is true only in the case if the second substance fully signifies the first substance (*univoce praedicantur*). This imposition of meaning from the direction of the first real substance is called “categorical predication” in the hyparchical mode *per prius* mentioned in *Categories* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). When the first substance is adequately put in this universal relation, the nominal definition carries the categorical and univocal meaning of genus, species, and their differences. Now, let us reverse the perspective in order to predicate the universal supposition according to *Cat*. 2a14–15. We get a new type of predication *per prius*, because the dialectician takes the side of universal meaning to establish a genuine relation to the first substance. Given that case, the categorical supposition *per prius* is possible only if the imposition of meaning is established from the direction of the first real substance. In the categorical predication *per prius*, it is true that the corpse is not a human being; but in the mode of logical supposition given on the level of semantic made in the mode *per posterius*, it can be a true statement. Logically true statement is in fact a metaphysically false statement. Taken as imposition in virtue of the metaphysical dative, the hyparchical definition states that second substances testify about reality in the context of categorical statements that keep accidental value in relation to real things. If relation of the second substance to the first is missing, signification runs only on nominal and equivocal level. Such a vague speech (*oratio*) cannot establish critical science and metaphysics; nevertheless, it can produce a modern version of science, in the mode of metaphysical *Irre* of Heidegger. The supposition taken from the direction that comes from the second substance to the first has in itself no univocal character, as Neoplatonic modernists of that time in schools of *Nominales* claimed.[[25]](#footnote-25) According to Abelard, it is not possible to decide from the supposition alone whether the predication is determined *per prius* and therefore given as hyparchical one; or whether it is determined only *per posterius* and given only as a nominal one. Then it becomes clear that the quality, the bodily extension and other hypostatized accidents that Neoplatonists take for hypostatic substances of the third kind, they can never be right. Their meaning originates at the level of nominal supposition. The nature of hypostatic universals in logical suppositions proceeds in reverse, from thinking to the first substances. Let us recall original “probalistic” direction of that ontological trajectory (*Vor-blickbahn*) made by Neoplatonists such as Simplicius (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). It is unfortunately an equivocal supposition, not an imposition given *univoce*. The intellect already has a universal meaning, which is given by hyparchical first substances. The metaphysician determines whether universal meaning really represents the singular first substance (*supponit pro*). Aristotelian metaphysic rejects every absolute supposition made out in logic as non-verifiable statement. These universals are not metaphysically true as Locke’s “primary qualities” pretend to be, but logically they are true (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Their meaning takes no root in reality, because the imposition of meaning does not proceed from the first substance by order of the metaphysical dative. Substantial qualities taken as such have no correspondence in reality, because they are but general determinations given in thinking.

The nominal essentialism of Abelard’s contemporaries in Neoplatonic schools of Anselm’s disciples in Laon and elsewhere established a false kind of categorical meaning placed beyond real relations between actual substances. Abelard cannot step back from the Aristotelian conception of truth. He would otherwise have to accept incoherent doctrines of meaning that the first Western modernists defended. Since the first substance really exists, we can create a categorical imposition. Since there is an imposition, we can adequately, that is truthfully, predicate the supposition. If we have only a supposition as *ad hoc* given meaning outside the existence of the first substance, this meaning cannot be univocal. This twofold view founds hermeneutic perspective that establishes the fundamental difference between scientific *demonstratio*, logical *enuntiatio* and verbal *significatio*. Abelard, Averroes, and the first Averroism cannot take the statement “The corpse is a man” to be true proposition. Dead body is a human being only in the mode of equivocal meaning and analogy. There is no categorically given predication that can establish scientific proof concerning the real state of affairs. The metaphysically adequate and thus true meaning of man can be taken exclusively from the person as an existing first substance. Abelard’s writing *Dialectica* presents this argument in the thesis “This corpse is a deceased person” (*hoc cadaver est homo mortuus*).[[26]](#footnote-26) The eminent Aristotelian criticizes univocal use of supposition, which was introduced by the Neoplatonist Gilbert de La Porrée as hypostatized subsistence (*aliquid, id est subsistens*; ch. 1.4). For the logician, the notion of some “body” is sufficient to make determination of man, because he works in the order of abstraction and performs a supposition of all possible meaning. Metaphysic propositions, on the other hand, need univocal imposition of meaning from the direction of real things. According to Abelard, the categorical predication means hyparchical being of the first substance. Such categorical meaning on the level of the second substance establishes true meaning and scientific proof (*demonstratio*). The logician and the mathematician already use the secondary abstraction. Causal relations among first substances do not determine logical truth (*enuntiatio*). The verbal meaning determines the first substance only equivocally, only in the framework of naming (*nomen*), that is, on the level of grammatical and lexical determination (*significatio*). Abelard therefore distinguishes four components of meaning in discourse. First, there is a meaningful speech, which is complete in and of itself in terms of meaning and requires no supplementary questions on the part of the addressee (*oratio*). Second, this utterance can contain complete grammatical determinations related to time and modality by means of certain words (*oratio perfecta*). Third, the meaning given by logical statements expresses the truth and falsity given by correspondence of formal relations between the universal essences (*enuntiatio*). Fourth, the recognition of truth ensures the scientific deductive judgment based on real effects that substances create in reality. The causality of substances is predicated by the middle part of deductive scientific judgment (*demonstratio*). This correspondence between things and intellect is created categorically on the basis of an imposition, that is, within the framework of demonstrative proof. Such deduction establishes correspondence due to causality of hyparchical substances existing in reality; hence it contains deductive character. Scientific demonstrations made with regard to the first substances contains full kind of metaphysically established truth. According to Abelard, an incomplete signification (*oratio*) does not establish a true enunciation. Taken in itself, meaningful speech does not yet have the value of deductive statement that is determined effectively in the framework of scientific proof (*demonstratio*). Because of the imposition taken from the direction of real substances, the scientific proof differs from logical statements (*enuntiatio*). The truth of logic exists at the level of abstraction, that is, outside the imposition of meaning taken from reality. Abelard clearly states that the word “substance” in the teaching of Aristotle keeps but a homonymic character (*figuraliter*). The dialectician has to clearly distinguish all meanings of substance.[[27]](#footnote-27) Nominal sentences referring to substances (*id est vox significans substantiam*) relate but metaphorically to existent hylemorphic substances (*translata sunt ad significandum nomina rerum*). Therefore, they have no univocal binding to reality of hylemorphic substrates (*non sunt complexae voces*). To secure a true predication, it is necessary to perform a categorical transfer (*translatio*) of meaning. Then it is valid that a general ability of signification (*ad se ipsam significandam*) given in any sign becomes the statement concerning reality of the first substances (*figura facta in translatione vocis de re*). The term “*translatio*” describes exactly hermeneutic function of the metaphysical dative. The sentence “Phoenix exists” has a meaning, but there is no determination taken from really existing things, which could establish hyparchical imposition of meaning. This relation to reality is necessary for constituting the truth as a univocal *adaequatio* for categorical propositions. In the case of the Phoenix, there is no necessity that relates to the first real substance. The supposition of meaning proceeds merely from thought and not at all from reality. Then it is a homonymic signification without corresponding correspondence to the real thing. If the transmission of signification (*translatio*) takes the direction of existing first substances, then we speak of a formal and univocal correspondence of statements and thing (*enuntiatio*). This meaning can eventually be proved in categorical statements based on a real causality that is employed on the level of the first substances (*demonstratio*). The logical statement given by the supposition differs fundamentally from the categorical statement of metaphysics and science based on real causality. Metaphysical value comes to being as *demonstratio* exclusively in virtue of the imposition of meaning from hyparchical reality. Again, necessity of the metaphysical dative applies, which determines true donation of meaning taken from direction of first substances. There is no direct meaning concerning reality, since the state of affairs must be truthfully predicated. Abelard rejected all confused concepts of truth in Anselm’s teaching traded by Neoplatonic and Porretans schools. The following quotation shows fundamental relations that determine Abelard’s definition of meaning.

“For example, the word ‘man’ has a specific character, which is given with respect to a mortal and rational animal creature. Primarily, the imposition of meaning comes from the direction of a real person (*ex ipsa individuis ipsius*), like Socrates and others. The imposition given in such a way preserves in itself the meaning of species (*significationem in se ubique speciei in se tenet*), and it is not given by Socrates and others as participating in meaning of species (*non Socratis et ceterorum quæ speciem participant*). Indeed, from the word ‘man’ (*ex 'hominis' enim vocabulo*) arises the understanding ‘mortal, rational animal creature,’ but not at all the understanding of what Socrates’s existence is in reality (*non etiam Socratem intelligimus*).” [[28]](#footnote-28)

The imposition of signification from the direction of real things takes place in various ways (*diversis modis accipitur*). Abelard is interested in two basic kinds of reception. In the first case, he follows the emergence of universal signification in thinking (*intellectum generat*); in the second case, he follows the true imposition of meaning that comes from real things, either signified or predicated (*modo vero*). He described the first group with reference to *De Int*. 16a3–8, where the origin of meaning is solved due to direct imposition (ch. 1.1). Abelard, with reference to Aristotle, emphasizes that meaning must have a universally true character (*constituit enim qui dicit intellectum*). Primarily, the imposition of meaning relates to real things such as Socrates. Since they exist in and for themselves, they establish a hyparchical signification (*significationem … in se tenet*) made in the mode *per prius*, which is not bound to Platonic participation as subsistent being of universal species. The predication is specific in this way, since it is based on the level of universals according to the Tree of Porphyry, and it is secondary with respect to real Socrates. Taken as such, dialectic division of universals according to the Tree of Porphyry truly applies. For example, one can divide the species “*homo*” and its specific determination within the framework of specific rationality or within the framework of animality taken as general generic determination (*animali rationali mortali*). Now, it makes evident that categorical hyparchical predication given *per prius* makes but general meaning, since that “*homo*” that cannot reach the real Socrates (*non etiam Socratem intelligimus*). Categorical predication generates general determinations of man, which stands in the place of real Socrates (*supponit pro*). Again, the concept of univocal imposition of meaning taken from the direction of singular entities and the univocal categorical supposition must be taken into account. In this passage, Abelard warns against the error of his sophist contemporaries who reversed the order of imposition. The quotation emphasizes with reference to Aristotle that the universal species determined *per prius* is given in thought only. Every supposition determines the real thing as species. Nominally given supposition has only universal meaning (*ex 'hominis' enim vocabulo tantum 'animal rationale mortale' concipimus*). The concept, i.e., the supposition of meaning in mind does not have a univocal character, as confused modernity supposes. The supposition of meaning in mind may or may not be confirmed by imposition of meaning from the direction of the first substance. The human being exists and the chimera does not. The real thing participates in universal determination of species through the act of imposition (*speciem participant*). Nominal concept of “man” as an abstract individual is made by supposition of universal meaning “*homo*.” It is therefore fundamentally different from categorical univocal predication given by imposition of meaning “Socrates” taken from the real person. Moreover, it is in principle true that species as universal cannot form in any case a constituent of Socrates as a first real substance. The true cognition of the singular thing is created solely by imposition from the first substance. What the first substance is in reality, there is a similarity that must be created in intellect as univocal categorical predication on the level of second universal substance. The naming in the framework of true and univocal meaning arises in the act of abstraction made from reality. It is done in the framework of *univoce* created determination made out of the hyparchical first substance that exists *per se* and it is not divisible in itself (*ex ipsa individuis ipsius*). The important indication hidden in the term “*ex ipsa individuis*” has a key character. It shows *Lichtung* of truth and untruth that concerns the next round of dispute about objectivity. Either the imposition proceeds from Porretans being of the third kind (*individuum*) or from the first substance. The generation of modern *Nominales*, who had been influenced by Porretans at Oxford, neglected the fundamental trajectory that makes understanding of being (*Vor-blickbahn*), from where a true cognition arises. Modernity reads the meaning of the world dogmatically, according to English Neoplatonist Anselm, and not philosophically and critically like Parisian Aristotelian Abelard.

This epochal event (*Ereignis*) determines subsequent history of the Latin West. Summarized in this way, the original form of so-called “Oxford—Paris Split” (Alain de Libera) is properly understood (ch. 3.1.1). The next matrix shows that the next confrontation at the University of Paris (Albert the Great and Roger Bacon versus Rufus of Cornwall and Robert Kilwardby) already concerned the interpretation of *Second Ana*lytics and *De anima* and not only *Categories* and *Isagoge*. The direction of hyparchical predication defended by Abelard is translated (*translatio*) into metaphysical dative in *Second Analytics* by the expression “*ex inmediatis*.” That notion entails real causality of first substances in the middle member of demonstrative judgment (ἔστι μέσον αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; *Anal. Post*. 89b39). Abelard’s criticism of *Nominales* clearly shows the direction that further development would take. Either we univocally grasp the state of the first real substance for the middle member of scientific proof in the virtue of the imposition; or, the supposition of meaning made only in thinking leads to general equivocation. Meaning and understanding of universals take the place of the real thing, what the scholastic term “*supponit pro*” denotes. True univocal supposition denotes the fact that the second substance stands in the place of the first substance in the order of imposition. The true supposition can be in the mode of true speech (*oratio*) or even scientific statement (*enuntiatio*), when the statement about the thing runs as categorical univocal predication. Abelard endorses the definition of truth as correspondence, because he clearly distinguishes between reality and its representation in mind (Jacobi et al. 1996, 18–19). Being a grammarian, Abelard highly values general capacity of speech (*significare*), but it cannot be substituted for existential propositions and scientific proof. Abelard’s commentary on *De interpretatione* uses verbal form of meaning to start the process of understanding.[[29]](#footnote-29) However, true poetic interpretation is not a scientific assignment of meaning, because both forms of signification are principally different from each other (*interpretari vocem non est assignare, sed intellectum aperire*). Being an Aristotelian metaphysician, he knows well that univocal categorical proposition is the only instrument to determine philosophically truth and falsity. Abelard makes a clear distinction between the two forms of meaning. Either the imposition states the fact with regard to the thing alone; or, the supposition can be given by both the thing and intellect as well. The statement has a univocal categorial determination if it is taken from the direction of real things. Therefore, the chimera has a general signification in the order of language, where it forms verbal meaning in the framework of supposition. The chimera has no true imposition from the first substance. Abelard’s interpretation of *De int.* 16a3–8 shows the emergence of the signification, which is given from the front, from the direction of first substances acting causally on the movement of the soul.[[30]](#footnote-30) Citing Boethius, the commentary explicitly emphasizes that the birth of signification in the mode of metaphysically conceived intentionality proceeds primarily and principally “*a causa*,” that is, through the reception of meaning taken from the front, from the direction of real first substances. We already know this first semantic transmission of meaning (*translatio*) under the influence of the metaphysical dative (σημεία πρώτων, *primae notae*, ch. 1. 1). Existence of external things given *simpliciter* and *per se* establishes a secondary causality in the order of knowledge. In relation to real things, the cognition makes a universal accident. The scientific proof (*demonstratio*) is valid with respect to existence of individual things and cannot be established only within the framework of mere language. Language is not yet a formally correct logical judgment of the abstractly treated things, let alone to grant scientific cognition. The latter makes sense in predication of real causality. The distinction between different modes of signification as imposition and supposition keep fundamental character because it establishes next levels of true meaning. Let us take all steps of understanding in true order.

1. The thing exists *per se* in reality (*ipsum individuum, substantia*).
2. Emergence of equivocal signification in mind that runs in the mode of nominal and verbal supposition of meaning (*intellectum*).
3. That abstract meaning can be expressed by logical judgments that keep formally true relations on the level of notions (*enuntiatio*).
4. This meaning is, furthermore, determined with regard to hyparchical value of the first substance, which establishes univocal and categorical imposition of meaning (*impositio vera*).
5. Deductive judgment determines whether this correspondence is true or not; such fundamental imposition needs to translate causal effects of first substances to middle member of scientific proof in the mode “*ex inmediatis*” to be predicated as scientific fact (*demonstratio*). Done in such an accomplished form, understanding of the world takes place in the mode of metaphysical truth as full correspondence.

Having established such an excellent distinction of different statements, Abelard completed the definition of truth as full correspondence between things and intellect. The univocal categorical meaning passes through the imposition to keep value of real substances that effectively determine human cognition according to *De anima*. The same kind of univocal meaning controls adequate and therefore true supposition of things in the world through the universal signification and symbolization according to *De interpretatione*. The univocal categorical predication (*enuntiatio*) needs the imposition, to recognize the world through the scientific judgment (*demonstratio*), that is, according to *Second Analytics*.

Modernity founded by Anselm changed the nature of imposition. The writing *Categories* originally postulated that the imposition concerns first substances only. Based on an ontotheology conceived to be dogmatically conceived metaphysics or demiurgic subjective knowledge, modernity takes equivocal statements to be sufficient condition for truth. Abelard’s defense of Boethius’s metaphysics dealing with sense of being in order to respect reality therefore keeps the fundamental character.[[31]](#footnote-31) Truth is defined with respect to relations of things in reality (*ad naturalem rerum relationem*) and in the form of difference between existence of things in reality (*rei esse*) and true cognition of corresponding essence of things (*rei essentiae demonstratio*). Having established the concept of truth as correspondence in the early Scholasticism, Abelard took a decisive step by introducing univocal predication in the framework of *similitudo* to keep true relations between the first and the second substance (*quantum ad naturalem rerum relationem*), and not only equivocal or analogical relations between universal species (*non tam visus ad vocalem constructionem*). Scientific proof therefore concerns relations of real substances and not their nominalist derivatives (*essentiam demonstravit, non vocabulum*). According to *Second Analytics*, the relation based on *demonstratio* does not concern primarily the level of nominalist similarity in the framework of words and verbal meaning, but the correspondence of real things that is made in human intellect.[[32]](#footnote-32) Abelard interpreted the relation between first and second substance and the corresponding theory of truth similarly to his contemporary Averroes, whose writings he did not know. The real connoisseur of Aristotle in the Latin West separated the order of reality and cognition from the general confusion of his contemporaries. He prepared future generations to achieve the true reception of Averroes’s metaphysics. They have inherited fundamentally true metaphysics to define a real *proportio* between intellect and reality. The definition of metaphysical truth in *Met*. 1011b26‒29received new confirmation (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The following quotation from writing *Dialectic* sums up Abelard’s definition of truth.

“Aristotle has clearly proved that affirmation and negation of truth in predications follow the course of real things that the predication entails. Taken with regard to existing things, it is confirmed whether they are true or false. This is because a actual thing is necessarily given in itself (*rem necesse est esse*). This existential necessity is established by the fact that everything either exists or does not exist. The statement based on existentially true necessity is necessarily metaphysically true as well (*propositionem veram necesse est veram esse*); if the thing is not properly set up with regard to existential necessity, then the statement is false.” [[33]](#footnote-33)

Scientific understanding expressed in deductive judgment must present the state of real things in the world (*sequi illos eventus rerum quos enuntiant*). Since the first substances exist, it is possible to formulate necessary and adequate statements about existence or non-existence of the first substances (*gratia quorum tantum verae esse uel falsae dicuntur*). The necessity is not given primarily in logical statements, but in the reality that necessarily is what is (*quamlibet rem necesse est esse*). This original necessity of real things and their relations is taken into the general propositions that take actual necessity in the world as the fundament of metaphysical truth (*propositionem veram necesse est veram esse*). In contrast to modernistsof his time, Abelard clearly affirms the difference between the scientific proof defined in writing *Second Analytic* and the general doctrine of meaning defined in the introduction to *De interpretatione*. The following matrix of objectivity shows the fatal way how the Oxford school of Anselm’s followers (Grosseteste, Rufus, Kilwardby) changed the nature of the middle link in deductive syllogism (*medium*) that safeguards that existential necessity. Original Aristotelian teaching keeps this form exclusively due to relation of statements based on real effects of the first substances.[[34]](#footnote-34) Abelard distinguishes two conceptions of signification that the modernists of Anselm’s school neglected. The incomplete signification includes an equivocal determination of man (*animalitas et rationalitas hominem constituant*); this does not yet give rise to a univocal meaning (*unus intellectus*). The univocal meaning is only given in relation to the signification uphold by hylemorphic substances. Done in that way, the statement refers to a concrete person and it carries univocal meaning. The nominal signification is indeed sufficient for the determination of verbal meaning (*'homo albus' una est in sensu oratio*); this signification is not sufficient to establish the univocal value that is based exclusively in the framework of the first substances (*unius rei substantiam nun perficiant res significatae*). Due to its ambiguity, the universal determination does not primarily refer to the first substance (*multiplices dicuntur*). In no case can univocal statements arise the other way around, i.e., by the composition of abstract, general determinations (*ex albedine et homine nullius rei substantia constituatur*). The meaning given *univoce* keeps its hyparchical value due to the existence of first substances. It makes the ultimate goal of signification and assures true cognition of the world. Abelard endorses the difference between the composition of form and substance (*totum integrum*), which is given *simpliciter* in reality, and its universal composite form, which is given *modo compositionis* in intellectual cognition.[[35]](#footnote-35) The imposition of substantial meaning is given either by the concept in thinking (*totum universale*), or by the hylemorphic substance (*totum integrum*). The difference is fundamental for critical metaphysics; it safeguards the imposition of meaning from the direction of universals in thinking taken from reality. Either we establishe the purely nominal signification within the framework of oratorical communication (*oratio*), or we can establish a categorical signification, which is necessary for determining the truth in deductive scientific judgment (*demonstratio*). But in no case it can be done as an imposition that contains the first substance as such, or by a false imposition that would neglect the existential necessity of real things. According to Aristotle, the philosophical truth as correspondence cannot be a Neoplatonic assimilation of eternal and *a priori* given value according to Anselm’s theory of truth as justice and rightness, both taken from a divine perspective. The forward-looking and critical scholastic Abelard saw the danger of univocal concept of substance that his opponents presented. The following matrix shows how Western objectivity was built on this metaphysical oscillation between recognition of things and real existence of things.

The first Latin gigantomachy about substance had a fundamental effect on theology and on academic institutions, because it orchestrated authoritarian structures in the Church to influence the first major philosophical quarrel between Platonism and Aristotelism. Gigantomachy concerning the new form of substance concerned the delicate theological topic that defined the relations in the Divine Trinity. At that time, cathedral schools accused each other of tritheism. According to Abelard, metaphysically uneducated modernists fatally changed the definition of the Trinity by taking the accidents and turning them into the hypostatic “substances.” Abelard rejected the definition of relations based on the supposition that neglected true imposition taken out of the first substances and their effects. Modernist poetry about God is not a metaphysical truth about God as the first cause. The meaning that arose only in thought leads to equivocal statements. Theology at that time, according to critical Aristotelianism, was a strict and most important science. The verbalism cannot establish a categorical predication of univocal meaning, as it is necessary for demonstrative, deductive scientific judgment. Porretans and schools of *Nominales* abolished the hyparchical value of man and the Divine Trinity as well. They created purely nominal definitions that entail new God of *Modernorum*, who is already dead today. He was perceived as a pure *opinabile*, that is, in the manner of the chimera. It is symptomatic of vengeful spirit of modernity that Aristotelian features of Abelard’s philosophy were misunderstood and distorted. Abelard was attacked by former classmates from the Neoplatonist school founded by Anselm of Laon (†1117). The young Abelard turned away from the teaching of Anselm of Laon sometime in 1113, when he was appointed as a master at the Notre Dame Cathedral School in Paris. Heloisa, in a letter to Abelard, denounced Alberich of Reims and Lotulf of Lombardy as the two main opponents of Abelard.[[36]](#footnote-36) Both Neoplatonists appeared as plaintiffs against Abelard at the council of Soissons (1121). Abelard states in his biography that they were students of Anselm of Laon (*Historia calamitatum* I.4; PL 197, 125C). An important representative of the Laon cathedral school was Gilbert de La Porrée (Gilbertus Porretanus), who played the same role in the constitution of the Latin version of objectivity as Avicenna did in the Falsafa. Anselm of Laon, and especially the school founded by Gilbert de La Porrée, is philosophically connected with the teaching of Anselm of Canterbury. Gilbert as the cathedral teacher in Laon may have known Anselm of Canterbury personally. Abelard, following the metaphysics of Averroes, preserves the autonomy of philosophy. It is separated from the theology because of different concept of truth that must be upheld by natural reason alone. Therefore, he rejects ontotheological constructs created on the basis of the Neoplatonic and Augustinian illumination. The philosopher cannot naturally prove theological interpretations of divine intentionality that are peculiar to various religions as Judaism.[[37]](#footnote-37) Al-Ghazālī held a similar critical attitude towards the anthropomorphization of God through intentionality and the death of God in Avicenna’s modernist philosophy (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). Aristotelians as Abelard and, after him, the school of the first Averroism, rejected the introduction of modern intentionality in the philosophical cognition of God. Another thing is how God reveals himself in human history, which belongs to the field of theological research. The dispute between Gilbert and Abelard concerning hypostatized relations in the Divine Trinity concerned the preceding form of gigantomachy about substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). Neoplatonism changed the accidental predication into an essential being and it predicted this essence univocally in the categorical mode *per prius*. Due to new determination of accidents, the being of the third kind (*tertium ens*) was introduced in Scholasticism, which was taken over by Neoplatonists of the Laon cathedral school and, after them, by schools of Porretans. The hypostatized category of relationships among the Divine Persons passed into the definition of the Divine Trinity. Abelard fundamentally refused to introduce substantial accidents into Trinitarian theology that took the form of Neoplatonic hypostases. The critical Aristotelian must keep the imposition of metaphysical meaning from the direction of real things, because the first actual substance founds real relationships. God is real and so are the divine Persons; therefore they must have an adequately true definition. From the point of view that concerns the above-mentioned theory of predication, it becomes clear that Abelard rejected all modern forms of hypostatized relations in the Divine Trinity as tritheism. The philosophical definition of the Divine Trinity must proceed theologically from the divine essence, philosophically from its causality in the creation, and then from the subsequent categorical predication of this causality in the scientific deductive judgment. The relationship between Father and Son arises in the classical categorical predication because both Persons exist as the real first substances (*dicimus 'pater filii pater'*).[[38]](#footnote-38) The real person is in and of itself a simple and actual thing, which exists for itself and beyond all universal meanings. Abelard assesses essentiality at the level of the second universal substance as a very dubious thing (*mihi quidem nihil videtur sonare haec constructio substantiorum*). The relations given at the level of the substantial universalization of accidents acquire at most an analogous meaning with regard to reality, which differs in principle from the mutual relationship of the existing substances (*ita etiam dicamus: 'paternitas filiationis paternitias'*). The definition created on verbally signified essence (*constructio substantiorum*) is not the same as categorical univocal predication. It needs the imposition of real causality and from the hyparchical existence of first substances that effectively act in the world beyond human mind. The classically educated philosopher and theologian backed Aristotle’s and Boethius’s distinction between the real thing and its virtual signification against the modernists of his time. This direction corresponds to Averroes’s polemic with Avicenna regarding the status of the first science that studies “substance *qua* substance” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The metaphysician cannot limit himself to exploring abstract being in logical equivocal mode “*ens inquantum ens*.” In such a case, we define in the mode *per prius* but universals given in thinking, and not the first substance existing in reality. The school of Neoplatonists led by Gilbert de La Porrée and the Neoplatonic magisters from Laon and Reims insisted on hypostatized relations in the Divine Trinity, which went almost to tritheism. But they accused Abelard of tritheism. Neoplatonists regarded the relations of three Persons in the Trinity as tritheism, because Abelard attached them to the divine Persons as real substances connected with one Essence. Abelard’s work *Theologia Summi Boni* (1118–21) defends the Aristotelian concept of the Trinity and condemns the Neoplatonic use of the universals of the third kind in the theology of Roscelin and his contemporaries. Abelard rejected the hypostatic definition of the Trinity made on the basis of the number, because arithmetic abstraction does not belong in metaphysics (*tres quidem, ut diximus, secundum definitiones aut proprietates, non secundum numerum*; *Theologia Summi Boni* 3.1). We have quoted the corresponding passage from *Metaphysics* that rejected the numerical unit as the basis for categorical determination of the substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The first form of modernism prevailed over the fateful decision of the Council of Soissons of 1121. Its direction was cast by representatives of the Neoplatonic schools from Reims and Chartres.[[39]](#footnote-39) This council opened the transition to modernity by rejecting Abelard’s critical view by dogmatically backing Neoplatonism in theology. But Porretans of the Neoplatonic schools from Reims and Chartres, who were quoted, separated themselves from the nominalist excesses of Roscelin’s school thanks to the criticism of Abelard and his school. The last shot of mercy was given to Abelard by the well-known mystic Bernard of Clairveaux at the Council of Sens (1140). Bernard of Clairveaux clashed with Gilbert de La Porrée as well. Gilbert was a staunch opponent of Abelard. Historically instructive is the horror of the philosophically illiterate Bernard of Clairveaux in the dispute over the definition of the assertion “*Deus est deitas*,” which formed the core of the dispute between Abelard, Roscelin and Gilbert. Bérenger de La Porrée was a pupil and defender of Abelard and his letter addressed to Bernard of Clairveaux clearly states that Bernard’s condemnation of Abelard was personally motivated.[[40]](#footnote-40) This authoritarian gesture of Bernard of Clairveaux, carried out at the Synod of Sens against Abelard, repeats the decree of the Parisian Bishop Tempier in March 1277 against the Aristotelians from the school of the first Averroism. The dispute over the so-called theory of twofold truth, which was condemned by the Paris Decree of March 1277, was foreshadowed by two letters written in the spring of the year 1141. Theologian Petrus Venerabilis (†1156) summons a scholar named Magister Petrus (most likely Abelard) to give up Western wisdom and go to the abbey of Cluny. Let us now quote the key part of Letter No. 9, in which Peter the Venerable casts doubt on the role of philosophy in the search for truth and upholds the conception of the one truth given within the framework of the ultimate form of happiness.[[41]](#footnote-41) The whole text is based on the quotation of divine wisdom, which “eradicates the wisdom of the wise people” (1 Cor 1:19). This quotation is used literally in the preamble of the condemnation in 1277, which was designed primarily against the school of the first Averroism. The modernist condemnation of so-called twofold truth in Paris and Oxford in 1277 ties in style and execution to fateful decision made in the Council of Soissons.

The hidden historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of gigantomachy concerning the substance of God passed through the hidden historicity (*Geschichte*) of metaphysical dogmatic teaching. The dispute over the status of divine Persons imposed the thinking of the first modernists by means of authoritarian decisions of Latin Church and its academic institutions. Modernism spread authoritatively in the Latin West with the help of ecclesiastical decrees, which interfered with the philosophical quarrels. Neoplatonic ecclesiastical magisterium dogmatized the objective errors in the ontotheology of *Modernorum*. They were made in the mode of truth as certainty and rightness, which adopted Anselm’s definition of truth as *rectitudo*. Through the influence of Abelard’s critics such as Alberich and Lotulf, the Neoplatonic formulations supported by the cited councils established the modern history of dogma based on the logic and grammar of Porretans that founded the schools of *Nominales*. Western objectivity appeared in those schools, as we will show further. Aristotelians like Abelard rejected this modern form of deism in principle. God of modernists defined in this way makes a pure nonsense. The death of this objective idol in the 19th century did not surprise these connoisseurs of metaphysics at all. They would have even gratefully welcomed this fact. The triadic structure of hermeneutics (*Geschichtlichkeit, Geschichte, Historie*) shows the basic way “how” (Heidegger’s *Wie*; OBJ I, ch. 1) the gigantomachy concerning the Divine Trinity shapes the *Lichtung* of objectivity in its truth and untruth. The councils of Soissons and of Sens were led by representatives of Neoplatonic cathedral schools. They were joined by theological zealots such as Bernard of Clairveaux and Petrus Venerabilis. The latter theologian called for a crusade against the Jews in order to complete the Second crusade, which his contemporary Bernard of Clairveaux had proclaimed against the Saracens in 1146. The Council of Soissons ordered Abelard’s work *Theologia Summi Boni* to be publicly burned, since the book endorsed Aristotelian conception of the Trinity and condemned Neoplatonic use of universals of the third kind in the theology of Roscelin and his contemporaries. The ecclesiastical magisterium in the Christian West was inclined to the side of Neoplatonic philosophical modernists, but did not take the extreme Neoplatonic position of the school of *Nominales*. A generation later, the metaphysics of Falsafa was destroyed in another part of the West. In 1197, the Moroccan caliph ordered the burning of Averroes’s writing as heretical. Both brilliant Aristotelians of the West shared the same fate in the beginning of modernism. The victory of modernity in the Latin West led to the death of anthropocentric God of *Modernorum* in the subsequent postmodernism. That development al-Ghazālī had already predicted for the modernist current in the Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The two ecclesiastical councils cited against Abelard definitely determined the fate of the Latin West in the mode *de fine*, that is, by the death of God of *Modernorum*. Nihilistic postmodernism objectively correctly states the death of that secularized deity in the 19th century. Unfortunately, following the projection in Freud’s mode of inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*), Feuerbach’s critique imputed the metaphysical error of modernity to Christianity as such.[[42]](#footnote-42) Due to the different orientation of Islam and Christianity, the disintegration of syncretic philosophy and ontotheology was accomplished in the West. The intellectual and mystic vacuum came to being in Late Antiquity after the decline of mysteries (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The next division between the Shiites and the Sunnis, as well as between the Catholics and the Protestants, was already taking place within monotheistic religion. The metaphysics of Falsafa continued in hidden mode of historiality in the Latin West, in schools of Avicennist modernity up to today’s metaphysical nihilism. An anti-philosophical school of fundamentalist theologians existed in the Latin West as well, but it did not exert any significant influence on the course of the history of Western thought.[[43]](#footnote-43) Let us ignore the course of the crusades called up by visionary theologians such as Bernard de Clairveaux. The Latin West, guided by nominalist cathedral schools, took its own path of modern philosophical *Irrtum*, of which Peter the Venerable wrongly accused Abelard in the *Letter 115*.[[44]](#footnote-44) Abelard, as a brilliant Aristotelian, took upon himself all the guilt of modern Neoplatonism in the form of scapegoat mentioned in *Leviticus* 16:10. Then, of necessity, he was also exiled to academic desert with Heloisa, in the mode of philosophical *damnatio memoriae*. Neoplatonic modernism and postmodernism refused to recognize his authentic and critical Aristotelianism. The scenario of sophistic manipulation and false accusations of Abelard will be repeated in the case of confrontations over Averroism. The modern Neoplatonists destroyed the Aristotelian Abelard academically and authoritatively just as thoroughly as the modern nominalists destroyed the Aristotelian Siger von Brabant and his colleagues at the Artistic faculty in Paris in 1277. William Ockham and Dante Alighieri nevertheless defended the position of condemned Siger. Likewise, Abelard’s work at the Sainte Geneviève Cathedral School in Paris had a fundamental significance for the subsequent matrices that investigate next feuds over objectivity. His school merged with the Cathedral School of Notre Dame. This school educated about twenty cardinals, as well as about fifty bishops and archbishops. Abelard’s school had an important monastic library and together with the Cathedral School of St. Germanin des Pré founded the first *Universitas scholarium* for students and masters. This community was recognized as a Paris University in 1200 by decree of the French King Philip II (Philippe Auguste). Pope Innocent III recognized that school as an independent institution in 1215. In the same year, the first statute of Parisian University was created and the Masters of Philosophy received papal university rights. The Masters of Law and Medicine had already acquired in Paris the protection of papal rights before this date. The cathedral school under Abelard’s influence was later called *L’École cathédrale de Paris.* Masters of this school adhered to the line of classical metaphysics and logic. In this point, it differed in principle from Porretan schools of *Logica Modernorum*, such as Parvipontani school founded by Adam of Balsham (Adam Parvipontanus) in Paris. The first important philosophers and founder of the University of Paris were Johannes Blund and William of Auvergne. They were not Porretan modernists issued from Neoplatonist schools founded by Anselm of Canterbury. They became genuine Aristotelians in the wake of Boethius and Abelard. These thinkers recognized the authentic Aristotelian teaching of Averroes when his writing reached the Latin West after the year 1220.

## 1.4 Creation of Objective Being (Gilbertus Porretanus)

The most influential pupil of Anselm of Laon was bishop Gilbert de La Porrée (Gilbertus Porretanus, †1154). His students vehemently attacked Abelard. Let us now return to the key topic of this dispute, that is, to the distinction between “*totum universale*” and “*totum integrum*” (ch. 1.1). The dispute of Abelard, John of Salisbury and other Aristotelians with Neoplatonic Porretans over the statute of indivisible substance formed the core of gigantomachy in the second half of the 12th century. The matter of quarrel was the exegesis of Boethius’s treatise *De hebdomadibus*. Aristotelian Boethius asserts that participation is possible only at the level of substance as thing taken in general, that is, within the framework of *ens commune* at the level of the second substance. The determination of actual subsistence runs in the mode of absolute priority of the first substance (*Cat.* 2a11). The above-mentioned passage from *Categories* refers to the hyparchical substance. The first substance exists in its own mode of subsistence, which is given as *simplex* and *absolute* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Boethius says in the part called *Tertia regula* that real existing thing is not capable of participation in another thing (*ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat*).[[45]](#footnote-45) Gilbert’s commentary on *De hebdomadibus* gives a new meaning to the *Third Rule*. The quotation shows sophistic exchange of hyparchical substance with its newly determined subsistence. Gilbert introduced a new version of being of the third kind in metaphysics.

“Being is subsistence, and not the substance (*esse namque subsistentia est, non substantia*). If such determined act of existence (*quo est*) is taken into account, it is therefore true that being as a subsistence, cannot participate in anything else. Everything that actually subsists is a hypostatic subsistence as such (*aliquid, id est subsistens jam est aliqua subsistentia*). Therefore, potential determinations that are of a different nature, such as quality or quantity, are assigned to this subsistence.“ [[46]](#footnote-46)

Gilbert starts to define the first substance according to the *Third rule* in a correct way (*nec participatione aliud aliquid in se habebit*). Boethius separated the act of the existence of the real thing (*quo sit*) from any mésalliance with the universal and merely potential concept given in mind. The quotation begins in an Aristotelian way and asserts that subsisting real being is not the same thing as second universal substance (*esse namque subsistentia est, non substantia*). Gilbert explicitly agrees with this definition and considers it true (*vere*). The following section keeps the key character, since Boethius places the meaning of the essence outside the first substance by making out of it a potential concept (*ad illius subsistentiae potentiam pertinens*). It is not the case of Porretanus. He made the existence (*subsistentia*) be tied to the first substance by combining two different meanings of predication in the mode of sophistic univocal fusion: the actual being of the first substance and the potential being of the essence as a concept in thinking. The subsistence belongs to the first substance, which is emphasized by Boethius’s definition. The second form of subsistence defines a special concept of hypostatic being (*aliquid, id est subsistens jam est aliqua subsistentia*). Gilbert defines a new form of subsistence, which establishes the substance of the third kind. The doubling of being as new substance is accomplished with respect to the being of the first substance in the modus *simpliciter* according to Simplicius’s hypostatized mode “*esse ad*.” This mode is given for the hypostatized category of relation (πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). The relation as a hypostasis doubles the real existence to create a purely abstract first substance as a supposition (*ad illius subsistentiae*). The second part of the quotation joined subsistence taken in ambiguous mode *simpliciter* to *simpliciter* first existing substance in reality. Gilbert claims that subsistence can be predicated without the relation to the first substance in terms of the generally given relation. Therefore, the new hypostatized substance gets physical properties of the first substance, namely quality and quantity (*quale vel quantum*). However, such an existence of the thing according to Boethius is given but in potency as a concept in mind and it strictly separated from the subsistence of real things. Porretanus created a new subsistence that is taken purely formally, which corresponds to Boethius’s essential and universal determination in the mode “*quod est*.” This was and is the fatal error of modernists in the mode of *peccatum originale*. Gilbert abolished the imposition starting from the actually existing first substance (*actus essendi, quo est*) and replaced it erroneously by a merely formal concept of existence given only in the mind (*quod est, essentia*) that is given as supposition. He created a new kind of amphibolic predication according to Elias (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). The newly conceived “exsistence” of Porretans founded an epochal new hylemorphic substance of the third kind (*aliquid, id est subsistens*). The existence of “anything” (*aliquid*) received an act of subsistence on the level of the first substance and simultaneously became a new universal entity (*est aliqua subsistentia*). The quotation establishes the existence of the new universal (*aliquid … id est*) in the context of participation in the act of existence, which is conceived as genus. The unique existence of the first substance has become the universal concept. This modern form of “exsistence” is predicated as Neoplatonic hypostatized substance. Gilbert hypostatized firstly the act of being as potential essence and secondly predicated quite wrongly the *actus essendi*, which is unique to the first substance, to be a potential concept of essence. By this twofold sophistical operation the hypostatized “exsistence” has been bound to the essence in mind and it was separated from real existence of the first substance. The new substance of the third kind got the properties of Avicenna’s amphibolic predication, which is bound to the division of universals within the framework of the Porphyry Tree. By mixing the imposition and supposition, Porretanus created a new individual entity (*individuum*) that sophistically replaced the first substance. The possibility of participation in the epochal new concept of existence of the third kind is given by the fact that something “exsists” (*participatio, qua subsistens, exsistere*) thanks to the subsistence of the twofold relation to itself. The specific form of Neoplatonic participation enabled the Porretans to hypostatize even physically determined accidentals (quality, quantity) as secondary properties of newly conceived “exsistence.” Neoplatonic participation (μέθεξις) that encloses the highest genera of being changed into a new form of transcendentalism. Modern version of *tertium ens* does not need Platonic highest genera of being, since it is set in the framework of the Aristotelian predication founded on the division of universal meaning that entails hypostatized genera and species (*Arbor Pophyriana*). Generic “exsistence” displaced the second substance by the new form of amphibolic predication. The first book analyzed similar positions of Simplicius and Avicenna. Boethius postulated existence in the mode “*quo est*” only for the act of existence of the first substance. Gilbert, in addition to the categorical predication of the first substance, introduced the predication of its hypostatized subsistence. Gilbert’s commentary on Boethius’s *Tertia regula* shows that the “exsistence of the third kind” (*qua subsistens*) allowed substantial predication of pure accidentals. This is true for the predication of quality and quantity mentioned above. These three accidents (quality, quantity, relation) got in modernity the fundamental meaning of new transcendental determinations of being. Let us see the exegesis of *Categories* around the year 1230 (ch. 3.1.2). The new “exsistence” of hypostases that received the status of the third kind and it was placed outside the realm of first substances. It means that universal predication via second substances became a special type of amphibolic universal concept. The new determination of substance and existence differ from the categorical predication. The second substance is in *Categories* taken purely potentially, but in the modernist version it makes a categorical imposition, originally predicated in relation to the first substance. Taken in the new form of subsistence, such determination must necessarily be in the categorical mode *per prius* to keep up with Aristotelian second substance. Gilbert created a new being of the third kind by combining the essence and the hyparchical predication of the first substance (*quidditas*). Aristotelian metaphysical dative ceased to hold because there was no effective correspondence of the real substance and its predication. The real causality was replaced by enlightened thinking of the first Latin *illuminati*. For the modernity, the existence or non-existence of the real thing is not important, because modernists define its objective simulacrum. Neoplatonic modernity takes for granted that the first substance is given in the mode of the essence, which is sufficient for univocal predication. Abelard firmly rejected this deformation of metaphysical predication done in Porretan schools (ch. 1.3). The transformation of the first hyparchical substance into a potential concept of essence allowed for a univocal participation of existence any generic predicate. Being became again, as in Plato, the highest genus. It extracted (*exsistere*) from the real existence of the first substances. Existence became a quasi-substance and began to operate within the framework of the categorical predication. Let us recall the model of this redoubled Being in Porphyry’s commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Being as existence became the highest genus in Porretan schools and it began to create in categorical predication as a second substance. Such a metaphysical heresy was absolutely impossible for genuine Aristotelians like Abelard.

The new predication of existence as hypostasis of the third kind changed the classical table of Aristotelian categories. Accidental determinations made in the framework of participation, they were conceived univocally and became the part of formally determined existence. Boethius’s commentary on the *Categories* claims that a determination of the type “*quale*” is possible only as an accidental determination of the second substance.[[47]](#footnote-47) The quality that is actually subsisting in the first substance, it is universally predicated in relation to the second substance (*ipsam qualitatem circa substantias determinent*). Boethius’s interpretation clearly distinguishes the universally given categorical accidentals from the singular real thing (*non hoc aliquid sed quale aliquid*). The second substance stands for the first substance in the order of signification through accidents. As the first substance exists in reality, so the categorically predicated quality of this thing is expressed as determination of the second substance. Therefore, one can categorize and divide only universal meaning, and not the real things. Gilbert’s interpretation mixes the *qua*-mode concerning the act of existence (“this white car”) and merely equivocal signification of accidents taken in the form of “exsisting” as quasi-subsistence (“the white”). Gilbert abolished the twofold statute of being and created a sophistical combination, wherein the twofold statute of existence was mixed into one concept to be an existence of the third kind. The being of the real given substance (*id est subsistens*) joined with abstracted being on the level of the predicate. According to Boethius, it can exist only nominally and therefore only in thought (*subsistens quale*). The hypostatized quality and quantity were separated from the accidental determination of the second substance in its categorical nature (*quale*). They received substantial meaning of the modern qualia after the pattern of Neoplatonists like Simplicius. The qualia are not yet understood as postmodern states of consciousness, but as metaphysical terms, which are inserted in dogmatic debates of theologians about tritheism and the first modern deism (ch. 1.3). The new form of Neoplatonic predication means the subsistence of real things absolutely ambivalent, because it equivocally predicates the mode of the first and the second substance for any abstract quality. Modernist Gilbert opened the way for postmodernism. Contemporary metaphysical nihilism places the hypostatized accidents in the form of postmodern qualia as experience of individual consciousness. Postmodernism endowed qualia with mutability and mortality, which Porretans from school of *Nominales* would have rejected on principle. Porretans combined categorical signification with purely nominal signification and therefore started a new quarrel about the statute of indivisible substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Postmodernism again hypostatized the accidentals given in the table of categories by mathematizing reality and projecting such hypostatized properties directly into the first substances. The first step on this way did after Descartes his companion Arnauld, who saw the mathematized ideas directly in the things (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The categorical predication of Porretans fundamentally contradicts the hyparchical predication in *Categories* and it principally makes impossible to define the truth as correspondence of the thing and the intellect. The modern thinking of Porretans has nothing to agree on with regard to reality, because they conceive existence as generic given essence, universal hypostasis or as formal subsistence.

The eclipse of the first substance is now complete, because its existence has passed into the metaphysical “oblivion of being” (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The modernity directed by dogmatically educated Furies sees with the eye of Gilbert the existence of the third kind. The new substance was literally “extracted” (*ex-sistere*) out of illuminated mind to create the new history of effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). For Aristotelians like Abelard, the predication of existence as an accident was absolutely unacceptable. Moreover, this dubious predication ran within the framework of Porretan *participatio*. They create the simulacrum of the first substance as *tertium ens* and, moreover, they put hypostatized accidents on the same level. Avicenna created the first predication of this type as *comitatio* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Abelard assigns quality and quantity only to the first substances. Thus, he ties in with Ibn Rushd’s criticism concerning Avicenna’s concept of quantity and quality (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The mental experiments of Porretans belong to the logical abstraction of the type “mountain of gold” or “chimera.” It is possible to take the being as a logical concept and to give it the character of the universal genus made as logical abstraction. Aristotelians therefore rejected such “exsistence” in Anselm’s Neoplatonic proof of God’s existence. The monk Gaunilo from the Toulouse abbey of Marmoutiers attacked the most important part in Anselm’s writing *Proslogion*. Anselm made an interchange of the categorical predication with the predication “*in artificialibus.*” Artisan creation of the vessel or the paintings is possible because there is the first substance of the painter or the craft, which acts as the first cause.[[48]](#footnote-48) Being is not a matter to be worked. The real and cognized thing does not have the character of a formal and material causality applied to production. Imposition done in the categorical predication is fundamentally different from the predication called “*in artificialibus*.” The external thing that we perceive through our senses retains its own causality beyond us. Only afterwards, there is a formal cognition in intellect. The artisan goes from formal causality in the mind (creative idea) to its realization in matter, which is exactly the reverse process. The critical thinking cannot take up the mythological scenario of such modern “cognition” of the world, because it is a complete paranoia. Thinking of modernists “creates” the hyparchical first substance that is in fact a *tertium ens*. Such process makes a divine tragicomedy that academically educated Furies prolonged to this day. Roger Bacon applied the same kind of criticism against modernist students at Oxford (ch. 2.4.3). The most important wise thinkers of their epoch, Abelard and Averroes, rejected Neoplatonic metaphysics and participation in being as genus. Categorical predication, in the order of universality, requires univocity in view of first substance or it concerns God as the first cause. The universal meaning of the second substance passes by the imposition of universal and potential meaning due to hyparchical existence of the first substance. Porretan participation of *ad hoc* given accidentals in the hypostatized existence makes but a pure homonymy. An example can be the statute of corporeality that had already been hypostatized in Neoplatonism. Porphyry and after him Boethius in the above-quoted *Tertia regula* clearly postulated that participation in the framework of universals can only take place in the mode of universal species and not on the level of single things. The univocity in the mode *simpliciter* with regard to the mixed being of the first and the second substance is a pure sophism. Simplicius changed the status of the category called “relation” (*relatio, esse ad*) that Aristotle took for an accident (τὸ πρός τι, *Cat*. 6a36; *Met*. 1088a34). Falsafa adopted a new being of the third kind that promulgated the hypostatic nature of accidents in Neoplatonic physics of Simplicius and Philoponos (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Avicenna adopted this abstract determination of the body and transformed the original meaning of accidents into a univocally defined essence. Gilbert took theological determinations of the second substance to create a “real” first substance; in the second step, he hypostatized the accidents to take the role of the second substance. The paranoiac position of thinking in view of reality and abolition of metaphysical dative (OBJ I, ch. 1.2) were necessary because of theological reasons. Porretans made the existence of the first substance unclear by sophistically defining the act of subsistence and participation to create a modern definition of the divine Trinity. Gilbert had to anchor the divine presence in an ideological concept that acquired a real meaning. The theology of modernists became a kind of total Platonism, which mixed the existence of God as an alleged substance and the predication of divine attributes in the form of an “exsistence” summed up as pseudo-substance. Therefore, those illuminates had to abolish Aristotelian metaphysics, which cannot allow such a mixture. His thesis followed theological disputes concerning the nature of the transformed bread and wine at the Eucharist and the dispute over the hypostatized union, which was first addressed at the Council of Ephesus (451). Following the example of Simplicius, Gilbert hypostatized the relationship of the Father and the Son in the mode of *dispositio*.[[49]](#footnote-49) The relationship of two divine Persons is metaphysically determined as *tertium ens* (*paternitas… est dispositio filii respectu patris*). The category of the relation is determined substantially, besides first two substances of the Father and the Son. This original Avicennian concept of the relation as hypostasis is taken up by a new form of modern theology. Porretanus performs the first Western reduction of substance to the logically, theologically and dogmatically determined principles. These principles are as real as reality itself, because predication has lost its Aristotelian function of representation. The paranoid word of modernity became the first substance and thus established an epochal aberration (*Irre*) by a fundamental metaphysical error (*Irrtum*).

Let us now look at the next version of Neoplatonic redoubling of being, which was presented for the first time in Porphyry’s commentary on the dialogue of *Parmenides* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The following quotation establishes the path of modernity (*via Modernorum*) that followers of Gilbert de La Porrée took as granted. The syncretic “existence of anything” (*esse aliquid*) indicates new *Lichtung* of Latin modernity by mixing nominal, amphibolic and categorical predication. Its falsity was rejected by classical Aristotelianism, and its “truth” will be revealed later. Gilbert’s concept “*esse aliquid*” established the origin of the objective being.

“When we say that ‘the body is’ or that ‘the person is’ or something like that, theologians understand the existence of what has been said as an external denomination, which is derived from the essence of originating principle (*extrinseca denominatione ab essentia sui principii*). They say nothing about corporeality that it is a body, but that it is some kind of being (*esse aliquid*), neither humanity nor being of man, but some being. Similarly, every subsisting essence can be predicted with regard to its principle (*sui principii predicant*). Not that it is any particular entity; it is a simple being (*non esse aliquid sed esse*). Every single subsisting essence is created for itself (*illa vero que in ipso creata est*); therefore it is no longer a pure subsistence (*subsistentia non esse*), but some kind of objective being (*sed esse aliquid*). “ [[50]](#footnote-50)

The being of the principle as a pure hypostatized essence (*corporeitas, humanitas*) is now separated from the real being of the first substance (*hoc est corpus, homo*). That hypostatic union of both quite different meaning was sophistically imported into the being of the third kind (*subsistentia non esse sed esse aliquid*). Gilbert deals with the new being as with the substance of the third kind, which we know from Simplicius (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Similar dispute took place in the Falsafa over the status of “*aliud esse*” proposed by Alfarabi (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). Gilbert’s quotation endowed this indefinite being with a new kind of subsistent existence, which differs from real existence of the first substance. The existence of the separated first substance is reduced to the determination of “anything” done in the mode of pure beingness. Let us remind the concept of Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The definition of being is valid with regard to meaning given theologically and dogmatically (*esse aliquid*), which has received an externally given definition (*extrinseca denominatione*). The new determination of being is determined with regard to the original principle from which contingent existence of real things proceeds (*ab essentia sui principii*). The dogmatic thinkers in the Neoplatonic monastic schools and the Porretans began to give things subsistent determinations (*quo est*), starting from what can be hypostatized in logical abstraction (*quod est*). In the modern dogmatics of Neoplatonists, the first creation of an objective world began, which took place completely *ex nihilo* as modern paranoia. The transfer of meaning lost the original imposition from reality. This kind of classic imposition was defended first by Abelard and later by Thomas Aquinas against Gilbert’s profanation of Boethius’s *De hebdomadibus* (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). Hypostatized accidents of Porretans no longer related to the second substance in a univocal way, because of erroneously conceived subsistence as universal genus. Finally, in the act of logical predication as being of the third kind receives a false, univocally conceived existence (*esse aliquid*). Since the divine Trinity undoubtedly exists, one can thus hypostatize the relations such as *paternitas* to be Divine Persons. The concept of transubstantiation, the relationship of Divine Persons in the Trinity or the statute of the body of Jesus after the Resurrection received the designation of first substances existing beyond reality (*theologici hoc esse dictum intelligunt quadam extrinseca denominatione*). Due to confusion of real and nominal existence, the class of purely nominal determinations arose in the mode of modern (later objective) substance and accident, which took the reference to the modern God of nominalists. Theological determination of divinity (*deitas*), corporeity (*corporeitas*) or humanity (*humanitas*) established a new determination of being of the third kind. God became a modern simulacrum, which caused the cited disputes about tritheism. The new determination of divinity or humanity is no longer determined by the existence of the first substance, but by the formal being of the first principle.

For Aristotelians like Abelard, modern theology made an absolute devaluation of critical thinking. Classical metaphysics is determined by the metaphysical dative and by the causality to establish a true relation to reality. Sophistic theology destroyed Boethius’s definition of the person as an indivisible first substance. A new paranoid concept of objective humanity now rests on non-existent God of *Modernorum*, who until his death in the 19th century guaranteed this realm of nonsense. This interesting deity guarantees a triple being of the third kind in the mode of logical attribution of essence and existence. Modernity has created a non-existent modern God, which it investigates through and through, even to his mythological intentionality; then it has created a non-existent objective man composed of hypostatized accidents; and finally a non-existent world given as a composite of hypostatized essences. To keep such a complicated nonsense in an objective “exsistence” required a considerable effort from dogmatic modernists, which is still true today, for postmodern secular surrogates of this simulacrum. The quotation from Gilbert’s commentary on Boethius shows that the signification of *humanitas* does not require any imposition of the existence of the real person. The modern form of hypostatized “exsistence” relates to the individual (*individuum*) to be a being of the third kind. It makes a sufficient condition in order to establish the imposition (*nec humanitate hominem esse, sed esse aliquid*). General determinations of the substance, such as corporeality, are no longer bound to the existence of the first substance (*non enim dicunt corporalitate corpus esse*). The supposition no longer had any relation to real first substances, because the imposition of meaning in the mode *per prius* relates to a hypostatic essence. Then the dead body is a human being and modern God are given as hypostatized arithmetic Trinity (*trinitas*). Neoplatonic schools accepted without any objection the new interpretation of the Porretans. Such a worldview corresponded to their conception of defined logical abstraction, which was carried out in the framework of *Logica Modernorum*. The logical school of the Parvipontani is the place where these modernist theses took their origin.

Now let’s take a look at the very modern way how Parvipontans argumented. There is the rule that one can derive something generally valid at the level of being done out from nothing (*ex impossibili quidlibet sequitur*).[[51]](#footnote-51) The disjunctive judgment sophistically follows the classic imposition, which, however, does not entail the relation to reality. Since nothing is given in reality, then Sortes knows nothing (*si hoc, nihil scit*). The second way of interpretation is quite modern. Following the pattern of Hegel’s absolute logic, the saying defines *aliquid* in terms of nullity, which is conceived in the consciousness of the logical subject. Reflexive self-consciousness replaces the nullity with the first representational content (*Sortes scit hoc, ergo aliquid*). The logical equivalence of terms “*nihil—aliquid*” is quite important for the further development of objectivity. The meaning is given by a false logical kind of the imposition (*ergo*), therefore it comes in the subject *ex nihilo*, that is, merely by self-reflection of the logician concerning the semantic meaning of the word “*nihil* (*Sortes scit se nihil scire*). Because of the self-reflection, the metaphysical nihilism became the logical positivism as “something” (*aliquid*) made out of pure logic. The second way gives the modern nihilism the first positive content. Parvipontans introduced the first process of Hegel’s absolute dialectic into logic (*Einheit von Sein und Nichts*).[[52]](#footnote-52) Modern Porretans and after them postmodern Cartesians and Hegelians perceive the existing being as an object of logical self-reflection, which acquired a metaphysical status. The univocally conceived meaning endows in the mode of logical abstraction all real and imagined things with hypostatized beingness. Contemporary philosophical nihilism knows this process by the famous phrase: “Anything goes.” The above-cited school of *Nominales* was unable to distinguish the logical supposition given only in mind (*scit se nihil scire*) and they took it wrongly for the metaphysical imposition given from reality (*scit hoc, ergo aliquid*). The modernists then univocally connect two meanings (*aliquid scit et nihil scit*). The false imposition created *ex nihilo* produced a metaphysically non-existent second substance as *tertium ens*; however, this is logically correctly defined, just like any other logical chimera. According to Parmenides, the path of the non-being is impassable (παναπευθέα, B 2.6). However, that is not the case of modernity that follows the path of absolutely given logical meaning of being. Modern logic starts deduction at nothing because it is given in the mode *absolute*, being separated from reality by logical abstraction. The metaphysician cannot use this type of nihilistic abstraction and thinking because he would cease to be a critical thinker. The logician can be paranoid because he is separated from reality by a form of logical abstraction. Logical paranoia has become metaphysically true under the leadership of modern Furies, and even in an absolute way. The classical logician of Abelard’s type distinguishes two things in principle. The logical meaning formed by the supposition exists only in thought. The metaphysical meaning of being is categorically given with regard to the second substance by the imposition of meaning from the hyparchical given reality of the first substance. The logical predication of meaning is determined by the rules of formal logic. The metaphysical supposition is determined by the causality that is translated into true statements by means of the metaphysical dative. The modern logic of the Porretans works within the framework of logical abstraction, which is given as absolute supposition. Therefore, *Logica Modernorum* no more consider the difference between the logical and the metaphysical abstraction, and therefore it does not see the difference between the logical and categorical predication. The cited dialectical procedures, as they are given in the corpus of *Logica Modernorum*, passed over into metaphysics. Schools of *Nominales* and Porretans created a sophistical equivalence between imposition and supposition, between the metaphysical being of the thing and its formal concept given only in the thinking of the subject. The argumentation of Porretan logical schools endowed the nonbeing with its own kind of existence within the framework of sophismata such as “*Ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet*.” Such cases were analyzed in the context of student exercises of the type *Insolubilia* (ed. Roure 1970) or *Obligationes* (ed. Braakhius 1998). The imposition does not arise at all by means of the first real substance, but it proceeds from the cognizing subject. The metaphysical dative and the real causality of cognition were replaced by Avicennist’s self-reference of the active intellect.

The imposition of meaning from the hyparchical first substance establishes in the system of Aristotelian *Logica Vetus* the metaphysical distinction between the logical exercise over the chimera and the categorical predication given in terms of the real thing. This fundamental distinction fell into oblivion. This pitiful situation finds its continuation in the chimerical contemporary philosophy of language due to the crisis of reference. In times of metaphysical nihilism, the logically minor difference between metaphysics and logical abstraction manifests itself in the sophistry of financial derivatives. These existence of the third kind “exsist” in an absolute way separated from reality. The economic simulacra multiply in a modern and logical way, that is, through the act of reflection concerning virtual debts in computers and in minds of concerned illuminati. For Abelard, as a contemporary of logical schools of *Modernorum*, the metaphysical concept of nothing as subject is absolutely excluded. The absolutely conceived negations exclude a relationship to the real being that establishes the signification (*nil omnino, nullam omnino rem*). According to Abelard’s logical school, which the philosophical beginners of the time compulsorily completed at the Cathedral school in Paris, similar logical abstractions contain only the intransitive mode of *copulatio*. The copula “*est*” forms a purely formal predication by connecting the predicates in an intransitive way, that is, in the mode *absolute*, with regard to the substance as a pure supposition in mind. The Paris Cathedral School, built on Aristotelian logic defended by Abelard, took the transitive predication of the type “The chimera is the non-being” (*chimaera est non-ens*) only in the mode of equivocal meaning.[[53]](#footnote-53) The meaning of the chimera is given in the mode of opinion (*opinabile*). Chimerical thought has no imposition from reality and thus no true supposition. The chimera has no metaphysically true meaning (*supponit pro*) to be a supposition. The imposition of this meaning cannot be justified from the existence of the real first substance. The quoted saying (*enuntiatio*) creates meaning only at the level of the word (*oratio*). One then compares the formal contents in the mode of logical abstraction. Logical abstraction performed the act of absolution from reality, which the metaphysician is not allowed to do. His thinking is “transitive” because it goes to reality in the mode of the imposition and *demonstratio*. Because the chimera does not exist, then neither is chimerical and true metaphysics and economics, wherein man is not a corpse, and the financial derivative has no value. Modern metaphysics began with Henry of Ghent, when the objective being of chimera became the basis of the first philosophy (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.1). Aristotelianism cannot accept chimerical metaphysics of Porretan modernity. The described dispute of both logical schools shows the fundamental rejection of the future *via Modernorum* at the moment of its historical beginning. Modernity first endeavored to penetrate classical metaphysics through Porretans and through *Logica Modernorum* dominated by them. Parmenides’s concord of being and thinking (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, *Parm*. B 3) constitutes the first principal dative (*dativus principalis*). Then it is true that in the correspondence of thought and reality there is philosophically nothing to interpret if thinking is determined from the direction of the non-existent being. In the age of modernity, even the metaphysical dative has become the non-being. Modernity and postmodernity are characterized by their inability to see the fundamental (i.e. metaphysical) difference between categorical and logical predication. The logical abstraction of Parvipontans is incapable of seeing its own limits. Porretans, and after them all modernity, naively presupposes that the imposition is given in the mode of generically conceived existence (*subsistentia non esse sed esse aliquid*). Logical truth has been no longer distinct from the metaphysical and categorical predication.

Gilbert proceeded in the same way as Avicenna and created a new form of *tertium ens*. The extension, for example, no longer had the status of accident, which is determined with regard to the second substance. We have already described the history of the emergence of the hypostatized accidents in the Neoplatonism (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). The corporeity of the third kind arose in the context of Avicenna’s definition of the body as an objectively determined substance (*non est necesse esse in corpore tres dimensiones in effectu*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). By confusing different levels of signification, a new definition of being emerged in the logical schools of *Modernorum* influenced by Gilbert de La Porrée. Abelard, who died just one year after the Council of Sens (1141), would have objected to the Porretans, as did Peter Lombard, that it is equivocally possible to say all sorts of things. The meaning given merely in modus *opinabile* involves neither truth nor falsehood. The true statement is made in virtue of the relation to reality. Aristotelian thinker Peter Lombard was a follower of Abelard at the cathedral school in Paris and accused modern Gilbert and his logical and theological school of tritheism. The Council of Paris responded to this complaint in 1147. The whole dispute shows the first clearing of metaphysical truth and mythology that led to the birth and death of God of *Modernorum*. Porretans were accused of heresy, and this time the mystic Bernard of Clairvaux opposed them. The question confirms the emergence of the philosophical doctrine based on the new conception of substance as an individual (*individuum*). In Porretan schools, predication defines both the classical accidents in the table of ten categories and the new hypostatized meaning. It is given as the univocal participation of autonomously subsisting qualities, which are attributed to the individual thing given as being of the third kind (*esse aliquid*). The Paris School asserts to the modernists that the divine Trinity is not a metaphysical “whatever” created by logic in the mode *ex nihilo*, also at the level of the chimera as a mere *opinabile*. The Avicennian concept of “*equinitas tantum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2) has almost nothing to do with the real horse. God took on the first chimerical character with Porretan modernists. These Christian modernists diligently prepared the arrival of this theological simulacrum just as Avicenna did in the Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). This nominalist thesis was considered a fundamental error torpedoing the essence of Christianity in the time of the critical thinking of the Paris School. The councils devoted to the question of tritheism in the second half of the 12th century show how truth and error coexisted in the metaphysics and dogmatic of the time. God of modernity became a sophistical simulacrum in the mode of metaphysical error. In Porretan metaphysics, he was given the first form of historial unconcealment (*alētheia*), made by academically trained Furies. A fundamental change concerned the subsistence of accidents, which had previously been predicated merely accidentally in terms of the second substance. Gilbert de La Porrée took categories to establish a new class of generic universals, which are conceived as a dogmatically defined hypostasis (*Deus est deitas*). Gilbert predicates “*deitas*” in the mode of universal supposition, whereas Anselm predicates them in the mode of categorical imposition, which relates to the real divine essence. When the Aristotelian and the modernist say the same thing, they do not mean the same thing. The meaning of being is not predicated in the same mode. Modern logic is not classical metaphysics. By forming a new concept and by predicating univocal generic hypostases on subsisting substrates of permanent determinations (*subsistens quale*), the first model of objective being of the third kind emerges in the Latin West. Aristotelians saw correctly that this leads to destruction of God and of the human being, because the definitions have acquired the nominal character of *opinabile*.

Porretans enabled the history of effects that imported Neoplatonism due to the reception of Avicenna in the second half of the 12th century. Gilbert’s followers adopted the new determinations of being in the framework of metaphysical “neutrality” of being in pure beingness (*hoc esse tantum*). The introduction of modern logic based on this substance of the third kind was made possible by Avicenna’s amphibolic predication. The neutral being of the third kind used transcendental predication of hypostatized existence and accidentals. Porretans linked this dogmatic and philosophical hypostasis from the second half of the 12th century both with the Platonism of the cathedral schools of the type Chartres and Laon and with nominalist logical schools, which we know from the corpus of the *Logica Modernorum*. New hypostases have become the being of the third kind. The being of existing things is put together to the new kinds of *tertium ens* to establish a new categorical predication. Neoplatonic interpretation of categories created highest genera of being to make their participation in the One according to the hierarchy of autonomously subsisting forms (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). This gave rise to the predication according to *magis* and *minus* at the level of universals. Classic metaphysics rejected this proceeding in principle. Existence of universals is merely a potentiality given in thought and universals cannot have more or less being because they are a pure potentiality. The categories became Neoplatonic highest genera of being and these were conceived in the hierarchy of more or less subsistent forms. Simplicius’s commentary on *Categories* establishes the first modern predication of universals in the framework *magis* and *minus* (κατηγορίας ...τὰ πρός τι δέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, *Simpl. in Cat*. 286.11‒13). This line was followed by Neoplatonic schools of Falsafa and after it by Avicenna through predication with the help of comitation (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The treatise on predication under the title *Liber sex principiorum* (ca. 1150) was attributed to the Porretans school. The writing performs, probably for the first time in the Latin West, a predication of substances of the third kind (e.g., “the whiteness”) in the modus *magis* and *minus*.[[54]](#footnote-54) A new form of imposition took place that pretends to be determined by hyparchical being of the first substance. Modern “exsistence” as being of the third kind got a mythological determination like the first substance. The predication of such “first” substance of the third kind in the mode “*magis—minus*” extended the influence of modern logic. The universal determination of the highest genera and forms is united with the categorical predication. The potential concept of indivisible substance (*individuum*) was set in universal division of universals as a second substance. This is absolutely impossible according to classical Aristotelianism. The universal meaning either exists or it does not exist. Every universal meaning is only potential and in the potency one cannot introduce some stages of actuality. According to Boethius, there is no difference “*magis—minus*” at the level of universal signification because it is merely a potential being.[[55]](#footnote-55) Accidents of the type “more” or “less” (*magis esse sanitatem*) are predicated only with regard to the corresponding substance, which is its carrier in this or that degree of actuality and potentiality (*esse saniorem*). The arrival of modernity made possible a new determination of hypostatized qualities, being, essence, etc. according to the principle of differentiation “less” and “more.” Introduction of univocal predication for hypostatized entities in schools of Porretans gave birth to a new quasi-categorical predication. It gradually replaced Aristotelian predication related to the first substance. This distinction made in the mode *per prius* and *per posterius* enabled the creation of a new hierarchy of subsistent intelligible forms according to the *Liber de causis*. Porretans did not conceive the uniqueness of new individuals and its hypostatized properties in terms of first substances, but in terms of impossibility that concerns nominal division of this or that universal entity (*individuum*). The existence of real things became first merely a kind of potency and finally but a predicate made by the comitation. It is given on the basis of the last difference between the individual in question and something else (*aliquid esse*). This modern individual became another substance of the third kind. Predication of modern *individuum* provided for emergence of a new form of objective, mathematically given metaphysics. It establishes a system of hierarchical infinitesimal predication given outside the real thing and the categorical substance. Following the example of Gilbert and Porretans, hermeneutics investigated proceedings of theological dogmatic. It created the simulacrum of modern God and split the person into several substances. Both forms of schizoid *tertium ens* form the basis of Western objectivity. Their disappearance caused the end of the objective worldview as well. The vacuum thus created is filled by the nihilistic simulacra of global corporations and the political and ideological power they have bought about to enrich their virtual accounts.

Gilbert de La Porrée started the transformation of Christian dogmatic into modern objectivity. Authoritatively enforced dogmatic of the Church helped Neoplatonic *illuminati* in the second half of the 12th century to remain blind to philosophical truth of being. The first Latin modernists replaced the reality in thinking by their own prefabricate as being of the third kind. The hyparchical value of the first substance and the predication by the imposition have remained quite unclear until today. The wave of Neoplatonists accomplished the philosophical destruction of the first substance in the Latin West by reducing it to a semantic meaning (*individuum*). The being of the first substance, which Boethius considers unique and outside of any participation, receives the new meaning of universality and individuality in the school of Porretans. These facts are incorporated in the system of modern “exsistence” predicated as hierarchical order of universally conceived beingness to be the highest genus. The previous part described the quarrel of Neoplatonists about the concept of indivisible substance (ἄτομος οὐσία) in the framework of the new statute of species (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Because of interchange of the species with the first substance such as cosmic intelligences, the first ontotheological model of *tertium ens* came into being in the philosophy of Jamblichus and Simplicius. In Neoplatonic universe of Simplicius, the indivisibility refers to the primary cosmic species as pure forms (κυριώτερόν ἐστι τῶν ἀτόμων κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, *Simpl. in Cat*. 85.12‒13). Meaning of the individual derives from the superior generic forms as hypostatic substances. The schizophrenic nature of modern God creates a modern man and his world. Aristotle’s metaphysical dative has become Neoplatonic mythology according to the dialogue *Timaeus*. The transition from the higher forms to the lower ones is considered in ontotheological construction of metaphysics. Situated outside of reality, the indivisible substance forms the terminus of thinking, since it impossible to further divide the general meaning into lower forms of universals. The Latin expression “*terminus*” precisely captures the whole process of nominalist abstraction and individuation, which ends at the new form of the first substance. The movement of specific difference stops at the last link of the series of univocal division of species, which cannot be further divided (*individuum*) within the framework of Porphyry’s Tree. Porretans became the first nihilistic terminators of metaphysics. Due to absolute value of logic, they founded the first historical figure of the *circulus vitiosus* of modernity. This is the main reason why the hermeneutics of objectivity consider these sophists as founders of Latin modernity. The dialectical division delimits the final “de-termination” situated beyond the final operation of universal classification and predication. The impossibility of division is positively balanced by infinite possibility of predication of specific qualities with respect to the newly created substrate (*aliquid, id est subsistens*). The new substrate is determined by universal divisibility of formally determined essences.

Formal division of reality was founded by modern Avicennism that was thought in the well-known Jansenist logical school in the Parisian monastery Port-Royal. Antoine Arnauld and Blaise Pascal bequeathed the objective classification of reality in the order of logically pure language to the world in their writing *La logique, ou l’art de penser* (1662).[[56]](#footnote-56) The new division of qualities within the framework of Porphyry’s Tree of universals establishes not only postmodernism, but also contemporary poststructuralism, which is given in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. Saussure, as the founder of modern linguistics, showed how meaning emerges fully *ex nihilo* in the system of differences.[[57]](#footnote-57) In the same way, the post-structuralist Michel Foucault determined the fundamental place of the production of meaning for humanist sciences (*Les mots et les choses*, 1966). Jacques Derrida, as a critic of so-called “logocentrism” in philosophy, only needs the movement of difference as such to constitute meaning. The concept of “différ*a*nce” (« *Genèse et structure » et la phénoménologie*, 1959) applies the principle of Porretanian division first in the context of Saussure’s differentiation of the linguistic sign (*valeur*) and then as structuralist difference, which is applied first in the system of phonology and later in structural anthropology (*écart différentiel*).[[58]](#footnote-58) At the end of the 20th century, metaphysical nihilism present in the philosophy of post-structuralists such as Foucault and Derrida repeated the original approach of the *Nominales*. Modernity began with non-being and ended with the individual as terminal movement of pure difference.

Porretans returned to Neoplatonic tradition of philosophy. They rejected categorical predication based on Aristotelian interpretation of the categories, which Boethius explicitly opposed to Neoplatonism, see the above-mentioned question of participation. In the second half of the 12th century, Avicenna’s metaphysics began to influence the Latin West. It introduced being of the third kind as pure essence (*hoc esse tantum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). In the following epoch, that “*tantum esse*” made out by logicians and grammarians receives a metaphysically character. The proof of this synthesis is given by the logical writings of Porretan schools. There opened transition from the logical concept of being, necessity, substance, etc. into the system of the new metaphysics that was produced in schools of *Nominales*. One of the first determinations of objective being as a new form of the thing is contained in the writing *Dialectica monacensis* dated around the year 1160. Probably for the first time in the Latin West, the possibility became a generic property of the univocally predicated being to be conceived in a Neoplatonic manner as the highest genus of being (*possibile superius et quasi genus*).[[59]](#footnote-59) Logical schools of Porretans combined formal possibile determinations of things as in the mode of logical signification (*predicabile est de omni dicto*) with the imposition of meaning from the hyparchical first substance that entails a causal necessity translated into metaphysics (*scilicet necessarium et contingens*). For logical *illuminati*, everything is equally logically pure. Such a false, univoce created connection of logic and metaphysics established the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of all future versions of Oxfordian Fallacy and in subsequently postmodern versions of *metaphysica generalis*. The new division of modal categories is univocal in character and begins with potency as the highest genus, which is superior to contingencies and necessity (*ad hec duo, scilicet* *necessarium et contingens*). Key function has the determination of contingency from the point of view of the logically conceived “*tantum esse*.” For Abelard’s school, the logical concept of being imported into metaphysics represented a total loss of critical thinking. The same will happen again after the year 1220, when Averroes’s treatises spread in the Latin West to the full extent. After Gilbert’s death in 1154, his opponents refer to the Porretan being of the third kind by the pejorative name “*nomen*.” The naming of *Nominales* resulted in the transformation of Porretan schools into new forms of metaphysics, as is attested around the year 1160 in the work *Metalogicon*.[[60]](#footnote-60) John of Salisbury criticized the *Nominales* for the Platonic conception of reality, which they had adopted from Bernard of Chartres (Bernardus Carnotensis, †1124). Hermeneutics is particularly interested in Salisbury’s contemptuous title “*impugnator nominalis sectae*” for the aforementioned Alberich of Rheims, who was one of Abelard’s staunch opponents. Porretans were accused of tritheism at the Council of Paris in 1147 and the title of nominalist schismatics is quite justified. The school of sophistic Porretans and Neoplatonic *Nominales* relates the supposition (*supponere*) to hypostatized properties of nominally defined substrata. The new vision of reality and the resulting conception of truth as *rectitudo* no longer see first substances, but only the abstract individuals. There is a new determination of atomic substance (*individuum*), which is given by dialectical division of universals according to the Tree of Porphyry (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). This became a sophistical mix between first and second substance, as it was the case in Neoplatonism. The following quotation from the work *Metalogicon* shows the essential features of the first school of Latin *Modernorum*.

“Since the existence of hypostatized substances is taken for granted, they impute this existence to the second substances, compose them anew and add the universals to real singular things and thus connect them with the essence (*denuo colligunt, universalia singularibus, quod ad essentiam, unienda*). Thus they take the existence according to Gautier de Mortagne and according to Plato. What establishes Plato’s own existence, they call the individual (*in eo quod Plato est, dicunt individuum*). What is man is given as species. What is given as the animal is taken as species, but in the secondary meaning, and the substance has become the most general.” [[61]](#footnote-61)

John of Salisbury clearly sees the fundamental error of the first modernists. The nominalists, out of ignorance of classical metaphysics and Aristotle’s *Logica Vetus*, connected two fundamentally different meanings of substance. The categorial predication of the second substance, which is given by the imposition of meaning from the hyparchical first substance, arrived at the same level as the indivisible part of the species, which is given at the end of the division of the universals (*individuum*). The composition of abstract determinations taken from the point of view of *Nominales*, forms a particular single thing (*individuum*), which is given on the same ontotheological level as the hyparchical first substance (*in eo quod Plato est, dicunt individuum*). The real Plato has become a modern individuum; his tragically false version of philosophy has become an accomplished tragicomedy. The next part of the description of the new school shows clearly that this division proceeds according to the measure of generality (*sed subalternum*), which is given in the framework of the division of universals according to the tree of Porphyry *(in eo quod homo, speciem: in eo quod animal, genus*). At the beginning of the series of division is the general substance in the sense of the Platonist Scotus Eurigena (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The first substance is now equivalent to the Neoplatonic essence (*essentia*). This transcendental expresses the universal concept of being in the Platonic sense of the highest genus and thus of universal substance. The first sentence of the quotation asserts that the school of *Nominales* doubled reality through their own entities. Porretans bypassed the reality of the first substance. They replaced the *modus essendi* with the collection of hypostatized universal and individually given properties (*existentibus his quorum sunt substantialia*). They added these properties to the abstract substrate (*denuo colligunt*). This kind of retroactive collection of abstract determinations (*universalia singularibus ... unienda*) was added to the nominally determinate substance (*quod ad essentiam*). This collection of hypostatized accidences formed a new atomic substance of the third kind (*individuum*). By interchanging the logical abstraction (*individuum*) with the metaphysical predication of species as the imposition the hyparchical value of the first substance disappeared, being now represented by logically conceived concept of substance. The school of *Nominales* became both absolutely logical and absolutely paranoid. This founding event (*Ereignis*) given by the disappearance of common sense gave birth to Latin modernism. To the first modernists, the imposition of categorical meaning does not relate hyparchical reality. Modernism keeps only the supposition, which it mistook for an imposition, since it introduced instead of the metaphysical dative a merely meaning in thinking (*substantialia*). The second substance became a modern individual that entered the categorial Aristotelian predication as a “truly” (i.e., mythologically and thus objectively) determined substitution (*his quorum sunt substantialia, denuo colligunt*). The new collection of hypostases is now predicated of *individuum* that plays the role of the categorial second substance. Gilbert de La Porrée was the first modernist Latin to create such a doubling of reality. He put the hypostatized subsistence on the same level as the existence of the real thing. According to *Nominales*, the truth as a modern consensus compares these or those cognized forms in the intellect (*denuo colligunt*), not considering the causal relation of cognition that material things exercised upon the senses. The definition of the individual is determined by the term “*collecta*,” which expresses the apposition of hypostatized predicates to the not further divisible element of the division of universals (*individuum*). In schools of Porretans, the cognition is performed according to a new version of Avicenna’s collecting (*iltaqaṭa*). This collection of properties into an individual whole is made possible by avicennistic abstraction conceived as *denudatio*. The formal determinations are gathered into the being of the third kind (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). This individual substrate at the level of the species is further determined by apposition (*apponere*), i.e., by adding further qualitative determinations (Valente 2013). The school of *Nominales* did not follow the path of the metaphysical dative. The modern *illuminati* observe the presence of the nominal meanings created in solar intellect of their own. The thinking directed by the modern Furies shows the direction from where the imposition comes to the new individual, which is grasped as the first substance. The first substance is synthesized in the process of the collection of the accidentals and the essential properties. Instead, it should be recognized thanks to the exposure from the front, from the direction of real things that effectively on human senses. Porretans don’t have to explore the first real substance any more. They keep the first substance in their enlightened intellect in order to push it away. These sophistical productions of new forms of *tertium ens* conceive the first modern shape of metaphysics in the second half of the 12th century. The important Aristotelians of the Parisian school founded by Abelard, such as Peter Lombard and John of Salisbury, completely rejected this path of their contemporaries. The emergence of the objective being is concealed in the term “*collectio*,” which is tied to Avicenna’s vision of the world made through the separated *intellectus agens*. The world is illuminated by cosmic intelligible forms. This nominalistic trajectory of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) established the original sense of objectivity in the Latin West. The essential properties and hypostases gather in the intellect (*collectio*) and this collection of formal essences is compared among themselves (*collatio*). According to the well-known analysis of scholastic theories of abstraction, in those schools of *Nominales* came to being new concepts of abstraction as *collectio*, *colligatio* and *collatio*, which is tied to the principally modified statute of species (Chenu 1927, Libera 1999, 224‒80). The modern approach of univocal collection, attested in the work of above-mentioned Gautier de Mortagne, will play an important role in the later *Modernorum*. Gualterus de Mauritania (†1174) studied with Alberich in Reims Cathedral School. This contemporary of Salisbury became a magister in Paris after 1150 and bishop in Laon in 1155. From the quoted texts, it is clear that Salisbury is by no means criticizing a single magister, but some representatives of influential modernist cathedral schools.

The anonymous work *Tractatus*, which was written after the year 1160 announces new statutes of the individual, of the matter and of the hypostatized predication. The treatise was written at about the same time as the Porretan writing *Notae Dunelmenses* cited above. To compare the work *Tractatus* with Aristotelians of the Paris School, let us return to Abelard that enumerates the different status of substance with respect to the imposition of meaning (ch. 1.3). Substance, from the point of view of categorical determination (*'totum' autem aliud secundum substantiam*), is either the universal thing (*aliud secundum formam*); or the particular thing given by the composition of form and substance (*aliud secundum utrumque dicitur*). Aristotelian Boethius, Abelard and John of Salisbury completely excluded a univocal differentiation of universals up to the level of the hylemorphic single thing (e.g., *Socrates*). According to Boethius’s interpretation of *Isagoge* mentioned above, the universal predicates ask about the way things are given in the intellect (*quale quiddam est*) and not about the being of the concrete thing in reality (*non in eo quod quid est*, ch. 1.1). Boethius predicated universal meaning related to the first substance. That kind of imposition disappeared in the schools of *Nominales*. They made the distinction between the first and second substances obsolete. The loss of metaphysical imposition and the univocal supposition associated to it meant that disappeared the distinction between the categorical second substance and the merely general nominal meaning of the logical second substance (Abelard’s *oratio*). Nominalists created the first metaphysics of the chimera. Classical Aristotelians took it for paranoia total. *Nomen omen*. A key role in the transformation of substance into the objective individual passed through the term “*species specialissima*.” The original model of Porretan individual predication of *species specialissima* must be sought in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*; however, it carries Aristotelian meaning and not Neoplatonic one. Boethius conceives *species specialissima* in the order of *Arbor Porphyriana*, which is given in contrast to the generality of the highest genus. This species defines in Boethius’s translation of the *Isagoge* univocally the last level of universality, which is given from the direction of the one particular genus. The last universal species on the other side of the division no longer contains anything of the generic meaning of the genus superior to it. The new identity of universal meaning holds only at the level of the species. But, of course, this division is possible only in the universals and its mix with the first real substance is excluded. We have already discussed the twofold status of species with respect to the genus and the singular things in the mode *per prius* and *per posterius* treated species in the introduction to this study (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Modernity chose the mythological path of being of the third kind. Therefore, it must find a third form of signification of the substance, which exists neither in reality nor only in thought. The author of the treatise works with a threefold concept of the substance and abolishes the difference between the supposition given by the cognizing subject and the imposition given by the reality of the first substance. The trajectory of understanding peculiar of modernity comes from the exposure of the individual from behind, that is, from the direction of the hypostatized collect of predicates, which are given only in thought. Through the absolute thinking of *illuminati*, the first historical unconcealment (*alētheia*) of the objective worldview. The following quotation establishes the epoch of modernity in the still veiled historicity, which is given in the mode “*discrete videamus*.”

“One can observe the triple meaning of the term (*triplicem nominum significationem*): the first meaning is in the substance, the second in the quality. The third meaning names what we see indivisible in nouns and adjectives (*discrete videamus*). The concrete name ‘*Socrates*’ has the specific nature of man (*specialem naturam hominis*) and likewise also the same quality (*qualitatem eandem*) about which we have spoken above. The name truthfully names the individual thing (*nominat vero individuam rem*) to which it is assigned (*cui positum est*).” [[62]](#footnote-62)

The author works with the determination of being according to schools of *Nominales*, which he univocally attributes to the different instances of signification: to the substance (*in substantia*), to the accident (*in qualitate*) and to the nominal definition of the first substance as the modern individual (*quod nominatur*). The univocal substitution of one meaning to another applies indiscriminately to three determinations of hypostatized substance. The imposition is out of the table, there is no hyparchic value of the first substance. Above-mentioned meaning “*in substantia*” confusedly takes an immediate participation of cognizing intellect in hyparchical being of the first substance in reality. The entities of the third kind manifest themselves as real first substances. The nominal definition applies to the last indivisible unity of meaning given universally and individually (*quod in substantivis et adiectivis discrete videamus*). The division of being into the last units of nominally given meaning continues up to the individual. The discrete division of species stops at the last meaning, which is not further divisible. The author of *Tractatus*, influenced by Gilbert de La Porrée, relates the definition of substance to individual entity, which is an atomic substance of the third kind. The division from top to bottom, to the indivisible individual, connects the first and the second substance to a new figure of the indivisible substance. Made by such a collection, the modern individual named “*Socrates*” and also his nominalist “*humanitas*” arise. In the mode of apposition, the individual is assorted with hypostatized predicates that extend the basic individual determination given by the final division of universals (*nominat vero individuam rem cui positum est*). Socrates gets a transcendental determination of the type “*res a corpus*.” The objective circumstantiality, known from the work of Jamblichus and Simplicius, was attributed to the determination of the proper name (*cui positum est*). It is meant in a nominalistic way but it extended the nomination into the realm of the existing individual (*individuam rem*). To the individual entity can be attributed various external hypostatized properties, in the form of objective Neoplatonic and Avicennist body. These properties represent for Aristotelians of the Parisian school merely accidents given on the second substance. Instead of the second substance called “wise Socrates” we have the composition of two hypostases: the individual “Socratity” (*socratitas*) and the “wisdom” appositionally added to it. The work *Tractatus* sees a different world than the Aristotelian philosophy according to Boethius, Abelard, Peter Lombard or John of Salisbury. The new individual has both the singular character of the first substance and the universal character of the second substance.

Porretans created a new indivisible first substance in the mode of “*totum integrum*,” which before had belonged only to the first substance. The individual called “*Socrates*” came *ex nihilo* as a pure supposition of modern thinking. The school of *Nominales* sees the first substance in the epochal new mode of the “discrete” view of the world (*discrete videamus*), which is completed by the infinitesimal number in mathematics. The anonymous *Treatise* uses Neoplatonic sophistry with regard to the first substance and to the material body, which the continuation of quoted quotation shows.[[63]](#footnote-63) Porretan *Tractatus* works with the term “*substantia nominis*,” which expresses the new subsistence of an individual bearer that is meant by given name (“*Socrates*”). Socrates’s individual uniqueness is directly contained in the proper name (*hoc nomen substantiam habet specialem naturam hominis*). The anonymous writer sees the person not as the first substance, but as the totality of nominal determinations predicated with respect to the individual (*nominat vero specialem rem*). This individual is the bearer of corresponding universal hypostases (*humanitas*), which entail a specific and not further divisible meaning of given individual (*qualitas nominis*). The cognition of Socrates proceeds on the last stage by the fact that the determination of the substance within the nomination also concerns the determination of the matter given in the external thing (*quam nominant uel quasi materiam*). The quoted matter of the third kind (*quasi materia*) is given as universally given quantified extension and passes into the nominal determination of the Porretan individual (*id quod redigit materiam in id quod nominatur*). The specific nature and the uniqueness derived by the last division of the species arise at the level of the individual. To the given determination of the quasi-substance “*Socrates*” a corresponding “corporeality” (*qualitas*), which is unique to Socrates, is added (*qualitatem eandem quam superius diximus*). Socrates is given as a thing within the special genus. This simulacrum now got an individual determination of the third kind in the form of matter, quantity and extension. Let us recall that such a discrete “Socrates” can be scanned and added to mathematical models. The specification of the individual “Socrates” in the sense of the last certain and not further divisible differentiation of the species “man” is given directly in the verbal act of signification. Therefore it is not necessary to go up to the reality. The substance as a category does not follow the hyparchical order *per prius* from the first substance to the second. The substance is first determined generically (*habet animal ipsum*) and by the differentiation towards the species (*homo*). Terminus of the division (*terminus*) is the individual. It arises due to derivation of meanings when the differentiation of universals according to *Arbor Porphyriana* creates a more specific generality. The key part of the terminological predication, which is given by the division of the specific meanings or by their collecting, is based in the logical statement (*enuntiatio*) according to the quotation from the treatise. The logical statement connects in the copula the specific “S” (*specialem rem, specialem naturam hominis*) with the corresponding comitation determination “P” (*qualitas*). The statement of Porretans in the form of specific *colligatio* then gives a resulting composition of the modern substance (*hoc nomen*) given as an individual.

Porretans took up Anselm’s twofold supposition, especially its invariable part (*significat ad quod significandum facta est*, ch. 1.2). The school of *Nominales* classified the class of abstractly conceived meanings in the framework of logical grammar, into so-called “*denominativa*” whose actualization was given in singular things. Boethius’s cited treatise *De hebdomadibus* identifies a similar type of comitation of hypostatized properties as impossible, even for God himself. God does not create nonsense called “whiteness” but a white thing. Boethius rejected in principle a predication of subsistent qualities made in the manner of Neoplatonism.[[64]](#footnote-64) The anonymous author of *Tactatus* knows the writing *Isagoge* and acknowledges that specific animality makes but a secondary determination with regard to the real Socrates. But he creates it already in the order *per prius*, because he conceived it in the mode of Porretan hypostatized existence. The identification of the modern individual based on Porretan’s *collecta* introduced the concept of hypostatized existence in the dialectic. It allows a reversal of dialectical process in order to pass from the analysis to the synthesis. The general determinations define the single thing as an individual, to which additional hypostatic determinations are assigned. Socrates is nothing else than a human species (*specialem naturam hominis*). This species get hypostatized qualities as specific extensions. They are assigned to “this individual” in the form of individualized comprehensiveness and matter. The integration of qualities creates an individual called “Socrates” that is not only created by the division of universals, but also by the collection of different hypostases, that is by synthetic composition of *ad hoc* given general things. Aristotelian John of Salisbury rejected such collecting as metaphysical nonsense. He gave the well-known name to this sect of modernists, because of this fundamental error given at the level of *nomen*. The same univocal process of division and synthesis of universals, set in motion by derivation and integration, we find in the school of the second Averroism in the terms “*resolution*“” and “*composition*” (ch. 3.3.2). Leibniz’s differential number repeats in postmodernism this approach to reality considered discretely.

Mathematics became the new *mathesis universalis*. This type of thinking displaced the critical metaphysics of the first substance in the present epoch of Cartesian nihilism. In the course of the function, the derivation separates “*magis*” and “*minus*” of objective quantity from the hypostatized atomic substance. This hypothetical substance forms the last limit of the mathematical, i.e., of the purely logical function. This substance of the third kind is defined in the infinitesimal calculus as principium, as dogmatically and logically given formal being. The *tertium ens* is defined in terms of mathematical accumulation (*collectio*), which forms a formal set of logical relations and operations. This function represents the nominal matrix (*essentia*) and the carrier (*subiectum*) of all logical relations and operations. In the mathematically applied postmodernism, the first real substance had to disappear infinitesimally. Instead of Porretan individuals, the mathematics displaced in the mode “*discrete videamus*” observes the formally defined entity as pure non-being. This hypothetical substance forms the last limit of the mathematical, i.e., the purely logical function. This substance of the third kind is defined in the infinitesimal calculus as *principium*, as dogmatically and logically given formal being. The *tertium ens* is defined in terms of mathematical accumulation (*collectio*), which forms a formal set of logical relations and operations. This function represents the nominal matrix (*essentia*) and the carrier (*subiectum*) of all logical relations and operations. Instead of the individual, the differential number puts an infinitely small difference between *magis* and *minus* into the formal division. Leibniz creates a specific derivation on the basis of the nihilistically determined difference. The derivation of the infinitely small division is given formally, with respect to the positive or negative course of the arbitrarily determined function. Either there is more or less of “something” (*tertium ens*). In every moment it comes to differentiation of mathematical value determined in this way. It is defined by a formal function and the transformation (*magis, minus*) of the mathematical variable. The formal division within the mathematical derivation corresponds to Porretan classification that is terminated by specific impossibility of further division. The integral number in mathematics takes over the composition of hypostatized qualities to make another individual in the mode of Porretanian collection. The infinitely small difference given by above-mentioned derivation is composed of a formal whole, which is given in the mode of Gilbert’s substance as something definite (*subsistentia non esse sed esse aliquid*). The lower and upper limits of the determinate integral then define given mathematical individual that is given by the sum of formal differences. The first original substance in Porphyry’s and Boethius’s mode of “*totum integrum*” passed into the mathematical operations given as an integral calculus. Mathematical difference is derived from the infinite derivation as division and from the collect as integration. Both procedures start from the hypostatized and discrete vision of reality. This worldview is set in the framework of logical abstraction and in the mode *magis* and *minus*. Thus, discrete vision of the world, as given in the school of *Nominales*, became a postmodern mathematical *factum*. The author of the *Tractatus* started discretely the modern mathematical revolution, i.e., the major return (*revolutio*) to finish the Neoplatonic eclipse of the first substance. New meaning of hypostatized substances is bound to the last member of the division. Done in this way, nominalists expanded original twofold meaning of substance (*significatio substantialis*), which is given in two registers, with respect to the substance and with respect to the accident (*significatio accidentalis*). Statements predicated in relation to the second substance became in Porretan schools a hypostatized entity, which carries the act of categorical predication up to the level of the individual. This newly conceived entity was predicated by the first modernists in the form of categorial second substance to an arbitrarily determined collection of accidents. This collection is given in the form of the decomposition of generic determinations downward to *species specialissima*. It is modern derivation as Neoplatonic “διαίρεσις” to reach the final level of meaning as *species specialissima*. Or is it modern integration as nominalistic collecting (or Avicennist *comitatio*) of hypostases to create the modern individual. The school of *Nominales* following the new type of univocal logic (*Logica Modernorum*) thus contested classical Aristotelianism. Such a thing did not escape any well-educated member of Abelard’s philosophical school. Mathematics finally replaced the metaphysics of *Modernorum* following their epochal *Irrtum*. Classical Aristotelianism became completely superfluous in the postmodern era. Porretan logic was once again reduced and formalized, this time to an infinitesimal calculus.

Now, it becomes clear why and how the school of *Nominales* got its pejorative designation. The discrete view of the world (*discrete videamus*) made with the help of mathematical analogy has nothing to do with the predication of Porphyry and Abelard. The indivisibility of the first and the second substance was defined on the basis of generically distinct difference. This error entirely changed the predication of universals in the framework of *Arbor Porphyriana*. Abelard and Boethius locked the indivisibility in two different registers of the sense of being. The imposition is given with respect to the first substance, exists as hyparchical in the act of its unique and indivisible existence (*simpliciter*) in the hylemorphic form (*compositio*). This indivisibility is signified by categorical statements in the univocity of imposition and supposition. It forms deductive syllogism to establish scientific knowledge (*demonstratio*). The nominalistic subject was formed by the final division of species and by subsequent addition of immutable properties added to this indivisible basis (*subiectum*). This procedure established a fundamentally different meaning of the individual from that of classical metaphysics. According to Abelard, the Porretan individual represents a purely nominalistic expression (*opinabile*), like the word “chimera.” The being received a meaning in the framework of the new way of division based on the generic postulated subsistence as the ultimate substrate of any individual being (*aliquid esse*). The imposition of categorical meaning starts from the thought and the supposition univocally includes every nominally given universal. This proceeding completely blurred the distinction between the imposition of meaning from reality and the supposition of this meaning in thought. This meaning is given in the logical concept only aequivoce (*supponit pro*). The supposition is given *univoce* only in the metaphysical concept, which for this fundamental reason ensures the true predication of universality with respect to corresponding reality. The modern and classical metaphysics differ in principle in what the subject and reality of the true predication consist. Therefore, both types of metaphysics do not have the same conception of truth. The nominalistic subject is generated by the last division of species and by collection of unchangeable properties. It determines such indivisible fundament (*subiectum*) only as equivocal individuals and not as the univocal second substance. According to Abelard, such a Porretan individual represents only an *opinabile* of the type chimera. The writing *Categories* received the meaning in the framework of the new division type on the basis of the generic postulated subsistence as the ultimate substrate of every individual being (*aliquid esse*). The imposition of categorical meaning comes only from the thinking and the supposition include any nominally given universals. Thereby the difference disappeared between the imposition of the meaning from the reality and the supposition of this meaning, which is given in the thinking. The thinking critically compares its predication of universality in view of the unique reality. The direct contemplation of modern *illuminati* is given by Augustine’s “eye of the soul” (*mens nostra, qui est oculus animae*) and is interpreted by the autonomous meaning given outside the senses (*verbum mentis*).[[65]](#footnote-65) The nature of *Categories* fundamentally changed the definition of *Isagoge* given above, which determines the ontological difference between the first and the second substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The school of Avicennist Augustianism tied the discrete worldview to the diacosmos of Neoplatonic hypostases. This diacosmos came to being in mythopoetic interpretations of the dialogue *Timaeus*. The wise Muses learned mathematics and led the modernity into the nihilistic phase of the Western thinking, by means of the historical *Irrtum* of knowledge, which had been transformed into a discrete infinitesimal worldview. In mathematically given blindness of the first substance, the tragic Oedipian wandering (*Irre*) of Western thought was born, to which the concluding epilogue is devoted.

The truth, for Porretans and *Nominales*, no longer had the character of correspondence statements made according to the *Organon*. It received modern nature, as correctness and certainty of the modern subject. The anonymous commentary on the *Categories* from the Porretan schools (*Compendium Logicae Porretanum*) comments on the saying “*significans verum falsumve*” in 1155‒70 (Ebbesen 2009, 90). The definition of truth relates to the model of avicennistic comitation. True categorical predication supposedly guarantees the mere fact of givenness in thought (that some composition is). The fact of something in thought turns a simple proposition into a formal logical proposition related to truth and falsity. This led to the destruction of Aristotelian *Metaphysics* and *Categories*. Porretans created in thought and *ex nihilo* a new being of the third kind. This “hyparchical” first substance then received the meanings of Aristotelian second substance. Only the secondary meaning of truth corresponds to Aristotelian correspondence (*significat verum*), because it entails the affirmation of things that exist in reality. The predication of Porretans shows that reality got a logical and nominal double, which changed the definition of truth. The agreement of modern logicians and mathematicians does not go to hyparchical first substance, but to the simulacrum of the first substance created by logical abstraction. Instead of reality, the modern subject recognizes its own mythological concept. Aristotelians took it for a pure paranoia of thinking. The process of specific division and synthesis of universals rejected the metaphysical statute of Abelard’s terminus “*totum integrum*” (ch. 1.3). The docetic subsistence of moderns was predicated of fundamental hypostatized properties, which were added by mathematical proportion in the mode *magis* and *minus*. The new definition of truth concerns sophistically defined first substance, which is given as *individuum*. Following Gilberts of De la Porrée and his posterity, *Nominales* combined all meanings of substance: the individual became an indivisible, *simpliciter* given first and second substance, all that considered as a univocal unity (*aliquid, id est subsistens*). The first Latin modernists created the predication *per prius* for the univocally conceived substance or for *quidditas* as specifically given being of the third kind. Basic character of modernist quality is the comprehensiveness, because it determines Socrates universally and individually as indivisible being. John of Salisbury quoted above, he remarked on this approach that admirable *Nominales* create the individual thing outside the real substance and then add this being of the third kind univocally to the real substance (*substantialia denuo colligunt*). The corporeality received in the writing *Tractatus* the Neoplatonic and Avicennist being of the third kind. Thus, in the environment of Latin Neoplatonism, a construction of a body of the third kind occurred, as it had been accomplished in Late Antiquity by Simplicius and his contemporaries (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). The modern concept of body got hypostatized properties, which belonged only to the determination of the first substance in the Aristotelian physics. Neoplatonic *illuminati* composing the *Tractatus* have already a complete individual “hyparchical” substance given outside the reality. This mythological *subiectum* can carry whatever meaning is imposed upon it. Modernity projects into the contingent first substance its own conclusions and ideas, which create an enlightened view of the world done by the pure intellect. The previous chapter analyzed the conception of truth in Anselm’s work *Dialogus de Veritate*. This ties in with the conception of truth as *rectitudo*. The conception of being as pure hypostatized *veritas*, separated from the contingent *veritas* bound to the existence of the first substance, is given for the first time in Gilbert de La Porrée. The supposition of meaning goes from the universals (*genus, species, species specialissima*) to the last not further divisible unit of meaning (*individuum*). The new form of meaning established a different concept of the categorization than that of Abelard. He clearly distinguishes different kinds of imposition within the difference between the first and the second substance (ch. 1.3). The result of Abelard’s imposition of categorical value from the direction of *simpliciter* given first substance is the truth as correspondence, and not at all the assimilation of the actual being and its universal meaning according to Anselm’s *rectitudo* (ch. 1.2). The new predication of reality was proved in schools of Porretans in the next generation after Gilbert by changing the concept of truth.

The above-mentioned theological disputes in the second half of the 12th century about tritheism show, from the point of view of hermeneutics, the first disintegration of the corresponding theory of truth in the Latin West. Quarrels about tritheism gave rise to the first *Lichtung* of objectivity. The truth and untruth of discrete worldview appears so far in the hidden mode of *a/lētheia*. This truth and falsity of the new form of objectivity were at work only in the Latin West at that time. The perspective of the treatise follows the conception of truth as the *rectitudo* and takes the determinacy of the universal cognition of being not from the first substance, but from the universal determination of being according to Avicenna. The philosophy of Avicenna came to the West at that time in the form of the first Latin translations of the Toledo school of translators. The anonymous *Tractatus* does not need any external reality anymore. It keeps the signification of the single thing purely immanently, in the mode of universal indivisibility. The new first substance is derived from the mythologic idea of the unique and discrete “substance—species.” The imposition of the meaning does not go from the real single thing, but from the universal signification of the genus, the species and the specific difference towards the individual. The attribution of the specific quality to the last member forms the modern concept of the single thing (*individuam rem*) that is based atomist and infinitesimal worldview (*discrete videamus*). In the school of *Nominales* disappeared the difference between the external thing and the mode of its cognition, which is given by means of abstraction and by universal concepts. The quoted *Tractatus* postulates nominalistic meaning of the name in the mode *per prius* and on the level of the existence of the concrete thing in reality (*qualitatem quam prius*). From the point of view of hermeneutics it is evident that meaning of being in the group of *Nominales* is exposed from behind, from the specific individual, instead of from the front, from the real thing. The definition of truth as *rectitudo* called into being, through hypostatized reality, a new nature of being. The difference between the first and the second substance is clearly held in the writing *Isagoge* and afterwards by Boethius (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). We have quoted the passage in the *Isagoge*, wherein the process of division goes from the genus to the species and up to the single thing (*quod quale quiddam est homo dicitur*). This is possible because of the fundamental separation of this atomic unity of meaning from the indivisible hyparchical substance (*sed non in eo quod quid est, In Porph. Isag. III. 10*). Historically important is the disappearance of the first substance from modern metaphysics. The first substance is in principle indivisible and separated in the writing *Isagoge*. Therefore, for Boethius and Abelard, the first substance is never a concept. Nevertheless, the purely potential concept cannot be divided in the mode more or less. Potency has no actuality which can be determined in any movement of immaterial cosmic form or of a hylemorphic body. The quality has no more secondary meaning of an accident related to the categorically determined second substance. It became a hypostatic being, which determines a new series of being of the third kind. The *Tractatus* defines the predication *per prius* for modern mathematical universals as quantity or difference in the mode *magis* and *minus*. The modern individual assumed the role of the second substance, and the hyparchical first substance disappeared completely from the predication. The individual appeared in the process of the derivation of species to the last level of differentiation; or vice versa it is true that the modern individual comes about in the process of integration. It makes a result of collecting of various pseudo-substances and hypostatized species, which can be integrated in nominal individuals composed in this way. The reality received a new kind of dialectical division (*discretio*), which determines the last element of meaning given to the end of the series of the division of the being. Let us recall the origin of this division in the dialogue *Sophistes*, where through this division of genera into species the final definition of the sophist is sought (τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ᾽ εἴδη διαιρέσεως, *Soph*. 267 d5–6). Platon is a realist and knows well that there is a real sophist at first; afterwards, its problematic art can be searched, which produces simulacra. Therefore, one cannot reverse the division of universals and go from the concept to the reality, because this would create a new production of simulacra. The dialogue instructs that meanings must divide only to the right, in one direction. Plato is the first dialectician to design a methodological procedure in the mode of permanent orthotomy, separating sophistical simulacra from reality in the mode *per prius* (πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ, *Soph*. 265a1). Orthotomy ensures a single, correct direction for the division of meaning. In contrast, the discrete worldview acquires an entirely homonymic character marked by mathematics. Modern *illuminati* as Porretans and Nominales climb already on the Jacob’s ladder of the simulacra up and down, from the reality to the objectivity and back again. They can and should mythologically dismantle everything possible apart and put it together again. The *alētheia* of Muses changed under the influence of the Furies into a modern kind of mathematics conceived to be the objective first science. In the school of *Nominales,* in place of the first substance enters an univocal substance of the third kind that finally abolished the categorical sense of the second substance. In Aristotle’s metaphysical abstraction, the univocally given similarity of the modern hypostases is excluded. Mystical determination of being goes one order higher, up to newly conceived God of Christian modernity. Aristotelian determination of truth and categorical predication, on the other hand, was placed one floor lower, into real substance.

Abelard holds the metaphysical determination *per prius* only from the real thing, because only this is given *simpliciter* in the shape of the actual, indivisible and completely self-sufficient first substance (*totum integrum*). In place of the first substance, the nihilistic individual began to reign, which is manifested as a simulacrum of reality in the field of Neoplatonic mathematical abstraction. In the Latin West, according to Jamblichus’s and Simplicius’s pattern, a new kind of quasi-matter emerged that was predicated by hypostatic quantities of numbers and corporeality. These quantities determined in the modus *magis* and *minus* that entails being of the third kind. Mathematics received a metaphysical status in the new Neoplatonism, which it could not have in classical Aristotelianism. The author of *Tractatus* proclaims in *pluralis maiestatis* made by expression “*discrete videamus*”, in the name of the first modernists, the emergence of a new worldview given by an infinitesimal calculus. The introduction of universal analogy and the classification of entities of the third kind made it possible that the formal mathematics of essences determined a new conception of quantity and matter. The formal mathematics done in such a way accelerated the introduction of a new worldview. Universal determination of being in the framework of discrete view of mathematical abstraction was based on the last indivisible element of reality. This discrete understanding of reality was adopted by the 17th century mathematics in the form of derivation and integration (I. Barrow, G. W. Leibniz). The postmodern *resolutio* and *compositio* of differential and integral calculus already characterizes the nihilistic form of modern metaphysics as discrete understanding of the world. The understanding is given in the arithmetic mode *magis* and *minus*, it is located in the ascending or descending numerical series (*numerus*) or in a normative function of every being (*subsistentia non esse sed esse aliquid*). The mathematics became the first science of the Latin West in the ever advancing nihilism of the first substance. The logical Nominalists and Porretans made a highest genus out of existence, quality, quantity and further accidents. According to the quotation of John of Salisbury, the nominalists universally attributed these pseudo-substantial forms and properties to the genus and the species (*qualitatem id quod redigit materiam*), up to the level of the not further divisible, nominally determined substrate (*in id quod nominatur*). Hypostasized universals in mathematical functions in the modus *magis* and *minus*, establish in a causal way in the Porretan school of Nominales the meaning of the first substance. After the disappearance of the metaphysical dative, the meaning of the first substance is reduced to mathematical variables that are confronted to permanent mathematical functions. The mathematical simulacrum of the real world is either produced by the division of genus into the last specific meaning and into the individual; or, it is synthesized as a nominal first substance by collecting of subsistent determinations. In either case, the individual stands at the end of the series (derivation by dividing or integration by collecting) as the last unit of analyzed or synthesized meaning that cannot be further divided. The discrete understanding, postmodernity transposed it from the logical level into the infinitesimal and into today’s digital difference between one and zero, founds present nihilistic nature of the world. Infinitesimal number plays the role of the Porretan classification today. The derivation and the integration of variable individuals are defined by formal functions. The parameter of the function determines the subject as the last individual, i.e., as atomic carriers of given division and composition. We can integrate or derive through the mathematical function any formally determined quality, comprehensiveness or any event with respect to the individual variable given as the limit of the function. The derivation and the integration of the variable individuals defined within the formal function play the role of the Porretan classification. The parameter of the function determines the subject as the last individual, as the atomic carrier of this operation of division and composition. Based on the associated function, given properties are then attributed to this subject. The difference either increases or decreases up to the not further divisible individual, which represents the last limit of every infinitesimal function. The postmodern individual and its “exsistence” now includes without distinction any logically and semantically conceived single thing in the univocal mode of the atomic being or the later atomic fact (*Sachverhalt*) defined by Wittgenstein.[[66]](#footnote-66) In the pure possibility of qualities given by a hypostatic and potential state of affairs, it is no longer a problem hypostatizing any meaning according to Porretanian *collecta*. The exposure from behind is accomplished according to the proposition “*discrete videamus*” in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* as well as in its Porretanian template, that is, according to the collection of nominalist qualities. The collection of neopositivist hypostases is actualized by collecting of internal properties.[[67]](#footnote-67) Porretans transformed the hylemorphic compositions as Socrates into an individual specified by matter of the third kind. This matter is given in the form of quantified comprehensiveness. At the beginning of the 20th century in the age of neopositivists, this division and collection created the nihilistic version of purely logical assimilation of the world, as proclaimed by analytic philosophy (so-called “Picture Theory of Meaning”). The concept of internal properties as hypostatic *scibile* was introduced by Porretans led by Rufus of Cornwall. Rufus founded a full-fledged version of analytic philosophy and science in the first generation of modern scholars at Oxford University. Let us see the further development of *Modernorum* analyzed in the term Oxfordian Fallacy. Then it is possible to create “Socrates” objectively as an individual, so that his matter and existence are hypostatized as a new being of the third kind. This new being is predicated univocally on the level of the first substance. Aristotelian critics of the schools of *Nominales* defended the realist kind of cognition. They could not allow the destruction of reality in the concept. From there comes the pejorative term “*nomen*” or “*flatus vocis*,” since the opponents took it for a new form of Neoplatonism. The most critics were gathered in the Parisian school of thought founded by Abelard. In the Falsafa, this type of *illuminati* did not prevail at all. Avicenna’s school was criticized from all sides; both by orthodox jurists and theologians of Koranic traditions, and by educated philosophical theologians as was al-Ghazālī, as well as by the best Aristotelian thinkers as was Averroes. The wisdom of the Islamic civilization separated itself from the modern philosophy. The latter prepared the death of modern God in the Latin version of the Western objectivity. The school of *Nominales* erased the difference between the real being of the first substance and the universal predication of the second substance and combined them into a new form of ontological univocity.

Aforementioned “discret” understanding of the world is given in the dogmatic version of philosophy proposed as the hypostatic union of thinking with its object. On the basis of this modern hypostatic union of generically different substances a new order of being has arisen, which determines the fundamental “How” (Heidegger’s *Wie*) things are revealed to human beings. The eclipse of the first substance led to modern sense of being. It is bound to the hypostasis of a nominal subject that carries and guarantees an unchanging meaning (*subiectum*). The modern individual, given by division of *humanitas*, establishes the objective being in terms of subjective genitive because it produces atomic meaning of everything else. The modern subject regards reality as the object of an epochal new knowledge done in the form of objective genitive, because it transfers all meanings to another indivisible basis of final determination. The objective meanings of *Nominales* existed in the mode of Anselm’s *rectitudo* and, since the mid-12th century, in the concept of Avicenna’s truth as *certitudo*. The truth is given beyond the real thing; therefore, God of *Modernorum* guarantees the existence of this simulacrum. This kind of God was indeed indispensable and necessary in the history of modernity, just as it was the sin of Adam that prepared the coming of the Messiah. Logical modernity, meanwhile, prepared for the coming of the Antichrist, as will be seen later (ch. 3.1.2). The objective meaning exists thanks to the diligent work of the subject, which made out the division from the universals up to the individual (*deductio*) as the last stop of thinking (*terminus*). Producer of the modern reality is the mover of specific difference. This movement is bound to discrete view of the world (*discrete videamus*), which is described in the above-mentioned *Tractatus*. The procedure given *more geometrico* by deductive derivation of lower axioms from the higher axioms represents a typical scenario of the Neoplatonic work *Liber de causis*, which was interpreted in a similar way by Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). The worldview creates the first substance in such a way that it took universal meaning in the order of the Tree of Porphyry (*species specialissima*) to create further indivisible and unity of meaning (*individuum*). The thinking of Porretan modernity represents the incarnation of the specific difference into the contingent world (*productio*). What is meant in the school of sophistical Nominales that is also categorically produced. Let us see well-known postmodern keyword that characterizes the principle of language games (“meaning is use”). However, critical Aristotelianism and hermeneutics know well that such production exists only in the diacosmos of imaginary beings of the third kind (*oratio* of Abelard). Therefore, genuine Aristotelians as monk Gaunilo criticized the universal predication “*in artificialibus*” to be a fatal error. This predication was unjustifiably extended by Neoplatonist thinkers like Anselm to the whole universe because of ontotheological proof of the “exsistence” of God. The schools *Nominales* started to merge with Avicennism in the second half of the 12th century. New hypostatic union established the first concept of classification and categorization of objective being by means of differences in the framework of Porphyry’s Tree. The philosophical docetism of Porretans, which was adopted from theology and Christian dogmatic, will have a great success in the next century. Porretans merged the first and the second substance to a new concept of being and created a new hypostatic union called “individual,” which was being of the third kind. Such hypostatized “exsistence,” put outside the existence of the real thing, unfortunately, comes about (*exsistere*) only in the thought of the *illuminati*. The resurrection of Neoplatonic simulacra created the first objective hypostatic union of *Modernorum* connecting the first and the second substance. Porretans created the new godlike man of modernity by crossbreeding two different orders of being. Socrates became an objectively existing individual, by which the modernists accomplished the miracle of objective resurrection (*exsistentia*) of the existing real Socrates in the thinking of *Modernorum*. Moreover, they sophistically attributed this dubious hypostatic union to Aristotle, which classically educated Aristotelians from Abelard’s school rejected in principle. The theological councils and decisions, which were dogmatically proclaimed by ecclesiastical and academic institutions, endowed this error of modernity with historical effects and established the first objectivity in the history of the Latin West. The individual had to be legitimized according to modern reason in the environment of the new Christian ontotheology given in view of the newly defined God of *Modernorum*. The epochal *ascensio* of the individual to the level of the first substance was only possible because of theological dogmatic of the first *Modernorum*. Theology provided for the objective sanctioning of this non-existent being of the third kind in the sphere of divine thought established by Ibn Adi and Avicenna. Persian and Islamic thought did not go down this road anymore, for it forcibly abolished the Falsafa to avoid the necessary and inevitable death of God in Avicennist modernity.

The clinical death of God of Western Neoplatonic *Modernorum* was impossible in Abelard’s school of thought in the second half of the 12th century. In this school, the University of Paris was born in the period when the first writings of Averroes came to the West. But modernism prevailed at the end of the 13th century even at the Paris University, carried out through self-conscious *via Modernorum*. Abelard and his followers from the school of the first Averroism were destroyed by the sophist argumentation run under neurotic protective mechanism of Freudian “inversion into the opposite” (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). The step forward made by modern sophists sacrificed authentic Aristotelians as necessary expiation on the altar of objective knowledge, with the help of institutionalized violence of modernity. That classic case of *damnatio memoriae* concerning the first critical Aristotelianism was carried out at the local councils in Soissons and Sens according to *Old Testament* example. It came to ritual theological expulsion of the scapegoat Abelard as heretics in the wilderness (*Leviticus* 16:10). In place of Aristotelian Abelard, a century later, at the age of victorious modernity, the Aristotelian Siger of Brabant and then William Ockham were to be sacrificed. The metaphysics of modernity completes through Duns Scotus the epochal *ascensio* of objectivity in the history of philosophy. Thus it completes the development of objectivity opened by Porretans. The Latin West led by such *illuminati* was no longer philosophically wise and its thinkers therefore ended in metaphysical nihilism. Now we live in the present postmodern and neoliberal forms of this rationality of the type of the fairy tales of the *Thousand and One Nights* (*Hazār-o Yak Šab*), which have been transferred to the matrix world of digital simulacra. These simulacra direct the course of today’s Western global village and its hybrid wars. In the current form of financial nihilism, the world is observed in the mode “*discrete videamus*” through stock market derivatives, which are assembled and disassembled by mathematical algorithms into a perpetually new shape of financial simulacra. Put beyond reality, the neoliberal economics of Ali Baba’s treasure frenetically differentiates chimerical virtual debt and then formalizes it into a series of mathematical operations. The paranoiac economy produces a simulacrum of the financial derivatives, which are divided and composed within the framework of a formal economic operation working with the non-existent future (*hedging*). Through the virtual individualization of the formally conceived nullity given by the digital difference between ones and zeros, basic units of individual character (futures, forwards, swaps, options) emerge. The objective manipulation of really non-existent future, such as stock exchange futures, was justified by Grosseteste’s metaphysical speculation about the coming of the Antichrist (ch. 3.1.2). Mathematics replaced real relations running the exchange of goods by the economy of the compound interest rate and the system of stock exchange derivatives, which are sophistically produced in the mode of High Frequency Trading. Modern mathematics and contemporary nihilistic economics can formally operate with the non-existent. The economic *illuminati* look for nihilistic truth in the framework of globally distributed *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. They pretend that it is about real existent economic obligations like debt or fiat money. The debt economy existed already at the end of the Neolithic, because thanks to the seasonal work, the artisan production and the business, there was already a gradual payment of debts. This archaic fiat money in the form of debt obligations was kept in official tables in the sanctuary or in the royal palace. Something else is the realm of nihilistic financial simulacra that was established on the basis of the modern being of the third kind. The economic nihilism makes a tragic case; therefore, it provides itself with double blindness with regard to the reality. Neoliberal *illuminati* created economic Platonism for common people in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism and according to *Nominales*. After the death of modern God, such nonsense became another kind of global religion. Mathematized forms of logical abstraction created a digital collection of simulacra. Put into new economics of chimeras or neoliberal voodoo economics, they replaced metaphysical blindness of *Nominales* to the first substance. Classical metaphysics can only afford a similar swap operation at the price of mental bankruptcy.

## 1.5 Objective Mythology of Substance (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*)

The new metaphysics was formed in the midst of the various accusations of tritheism that influenced philosophical debates in the second half of 12th century. These debates were replaced in the following century by equally confused disputes about Averroism. Connections of various currents created favorable conditions for the emergence of the modern form of metaphysics. Aristotle was interpreted from the position of Neoplatonism revised by Avicenna. Analysis of the term “*individuum*“ based on derivation and integration of Porretan hypostases proved one important fact: gnoseology of *Nominales* does not need actual existence of the first substance for cognition. The new „science“ needs only universal essences to carry out a logical deduction. The representatives of early Latin modernity don't need the real Socrates existing as the first substance to establish knowledge at the level of modern *rectitudo*. The understanding made by the exposure of being from behind got a new impulse by importing Avicenna’s metaphysics to merge it with the doctrine of Gilbert de La Porrée and later schools of *Nominales*. Thanks to writing of Dominicus Gundissalinus, the Latin translation of Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Shifā* (*Liber de Philosophia prima sive scientia divina*) spread in the years 1150-75.[[68]](#footnote-68) Avicenna’s insight into being through the form of abstraction as *denudatio* and the introduction of the new being of the third kind (*equinitas tantum, hoc esse tantum*) fitted perfectly into the Porretan system of pure, *simpliciter* given subsistence. To this subsistence that was defined purely logically, Porretans attached hypostases of all kinds, in the form of Avicenna’s comitation. The predication of being of the third kind in the mode of comitation enabled scholars in the second half of the 12th century to predicate in the model of univocal predication of hypostases in the mode of apposition, collection, division, classification, and so on. Porretans followed the example of their master and they transformed formal determinations like “whiteness” (*albedo*) into individual substances on the level of qualia (*quale quiddam est*). They used this specific extension of whiteness in the form of predication related to singular things (*discretiva suppositio*). The school of *Nominales* does not mind that whiteness in Aristotle is merely an accident predicated *univoce* in the mode of imposition with respect to second substance. The first real substances acquire no “whiteness” at all, because they exist *simpliciter* and *per se*, that is, without additional cognition and predication. The terms of the type “*propria appellatio*” and “*discretiva suppositio*” show in the work *Summa Zwettlensis* (around 1180) the differentiation of meanings up to the individual that was understood as substance of the third kind. The new vision of reality arises in the Porretan branch of *Nominales* thanks to the action of the higher generic principle in determining the lower and therefore more specific level of meaning. The resulting indivisibility arises from Platonic division (διαίρεσις) of meaning at the level of the genus and species. Alternatively, meaning arises through nominalistic collection made from the bottom (*individuum*) to the top (*genus*). A synthesis of hypostatized predicates runs in the context of univocal nomination, which is a form of nominalistic collecting. Various hypostatic properties are added to the substrate as *tertium ens* due to comitation. Both procedures of analysis and synthesis of universal meaning, we find them in the form of *resolutio* and *collectio* in the later representatives of the second Averroism. The metaphysical nihilism confirms convincingly by two World Wars and by the global warming that the twofold historical task of the Docetists regarding the ratification of the non-existent being (*ascensio*, *sanctificatio*) has succeeded, death of objective God of *Modernorum* included. This human and thoroughly modernist *factum* was predicted by al-Ghazālī and completed victoriously in the post-Christian West when Nietzsche began to philosophize with the hammer.

The work *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, probably written by Abbot Everard of Ypres sometime around 1190, produced the first synthesis of Avicennism in the school of *Nominales*, in which the objective vision of the world emerges. The text of the *Dialogue* takes up step by step the arguments of Gilbert de La Porrée and also of the anonymous writing *Tractatus* mentioned above. In contrast to *Tractatus*, the Porretanian division of being of the third kind already acquires causal efficacy with respect to real things. The paranoia of modernity, which forms reality only through the word, is shown in the following quotation.

“The humanity expressed in the concrete term ‘man’ is given with regard to the quality as of the species with regard to the genus, that is, animality. Animality, as has already been said, divides the genus of animality in this denomination, because we say: ‘This animal is a human being,’ and again ‘that animal is not a human being.’ But another humanity, namely its effect (*humanitas, immo effectus ejus*), is predicated by the quality of the name ‘humanity’ as a species of individual things (*pro qualitate significatur hoc nomine* ‘*humanitas,*’ *est species individuorum*), when we say: ‘socratitas is humanity,’ ‘Platonicity is humanity,’ and so similarly with respect to individual things (*sic de singulis*). This specific determination of humanity binds individuals by the effect of their causality (*individua ibi subjiciuntur mediantibus effectibus suis*).“ [[69]](#footnote-69)

The first sentence shows the normal world of division of universals within the framework of Porphyry’s Tree, when the genus determines the subordinate species (*animal—homo*). But the second sentence shows an inverted order of Aristotelian metaphysics. The generic determination (*humanitas*) exercise by itself causality of the first substance. Then, species defines the meaning of Socrates and Plato. This determination refers directly to the individual things through the specificity of the proper name (*hoc nomine 'humanitas' est species individuorum*). The generic determination became the effective cause of “individual” things, since it divides the continuum of universals from the genus to species (*hoc nomine dividit hoc genus animalis*). The universal meaning of the name possesses its own causality justifying the division (*mediantibus effectibus*), because it finally determines the “real” thing (*individua ibi subjiciuntur*). The individual is then determined as a objective body of the third kind with the help of the hypostatized quality (*hoc nomine 'homo' pro qualitate*). Thus the purely dialectical division of genera in the framework of universals defined by Porphyry and Boethius into lower units of meaning acquired a metaphysical, causally justified status. Because of abolition of imposition, Porretans imported the effective causality into division in the Tree of Porphyry (*mediantibus effectibus*). The division runs from the genus (*humanitas*) to the specific substance of the individual (*socratitas est humanitas*). The hypostatized “humanity” is applied in the process of apposition of the accidents (ch. 1.4) to the nominal substance (*Socrates*), which has the permanent essence of “Socrates” (*socratitas*) in the form of habitus. The supposition of individual contains both universal meaning and properties given only to the first substance. The division of universals operates in the order of the newly conceived actual reality given only on the basis of the naming of the first substance. Accidental determinations of substance become a genus of the third kind endowed with qualities of the particular substance (*quasi qualitatis genus*). This scenario is inspired by objective existence of the third kind like Avicenna’s “*equinitas tantum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). In the mode of comitation, afterwards, the “real” (i.e., objective) existence is added to these objective essences. The modern “exsistence” is conceived as an actualisation of a permanently given essence that comes acroos (*exsistit*) in the contingtent world. Porretan schools of *Nominales* converted the sentence “Socrates is a man” into a univocal categorial statement of the type “individual socratiness is univocally contained in generically given humanity.” Thus, the implication of meaning from the first hyparchical substance disappeared completely. The metaphysical subject of meaning given by categorial statements is exchanged for an equivocal logical concept. This was the same attitude of the school of Grammarians criticized by Bishop Alvernus in Paris (ch. 2.3.2). We find the archetype of this thinking in Neoplatonism, as the Dyad divides the Unlimited continuum, wherein, according to Jamblichus, the Neoplatonic dialectic “Limited—Unlimited” applies (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). A key change occurred in the nature of causality. The cause such as “universal humanity” determines the effect (*humanitas, immo effectus ejus*) to make the qualitative formation of Socrates (*qui pro qualitate significatur*). Since the second half of the 12th century, the process of differentiation started to run in the homogeneous and univoken continuum. The universals began to play the role of *causa efficiens*, and not only *causa* *formalis*. The identity of the single thing related to an individual that could not be further divided. The causality took itself out of the action of the physical substances and referred to the formal process of differential meanings made on the level of the genus to the species. The difference goes up to the not further divisible individual. It can, but not necessarily must, get an extensive accidental determination on the level of the first real substance. The epochal effect of this sophistical worldview is completed in the next generation by creators of Oxfordian Fallacy. Rufus and Kilwardby suspend the predication of causality of real substances in the middle member of scientific judgment (ch. 3.3.1). Anonymus in the work *Tractatus* ten years earlier opened a new view of univocally defined *tertium ens*. The plural “*discrete videamus*” announced a new epoch of the *Tractatus-*world. Spinoza and Wittgenstein completed the development of the *Tractatus*-world in the epoch of postmodernism and metaphysical nihilism. Causality acquired a paranoiac status as it replaced real effects at the level of first substances. The writing *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi* takes Neoplatonic evaluation of mathematical abstraction at the further level of metaphysics. Discret worldview got the status of formal and effective cause and made the way to mathematical models of the world, which had been opened in ancient Neoplatonism and Falsafa. The mathematical abstraction (*mathematica abstractio*) occupies primary position to establish the modern worldview. The mathematical similarity given by the number or the proportion exists according to Aristotle only analogically, because it does not go to the reality of the first substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Mathematical abstraction extended the tripartite analogy of relations (*similitudo relationis*). The new abstract division given by mathematical analogy arose thanks to the determinacy of the individual as the formal substrate of nominally added properties. Porretans conceive mathematical abstraction on the level of universals of the third kind, which can be predicated just as univocally as accidents or substances.

“Mathematics is a certain kind of abstraction (*mathematicum est quasi abstractivum*); it means the form abstracted from a support, as in the case of whiteness.” [[70]](#footnote-70)

The categorial predication completely overrides the hyparchical attachment to the first substance, which is blurred by nominalistic notion “*species specialissima*.” The author of *Dialogue* completely ignores the above-mentioned definition of the term by Boethius given in the commentary on *Categories* of Porphyry (ch. 1.4). Everard’s dialogue uses the term *species specialissima* in the same sense as Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Thus, the writing first distinguishes Aristotelian universality of species from the genus. The universality in Porphyry’s definition of species provides the final level of specific meaning, which is differentiated at the final level of particulars (*individuum*). The new (that is, objective) universality of nominalist *species specialissima* already defines the indivisible individual thing as hyparchical first substance, i.e., the modern individual, called “Socrates.” We have defined “*socratitas*” as *species specialissima* on the level of modern supposition (ch. 1.4). The modern “Socrates” appears as the final offshoot of individuation. The predication given by the *species specialissima* runs in two directions.[[71]](#footnote-71) According to Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, species is inseparable from the individual since it makes its meaning (τὸ μὲν ἄτομον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους; OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The definition of the ultimate and henceforth indivisible individual is given in terms of universal species. It is now clear that individual “Socrates” is inseparable from *species specialissima*, that is, from his “*socratitas*.” This nominally and *ex nihilo* created “Socrates” then gets quasi-physical properties of the body, which are commutatively predicated to this individual. Socrates as an individual is put on the level of the Aristotelian first substance in its objective “exsistence.” Aristotelians of that time very well recognized that this is a completely paranoid proceeding of thought. The imposition of hyparchical meaning comes not from reality, but from the modern subject. Roger Bacon therefore considered the modernists to be academic crackpots. But logic can be paranoid, since it must be but logically correct. The individual as “first substance” formally establishes valid *modus tollens* or *destructio primis* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Thus, the “exsistence” of the individual ensures univoce categorial predication of the superior universals, which is “*socratitas*” as *species specialissima*. According to *Isagoge*, every species is inseparable from the individual, in that case named “Socrates.” Therefore, his “*socratitas*” is a kind of species that is maximally “*specialissima*.” The nominally specific individual “Socrates” establishes a genus called *humanitas*, which stands above the individual in the order of supposition of universal meaning (*universiter subiicitur suo generi*). Starting from the genus, nominalists can proceed to the individual (*homo praedicatur de suis individuis*). The individual is finally determined by the categorial set of hypostatic properties, such as Neoplatonic corporeality. These properties later became pure mathematical functions.

The procedure of discrete division has a fundamental character for the constitution of mathematics as the first science. This has been shown in the previous chapters by the example of Porretan schools like *Nominales*. The infinitesimal path of determinacy confirms the modern worldview constituted by Gilbert and his followers. The atomic individual finally changes into a number to close the framework of hypostatic univocity. From a purely formal point of view, both elements represent the last link of specific division concerning reality.[[72]](#footnote-72) Porretans changed the universal as *species specialissima* to a new individual, which got the status of being of the third kind. Moreover, individuals given by proper names have their own form of generality, since they are determined by universal accidents such as corporeity. Thereby “substance—*individuum*” univocally links to the first level of generality. This first level is determined as *species specialissima*. The last species is followed only by the individual, which is defined by the hypostatized matter and extension as a new form of the *tertium ens*. After this universal division, which establishes the modern individual, the singular being of the material individual thing follows that is the first substance in reality. The school of *Nominales* and Porretans took up the Neoplatonic statute of body and matter. Aristotelian determination of the singular thing as “this being here” (τόδε τι) changed character for the first time in Simplicius and later in the environment of logical schools of the 12th century. The development towards the specific difference as the ultimate source of meaning was confirmed by the primacy of mathematics. It established the victory of homonymy. Mathematical abstraction moved hypostatized entities of Porretans in the predication *magis* and *minus* to create the new worldview. Thinking can enter and exit the process of mathematical division of the new reality where it wants and how it wants, since the logical abstraction does not need the hyparchical statute of the first substance. The imposition comes from universals given in the thinking and the supposition includes the first substance conceived as being of the third kind. The nominally given hypostasis creates the modern individual that replaced Aristotelian categorical predication. The latter is determined from the direction of the hyparchical first substance. The hierarchy of objectified forms is predicated in the Neoplatonic mode “*magis—minus*” according to *Liber de causis*. The school of *Nominales* adopted the mystical Jacob’s ladder, which enables the ascent and the descent in the world and that of being of the third kind, respectively. The mystical figure of this ladder is presented by Franciscan Bonaventura in the work *De reductione artium ad theologiam* (around 1256) and especially in the well-known writing *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* (1259). This writing presents the first system of objective ontotheology in the West (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). It is no wonder that at the same time Thomas Aquinas writes a new interpretation of *De hebdomadibus* not after Gilbert, but after Boethius (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). The representatives of the school of the first Averroism knew well that the epochal error of modernity had arisen from an erroneous interpretation of this writing of Boethius in the school of Porretans. The transformation of mathematics and physics towards infinitesimal number, derivation and integration completed the development of differentiation, which was first opened by Neoplatonists in the second half of the 12th century. It accomplishes the simulation of the causality of the physical world. Today we do not need the real world and even consider it as superfluous ballast of theoretical models. Mathematics represents the objective Jacob’s ladder of postmodernism. In the epoch of nihilism, mathematics completed the mystical vision of Ireneus of Lyon about the Holy Spirit. This is the power that makes possible the ascent of man to God (*Adversus haereses* III.24.1). From the end of the 12th century onwards, the rise of the modern individual (and not the real person) has been towards modern God. Mathematics ensured the transition to the pure world of the spirit as conceived according to the Neoplatonic mystics in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This new form of objectivity was founded as an effective instrumental rationality of the West in the years 1230‒35 by the enlightened academic *spirituales* of the Franciscan order who lectured at the University of Oxford dominated by Porretans. The Franciscans of Grosseteste’s school under the leadership of charismatic intellectuals like Rufus, conceived a modern version of *intelligentia spiritualis*. The group of the first objective thinkers was to lead the third stage of human history under the rule of the Holy Spirit, as postulated by the vision of Joachim of Fiore (ch. 3.1.2). The Latin West, inspired by Avicenna and the Neoplatonic Falsafa, conceived another form of abstract physics that replaced philosophical tale of the dialogue *Timaeus*. Mythological tales of Neoplatonists made the first form of Western objectivity. Its new form is based on the mathematical abstraction, which predicates a hypostatized extension and matter towards the discretely determined body of the third kind. Modernists either divide this sophistical simulacrum by derivation ; or, they put it together by integration.

The existence became a formal predicate, which fundamentally changed the concept of truth. The scholars in Gilbert’s line do not need to conceive of truth as a correspondence between the real thing and the intellect because they knew Anselm’s theory of truth as *rectitudo* (ch. 1.2). The first part of essay has shown that the real thing has no major significance for Avicenna’s theory of truth. The school of *Nominales* defined a singular thing in the order of universality and the truth acquired Avicennist character. Everard’s *Dialogus* recognizes the independent status of reality. The imposition of formal and discrete determinations does not exhaust external reality (*homo humanitate non facit hominem esse hominem*; ibid, p. 269). Following the pattern of Gilbert de La Porrée, the author distinguishes only formally between the substance and its subsistence, because he conceives subsistence in univocal meaning with the existence of the external thing (*subsistentia vero est substantia*; ibid, p. 272). Neoplatonists take the single real thing for a contingent being, which is recognized in the mode of truth as *veritas*. The nominally determined essence of Socrates can also exist in a contingent way in the form of *socratitas*, due to the extension of matter. The discreet vision of the world takes Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*” as its basis (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2) because it is given as a singular and universal individual. To this *tertium ens*, modernist one can add any hypostatized function. Avicenna’s comitation runs in the form of a formal apposition given at the level of logical abstraction. The intellect does not need any more a correspondence of reason and reality, because it recognizes the truth as *rectitudo*. The mathematical function is more important and permanent than merely the contingently given variable. Let us quote from Everard’s *Dialogue* an example of the modern predication given on the basis of Avicenna’s comitation.

“Just as Peter is human through his own humanity (*Petrus est homo humanitate*), so in truth he is human thanks to the humanity thus conferred (*verus homo veritate humanitatem comitante*).” [[73]](#footnote-73)

The ablative “*homo humanitate*” shows that the universal (*humanitas*) causally establishes Peter’s individuality. In fact, it not an ablative but *casus instrumentalis* when the mere noun (*humanitas*) is the instrument that makes the subject (*homo*) to accomplish an important action “to be a human being.” The quotation marks the birth of instrumental rationality of Latin West in the figure of modern Western humanism. That paranoiac thinking is futher developped as special case of *dativus obiectivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). The new determination of truth arises by adding new determinations to the original subject of “Peterness” in the mode of Avicenna’s comitation (*humanitatem comitante*). The nominally and later objectively determined man (*verus homo*) is given beyond the being of the first substance. That paranoid way made the modern humanism arose in the Latin West. The previous chapter has shown that Porretans and schools of *Nominales* performed an avicennistic comitation in a similar way, see the term “*socratitas*.” For Porretans, the truth is done as formally correct predication of terms and the assimilation of entities of the third kind, which are predicated with the help of apposition. The comitation of hypostases establishes an individual in the mode of the “*verus homo*.” This predication is carried out in the Avicennian form of comitation (*luzūm*), when hypostatized and subsistent determinations are added to the given substrate (*humanitatem comitante*). The connection “*verus … veritate*” keeps the key function. The doubling of modern man as *tertium ens* is accomplished by new causality derived from concepts. They produce a new way of correspondence that is completely determined by the cognizing subject. The instrumental case “*veritate*” subjectively obtains the meaning of the hypostasis “humanity” (*humanitatem*). Completely instrumental use of the truth has been worked out nihilistically in today’s ideologies and media manipulations. It clearly shows that nominalistic division and composition of being in the framework of the hypostases got a fully causal and effective character. This gave rise to a new theory of truth whose import into the theology of the Divine Trinity was rejected in principle as tritheism by theological circles under the influence of Peter Lombard. Aristotelian cannot predicate anything true of abstract hypostasis called “divinity” or “humanity” in the manner of later Neoplatonic mystics in the second half of the 13th century such as Dietrich of Freiberg (†1320) or Master Eckhardt (†1327). According to Abelard’s logic, these terms merely represent an *opinabile* because modern truth is not formed by the correspondence between real thing and cognizing intellect. The comitation of formal determinations plays an important role in the next round of the dispute over objectivity.

The predication of these metaphysical docetists was already objective at the time of the reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics, since it attributed hypostatized properties to the “subject—*individuum*” in the form of “*hoc esse tantum.*” The predicate is in the mode “*equinitas tantum*.” The writing *Dialogus* does not care for the hyparchical imposition from reality and it takes the universal supposition uncritically as the first substance. Hypostatized and subsistent determinations define the individual subject of these properties. Humanity has the objective-specific character of *species specialissima* and determines the individual (*petrus*), which is given at the end of the series of division or composition of *tertium ens* as species. The system of differences allows a transition from the higher universal to the not further divisible individual and vice versa. Peter is the subject or function that provides the projections of modern intellect (*petrus est homo humanitate*). The unique substance “Peter” is the projection of species “*homo*” and this species is produced by generic causality given as “*humanitas*.” The comitation creates the individual thing by addition of universals and additional hypostases (*collecta*). The modern subject makes the synthesis of hypostatized determinations in individual variable form *(socratitas est humanitas*). By anabasis from such an individual towards eternal species or genera, modernists pass from Anselm’s contingent *veritas* to the permanent and full *rectitudo*. Conversely, the universal meaning is accomplished through the act of catabasic division of higher universals toward the individual as the final hypostasis, which bears a univocal signification within the framework of this or that division of universals (*resolutio*). To this last atomic signification, which is defined at the end of the series, the *species specialissima* is then added by comitation of the extension made by the matter of the third kind. Thus, a unique specimen as Peter the Apostle or Socrates is created. The truth means in the modernity and the postmodernity the division of meaning in the unified series up to the individual, or the complete comitation of hypostatized properties which are added to the given substrate. The individual determined by division of universals then gets the associated functions given by the Neoplatonic physics. The definition of truth does not need the existence of the first substance, because the actual correspondence between thought and reality is missing. The individual represents a formal substratum (*subiectum*) endowed with specific subsistence of the third kind and capable of bearing the given divisions or assuming determinations by means of various appositions. The nihilism of modernity turned the existing person into an impersonal and non-existent individual, which makes a carrier or function of any projections of the modern intellect (*petrus est homo humanitate*). The objective meaning of the term “*humanitas*” is further deepened by Grosseteste’s term “*exemplar*” (ch. 3.1.1), which Bonaventure later adopted (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The new form of division produces Rufus’s objective *scibile* and Scotus’s objective being, which is given on the level of the metaphysical concept (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*; OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). Siger of Brabant founded another model of anti-modern humanity in the framework of the first Averroism, which Dante adopted in the form of humanism in the term “*universitas humana*” (OBJ III, ch. 4.3.4). The conception of truth in the model of hypostatized predication of existence was rejected in principle by William of Auvergne, Albert the Great, and Roger Bacon when they fought against the second wave of *Modernorum* at Paris University since the year 1240. The modernists emerged from logical schools influenced by Porretans and *Nominales*. From about the year 1220, Aristotelian schools that emerged due to transformation of the School of Paris into the Paris University, received a tremendous boost thanks to the introduction of Averroes’s philosophy that insists on Aristotelian concept of truth as *proportio* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Truth as enumeration of hypostases within the framework of truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo* displaced the first substance by a new diacosmos of hypostases. The emergence of the Latin form of the mystical *mundus imaginalis* of Sufism objectified by Avicenna establishes the epochal error of Latin modernity. Blindness to the first substance led the Christian West to metaphysical nihilism. The paths of the Islamic West and the modern Latin West were separated in the second half of the 12th century, when the first objective form of forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) emerged. The further meeting of both ways of thinking determined by Aristotelian falsafa occurred in Paris in the years 1220‒30, when the Blund’s school received the metaphysics of the Commentator in the mode of Aristotelianism made by Abelard.

## 1.6 Birth of Modern Nominalism

The dispute about the definition of truth between Anselm and Abelard indicates the place of origin of modern science (*ortus scientiarum*) in the Latin West. The new determinations of substance came at the time when quantity and matter changed into new being of the third kind. Hermeneutics made in the mode of Apollonian semantics follow the emergence of modern *tertium ens* through the relentless dispute of two monastic schools in Paris. In 1100, Abelard entered the cathedral school of Saint-Jenovefa Abbey (*L’abbaye Sainte-Geneviève*), where he began to teach the genuine Aristotelianism. Neoplatonist Guillaume of Champeaux and his philosophical opponent founded another cathedral school in 1108 at Saint-Victor Abbey (*L’abbaye Saint-Victor*) on the opposite bank of the Seine. Guillaume lost his thesis on universals in a public debate with the young Abelard in the so-called “*Querelle des Universaux*.” This personal disputation opened the era of so-called quarrel about the universals. Engaged in this academic war, the Abbey of St. Victor undertook a systematic criticism of Abelard’s philosophy and theology.[[74]](#footnote-74) The continuation of this struggle between Modernists and Aristotelians shaped the dispute about so-called Averroism. The new concept of being and its assimilation by modern subject set in motion nihilistic adventure of Western modernity. It is contained in Heidegger’s notions “*Irre*” and the “*Irrtum*.” After Avicenna’s philosophy became known in the West, truth as *rectitudo* received a new confirmation in the Franciscan school of Paris. This school published the complete work *Summa Halensis*, which Alexander Hales started to compose. This school rejected Abelard’s categorical teaching of substance and his concept of truth. They took Anselm’s *rectitudo* and Avicenna’s *certitudo* as the basic theory of truth. At the end of this development, we find the first modern concept of objective being in the work of Henry of Ghent (*res a reor reris*), which Duns Scotus unfolded as objective metaphysics. On the other hand, Abelard and his followers regrouped in the school of the first Averroism. They defended Aristotle’s and Averroes’s definition of truth as *adaequatio*, which they applied to the interpretation of Aristotle’s writings. In the next round of gigantomachy, which concludes the dispute between Abelard and Anselm, young Aristotelian Heidegger left Avicennist Husserl, who belongs to Brentano’s Cartesian school. Heidegger’s fateful Heloisa became Hannah Arendt, who completed the political interpretation of Aristotle in the line of the forgotten first Averroism. This doctrine was introduced to the West by Albert the Great (*intellectus practicus*; OBJ III, ch. 6.1). Aristotelian metaphysics and political philosophy have always been oriented to the real world. Only the imposition of sense from the first hyparchical substance constitutes a true science.

The division of universal meaning according to *Arbor Porphyriana* has shown that the followers of Gilbert de La Porrée no longer needed the existence of real things for the scientific proof, as Abelard had postulated. Gilbert proposed univocity of being only as nominal determination of subsistence, which is given by its participation in the collection of immutable hypostases. The truth as formally correct comitation and univocal predication of existence, we find that concept in logical schools following Gilbert de La Porrée. The carrier of the modern truth becomes the not further divisible individual determined by proper name. It keeps a nominal body and hypostatized qualities. Treatises such as *Sophismata*, *Quaestiones logicales* or *Syncategoremata* claim that even if no real person existed, the objectively determined human being will nevertheless have a generic determination such as animality (*omnis homo de necessitate est animal, nullo homine existente*). Likewise, the answer to the problem of autonomous signification for the single thing was done in the same way, because even the dead Caesar continues to be Caesar (*Caesar est Caesar, Caesare mortuo*). The philosophy of language in the epoch of nihilism repeated this dispute with the sentence “The present king of France is bald” (Bertrand Russell) to close *circulus vitiosus* of modern logic in Freud’s defense mechanism of repetitive compulsion (*Wiederholungszwang*).[[75]](#footnote-75) The transformation of Avicenna’s humanism into nominalist humanism of Porretans produced the first objective humanism of “man—corpse” in the Latin West. In the second half of the 12th century, the logical schools of the time had only some themes in common with *Nominales* and they did not form a coherent whole. Besides the new *Logica Modernorum*, other schools maintained the classical Aristotelian line of *Logica Vetus* founded by Boethius and Abelard. These Aristotelians argued against the theses of *Nominales* in the framework of truth as correspondence. They defended the imposition of the meaning from the hyparchical first substance. The example of authors of the writing *Tractatus Anagnini* (around the year 1110) shows that some logical schools, influenced by Abelard, kept the statute of the logical terminus (*significatum per terminum*) strictly at the level of the second substance, i.e., only as logical supposition (*dici de subiecto*).[[76]](#footnote-76) The classical logicians, unlike the modernists, knew that supposition carries a threefold distinct meaning (*'subiectus' tripliciter dicitur*). Supposition is given: 1) metaphysically, with respect to the subject as a second substance; the predication contains its meaning due to the imposition from the hyparchical first substance; 2) categorically, with respect to the supposition of the second substance and to its accidents; 3) nominally, with respect to the subject as an element of the statement in the context of non-binding signification. The last most general, but merely equivocal level of signification is determined at the level of Abelard’s act of language (*oratio*, ch. 1.3). Moreover, the second substance has a different status in the context of categorial predication than its accidents (*esse in subiecto*). The Anagnians defended the Aristotelian nature of Porphyry’s Tree against the univocal difference of *Nominales*, since they separated the first and the second substance. The semantic or logical term carries only an equivocal signification. It makes them distinct from the categorically predicated second substance, which, moreover, is distinct from its accidental determination. Then, the individual in the sense of the indivisible first substance and as the imposition predicated categorical and univocal second substance cannot be modern, that is, univocally unified. For Anagnians, the supposition of the individual as the subject of categorical predication is always false if it is taken in the sense of the second substance. Such supposition does not respect the hyparchical modality of categorial predication given by the imposition from reality (*'individuum dicitur de subiecto', falsum est*). In the sense of the real subject of the categorial predication related to the first substance, Socrates is not an individuum given at the end of the division of universals. It is possible to predicate the univocal existence of Socrates in the present or the past only on the basis of the imposition of the meaning from the being of the real person. The equivocal meaning of the purely nominally determined individual does not have the same level of signification as *subiectum* given by the categorically determined imposition from first substances. The treatise from the school of Anagnians inspired the representatives of the classical *Logica Vetus* in the 13th century, who rejected the theory of univoken *suppositio* of modernists for the individual of the third kind. The dispute between Porretans and Aristotelians at the University of Paris represents the next round of the quarrel over the statute of logic and metaphysics. It started in the end of the 12th century. The writing *Metaphysics* presupposes knowledge of the writing *De anima* about cognition and its knowledge to establish the semantic interpretation of *Categories* and the scientific interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Modern Porretans simply abolished this original structure of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and replaced it with their logic. The disciples of Gilbert de La Porrée extended the validity of univocally understood logical being into metaphysics. John of Salisbury, following Abelard’s pattern, distinguishes three levels with regard to cognition of the external thing: the existence of the real thing, its cognition on the basis of the senses, and the signification of this cognition.[[77]](#footnote-77) Following Aristotle, classic scholasticism distinguished three levels of meaning of being: as the thing exists in its actuality of first substance (*modus essendi*); as it is given in our cognition (*modus intelligendi*); as it is stated in the true statement about the recognized thing (*modus significandi*).[[78]](#footnote-78) The school of Aristotelian Modists continued this legacy of Aristotelian cathedral schools. Under the dominant influence of the Paris School, these schools founded the University of Paris.

The major error of *Nominales* came from the inability to distinguish the level of metaphysical and logical abstraction given by different stages of abstraction and syntheses of cognition (sensual, logical, metaphysical). As the best commentator on Aristotle in the history of Western philosophy, Averroes knew very well that modernists do not in fact read Aristotle’s writings; they project interpretations of their own making into the letter of the text (*Moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). Because of sophistical mixture of the imposition and supposition, the first modernists fundamentally differ from Abelard’s commentary on Aristotelels’ writing *De interpretatione* mentioned above. Aristotelian concept of cognition in *De anima* became the touchstone of classical and modern logic, as the following matrix shows. The school of *Nominales* proved the truth of the *Second Analytics* but in a sophistical way. Science is possible only in relation to the necessary and universal meanings (τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα περὶ εἴδη ἐστίν) and the first substance does not possess in and of itself these general determinations (οὐ γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινός, *Anal. Post*. 79a7–8). The logically conceived essence replaced the real causality of the first substance. The newly defined effect, established in the process of division, goes in the direction of quantified individual. This last difference of species is given in the form of the body of the third kind that relates to the equally hypostatized causality. The hyparchical predication *per prius* in the direction of the first substance after its disappearance was replaced by the modern individual that come about at the end of the division of universals. The new atomic substance made possible any thought experiment, because the logical simplicity is not determined by the principle of actual and causally effective reality. Through this fundamental error, modernity marginalized the first substance in the true cognition. The analysis of Oxfordian Fallacy in the following matrix will prove this point.

The modern individual became the atomic substance of the third kind and began to act as an effective cause. Such role was reserved before only to the first real substance. The definition of causality goes from the first substance to the nominally defined essence. Objective causality will be of crucial importance in the Oxford of 1230 in the new interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Aristotle and Averroes conceived the effective causality exclusively in the framework of the first substance, i.e., at the level of physics and subsequently also of the first science of the causes of the movement, the origin and the decline of hyparchical substances. We have analyzed the original hyparchical concept of substance in Aristotle at the beginning of the dispute about substance according to the locus classicus (*Cat*. 2a11‒16)), which determines the whole gigantomachy (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). True metaphysics must investigate “substance *qua* substance” and not “substance *qua* essence.” According to Aristote, the transformation of hyparchical predication into universal supposition establishes, at best, an analogical form of similarity. Analogy cannot establish true scientific knowledge of the world, which is given causally by deductive judgment at the level of predication as *demonstratio*. Today, the sophisms of *Nominales* seem to be completely normal; they tie in with the concept of postmodern science as speculation about mathematically given essences and their properties. But at the end of the 12th century, there were very influential critical thinkers from classical Aristotelian schools of Boethius that were not paranoid in a modern way. Some philosophical contemporaries of *Nominales* disagreed with the interpretation of substance and reality constructed with the help of a word game. They clearly rejected the eclipse of the first substance. We have quoted John of Salisbury, who gave the sect of *Nominales* their pejorative name and carried out the first interpretation of their errors. But there were more critical Aristotelians. Magister Godfrey of St. Victor, in his ironic book of epigrams (*Fons philosophiae*, 1178), hits exactly on the dilemma of the modernists of his time. Godfrey left Paris sometime after the year 1150 because he was disgusted by studies in schools of *Parvipontanes* and declared the school of *Nominales* to be insane. The thinkers with common sense cannot accept such nonsense. Let’s look at the part of the philosophical epigram, which exactly enumerates the most important points of the worldview according to *Nominales* in their dispute with the Aristotelian school of classical logic and metaphysics. The epigram dedicated to the modern Porretans stands out for its wit and accuracy.[[79]](#footnote-79)

“‘Nominalist’ friends join these (they themselves admitting!) / Friends ‘in name,’ but not ‘in thought’ — such the bonds they’re knitting / Others they call ‘realists’ closer yet are sitting; / What is real their name supplies — here is how it’s fitting / If to ‘guilts,’ reatibus, (terms deriving lamely) / We should trace realium, (‘realists,’ of namely) / We must all their slips remit, though they reason vainly / Clash with mind is normal for those who think insanely. / He who some mere name a class general is deeming / Gives by this sufficient proof that his brain is steaming; / World with classes multiple obviously teeming, / How bare names could fill the bill goes beyond all dreaming! “ (Godfrey of Saint Victor, *The Fountain of Philosophy*, trad. Edward A. Synan, p. 48)

Porretans transformed the generic determination of the category into a being of the third kind. It is placed in the framework of a new nomination that suppressed the meaning made by categorical predication (*mens cogitet nomen esse genus*). They rejected the realist difference between twofold substance as the uniquely actual and universally predicated (*realium nomen dici horum*). They reduced the reality to a nominal meaning that nominalists cherish as a sect (*nomine… sodales*). They got into contradiction with themselves, because the “realism” of nominal substances is an expression of insane thinking (*solus hoc crediderit mentis alienus*). The first Nominalists fill the world with generic “things” *(cum sit tot generibus rerum mundus plenus*). Their doctrine has nothing to do with the determination of the genus, since it was not determined according to Aristotelian substance but according to eternally given meaning (*cuius genus nomen est semper sit genus*). The thinking of these modern sophists works so diligently on all kinds of nonsense until it begins to smoke. Roger Bacon repeated Godfrey’s ironic attitude, let us see the next matrix of the dispute with the following group of *Modernorum*. This Aristotelian called modernist colleagues at Oxford to be madmen (*insaniunt contra veritatem*, ch. 3.4.2). The new scheme of cognition is no longer determined in principle by the extra mental thing, see the cited *Metalogicon* of Salisbury (ch. 1.4). Introduced by Avicenna, the concept of *tertium ens* began to be effective in the Latin West through debates about the altered status of the genus, species, and individual as there are defined in the *Isagoge*. The univocity started to apply in terms of arbitrarily defined properties, rather than in relation to actually existing substance, as in Aristotle. The formalization and univocity of beingness caused that basic properties of the physical body (existence, matter, quality, quantity) acquired a hypostatic univocal status. The register of universals added by comitation can be extended with the help of *ad hoc* formed hypostases. The schools of Porretans and Nominalists created the world of modern individuals to be a collection of hypostatized meanings, which they added to the nominal subject in virtue of avicennistic comitation of universal meanings. Avicennist comitation replaced Aristotelian categorical predication. The Nominalists merely established a logical conception of truth and falsity that was completely detached from the effect of the metaphysical dative and from the metaphysical abstraction tied to real hyparchical first substances. The paranoiac thinking of *Nominales*, which was criticized by thinkers like Godfrey, no longer recognizes the real world, but only its own creations. Thereby it determines itself by itself, with indirect help of real things. Following Boethius’s example, classically educated Abelard tied the truth of cognition to the actuality of the first substance. His thought did not prevail in the Latin West because the modernists triumphed in a new guise, in the second half of the 13th century. Abelard knew that in his confused proto-modernist times he represented almost the only protector of authentic Aristotelianism. Likewise, Siger de Brabant was the only philosopher of his time to grasp in depth the phenomenological sense of the CMDA, Averroes’s ipseity of the person, and his fundamental critique of Avicenna’s metaphysics. The principal novelty of Porretans and *Nominales* resides in the fact that they tied univocal meaning to mathematical abstraction. The mathematically determined individual became a new universal and at the same time an individual thing in the framework of hypostatized matter and extension. Taken from the point of view of hermeneutics, Roscelin, Gilbert, Alberich and their followers called *Nominales* represent a typical Avicennist position. Their teaching will have a great future especially in logical schools (*Porretani, Parvipontani, Meludinenses*). The decline of these schools after the year 1200 corresponds to the arrival of the authentic writings of Aristotle and the commentary of Averroes in the Latin West, and to the transformation of *Logica Modernorum* into an ontotheological version of modernism practiced in schools of the second Averroism. After the year 1200, it came to the dispute of modernists with Blund’s school. This school assisted in founding the University of Paris by transforming the curriculum of *École de Paris*. Modern Avicennists rejected Boethius’s and Abelard’s metaphysics lectured in Blund’s school. It was based on the new interpretation of the writing *De anima*. Thus, the dispute concernin true meaning related again to the interpretation of *De anima*, where Aristotle located it after *De Interpretatione* (ch. 1.1). The interpretation of *De anima* establishes the next matrix of objectivity, because these disputes were already influenced by the arrival of Averroes’s major work CMDA in the Latin West. The knowledge of the first theologically based modernity is founded on ecclesiastical and academic power, invested by dogmatic convictions (*certitudo*) of absolute rightness (*rectitudo*). Modern knowledge is not based on truth, but on academic power. It generates the truth determined by the modern subject (*scientia potestas est*), which Francis Bacon applied to knowledge of modern God (*Meditationes Sacrae*, 1597). In the 13th century, Porretans and their followers reduced the subject to the autonomous essence used in the process of Avicennian denudation. This sophism changed the classical *Logica Vetus* into the *Logica Modernorum*. The school of modernists in Oxford founded a new scientific instrument of cognition and created a new concept of truth around the year 1230. From the point of view of the history tracing the impact of objectivity, the local councils in Soissons (1121), Sens (1140) and after them Tempier’s decree of March 1277 are absolutely important. The authoritarian ecclesiastical institutions did not understand the twofold way to the truth after specific research of philosophy and theology. The scientific proof, according to the *Second Analytics*, keeps the univocity according to the second substance as the last level of the univocally predicated meaning within the genus. The generically different research of theology and philosophy cannot proceed according to the one method. That assumption founded the modern theory of one truth according to the Paris Decree of the year 1277 or from a later time in the postmodern Unified Science. Dogmatically conducted research passes beyond the imposition of meaning from real first substances. The theory of one Neoplatonic truth made by mythologic predication *ad unum*, ceased to be a critical Aristotelian science.

Taken from the point of view of proposed hermeneutics, the quarrel about tritheism in the second half of the twelfth century masks a quite different dispute; namely, the advent of Avicennistic modernity and its methodological path to an ontotheological metaphysics conceived in unitary terms. The hypostatized Persons in the Divine Trinity are determined by essentially and nominally conceived relations. They represent an epochal new simulacrum that facilitated the arrival of new metaphysics. Classical Aristotelians rejected in principle such God of *Modernorum*. At the end of this path, the death of the modern God and the annihilation of the human person as an individual — all that first appeared in the Porretan tritheism. Islam fundamentally rejected this error. The price to pay was official suppression of philosophy and validation of theologically based wisdom present in various cultures and religious traditions of Islam. From the point of view of the present hermeneutics, the dispute about the definition of what different authors called “*opinio Nominalium*” since 1160 has some common features with the later dispute about Averroism, which was running in the framework of “*opinio Latinorum*.” The following points show the common features of historical impact of Avicennism and Averroism.

* Averroes was not an Averroist and Abelard did not belong to schools of *Nominales*, which is proved both by his work and by logical schools based on Boethius’s metaphysics (*Tractatus Anagnini*).
* The designation of the school as *Nominales* is attested around the year 1160 by the philosophical opponents of Porretans and not by the actual representatives of this school. Likewise, the term became a philosophical label after the year 1250 and not at the time when Averroes’s first reception in the Latin West took place.
* The theory of meaning did not have a uniform character in logical schools of the time; therefore, not all representatives of the compilation called *Logica Modernorum* can be considered followers of the school of *Nominales*. The reception of Averroes after the year 1230 shows a similar complexity because of the fundamental difference between the first and the second Averroism.
* In the later scholasticism a new stage of the dispute about nominalism began, which erased the original dispute and replaced it with a quarrel about universals. Similarly, this development takes place in Averroism after the year 1300, see the appearance of John of Jandun, Marsilius of Padua and other modernists.
* Just as there were no Averroists around 1270 due to the condemnation of the so-called twofold truth from 1277, there was no documented connection between the *Nominales* and Abelard. This Aristotelian, tested by grim fate, wrongly received the etiquette of the nominalist; in a similar way, Aristotelian Siger of Brabant became an Averroist.
* The revival of nominalist schools occurs in the 15th century, see the royal edict of 1473, which forbids lectures of nominalists in Paris. The renaissance of the Italian Averroists took place at the universities of Padua and Bologna during the 15th and 16th centuries.
* Contemporary Thomism unveiled and cloaked the debate with regard to *enuntiatio* according to the school of *Nominales* as effectively as Ernest Renan had already done it with regard to Latin Averroism.

From the point of view of hermeneutics, the controversy about the ideological label of *Nominales* means the hidden presence of another historical phenomenon. It is the reception of Avicennism in the West in the environment of logical schools influenced by Neoplatonism when a new form of being of the third kind emerges. Connoisseurs of Boethius’s interpretation of *Organon* and Porphyry’s *Isagoge* resolutely rejected the concept of objective being. Their cathedral students founded the University of Paris in the next generation. The first translations of original *Corpus Aristotelicum* into Latin reaffirmed the position of Aristotelians. The interpretation of the Latin reception of Averroes forms a historical complement to the controversy over the school of *Nominales*. The designation “*Averroistae*” relates to an equally ambiguous group.

The dispute between Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus and Porphyry, Avicenna and Averroes, Anselm and Abelard has an ever-repeating character of an epochal battle over substance. This gigantomachy proceeds through a series of matrices of objectivity, wherein new forms of the *tertium ens* are continually produced in new historical constellations. Avicennian *Nominales* spread the new kinds of *tertium ens* from the second half of the 12th century. They introduced into this concept mathematical abstraction, univocal hypostases and new conception of species as effective causes. These forms of *tertium ens* replaced the causality of first substances in scientific proof. The connection between Avicennism and Neoplatonic scholasticism was tied to the truth as Anselm’s *rectitudo* and Avicenna’s *certitudo*. The view of reality through a series of being of the third kind created a new theory of individuality and causality. This development is confirmed by the above-mentioned quotation from the work *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*. It establishes an epochal new determination of man through the comitation of abstract predicates (*sic est verus homo veritate humanitatem comitante*, ch. 1.5). Truth is no more an Aristotelian, hyparchical predicate, but an Avicennian supposition given in the mystical insight of modern *illuminati*. The subsistence of the individual displaced the existence of the real person in the sophistical system of nominal differences. That exchange founded a modern simulacrum of objectively conceived humanity. The new determination of the human being refers directly to individual things marked by specific proper name (*hoc nomine 'humanitas', est species individuorum*, ch. 1.5). The redemptive word of modernity (*hoc nomine 'humanitas'*) was established after decline of the Falsafa in the Latin West. Such humanity became a nominalistic body and began to dwell among us objectively. The objectively seen human being became merely a name. The changed statute of metaphysics also forms the objective historical *factum*, i.e., a new humanistic worldview, which is marked by incipient nihilism of modernity. Such humanism produces historically effective objectivity, which led to the historical events of the year 1277 and created the extermination camps of the 20th century in the age of metaphysical nihilism.

The new determination of man by the matematically hypostatized humanity of the third kind founded the modern subject of Christian religiosity as well. The introduction of *tertium ens* into the univocal concept of substance was projected into the theological concept of purgatory. The sale of indulgences created the first form of modern economy. The previously obscure substance called *tertium ens* emerged from the Neoplatonic philosophical limbo and became a historically active factor in modern ontotheology. The distant God finally became intelligible because he was given a modern form and became purchasable. The worldview given in purgatorial writings was connected to the mysticism of the Ascension. This mysticism appears for the first time in the writings of Jewish mysticism. The Christians were inspired by the mysticism of the heavenly sephiroth in the cabalistic works of the type *Sefer Yetzirah* (*Book of Creation*) or the description of the ascension of Jewish mystics to the Merkava, as it is handed down in the literature of the type *Hekhalot Rabbati*. This kind of compositions describes the path to the heavenly palaces. Christian mysticism knows this thesis from the *Second Letter to the Corinthians*, wherein the Apostle Paul describes his rapture into the third heaven (*2 Cor* 12:2‒4). Similarly, Islamic writings as *Kitāb al mi’rādj* (*Liber scala Machometi*) emerged, which were inspired by *Enoch’s Apocalypse*, gnostic and rabbinic works, the mysticism of the Jewish school of the Geonim, and the *New Testament*. The mystic contemplation penetrated the original demiurgic diacosmos and directly observed God’s glory. The path through purgatory to objectivity passes through the eastern gnostic writings such as the *Apocalypse of Paul* (*Visio Pauli*), which were reworked between the 7th and 8th centuries in the writing of Gregory the Great (*Libri dialogum*, lib. 4, cap. 36) and Beda the Venerable (*Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum*, lib. 5, cap. 12). Heaven and Earth joined into a new unity, as the persons admitted in the diacosmos (Prophet Elijah, Apostle Paul, Rabbi Nechoniah ben ha-Qana, Prophet Mohammed) interpreted this mystical connection with the diacosmos through the eidetic vision of divine glory. The mystic was endowed with the ability to directly see the divine world. This was made possible by the philosophical mystical versions of the Neoplatonic diacosmos propagated in Christianity, Kabbalah, and Islam. This eidetic vision abolished the generic distinction between theology, mysticism and philosophy. The modern *illuminates* as uncritical intellectuals of that time could finally sell the tickets to make the journey between the Earth and the Heaven. Modern God was merciful to them in this point, because he was as much a *tertium ens* as the modern subject. The millenarian utopias inspired medieval *illuminati* and shifted the development of history to redemption, which is given as a secularized version of the millennial reign of God in the *Apocalypse of John* (Mannheim 1995, ch. IV). The combination of mysticism, Porretan hypostases, mathematics and quantified morality of indulgences created the fundamental *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of modern economics at the beginning of the 13th century. The contemporary variant of neoliberal indulgences offers individuals and even states the illusion of secular salvation through the quantified nihilism of virtual debt, which grows exponentially. This *homo economicus*, the new subject of further historical upheavals and struggles, so far waits in the metaphysical and theological limbo (Jamblichus’s διάκοσμος, underworld *barzach* in the Koran, medieval *purgatorium*) for its historical manifestation.

The birth of Western capitalism is accomplished in historical *veritas* by Petrus Olivi through the justification of modern economics (OBJ III, ch. 5.1.3). At the end of the 12th century, all the presuppositions of modern economy are already present in secret in the new form of metaphysics. The new worldview established the discrete and therefore fully quantifiable vision of Christian diacosmos. The objective economy arises in the Latin West in a mythologic and irrational way, like any other version of objectivity. It is based on mathematical analogy, which connects Paul’s third heaven and the Christian first earth. Modern Latin *illuminati* began to rediscover the pagan diacosmos in the mode of “*discrete videamus*.” It existed before in Plato’s dialogues *The Republic, Tiamaios* and in Islamic and Jewish mysticism. Latin Neoplatonists of the Porretan schools grasped that mystical diacosmos by mathematical analogy linked to numerically quantified merits. Theological satisfaction became accessible in Augustinian mysticism. At the end of the 12th century, the idea of satisfaction went to Porretan theological schools, where it joined the mathematical vision of the world. The basis of modern economics is the capital and interest system of purgatorial indulgences. This system dates back to Augustine’s writing *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*.[[80]](#footnote-80) The quotation mentions capitalization of merits for deceased souls of blessed (*pro valde bonis gratiarum actiones sunt*) and establishes the first *Lichtung* of purgatory economics for failed souls (*pro non valde bonis propitianiones sunt*). The mathematically and economically conceived purgatory spread the diacosmos of Neoplatonists and the world-*barzach* in the Koran (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). Parallel to the new concept of truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*, the theological concept of purgatory emerges in Christianity. The ecclesiastical model of quantified sanctions was given in the form of legally codified penances for serious crimes. Later, it was necessary to transfer this economy of penance into the purgatorial diacosmos. The idea of purgatory emerges at the same time as cited writing *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*. The idea of purgatory is attested in the work *Tractatus de Purgatorio Sancti Patricii* (c. 1190). The historical significance of this writing was interpreted by Jacques Le Goff in *La Naissance du Purgatoire* (1981). The hermeneutics of objectivity appreciates the analysis of the newly emerged meaning of the world in the chapter 7 (*Les nouveaux schémas mentaux non binaires*), which resonates with proposed interpretation of the *tertium ens*. The production of metaphysical simulacra was reinforced by the evolution of redoubled reality. The mathematization of the world followed the theology of purgatory. This modern ontotheology determines the existential question of eternal salvation and damnation in an analogical and mathematical way, based on “*discrete videamus*” principle. Abstract definition of human being began to operate through merchant mentality of the High Middle Ages. The purgatorial structure of gratification and tradable indulgences, and later capital securities, accelerated the development of the secular economy. Mathematics was exported to the previously wholly separated fields of sovereign divine grace and judgment. Modern subject secured its redemption under almost all circumstances. The idea of capitalized purgatory represents the *Lichtung* of Western secularization. Its ultimate truth is given in the necessary and inevitable death of modern God. He was quickly replaced by mathematical economy of stock market derivatives. *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*. The modern economy of mathematized merits and satisfactions is given by commercial necessity and redemption comes without modern God. Today’s mentality of purgatory is hidden in the virtual economy of mystically conceived global debt, which got the character of absolutely given simulacrum and today destroys even the whole states. Economic nihilism operates irrational purgatory by means of stock exchange derivatives. One per mille of *illuminati*, hermetically separated from the rest of mankind in the mode of the above-mentioned term “*absolute*,” direct the diacosmos of derivatives and virtual debts. After the death of modern God, banksters sat down on the vacant throne. This group of extraterrestrial subjects administers the economic realm of virtual *tertium ens* and they give their digital absolution to the rest of the normal living humanity. Those who do not pass through the neoliberal banking purgatory of dollar economics are reaping the doom as the hell of hybrid warfare. The dispute of Aristotelians with the representatives of logical schools united in schools of *Nominales* showed one important thing. In the Latin West equipped with purgatorial mentality, the determination of being made in the model of Avicenna’s comitation came at just moment. Abelard and his school believed in the common sense, which scientifically investigates the real world, and not in the mythology of modernity. At the beginning of the 13th century, God of *Modernorum* acquired the features of a loving and infallible accountant with a distinctly mercantile mentality. From this *factum* Petrus Olivi derived the first form of capitalist economy. The following matrix shows how Avicenna’s metaphysical obscurity reinstated a new kind of modernist thinking that Averroes criticized (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The new turn in the development of the objective worldview occurred at the moment when Averroes’s writings came to the Latin West.

# 2. Emergence of the First Averroism (Matrix II)

The first matrix of objectivity related to the development of the Latin West has shown the hermeneutic triad of historiality, historicity and history based on the first Latin gigantomachy of substance between Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism. The import of Aristotle’s corpus into the Latin West proceeded in several waves. The works *De anima, Physics, Metaphysics*, and the collection *Parva naturalia* had been known in the West since the 12th century; for example, through the translation of James of Venice (Iacobus Veneticus Grecus, †1147). At about the same time, Avicenna’s writing, translated into Latin, began to find their way into the West. Magisters at the University of Paris knew Avicenna’s corpus in Latin translations of the Toledo school. The objectivity discovered by Avicenna extended and complemented the Neoplatonic interpretations present at the cathedral schools, e.g., Chartres, Laon, and Rheims. Western reconciliation between Aristotle and Plato had been handed down by the Falsafa to reach the environment of Christian Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism. The result was a new production of being of the third kind, initiated by Gilbert de La Porrée and after him by Porretans and schools of *Nominales*. The new worldview emerged in schools of Porretans thanks to a twofold impulse. First, the ecclesiastical condemnation of Abelard and his Aristotelian school elevated the sophistic philosophy of *Modernorum* to an officially recognized dogma. However, the condemnation of Gilbert de La Porrée made by the Council of Paris (1147) and Council of Rheims (1148) showed that the coming out of Modernism would not be an easy task. The disintegration of the doctrine of the Trinity and, finally, of the unity of the person as well, was too high a price to pay for the advent of modernity; especially for critical ecclesiastical thinking of the time. Second, the import of Avicenna’s corpus into the Latin West confirmed the Porretan predication of hypostases made by comitation of pure essences. The first Western *illuminati* took a direct insight into the pure essences. After the arrival of Avicenna’s works in the Latin, Porretans designed a new version of Neoplatonism that replaced Aristotle’s metaphysics. In virtue of connection merging Aristotelian predication, Neoplatonism, Avicennism and Augustinianism, a new meaning of being was born. The historical impact of being of the third kind manifested itself immediately in following generation of Porretans and parallel to the reception of Avicenna (1160‒90). The school of *Nominales* determined, on the basis of mathematical analogy, the minimal portion of beingness between logic and metaphysics (*individuum*). This atomic substance of the third kind was inserted into the universal system of classification known as Tree of Porphyry. The division of universal reality goes to the last indivisible unity of meaning that received the status of the first substance. The basic unity of hypostatic accidents, hypostatic existence and even hypostatic causality came into the definition of being. The order of subsistent properties and substantial determinations on the level of genera and species was predicated to the not further divisible carrier of these determinations (*individuum*). Within the framework of abstractly conceived meaning, the modernist can sophistically divide and compose everything that can be named. The new way of dividing was connected in the framework of hypostatized predication with the synthesis (*colligatio*) that composed the substance of the third kind with the help of apposition to create nominalist determinations of the individual (*socratitas*). Hermeneutics interpreted this historical unconcealment (*alētheia*) of the objective being by the terminus “*discrete videamus*,” which is listed in the anonymous part of the work *Tractatus* (ch. 1.4). This founding event (*Ereignis*) established the figure of a new but hitherto hidden metaphysics. The first substance transformed into an individual acquired a hypostatized existence in the schools of Porretans. That *tertium ens* began to act as a second substance in the new system of categorical predication. The new meaning of being passed into amphibolic predications, as they had already existed in the Falsafa, therefore, a new class of being of the third kind emerged. Aristotelianism defended the correspondence between intellect and real thing by respecting the hyparchical function of the first substance. The truth defined according to the writing *Categories, Metaphysics* and *De interpretatione* necessarily came into conflict with the thinking of Porretans. Their worldview was established by hierarchy of effective cosmic forms, which was done *more geometrico* according to the writing *Liber de causis*. A new parallel world of the spirit was inserted between the universal and the single thing. Latin scholasticism replaced Jamblichus’s diacosmos and created the scholastic theory of one ontotheological truth. By combining mysticism, mathematics, philosophy, and purgatorial economics, a new version of atomic substance emerged.

New gigantomachy of substance began at the moment when Averroes’s writings appeared at the Paris University. The reception of Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle caused a partial separation from Avicenna’s ontotheology. According to two well-known medievalists, the key part of Averroes’s translations came to Paris either in 1230 (De Vaux 1933) from Michael Scotus’s school of translators or already ten years earlier from the environment of the Toledo school (Gauthier 1982). Under the summary of Arabic school known as *Peripatetici novi* or *Peripatetici posteriores*, the anonymous Latin reception of Averroes’s *Great commentary on Metaphysics* in the work *Commentum in Metaphysicam* is attested (Bertolacci 2014, 99). Averroes’s Great commentary on Aristotle’s writing *De anima* (CMDA) was translated into Latin around the year 1225. Gauthier places the first reception of Averroes in the Latin West in the current of the so-called “first Averroism” that which received the teaching of the genius from Córdoba in a positive way. We find the term “first Averroism” in the introduction of the critical edition of *De anima et potencis eius* (around 1225).[[81]](#footnote-81) Hermeneutics fully support Gauthier’s definition of the first Averroism, whose followers clearly identify the *intellectus agens* as an individual faculty of the human soul.[[82]](#footnote-82) The treatises of the Commentator brought from Toledo and Sicily helped to introduce the school of the first Averroism, which had existed in the circle of John Blund’s students. The effect of this school after the reception of the Corpus of the Commentator can be traced in the anonymous writing *De anima et de potenciis eius*. By introducing the possible intellect in the manner of CMDA, a new field of manifestation of being emerges together with the Christian Neoplatonism. The followers of the first Averroism would certainly agree with the above-mentioned proposition of contemporary connoisseurs that Averroes was not an Averroist (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Classical studies have proved that the first scholastic interpreters (William of Auvergne, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon) took the Commentator’s interpretation beyond the line of later Averroism and that they took Averroes basically positively (Salman 1937). The quotations of Latin authors from Averroes’s writings in the years 1230‒50 do not contain any criticism of the numerically one intellect and no allusions to the alleged doctrine about the one soul. The mentioned authors do not interfere with Averroes’s theory of the cosmic *intellectus agens* that is bound to the astral sphere (Baumgarten 2001, 35‒36). The authors of the first Averroism do not classify the Commentator as a follower of monopsychism. This interpretation was first put forward in 1236 by Rufus of Cornwall, the founder of the second Averroism (ch. 3.3.3). The circumstances of the first reception of Averroes’s metaphysics confirm the previous interpretation of the CMDA, which showed a fundamental agreement between Ibn Rushd’s interpretation and the Aristotelianism of the Parisian school. Abelard and his disciples were engaged in polemics against Avicennists, such as Porretans and *Nominales*. Aristotelian philosophers in the tradition of Boethius and Abelard opposed to the school of *Nominales*. They had no problems with the reception of Averroes’s metaphysics. The connoisseurs of Averroes from the schools of Abelard and Blund defended the first substance as “*totum integrum*.” By exploration of CMDA they tied the first substance to Boethius’s definition of the person as first indivisible hylemorphic substance. In the name of the Commentator, representatives of the first Averroism rejected the teaching of modern *Latinorum*. The latter tried to introduce into the interpretation of *De anima* some Neoplatonic elements made according to Avicenna. The stream of Augustinian Avicennists destroyed the foundations of Christian doctrine on God and man, which was shown in the debates on tritheism in the second half of the 12th century. The philosophical founders of the University of Paris, in accordance with Boethius’s and Abelard’s Aristotelianism, defined human cognition as an individual act of the will, which is tied to the physical faculties of the body. Like the Commentator, they defended the interpretation of metaphysics given by the exposure of being from the front, from the direction of the real substance, and they firmly rejected the modern plurality of substances in man. The followers of this school rejected the doctrine of their contemporaries called *Latini* or *Moderni*, who had not understood or had not accepted the interpretation of metaphysics presented *ad mentem Averrois*. That is why the debate between the first and the second Averroism was so stormy, especially in the years 1245‒55. The positive reception of Averroes established in the first Averroism was replaced in year 1250 by the negative view, which points to the new constellation of *tertium ens* in the scholasticism of that time. The accusation of Averroism was used by all interpreters of Ibn Rushd. But only the *Moderni* changed in a fundamental way the doctrine of Aristotle towards objectivity and disinterpreted the meaning of CMDA towards Averroism.

Hermeneutical archaeology interprets basic forms of unconcealment of being, which produces a historial field of an epochal revelation of Being (*Lichtung*) before and after the reception of Averroes’s corpus in the first half of the 13th century. The methodological introduction of the work emphasized that revealed *tertium ens* must show itself to someone, because only in this way it passes from lethargic phase of Being given in *Lichtung* into the direct historial effect within the framework of full unconcealment (OBJ I, ch. 1). The objectivity hidden in works of Porretans passed into the truth as manifested *alētheia* at the moment when the whole dispute about substance came under the influence of Averroes’s metaphysics. This historical fact established a new event of Western metaphysics, because it shaped truth and falsity of Western objectivity. The dispute between the school of the first and the second Averroism founded in the victorious metaphysics of modernity a new hiddenness of being, which described Heidegger’s terminus *Irre* and *Irrtum* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.). The eclipse of being, interpreted in the previous matrix by the dispute between Aristotelians and *Nominales*, received a new dynamic. The first Averroism resolutely rejected any form of *tertium ens*, therefore, it could produce no concept of objectivity. The preceding matrix has shown the fundamental reasons for rejecting being of the third kind, which were addressed for the first time by Aristotelian Abelard and by logical schools following him in the line of Boethius and the classical *Logica Vetus*. A different situation prevailed in schools of Porretan *Nominales*. In the schools of *Logica Modernorum*, it came to introduction of Avicenna’s metaphysics. In the years 1230‒40, a new synthesis of meaning of being emerged in Oxford and Paris as part of the newly founded path of *Modernorum*. This synthesis created the first model of objectivity tied to the modern subject. Different interpretations of Averroes’s metaphysics play a key role in the second matrix. The year 1230 marks a symbolic milestone and, according to Roland de Vaux, a real one, when a new concept of metaphysics and truth began to take effect.

Frederick’s court astrologer and translator Michael Scotus visited the University of Paris about the year 1230. His arrival and treatises he brought with, they initiated the school of the first Averroism, which existed in the environment of Blund’s school. By introducing the possible intellect in the way of CMDA and directed against the Christian Neoplatonism defended by schools of modern Porretans, the first Averroism created a new field of the revelation of being. Therefore, the year 1230 is an important historical date as well. It came to new gigantomachy concerning the substance, between the school of the first and the second Averroism. Averroes’s philosophy appears for the first time around the year 1225 in the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius*. Grosseteste was the assumed author of this writing and an important representative of Blund’s school; he rejects the interpretation of Aristotle commented by Toletan Avicennists. They followed Avicenna’s pattern und gave the universals a new being in the world (*habent esse in mundo*; OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). In the following decade, the first analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* (ch. 3.1.1) emerges in Oxford, which establishes the modern version of objective science. After leaving the Blund’s school in Paris, Aristotelian Grosseteste changed the interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus to Neoplatonism. Porretans in Oxford after 1230 accepted Grosseteste’s doctrine and they became the first Franciscan modernists. Their leading spirit was Rufus of Cornwall. The study of the newly established corpus and the present Averroes’s commentaries fundamentally influenced the philosophy in the Latin West. The declining wisdom of the Falsafa acquired worthy successors in Islam in the environment of the first Christian universities, thanks in part to prudent rulers and translation patrons who rejected the papal crusades, such as the Sicilian emperor Frederick II. (†1250). The diabolization of Frederick given by excommunication in year 1229 and ecclesiastical ban on the imperial title in year 1245 related to his struggle against the Papal state in Italy. Papal propaganda portrayed him in the figure of the modern Antichrist or the beast according to the *Apocalypse of John*. Followers from among the philosophers and patricians of Italian cities honored Frederick with the titles “The Wonder of the World” (*stupor mundi*) and “The Highest of Earthly Rulers” (*principium mundi maximus*). For Averroes’s reception in the Latin West, the collection of translations of *Corpus Aristotelicum* from the palace library of Frederick II. is of key importance. This admirer of Aristotle, fluent in seven languages, had them made translated into Latin in his own translators’ workshop run by Michael Scotus, and sent them at his own expense to the University of Bologna. His son Manfred created a similar collection of Latin translations of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* for the University of Paris. These translations presented an Aristotle different from the Neoplatonic mysticism of the Toledo school. Scotus came to lecture at Paris in 1230 as Aristotelian translator from the workshop of Frederick II. the Sicilian. He brought with him the first knowledge of Averroes’s metaphysics that was not contaminated by Avicennism of the Toledo translators. The translators of the Toledo school brought about Neoplatonic interpretation of Averroes, following Dominicus Gundissalinus that changed the interpretation of Alfarabi’s commentary on *De anima* towards Neoplatonism (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The influence of this school can be seen, for example, in the *Summa Duacensis*, which was written around 1230 (ch. 2.2.2). The first Latin connoisseurs of the Sicilian Averroes appreciated the concept of individual knowledge and the theory of truth as a correspondence of the first real substance and intellect. They refused the illumination scenario of Avicennian theologians that caused the eclipse of the first substance. Aristotelian correspondence of intellect and real substances was transformed into the Neoplatonic correctness of illuminated intellect. Instead of the Augustinian *exemplar*, the first Averroists placed the being of the real thing and its adequate cognition at the center of metaphysics. This direction, given in the line of Abelard and Blund’s school, was supported at the Paris University by Aristotelian Michaels Scotus, whose philosophy combined the traditions of Falsafa with scholasticism. A conflict of both interpretations of Averroes’s corpus was inevitable, because it reproduced the conflict between Averroes and Avicenna in the Latin West. Michael Scotus introduced the interpretation of the Commentator done on the basis of natural scientific writings of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and he fully confirmed Averroes’s separation from Avicenna. This fundamental difference between Averroes and Avicenna concerns the question of cognition and the definition of metaphysics. Parisian Aristotelians accepted his interpretation of CMDA. The followers of Scotus founded the school of the first Averroism about the year 1230. The reception of CMDA in this school took up the Aristotelian interpretation *De anima* made in Blund’s school. The exegesis of the Avicennist Dominicus Gundissalinus from the Toledo school was influenced by the Jewish Kabbalah. The naturalist Michael Scotus from the Sicilian school was influenced by Aristotelian works dealing with the behavior of animals and the training of hawks. Both interpretations form a fundamental difference as far as Aristotle’s and Averroes’s corpus is concerned. We name this direction of interpretation of Averroes with a summary term “Sicilian school” and distinguish it from the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Commentator in the framework of the already known Toledo school. Later witnesses of this hitherto unexplored dispute between the two interpretations of Averroes are bishop Alvernus and, above all, Roger Bacon (ch. 3.2). The phenomenological interpretation of cognition according to Siger of Brabant (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.1) is based on the scientific writing such as *De generatione animalium*. Between the years 1225‒30 the first dispute about the authentic interpretation of the Commentator’s corpus took place at the Parisian University. It was decided by Michael Scotus in favor of the authentic Aristotelians against Neoplatonic interpreters of Averroes from the Toledo school.

Hermeneutics must determine when and how the concept of *intellectus possibilis* was rediscovered, which in its fundamental features corresponds to the concept of CMDA. The possible intellect determines the exposure of being from the front, from the direction of real things. Thus, everything revolves around the question of twofold exposure of being, which was discussed before in the Falsafa in the figure of Alfarabi, and afterwards by early scholasticism in the theories of signification and predication. The ontological statute of *intellectus possibilis* as a new form of passive and active cognition in the individual soul represents for the hermeneutics of objectivity a principle field of revelation of new sense of being (*Lichtung*). The transformations of the possible intellect, of the intelligible species and of the intentionality show effects of hidden historiality. It produces in the field of the epochal revelations the historial unconcealedness of the Western objectivity. The previous chapters devoted to Averroes have shown that his concept of metaphysics and cognition exists only within the framework of the first and the second substance and the newly defined *intellectus possibilis*. Averroes resolutely defends the personal intellect as the faculty of the human soul against Avicenna and against Aristotelian Neoplatonists from the school of Alexander Aphrodisias. Averroes’s struggle was adopted by the first Averroism, which knew the authentic Aristotelian tradition from Boethius’s metaphysics and from Abelard’s metaphysics and logic. Influenced by Scotus around 1230, thinkers in the Blund’s school recognized the genius of Averroes’s approach that acknowledged limitations and contradictions in the original text of *De anima*. Since these Aristotelian thinkers in Abelard’s line founded the University of Paris by merging the main cathedral schools together, they exerted a major influence on its curriculum. Scotus’s interpretation of the Corpus made in spirit of the Commentator clearly showed that Aristotle’s writings could be fully interpreted in Christian terms, since they supported the unity of the person and especially the personal imputability of merits and punishments, which was necessary for theology. Christian thinkers around bishop Alvernus appreciated Averroes’s defense of the unity of the person, which is given in the act of knowing and is fully consistent with Boethius’s definition of the person as indivisible first substance. Under the influence of the import of the authentic Averroes’s writing from Scotus’s workshop and his lectures in Paris in 1230, the ban on teaching Aristotle’s writings at the Paris University lost its validity in the very next year (1231). This ban had been previously confirmed in 1210 and 1215. This was the fundamental difference from the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Toledo school, which interpreted Averroes through Avicennism. Modernist interpretations of Averroes at the University of Paris were influenced by translations of Averroes’s Corpus inspired by Avicennism according to the Toledo school. This concerned especially the philosophical school of the Chancellor Philip, since it merged around the year 1240 with modernist school of the Franciscans founded by Alexander of Hales. This school was involved in the edition of his main work *Summa Halensis*. On this side of the intellectual front were the modern Alexandrians from the Porretan schools, who took up the modern logic in the schools of *Nominales*. Bishop Alvernus rejected these Neoplatonic philosophers who followed Aristotle (*philosophi sequaces Aristotelis*). It shows that this interpretation of Aristotle was unacceptable to the ecclesiastical offices especially because of the plurality of substances in man, the divided *intellectus agens* in man and because of the theory of emanations. All these signs we find later in the accusations of purpose, since Averroes was accused of Averroism in the spirit of the Freudian protective mechanism of inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). Until the year 1255, the leading philosophers at the Paris University were not modern sophists but critical thinkers who were fully at the height of their historical task and fulfilled it in an excellent way. This hitherto neglected difference in the interpretation of the Commentator according to the Toledo or the Sicilian school has a fundamental importance for the history of medieval philosophy, which was affected by modernist *damnatio memoriae*. In the writings of both schools exists a diametrically different interpretation of metaphysics as presented *ad mentem Averrois* in both schools. Therefore, in the Latin West there is no unified objectivist reception of the Commentator and Avicenna, but two receptions, which are fundamentally different from each other and formed various combinations and intermediate stages. Through the combination of Avicenna and Averroes in the Latin scholasticism of the Toledo school around environment of Chancellor Philip, a new metaphysic emerged that changed the history of the West. The Latin Avicennists defended against the representatives of authentic Aristotelianism the theory of the separated *intellectus agens*, which illuminates the passive intellect in the human soul. The theological Augustinians were influenced by Neoplatonic Anselm and by philosophical schools of *Nominales*. Therefore, they professed the unity of the divided active intellect according to the metaphor of the sun as did Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Neoplatonic abstraction conceived by Avicenna’s *equinitas tantum* or the Augustian *exemplar* did not have to clarify the actual relation between cognition and reality in the sense of Averroes’s *proportio* between the real thing, the senses and the intellect. In modernity, the illumination of being come from behind, from autonomous forms of the intellect. The scholastic thinkers of the first half of the 13th century connect Avicenna’s analogy of the sun with the pseudo-Augustinian illumination from the writing *De spiritu et anima*, including the quotations from the authentic writings of Augustine (*De genesi ad literam* XII; *De Trinitate* IX.6). In the polemic with the Aristotelianism of Abelard and Blund’s school, the modernists made use of translations of Toletans. The illumination of thinking in the model of Neoplatonic *denudatio* was accomplished in Alfarabi’s writing *De intellectu et intellecto* by using Aristotelian form of abstraction. This form referred to the sensuous and intelligible cognition of hylemorphic substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The transformation of the schools of *Nominales* from the second half of the 12th century to the modernists from the first half of the 13th century proceeded in part because the Avicennists were influenced by the contemporary reception of Aristotle’s corpus. In the first half of the 13th century, Avicennian and Augustinian theories of cognition blended through theories given *ad hoc* with the text of Aristotle’s original Corpus, which were gradually translated into Latin through the Commentator’s translations. The Neoplatonic *illuminati* were influenced by Aristotelianism according to Averroes; but they interpreted the cognition and meaning of being through the Augustian *exemplar*. These modernists, influenced by Avicennian concept of abstraction, founded the Porretan vision of the world according to the immaterial forms, which are seen through the enlightened form of the active intellect. Thanks to the superior position in the human soul, we share these forms with the higher cosmic intelligences. The philosophical schools in Paris and especially in Oxford followed mostly the school of *Nominales* and their discrete worldview, which was given by being of the third kind. The school of the second Averroism in the years 1235‒40 changed the metaphysics and the notion of truth to such an extent that meaning of being underwent a fundamental change.

The first Averroism rejected that modern interpretation in principle. The positive evaluation of Averroes in the first stage of the reception, which reached its peak around the year 1245, was completed by the Dominican Albert the Great and the Franciscan Roger Bacon, the two greatest connoisseurs of the Aristotelian corpus of the time. In the work *De homine* (ca. 1242), the Cologne Dominican places Averroes in the school of individually conceived active intellect and rejects the Oxford interpretation of *Second Analytics* with reference to Averroes’s interpretation of cognition according to CMDA. Bacon does the same in the *Commentaries on Metaphysics* written at the same time (ch. 3.2). The fundamental dispute between the two schools interpreting Averroes’s corpus started after the death of Alvernus, the Archbishop of Paris, and the Chancellor of the University (†1249). The dispute between the first and second Averroism came to a head in an authoritarian way with the Paris and Oxford Decree of March 1277, which silenced the school of the first Averroism located in the Artistic faculty of the Paris University in the Rue du Fouarre. The Oxford decree issued through Kilwardby’s modernists silenced only Roger Bacon at the local *alma mater*. The victory of modernists assured by the Decree in 1277 was made possible by the influence of the charismatic academic Bonaventura, who directed the mendicant studies in Paris and then became the general of the Franciscan Order. In the epoch 1250‒77 objectivity passed into the fully unconcealed phase and determined the key aspects of the history of the West. From the workshop of reformed Avicennists at Philip’s Paris School (Henry of Ghent) and Rufus’s Oxford School (Duns Scotus) finally arose the victorious concept of Western objectivity in the years 1290‒1300. The connoisseurs of the Middle Ages know this period as the second beginning of metaphysics, which passes into the well-known historical figure of *via Modernorum*. From the point of view of hermeneutics, it is true that the metaphysics of the *Modernorum* since the 14th century passed through the *via Modernorum* into the complete eclipse of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*), which founded the present epoch of nihilistic metaphysics and thinking. The original recognition of the first substance in the mode of the first Averroism ended in the epochal Lethe, since the existence is considered in the mode of the objective and nihilistic *veritas*.

## 2.1 Aristotelian Interpretation of *De anima* (John Blund)

The brilliant Aristotelian John Blund, thanks to the critical revision of the writing *De anima*, returned to the exposure of being from the front, from the direction of real things. Dominicus Gundalissinus of the Toledo school created for the West in the second half of the 12th century an original synthesis of Avicenna’s philosophy based on four forms of intellect in the human soul. Avicenna’s writing *De anima* indicates the different level of actualization of man’s cognitive faculties (*intellectus materialis, in habitu, in effectu, adeptus*), which makes the soul available for connection with detached *intellectus agens* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Alfarabi’s and Avicenna’s acquired intellect in man was primarily connected with the separated cosmic *intellectus agens* that ensured the actualisation of cognition. Neoplatonic interpretation of cognition defined true cognition through the conjunction of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) with the detached active intellect (*intellectus agens*), which is common to all people. On the lower Aristotelian level of abstraction, the cognition went through sensually founded individual cognition (*intellectus materialis*). The material intellect performed the act of contingent cognition of real things. Cognition needed the *intellectus possibilis* actualised by the material thing and also by the exposure of meaning coming from behind (*intellectus in effectu*). Avicenna′s hierarchy concerns the four forms of progressively hypostasized intellects in accordance to *Liber de causis* that is based on the self-reflection. It proceeds in stages from the intellect that deals with human forms to cosmic ones. This scheme includes the actual form of intellect as substance at the beginning of cognition, and the completion of cognition proceeds from the external active intellect. Avicenna’s hierarchy of the four forms of the gradually hypostatized intellects is placed, according to the *Liber de causis*, on the stepwise given self-reflection of the intellect from the human to cosmic level. There are two illuminations made from behind and running parallel: the initiation of the innate principles of human cognition and the final illumination of the active intellect. Avicenna constituted a new path of cognition given by illumination of the being from behind. The school of the first Averroism, in Blund’s version, rejected the Avicennian concept of cognition because Neoplatonic *illuminati* had not properly understood the writing *De anima*. This Aristotelian school kept Boethius’s and Abelard’s line; it defined cognition by very different interpretation of *De anima*. Blund followed actualization of cognition based on different potencies of the *anima intellectiva*, which are actualized by bodily senses. That Aristotelian scheme of cognition and truth was fully defended by Albert the Great after the year 1240 with reference to the Sicilian interpretation of CMDA. This brilliant Aristotelian rejected Avicenna’s speculative division of the intellect as a Neoplatonic hypostasis (*quattuor sunt gradus*) and carried out a phenomenological interpretation of cognition according to the commentator (*tres sunt species*, ch. 2.4.2). The soul does not become everything in the course of intellectual self-reflection, but by being universally receptive. Blund carried out the new interpretation of *De anima* around the year 1200 and his successors in Blund’s school outlined material and immaterial correspondence of reality and intellect. Therefore, they rejected Avicenna’s illumination model of cognition given by exposure of being from behind. Blund’s school described phenomenologically for the first time in the Latin West the course of cognition in the mode of hermeneutic manner (“*Wie*” of Heidegger) that determines the Aristotelian revelation of being and its exposure to the intellect (πώς ἐστι πάντα, *De anima* 431b21). The separation of the Blund school from the Toledo school was inevitable after the arrival of *Metaphysics* en latin explained by Commentator and especially after his work CMDA which came to Paris around 1220. Magisters of Paris school founded by Abelard saw an Averroes that was different from Avicennist Toletans. For the classical Aristotelianism, the illumination of intellect comming from behind was absolutely unacceptable. The modern intellect starts the immaterial cognition by self-reflection and carries out its completion by the illumination taken from direction of the cosmic intellect. The eclipse of the first substance occurred by the fact that, according to the Neoplatonists, the form in the material thing has only a contingent existence. Therefore, the recognized form of external things must be received in immanently given principles of deductive judgment. These principles exist in us permanently. The recognized conclusion acquires a permanent necessity only in the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). That kind of intellect provides the connection between contingent recognized forms and the world of higher cosmic forms that are recognized by separated *intellectus agens*. This Neoplatonic schema of cognition is given on the basis of metaphor that provides the solar intellect. That intellect changed fundamentally at the turn of the 12th and 13th century. The first Averroism insists on the cognition given by the first actual substance. The actualized being given in reality is necessary for the true cognition. The most important change consisted in the introduction of the *diaphanum* into the scheme of cognition, which Alfarabi proposed for the first time in the writing *De intellectu et intellecto*. His teaching passed over in Avicennist translations of the Toledo school (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). This created a threefold species of intellect, which was given by different acts of mediation and not, as in Avicenna, by different stages of self-reflection. Blund investigates original meaning of *De anima* and in the process of cognition he distinguishes three components: the ray of sunlight (*lux*), the transparent environment performing the mediation (*translucentis*, *splendor*) and the occurrence of color on a colored body (*color*). The resulting scheme of transmission of color is based on the mediation between the primary actuality of the ray and the color (*perfectio translucentis*). The primary actuality of the ray corresponds to the secondary actualization of the light, which is adequately given in the color on the irradiated surface of the body. The transmission and mediation of the actualized being proceed in the potential environment of diaphanum.

“The light in its nature is given as quality, which in virtue of its essence completes the diaphanum (*qualitas que ex essentia sua est perfectio translucentis*). But this quality, which belongs exclusively to color, can be called light only insofar as it is capable of generating light from itself, thus completing the diaphanum (*color … est perfectio translucentis*). Then it is true that this quality makes the color insofar as it colors its bearer. Therefore, in the commentary, one must distinguish between the sunbeam, the light and the translucent environment (*inter lucem et lumen et splendorem*).” [[83]](#footnote-83)

The ray coming from the sun does not form color on the body by itself, because mediation by the diaphanum is necessary for that kind of transition. The transmission of the actual sun ray (*lux*) must be accomplished by some receptive environment. The physical diaphanum takes the light out into its potency (*translucens*) and transfers the light to the body by actualization of light (*splendor*). The accomplished diaphanum reveals itself in the form of the transmitted light (*lumen*) in a new quality called “color” (*color*) on the irradiated first substance (*colorat subiectum*). Between the light emitted by the sun (*lux*) and the light received by the diaphanum (*lumen*) or finally also the color (*color*) there is therefore a threefold principal difference thanks to the changed character of the form. The same actuality of light (*lux*) is formed in different acts of reception (*splendor*), which generate different shapes of light (*lumen, color*) thanks to different forms of diaphanum. Blund’s concept of diaphanum anticipated Averroes’s interpretation of diaphanum in CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The thinkers from the Toledo school did not investigate the actual course of the transmission of light to color. The moderns were and they are directly illuminated by the sun of the intellect, as later the Cartesian Arnauld. The introduction of diaphanum and intentionality helped in the restitution of the receptive component of cognition by the *intellectus in potentia*, which was present in the teaching of Alfarabi and Averroes. The diaphanum was conceived in the Aristotelian sense of the passive capacity of the individual soul, which is actualized by the sensual cognition of the first substance. The emergence of the new interpretation of *De anima* is indirectly shown in the studies systematizing the occurrence of the various forms of intellect during the first half of the 13th century. The researchers try in vain to get Blund’s Aristotelian conception of the soul into the Avicennian scheme of the four forms of intellect.[[84]](#footnote-84) This brilliant Aristotelian saw precisely Alfarabi’s innovatory approach to Alexander Aphrodisias interpretation of *De anima*. The innovation of the Second master was ignored by his Latin contemporaries, namely the modernists of the Toledo school. The Toletans were enlightened by the higher intellect of Avicenna in translating Alfarabi’s *De intellecto et intellectu*. The same type of error guides today’s interpreters of Blund, influenced by Cartesian objectivism.

### 2.1.1 Emergence of Formal Intellect

Blund read the writing *De anima* in the realist line of Boethius and Abelard. This Christian and anti-modernist thinker extinguished in the human soul the light of the cosmic *intellectus agens* and refused the external illumination associated with it. Avicennist modernity of the Latin West made the first eclipse of cosmic and acquired intellect in that way. In the darkness of mythological tales, it came to the resurrection of original Aristotelian cognition according to *De anima*. Blund made the *epokhē* of Neoplatonism to recover the course of actual cognition that is determined by the exposure of intellect from the front. The meaning of the second substance is again formed according to the Aristotelian metaphysical dative, which is given by the donation of being from the first substance coming to the past (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). In the darkness of the Neoplatonic intellect, the categorical meaning of the first substance and its adequate cognition in the human intellect appeared again. Therefore, the objective medievalists in Blund’s school search in vain for Avicennist forms of the intellect. The new explanation of cognition according to the Aristotelian line in *De anima* is shown by the term “*intellectus formalis*.” The emergence of this term can be dated to the time around 1200 according to Blund’s pioneer work *Tractatus de anima* and further according to the anonymous writing *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, written around the same time (Gauthier 1982, 350). The *Treatise on the soul* predates the emergence of the first Averroism by reducing the system of the four Avicennian intellects to only two forms, exactly according to the letter of *De anima* mentioning the passive and the active (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14‒15). Blund reinterprets *intellectus agens* by making it an individual faculty of the soul.

“The active intellect is the life of the soul that recognizes universal things by abstracting them from accidental properties.” [[85]](#footnote-85)

The active intellect is directly integrated into the personal existence. It is defined as a living act of the sensual and intelligent soul engaged in the cognition (*intellectus agens est via animae apprehensiva*). The newly introduced formal intellect (*intellectus formalis*) abolished the exposure of the intellect from behind from the direction of the separated *intellectus agens*. The reception of recognised form is defined in the process of abstraction which, according to *De anima*, is represented as a movement that proceeds by abstracting accidents from the first substance (*abstrahendo eas ab accidentibus*). This process of abstraction is entirely personal thanks to the senses, since the universals are the result of the abstraction. Thus, in the manner of the preceding analysis of the *diaphanum*, three fundamental phenomena are given, which are necessary for establishing the cognition as Aristotelian correspondence: the active material first substance; its adequate mediation by the sensual and intellectual cognition; resulting immaterial and actual cognition. The cognition proceeds formally in a similar way as the transfer of light to color; but it differs in the resulting actuality, which in the case of human cognition is immaterial.

Hermeneutic archaeology is interested in the key part of Blund’s treatise, which changes the statute of Avicenna’s acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). The mediation by various forms of *diaphanum* represents a pure potency of the soul in the mode of Alfarabi’s *intellectus in potentia*. The donation of being runs through the formal intellect thanks to the act of immaterial synthesis of meaning. By the first definition of the formal intellect, the second part of the definition already contains the *intellectus possibilis* in Alfarabi’s treatise *De intellectu et intellecto* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The Second master determines the origin of the meaning in the faculties of the soul, which has the active capacity to make abstraction of immaterial forms from the material things (*die Formen von allem, was vorhanden ist, von den Stoffen derselben zu abstrahiren*).[[86]](#footnote-86) Blund’s school correctly understood that this active capacity of abstraction given in view of material forms in hylemorphic substances is fundamentally different from the reception of cosmic forms made by *intellectus adeptus*. With regard to the reception of the form in the process of abstraction, the *intellectus formalis* and the *intellectus in potentia* form together a composite faculty of the soul given by the exposure of cognition from the direction of sensually perceived first substances. Blund’s treatise connected the acquired intellect with the formal intellect and separated this active faculty of the soul from the receptive component of the intellect and from the material cognition of bodily senses. The active intellect creates an intelligible cognition, which relates to hylemorphic things. The real thing actualizes the receptive intellect through the sensual and intellectual *diaphanum* given in the soul. Blund reversed the direction of the exposure of being and creates in the Latin West, after the pattern of Alfarabi, a fundamental *Lichtung* of truth and untruth for subsequent quarrels between the first and the second Averroism. This dispute between both schools repeats the gigantomachy between both major disciples of the Second master, Avicenna and Averroes in the new epochal constellation of historicity. The cardinal points of difference are the creation of knowledge (*rem intellectam*) and the human faculty that produces it (*intellectus adeptus*). This difference, given by exposure of being from the front, founded a new form of cognition in the Latin West, because it abolished the acquired intellect of Avicenna as superfluous.

“The acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) is an effect (*passio*) generated in the soul, which consists in the resemblance with the external thing (*similitudo rei extra*). The cognition conceived in this way (*de quo intellectu*) we know it from Aristotle’s writing *De anima*. The conceived thing (*res intellecta*) represents the completion of the soul given by its way of being (*de eius essentia*). Aristotle calls the apprehended thing (*rem intellectam*) in this writing acquired apprehension (*intellectum adeptum*), which consists in the resemblance to the real thing (*qui es ymago rei extra*).” [[87]](#footnote-87)

The new figure of the intellect is determined from the direction of the real thing (*est ymago rei extra*). The cognition of things in the intellect (*rem intellectam*) is given by the sensual imago, which is created by the effect of the external thing cognized by senses that was received into the acquired intellect. The donation of the cognitive form proceeds from the hylemorphic thing whose actuality establishes cognition according to Aristotelian metaphysical dative. The quotation determines the concept of truth in terms of the form in the first substance to create its *similitudo* and *proportio* (*ad similitudinem et proportionem formae*) as cognitive form in the soul. This proceeding makes the fundamental distinction between the real course of cognition in the soul and the emergence of resulting cognition acquired from the actual thing. This epochal change in the exposure of cognition from the front, from the direction of the actual hylemorphic form of the first substance created a new definition of the formal intellect. The methodical procedure from the emergence of the intentional object in the mode *per prius* to the abstract determination of its mental instance in the modus *per posterius* has a principled character, since it corresponds to the distinction between the intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus* according to the CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The existential act of *intellectio* (*tertium genus*) is different from the final cognition as *intellectum* (*quartum genus*). The approach of Blund’s school represents the first phenomenological description of human cognition in the Latin West. This is given by the exposure of the being from the front, from the direction of the real actual form of the thing perceived with the senses. This fact fully escaped modern and postmodern objectivists, but not Albert, Bacon and Siger from the Sicilian school of the first Averroism. Only after the establishment of the actual character of cognition the well-known Blund’s definition of the formal intellect appears.

“This acquired intellect (*ille intellectus adeptus*) is also called formal intellect (*dicitur esse intellectus formalis*) because it contains in itself the relation to the similarity and proportion of form (*ad similitudinem et proportionem formae*). Just as form completes matter by giving it real existence, in a similar way, the acquired intellect perfects the material intellect by transferring it into an effective actuality (*intellectus adeptus perficit intellectum materialem dando ei esse in effectu*). Thus, the soul receives the second form of perfection, from the direction of the acquired intellect.” [[88]](#footnote-88)

A key function falls to the little word “*ille*,” which transforms the status of Avicenna’s acquired intellect according to Alfarabi’s scheme of cognition into the newly defined *intellectus formalis* (*ille intellectus adeptus dicitur esse intellectus formalis*). The acquired intellect is no longer of Avicennist nature because it is redefined as Alfarabi’s intelligible *diaphanum*. The form currently given in the external material thing is mediatized by the abstraction of sensual imagination, which is absorbed into the immaterial intellect. Avicenna has no mediation in the scheme of intellectual cognition, only illumination. Although the new division invokes Avicenna’s scheme (*distinguitur autem intellectus ab Avicenna quattuor modis*, ibid, p. 92.23), the whole procedure is already fully Aristotelian and is placed outside Avicenna’s self-reflexive gradualness of illumination. The introduction of the diaphanum and the abandon of Avicennian *intellectus adeptus* abolished the acquired intellect of *illuminati* and transferred it to the Aristotelian formal intellect of Alfarabi. The formal receptive intellect defines cognition by exposing it from the front according to the real course of cognition in *De anima*. Its second book deals with empiric cognition of animals and humans, and the third book provides the intellectual scheme of human cognition. The sensuously cognized object determines the intellectual cognition. Therefore, the scheme of cognition is not defined by illumination coming from direction of *intellectus agens*, but on the contrary from direction of properly apprehended process of abstraction according to Aristotle, that is, by the transition from the second to the third book of *De anima*. Thus, the illumination of intellect dropped the intellect as a separated, subsistent and eternal form, which illuminates the human intellect from behind. The diaphanum and the possible intellect received again a basic place in the scheme of cognition. The intellect becomes a purely individual faculty of the soul, because the form enters the cognizing intellect from the direction of existing hylemorphic things and not from the direction of the mythological world of Neoplatonic forms. The integration of active intellect into the personal course of cognition establishes only two forms of the intellect: the receptive (*intellectus materialis, in potentia*) and the formative (*intellectus formalis, agens*). The classical names for the four Avicennian forms of intellect remained, but the scheme changed fundamentally. Blund, as the first Western Aristotelian of the 13th century, turned the donation of the sense of being from the realm of philosophical fairy tales into reality. This ended the unrestricted reign of Neoplatonism, which was marked by the metaphor of the intellect as the sun shining on the soul. Modern knowledge starts from from the separated cosmic form, which is given as the Neoplatonic *intellectus agens* or as Avicenna’s *Dator formarum*. The new kind of synthesizing intellect became the acquired cognition of Aristotelians conceived from the direction of the first substance (*intellectus formalis*), and not the acquired intellect of the *illuminati* (*intellectus adeptus*).

The cognition in the school of Blund is a gift in the sense of an accident that comes to the intellect in the process of abstraction from direction of the real thing; just as the color appears on the real thing, after the mediation of the light by the diaphanum. The thing first exists in reality as the first substance and then is exposed to be recognized; in the same way, the person first exists and then it cognizes something. The actuality of cognition as donation of cognitive form, it goes from the direction of the existing thing through the senses to the intellect that synthesizes these actual immaterial forms. In the scheme of CMDA, the resulting synthesis at the level of the *intellectus speculativus* corresponds to this completed knowledge (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The formal intellect becomes a reframed *intellectus agens* in the process of donating the cognitive form. The intellect takes the recognized form (*rem intellectam*) created by abstraction into the process of mediation and accomplishes its synthesis into an intelligible form, which in turn is actual but already immaterial. The formal intellect (*intellectus in effectu*) is responsible for actualizing the intelligible form in the soul. The thing actualizes the intellect by the fact that it exists; therefore it can be recognized. The concept of abstraction introduced by Blund runs from the direction of the form received by the intellect, actualized by sensually recognized first substance. As a result, the nature of the intellect changed the status of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). This kind of intellect was previously exposed from the direction of separated cosmic intelligent form (*intellectus agens*). Now it is valid that the actuality of human cognition proceeds from the hylemorphic thing, and not from the separated active intellect, which is connected to the world of cosmic intelligible forms. The acquired intellect, which is given by intervention of separated active intellect in the cosmic spheres, has become superfluous in the new scheme. But Blund had to retain the basic function of the cognitive intellect done in Alfarabius, namely the actualization of the material intellect from sensual data (*intellectus in effectu*). Therefore, Neoplatonic and Avicennist combination of material and acquired intellect was replaced by a formal cognitive intellect (*intellectus formalis*). This is the first case of the use of well-known “Ockham’s razor,” which this thinker brought against the Avicennist scheme of cognition in the teaching of Scotism. The leading figure of the first Averroism, Albert the Great, after the reception of Averroes’s corpus, identifies the *intellectus formalis* defined by Blund according to the CMDA as *intellectus speculativus* (ch. 2.4.2). The emphasis on the formal causality of the intellect actually determined by the first substance reintroduced into scholasticism the correspondence theory of truth according to the Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*. Aristotle’s writing *De anima* (including *Physics* and *Metaphysics*) had been known from Jacob of Venice’s translation since the middle of the 12th century. These writings now received a new Aristotelian interpretation, which was introduced by Blund’s school. The first true Aristotelian of scholasticism explicitly enshrined the passive and the active intellect as individual faculties of the soul. Two decades before arrival of Averroes’s writing in the Latin West, a basic scheme of cognition already exists in Paris according to the original interpretation of *De anima*. Therefore, Blund and his students are founders of the school of the first Averroism. The reception of Averroes’s metaphysics according to the Toledo school, on the other hand, belongs to the school of the second Averroism.

### 2.1.2 Aristotelian Interpretation of Diaphanum and Intentionality

The turning point in the separation of two schools was Scotus’s lectures at the University of Paris about year 1230. It is quite likely that Scotus never reached the Oxford University. The Corpus of the Commentator interpreted in the Sicilian school did not exert any influence here since 1230, because of the impact of Toletan thinker Robert Grosseteste (ch. 3.1.1). Oxford was dominated by Grosseteste’s modernist students with the honorable exception of Roger Bacon, who, however, spent most of his academic life in Paris. Hermeneutics must explain the dual reception of Averroes’s corpus according to the Toledo and Sicilian school. Interpretation according to the Toledo school came with the first translations of Averroes sometime around 1220 from Spain. Michael Scotus of the Sicilian school, during his lectures in Paris around the year 1230, made a principled critique of the established doctrine of Toletans. To put it simply, we can say that he confirmed by virtue of his authority the interpretation of *De anima* already made by Blund’s school around the year 1200. Blund read *De anima* as an Aristotelian, not as a Neoplatonist. The fundamental dispute concerned the conception of the *species* and the *possible intellect*. The dual receptivity of sensible and intelligible cognition fundamentally changed the statute of *species* from the Neoplatonic form to the Aristotelian one. The preceding part has shown that by introducing the concept of *intellectus formalis* Blund rejected Avicennist illumination that requires the cognition of external things only as an accidental appendix to the reception of separated forms. The same view took Blund’s student, Robert Grosseteste in his commentary on *De anima*, whose inspiration, or even redaction, occurred while he was studying at the Paris School. Grosseteste says that we recognize the real thing by species that we abstract from real things (*apprehendit res per species abstractas a rebus*).[[89]](#footnote-89) The key character is the conception given by exposure of the cognition from the front (*a rebus*), which follows the Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*. Grosseteste denies the Porretan concept of universal species given in things by means of hypostatized existence that defended schools of *Nominales* (ch. 1.4). Blund’s school, to which Grosseteste belonged at that time, did not need to activate human intellect by Avicennist self-reflection that exposed the cognition from behind, from the direction of separated active intellect. Thus, the statute of species as the being of the third kind became invalid, because Aristotelian school of Blund conceives species by the intentionality given by abstraction, which is fundamentally different from Avicenna’s denudation. The exposure of cognition must start from the actual thing perceived by human senses. Human sensuality is distinguished from animals by the incorporation of material sensuality into immaterial intellect within the formal correspondence of passive and active faculties present in the soul. The synthesis of the species is accomplished in animals by *vis aestimativa* (Avicennas *wahm*). In the man, it makes the lower stage of intellectual cognition, which is coordinated within the framework of *similitudo* made by the cognizing intellect. The cognition adapts in the act of sensual and intellectual abstraction to real things. Blund defines the phenomena which are gradually given in the course of sensual cognition: the cognized thing in reality; the receptive faculty of material senses; the formal faculty of intentionality; and finally, the synthesizing faculty of the imagination which creates the resulting sensual *imago*. In the Latin West, a new concept of intentionality emerged, which is given outside the real thing and outside the resulting synthesized image in the soul. This conception links to the mediatizing function of the sensuous *diaphanum* and to the act of seeing. Blund knows that the first material substance given in reality is not the same as its immaterial cognition in the animal sensible soul and in the intelligible human soul. This Aristotelian thinker distinguishes exactly according to the second book of *De anima*: empirical reception of sensual impressions given in bodily organs; the mediation by intentionality given as diaphanum; resulting synthesis of sensory cognition in the imagination.

Let us now look at the common aspect of sensory perception of animals and humans. This aspect creates a common world of all living beings (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The following quotation shows the correctly assessed cognition done by exact distinctions of singular elements, according to the exposure of the senses from the front, from the direction of real things.

“The intention is the recognized thing taken up in the imagination, but not as if it came into the soul by mediation, because the soul then needed no further faculty for recognizing the intention. Therefore, the intention is not an imprint of the recognized thing in the senses or in the imagination (*nec est eius imago in sensu vel in imaginatione*). In sensuous cognition, a sensuous image arises (*fit in aestimatione*) through a certain similarity of intention (*aliqua similitudine intentionis*). This image is given in the cognitive environment that is created, on the one hand, by instruments of imagination, and, on the other hand, by bearers of intention (*inter subiectum intentionis*). The same was said above about the faculty of seeing, namely, that the image of the thing observed is in what is given by the act of seeing (*imago rei visae sit in visu*). The likeness given by the image is not in the transparent environment (*non tamen in aere intermedio est consimilis imago*).” [[90]](#footnote-90)

Intentionality is the act of the faculty of soul, engaged in the act of imagination (*intentio est res accepta ab aestimatione*); therefore, it is not a component of bodily senses (*non cadens in sensum*). The act of intention given in the soul is different from the sensory mediation based on sensual impressions in bodily organs. Intentionality is a tool of imagination; therefore it is not identical with it. The resulting cognition is not the same as the mediated intentional object. The mediation by senses actualizes the potential mental faculty of intentionality (*mediante sensu apprehendatur ab anima*), which animals dispose of as well. The intention of the soul differs in principle from the sensual impression, which is given materially in the bodily organs. The intention is namely a mediation in the soul as immaterial form of the body (*esse spirituale*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Therefore, four phases of sensual cognition must be distinguished from each other: 1) actually existing and observed thing; 2) its causal effect on the senses through the physical and sensual diaphanum (*translucens, perspicuum*), which transmits the light into the eye as a sense organ; 3) intentional and therefore formal mediation in the soul; 4) the resulting cognition in the imagination that reproduces the observed object. Aristotelian synthesis is not Neoplatonic and modern imprint of the thing in the intellect, but the synthesis of an intentional object in the act of seeing (*imago rei visae sit in visu*). The formation of an intentional resemblance of the thing represents an act of recognition that makes a different order than the reception made in the sense organ. The imago receives the statute of *consimile* with regard to the real thing by the act of the soul. The active reception of the intentional object (*imaginatio*) that takes place in the entelechy of the animal or human body is entirely individual. Blund reminds us that the mediation of vision by intentionality does not establish a full resemblance to the real thing (*non tamen in aere intermedio est consimilis imago*). The act of intentionality (*intentio*) as such is not the resulting sensuous *imago*. The soul takes up the recognized sensual form in the act of imagination, where an intentional object comes into being. This soul potency must be actualized both from the direction of the real form given in the cognized thing and from the direction of the real form given in the cognizing body. Both forms are actual, but they are different from each other. In actual process of mediation, there is no resemblance to the external thing, since the physical and mental diaphanum is pure potency. In the second step after reception follows the act of synthesis which forms the resulting sensual cognition (*fit in aestimatione imago intentionis*). The subjective and objective genitive is fundamentally tied to the act of personal or animal intentionality. The resulting synthesis of different transitions from potency to actuality is supplied by the actual cognition. The intentionality produced by mediation abolished the status of being of the third kind. The material organ cannot recognize anything in and for itself, because the recognition is a faculty of the immaterial soul as entelechic form of every living body. We do not recognize anything in the way that it is in and for itself present as the simple hylemorphic existence. Passively and then actively we create its adequate cognitive form in two stages of abstraction: first in the imagination and then in the intellect. The correspondence between thinking and real things arise thanks to intentionality, which concerns the sensual and formal level of similarity between the thing and the intellect. The senses given in the organ of perception can be partially replaced by a device today because both are material in nature. But we cannot replace the act of intentionality, which is an act of the unique ability of the soul, whether the individual and animal or the personal and human one. Each animal creature performs its own synthesis of the perceived content. Therefore, animal cognition is an individual act in the mode of Aristotle’s intentionality, which is given as “desire, craving” (ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία; *De anima* 413b23‒24). The meaning of this intentional conception of the world was precisely interpreted in the CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Cognition establishes at the basic sensory level the twofold act of intentionality, which is given as the physical reception of bodily organs and as immaterial synthesis of *species sensibilis* in the soul. This individual process, given in the animal as well as in the human being, causes that the recognized form differs fundamentally from the form actualized in the real thing. In the case of humans, the process of intentionality and cognition even differs generically from animals, because the animal materiality of *species sensibilis* differs from immaterial human *species intelligibilis*. Reading thoroughly *De anima*, Blund knows well that intentionality belongs to the animal or to the human being as a whole, because the active synthesis of the cognition has no sensual bodily organ. The senses are materially receptive because they have their seat in the bodily organs. But we actively cognize in the manner of living organisms as entelechic first substance, that is, in the mode of similarity of intention and real things (*similitudine intentionis*). The faculty formalizing sense impressions create a new form of diaphanum for the reception of the recognized forms coming from the senses. Thus, the intentionality of humans and animals differs, because they do not have the same entelechic form of life, i.e., the same form of soul. The similarity between the thing and cognition is given by the fact that the act of intentionality differs from sensory reception because it creates a new similarity at the level of the animal or human soul. According to Blund, intentionality mediatizes the potency of cognitive form and it serves as diaphanum between the faculties of the soul and the unique subject of cognition (*inter instrumentum aestimationis et subiectum intentionis*). The formalization of sense impressions forms a new form of diaphanum to acquire recognized forms coming from the direction of bodily senses. This first form of intentionality also exists in animals as well, because they recognize the world passively through the senses and synthetically through the intentionality. Both abilities are specific, because they are the act of entelechic soul given in “this” living body. Intentionality is neither sensual sensations nor a resulting image given by the *vis aestimativa*. The former is given thanks to the sensory bodily organs and the latter is the final product of cognition. The sensual species must first be mediatized by the animal and human intentionality. It is based on the act of imagination, namely by its mental (animal or human) orientation towards the sense impression, which is given by a sensation originated in the organ of perception of the body. This orientation of the imagination to the intentional object represents, after the work of sense organs, the first act of the mental reception. One must notice again the origin of the color on the body in the triple specificity (actuality of the ray, the mediation, colored surface of stain glass), which has been described in the previous analysis of CMDA. The common world of perception given by diaphanum was introduced for the first time by Averroes (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Before the sheep sees the “wolf,” it must intentionally receive the necessary sensual impressions, which directly testify to the existence of the real wolf in the eye or in the sense of smell. Its own being is given with regard to the recognition of the sheep in the mode of the metaphysical dative. The sheep concentrates its potential psychic and intentional attention to these actual sense impressions. The animal soul creates another diaphanum through the act of directing attention to the sense impression and transfers this *intentum* to the *species sensibilis*. Then the animal performs the resulting synthesis of sensory cognition (*imago*). This synthesis is given in the form of fully individual synthesis (*sensus communis*). Blund refused to identify the species as a form of the real thing with the universal meaning in thinking, as Avicennists of that time and after them Porretans and modernists of all kinds did and still do. The senses perform a passive reception of the cognitive form related to the real thing. Therefore they are only an instrument of cognition. It is the individual soul of man and animal which provides for the act of cognition, and not the senses. The physical soul an actual substrate, which carries the ability of intentionality (*subiectum intentionis*) and creates an intentional object on the level of formal similarity (*species sensibilis*). The act of intentionality as a faculty of the soul (*subiectum*) produces an intentional species as an actualized diaphanum in the soul (*species sensibilis*). This intentional *species sensibilis* is then synthesized by the imagination into a resulting cognition (*ymago*). For the reasons given above, hermeneutics reject an interpretation of Blund’s terms “*ymago intentionis”* and “*subiectum intentionis*” according to Avicenna’s scheme of *univoce* given species. The objective medievalists, unfortunately, proceed in this way.[[91]](#footnote-91) According to Blund, the soul is primarily receptive as *tabula rasa* and the real world is outside the soul. The human soul has manifold abilities which serve as tools of cognition. But the cognition is activated from outside by the actual thing existing beyond us. Therefore, the intellect taken alone is not able to recognize the world out of itself and recognized intelligible species are activated from the senses. Placed at the level of intentionality, the act of recognition presents a recognizable form for active synthesis in the imagination or in the intellect. Therefore, the soul, as the actual form of the body, is the only carrier, i.e., the subject of intentionality in the sense of Aristotle’s original term (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*). Therefore, Blund’s school fundamentally rejects the definition of the soul as an independent substance given by Avicenna and by Toletans, which will be shown in the next chapter. The representation of the sensory impression is accomplished by the wholly autonomous act of the intentional evaluation of the sensory ideas in the imagination (*fit in aestimatione ymago intentionis*). The similarity between the intentionally created species and the object recognized with the senses arises thanks to the act of singular understanding (*aestimatio*) in the animals or thanks to the act of imagination of the human being (*ymaginatio*), which is given on the basis of sensual abstraction. The intention made by *species sensibilis* and resulting recognized form (*ymago*) is separated both from the actual thing in the reality and from the sensual perception done in bodily organs. This twofold separation of individual cognition of animal and human from the real thing through the primary intention and through the resulting synthesis declared neither Avicenna nor the school of *Nominales*. Blund emphasizes the analogy with the process of seeing, which we have analyzed in the Aristotelian statute of the diaphanum in Averroes’s teaching (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Modernity does not take note of these nuances given by formal mediation of diaphanum, because it lives in the age of eclipse of the first substance. Reality is replaced by the industrious Western subject whose permanent imagination given *per prius* is objectively reflected in the contingent thing given *per posterius* (*speculatio*). Avicenna’s *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*, defined as being of the third kind, received a new status in Blund’s school, because they had become intentional objects. The synthesis of those universals exists only in the soul, the imaginative or intellectual intention to formalize a sensual apprehension. The synthesis of individual and intentional forms is done with regard to the cognition of the external thing by superior capacity of the animal and human soul (*imaginatio, intellectio*). Blund establishes an intentionality that defines according to Aristotle and Averroes the real proportionality of things and mind. Therefore, Blund and his school accepted without objection Averroes’s concept of truth according to *De anima* 430a20‒25 as *consimilitudo*. The Commentator maintains the fundamental difference between the external thing and the separated cognitive form in the immaterial possible intellect (*anima autem rationalis materialis est forme existentes in ea, non actu, sed potentia*; CMDA III.6; p. 417.104). The thinking that carries out the abstraction receives an intentional form from the direction of the experienced external thing in the framework of the *similitudo*. Since there is a strict separation between the material cognition and the intentional synthesis of the intentional species, there can be no Avicennian mixture with the reality given by the being of the third kind. In contrast to Avicenna, the intentional object is neither in the thing nor in the senses, but it is grounded in the individual act of the cognizing soul. Intention no longer attached to the senses and became an autonomous property of the individual animal soul (*vis aestimativa*) or an exclusively human faculty of the immaterial and individual soul (*intellectus possibilis*). The production of the recognized form is now bound to synthesizing and consequently immaterial *intellectus formalis* as one of the faculties of the soul. The intellect takes in the sensuous contents in the immaterial environment of the soul as a form of animal or human life. Therefore, the cognition is concentrated on the cognized content (*intentum*) made by its own faculty of formation (*intentio*). The act of intentionality given in the soul differs from the material reception, which is given by the senses in the bodily organ. The sense impression is not an intentional object and it cannot be, because its synthesis is carried out by the soul. The cognition represents even for animals an immaterial ability, because the soul is the entelechic form of every living body. The sense organ forms only a part of the body as an animated whole. The intellect of man, in contrast to the animals, is a fully immaterial faculty of the soul in the *anima intellectiva*. Therefore, the animals have a world given by their animal intentionality, which, however, has a completely different character than the human world given by the immaterial cognition of the soul. Thus, for the first time in the West, a scheme of receptive and active synthesis of intentional species was created, in which the soul abstracts the form from the recognized thing on the basis of associated mental activities of animal or the human being (*subiectum intentionis*).

Blund does not need metaphysical crutches for the synthesis of species in the form of being of the third kind (*non exigatur vis alia ad intentionis apprehensionem*; ibid, p. 65.25). The act of intentionality is given materially and sensually-individually, because the *vis aestimativa* is given in animals as the first synthetic act in the order of cognition. Therefore, one must read the work *De anima* from the second book to the third and not vice versa, as modernists have done since immemorial time. Animals and human beings intend pure sensual perception given in the sense organ in their mode of *adaequatio* made on the level of reception. The bodily organs are activated by first actual substances that exist in the mode *simpliciter* and *per se*. This intended form is subsequently synthesized by corresponding mental tools of animal or human synthesis (*aestimatio, intellectus in potentia*). Another form of correspondence is found only in humans. The actual act of intentionality, which is linked to the ability of synthesis of the formal intellect, gives the recognized thing to the human being in the act of personal understanding (*intellectus formalis*). A more detailed comparison in the CMDA shows a principled agreement of both views (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). In the CMDA, the act of intentionality takes place in the immaterial environment of the receptive-active intellect (*ab intentionibus quas recipit intellectus*). Intentional contents, in contrast to animals, are given on the sensory level to be intelligible, because they are further received by the intellect. Therefore, they are universal because *intellectus possibilis* is immaterial by its nature (*ille enim sunt universales, iste vero tantum sunt iste*; CMDA II.121; 317.35). Each link in the chain of intentionality and abstraction has a different status given by mediation. The resulting cognition forms different faculties of the one immaterial human soul. Cognition is produced at the sensory level of animals by the sensory faculty (*vis imaginativa*), which determines the receptive and formative faculty (*vis receptiva, retentiva*). Thus, for the sensual cognition of human beings and also animals are formally given the same scheme in modus *duplex* as for the cognition of the intellect, which is only the privilege of human cognition. The treatise forged an authentic Aristotelian interpretation of the central part of *De anima* 430a21–23, which connects the passive act of cognition with the active one.

“In the imagination there is a twofold faculty of the body (*duplex vis corporalis*). The first potency receives the resemblance from the external thing (*receptiva*); the second faculty gives to this bodily reception the form in which the sensual resemblance to external things is maintained (*retentiva*). Each of these two faculties performs its own act of cognition that is based on the faculty of imagination. Thanks to this distinction, imagination is given as the faculty of intentional reception (*vim receptivam*), which differs from imagination as the faculty of synthetic retention (*vim retentivam*).” [[92]](#footnote-92)

The first synthesis of cognition acquires, at the sensory level, a twofold form of imagination that integrates two acts of bodily invested faculty (*in ymaginatione duplex vis corporalis*). The receptive component of senses passively takes the form of the thing (*receptiva similitudinis corporis extra*). The second part of cognition actively performs the synthesis of sense impressions into a common sensually given form (*formate similitudinis retentiva*). The total synthesis of the sense impression is receptive and active because the imagination has two components (*utraque istarum virium subservit apprehensioni*). The act of retention already holds on to the synthesized sensory form, which was created in the twofold act of abstraction. Both components together establish the second floor of sensuously given cognition. Aristotelian Blund emphasizes that man’s memory in and of itself is not actual and self-reflexive as in the Augustianism because it is primarily actualized from the senses (*se meminisse autem meminit per ymaginationem*).[[93]](#footnote-93) Memory is actualized at the moment it remembers something and the act of memorizing is given by the faculty of sensual imagination. Hermeneutics draw attention to the correspondence concerning the analysis of the act of seeing made by Blund and Averroes. This correspondence has a principled character for the establishment of truth as the correspondence of things, senses and intellect. Both views follow formal similarity between the irradiated object and the observed object. This resemblance is mediated by various kinds of diaphanum (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4) and arises thanks to the synthesis of the image in the act of seeing. We describe that proceeding of cognition as “exposure of being from the front,” since the actualization of cognition comes from real things and it is mediated by bodily senses. Averroes rejected the Neoplatonic model of knowledge based on the metaphor of the sun and light, which Avicenna applied to the intellect–sun. The recognized thing activates the faculties of cognition from potentiality to actuality through the senses. Individual faculty of humans and animals is given outside the senses. It must therefore synthesize the intentional object. The cognized form in thinking has immaterial character in the animal and also in the man; therefore it is not identical with the form of the external thing. The phenomenology of perception is not a modern and postmodern speculation. The Sicilian school, which interpreted the Commentator, therefore observed, together with Aristotle, the world of nature, the behavior of animals and the human cognition. Therefore it was able to describe accurately various kinds of mediation that make a correspondence between cognition and reality. The diaphanum carry the light, in order to make individual things visible in the animal or human act of seeing. Therefore, in the soul, another diaphanum must mediate the recognition of those real forms. This individuation of recognized thing cannot be accomplished by the separated solar intellect, because the intellect thus activated would be identical in all men. The renaissance of Aristotelianism in Blund’s school prepared scholasticism in the school of the first Averroism for the reception of Averroes’s interpretation of *De anima*.

The dispute between Blund and the *Nominales* shows the major change in the theory of truth. The preceding schools of Aristotelians following Abelard explored against Porretans above all the statute of predication and signification, which was given in the framework of the Organon known in that time (ch. 1.3). The dispute between Anselm and Gilbert showed that Porretans did not need an actual correspondence between intellect and thing made with the help of the *species intelligibilis*. They got along with the quasi-substantial, categorical and ontologically given species (ch. 1.4). Nominalists and Avicennists do not possess a real *adaequatio* of the thing, the senses and the intellect. In schools of *Nominales* the species got the effective and causal value of the first substance and not only the formal function of the universal concept. Eternal essence made of species of the third type univocally links the cognitive form to the real thing via eternal form that is inserted into the enlightened mind. The imposition of the meaning proceeds from the eternal form given in the cosmic intellect and in the divine thinking. The resulting supposition of universal cognition includes in itself the existence of the real thing given in the form of the being of the third kind (*individuum*). Abelard and the classical schools of *Logica Vetus* precisely distinguished between the suppositional relation in thought and the imposition of meaning from the direction of the hyparchical first substance. Porretan schools of logical contemporaries uncritically mixed both elements into a new form of *Logica Modernorum*. Blund as critical Aristotelian understood that the illumination of the intellect must proceed thanks to the specific course of cognition. Facing Porretan modernists, Abelard insisted on metaphysically correct imposition and logical supposition. The predication of meaning received a justification in *De interpretatione* in Blund’s school through the analysis of *De anima*, which was a principled requirement on the part of Aristotle (ch. 1.1). Actuality proceeds from the direction of hylemorphic forms given in reality. Their similarity arises as a recognized form in the formal intellect. In this act of intellect, which is given as acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), the donation of the resemblance from the thing receives the definite recognized form (*ad similitudinem et proportionem forme*; ibid, p. 93.11). The scheme builds on the exposure of the sense of being from the front. The outline of *intellectus adeptus* has nothing in common with Avicenna’s forms of self-reflection, which postmodern Descartes later adopted. The new concept of the formal intellect exerted a decisive influence on the metaphysical nature of truth given as the correspondence between intellect and thing. Blund extended Abelard’s concept of true predication by adding a new scheme of cognition to the process of donation, by exploring the exposure of sense of being according to Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*. The cognition progresses from the actual thing to the potential intellect. Then it is true that the form of the actual thing is not the same as its formal aspect in mind. The comparison of both forms creates a new art of correspondence. The similarity between thing and intellect guarantees the fact that at the level of *sensus communis* the intentional process of reception and formation takes place, which does not relate to general concept, but to the hylemorphic real thing. Blund, in contrast to the Avicennists, follows the basic line of interpretation of *De anima*, wherein the faculty of cognition (sensual and intellectual) is primarily divided into a passive-receptive and active-synthesizing component. This twofold conception of the mental faculties makes the unity of the person on the level of sensual and intellectual cognition. The gradualness of cognition, according to Aristotle, promotes the actuality from the real thing to the intellect, which was the opposite of Avicennists. According to the Commentator, Avicenna put the fundament of metaphysics into cognizing subject and not in the first substance (*quasi a se*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The *illuminati*, therefore, in the mode of Avicenna’s epochal *Irrtum*, read the Aristotelian *De anima* quite modernly, that is, from the third book to the second. Today's nihilistic postmodernists read *De anima* like madmen: they start with the second book and never get to the third. From the objectively conceived animal psyche, in the purely material mode of univocity, the world of human cognition is determined, which either way is but an evolutionary developed superstructure of animal brain. Blund is not a modernist because he seeks the original Aristotelian meaning *De anima*. The principal difference from the Neoplatonic abstraction as *denudatio* is based in the actualization of imagination and intellect from the direction of the actual thing. Blund, in contrast to Avicenna, emphasizes that the *intellectus materialis* is empty in the manner of Aristotle’s blank page (*tabula rasa*). Likewise, the sense organ is also empty, which receives the sense impression. The materiality of the intellect is essential as pure potency and receptivity for the mediation of the cognition from the senses to the intellect. The next quotation shows the first *Lichtung* of the truth and the untruth, in which the epochal unveiling of newly given sense of being took place. The possible intellect proposed by Blund represents the basic field of the revelation of the existing in its historical truth and untruth.

“The material intellect is the soul as such, which is devoid of all received dispositions, and ‘material’ is the name of this intellect because the soul has in itself the faculty of receiving everything after the manner of the first matter (*ad simulacrum aptitudinis materia prime*), in which there is also no form (*in seipsa non est aliqua forma*). Similarly, we also call the material intellect ‘intellect in potency’ (*intellectus in potentia*), because matter is given only in potency, which makes it imperfect and must be perfected by the reception of form.” [[94]](#footnote-94)

The soul is completely empty at the beginning of cognition, because its cognitive abilities have only potential nature (*intellectus materialis est ipsa anima nuda*). Thanks to the absolute potentiality, the material intellect requires the reception of the form from the recognized external thing. Blund uses analogy (*similiter dicitur*) between matter and form to elaborate the scheme of cognition. The quotation defines the receptive component of the intellect in the mode *similiter* vis-à-vis the receptivity given in the form of primary matter. Intellectual cognition is immaterial; therefore, it runs in the mode of receptivity that is but similar to the concept of *materia prima*. The potential intellect is not a *materia prima* because it resembles to it by its universal receptivity (*ad simulacrum aptitudinis materie prime*). Similarity of the prime matter and the potential receptive intellect corresponds exactly to the argumentation of the writing CMDA, which Blund, however, with great probability did not know yet when he wrote his commentary. Issued against Porretans, the main thesis asserts that the soul, because of its receptivity, is not capable of creating a form only from itself (*ex qua in seipsa non est aliqua forma*). The key difference separates the material intellect oriented toward the reception of material sensuous forms from the immaterial potentiality of the higher intellect (*similiter dicitur esse intellectus in potentia*). The word “*similiter*” carries a fundamental meaning because it emphasizes the same scheme of cognition as Averroes’s definition of *intellectus possibilis* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). According to Blund, the material intellect makes the receptive component of human intellect, which constitutes the ipseity of the immaterial soul (*intellectus materialis est ipsa anima*). The passive component receives intelligible forms in the manner of potency (*esse materiae est esse in potentia*) so that the fully receptive soul can accept any cognitive content according to Aristotelian definition of human soul (*anima quodammodo est omnia*, *De anima* 431b20–21). The receptivity of intellectual cognition on the second level already goes to pure formal abstraction carried out by the active component of the soul. Blund connected two processes that contributed to the emergence of recognized form in the mode *proportio* and *similitudo*, that is, the sensual and the intellectual faculty. Both processes of cognition are passive and active and both fall under the dual faculty of the soul (*imaginatio, intellectio*). The passive and active virtue of the soul is activated thanks to the reception of cognized sensory data received by *intellectus materialis*, which in the mode of similarity (*similiter*) receives the thing recognized by bodily senses. This reception of the external thing is formed in the imagination. The translation of the form recognized by the senses into the immaterial form recognized by the intellect is safeguarded by *intellectus in potentia*, which constitutes the intentional faculty of the human soul and makes the immaterial diaphanum proper to it. The process of abstraction and the resulting syntheses of *intellectus formalis* are determined by exposure from the direction of the first substance, thanks to the dual form of reception of the animate body (*duplex vis corporalis*). The quotation defines the material and formal intellect in the soul by similarity with the form given in the real hylemorphic composition (*ad similitudinem et proportionem forme*). Blund does not divide faculties of the soul into material and immaterial forms in the mode of gradual superposition according to the *Liber de causis*, as Avicennists do. This Aristotelian thinker rejected modern dualism and, according to *De anima*, defines only the passive and receptive and the active and forming faculties of the human soul that recognizes primarily through bodily senses (*ipsa anima*). Therefore, the *intellectus formalis* rather than Avicennian *intellectus adeptus* takes a central place in his scheme of cognition. The similarity between thing and mind is ensured thanks to the receptive and synthetic process of cognition at sensory and mind levels made through harmony of various components of the simple, immaterial soul. The resulting cognition represents the synthesis of two components of the one intellect. The interpretation of Alfarabi’s writing *De intellectu et intellecto* follows Averroes’s interpretation *avant la lettre*. Blund renewed the original scheme of cognizing the passive and active faculties of the intellect (*De anima* 430a14–15), which Averroes had commented on in the Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). In the Latin West, no one before Blund had so closely connected the material intellect with active immaterial components of the soul. The schemes of modernists were tributary to Avicenna’s dualism between the material and immaterial cognition.

All these facts explain why Blund’s students, who founded the University of Paris, rejected Avicennian exegesis of the Toledo school when Averroes’s corpus became known to them after year 1220. The reason was not only philosophical, but theological as well. Modernists destroyed the Christian concept of the person and free will. The main Parisian representative of this school, William of Auvergne, was appointed the bishop of Paris and the rector of the new university. His colleague, Robert Grosseteste, went to Oxford to establish the university in a similar Aristotelian spirit, which, unfortunately, turned out to be completely different story. The writing CMDA commented since 1230 by the first Averroists adds only the last important fact to the brilliant Blund’s definition of the possible intellect. According to Averroes, the *intellectus in potentia* cited by Blund is immaterial in nature. For this principled reason, the unity of cognition must be accomplished in the mode of *tertium genus* to provide for personal course of cognition and in the mode *quartum genus* to elaborate total description of the intellect in the framework of universal notions. Blund’s definition of material and potential intellect is basically the same as the concept of *intellectus possibilis* in CMDA. Blund uses Alfarabi’s term “*intellectus in potentia*” and conceives it in a similar sense to Alfarabi and Averroes. This answers the question why the first wave of interpreters of the CMDA extended without any problem Blund’s material intellect to Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* and Blund’s formal intellect to Averroes’s *intellectus speculativus*. Blund’s treatise provided Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima* 230a21–23, which describes the connection between the active and passive components of cognition, and changed the process of abstraction from Avicennist *denudatio* to Aristotelian abstraction. Averroes masterfully performed the same point in the Falsafa to open a new possibility of philosophy in the West after Avicenna for the previous generation after year 1170. Blund, as the first Latin Aristotelian at the beginning of the thirteenth century, fully grasped the truth as correspondence according to *De anima*. A thorough reading of *De anima* led Blund to the following thesis. The passive component of senses or intellect must be formed on the basis of animal or human intentionality, which is given either as *vis aestimativa* or in the human imagination and intellect. These abilities are located in the soul as *tabula rasa* and they are actualized in the synthetic process of abstraction. The cognition proceeds by passive sensual reception of actual things existing in reality. Universal species cannot exist in actual things because they have no possibility to do so. The hylemorphic form is given *simpliciter* in the act of being of the first substance; universal meaning is synthesized in the act of abstraction. Thanks to intentionality, the intentional species is not identical with the first substance; but formally it resembles to it in the mode of *similitudo*. The similarity between reality and cognition is given by the fact that the first substance acts in an actual, causal and efficient manner. By virtue of its causality, it establishes cognitive reception in the sense organ and, subsequently, the cognition given formally in the soul of the animal or human being. There is no such a thing as being of the third kind. Due to the correspondence interpreted in this way, which is given in the formal synthesis of cognition, the proposition about the Excluded Third is valid all the time. What are the potential and universal species in the soul, that cannot be the actual form in the hylemorphic substance. The second Averroism took over the mythological concept of “species—esence” given in the worldview described in the previous matrix (*discrete videamus*, ch. 1.4). Blund’s interpretation abandoned Avicenna’s nature of abstraction. The abstracted species is intended by performance of the soul and then synthesized in the imagination or intellect. The metaphysical dative characterizes cognition from the direction of the real thing whose properties are apprehended in the process of sensuous abstraction. The higher intentionality of man, determined by the sensuous imagination and the immaterial intellect, forms a new recognized form, which, however, is still a pure potency. The cognition arises in the process of truth as *similitudo* and is given by the intention of the senses (*species sensibilis*) or that of thinking (*species intelligibilis*). The intentionality involves the abstraction of properties that exists in the hylemorphic first substance. Both cognitive forms are given as signification of the second substance, which create a specific and universal *similitudo* of the first substance really existing outside the field of cognition. Thanks to the specific form of sensually and intelligibly applied cognition, we have to abstract the forms in the mode of intentional reception and active synthesis. The form is given by the intention of the potential intellect on the basis of a similar intentional relation and a process of abstraction. Both are given at the sensory level (*nec apprehenditur sensu nisi secundum quod forma est ei presens*). Man is not capable of directly receiving the form of the first existing substance (*de impotentia forme secundum quod separari non potest a subiecto*); therefore, we must intend it through our own cognition. Thanks to the definition of the soul as *tabula rasa*, the ability of abstraction creates the intentional object of senses and of intellect (*sensus est… in se abstractivus sicut intellectus*). The thing exists originally for itself in an external form and it is given to us secondarily and accidentally in virtue of the act of cognition as universal form. At the next level of cognition, the synthetic intellect, in the mode of scientific predication, creates a logical and metaphysical judgment that states truth and falsity. We do not consider the recognized form directly in the things, as modern *illuminati* postulate. The indivisibility and the simplicity of both forms are only apparently univocal. Thanks to the receptivity of the soul, the relation between reality and cognition is based on the similarity. Aristotelians and modernists differ in the definition of intentionality according to the exposure from the front or from the back. Necessarily, the result of these cognitive acts differs as well.

The scientific cognition of both schools cannot have the same concept of truth. Blund knows well that the hylemorphic form cannot be conceived univocally in thought. Therefore, he became the first thinker of Western scholasticism who consistently interpreted the writing *De anima* in terms of “things themselves,” that is, in terms of the first real substance that is intentionally recognized through the metaphysical dative. The metaphysical dative universally and potentially enacts in the soul the past character of the real and unique first substance. Contemporary exegesis, on the other hand, declared Blund to be an Avicennist, especially because of the overall structure of Blund’s treatise and the terminology used, which formally pays tribute to Avicenna’s interpretation of *De anima* (Hasse 2000, 18–23). Hermeneutics consider Blund to represent the first Averroism *avant la lettre*. His commentary on *De anima* defines the species through the act of intentionality, that is, as a receptive-synthetic act of the senses and intellect, which are directed towards the cognition of the world outside the animal or human soul. The abstraction exists according to Blund already on sensual level (*sensus est abstractivus*).[[95]](#footnote-95) The abstraction is not identical with the activity of senses in bodily organs. Thanks to the intentionality, the abstraction makes the active synthesis of recognized content in the human and animal soul. It is therefore separated from the material reception that makes sense impressions in the physical organ. In the act of primary intentionality (*intentio prima*) the species arises as an individual imago of the imagination. Therefore, there can be no mesalliance with the first substance even on the sensual level. The material form is in the external thing or this immaterial form exists autonomously in the separated cosmic intelligences. The thinking makes only their similarity. The new definition of species changed the cosmic *intellectus agens* into the individual component of the soul that is activated by *intellectus formalis*. The effective causality is bound to the sense organ in the body and the formal causality to the immaterial intentionality of animal or human soul. The intentionality ensures the reception of reality, which is given by donation of actuality through the metaphysical dative. The past presence of the first substance is outside of the soul. The reception of this actuality starts the synthesis of sensual or intelligible species in the different forms of the diaphanum. Thus, the material and the formal causality of the process of cognition differ in principle. Modernity completely neglected causality and uncritically combined the two components into one objective form. By the introduction of the diaphanum and formal causality, it came to the distinction in the soul between the individual-actual form of the first substance and the synthesized form-species. The latter is given either as sensual and singular *species sensibilis* or as intellectual and universal *species intelligibilis*. The twofold form of abstraction forms a new species, which scholastics influenced by Alfarabi and Blund call *intentio prima* and *secunda* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). Blund does not activate self-reflection as an independent act of the active intellect because thinking takes place within the Aristotelian framework of the intellect as a primarily receptive immaterial faculty of the soul as a *tabula rasa*. The new Aristotelianism separated the intentional species in thought from the substantial form of the species defended by the sophistical *Nominales*.[[96]](#footnote-96) The twofold manner of species as a universal given merely in thought or as being of the third kind establishes the fundamental difference between the first and the second Averroism. Blund’s interpretation of *De anima* questions in some principled points Avicenna’s scheme of recognition that generates different forms of being of the third kind. The twofold manifestation of species distinguishes between the conception of truth as Aristotelian *adaequatio* or Anselm’s *rectitudo* or Avicenna’s *certitudo*. The difference between the first and the second intention prepared the West for the adoption of Averroes’s scheme of intentionality based on the new concept of *intellectus possibilis*. The soul is not consubstantial with the universe of being of the third kind, as Avicenna and after all modern postmodern *illuminati* presupposed. The formal intellect exists thanks to the first and the second form of intentionality, which is related to the human imagination and thinking (*imaginatio, intellectio*). They are immaterial due to the activity of the soul as a form that produces the universal cognition. Thereby the human cognition separated itself both from the animal instinctive judgment (Avicenna’s *wahm*, scholastic *vis aestimativa*) and from the external form in the real first substance. The animal form of intentional species remains individually bound to the imprinting created by *sensus communis*. Therefore, the common world of animals comes to being in the first days of life of the individual and remains stable during the whole of further life. The human form of the common world, on the other hand, is universal, historically variable, and tied to the long process of education, as well as the cultural, spiritual, and intellectual maturation of the person.

### 2.1.3 Dispute of the Sicilian and the Toledo School

The treatise CMDA was commented on by the generation of Aristotelian thinkers after the year 1230 in a twofold and entirely different way, that is, according to the Toledo and the Sicilian school. The first Averroism interpreted the CMDA according to Blund’s interpretation of *De anima*, in the line of the *Logica Vetus* of Abelard’s school. The second Averroism interpreted the CMDA according to Avicenna’s *Metaphysics* and according to Augustinian and Avicennian interpretation of *De anima*. This interpretation prevailed globally, although Averroes rejected it as fundamentally flawed, and the entire Avicennian metaphysics as well. The mysticism of man as an imperfect angel determined by the world of cosmic intelligences was fundamentally different from the real study of man in the context of biology and “meta-physics.” The nihilistic development of the 20th century and the present epoch of Anthropocene paradoxically shows, in the mode of epochal *Irrtum* and divine tragicomedy directed by Furies, how the objectively fallen angel of Avicenna became a nihilist animal. The humanists Averroes and Alfarabi rejected both erroneous destiny with regard to the true nature of man. Blund’s Aristotelianism offered not only the brilliant exegesis based on the Latin translation of *De anima*, but also he did thorough reading of Boethius’s commentaries. The first authentic Aristotelian in the age of incoming high Scholasticism defended the hyparchical value of the first substance according to Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and its interpretation done by Abelard. In the dispute between Abelard and Gilbert de La Porrée, Blund sided with Abelard because he held the same nature of the imposition related to the first substance. Hermeneutics emphasizes Blund’s congenial connection to the tradition of Aristotelian Arabic philosophy. For the first time in the history of the Latin West, his school overcame Avicenna’s demiurgic intuition of singular-universal essence (*hoc esse tantum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). This direct insight into the pure essences in the manner of enlightened vision brought into scholasticism a fatal production of being of the third kind. Recognition by denudation defines modern intentionality, which connects in a consubstantial and univocal manner predicated species with the existence of the real things (Avicenna's *equinitas tantum*, Rufus's *scibile*, Husserl's *noema*). Latin modernists ensure the univocity of both species by the act of cognition of substantially separated *intellectus agens* or Cartesian *cogito*. The process of abstraction like Avicenna’s *denudatio* or Husserl’s *Wesensschau* establishes the reception of the external thing as a side effect of already given self-knowledge of the soul and its own actuality (ch. 3.3.2). In Blund’s time, this hypostatized intellect was illuminated from the direction of the cosmic *intellectus agens*. That separated intellect acted on the soul through the self-reflection of Augustinian memory (*memoria, reminiscentia*) or through direct contemplation of some permanent form manifested in the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). Blund abolished this scheme of cognition. The term “species” has a principally different meaning in the first and second Averroism. The objective understanding of the philosophical texts does not see the fundamental difference of both conceptions of species. Blund became the first critical Avicennist in the Latin West. Because of different concept of truth, abstraction and metaphysics, there is no univocity of species for the first and the second Averroism. The contemporary scholastic interpreters, influenced by the objective vision of the world, explore “what” the species is, but do not see the hermeneutic question of “how” the constitution and revelation of species proceeds.[[97]](#footnote-97) Archaic hermeneutics stand methodologically outside objectivity; therefore, it cannot conceive of the *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* in the mode of univocal identity given by the worldview done in the mode of the epochal *Irrtum* of modernity. The different approach to intentionality separated the Husserl as Avicennian objectivist and Heidegger as reformed Aristotelian in years 1919–21. Postmodern Husserl went to “things themselves” in the form of Cartesian being of the third kind according to the Toledo school. Aristotelian Heidegger explored the act of life in its primary form that generates the first form of the intentionality of *Dasein*. Necessarily, the original meaning of being must be looked for at that level. Beginning of Heidegger’s way to philosophy in the mode of the Sicilian school was the hermeneutics of facticity that followed the theological figure of the real Christian existence explored in the Pauline epistles. Therefore, Heidegger rejected the hypostatized definitions of the Toledo school of that time, which were given by Kantian or Hegelian philosophy of life. These forms represented for him an impossible being of the third kind. In comparison to *Modernorum*, the authentic Aristotelian cognition and intentionality represent a fundamental difference; they changed in principle the nature of man and the definition of science. Avicenna’s *intellectus agens* was no longer a dominant component directing the whole process of cognition from behind towards the world of autonomous forms. The Blund’s school proposed the cognition to be the actualization of the soul by the hylemorphic thing given in reality. The first intention goes primarily to the body (*anima habet convertere se ad corpus*) and not to the separated active intellect as the form giver.[[98]](#footnote-98) The soul actively abstracts cognitive forms in relation to image of things stored in the memory (*ad similitudinem ymagimum inventarum in memoria*). These forms are intended and synthesized by individual formal intellect (*imprimitur in anima intellectus formalis*). The formal intellect takes their original actuality from the Form giver (*mediante primo datore formarum*). The action of Avicenna’s Form giver was reduced to merely an indirect influence in the process of cognition. Blund keep God to have the leading role of the first cause and the separated active intellect as *Dator formarum*. However, God’s existence is fully separated in his being from the human soul. The intellect as form must come directly from God as the First form, which was also the point of view of Grosseteste as an eminent representative of Blund’s school (ch. 3.2). This corresponds to the Aristotelian scenario of cognition, which is determined by the actuality of the recognized thing and not by the actuality of the separated form and its efficient causality. At the beginning of the 13th century came to the first liberation of person, soul and intellect from the diacosmos of Jamblichus and Avicenna. The twofold division of *intellectus agens* into an internal component of the soul and an external factor of cosmic character we find further in the Parisian archbishop William of Auvergne (Guilielmus Alvernus), who is the best known and most important disciple of Blund’s school (ch. 2.3). The *intellectus adeptus* lost the independent role in the schema of cognition, because the exposure of intellect goes from the front in the direction of the real thing recognized by the senses. According to Blund’s treatise, the resulting conception of truth as the correspondence between thing and intellect is as follows.

“In a similar way, it can be shown that all cognitive faculties of the soul are one and the same faculty, which is given in the act of first substance (*una et eadem vis in essentia*). This we readily accept by pointing out that cognitive components of the human soul are not substantially distinct, but merely accidentally (*non sunt diverse in essentia, immo in accidente tantum*). There is no other difference between them than this, which is based on the modality of their cognition (*in modo apprehendi*). Namely, the senses cognize the present thing that has been previously apprehended by the senses; the intellect then abstracts the thing from its accidents, as it has been said according to the arguments expressed above.” [[99]](#footnote-99)

The senses perceive the thing in its real presence (*rem presentem*); the intentionally given imagination holds the thing in its absence (*rem absentem*). The intellect, in the subsequent process of abstraction, creates a universal concept through the abstracted recognition of the accidental properties of the first simple substance that is indivisibly given in reality (*abstrahit rem ab accidentibus*). It comes to the new exposure of the active intellect. It is actualized from the direction of sensually recognized things and their cognition is now located in the human soul. According to Aristotle, the introduction of the metaphysical dative separates the metaphysically different modes of being, which is later explicitly conceived in the school of Modists, which were founded in the following generation of Blund’s disciples. The donation of similar form in the soul runs by the transfer of sensuous and intelligible forms through the diaphanum. That process creates the unity of all cognized components in the one immaterial soul that is given in its subsistent and bodily-founded act. The substantial unity of the person excludes the modern and postmodern scenario of plurality of substances in man. Aristotelian Blund clearly defines the difference between the philosophical and theological concept of the soul.[[100]](#footnote-100) Theology should take care of the soul from the point of view of merits and punishments, which are conceived in the perspective of redemption or damnation. The typical questions of the writing *De anima*, namely what the soul is, how we should analyze it from the point of view of its components and how is bound to the body, belongs to the field of philosophy and not to theology. Blund’s follower, the Parisian archbishop Alvernus and the chancellor of *alma mater*, represented this form of authentic Aristotelianism for two decades, defending it against the Latin sophists (ch. 2.3.1). We know too little about the brief period of his successor Gauthier de Château-Thierry, the Chancellor of the University in 1246–49 and archbishop from 1249. The fundamental dispute between the school of the first and second Averroism unfolds after the year 1250. Respect for the autonomous path of philosophy to discover the truth characterizes the school of the first Averroism. Meanwhile, with the increasing influence of modernity, critical thinking disappeared after the year 1250. The modern Latins had already been creating knowledge for a century through the modern simulacra led by the dogmatically educated Furies. After the condemnation of Abelard, the modernists orchestrated the condemnation of Aristotelians in the name of one objective truth in 1277; but now, there is the beginning of 13th century.

Blund establishes for high scholasticism, which precedes the reception of Averroes’s metaphysics, a new field that enables the revelation of being. The comparison between animal and human intentionality had a crucial importance for the positive reception of Averroes’s writing in the paradigm of the Sicilian school founded by Frederick II.. The commentators inspired by Aristotle’s natural scientific writings grasped the real meaning of metaphysics of “substance *qua* substance” because they perceived it by exposing it from the front, from the direction of real existing and perceived first substances. The cognition was analyzed according to behavior of real animals, like the hunting hawk. This made the principal difference from Avicennist Toledo school that interpreted the corpus of the Commentator in the spirit of mystical Neoplatonism. The phenomenological direction given by the research of the real cognition distinguished the authentic interpretation of CMDA from the Avicennism of the Toledo school. It was represented especially by translators Avendauth and Gundissalinus and after them by the Neoplatonic school of Philip the Chancellor. According to Avicenna or Averroes, the interpretation concerning the goal and the unity of Aristotelian metaphysics brought a new point of view into the hidden gigantomachy of logical schools. The followers of *Logica Modernorum*, which Alvernus called “*sequaces Aristotelis*,” extended their sophisms into Avicennian metaphysics and created a system of a new Neoplatonism. Blund’s school preserved in Paris the intellectual environment of reformed Aristotelianism in the spirit of logical schools inspired by Boethius and Abelard (*Tractatus Anagnini*, *Logica “Cum sit nostra”*) in the mode of *Logica Vetus* and expanded it in the metaphysics. This dispute took place at the end of the 12th century and it ended the activity of the schools of *Nominales* and *Logica Modernorum* in Paris. Those schools took a modernist form afterwards. On the academic ground of the metaphysical and logical realists in Blund’s school, the first integral reception of CMDA took place according to the Sicilian school that Michael Scotus imported to Paris in year 1230. Their influence was supported by the Latin translations of the Aristotelian corpus, which were sent by Frederick II. to the University of Bologna and his son Manfred to the University of Paris. The first Averroism emerged in the environment that integrated the Sicilian school and Blund’s academy. Their union founded the University of Paris. Blund and his school led by the later Bishop Alvernus welcomed the arrival of Averroes’s corpus in Paris interpreted through Scotus’s Sicilian school. Around the year 1230, it confirmed in all fundamental points their Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*, which had already existed before the Commentator’s arrival in the Latin West. The Blund’s school inspired the first Averroism that explained the first commentaries of Averroes in the Latin West. That point will be discussed in the next chapter. The representatives of Blund’s school facilitated the transformation of the *École de Paris* into the University of Paris. The pope recognized its irreplaceable value for the defense of the Christian image of the world, God and human person. Blund’s interpretation of Aristotle was widely appreciated by his contemporaries. Henry of Avranches (Henricus Abrincensis, ca. †1260) testifies in his laudatio to the importance of Blund for the establishment of the school of the first Averroism.[[101]](#footnote-101) In the style of Averroes’s critique of modernists in CMDA (*moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5), the Parisian magister is praised against modernist interpreters for having studied Aristotle’s original writings in depth (*primus Aristotelis satagens perquirere libros*). Subsequently, Blund allegedly completed the reception and interpretation of philosophical writings of the Falsafa, which had reached the West during this period (*recenter eos Arabes misere Latinis*). The adverb “*recenter*,” in the present interpretation, may mean the first reception of Averroes’s philosophy, which might be presented outside the Toletan paradigm “*ad mentem Averrois*” even before 1230. In that year, Blund’s school adopted the paradigm of the Sicilian school during Scotus’s stay at the University of Paris. This first critical reception of the Commentator interpreted against the Toletans is provided by the interpretation in the work *De anima et de potenciis eius* (c. 1225). The new interpretation of Averroes precedes the arrival of the Sicilian school (1230) and presupposes the first criticism of the Toletan school that existed on the soil of the University of Paris from about 1220. The Blund’s school anticipated the interpretation of Averroes according to the Sicilian school, because the masters kept the same interpretation of *De anima*, *Categories*, *Metaphysics* and *Second Analytics*. In this common interpretation, cognition is exposed from the front, from the direction of the first substances.

The work of Blund and his school called into being the first known Christian interpretation of Aristotle in the Latin West, which presented an authentic Aristotelianism compatible with Christianity. The Cathedral school in Paris rejected in a qualified manner the sophistry of Neoplatonic modernists of false Aristotelian provenance, as was David de Dinant. For this epoch-making achievement, the Cathedral School of Paris was elevated to the status of a Pontifical University. These Aristotelians, through their influence and fundamental criticism of David of Dinant, achieved that their defense of philosophical wisdom of Christian doctrine earned the protection of the pope for that school of Paris. They conducted their research in accordance with the philosophical legacy of Abelard and his metaphysics and logic known as *Logica Vetus*. The University of Paris was born from the transformation of the one cathedral school (*École de Paris*) directed by Blund into an academic Christian institution of central importance. The papal authority protected it from arbitrary decisions of local rulers and bishops from the year 1215. This place of central education and authority, given by the transformation of Abelard’s cathedral school, integrated in itself the other locally important cathedral, religious and episcopal schools. It is quite understandable that the defeated party of modernists imposed on Blund’s group the academic *damnatio memoriae*. The erasure of the hitherto non-existent Blund’s school from academic memory had a wholly practical motive, because modernism had to cover the traces of its own sophisms and errors. The modern Averroism proceeds from the concept of *intellectus possibilis* made by David of Dinant. He defined as a unified cosmic substance that joins the individualized *intellectus materialis* in the mode of the Averroist *copulatio*. Due to the brief, but all the more important victory of the Sicilian school at the University of Paris, Averroes received the honorary title “the Commentator” in the Latin West. Chancellor Alvernus opposed the metaphysics of the Commentator to philosophic schools following Neoplatonic Aristotle (*philosophi sequaces Aristotelis*, ch. 2.3.1). Grosseteste belonged to Blund’s school during his studies in Paris. According to the following interpretation, this Aristotelian thinker is the author of the polemic writing *De anima et de potenciis eius*, to which he later added his commentary on *De anima*. Another author at Blund’s school was Bishop Alvernus, who wrote two commentaries on *De anima*. The first was polemical and the second magisterial. Gauthier’s preface to the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ca. 1225) emphasizes the defense of the unity of the person, which connects this writing with the commentary called *De potenciis anime et obiectis* (ca. 1230). Its author, according to the interpretation presented in the following chapters, is bishop Alvernus.[[102]](#footnote-102) Gauthier’s analysis of quotations from Averroes’s *Commentary on Metaphysics* that correspond to Grosseteste’s first cosmological works is crucial in determining the authorship of *De anima et de potentiis eius* (Gauthier 1982, 8–9). Another criterion of Grosseteste’s authorship is the pluralism of potency and forms in the soul and the same interpretation of the diaphanum and species as in Blund’s school of the first Averroism (ch. 3.2). Grosseteste wrote the first philosophical writing citing Averroes explicitly against the Avicennist Toletans and against the Parisian Porretans. Alvernus supplemented the latter’s analysis from a theological point of view probably after the arrival of Scotus from the Sicilian school in 1230. To understand this dual reception of Averroes in the mode of the first Averroism of the Sicilian and the Toletan school, we must go two centuries backwards, when the first interpretation of Avicenna emerged in the Latin Aristotelian mode that integrated Neoplatonic Avicennism with the theory of knowledge according to *De anima*.

The interpretation of Aristotelian Falsafa in the paradigm of the Toledo school was presented by Aristotelian David of Dinant. His interpretation of *De anima* created the untruth of Aristotelianism by establishing the first Averroistic conception of objectivity in the Latin West. His teaching was condemned by the episcopal synod in 1215 as a pantheistic interpretation because of his use of *anima mundi*. Dinant’s interpretation directly used Aristotelian writing; therefore, the cited synod forbade the study of some writing from the Aristotelian corpus at the University of Paris. The difference in interpretation of intentionality and cognition between Blund and Dinant around 1200 shows the nature of the later quarrel between the first and the second Averroism. Dinant’s concept of the diaphanum features an interesting blend of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian doctrine, from which the first Latin modernist Rufus of Cornwall drew inspiration. The episcopal synod convened in Paris in 1210 condemned Dinant’s pantheism and ordered the public burning of the work *Quaternuli* as a heretical treatise. The rules regulating the curriculum of the newly founded university, issued in 1215 by the papal legate Robert, expressly forbade the teaching of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, as well as his scientific writings. They were influenced by Neoplatonist Aristotelianism according to David of Dinant and other Amalricians, such as Amaury de Bennes and an unknown Neoplatonist from Spain. The period between the years 1210 and 1215 keeps a key character for the birth of modernity. During this time the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth came into being that presided the founding of the Paris University. This historicity, in the mode of modernist fallacy, shaped the subsequent history of the University of Paris until its decline in the Enlightenment during the French Revolution. The condemnation of Dinant’s philosophy shows that a fundamental turn occurred at Paris University in the environment of the first Averroism. The first Averroism interpreted Aristotle’s writings in a clearly Christian way. The arrival of authentic Aristotelian philosophy provoked a fundamental conflict between Blund’s school and Neoplatonic interpretations of Toletans and first modernists from declining schools of *Nominales* and *Logica Modernorum*. This conflict can be dated about 1215–31, when the ban on teaching the Aristotelian corpus at the University of Paris was lifted. The modernist schools followed the Neoplatonic Aristotelianism of David of Dinant; therefore, they could not reject its heresy in a qualified manner. Blund’s school received papal recognition because it defended the Christian value of Aristotle presented according to the Sicilian school, that is, *ad mentem Averrois*. David’s of Dinant modernist Aristotelian philosophy played a decisive role in the birth of the University of Paris by *via negativa*. This physician and thinker obtained a master’s degree in Greece and became personal chaplain to Pope Innocent (probably in 1206). He maintained contact with the Sicilian emperor Frederick II., under whose protection the Sicilian school of Averroes’s interpretation was established at the University of Bologna and at the Sicilian court of the aforementioned ruler. Dinant taught metaphysics according to Abelard’s logic in Paris in 1207–10. His ties with the main Sicilian centers of interpretation of Aristotle have key character for the foundation of the Parisian university, because only the connoisseurs of Blund’s school were able to reveal the sophistry of his teaching.

Let us return to the University of Paris during the years 1210–15, when the history of the Latin West for the next millennium takes on a new character. A fundamental metaphysical event became the defense of truth as *adaequatio* based on intentionality, which stood against Neoplatonic truth as *assimilatio* of being of the third kind. This concept of truth as assimilation acquired in Dinant’s doctrine the character of a cosmic pantheism, which links the cosmic intellect directly to the divine essence. Blund objected that this pseudo-Aristotelian *anima mundi* has no possibility of existence because, according to *De anima*, it does not make part of the scheme of cognition. The key moment of polemics against Dinant’s pantheism was the status of *intellectus possibilis* as exclusively human intellectual diaphanum. The defense of the receptive intellect actualized by exposure from the front, in the mode of the metaphysical dative, separated the cognition from the exposure from behind given by pantheistic forms of *intellectus agens*. For this principled reason, the cosmic form of the soul cannot exist in the form of Dinant’s *anima mundi*. The cosmic intelligences cannot have passive cognition attached to sensory cognition. The intelligible cosmic intelligences have the principle of life in the pure forms of intellect, which fundamentally separates them from the human soul. The latter attains the actuality of cognition only from the senses. The predication of universality and causality that involved God as *causa prima* were at stake as well. It was necessary to interpret correctly then forbidden writing *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Toletans and Avicennists such as school in St. Victor’s Abbey proposed a Neoplatonist interpretation of *De anima*; therefore they offered but a partially rational and true argument against Dinant’s philosophical pantheism. The same was true of Avicennist scholars such as Prévostin de Crémone, the Chancellor of the University of Paris elected in 1208. The argumentation against Dinant was raised in full only in the Blund’s school. The Pope Innocent II. recognized the value of that argumentation in year 1215 by granting papal rights to the school of Blund that united other cathedral schools. The interpretative power of Aristotelianism put in the service of Christian orthodoxy caused Innocent III. to grant papal university rights to Paris schools that were run by Abelard’s *École de Paris* and were united under the aegis of Blund’s Aristotelian interpretation. This interpretation won at the Parisian trial of 1210 against the magister David of Dinant. The confused schools of modernists were punished by the ban to teach the disputed writing from the Aristotelian corpus. However, these schools definitely lost the battle in year 1230, after the arrival of Scotus’s interpretation of the Sicilian school. Therefore, Aristotle’s ban was lifted as counterproductive in the next year (1231). The main representative of Blund’s school was William of Auvergne (Guilielmus Alvernus, †1249). This master of theology (since 1223) and bishop of Paris (1228–49) became the most important defender of Averroes’s metaphysics in the Latin West. The status of the new university was definitely confirmed by Pope Gregory IX. in 1231. Through the difference between the schools of Toledo and of Sicily, hermeneutics answered Gilson’s important question about the nature of the conflict connected with the arrival of Aristotles in the Latin West.[[103]](#footnote-103) The period 1215–31 proved by the confirmation of papal rights the successful foundation of schools of the first Averroism. It constituted the fundamental historial event for now extinct Parisian University. Dinant’s key argument, according to Albert the Great, was the introduction of universal hylemorphism directly into the divine essence, from which he deduced the origin of the lower substances through the emanations.[[104]](#footnote-104) A principal unsolvable problem for schools of Porretan Aristotelians was Dinant’s univocal predication of the intellect as a being of the third kind defined in the framework of the universal hylemorphism. This generic intellect-matter can be divided into species within the Tree of Porphyry and according to *Liber de causis*. By activity of higher active form of intellect, the lower material form of this intellect comes into being, in the model of *passio*.[[105]](#footnote-105) Being an well-known Aristotelian, Dinant knew the mediating function of the diaphanum and its importance for the activity of senses and intellect. However, like the Avicennist Descartes, he explicitly asserts that the diaphanum is a substance given as a body (*dyaphanum vero corpus est*).[[106]](#footnote-106) The first modern Aristotelian of the Latin West has a mechanical conception of cosmic pantheism as modern atomism that postmodernists Descartes and Newton took up. Newton, however, was not a deist. Like Pascal, he separated revealed God of Israel from his objective divinity manifested in the cosmos. Newton refused to connect God as *causa prima* with the cosmic *anima mundi* that according to him was responsible for movements of heavenly bodies.[[107]](#footnote-107) Dinant defined the passive and the active character of the soul, but rejected the Aristotelian approach of individualization of the intellect according to *De anima*. The unity of intellectual content in man arises in a Neoplatonic way by exposure of sense from behind. The intellect has no possibility of individuation in human cognition and became an independent substance. Dinant puts rightly the receptive component in every human faculty (senses, intellect, will), because otherwise there could be no individual act of cognition (*horum autem unumquodque est possibile*).[[108]](#footnote-108) This interpretation of receptivity does not agree with Blund, because Dinant’s intellect is not included in the passive component. Instead, the passive role is played by the imagination, which in Blund’s philosophy, on the other hand, plays a synthetic role only for *species sensibilis*. Dinant first made an identification of the receptive intellect as matter and potency in relation to the superior cosmic intellect as form. In doing so, he created the receptive or hylic component of the intellect according to Themistius.[[109]](#footnote-109) Then he unified both forms of passive matter in one genus and also gave the active act of synthetic intellect in the same genus. Following Alexander, the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) of Dinant became a generically different hypostasis, which exists outside of the human being. Dinant gave both forms of immaterial and unitary intellect into two actively and passively given cosmic substances. The personal act of cognition was proposed without the experienced intentionality in the soul. Dinant could not make it otherwise; the separated *intellectus agens* is given in the mode of universal hylemorphism and pantheism. Neoplatonic thinkers combined both hylemorphic substance and Neoplatonic matter of the third kind into a univocal form. He then linked this receptive component to God as the First intellect at the level of the active Form-giver. The receptive, therefore “material” part of the intellect was at the level of the entire material cosmos. This cosmic matter, in its created wholeness, can be formed only by the divine active intellect. Dinant, in contrast to Blund, conceives the intellect as pantheistic to be an indivisible active component of cognition, to which corresponds unitary receptive intellectual matter.[[110]](#footnote-110) Then the scenario of *De anima* 430a21–23 begins to apply. It describes the complementary connection between the passive and the active component of cognition. God is reflected by the hylically given receptive world in the totality and the fullness and creates thereby in us individual thought contents. The only logical solution was the consequent pantheism, in which the passive world reflected the active God. Spinoza, who professed the thesis *deus sive natura*, would certainly subscribe to Dinant’s logical conclusion about the existence of only one indivisible and immaterial divine substance, which shapes all forms of matter, within the framework of the difference between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Dinant’s deism shows in the Latin West the first form of universal hylemorphism, which in the next generation establishes the objective concept of matter.

“The thinking, which we are just talking about and which we define as immaterial, is nothing else than God himself. If, then, the world is nothing other than God, who, according to the assertion of Plato, Zeno, Socrates, and many others, thinks himself through the world even in a sensuous way, God is also the matter of the world. The form which comes to this matter is nothing other than that which makes possible the perception of God of Himself.” [[111]](#footnote-111)

In contrast to Blund’s *similiter*, the uncritical pantheist Dinant conceived cognition in the mode of generic univocity, which applies to both the receptivity of the substance and the hylic intellect. God thinks himself reflexively in the Avicennistic mode of the Flying Man, and the hylic world thereby acquires a cosmic form. In this way, God can feel his own thinking through the hylic *anima mundi* given in this way. The quotation comprehends the reception of recognized forms within the framework of universal hylemorphism, which is formed by the one pantheistic *intellectus agens*. Conceived in the mode of the hylic and cosmic *intellectus possibilis*, cosmic matter receives the divine act of reflection (*mundus est ipse deus preter se ipsum perceptibile sensui*). Dinant skipped the intentionality because he had made a substance of the third kind instead. In addition, he turned the diaphanum into a physical body, which made it impossible to mediate between the world and the intellect. This function had to be taken over by the cosmic form of the receptive intellect, because it is given as primary matter. The divine individuation of this *materia prima* gave rise to the first conception of the unified *intellectus possibilis*, which is numerically one for all people. Dinant was a modern Averroist two decades before the import of Averroes’s writing into the Latin West. He proposed the first form of the numerically uniform, separated and divine *intellectus materialis* for all people (*mens ... unam dicimus esse eamque impassibilem*). The second Averroism adopted Dinant’s mythology in slightly modified forms. Finally, modernists have attributed their own errors to Averroes in order to create the figure of modern Averroism. Dinant’s averroism *avant la lettre* shows the first synthesis between Avicennism and Aristotelian teaching on receptive and synthetic capacity of the soul. Dinant hypostasized this faculty into two cosmic substances. Dinant's pantheism shows *Lichtung* of Western objectivity in its original error. Rufus, the first modernist at Oxford, transformed Dinant′s mythology into a new form of sophistry. It is quite understandable that this Oxford sophist was as ingloriously received by the first Parisian generation of connoisseurs of Aristotle as David of Dinant.

Both founding modernists, Grosseteste and Rufus, by relying on Aristotle's *De anima*, created a link between Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism that differed from the pantheism of Dinant. They defined the passive and active element in the human soul and, moreover, they did not identify the cosmic soul with God. Although this half-hearted solution saved both authors from excommunication for pantheism, it was in no case on par with the Aristotelians from the school of the first Averroism. This was the reason why Grosseteste had to leave the University of Paris, even though he had previously been one of the best students at Blund’s school (ch. 3.1.1). In contrast to Dinant, Grosseteste and Rufus, it was Blund’s interpretation of Aristotle that fundamentally rejected the existence of the cosmic soul known from the dialogue *Timaeus*.[[112]](#footnote-112) This actual *revolutio* or turn of thought to the original version of *De anima* was confirmed by Aristotelian exegesis of Michael Scotus. *Corpus Aristotelicum* according to Averroes and interpreted in agreement with Aristotle’s scientific writings was published in Paris in the year 1230. The qualified rejection of Dinant’s heresy would not have been possible without the thinking of modest Johannes Blund, whom Avranche’s laudatory speech honored for lifelong search for truth according to principles of natural human mind (*insitus humane rationi iura tuendi*).[[113]](#footnote-113) Therefore, the Pope Gregory IX. allowed by the decree of 1231, the study of the scientific writings of Aristotle (*Chartularium I*, no. 86, p. 143). This change was brought about by Blund’s school under the leadership of Bishop Alvernus as rector of the University of Paris. Alvernus took the interpretation of Aristotle “*ad mentem Averrois*” with the Latin corpus of Averroes into the previously prepared environment of different Aristotelian schools. Porretans, schools of *Nominales* and schools of *Logica Modernorum* conceived Averroes as the continuator of Avicenna. Therefore, they did not see anything fundamentally new in the Commentator’s metaphysics. Avicenna was the most important commentator of Aristotle for them. On the other hand, the representatives of the newly created University of Paris, which were gathered around the academic representatives of cathedral schools formed by Abelard, received a new impetus for the interpretation of *Corpus Aristotelicum* in the years 1220–30 through a radically new interpretation of Aristotle. The Commentator’s writing came in two waves at Blund’s school, from Toledo and from Sicily. In the authentic interpretation of Aristotle, the masters of Blund’s school distinguished precisely between the Neoplatonic simulacrum of Aristotle. It was of the same nature as a simulacrum of Averroes according to Avicennistic Toletans. The translator school imported by Scotus confirmed their critical philosophical judgment. This school covered cultural centers of the Sicilian school founded by Frederick II. and it was very well maintained by his son Manfred. The Sicilian school was the only one to understand the innovative aspect of Averroes and they positioned his teaching against Avicenna. This school dominated philosophical thought in Paris until Alvernus’s death in year 1249. After his death, it began a new round of gigantomachy concerning substance that culminated in the disputes of 1255 and 1277.

The dispute over the title of “Commentator” takes a principled character, which indicates the place of origin of the first Averroism. It preceded a similar dispute between Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas over the title of *Expositor Novus* (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.4). The hitherto hidden conflict between the Toletan and Sicilian school explain why Scotus was sent from the Neoplatonic Toledo to the Sicilian court of Frederick II. There he translated Averroes’s key commentaries and Aristotle’s scientific writings *De anima, De sensu et sensato, De caelo et mundo, Physica* and *Metaphysica*. His departure from Toledo around the year 1220 coincides with the first reception of Averroes’s Toletan corpus in Paris. Scotus’s departure from Toledo indicated the *terminus a quo* when Averroes’s writing began to spread throughout Europe. The Sicilian school translated or edited about fourteen translations of the entire corpus of the Commentator. It linked his metaphysics with the study of Aristotle’s scientific writing and not with Neoplatonic mysticism and Avicenna’s objectivism of *illuminati*, as the Toledean school and David of Dinant handled it. A key role in this dispute was played by Scotus’s translation of the Arabic compilation *On the Life of animals* (*Kitāb al-hayawān*), which combined important parts from three scientific writings of Aristotle into one treatise (*Historia animalium, De partibus animalium, De generatione animalium*). Scotus understood the key meaning of this Arabic biological *Organon*, which investigates the cognition of animals. He connected it with the first and the second book of *De anima*. The new translation of the quoted Aristotelian writing from the original Greek language was prepared by Wilhelm of Moerbeke around the year 1260. Modernity was never really interested in behavior and cognition of real animals, which is still true today in biology determined by molecular genetics. The combination of all three parts of the work *De anima* into a coherent interpretation allowed Scotus to find a central link between Aristotle’s cosmology, logic and science. Metaphysics was linked to the third part of *De anima*, which explores the human soul and its cognition. This thinking was not peculiar to the Toletan school characterized by mysticism and Neoplatonism of Christian, Islamic and Jewish provenance. The inevitable conflict of interpretations concerning *Corpus Aristotelicum* was established by twofold interpretation *ad mentem Averrois*. This event took place in two completely different paradigms of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. What is very important, Scotus might know the authentic interpretation of the Commentator (†1198) published by his students and connoisseurs in Islamic Spain. Therefore, around the year 1220, after the completion of Scotus’s translation of the *Life of Animal*s (*Kitāb al-hayawān*), Toledo is the place where the *Lichtung* of Western objectivity in its “biological” truth of realism and “mystical” untruth of objectivism took place. After the completion of some of those translations, Scotus probably left the Avicennist Toletan school and went to southern Italy, where Frederick II. the Sicilian was the first intellectual of the Latin West to rule. The Sicilian school combined the writings of the *Organon*, *Physics*, the *Kitāb al-hayawān* and writing *De anima* into a coherent interpretation. It created a new goal (σκωπός, *ġaraḍ*) of the first science that Falsafa explored according to the Commentator’s vision of Aristotle’s metaphysics. Scotus’s arrival in Paris in 1230 confirmed the change of paradigm in Averroes’s interpretation.

The dispute between the two schools also explains the peculiar circumstances concerning the dual reception of Averroes in the Latin West in the years 1220–30. His first writing reached the Latin West already around the year 1220; but the teachings of Ibn Rushd had no revolutionary influence in the version of the Toledo school made in the context of Latin Avicennism. Averroes’s writing interpreted in the paradigm of Neoplatonism did not bring anything fundamentally new into the already existing Avicennian metaphysics and into prevailing Neoplatonic interpretation of *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Averroes was considered to be merely a commentator on Avicenna and Alfarabi. Therefore, he also did not receive the honorary title of “the Commentator,” which was understandably the privilege of Avicenna. Blund’s school of Aristotelians immediately recognized the genius of Averroes even in the distorted Neoplatonist version coming from the Toletan school. This was the fundamental reason why the Michael Scotus as authentic Aristotelian left Toledo, just as Porphyry had left Plotinus’s Neoplatonic school and Averroes separated himself from “Alexandrians” as Avicenna and Ibn Badjah. The work *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ca. 1225) set Averroes’s interpretation of the *Corpus* against Avicenna’s metaphysics defended by Porretans schools in Paris (ch. 2.2.1). Scotus left Toledo around the year 1220 and it followed a short intermezzo at the University of Bologna and perhaps in Ireland in the service of Pope Honorius III. His arrival at the Sicilian court of Frederick II. around the year 1227 has the same historical significance for the West as the year 268, when Porphyry arrived at Sicilian town Marsala (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). This historical event manifests in the mode *a/lētheia* the musical nature of metaphysics, which after the fall of the Falsafa sparked another gigantomachy concerning the substance. A key role in the emergence of the critical intellectual West, which rejects the modern *illuminati*, played the Sicilian school of translators, which, in fact, was founded by the enlightened ruler and official heretic Frederick II. the Sicilian . In his Sicilian court, the Aristotle of the Falsafa met the thought of scholasticism. Unfortunately in Toledo, which made Averroes an Avicennist, it was one Neoplatonic Aristotle that met another Neoplatonic Aristotle. Scotus’s arrival at the Sicilian court of Frederick II. made Averroes the new Commentator of the Latin West and he replaced Avicenna. This led to a fundamental change in metaphysics, as it is understood by the hermeneutics of historicity in the mode of Heidegger’s *paideía* (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). This pedagogical exchange of the guard in the West shows *Lichtung* of *a/lētheia* in the metaphysics established by twofold interpretation of Aristotle. The modern *apaideusía* (*Met*. 1006a6) has no important determination of cognition from reality of the first substance in the mode *per prius*. The solar intellect of the Toletan school is exposed from the world of autonomous cosmic forms. The fundamental reception of Aristotle (*ad mentem Averrois*) interpreted by Averroes’s life work came after the year 1230, when the Blund’s school joined the thinking of the Sicilian school. Averroes received the honorary title of “Commentator” at the newly founded University of Paris. The defense of the Christian unity of the person against Dinant’s Aristotelian pantheism found the most important help and a philosophical basis in the Commentator’s philosophy. Modernity, on the other hand, grows out of univocal Aristotelianism based on the one pantheistic truth. Therefore, after 1230, the first Modernists at the University of Paris, secretly led by Erinyes, had to create a sophistic simulacrum of the Commentator following the manic mode of inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*).

## **2.2 Anonymous Commentaries on De anima (1225–1230**)

The integral interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy presented in the paradigm of the Sicilian school refuted Dinant’s pantheism and showed the importance of the writing *De anima* for the unity of the person, which the interpretation of CMDA confirmed later on. This interpretive accomplishment protected the Christian value of the person, creation, and God, and exerted a decisive influence on the founding of the University of Paris. Educated Pope Innocent III. studied in Paris and admired the defense of authentic Aristotelianism against Dinant, whom he knew personally. The pope recognized the merit of magisters from Blund’s school for the development of Christianity by elevating the schools in Paris to a university and removing them from the jurisdiction of the Parisian bishop. Blund, as a recognized scholar, and his school, under the leadership of Michael Scotus, fundamentally helped rehabilitate the Aristotelian corpus. In addition to Scotus, the two Parisian magisters Guillaume d’Auxerre and Simon d’Authie played a key role in the evaluation of Aristotle’s writings in accordance with the papal decree (De Vaux 1933, 218). But their work was not completed because of the death of Guillaume d’Auxerre (†1231). Aristotle’s writings would probably have been allowed in any case. There was a strong influence of the Toletan as well as the Sicilian school and the positive appreciation of Averroes as the new Commentator. The rehabilitation of Aristotle, however, was brought about by the influence of the Sicilian school through Scotus’s lectures in 1230 and the translations he produced. Blund and his two significant students Robert Grosseteste (†1253) and William of Auvergne (†1249) rescued Aristotle’s teaching in the version of the Sicilian school. Therefore, Alvernus, as a rector of the Cathedral school of Notre Dame, became the rector of the Pontifical University after 1223. At this time, he obtained the master’s degrees. Grosseteste founded the university at Oxford at the same time (c. 1224) and then, like Alvernus in Paris, became bishop at Lincoln in 1235. The jurisdiction of this bishopric included the University of Oxford. Formally, the history of both university founders and bishops resembles, but by no means their further intellectual career after the year 1230. Blund’s school protected in a principled way the specific wisdom of philosophy and Christianity, without a metaphysical pantheism as did the Avicennist modernism of Porretans in Paris. Blund’s Aristotelianism refused the doctrine of *Nominales* about the universally singular species given in things themselves. He replaced this being of the third kind by the intentional orientation of thinking to the recognized form (*res intellecta*), which is formed by abstraction given from the direction of the receptive and active component of bodily senses (*cadens in sensum*). The soul turned from the eternal forms considered by the separated active intellect to recognized things. They became the intentional object in receptive faculty of the intellect and finally the universal concept in synthetic faculty of the intellect. The extinction (*epokhē*) of the cosmic intellect in man changed the fundamental comprehension of being (*Vor-blickbahn*) in the metaphysics, because it eliminated the influence of the active separated intellect in the scheme of cognition. In contrast to the Neoplatonic *Nominales*, the correspondence between real things and the human intellect acquired a realistic character. Blund and his students critically received the Toledo translation of Averroes’s corpus immediately after its arrival in Paris and added the Commentator’s conclusions to their lectures and treatises. The arrival of the Sicilian Averroes in the Latin West in Scotus’s version strengthened these connoisseurs in correct interpretation of Aristotelian corpus. The first work from the school of authentic followers of Averroes must be understood within the framework of Heidegger’s hermeneutic distinction between “what” is given and “how” it is historically revealed to those who possess the capacity to see anew. John Blund prepared the turn that changed the meaning of being. He proposed the new reading of *De anima*, which separated Aristotelianism from Avicennism. The dispute over Aristotelianism exists in a new historical constellation given by Blund’s writing *Tractatus de anima* and the arrival of Averroes’s writing in the West. This reception of Aristotle separated his philosophy from Neoplatonic ontology and revealed theology. On the other hand, it exerted the fundamental influence on the emergence of objectivity. This fundamental event at the University of Paris as the patron of the universal wisdom presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” entered the historically given Lethe after the constitution of modernity after the condemnation of 1277. The historical destiny of the University of Paris harmonizes with the original event of historicity (*Ereignis*) in the archaic truth in the mode of the commencement (*Anfang*). Due to the gigantomachy concerning the substance, that kind of truth migrated into the lethargic hiddenness. The followers of the correspondence theory of truth lost this gigantomachy against modernists. After the advent of the *via Modernorum*, the University of Paris entered the period of gradual decline. The dissolution of the university as a unified institution fundamentally coincides with the victory of modernism and with the death of God of *Modernorum* in the Latin West. In the triadic interpretation of hermeneutics, it is true that the hidden historiality determines the historicity of thought and this determines the history of academic institutions. Then it is clear that the objective end of the University of Paris occurred in the postmodern period of the Enlightenment, when the supreme guarantor of modern metaphysics died. The university was dissolved in the wake of the French Revolution in 1793 and was replaced by today’s cluster of schools specializing in various disciplines. The University of Oxford experienced a very different fate given by the epochal impact of Oxfordian Fallacy. During Grosseteste’s lecturing at the Franciscan College in the course of the years 1230–35 and mainly after his departure to Lincoln, Oxford became a bastion of modernism that in the form of Oxfordian Fallacy still dominates the academic world in an objectively victorious way. Therefore, the institution called The College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity in the University of Oxford has an epochal and fundamental task. Based on the essence of such “truth” given in an archetypal way as fundament, this historically first academic bastion of modernism in the Latin West strives to preserve the unitary character of the God of *Modernorum*. This character is based on the defense of the objective metaphysics and the concept of science in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy linked to it. After the objective victory of modernity, in order to effectively fulfill this important task of thinking, the university founded associated academic branches. Following Pythian truth, the hidden effect of truth as *a/lētheia* proves the decline of the University of Paris into autonomous faculties. Similarly, following Pythian non-truth, this fate explains the proliferation of objective offshoots of the victorious University of Oxford. Its economically prosperous branches and scientific institutions effectively introduced new *mathesis universalis* throughout the world dominated by Anglo-Saxon imperialism. The decline of mysteries in Late Antiquity and the death of modern God in the nihilistic environment of European *illuminati* is a fundamental event for archaic hermeneutics. The metaphysical interpretation of the world changed in that way.

The dispute over the interpretation of metaphysics done “*ad mentem Averrois*” constituted until the year 1230 a twofold form of new metaphysics. It ended by death of modern God, by decline of the university founded by defeated antimodernists, and by global dominance of the university founded by victorious modernists. The double effect of historiality revealed as divine tragicomedy is based on death of modern God. That epochal event of thinking must be interpreted through philosophical disputes of the years 1225–35. Musically given truth as *a/lētheia* establishes, with regard to these important *facta* of thought, the twofold history of metaphysics. One has to interpret the historical manifestation of objectivity in its truth and untruth presented according to hermeneutic criticism of metaphysics. The historicity of modern metaphysics interpreted in the mode of *alētheia* tries to cancel the destructive effect of the protective mechanism running in the mode of inversion into the opposite. The objective interpretation of the history of metaphysics is based on the truth as *veritas*. The archaic hermeneutics seek with Socrates Pythian *a/lētheia*. Apollonian Muses protect and serve truth and error at the same time. The historicity of objectivity represents truth and error in the original ante-metaphysical shape of *tertium ens* (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). Music interpretation of the emergence of metaphysics seeks the original meaning of gigantomachy concerning the substance that produced fundamentally different founding event at the University of Paris and Oxford. Michael Scotus lectured in Paris around the year 1230. After his lectures, Grosseteste left his *alma mater* and arrived to Oxford. The historicity of philosophy (*Geschichte der Philosophie*) and historical events in the years 1225–35 related to it represents the original *Lichtung* of *a/lētheia* in the Pythian mode. The founding metaphysic event (*Beginn*) of modernity worked through different histories of reception concerning the work of Aristotle and of his interpreters in Paris and Oxford. The history of effects related to this twofold beginning established the different history of both universities until the fateful condemnation of classical Aristotelians in 1277, when the modernity officially asserted itself at the University of Paris. Today’s outcome of this hidden controversy between Paris and Oxford is determined by global tragedy of metaphysical nihilism and by the birth of the epoch called “Anthropocene.”

### 2.2.1 Foundation of the First Averroism (*De anima et de potenciis eius*)

The treatise *De anima et de potentiis eius* was written about 1225. It shows the way how the interpretation of *De anima* from the Blund school was influenced by the arrival of Averroes′ philosophy that came from the Toledo school. René-Antoine Gauthier masterfully assessed the importance of this treatise for the first Averroism in the critical edition of this writing, in connection with the similar treatise *De potenciis animae et obiectis* (ca. 1230). Aristotelians in the line of Boethius and Abelard became the first Averroists immediately after the arrival of Averroes’s corpus coming from the Toledo school, because they correctly interpreted his metaphysics against Avicenna’s teaching. Robert Grosseteste, the presumed author of this writing, defends the realist position of Abelard and logicians in the tradition of *Tractatus Anagnini*. It is no coincidence that the first direct citation of Averroes in the Latin West was directed against the determination of man in schools of *Nominales* and against the Neoplatonic school of Toletans. Let us now quote the key part of the first positive reception of Averroes in the Latin West, which defends the hylemorphic unity of human person against the modernists of that time.

“Toletanus as translator [Dominicus Gundissalinus], however, interpreted both kinds of being given in the definition of the soul in the following way: ‘The soul is the first act of the physically and biologically given body and it possesses the capacity of life (*potencia uitam habentis*).’ But as I predicate the term ‘organism’ (*dico organici*), the physical elements that are not biological, such as the cosmic elements and the natural elements (*elementa et elementata*), are excluded. The blood and sperm are excluded by this difference (*excluduntur per hanc differenciam*). Moreover, he [the Toletanus] considers dead animal bodies as an organism. To separate the organisms [from the corpse], he added to the definition another term ‘having vitality’ (*potentia vitam habentis*), which is to be understood in the above-mentioned way.” [[114]](#footnote-114)

The anonymous treatise takes Blund’s definition of the soul literally (*anima est primus actus corporis fisici organici potencia vitam habentis*, p. 29.43–44). The author gives a new meaning to this definition by explicitly rejecting Avicennist interpretation of the Toledo school. The definition does not mean the living substance as an organism; it follows the formal definition of the organism as hypostasis, which habitually includes life as potency (*potencia vitam habentis*). The author first defends the term “organism” in the existential mode (*sic se habet re, non dictione*), which cannot be deduced in a Porretan manner from the essence of the soul given permanently, in the mode of some habitus (*habens*). The existentially conceived definition of the soul is given according to Blund’s school and not according to the Toletan school of Avicenna. Blund’s school received Averroes’s writing in the paradigm of Aristotelian interpretation. It was for the first time historically presented “*ad mentem Averrois*,” which is stated in conclusion (*hoc dictum est secundum expositionem Aueroist*). Against whom is this conclusion directed? This is shown by the continuation of the quotation criticizing the Toledo school.[[115]](#footnote-115) From the Toledo school came the first translations of Averroes, but unfortunately written in the spirit of Neoplatonic Avicennism. The author defends the hyparchical predication of the person and the soul according to Abelard’s interpretation of *Categories*, when the exposure of being is precisely determined as exposition of sense comming from the reality (*secundum prius et posterius et re et dictione*). The anonymous author does not agree with the modern definition of the organism as a Porretan collection of different hypostases, which are animated by receiving potency added from outside, such as the hypostasis “to be a living organism” (*potencia vitam habentis*). Existence became a universally predicated Porretan essence given in the form of the hypostatized habitus. The school of Boethius, Abelard and Blund cannot accept such definition. If the animal or the human being is alive, the first real substance cannot be divided in the framework of the *Arbor Porphyriana* into hypostasis and substance of the third kind. Such error is made according to the schools of *Nominales*, because they form *ex nihilo* the entelechy of living and hylemorphic first substance. What does not belong in the organic unity that stands outside of the living body like shed blood and sperm. Both quotations show exactly the error of Gundissalinus’s Avicennist interpretation that mixed the existential and the universal definition of the soul into the univocal scheme. The key difference prevails over antecedent definition of the soul (*actus primus corporis phisici organici*) that the anonymous presents in the existential paradigm concerning Blund’s interpretation of *De anima*. This definition ties directly to the conception of the living organism according to the Commentator. The Toledo school kept an Avicennist definition of the soul, that is, man being a kind of specific corpse. The eternal and immaterial soul possesses a real physical life as its potency and forms a hypostatized and therefore permanent habitus of this potency. In the dispute with Porretans and Nominales, the anonymous author does not appeal at all to the preceding Aristotelian tradition, but to Averroes’s concept of cognition. Following his teacher Alfarabi, Averroes affirms the hyparchical sense of predication, which is effectively bound to the first actual substance in the context of a truthful and univocal imposition. Moreover, he showed how this type of predication relates to true nature of cognition according to *De anima*. The continuation of the quotation shows that around the year 1225 there was already established the school of the first Averroism, which grasped the argumentation of CMDA in depth.

“But for us the sense according to Averroes is much more advantageous. The body of the dead is not alive, because its parts are no more bodily organs: The eye of the dead man is no longer an eye.” [[116]](#footnote-116)

The author criticizes the position of *Nominales* because their definition of man does not emerge from the existing real being. What is dead, that is not a living substance. The anonymous, with Averroes’s help, showed the nonsense of logical debates such as “This corpse is a dead man” (*iste est homo mortuus*), in order together with Blund and Alvernus to speed the decline of Porretan logical schools in Paris. The dispute over the sophisms regarding “the dead man walking” extends to Abelard’s polemic with Porretans concerning the statute of hypothetical predication (*opinabile*). Abelard’s writing *Dialectica* presents a similar argument in the thesis “This corpse is a dead man” (*hoc cadaver est homo mortuus*, ch. 1.3). We have shown Abelard’s use of the imposition and supposition according to the writing *Categories* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The notion “dead man” represents a metaphysical nonsense for Abelard (*oppositio est in adiecto*). People are living beings *ipso facto* and exist exclusively as first present substance. This unique hylemorphic substance determines the here and now given existence and the temporal sequence of past and future in the mode of syncategorematic predication, when these states of the first substance are not present.[[117]](#footnote-117) Aristotelian Abelard criticizes the existence statements of modern logicians for the univocal use of supposition, which was explicitly introduced by Gilbert de La Porrée through the hypostatized subsistence (*aliquid, id est subsistens*, ch. 1.4). In the context of *Nominales*, the dialecticians have no problem with the univocal predication of the type “this person,” that are related to “this body” according to the mode of hypostatized notions and existence defined in that manner (*secundum quid*). Porretans add any hypostasis to the subject “*homo*” by means of univocal logical apposition, including the predicate “*mortuus*.” Moreover, it is true that generally conceived predication (*secundum simpliciter*) already includes the entire determination of the individual based on the division of being of the third kind according to the Tree of Porphyry. The univocal apposition of Porretans was already rejected by the above-mentioned logic of Anagnines. They proposed the predication about the dead man clearly in Abelard’s line that excludes the determination of a human being for the corpse and vice versa.[[118]](#footnote-118) The writing *Tractatus Anagnini* confirms the universal truth of the saying “The corpse is not a man” (*est universalis negativa et vera*). Thus, the universal conversion of this saying is also true, since no living human being is a corpse. There is no imposition of univocal meaning “*homo*” to be transposed from the corpse to the living man. The logical apposition of predicates fundamentally differs from the categorial predication that follows the imposition of meaning from the direction of the first substance. The apposition starts on the level of logical abstraction and therefore it makes but homonymy on the level of metaphysical meaning. The corpse cannot represent man in the mode of metaphysically conceived univocal supposition, but only in the mode of logical equivocation placed outside reality. The treatise rejects the modern humanism of “dead man walking” that defended Parisian Porretans in schools of *Logica Modernorum*. The defense of the person refers to the correspondence theory of truth according to Blund’s interpretation of *De anima*, to which the anonymous author rightly added Averroes’s concept of metaphysics and cognition. The imposition of metaphysical meaning comes from the reality of the hyparchical first substance, which determines the predication through the metaphysical dative. Almost natural acceptance of Averroes’s corpus in the accomplished argumentation of Blund’s school can be proved by the instantaneous insertion of writing CMDA in current interpretations of *De anima* proposed by Parisian magisters of Blund’s school. The defense of organically conceived body went hand in hand with the correct theory of cognition. The first Averroism rejected the theory of subsistent species given both in the real thing and in the process of Avicennist *denudatio*. Blund’s school defends the abstraction and the scheme of cognition according to Averroes. His interpretation of cognition and metaphysics linked to the Aristotelian line of the Second master, which was missing in the teaching of Toletans. The full insight into the unity of the person and cognition reached the first Averroists in Paris after the reception of the Sicilian school in the version of Scotus until the year 1230, when Averroes received the title of “the Commentator.”

The abstraction defined according to CMDA changed in principle the univocal status of being of the third kind defended in schools of *Nominales*. In the formal correspondence of the senses and the mind according to Blund’s school, the term “species” got a meaning according to new interpretation of *De anima* (ch. 2.1.2). The question whether the corpse is a human being or not, it basically refers to Neoplatonic or Aristotelian statute of species. Either the species as abstraction relates to the living human being; or, it is predicated by the apposition in the form of essence that is given in mode “*semel—semper*” according to Porretans and Avicenna. Blund’s school maintains that the object of cognition is intended at first passively from the thing in reality that is cognized by bodily senses. The process of cognition begins in the receptive faculty of the intellect and received species are actively abstracted in the synthetic faculty of intellect. During his stay in Paris around the year 1225, Grosseteste took the same position, by defending the primacy of real things.[[119]](#footnote-119) A real thing has its own effective causality, and the potency that is given in a concept determined by the supposition arises the through imposition. This kind of potentiality separated the concept of corpse from the concept of person (*non est possibile rem illam esse*). The imposition of meaning runs on the basis of the physical or biological faculties, which are bound to the first actual substance or to the living body. The reading of Averroes’s corpus consolidated the position of Blund’s school and provided it with new arguments for the unity of the person as an indivisible first substance established by Boethius. Nevertheless, fundamental doubts remained among the magisters of the University of Paris regarding the Toledo interpretation of Averroes influenced by Avicennism. Blund’s critical school uncompromisingly rejected the Averroist interpretation of Averroes at the very beginning; therefore, it is not modern. The first historically known quotation from the Commentator refers to the polemic against the nominalist and logical schools of *Modernorum*. Grosseteste used then available corpus of the Commentator against the Toledo school of Avicennists. Presenting the definition of body as the imposition of meaning from the first substance, Blund’s school asserts that collecting of potential and universal hypostases cannot define the human being. Grosseteste took up the same position in his second commentary on *De anima*.[[120]](#footnote-120) The quotation draws the attention of Toletans and Porretans to the fact that according to the scientific syllogism of *Second Analytics*, the real causality of the soul must be given as in the intermediary statement (*medium*) in the deductive syllogism to provide for scientific definition of the soul. This effective causality is sensually given in the body as the first substance (*sensibile sit medium*). The middle position cannot be taken by logical notions, but exclusively by sensual cognition of the real thing, which in the process of abstraction and intentionality creates the cognized form in mind. Key character has the use of the verb “*secare*” for the secondary and merely abstract determination of the soul, which is directed against Neoplatonic interpretation of *De anima* (*secantur sensus et scientie in res*; OBJ III, ch. 6.1). The role of *medium* is given in the anonymous treatise to the properly understood diaphanum after the pattern of Averroes (*in diaphono, id est in transparenti*), in which color, in contrast to light, is contained in a purely formal way (*color est formaliter*; ibid, p. 37.225–26). Without diaphanum, there is no intentionality or the theory of truth as correspondence that Blund’s school defended against Avicenna. The interpretation of Averroes, which had come from Toledo, bypassed the mediating function of the diaphanum, which was present in the original of *De anima* as well as in Alfarabi’s commentary on *De anima* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). Grosseteste also holds the same opinion at the time of his Parisian studies at Blund’s school. Therefore, he disagrees with Avicenna’s argumentation on this fundamental point and defends the diaphanum as the key component for the transmission of light. Grosseteste’s cosmological treatises define the various role of physical diaphanum in the transmission of light through the cosmic elements, which differ from the cosmic first substances due to the mediation of light.[[121]](#footnote-121) The diaphanum assure the mediation for the intellect in Grosseteste’s treatise on *De anima*. It is associated with the intentional mediation of bodily senses in the cognitive mode (*medium ordinans*), as opposed to the physical diaphanum given in the participatory mode (*medium participans*).[[122]](#footnote-122) There is twofold division of diaphanum into a physical *perspicuum* given in space and intentional *species* in the soul. The middle position of the species is not given in the scheme of *tertium ens*, but with the help of the mediation made by diaphanum as in CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The same position is asserted in the treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*. The treatise has the same opponents, that is, Porretans and Avicennist Toletans. Their scheme of recognition relates to the exposure of the sense of being coming from the separated *intellectus agens* and it follows the mode of abstraction as *denudatio*. Averroes’s concept of diaphanum enables a processing of sensuous species within the immaterial and formally divided abstraction secured by the passive and active intellect. Due to connection of twofold intentionality and receptivity, the direction of cognition runs from reality and relates to actualized being of the recognized thing. The exposure of meaning comes from the front, from the direction of the external object through the physical diaphanum to the senses and the subsequent mental activity. It starts from the sensual cognition and goes to the intellectual cognition due to the mediation in the soul (*in spiritu*).[[123]](#footnote-123) Both kinds of intentionality tie together just as in Blund’s school, see the previous chapter. The importance of twofold mediation runs in the sequence “*obiectum, medium organum, spiritus*.” It follows the context of Aristotelian abstraction as *proportio* that synthesizes the cognitive form from the senses to the intellect. The correspondence of things and intellect is further supported by the change in causality governing the process of cognition. Nominalists and Avicennists make use of final causality conceived in an effective way (ch. 1.5). The cognition arises by exposure from the direction of the separated active intellect, which grounds the subsistent forms of cognition in the intellect by the external causality. The treatise, on the other hand, by defending Averroes’s notion of diaphanum, introduces a formal causality that connects the otherwise incommensurable processes of sensory and intellectual cognition (*intellectus intelligit species in fantasmatibus*; ibid, p. 33.144). Introducing the formal causality, there is a real correspondence between thing and intellect as cognized form of the thing. This abolished Neoplatonic *tertium ens* given as univocal mixture of first and second substance or their hypostatized qualities. The writing takes the intentionally given species as the central element for mediation of cognition and rejects species as the metaphysical quasi-substance of nominally defined things. The existent human being is primarily recognized not by the nominal definition, but in the process of formal correspondence of the intellect to the real person. The imposition of the meaning is intentional and given by the process of abstraction from the direction of the real person. Therefore, the dead body is not a human being. The rejection of Avicennism concerns the character of the species that is bound to the separated *intellectus agens*; the new metaphysics follows the recognition of the real world.

By rejecting the interpretation of *De anima* according to Avicenna, it came to the fundamental difference between the school of the first Averroism and the schools of *Nominales* in Paris at that time. They had been already in decline in the years 1220–25. The author emerging from Blund’s school knows well that Avicenna’s and Averroes’s metaphysics are incompatible because they do not recognize reality in the same way. If someone claims that the corpse is a human being in the order of univocal apposition of hypostases and habitual determinations, he does not recognize the real world of first substances as it is given by the imposition and by the truth as correspondence between intellect and real things. The mediation between the senses and the intellect in the context of *proportio* becomes a key thing, just as in the writing CMDA. The treatise accurately designates the imagination as the reservoir of sensuous intentions (*thesaurus intentionum*; ibid, p. 47.384) rather than of intelligible species, because these arise only on the next floor of abstraction given only in the intellect. Avicennists issued of Augustinianism, on the other hand, made memory an immaterial *locus specierum* according to Augustine’s mystical *memoria*. The author is an Aristotelian with an excellent knowledge of scientific writings of the *Corpus*, since he knows the concept of Aristotelian sensory memory as *reminiscentia*. The material intellect is, understandably, the immaterial component of the soul, but clearly separated from the process of intellectual abstraction. The transition to the new concept of cognition is shown in the following quotation that includes the work of both intellects and reproduces Blund’s treatise on the question of intentionality and abstraction. The author establishes an intelligible form of the diaphanum as *potentia media*.

“This mediating faculty (*potentia media*) operates between the sensual faculty and the immaterial intellect. The faculty of the senses is given with regard to phantasmata, the immaterial intellect is given with regard to species. The material intellect intends (*considerat*) the species in the phantasmata in such a way that it recognizes (*apprehendit*) the species with their [sensual] accidents and distinguishes between species and accidents, but not yet by abstraction. The material intellect thus prepares the species materially for the immaterial intellect (*sic prepare materialiter species intellectui separabili*).” [[124]](#footnote-124)

The receptive component of intellect has immaterial intentions from the direction of sensual intentions (*intellectus materialis considerat species in fantasmatibus … non tamen abstrahens*). In the formal and therefore synthesizing intellect, the reception no longer proceeds through sensual mediation; the cognitive process runs through intellectual abstraction. The material intellect, as an act of pure immaterial intentionality, cannot perform abstraction; only the active component of intellect can do it. The quotation separates the perception of real properties recognized by bodily senses and the intentional reception of recognized forms from the material intellect, where the sensual species become the recognized immaterial forms. Mediation runs between two types of intentional objects (*circa fantasmata … circa species*). The central position of *potentia media* forms the connection with the Blund’s process of sensual abstraction given from the properties coming from the real thing (*ita quod apprehendit species cum accidentibus*). The anonymous author knows the difference between the first and the second substance according to *Categories* and distinguishes exactly according to *De anima* different modes of cognition and resulting signification. The material intellect intends (*considerat*) the sensual species given in phantasms and it recognizes (*apprehendit*) the universal forms through the sensual species. Thanks to the intentionality of the material intellect, the reception takes place in the individual act of abstraction. Their result consists in universally recognized form (*intellectum*) that is worked out in the individual act of cognition (*intellectio*). The intentionality of the material intellect is directed towards the sensual potency (*potentiam sensibilem*). The material intellect takes sensual species in an immaterial way. The individual *species sensibilis* exist in the imagination, and the material intellect intends them formally, that is, within the framework of the signification tied to the categorical predication of the second substance (*distinguens inter speciem et accidencia*). These intelligible intentions are linked to real properties of the first substance by formal similarity between the first and second substance. Human cognition is an accident with regard to the first real substance, because it creates in the intellectual faculties of the soul a formal correspondence of cognition and the real thing. According to the metaphysical dative, the author brilliantly distinguished between the separated real thing and the three acts of cognition: the emergence of *species sensibilis* in the imagination; the formal and immaterial intention of these species by the material intellect (*species intelligibilis*); the synthesis of this received accidental form in the active process of abstraction (*intellectus formalis*). Only in the last phase of cognition does a universal concept arise in the active intellect (*intellectus agens*). The same defense of the *potentia media* defined according to Averroes and directed against the Porretan interpretation of this term is present in Grosseteste’s commentary on *De anima* that is directed against Porretans in Oxford.[[125]](#footnote-125) The quotation rejected the Toletian definition of soul as substance given by exposure from behind, from the direction of the separated *intellectus agens*. Under the mode of *potentia media*, the Porretans intend sensual cognition as being of the third kind and change the species into a hypostasis of sensuality (*mediante sensibili*). The hypostatized sensibile is later given as Rufus’s *scibile* (ch. 3.1.3). In Neoplatonism and Avicenna, for example, it represents a corporality that is placed outside the real body; in Locke’s postmodern philosophy it makes a primary qualities (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). This being of the third kind passes through Avicennist denudation. This results in an analogous recognition based on permanent Porretanian species that bypasses the real sensible species (*mediante sensu est ratio in homine*). As a representative of the first Averroism from Blund’s school, Grosseteste argues that bodily senses taken by themselves cannot convey immaterial (sensual, intelligible) cognition in the soul, because this is only done by the double diaphanum (*nec est eius imago in sensu vel in imaginatione*, ch. 2.1.2). The destruction of the middle link of the syllogism made according to the real causality also destroys the universal signification that is given in the specific way of cognition, different from the real thing and from the animal imagination. According to Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*, the universal meaning has no possibility of existing (*destructio medio et destruitur idem*), because cognition is given by actualising the intellect from the direction of the real thing.

During his activity in Paris, Grosseteste defended the scientific proof according to *Second Analytic* and *Categories* (*destructio primis*, *modus tollens*; OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Following the pattern of Blund, the anonymous writing on the soul separated in the same way passive and active intellectual faculties in the soul from each other. The receptive component (*intellectus in potentia*) is fundamentally different from the synthesizing component (*intellectus formalis*). The intention given by *intellectus materialis* enables a true correspondence of immaterial cognition and the material thing. Both acts of cognition run as mediation from the senses to the intellect; but each act (*intentio, abstractio*) has a different form of involving the intellect in this activity: either a receptive or a synthesizing one (*apprehendit, considerat*). The receptive potency is given as *intellectus in potentia* and its active apprehension (*apprehendit*) proceeds as an act of intentionality. Its actuality is given by the received *species sensibilis*, which are mediated as *species intelligibilis* by new diaphanum (*intellectus possibilis*). This transfer of sensible and then intelligible species brings about the final act of cognition, the active synthesis. It is accomplished by *intellectus formalis* that abstracts resulting concept through the act of reflection (*considerat*). The material intellect is separated from the receptive capacity of the senses as *potentia media*. Its receptivity is given at the level of sensory phantasms (*potencia enim sensibilis est circa fantasmata*). However, the material intellect already intends the sensible species according to the intelligible mode of immaterial reception (*considerat species in fantasmatibus*). This is an accurate understanding of the key argument in CMDA, where the transformed *intellectus materialis* of Themistius ensures the individuality of cognition in the immaterial receptive intellect. But the essence of this intelligible diaphanum is given as pure receptivity according to Alexander’s definition of the *intellectus possibilis*. The material intellect ensures the transition from the sensuous receptivity to the immaterial one, that is, to the purely intelligible faculty of the soul. Both types of intelligible reception of accidental forms (*intellectus materialis, in potentia*) are formally the same, as they are immaterial and fully potential faculty. Therefore, they constitute intellectual mediation of cognition in the soul (*diaphanum*). The difference between the material and the possible intellect lies only in the direction, that is, from which side we define its activity. Let us see the dual role of the diaphanum according to the CMDA with regard to the ray of the sun and the colored surface. (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). With regard to the sensual species given in the imagination, this intellect is material. It receives the sensual species as passive potency, given as *materia prima* for the intellectual ability of the soul (*apprehendit*). It intends (*considerat*) these individual sensual forms as *species intelligibilis* in order to form universal second substance. Taken as *intellectus in potentia*, it makes an immaterial receptive potency of the soul. The *anima intellectiva* defined in this way is the only immaterial form of the actual body.

The material intellect occupies the middle position because it takes sensual intentions in the mode of immaterial abstraction. The *species intelligibilis* are ready for the final act of recognition, which is the active synthesis of the concept. The receptivity of the soul (*potentia media*) is given between the sensual faculty and the immaterial intellect. Therefore, the *intellectus materialis* operates as *diaphanum* in the first Averroism. It has a completely different status than the material intellect of Avicennists and modern Alexandrians. The modernity living in the Platonic cave managed by the objectively illuminated Furies is blinded by mythological solar intellect; therefore it does not require a diaphanum. In the first Averroism, the material intellect in man is responsible for creating the intellectually given intentionality. Therefore, this diaphanum represents an immaterial mental potency, which is separated from the senses in the mode “*inmixtus*.” The present postmodernism has an *intellectus materialis* given as sensual matter of the third kind, which corresponds to the hylic intellect of Alexander and Themistius. In the second case, the *intellectus materialis* forms a completely separate Alexander’s *intellectus possibilis* according to the pattern of Averroistic interpretation of Averroes. The hypostatized *intellectus materialis* of Alexander and Themistius does not function as a diaphanum for the modernists, but as an intellectual quasi-matter. It makes the reception of purely intelligible forms given by Neoplatonic solar intellect. The first Averroism understood well that no hypostatized intelligible form can be sent in the receptive intellect, as the modernity thinks. The intellect produces knowledge within the mental faculties and it synthesizes the real knowledge coming from the bodily senses. David of Dinant for the first time introduced the material intellect of the modernists as a cosmic hypostasis in the form of universal matter of the third kind (ch. 2.1.3). The abolition of diaphanum or its transformation into material corpuscles, as in the case of Dinant and Descartes, led to the emergence of the second Averroism. In modernism and postmodernism, it came to insurmountable dualism between sensual and intellectual cognition. The anonymous treatise, on the other hand, defines the intellectual diaphanum as *intellectus possibilis* with regard to the synthetic formal intellect and as *intellectus materialis* with regard to the imagination. Now, the perspective on the receptive intellect is given by the view from behind, since its intentional contents are worked by actively forming component of the soul. The receptive and immaterial component of the soul, in the form of *intellectus possibilis*, mediates the immaterial intention into the active part of *intellectus formalis*. Both manifestations of the one and the same passive intellect are fully potential, because the soul must recognize everything. The position of the receptive component of the soul (*intellectus materialis—in potentia*) has a central significance in following debates of the first and the second Averroism. The first Averroism, inspired by the CMDA, emphasizes the similarity between the material intellect and the senses. This similarity is given by the formal intention and the immaterial cognitive faculty. The intellect is defined as *separabilis* and *inmixtus*. The cognition runs in the mode *obiective* with regard to the body, because it makes a cognitive and immaterial object. Both properties are joined through the concept of diaphanum, which mediates the exposure to the sun’s rays and the detected colors. The receptive intellect is no longer sensual and material, but in a similar way (*similiter*) purely receptive as a kind of matter. It is precisely this view that is defended in Blund’s citation in the previous chapters and, understandably, in the writing CMDA as well. Thanks to the reception of Averroes, the species sensually connects in the imagination with the new type of cognitive ability (*potentia media*) through the second intention, i.e., as Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*. Let us recall that this receptive intellect was identified with Aristotle’s notion *tabula rasa*, which is necessary for the adequate recognition of the matter, just as it was the case with Blund and in the CMDA. The following quotation shows how little it was necessary to turn Blund’s *intellectus* *in potentia* in Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*.

“The possible intellect is, first of all, the potency of the soul, in which there is nothing actual. An example can be a blank blackboard on which there is no picture. Thus, it is not determined to be this or rather something else, because it has the potency of being everything that is possible.” [[126]](#footnote-126)

The purely receptive intellect, as a component of the immaterial soul, is separated both from the material sensual component and from the active immaterial component; therefore, it forms a pure potency of the soul (*intellectus possibili eum ipse sit potencia anime et nichil actu*). In the line of the CMDA and according to the Blund’s treatise, the author made the fondamental thesis, according to which the soul must somehow be everything (*quodammodo omnia*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Therefore, the immaterially given act of intentionality must be fully receptive and only in potency. Through the act of the intentional reception of sensual species, a new, now purely intelligible type of species is created in the process of intentionality. The intention of cognitive forms in the *intellectus possibilis* and the synthetic abstraction of those forms in the *intellectus formalis* are given first by the effect of the real thing on the senses and then on the intellect in the framework of the passive and active ability of the human soul. Intentionality first receives the sensually recognized form from the real thing and then it creates a universally recognized form. The different status of the form recognized by humans or by animals is given by the fact, whether it is synthesized in *potentia media* of the animal, or that of the human being. Thus, the concept of truth as *similitudo* of the intellect and the thing arises on an animal or human level. Following the Falsafa, the first Averroism created another model of the jointly recognized world for all living beings that have the ability to recognize through their own intentionality. At the same time, he clearly separated the immaterial human ability of cognition from the animal realm. The anonymous author shows the transformation of Blund’s terminus “*intellectus in potentia*” into the terminus “*intellectus possibilis*” in the CMDA.

Hermeneutics found an important trace of the first reception of the CMDA in Blund’s Aristotelian school, which had been constituted by reading of *De anima* and its commentary written by Alfarabi. This reading precedes the arrival of the Sicilian school, but it already differs in principle from the reception of Averroes′s corpus done in the Toledo school. The treatise proceeds in the same way as Blund in the criticism of logical Modernists and Avicennists and brings the conclusions from his writing to cope with the new situation created by the reception of Averroes. Grosseteste’s writing *De anima* followed the same line of arguments against the Neoplatonic Toledo school as was shown above. Surely, Blund can be the author of this writing; but the connection with the writings of Grosseteste is indisputable, especially in the question of the rejection of the universal hylemorphism and the plurality of substances in man (ch. 3.2). But certainly the inspiration comes from Blund’s Aristotelian school that brilliantly received the writing CMDA in what it differs from Avicenna in the period around 1220–25. The separation from Avicenna is indicated in a well-known part of the treatise, which describes his cognitive scheme and the definition of the soul as fundamentally flawed. Let us now begin with the first part of the argument against Avicenna and the school of Toletans. The defense of cognition given on the basis of Blund’s and Averroes’s concept of diaphanum clearly distinguished the process of receptive and active abstraction. The connection of the possible intellect with the *intellectus agens* follows the difference between the receptive and the active component of the intellect, as we find it in *De anima*430a21–23 and afterwards in the CMDA and in Blund’s school. The resulting process of the entire synthesis secures the newly defined, already purely personal active intellect (*intellectus agens*).

“The active intellect can be compared with the possible intellect, just as one can compare light with vision. The light beam causes the eye to pick up the species of color from the irradiated colored object. In a similar way, the active intellect abstracts the species from sensual apprehensions that the material intellect has arranged for it (*intellectus agens abstrahit species a fantasmatibus, quas preparavit ei intellectus materialis*). The active intellect finalises the species in such a manner as the possible intellect can receive them. Therefore, there are two acts of the active intellect (*duo sunt actus intellectus agentis*). The first act abstracts the species from the phantasms; the second act conveys them to the possible intellect.” [[127]](#footnote-127)

The key phrase connects all links of the chain that make an overall view of human cognition. The active intellect abstracts the species from the sensual conceptions which the material intellect has arranged for, through the act of intentionality. The key transition is linked to changed position of intentionality, which is now considered not from the position of Blund’s formal intellect, but from the concept of *intellectus agens* that forms a component of the human soul. The fatal problem is given in the assertion that “the active intellect adapts the species in such a way that it can be reversely accepted by the possible intellect” (*facit eas quodam modo resultare in intellectu possibili*). This is a step back to the position of Toletans and is not in accordance with the concept of CMDA, which is given by the exposure of cognition from the direction of the real thing to the receptive intellect. The active intellect of Grosseteste acquired a hypostatized character in the human soul, although by no means in the cosmos. The separation of *intellectus agens* from human cognition is only partial, but it is already given in the Neoplatonic mode “*separatus*” and not in the Aristotelian mode “*separabilis*.” Grosseteste thus abolished the basic scheme of cognition according to the CMDA that Blund’s school defended. This position became untenable at the University of Paris after 1225, taken by the master of similar qualities. Grosseteste changed the teaching of the Blund’s school in this key function, since he took up hypostatized active intellect. This school let the actuality come into the receptive intellect through sensual intentionality, because it had interpreted the sensual diaphanum exactly according to the second book of *De anima*. Grosseteste is a Toletan on this point and exposes the *intellectus possibilis* from behind through the *intellectus agens*, which forms another hypostatized form in the human soul (ch. 3.2). This position of the Toledean school was taken over in a new way by Thomas Aquinas, who tried to sell it out to Siger as Aristotle’s authentic interpretation of *De anima* (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.4). As the supposed author of the treatise, Grosseteste, in contrast to the Avicennists and the later modernists, knows very well what makes the difference between the activity of *abstrahere* and that of *ordinare*. The material intellect is assigned to the first intentionality received from the senses and processed by activity of *intellectus possibilis*. The changed position of Grosseteste makes the reception of cognitive forms no longer comes from the imagination, but from the direction of the possible and active intellect given in the soul (*facit eas quodam modo resultare in intellectutu possibili*). The process of abstraction of Blund progresses from *species sensibilis* to the *species intelligibilis*. Alfarabis *intellectus in potencia* is engaged in the act of immaterial intentionality. Either it turns to the sensual species (*intellectus materialis*); or, the same detached and therefore immaterial receptive faculty of the soul intends *species intelligibilis* from the position of intellectual reception (*intellectus possibilis*). It passed them to the active intellect as a further faculty of the soul. Let us recall the ambivalent concept of “*intellectus in effectu*” according to Alfarabi (*possibilis—in effectu / adeptus—agens*; OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The receptive intellect occupies a central position, which can be actualized both by Aristotelian abstraction and by Neoplatonic illumination, but is conceived as the inner active intellect (*materialis — possibilis/agens*). This unclear position regarding the hypostatized *intellectus agens* was taken over by Toletans and Grosseteste adopted it as well. The quotation shows that the author of the treatise made the active intellect operate as a hypostasis that can work on the receptive intellect as well. The previous book has shown that Averroes abolished the intellect as a hypostasis in the human soul and allowed both types of intellect to exist only as the potency of the soul. The actuality that moves the act of cognition can only proceed from the real and sensually recognized thing. Grosseteste did not pass from Alfarabi’s concept to Averroes teaching, and therefore he left Paris to Oxford.

The analysis of *De anima et de potenciis eius* clearly shows that Grosseteste could not take the position of Neoplatonic modernists in Paris, since he considered their concept of cognition and the human person to be a fundamental error. As we will see later, Thomas Aquinas also found himself in a very similar situation in the next generation. He had to leave the Paris University even twice. The anonymous writing, in accordance with the CMDA, asserts that the material and the possible intellect mediate cognition in the twofold role of the diaphanum. The recognized concept (*intellectum*) is created, on the one hand, by the sensual species and, on the other hand, by the exposure from behind in the direction of the active intellect. Avicenna’s material intellect is also possessed by animals in the sense of imagination, which is controlled by the intuitive ability to make correct decisions (*vis aestimativa*). Human beings have a completely different material and possible intellect, which receives both the sensual and the intelligible forms. The process of abstraction, which synthesizes the received immaterial intention into the recognized form, proceeds from the direction of the active intellect. The synthesis of the recognized form is linked to the reception of intelligible species from the sensual apprehensions. This proceeds in the act of intentionality from the possible and from the active intellect. The act of intentionality receives the material species given in the imagination into the immaterial recognized form. Intentionality, in turn, works in two registers, i.e., in the mode of *intentio prima* in the direction of abstracted phantasms and in the mode of *intentio secunda* in the direction of the abstracted intelligible species. In the process of twofold intentionally given abstraction, *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* arise, and they are determined by real existing things. Consequently, immaterial cognition is formally separated from sensual understanding on the level of “*separabilis*.” However, intellectual cognition is linked to *species sensibilis* by active causality that comes from the bodily senses. Grosseteste, as a presumed author of this work, for the first time, relying on Averroes in the model of Blund’s school, created a new synthesis of separate intellectual ability of the soul and of sensual components. The synthesis of cognition proceeds according to Averroes, that is, in the mode of the intellect as a *separabilis*. The new unity of the human soul was imposed against the teaching of Toledo school about the substantially separated intellect (*separatus*). The school of the first Averroism abolished the cosmic *intellectus agens* as a direct factor in human cognition, which Gauthier clearly stated in his critical edition of this work. The soul taken as such could not recognize anything at all. Passive reception produces intelligible species through intentionality; active synthesis shapes a universal concept out of them. In the active synthetic process of abstraction given from the direction of the active intellect, these abstracted forms are grouped into universal concepts and categorical statements (*species abstractas ordinare*). Therefore, there is a difference between the intelligible act is on the level of *abstrahere*, which is given by the progression of intentionality. The intelligible act on the level of *ordinare* is performed by the active component of the soul. The second reason for the rejection of Avicennian scheme of cognition follows immediately in the next sentence in connection with Averroes’s criticism of the separated intellect of Avicenna and Neoplatonists. The treatise, with a precise knowledge of the problem, defines the fundamental error of Avicenna, just as Averroes had done before. The meaning of being follows the exposure of meaning from the front, taking the direction of the real first substance. The anonymous author of *De anima et de potenciis* eius rejected the objectivist scenario of exposing the being from the direction of the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. This scenario observes the soul though some mystical illumination, as it was the case of the Toletan school. But the writing left to the later generations of the school of the first Averroism as a task and as a great challenge the unclear position of the *intellectus agens*, which is given either as a faculty of the soul (model of the Sicilian school) or as a hypostasis of the soul (model of the Toledo school). The following quotation establishes the school of the first Averroism in the Latin West by the first declared separation from Avicenna.

“In this point Avicenna was mistaken (*in hoc erravit Auicena*), since he postulated an active intellect separated from the soul as a cosmic or angelic intelligence, just as the sun is separated from the act of seeing. On the other hand, there is no doubt that this active intellect makes a faculty of the soul, since it is entirely within the power of the soul to understand whenever it wants. It follows from this that phantasms are always present in the soul; and that the active intellect, which abstracts the species from the phantasms, is connected with the soul as well as with its ability. With the senses, however, it is exactly the opposite, because we do not see a white color if we want, because either a light is present or the white thing may be missing, even if the light is present.” [[128]](#footnote-128)

The separation of the school of the first Averroism from Avicenna around the year 1225 starts from the correctly conceived scheme of cognition according to the CMDA, which is subsequently confirmed in the Sicilian school according to Scotus. The active intellect cannot be separated from the soul because it is in our power (*in potestate anime sit intelligere quando vult*). To recognize something is a matter of the individual will, which was Averroes’s key argument against the separated intellect of the Neoplatonic modernists (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The central role of the new medium, called *intellectus in potentia*, is given with regard to the concrete thing, which is perceived with the senses and kept in the imagination. The possible intellect, in the intentional mode given by this property to the domain of our will (*intellectus materialis*), receives from the imagination the sensual species as accidents. This intellect operates as a diaphanum in the mode of the *intellectus in potentia*, because it creates an immaterial environment from the senses to the intellect, which is necessary for the mediation of the recognized forms. In the receptive intellect, given as an act of intentionality, the process of abstraction takes place for *species intelligibilis*. They are considered purely formally, because they come out of sensual intentions (*abstrahere species a fantasmatibus*). The recognized form is already immaterial and acquires a new function in the process of cognition through Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*. Neoplatonic metaphor of intellect as the sun cannot be applied to the scheme of intellectual cognition. The vision of eyes is given sensually, but it now takes the course of intellectual cognition (*quod patet in uisu per contrarium*). The eye must recognize all the time, because the recognition of the material body organ is effectively conditioned. The bodily organ operates on the causality and it always recognizes the world when necessary and sufficient conditions are given for its execution. Therefore, one can exchange the eye or another organ for a prosthetic instrument made by man, because the reception of light is material and given in the mode *causa efficiens*. On the contrary, the intentional and synthetic intellect is immaterial, and its attachment to reality represents only a formal ability of the soul as a *tabula rasa*. Due to this different mode of cognition in the personal act of will, the *anima intellectiva* is separated not only from the sense organ, but also from the cognizing act of bodily senses. The diaphanum given by their receptive immaterial capacity in *anima intellectiva* is separated from material activity. Therefore, intelligible intentionality is different from sensual intentionality. That is why we can intellectually recognize when we want and we have no animal imprinting (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The activity of the human intellect is formally linked to the reality of the hylemorphic, immaterially recognized first substance. The modernists lack the cited intermediate function of receptive intellect in the soul, which ensures both adequate cognition from the direction of the senses and the volitive and individual character of human cognition (*in potestate anime sit intelligere quando vult*). On the other hand, the sensually predisposed animal always recognized when there are necessary and sufficient conditions for this, because the formal causality of the animal soul is directly connected with the efficient causality of the senses by imprinting. The first Averroism rejected the conception of the solar intellect as a pure metaphor. The comparison concerns only the sensual reality and it keeps but a limited validity. The intellect, defined in the school of the first Averroism, does not need the Avicennian mysticism of *Modernorum*, because the existence of the real, sensually perceived world is sufficient condition for true cognition.

The exposure of menaning coming from the front, according to the reception of CMDA, fundamentally changed Avicennian structure of intellect about the year 1225. The acquired and formal intellect lost their self-reflexive function in the new scheme, as the previous chapter shown by analyzing Blund’s *De anima*. The formalization is already made by intentionality at the first level of immaterial reception in the material intellect (*forma abstracta primo est in medio*, ibid p. 36.201). The distinction of the two orders of cognition by the function of the diaphanum showed the fundamental error of Neoplatonic metaphor of the solar intellect, which *univoce* connected the intellect with the recognized thing. Thus ended the reign of Avicennism in the Latin West, as Gauthier noted in the introductory analysis of the treatise (*le régne d’Avicenne prend fin, celui d’Averroès commence*, ibid, p. 25). The epochal error of Avicennism was gradually revived by the modernist wave of the second Averroism from the year 1235 (ch. 3.3.1). The *Treatise* distinguishes three different acts, levels and processes of human cognition, which are later defended in the school of the first Averroism.

1. The first act of the diaphanum as the intentional potency of the soul intellectually oriented in the direction of the sensual species. These species are synthesized in the sensory imagination. With regard to these individual sensual species, the *intellectus materialis* operates as a quasi-materie (Alfarabi, Averroes), because it takes the *species sensibilis* in an immaterial way.
2. The second act of the diaphanum takes place at the level of *intellectus possibilis*, which mediates the formal properties of the real thing in the act of formal reception (*intentio*) in the mode of the intelligible species, which is given as intentional meaning (*species intelligibilis*). According to the categorical predication, it is an activity at the level of an accident. It relates to the real thing that exists outside of cognition in the mode of existence *per se*.
3. The intentionally created species given in the passive component of the intellect are updated with the help of the active component of cognition. This component is given individually in the soul (*intellectus formalis*). The synthesis of the universal meaning in the concept completes the receptive-synthetic ability of the soul (*intellectus agens*). According to categorical predication, it is an activity at the level of the second substance, which in the next step allows a scientific knowledge of the world in the mode of *demonstratio*.

The result of cognition is given as synthetic act of intentionality and it operates by the individual *intellectus agens*. Therefore, it is necessary no external illumination by the separated active intellect of Avicennists. The possible intellect fulfills the function of diaphanum in the soul; therefore, it is fundamentally individual in terms of function and character (*corruptibilis*).[[129]](#footnote-129) The active faculties of the soul produce forms recognized in the act of synthesis. Conceived in the mode of *intellectus agens* of the person, the active cognizing faculty of the soul ties in with the receptive act, which creates the corresponding sensual and intelligible species through abstraction.

The treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* started new dispute concerning the objectivity in the Latin West. Taking the position of Averroes, it drew attention to the fundamental error of Avicenna. Its separate active intellect operates in the human soul without the diaphanum. The author, inspired by Averroes, clearly sees the fundamental errors of Avicenna and the whole school of modernism. Avicenna creates an intellect as a substantial *tertium ens,* which is unacceptable for the process of personal cognition. The soul would lose the purely receptive character of the *tabula rasa* assured by the *intellectus possibilis*, and would not be able to recognize the world in its fullness. Moreover, the cognition determined by external intellect would no longer be in our power to recognize and not to recognize. Modernity does not need an *intellectus possibilis* because it has no mediation and thus no concept of truth as correspondence. The epochal new concept of the species defined by the intentional act of abstraction brought the basic classification of the intellect back to the position in CMDA. The act of the individual intellect is different in the process of abstraction (*tertium genus*) from the intellect as a universal term (*quartum genus*). The treatise receives this teaching by determining a new set of species in the real process of abstraction and separating this activity (*intellectio*) from the universal product, which is given in the process of the intentional synthesis of the recognized forms (*intellectum*). The dualism of modernism and postmodernism came into being as a result of erroneous understanding that relates to the role of the material intellect, which in the first Averroism is given as *intellectus possibilis*. The Neoplatonic contemporaries of Blund’s school were not interested in the actual course of cognition determined by real things. The modern Porretans were interested and are still interested only in *univoce* given thinking that creates the cognitive form in the act of *certitudo*. In this act, the comprehension of the eternal form and its contingent variation in the real thing merge together (ch. 1.5). The Avicennistic *intellectus adeptus* recognizes the pure forms in their *quidditas* thanks to the active intellect working on the higher floor as pure intention of forms perceived by the new type of abstraction (*denudatio*). The difference between the concept of species given in this or that kind of abstraction is of principled nature for the hermeneutics of objectivity, since it indicates, within the framework of Heidegger’s phenomenological “*Wie*,” the twofold approach to ontological meaning of being. The universal and immaterial species of the first Averroism is fundamentally different from the hylemorphic form of the real thing. It clearly differs from the hypostatic *tertium ens* of Porretans and from the nominalist kind of objective species. That fundamental classification of different movements occurred in the years 1225–30, when the first generation of Latin thinkers had to choose between two opposite approaches to meaning of being. The first group in the Blund’s school read the writing *De anima* as to its full meaning. That is why they critically defended the autonomy of philosophy. The first Averroism separated natural cognition from the illumination theory of Toletans, from the mystical theology of Augustinian Avicennism and from the nascent modernity. Aristotelian school in Paris adopted translations of Averroes from the Toledean school, but by no means their Avicennism, because it was at odds with their own interpretation of *De anima*. The first wave of Averroism unconditionally adopted the new conception of intentionality, which was based on Averroes’s *intellectus materialis* and *possibilis* according to CMDA. Following Averroes’s concept of abstraction and intentionality, a new kind of formal similarity between the sensual and the intelligible species emerged. The fundamental difference was in the statute of the species and in the following role of *intellectus agens*, which was either personal or partially separated. That point interpreted the Toletan school in contradiction with CMDA. The first Averroism accepted the writing CMDA as an authentic interpretation of Aristotle’s *De anima*. It understood around the year 1225 exactly in which points Averroes’s interpretation of the first philosophy differs from Avicenna’s errors, which were propagated in the Toledo school.

### 2.2.2 Ethos of the First Averroism (*De potentiis animae et obiectis*)

Scot's arrival in Paris in 1230 inaugurated the fundamental discernment of academic minds. They were divided according to the interpretation of the Sicilian or the Toletan school. The group of traditionalist thinkers from the group of Augustinian Avicennism around Philip the Chancellor demonstrated the confused reception of the CMDA. This group was bound to the interpretation of Averroes according to the Toledo school. Philip the Chancellor quotes Averroes under a distorted name in the work *Summa de bono*; but he already knows the writing of Averroes (De Vaux 1933, 237). Hermeneutics emphasize the fundamental difference with respect to the first Averroism, which concerns the different conception of the formal intellect and the species. In the new framework of the intellect given by the actualization from the direction of the sensually cognized thing, the scholars could insert all the remaining elements from the then known scholastic classification of Avicenna: different forms of sensual perception (*sensus communis, aestimatio, imaginatio, memoria*) and finally different forms of intellect (*materialis, in potentia, formalis, agens*). We questioned this categorization in the undermentioned treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*, which has led most contemporary commentators astray. Their preliminary understanding of this period is formed in the spirit of objective Avicennism. Academic erudition based on Avicenna differs in this point from the critical thinking of Gauthier. The latter had understood that this writing had opened a new epoch of thought in the Latin West, since it had launched a new philosophical school. It is therefore necessary to reject the univocal concept of *intellectus formalis*, which is tied to Avicenna’s objective cataloging of the four hypostatic intellects (*Vier Intellekten-Lehre*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). This concept of the formal intellect that existed in Avicennists circles of Philip the Chancellor and in the writing *Summa Duacensis*. It differs fundamentally from the concept of *intellectus formalis* of the first Averroism, which Blund introduced by reducing the intellect to two components (receptive and synthetic) according to an authentic reading of *De anima*.

The emergence of the Paris University took place in the middle of gigantomachy concerning the substance, as it was the case with the Baghdad *House of Wisdom* (*Bajt al-Hikma*). The foundation of modern education in the Latin West is therefore connected with the archaic truth as *a/lētheia*. The historical beginning of the Paris and Oxford University is connected with the historical event of philosophical truth and untruth. This fateful birth (Heidegger′s *Beginn*) of modern metaphysics still shapes globally active knowledge of postmodernity and metaphysical nihilism. Aristotelian exegesis of *Modernorum* is revealed in the anonymous theological compilation called *Summa Duacensis* (ca. 1230).[[130]](#footnote-130) The anonymous author works with Porretan concept of species recognized by illumination. That scenario prevented him from grasping the meaning of the first Averroism presented by the Blund’s school. The interpretation of Averroes took the direction according to the school of Toletans. In this point, it coincides with the later Averroism of the first modernists, who came to study from Oxford to Paris around the year 1235. The formal intellect is defined in Avicenna’s style as actual hypostasis in the soul.

“Similarly, we speak of the intellect with regard to the existing real thing, since the cognition is similar to it. The intellect is called ‘formal’ with regard to the real soul. The soul is formed and completed by it, and this not done with regard to something else (*non ad aliud*). The species defined according to this intellect is given by the fact that through this intellect the soul itself strives for the cognition of the thing (*anima per ipsum tendit in rei cognitionem*). This intellect we determine as formal or as species or alike because it can be abolished or destroyed (*deleri potest et annihilari*). But the actual active intellect or the possible intellect (*intellectus ipse agens aut possibilis*) always remains inviolable in substance (*semper in sua substantia*) and immaterial (*incorruptibilis et inmixtus*).” [[131]](#footnote-131)

The anonymous writing *Summa Duacensis* pictures the intellect as a Porretan species or as being of the third kind. The one form of intellect (*formalis*) is contingently given in the body as the first substance and is perishable (*deleri potest et annihilari*); the second form of intellect (*agens, possibilis*) is given as pure subsistent form and is separated and untouchable. The quotation shows the confusion of Augustinian theologians unable to connect the intentional process creating the species with the receptive intellect. The school of Philip the Chancellor, influenced by the Toledo interpretation of Averroes, did not understand the work of Blund’s *intellectus formalis*. They preferred the cognitive scheme of illumination according to Neoplatonism. Parisian Avicennists identified Blund’s formal intellect, given as a faculty of the existing person, with the hypostatized *intellectus adeptus* according to Avicenna. Therefore, they added to that hypostasis the individual property of *intellectus materialis* according to CMDA. Afterward, as correct Alexandrians, they separated the active and the potential intellect from the actually living person and made of them external eternal substances of cosmic character (*intellectus ipse agens aut possibilis manet semper in sua substantia incorruptibilis et inmixtus materie*). The intellect as *quartum genus* according to Averroes is a pure concept in thought. Modernity and contemporary nihilism have turned it into a mythological substance as *tertium ens*. This tragicomedy of thinking represents the metaphysical madness (*Irre*) of modern times. The pantheism of Dinant put that kind of mythological intellect directly in God (ch. 2.1.3). The school of the second Averroism let that kind of intellekt “exsisted” as new hypostase, to be located partly in diacosmos of Neoplatonists, partly in mythological concept of modern human mind. A new form of Averroism emerged, established by that double dualism. The process of cognition proceeds in the mode of Avicennian comitation (*hec semper esse rei comitatur et se tenet ipsa re*; ibid, p. 22) rather than Aristotelian intentionality. The Porretan species keep a permanent form, which is given in the contingent cognition of things only in a changeable way. The cognition of reality runs through the Augustinian form of memory as *memoria*. This memory holds on to sensual images as well as to universal univocal species (*ymagines rerum vel species*).[[132]](#footnote-132) The modern kind of memory serves as a new being of the third kind, since it is detached from Blund’s scheme of cognition. In the first Averroism, memory is given only as “*thesaurus intentionum*” and not as Augustinian and Neoplatonic species of the third kind. In the Latin West, it came to the transformation of Aristotelian *reminiscentia* that was a vulnerable sensual faculty of the soul, to be found in animals as well. The memory received a Neoplatonist character (*memoria*) and that kind of *memoria* represent a realm of species of the third kind (*locus specierum*). Today this mythological sector has become the cloud of databases. The reason for universal inviolability of species is the substantial character of possible and active intellect, which is given as a separated, eternal and imperishable substance (*manet semper in sua substantia incorruptibilis et inmixtus materie*). This characteristic of numerically one *intellectus possibilis* for all men shows the first form of modern Averroism, which was cultivated in the school of Philip the Chancellor. This cathedral school was bound to interpretation of the Toledo school. The soul cognizes the world through the act of its own self-reflection, which is hypostatic in its character, endowed with its own actuality (*idem intellectus secundum quod anima per ipsum tendit in rei cognitionem*). The cognition determined by the first substances belongs only to the sensual character of the formal intellect, which translates the sensual cognition in sensual species.

The anonymous author correctly grasped the main direction of formalization in Blund as primary cognition activity of the existing soul. But the act of cognition done by *intellectus formalis*, he conceives it according to Avicenna’s acquired intellect, which stands in connection with the separated active intellect. Both kinds of intellect adapt the soul according to the scheme of exposure of being from behind (*ad ipsam animam quam format et perfecit*). The author of the *Summa Duacensis* knows well that the possible intellect in the school of the first Averroism is immaterial by its essence just like the active intellect (*intellectus ipse agens aut possibilis manet semper in sua substantia incorruptibilis et inmixtus materie*). He has no problem with this definition as an Avicennist, because he declared both forms of intellect to be independent immaterial substances. He separated them from sensual cognition. Augustinianism (hypostatized *memoria*) is combined with the Avicennian relation between soul and body (hypostatized *intellectus*). This mixture gave birth to the modern dualism of soul and body, which ties in with the illumination given from the world of cosmic intelligences and forms. The result of the treatise *Summa Duacensis* is the twofold dualism in the conception of the so-called “*triplex unitas*” (Bazán 1969, 49). The soul represents an autonomous form with the fullness of subsistence at the level of spiritual substances (*firmissima*).[[133]](#footnote-133) The body follows as further autonomous, this time hylemorphic substance, where the form already binds itself to the material substance (*unitas minus firma*). The connection of both substances of body and soul belong to the type of the unity of the lowest order (*unitas minima*). Philip the Chancellor defended this plurality of substantial forms in the threefold concept of unity and we find it in a new form about the year 1240 in the Oxford’s school of *Modernorum* (ch. 3.2). The writing *Summa Duacensis* shows the manner how the new school of the second Averroism emerged from Philip’s Avicennist school in Paris during the years 1230–35. This occurred after the arrival of Rufus of Cornwall in Paris, when Philip’s school merged with the school of the first academic Franciscan circle united in the edition of the *Summa Halensis*. Aristotelianism of Blund’s and Alvernus’s school contrasts with the Avicennian orientation of the second treatise on the soul written at the same time (ca. 1235–40) by the Franciscan Jean de La Rochelle (John de Rupella). His dualistic vision of man is not of Aristotelian origin, since he is an Avicennist as well.[[134]](#footnote-134) The key difference of both schools concerns the soul as *perfectio*. Rupella holds to dualism in the framework of the twofold act of substantially given being (*duplex actus essendi*). The soul is the primary substance that operates in relation to the body from the position of the external activator (*secundum quod comparatur ut motor et ut actus*). The soul as a detached mover of the body keeps habitually given primary possibilities of man (*completio*). The radical branch of young Franciscans influenced by Porretans rejected the criticism of Alvernus and representatives of the Sicilian school. The work *Tractatus de divisione multiplicis potentiarum animae* (ca. 1233–35) of John de Rupella follows the division of intellects according to the treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*. However, Rupella did not grasp correctly the new concept of intentionality in Blund’s first Averroism (ch. 2.1). The reception does not start from the senses, but from the illumination by the active intellect as the Sun that irradiates the Moon; but the latter shines through this reflected light up to sensual phantasms (*agens intellectus recipit ab agente superiori et illuminat fantasmata et intellectum possibilem*).[[135]](#footnote-135) The immaterial cognition is summed up in the mode of Neoplatonic imprinting. In such reversed process of cognition, the *intellectus possibilis* serves as matter for imprinting hypostatized cosmic forms. The Neoplatonic model is separated in principle from individual reception of intellect, which intends the sensual species. The scenario of the exposure of being from behind runs exactly the other way round in comparison with the first Averroism. The role of the formal or receptive intellect actively forming the *species intelligibilis* becomes superfluous. The receptive intellect is replaced by the *intellectus agens*.[[136]](#footnote-136) There is the classic case of the exposure of sensual forms from behind, from the direction of *intellectus agens* instead of rapporting them to sensual phantasms. The treatise defines cognition from the direction that is opposite to the first Averroism. Rupella’s later work *Summa de anima* (ca. 1236) was directly inspired by Avicenna’s interpretation of *De anima*.[[137]](#footnote-137) The active intellect shines like the sun on sensual forms in the imagination. This exposure from behind determines the process of abstraction as *denudatio* of the previously known things. The acquired intellect illuminates the eternal form in the act of a donation handed down as Augustinian and Avicennian illumination. Neoplatonic *intellectus materialis* passively reflects this illumination and bears it as immaterial *subiectum*. There is no distinction between intentionality and the process of abstraction because it is not necessary for intellectual cognition of things. The hypostatized forms exist independently, and in things as well. Then it is not necessary to receive the cognition from the sensual experience and actively synthesize it in the active component of the intellect. The passive and active activity is accomplished by the active intellect of modernists that imprints external abstracted contents in the passive intellect (*abstractas copulare siue ordinare in intellectu possibili*). The intellect reflects the autonomous Porretan species in the soul; eventually, it can rectify that “knowledge” in external things according to Anselm’s theory of truth as *rectitudo*. Neoplatonic *copulatio* of both separated forms of intellect brought about the dualistic scenario of cognition. Avicenna’s interpretation of CMDA was bound to be a fatal error, as the next history of this controversy shows. Toledo school of *Modernorum* around Philip the Chancellor experienced the first shock with Scotus’s arrival in Paris about the year 1230. Modernists defended by hook or by crook their confused dualistic conception of cognition and man by attacking the philosophy of Averroes. Aristotelian line of commentators strictly refused such confusion of various forms of intellect, philosophical and theological kinds of memory. This group followed Blund’s school of the first Averroism, which interpreted Averroes’s writing correctly and adopted Scotus’s line according to the Sicilian school. Therefore, no univocal and objective term exists for the individual categories of intellect in the school of the first and second Averroism in the years 1230–50.

The second key writing of the first Averroism was the treatise *De potentiis animae et obiectis* (ca. 1230). This apologetic writing was written at the same time as *Summa Duacensis* and responds to disputes that took place in this school in the years 1230–35. In view of the intellectual affinity and the link between the topics, it is clear that the treatise comes from the school of the first Averroism, which follows the teaching of John Blund. We will later return to the debate concerning the bishop Alvernus as presumed author of the treatise (ch. 2.3.1). The writing creatively backs up the findings of the previous treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* on faculties of the soul. Since the intellect has passive and active capacity of cognition, the soul takes up various kinds of activities. A key contribution consists in the precise determination of passive potencies of the soul, which is different from the status of the *intellectus agens* forming a part of the individual soul. Following the CMDA, the author clearly states that the passive potency of the intellect accepts the thing in its own manner (*proportionaliter*). Moreover, these different cognitive faculties form a part of the individual soul and of the one individual intellect. The brilliant formulation emphasizes the difference between the first real substance (*quod sit aliud secundum substantiam*) and the recognition of this real otherness of the first substance in the mode “*ab alio*”with the help of the second substance (*vel ab alio secundum substantiam*).[[138]](#footnote-138) As we will see later on, Alvernus used this argument against the nominalist school of Grammarians (ch. 2.3.2). The scheme defends the exposure of the sense of being from the front, which assigns the treatise to the school of the first Averroism. The cognition starts from the first substance and assumes its knowledge in the mode of otherness according to the metaphysical dative (*recipiendi ab altero secundum quod alterum*). The alterity of the singular cognition given by sensible reception (*species sensibilis*) is given in the mode of correspondence with the thing, but at the same time with the mode of dissimilarity with intelligible species that are immaterial and universal. This fundamental distinction did not exist in the schools of *Nominales*. It was evident in explaining the confusion that explored the notion of formal intellect in *Summa Duacensis*. The modern Alexandrians *univoce* connected in the modus *tertium ens* both the faculties of the soul and the various forms of substances of the third kind. The hylemorphic form and the abstracted species acquired univocal character. That error criticized Blund’s school in a preceding anonymous treatise as a fatal error of Avicenna and the Toledo school. The first Averroism defends the status of cognition and truth in the mode *proportionaliter* to keep the line of CMDA. The first substance can be taken up in different ways and with the help of different faculties; the true scientific cognition must seek the correspondence that relates to real causality in the world.

“But the question is whether the soul assumes multiplicity in its essence or according to the order of being or according to definition; whether cognition takes place through the bodily organ or through an instrument or through a synthetic meaning.” [[139]](#footnote-139)

Thanks to clear distinction of intentionality, the anonymous author obtains this triad of notions: sensual reception or in mind at the level of intentionality — synthetic and personal capacity of the soul — resulting concept of cognition. Furthermore, the fundamental thesis about the proportional reception of the first substance in its alterity is valid. This key distinction between the three levels of cognition (sensual, practical, abstract) is complemented by the three types of rationality according to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which produces cognition (sensual cognition, practical intellect, theoretical intellect). Made according to CMDA, this scheme offers the definition of the soul characterized by two intellectual components: the receptive one and the synthesizing one. The writing created a complete scheme of cognition as *proportio* between the cognized thing, the cognizing organs and the created intelligible species and the concepts. The *potentia media*, known from the previous anonymous treatise, finds expression with regard to the beginning and to the final act of cognition.[[140]](#footnote-140) The soul has different kinds of potentialities and these naturally strive to objects of cognition (*sumitur diversitas potentiarum secundum obiecta*). The cognition passes from potentiality to actuality (*maxime cum potentie sint per suos actus ad obiecta*). The intellect begins with reception of singular species, which it abstracts from the senses (*a quo inchoatur actus*). The process of intentionality ends with the active synthesis of universal meaning, which is the resulting goal of cognition (*in quod terminatur actus*). By this distinction of the movement of cognition (*a quo—in quod*) both intellectual faculties of the soul are given. The cognition proceeds in the order of sensual abstraction towards the soul (*unus dicitur motus ad animam*). Reception, on the other hand, begins through immaterial intentionality starting from the soul in the sense of intentional reception of sensually given species (*alter motus ab anima*). The soul is in the center of the twofold movement “*ad—ab*.” Therefore, it sensually receives from the world the contents given in it (*ad animam*). The world, however, recognizes in its way in it what is essentially proper to human soul as intellectual power (*ab anima*). Again, Averroes’s term “*proportio*” is valid for separated immaterial cognition of the intellect, because we take up the real thing and the sensual species in their alterity. Their materiality becomes the universal immaterial cognition of the same thing.

The author solved the basic philosophical questions concerning the cognition and points out to the continuation of debate in his writing on the soul.[[141]](#footnote-141) The mentioned writing is undoubtedly Alvernus’s treatise *De anima*, which will be analyzed in the next chapter. It directly links to this anonymous work and unfolds its consequences for Christian theology. The process of cognition in the treatise *De potentiis animae et obiectis* is inspired by Blund’s definition of abstraction and intentionality. The writing adopts the above-mentioned notion of *potentia media* and Averroes’s definition of *intellectus possibilis* given in the preceding treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*. The anonymous author uses a comparison with the diaphanum just as the preceding treatise did. The first Averroism had to separate Aristotelian intentionality from the Neoplatonic version of cognition. In the latter, the active solar intellect, external to the soul, directly irradiates the receptive intellect. The author begins by emphasizing the difference between sensory and intellectual cognition.[[142]](#footnote-142) The soul has its own abilities, which are given to it naturally (*ex sua agilitate maxima*). It doesn’t need any special enlightenment for cognition of the world. There is a medium of cognition in the soul itself, just as the diaphanum works for the act of seeing in Averroes’s scheme of the CMDA. The diaphanum is necessary because two processes of mediation take place in the soul. On the one hand, there is the difference between sensual and intellectual faculties (*diversificetur apprehensio virtutis rationalis ab apprehensione virtutis sensibilis*); on the other, the composition of the immaterial cognitive form is detached from the process of knowledge in the soul (*comprehensio forme ab anima rationali*). Through the process of abstraction from sensual images (*abstractionem a phantasmatibus*), it comes to creation of new kind of intentional object that already has an immaterial character. The intention given by the material intellect in the direction of sensuous species is taken again as intentional objects (*species intelligibilis*) by the receptive possible intellect. Thus, according to Aristotle and according to CMDA, the whole process of cognition is accomplished. Then nothing remains but to describe the cognitive processes in the order in which the elements follow each other. The two quotations, which directly follow each other in the treatise, form a brilliant summary of the first phase of the first Averroism, which found confirmation in Scotus’s lectures in Paris.[[143]](#footnote-143) Following both preceding writings of Blund’s school, the first theory of truth as correspondence in the Latin West emerges, thanks to the precisely analyzed process of mediation and similarity. The following quote forms a summary of the entire architecture of cognition according to the CMDA.

“The first way of existence is in the ether or in another medium, depending on how one has to transfer the external form to its intentional form in the soul (*esse spirituale*). The second being is in the bodily organ, the third in mind, the fourth in the sensual soul, the fifth in the rational soul. The being of the color in the ether is given in view of the transparent nature of diaphanum (*ad naturam transparentis*). The true being of the color in the eye is given in view of universal being of the diaphanum, which is connected with the transmission of light (*ad naturam transparentis lucidi coadunati*). The object is given by the mediation of universal essence of light (*ad naturam luminis*). The apprehended being in mind given in the sensual part of the soul is immaterial, but not in the sense that it is separable from the soul. The recognized being in the rational part of the soul is immaterial and separable from the soul. This is the manner how the gradual growth of spiritual forms is manifested.” [[144]](#footnote-144)

The first proposition says that the sense of being cannot be univocal because it is received in different ways in different modes of cognition (*secundum quod debet reduci forma in esse spirituale*). Univocity arises only at the very end of cognition, when a full correspondence of the intellect with the thing given outside sensory experience is achieved. The author emphasizes that the being of color is linked to physical diaphanum (*quantum ad naturam transparentis*). Then the mediation begins at the level of the eye as a sense organ, which continues to be a physical process of mediation (*ad naturam transparentis lucidi coadunati*). It follows the reception of color through the mediation in the soul in view of universal essence of diaphanum, which is given in the sensual intentionality (*esse spirituale*). The mediation by the diaphanum forms the true universal essence of the light in the concept (*quantum ad naturam luminis*) only at the end of the cognition as true correspondence. The exposure through the diaphanum produces a similarity between thing and intellect through the proportionality of intentional and sensually given objects, but it happens already in the soul as immaterial form of the body. The form created by sensual cognition is not identical with the external thing (*est incorporale*); but at the same time it cannot be separated from the body (*non tamen a corpore separabile*), since it is material and bound to the eye. The sensual species passes into the immaterial intelligible form in the process of abstraction (*esse vero in anima rationali est incorporale a corpore separabile*). The manifestation of being proceeds through abstraction, which is given by the exposure of the intellect from the front, that is, from the thing grasped first by the senses and then by the intellect.

Alvernus’s scheme of cognition in this treatise differs from Grosseteste’s proceeding in the aforementioned treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*. Alvernus draws the transfer of actuality from an external thing through the senses to the receptive intellect exactly according to Blund’s school.[[145]](#footnote-145) The *intellectus formalis* plays a key role in the actualization of knowledge. This intellect known by Blund forms the last level of intellectual diaphanum in the system of Alvernus. Its mediation is already completely immaterial and separated from the receptive *intellectus possibilis*. The possible intellect as diaphanum still relates to sensuous species, which it transforms into their intellectual form (*species intelligibilis*). Thus, in the order of reception, the transfer of actuality from one diaphanum to the other is precisely determined: *perspicuum—species sensibilis—species intelligibilis*. The instances of intentionality that these species of diaphanum carry in the soul are clearly distinguished as well: *intellectus possibilis—formalis—agens*. This passage advocates the gradual growth of intellectual forms that are separated from the real world and from sensory perception. Alvernus, according to Blund’s school, adheres to the interpretation of Aristotelian scheme according to Alfarabi, because he insists on the transmission of actuality by exposure from the front, from the direction of sensual forms. This passage defends the gradual growth of intellectual forms from the direction of the real world and from sensual cognition. It has a central importance for dating this work of Alvernus to the years between 1225–30 (ch. 3.1.1). Grosseteste saw the cognitive schema in a different way, as dualist process of cognition. He *de facto* abolished the unified concept of the person by introducing the intellect as another actual form in the soul. This fundamental difference in the concept of the soul and cognition between the two leading personalities and founders of the University led to Grosseteste’s departure for Oxford about the year 1230. This writing shows that the second branch of the first Averroism followed exactly Blund’s interpretation, since it holds to the unity of the person as the only substance and the soul as the only form of the body. The formal intellect makes the abstraction of species and processes the intentions as recognized forms coming from real things. There is no predication of these forms done by Avicennist intuition in *intellectus adeptus* or in hypostatized *intellectus agens*. The gradual gradation of forms has nothing in common with the Neoplatonic deduction *modo geometrico* according to the work *Liber de causis*. The first Averroism cannot take the construction of the world according to Avicenna’s self-reflective graduation of the soul exposed from behind, which considers the graduation of cosmic forms in the mode of consubstantiality. Cognition is given as the process of actualizing intentional species. They arise in the process of intentionality and abstraction of the species that remains generically different from reality. The form given as a first real substance determines cognition and not vice versa. By the introduction of mediation by Alfarabi’s and Averroes’s diaphanum, Avicennian interpretation of *De anima* was rejected. The difference given by different value of the form created either in the framework of *abstractio* (Averroes) or *denudatio* (Avicenna). Both views form two entirely different meanings with regard to the recognized form, which is given either in a Porretan or Aristotelian manner. In the first and in the second Averroism there is not the same conception of intentional and cognitive forms. The same point is even more true for the definition of the intellect, which is a gradual universal manifestation of truth as a correspondence of the singular thing with the universal intellect. The anonymous treatise explicitly ties the emergence of species to Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*, which the author associates with Blund’s formal intellect.[[146]](#footnote-146) Again, there is a fundamental difference between Avicennist concept of abstraction and the abstraction of the first Averroism. The connection between the receptive and the synthetic component (*intellectus possibilis unitus intellectui formali*) establishes the creation of intellectual species due to their transition from potency into actuality (*fuerint species in intellectu possibili ordinate ab agente*). The twofold activity given in the mode of the metaphysical dative establishes the same scheme of thought in the mode *abstrahere* and *ordinare* as in the preceding anonymous treatise. From this process of cognition and faculties of the soul emerges the rejection of fundamental component of Neoplatonic cognition, that is, the active intellect separated from the soul. The separated solar intellect enables the soul, through the acquired intellect, to the act of Avicennist denudation, which establishes the vision of Porretan species in real things. The second Averroism represented by the work *Summa Duacensis* links the perishable *intellectus formalis* to the direct contemplation of essential form as being of the third kind. Blund’s school represented the conception of cognition as it was already given before the year 1230 according to the CMDA. The school of the first Averroism therefore rejected Avicenna’s scheme of illumination that defended the school of Philip the Chancellor. The first Avicennism sees the real things in the mode of intentionality and abstraction and not at all being of the third kind in the mode of denudation and illumination. The statute of the formal intellect is linked to the intentional species considered as correspondence to reality. The resulting universal concepts arise in the process of abstraction. The argumentation includes the doctrine of the first Averroism about the one soul and the two components of the immaterial intellect, which thanks to its immaterial performance is different from the cognition bound to the material senses in the body (*intellectus qui est separabilis a corpore*).[[147]](#footnote-147) The key definition of intellect, in its Aristotelian mode “*separabilis*” and not the Neoplatonic mode “*separatus*,” clearly shows a perfect knowledge of the CMDA that defines this type of intellect as *tertium genus*. The quotation following the CMDA explicitly reminds us that a comparison between the intellect and light is proposed in the mode of similarity, because light is separate from the act of seeing, but the active intellect cannot be separated from the act of being corporeal of the soul (*lux est separata a substantia visus, intellectus autem agens non est separatus a substantia anime*). The quotation in the note includes the preceding treatise on the reception of light and cognition. There exist two faculties of one and the same intellect, a passive and an active one (*post hanc virtutem est intellectus… agens et possibilis*). Moreover, we have two spheres of cognition, the material and the immaterial. Therefore we need two intentional acts and two kinds of synthesis which leads to the resulting immaterial cognition given in the soul of the real person. There is no sense in introducing an external cause in the natural process of cognition founded by philosophical genius as Aristotle and his Commentator (*non est necessarium illuminatione substantie separate*). It is the same application of Ockham’s razor as in the previous anonymous writing on the faculties of the soul. The dualism of cognition is not external, but internal, between the two faculties of the soul, and the active intellect is in the soul (*intellectus agens qui est lumen interius*).[[148]](#footnote-148) The soul recognizes the world passively and actively, sensually and intellectually. Therefore the result of the activity of this one *actus essendi* bound to one being of the soul consists only in personal intellect as *virtus* of this soul and as intelligible species, which is given in the process of personal cognition. The act of cognition has several stages, but only one hylemorphic substratum (*subiectum*). The following sentence criticizes a group of Neoplatonic philosophers (*quidam philosophorum*) who form the process of cognition according to the metaphor of the intellect as the sun.[[149]](#footnote-149) The Neoplatonists, with reference to Averroes, grasped the *intellectus possibilis* as potency, which takes on the autonomous forms given in the separated *intellectus agens*. The active solar intellect actively radiates these forms into the receptive intellect (*per irradiationem sui super possibilem fieri intellectum possibilem in effectu*). As we will see further, bishop Alvernus criticized the same group of Avicennists as followers of Aristotle (*philosophi sequaces Aristotelis*). From this group, understandably, Averroes is excluded as an eminent Aristotelian. The anonymous author is a theologian; therefore, he holds to the concept of the twofold cognition and the twofold path, the philosophical and the mystical. In this way, he took up the philosopher Blund and his school, as quoted above (ch. 2.1). The active part of the intellect is fully integrated into the individual soul as one of its faculties and the separated active intellect is superfluous for the natural cognition of the world. Therefore, it exists outside the sphere of human cognition as an independent cosmic form or intelligence. The dispute about the separated *intellectus agens* forms the main reason why Daniel Callus excluded bishop Alvernus as a possible author of the writing, although the direct remarks in various manuscripts testify to it.[[150]](#footnote-150) The key manuscript of the treatise from the Balliol library is included in the volume of Alvernus’s writings. Hermeneutics show on the contrary that Alvernus considers the concept of *intellectus agens* in man and in the cosmic intelligences as fundamentally different. That is the exact position in this writing. The difference between the two forms of intellect is absolutely principled: the one *intellectus agens* is in the body as a faculty of the soul and the other is pure immaterial substance. We assign the writing *De potenciis animae et obiectis* as to the date of origin after 1230 because it shows a theological polemic concerning the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. This point was defended around 1230 in the theological school of Philip the Chancellor, as it attested in the work *Summa Duacensis*. Bishop Alvernus considered this doctrine heretical because it abolished free will and the unity of the person. As chancellor of the University of Paris, he officially forbade its dissemination.

The first anonymous treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* clearly had a philosophical character and protected the metaphysical heritage of *Logica vetus* after Abelard. But the debate later turned to the theological consequences of the conception of the intellect and the identity of the person. Those questions emerged from confused interpretations of cognition and the unity of person presented *ad mentem Averrois* in the Toledo school. The second writing from the school of the first Averroism already has other opponents than Porretans from Parisian schools of *Logica Modernorum*, as was the case of Grosseteste. Being the dean of the cathedral school and eminent theologian, Alvernus had to defend the unity of the person and its cognition against theologians from schools of Augustinian Avicennism, who received the work of the Commentator in the sophistical manner of such works as *Summa Duacensis*. This Avicennist school founded the original form of dualism, which is represented in the postmodern version of the dispute over substance by the terminus *surnaturel*. Its foundation established the next generation of Parisian modernists led by Bonaventure (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.4). Alvernus’s theological writing suggests a different reception of the Sicilian school that primarily defends the unity of the person according to CMDA. Grosseteste defended in the first writing Abelard’s logic, which is given by the imposition from the direction of the hyparchical substance. This interpretation is consistent with the reading of the Commentator who explained the writing *De anima*. This theological and philosophical defense of the person made *ad mentem Averrois* explains in a reliable way, why the ban on the study of the Aristotelian writing at the University of Paris, in force since the year 1215, was lifted in year 1231 (ch. 2.1.3). Magister Alvernus of Blund’s school played a key role in the reception of Averroes as a philosopher who defended the Christian unity of the person, because he precisely distinguished the exegesis of both schools presented *ad mentem Averrois* with regard to Aristotle. Alvernus rejected the theological and anthropological worldview of modernity brought to the University of Paris. This appeared there in the version of the Toledo school and was interpreted in the circles of Philip the Chancellor. Confused concept of the intellect in the work *Summa Duacensis* confirmed the fact that around the year 1230 the first problematic interpretations of Averroes’s metaphysics appeared, which were written in the Avicennism according to the Toledo school. The school around Philip the Chancellor and the first Franciscan magisters, such as Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, made of the active and passive intellect a Porretan substance of the third kind, given in the mode *semper*, which is immaterial and separated from the body. The interpretation of this falsehood related to the CMDA is presented in the following matrix, which interprets the dispute of both schools during the years 1230–45. The quoted Averroistic texts from *Summa Duacensis* clearly indicate the direction that took the school of the second Averroism. The cosmic active intellect, as a subsistent form, takes modern *illuminati* to the world of cosmic forms and intelligences. This is theologically unacceptable because it disappears both the unity of the person and the freedom of the will. The first Averroism teaches that the human *intellectus agens* is an individual faculty of the soul, which is given by the exposure of the receptive human intellect from the front, taking the direction of cognition from real things. Therefore, as soon as he obtained the degree of Master, Alvernus was appointed to be the archbishop of Paris and the Chancellor of the newly established Pontifical University. Let us recall that Blund’s school carried out a brilliant interpretation of Aristotle according to Abelard and the Commentator, which confirmed the importance of the latter’s metaphysics for Christian determination of the person and God. Hermeneutics has shown that it was the metaphysical school that founded the University of Paris as a bastion of Christianity. This house of wisdom, like the Falsafa of the Commentator protected the common sense of philosophy against the death of modernist God that took place in Avicenna’s metaphysics. Similarly, the first Averroism defended the unity of the existing person against disintegration into non-existent modernist substances. The disputes over tritheism in the preceding matrices have shown how closely are related the definitions of the person and God. When the death of the deistic God occurred as a historical fact during the French Revolution and the God of *Modernorum* actually died in the Enlightenment, this university naturally expired and was disintegrated into disparate faculties. The kind of humanism and the unity of the person that the University of Paris defended, such an end it took as the price. After the death of God in the modern metaphysics in the modus of *auctoritas*, Paris had no more the founding archaic sense of existence, which it could have passed on and on which it could have built. The humanities, after the decline of the person and finally of the subject, passed from the mode of the original unity to postmodern *colligatio* of substances and structural differences. The nihilistic humanism was completed by the post-structuralism of Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge. This was presented in the *Collège de France*, which forms a Pythian antithesis of the archaeology of wisdom defended in this work by socratic humanism done in Delphi. The tragic fall of the academic *auctoritas* of Paris forms a fundamental difference with the academic *potestas* of modern Oxford. Its metaphysical foundation is given by objective science and by sophistical cognition of the “man—corpse” given in the paradigm of Oxfordian Fallacy. These historical circumstances explain the orientation of Alvernus’s first commentary on *De anima* written at the time when the University of Paris was founded. The papal university was not founded by an objective and pragmatic union of different cathedral schools into one college, but by the struggle for Christian concept of the person according to Aristotle and the Commentator. Hermeneutics claim that this university was established on the basis of conflictual paradigm given by gigantomachy concerning the first substance. It was the Parisian school that won the academic tournament concerning the substance. Therefore, the *École de Paris* was transformed into a pontifical university against the Porretan, Avicennist, nominalist and modern logical schools. As soon as the founding authority of this original conflict became extinct, necessarily this institution also became extinct as well. There was no *arkhē* in the sense of the original power of thought given by the bond to the commencement. Magister Alvernus, as the *de facto* founder of the papal college of magisters and disciples (*universitas*), fundamentally rejects the modern dualistic view in his first writing. This modernist view follows the Neoplatonist interpretation of *De anima* according to the Toledo school that connected Avicenna and Averroes in a sophistical manner. The separated cosmic intellect needs for its activity neither *species sensibilis* nor *intellectus possibilis*, but only the act of pure illumination. Avicennists took the *intellectus agens* in man and in the cosmic intelligences in a univocal way, and the contemporary objectivists repeat the same error.

Alvernus differed from Grosseteste’s treatise, since he connected theological determination of the soul with the philosophical definition. The possibility of direct illumination remains for the acts of faith and mystical illumination given directly by God.[[151]](#footnote-151) The interpretation of *synderesis* according to the mystical seeing of Ezekiel about the beings with the two faces of the bull and the eagle was connected to this insight (*facies bovis.... facies aquilae*; Ez 1:10). The synderesis of the eagle presented Alvernus from this principle mystical reason as an infallible, but it was not the case of its naturally given component.[[152]](#footnote-152) This conception of synderesis proceeds from the interpretation of cognition of *De anima* according to the Blund’s school. The intellect occurs only in the mode *tabula rasa* and therefore cannot possess an innate moral synderesis given directly by God. Therefore, Alvernus separated the twofold nature of conscience from the Neoplatonic conception of synderesis as the being of the third kind. It was present among theological Avicennists as general property of infallible conscience. The question of fallible voice of conscience at the level of the person’s rational moral judgment is analyzed by Alvernus and defended in his following treatise on the soul (ch. 2.3.3). The influence of Avicenna’s illumination on mystical cognition explains why Alvernus promulgated the thesis about direct insight into God’s essence (ch. 3.4.3). People are capable of accepting the act of mystical illumination in the Avicennist way; but normally they recognize the world without mystical illumination in a wholly natural way. Therefore, their natural conscience is exposed to the possibility of error. The result is the twofold concept of human intellect and ethos, which has a principally different structure from the definition of man by the cosmic *intellectus agens*. The treatise rejects the Neoplatonic solar intellect and introduces a precise scheme of both components of the soul according to the CMDA. Moreover, it also adopts for the wholly separated mystical cognition of God the Augustinian and Avicennist model of enlightenment given in Avicenna’s commentary on *De anima* by the concept of *intellectus sanctus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). This cognition is fundamentally separated from the natural cognition of the world and of the ethos given to all people. The division of both forms of illumination as well as intellect, theology and philosophy shows the first autonomous cognition of the world through the Aristotelian sense of being. The theological acceptance of Avicennism establishes the Lichtung of the dispute about the twofold truth. Its modern falsity is shown in the Parisian decree of his episcopal successor issued in autumn 1277.

The first reception of Averroes in the West in 1225–30 opened a new round of gigantomachy, this time concerning the status of species and intellect. The interpretation of Averroes according to the Toledo or the Sicilian school established at the University of Paris two traditions given *ad mentem Averrois*. Their representants became involved in theological and philosophical quarrels immediately after the year 1230. A school of the first Averroism was based on the philosophy of Blund, and the school of the second Averroism came into being in the circles of Philip the Chancellor. The writing *De anima et de potenciis eius* defends philosophical interpretation of unity of the person against Porretan modernists; the writing *De potenciis animae et obiectis*, in turn, defends theological unity against modernity of Avicennists. Both writings brilliantly distinguished the error of the Toledo school and found the correct interpretation of *De anima* according to the Commentator. Alvernus and Grosseteste together founded the University of Paris *ad mentem Averrois* in polemics against the death of modern God and against the disintegration of the person as it was given in Avicenna’s modernist philosophy. Both of Blund’s outstanding students took up with dignity the emergence of this university in the struggle against Dinant’s pantheistic Aristotelianism. This eminent act of the true Christian philosophy unfortunately disappeared in historically given Lethe and the unity of the person followed it as well. The victorious modernity imposed objectively valid *damnatio memoriae* on the origin of the Parisian University. After the arrival of the Sicilian school in Paris in 1230, we can speak of the emergence of an autonomous Latin Aristotelianism, which grew in the Falsafa from the dispute between Avicenna and Averroes over the twofold nature of metaphysics. Aristotelian falsafa proceeded against modernism in a similar way (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The whole of being received a new meaning in epochal new conception of *intellectus possibilis*, which broke away from Augustinian Avicennism. The receptive component of the soul absorbs the sensual species synthesized in the imagination and at the same time forms the second floor of the synthesis accomplished by *intellectus agens* as active component of the soul. The ambivalence of the term “*species*” is given in the teaching of *Nominales* by its untruth and in Averroes in its truth. The concept of formal *similitudo* indicates the place of epochal *Lichtung* that establishes the concept of truth as the correspondence between intellect and thing. Thus, in the new form of cognition given by *intellectus possibilis*, it came to a revival of old dispute mentioned in the previous matrix between Anselm and Abelard, regarding truth as *rectitudo* or *adaequatio*. The interpretation of Aristotle according to the Commentator created the first version of autonomous philosophical knowledge of the world in the history of Western scholasticism. Both quoted writing understood the real meaning of Averroes’s metaphysics; both of them took up the truth as correspondence and defended the cognition of the real person as the actual first substance. The thinking related to that foundational event (*Ereignis*) was established in the mode of the academic *religio*. After the decline of that tradition, the historical connection with the sense and the origin of that knowledge ceased to exist. The authority of the Paris University came to the mode of the untruth and this institution died as well. When the basic principles forming *auctoritas* of the Paris University cased to form its foundation, the local modernists had nothing at all (*nihil*) left to pass on (*traditio*) that related to original Aristotelian unity of the person and metaphysics. This unity passed into the epochal Lethe as it was later confirmed by Descartes and Husserl. As far as the modernity is concerned, hermeneutics confirm the basic meaning of the Latin verb “*augere*” in the triangle between religion, authority and tradition (*religio, auctoritas, traditio*) that are described in the famous essay on the emergence of authority in republican Rome (Arendt 1961, 91–142). Both treatises that established the academic authority of the University of Paris came from the workshop of the first Averroism. This was inspired around the year 1200 by Blund’s masterful interpretation of *De anima* and expanded in the years 1225–30 by the congenial reception of the Commentator. The first philosophical and theological Averroism clearly distinguished both components of individual intellect and rejected Neoplatonic theory of illumination for natural course of cognition. The previous parts have shown that this distinction in the CMDA makes the core of Averroes’s criticism of Alexander, Avicenna and all Alexandrians of his time (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Both writing established the truth as formal correspondence between thing, senses and intellect made on the basis of a new concept of *intellectus possibilis*, which was given “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to the Sicilian school. The key characteristic of the receptivity of individual intellect falls into complete oblivion among modern Toletans. It came to it due to metaphysical *epokhē* given by obscuration of the first substance. Around the year 1235, Averroes and his Latin interpreters are accused of monopsychism inspired by Avicenna’s concept of the intellect (ch. 3.3.3). Therefore, the second writing keeps clear theological and polemical character, because it was written after the year 1230. Alvernus had different opponents in mind that the first commentary that made criticism of expiring schools of *Nominales* and *Logica Modernorum*. Christian thinkers inspired by Averroes were interested in the manner how the intellect can form a true picture of reality in the sense of the formal *proportio* given in the CMDA. The emphasis on this “how” connects this school with the project of the present hermeneutics according to Heidegger’s phenomenological *Wie*, which was determined for the first time by the analysis of Christian existence according to the Protestant authorities. We can mention Kierkegaard, Paul von Yorck and finally the Pauline Epistles from the *New Testament*. The phenomenality of metaphysical *Ereignis* summarized in the terminus “*intellectus possibilis*” forms the fundamental *Lichtung* in which the truth and untruth of modernity occur in the mode of epochal un-concealment (a/*lētheia*). The thinkers and bishops of Blund’s school differed fundamentally in their philosophical and theological thinking from the subsequent representatives of the Church, who destroyed the school of the first Averroism by the episcopal decree of March 1277.

## 2.3 Christian Aristotelians and Modern Sophists (William of Auvergne)

William of Auvergne (Guilielmus Alvernus, †1249), master of theology since 1223 and archbishop of Paris in 1228–49, became the most historically important defender of Averroes’s metaphysics in the Latin West. This wise philosopher and bishop uphold the first Averroism in the key period of the first disputes with modernism in the making. His ideas shows the reasons why Averroes’s philosophy penetrated Latin scholasticism in the years 1225–50. Both preceding treatises have shown that the first Averroism makes a fundamental distinction between the metaphysics of Averroes and Avicenna. Neoplatonists of Toledo interpreted Aristotle according to Avicenna and placed him in a modernist scenario, to which they gradually added Averroes’s writing. Blund’s school defended the authentic Aristotle after Abelard, and the Sicilian school confirmed that interpretation later on. Alvernus, like Grosseteste, wrote two commentaries on *De anima* in 1230–40, a minor introductory writing (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*) and a major magisterial writing (*Guilielmi De anima*). In the second writing, the bishop of Paris defines the first modernists as philosophers following Aristotle (*philosophi sequaces Aristotelis*). These Arabic successors of Aristotle are explicitly mentioned in the Alvernus’s treatise on *De anima* in connection with the doctrine of the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. It makes direct cognition in the human soul, because it acts on it as a separated effective cause. The theory of separated *intellectus agens* represents that kind of intellect as final element of the last celestial sphere in Neoplatonic emanation theory. This would mean that God is not the only creative cause for the world. The divine intellect coalesced with the cosmic creative intellect, which is the point that David of Dinant assumed in his Aristotelian pantheism. The human *anima intellectiva* would be coessential with the separated cosmic intelligences which, according to Neoplatonists, exist through the scenario of emanations and not through the divine creation. Neoplatonic concept of the world as formal order of effective causes runs according to the book *Liber de causis*. It descends from above and degrades the sovereign role of the Creator. Therefore, according to Alvernus, that teaching is not in accordance with the Christian doctrine.[[153]](#footnote-153) This scenario exposed in the *Liber de causis* was adapted by Avicennists. They introduced the comitative predication in that system and joined it with the help of a categorical predication to diacosmos of Porretan hypostases. The bishop and chancellor of the Christian University could not tolerate any incursion of modern Neoplatonism into the Christian theology, since it would have caused the death of God in the emanation scenario. Al-Ghazālī and Averroes carried out the same dispute in the Falsafa against Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). Alvernus’s criticism of Avicenna is therefore very different from the positive acceptance of Averroes, who does not appear on the list of Aristotle’s Neoplatonic successors.

“After that, I intend to destroy the errors of those who postulate other effective causes besides our blessed Creator, and who include Aristotle and his followers such as Alfarabi, Al-Ghazālī, Avicenna, and some others (*ex quibus fuit Aristoteles, et sequaces eius videlicet Alpharalius, Algaxel, et Avicenna*). These erred from the way of the truth after him, since he had inaugurated the error in this matter. Namely, they postulated the separated active intellect as the effective cause of human souls (*posuerunt enim intelligentiam agentem effectricem animarum humanarum*).” [[154]](#footnote-154)

Alvernus attributes the theory of unitary and cosmic *intellectus agens* to Aristotle himself on the one hand and to Alfarabi’s Neoplatonic followers on the other. The quotation rejects the argumentation of the Toledo school, which created a unified line of Neoplatonic interpretation of the corpus from Abunaser to Avicenna to Averroes. The quotation shows an accurate knowledge of CMDA regarding two forms of *intellectus agens*. The Commentator does not advocate the theory of separated cosmic intellect, which creates the human soul, and he has a different concept of cognition than Avicenna. The separated *intellectus agens* belongs to the cosmic sphere as an autonomous intellectual form. But in the human soul there is an individual form of the active intellect, which makes entirely different genus. This kind of active intellect exists in the body and it recognizes the world by abstraction based on the bodily senses. Ibn Rushd is quoted in connection with the Aristotelian unity of form and matter in the real body against the Neoplatonists and other Arab philosophers.[[155]](#footnote-155) This quotation has a key character because it honors Averroes with the title “*philosophus nobilissimus*.” The writing insists on the separation of singular things and universal notions. On this point, the teaching of the first Averroism harmonizes with the two direct mentions of Averroes in the whole of Alvernus’s work (Roland de Vaux 1934, 21–22). The reference to Averroes’s scheme of cognition and the personal nature of *intellectus agens* as a faculty of human soul explains rejection of Platonic ideas and of independent *mundus intelligibilis* made by ancient Neoplatonists and his contemporaries. Alvernus resolutely rejects any form of being of the third kind, which he already confirmed in his first commentary on *De anima*. The sensual cognition given in the body is ontologically different from the separated cosmic substance. There is no place for *tertium ens* to be inserted beyond the two worlds. Both forms of active intellect are fundamentally different and there is no univocity between them because man is not a spiritual being like the angels and the cosmic intelligences. Alvernus is the first Latin thinker who, thanks to the presentation of the Sicilian school, was able to distinguish two different Aristotelian traditions directly attributed to Aristotle.[[156]](#footnote-156) This makes the fundamental difference with regard to Grosseteste as the author of treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*. The Oxford scholar integrally defended only the writing CMDA from the teaching of the Commentator against the second Averroism, in order to guarantee the substantial unity of man and cognition. However, Grosseteste considered the cosmology and the metaphysics of Aristotelianism according to the Toledo school (ch. 3.1.2). These Avicennists were not able to distinguish the authentic Aristotle from its Neoplatonic interpretation given by *sequaces Aristotelis*. The following quotation shows that at the time of his Parisian studies, Roger Bacon took this distinction for granted. Like Alvernus and Albert, Bacon read the real Averroes without Neoplatonic prejudice. His commentary on *Metaphysics* presupposes that we truthfully recognize the whole of being, which had been determined in the writing *De anima*. Bacon knows well that the writing *De anima* can be interpreted according to Neoplatonism and according to CMDA.

“The active intellect is active only in such a way that it requires for its activity speculative intellect, which according to the Commentator forms a part of the soul (*intellectus agens secundum Commentatorem est pars anime*). But according to Alfarabi, Aristotle, and Avicenna, it is given as a separated substance (*est aliquid aliud*).” [[157]](#footnote-157)

The basic dividing line between the first and the second Averroism was also considered with regard to the position of the *intellectus agens*. The above-quoted commentaries on *De anima*, which originated in the time around 1235 in the school of the second Averroism (Philip the Chancellor, Jean de La Rochelle), bound the human cognition to the separated *intellectus agens*. The cognition was determined from behind, from the direction of autonomous cosmic forms. These forms exist in the archetypic manner in Avicenna’s figure of detached cosmic *intellectus agens*. It operates in the objective diacosmos as a form giver (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Moreover, this intellect is an independent immaterial substance (*hoc aliquid*). Bishop Alvernus in Paris refused to accept this theory. Roger Bacon from the school of the first Averroism recalls that Alvernus, as the bishop and the rector of the Paris University, publicly proclaimed before all magisters that the separated cosmic intellect as an independent substance couldn’t form a part of the human intellect (*intellectus agens non potest esse pars animae*).[[158]](#footnote-158) The active intellect in the soul is separated from Neoplatonic *intellectus agens* as an independent substance that keeps the immaterial character. A direct causal effect of this cosmic intellect on man is not possible because human cognition comes from the senses. Bacon quotes Alvernus and reminds that this division of *intellectus agens* into a faculty in the human soul and an independent cosmic substance is already contained in Aristotle’s *De anima*, because the intellect is not given from the point of view of its substance (*non secundum essentiam*).[[159]](#footnote-159) God as sovereign cosmic intellect does not have to wo rk directly in the soul through his substance, because his indirect effect by means of secondary effects is sufficient for the soul (the sun—light). The light of the separated active intellect forms in the process of Neoplatonist cognition a component of the human soul by its individual ability of seeing.[[160]](#footnote-160) Bacon added a few lines later that the theory of the direct action of the detached cosmic intellectus agens in the human soul had already been condemned by Averroes.[[161]](#footnote-161) Alvernus’s statement fundamentally discredited the Toledo school of modern Averroists at the Paris University. The interpretation of modernists was not in harmony with the Christian doctrine of the unity of the person and indirectly defended the univocal emanation theory of God as Avicennian *Dator formarum*. Christianity was threatened by this doctrine that abolished the uniqueness of the person as *imago Dei* and created an anthropomorphic image of God. The soul was not created by God, but by lower cosmic intelligences in the process of necessary emanations. Bishop Alvernus argued against it as a teacher before the Parisian magisters and that is the reason why Bacon quoted his statement in the struggle against a similar group of Avicennists who were wreaking an intellectual havoc in Oxford. Alvernus, like Grosseteste and Bacon, saw a principled division between two intellects as hylemorphically bound human faculties to the body and generically distinct cosmic active intellect. Alvernus derives this division from Aristotle himself, because he interprets the writing *De anima* after Blund’s school and after the CMDA. The following quotation precisely distinguishes the interpretation of cognition by exposure from the front or from behind in the mode *evidenter*.

“From Aristotle’s words it is clear (*evidenter apparet*) that he himself perceived the intelligible faculty of man from below (*ab inferiori*), i.e., from the senses by abstraction (*per spoliationem*), which he also interpreted accordingly. From above (*a parte superiori*), that is, from the separated active intellect, the soul can be illuminated (*esse illuminabilem*).” [[162]](#footnote-162)

The quotation from the work *De universo* distinguishes both forms of the active intellect, citing *De anima* in the version that Blund’s school defended against Avicenna. The quotation rejects illumination as a necessary component of cognition in the modus *sine qua non*, but leaves the influence of cosmic *intellectus agens* in validity for theological contemplation and for mysticism. The anonymous writing *De potenciis animae et obiectis* defended precisely this point of view; therefore Alvernus is its author. The first form of active intellect forms a part of the individual human soul and works in the model of exposure from the front (*ab inferiori*), that is, through the senses and through the process of abstraction (*a parte sensibilium per spoliationem*). The hermeneutics of objectivity therefore disagree with Gilson’s conclusion regarding the univocal position of the *intellectus agens* in Alvernus (Gilson 1926, 71–72). The cognitive intellect of Neoplatonists as *sequaces Aristotelis* is permanently and necessarily illuminated by substantially separated and immaterial *intellectus agens*. According to the modernists, it is the only way in which human cognition can be explained. The cognition of *Modernorum* established a peculiar kind of an inner cinema in the soul of *illuminati*. External forms projected by cosmic *intellectus agens* or Cartesian postmodern God are reflected on the screen of Avicenna’s *intellectus adeptus* or on the screen of Descartes’s *cogito*. Modern God is given as *causa sui* and innate idea. The cognition of these *sequaces Aristotelis* is made by exposure from behind and by denudation. Therefore, it is separated both from the external reality and from the senses. The official decree confirmed the abolition of the separated cosmic intellect of *illuminati* and it opened the short epoch when the Blund’s school academically dominated the Paris University. This critical thinking extinguished when the mythological light of the separated solar intellect replaced the hylemorphic first substance and started to determine the natural cognition. Alvernus separated himself from the Toledo school. It used the light of the detached active intellect to illuminate the gnoseological confusion of modernity and postmodernity. At the time of bishop Alvernus, the first dispute between the school of the first and that of the second Averroism came place, with all the basic questions at play that shaped the future development towards objectivity.

### 2.3.1 Criticism of Neoplatonic Aristotle

Alvernus’s early work *De universo* makes criticism of thinkers that received the general designation “*sophistae Italici*.” In view of the analysis concerning the school of *Nominales* in the preceding matrix, hermeneutics can easily determine the identity of the first group of sophists, called *Italici*.[[163]](#footnote-163) Alvernus mentioned this group of Porretans to be involved in certain disputes. He called them by the term *Grammatici* as well, which will be explained in the next chapter. These are two Capuans, Petrus Capuanus Maior (†1214) and his nephew, Petrus Capuanus Minor (†1245). From the previous generation of Porretans, it may also have been Peter of Vienna (Petrus Wiensis). This disciple of Gilbert de La Porrée was active in the dogmatic disputes of 1150–60 and he is the presumed author of the most important Porretan theological work, *Summa Zwettlensis* (Nielsen 1989, 284–85). In the case of those thinkers, the epithet “*Italici*” was really well used. Peter of Vienna and Petrus Capuanus the Elder spent long years in Italy and maintained contact with Byzantium because they worked for many years in papal diplomatic service in the East (Courtenay 1992; 2008, 50–80). Petrus Capuanus the Younger was Alvernus’s contemporary. Pope Honorius III. deprived this Parisian magister and influential representative of the school *Logica Modernorum* of the function of *magister regens* in 1218. His name is cited in connection with two other important representatives of modern logical schools in Paris (William de Pont d’Arche, Richard the Englishman). Petrus Capuanus finished his academic career and became the papal patriarch of Antioch. The mentioned representatives of the school of *Nominales* are characteristic in the point that they combined Avicennism and logical nomination to the univocal project of the pseudo-substance given as *tertium ens*.[[164]](#footnote-164) The matrix of objectivity concerning Gilbert de La Porrée offered the analysis of those logical schools (ch. 1.4). A classical example comes from the quoted thesis “*semel est verum, semper est verum*,” which was attributed to the Porretans and handed down in the version of Peter Capuanus. Peter Capuanus does not agree with it, however, in this extreme form.[[165]](#footnote-165) The statement combines two kinds of nomination. The meaning on the level of the term concerns the first substance that received a nominal and ontological meaning (*unitas nominis*). This meaning is connected to permanent signification established in the framework of Porphyry’s division of universals. The truth is safeguarded as Avicenna’s univocal concept made by comitation of specific meaning that keeps an unchanging character (*unitas enuntiabilis*). In those schools of *Nominales*, the truth-value of statements is given in the framework of the logically defined individual. The imposition of meaning from the direction of the hyparchical first substance was abolished. The dead body was once a human being and therefore always remains a human being in the order of the categorial predication proposed by *Nominales*. The essentialism of *Nominales* attributes hypostatized predicates to the individual. It does not matter whether the action refers to past, present, or future statements. Capuanus’s quotation represents the inference of hypostatized qualities given by essences that are directly constituted by God. This eternal essence is imitated in the world, when the limited, uncertain and contingent substance takes its place. The quoted authors still held on to the doctrine of *De interpretatione* about the logical indeterminacy of the future sea battle. The unity of meanings is guaranteed in the divine thinking, but not at all in reality recognized by us. Grosseteste changed the logical indeterminacy of future events, because of eschatologically and logically important arrival of the Antichrist (ch. 3.1.2). His arrival on the Earth is necessarily given. Therefore, this future contingent event must be logically determinable in human mind as well. Abelard strictly rejected the modality “*semel—semper*” in the debate with Porretans. His position was adopted in schools of *Logica Vetus* by the Anagnines (ch. 1.6) and after them by Blund’s school as well (ch. 2.1). Regarding the sophism of man as a corpse, Blund’s school defends the opposite of what the logical schools of modern Porretans advocated. The corpse is not a human being from the point of view of categorial predication (*enuntiatio*) that follows the imposition of hyparchical meaning from the direction of the first substance (ch. 2.2.1). It becomes clear why the controversy about the sophism of the dead human being became so important after the year 1200.

More complicated problem is the determination of “Latin sophists” (*sophistae Latini*) that Alvernus defined as an independent group by disjunctive conjunction “*vel*.” The identity of these Latin contemporaries of Alvernus will be clarified in more detail in the following matrix that treats the second Averroism in the version of its founder Rufus of Cornwall (ch. 3.3). The first candidates of the group called “*sophistae Latini*” are Alvernus’s contemporaries teaching in modern logical schools. Some of them were inspired by schools of *Nominales* and we know them as authors of logical treatises and handouts of the type *Sophistaria*, such as Matthew of Orleans (Matthaeus Aurelianensis). The connection between Matthew of Orleans and the Porretan school of *Logica Modernorum* is well known.[[166]](#footnote-166) The activity of these logicians reaches to the first half of the 13th century, and their doctrine was criticized by reformed Aristotelianism of Blund’s school. These *sophistae Latini* created an objective sphere of universals as being of the third kind by giving them a singular and universal meaning in the Neoplatonic interpretation of *Categories* (ch. 3.1.2). Alvernus rejects for species the singular status that the followers of the second Averroism proclaimed in the controversies dating back to the period between years 1230–40. Those treatises will be dealt with in the following matrix. Alvernus’s polemics with this group concerned primarily the interpretation of Aristotle’s *De anima*, which the *sophistae Latini* interpreted according to the doctrine of the separated active intellect, in the spirit of Toletans. The criticized Latin sophists have a fundamental problem with sensual cognition. They admit the illumination of intellect that comes outside the senses and they place the act of cognition in the predication of pure hypostases. These substantive forms of cognition come to being in a Neoplatonic manner, in the act of pseudo-creative emanations of forms (*processio*). Bishop Alvernus fundamentally rejected all emanation doctrines associated with the cosmic intellect to be the origin of natural knowledge.

These sophists, moreover, defined the receptive and synthetic components of the intellect as two separate substances. Those sophistic Latins came close to the pantheistic heresy made by David of Dinant; these two intellectual substances are immaterial and they have the character of actual cosmic forms. The dualistic interpretation of Avicennists is derived from the Neoplatonic distinction between the higher and the lower form of intellect, which we find in their interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (OBJ III, ch. 6.1). The aforementioned dualists prefer Avicenna’s doctrine of two faces of the soul, which had originated in Proclus’s interpretation of the dialogue *Timaeus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Alvernus’s compilation of *De anima* asserts that Aristotle’s interpreters following Avicenna and Alexander Aphrodisias take the action of the separated active intellect to be an efficient cause working in the human soul. Their doctrine of human cognition stands in contradiction with fundamentals of the writing *De anima*. In this key issue, they are at odds with the teaching of Aristotle, whose successors they proclaim to be. Alvernus’s sophist contemporaries are dualists and their view directly contradicts the Christian doctrine of salvation. The theory of impersonal intellect annulled theological meaning of the baptism, of the free will and of the Christian salvation. Due to the lack of individual cognition linked to the act of personal will, the imputability of good and evil deeds is missing. The classification of intellect into the separated and individual component does not allow a full personalization of the cognition and the will in the framework of the person as a hylemorphic substance. Alvernus defends all his life Aristotle’s and Averroes’s interpretation of the one intellect operating via two faculties, the receptive and the synthetic one. Neoplatonist Aristotelianism runs in the framework of dualism between material and immaterial cognition. This distinction of both forms of Aristotelian interpretation according to Avicenna and according to Averroes has an enormous impact on the development of objectivity, as we will see later. Averroes’s doctrine, given as Aristotle’s interpretation according to personalised receptive and active component of the intellect (*tertium genus*), is fundamentally necessary for Christian theology. It keeps the primacy of personalized intellect tied to human person. The intellect is active in the soul as a immaterial form of the material body. The school of the first Averroism proclaimed through Alvernus that the interpretation of *De anima* in the framework of Avicenna’s metaphysics does not keep the full connection between the personal will and the intellect in the unique body given *simpliciter* as the first substance. However, the concept of the immaterial and intellectual soul as a fully autonomous form of the body is in principle correct in that point that it can explain the existence of soul after death. Alvernus’ writing about the soul argues against the modernists with the fact that the separated active intellect would make an individual cognition impossible.[[167]](#footnote-167) For this reason, he rejects the teaching of Alexander and the Parisian Alexandrians, just as Averroes did in the CMDA. The authentic interpretation of the Commentator as the most acclaimed philosopher is fundamentally different from Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle done by aforementioned *sequaces Aristotelis* in Toletan schools of Avicennistic Averroism.

The protection of personal active intellect against the first group of modernists had to clarify the role of the active intellect in human cognition. The key passage rejects the Neoplatonic theory of the active intellect as the sun, which acts in the human soul in the manner of Avicenna’s *intellectus adeptus*. This type of human intellect directly receives intelligible forms from the separated active intellect (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Avicenna’s active intellect does not need the sensual experience as it is in the philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotelian intellect is basically a blank sheet where nothing is present before sensual experience. Alvernus explicitly defends the central part of Aristotle’s teaching on the soul as a *tabula rasa*.[[168]](#footnote-168) The active intellect is an integral component of the individual human soul and it works only through sensual experience. To recognize incompatible forms in things and in thinking, a medium is required, just as a diaphanum must exist to bring the radiation of light upon the colored surface. The reference to Aristotle emphasizes that even the sun does not directly produce colored things. We perceive exposed surfaces as colored only through the work of the sense organ. The summary of cognition corresponds to Blund’s treatise on the soul, and to the two anonymous treatises from Blund’s school mentioned above.

“Following this way, the senses are enlightened for sensual cognition by the mere similarity with the sensual forms, which are imprinted in the sense organs; moreover, the intellectual cognition is enlightened only by intelligible forms that ensure cognition in the intellect. That, which is imprinted in our faculty of recognizing intellect, is nothing other than the intelligible form, which resembles to that which is understood, that is, to the actual thing that we recognize.” [[169]](#footnote-169)

There is a fundamental difference between the sunlight and its reception in our eye. The soul has its own receptive and synthesizing ability, which neither the sun nor the sunbeam possesses. Likewise, the recognized form in our intellect must render the similarity with the actual external thing (*forma intelligibilis et similitudo intellecti*). The individual human intellect absorbs the forms *per similitudinem* and thus it differs from the active intellect as a separated cosmic substance. The Italian and Latin sophists, on the other hand, defend the detached and univocal *intellectus agens* that was conceptualized by Neoplatonic metaphor of the solar intellect. This mythopoetic form of the modern intellect directly brings about any cognition. The cosmic *intellectus agens* acts in us as a separate effective cause. The arrival of the CMDA in the version of the Sicilian school confirmed in principle the criticism of Neoplatonists given in Blund’s school. For Alvernus, the arrival of Averroes‘ writings via Scotus‘ lectures in 1230 was particularly important, for two reasons. Firstly, the Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima* in Blund′s school was fully confirmed as right. Secondly, it came to the integration of scientific writings of Aristotle and his scientific methodology into Christian philosophy. Alvernus, as an eminent representative of the Sicilian school in Paris, saw the unity of newly discovered *Corpus Aristotelicum* with the writing *De anima*. This influential bishop and scholar was certainly among the main scholars that called for lifting the ban on studying of Aristotelian corpus at the University of Paris. And this ban was actually lifted in 1231. This basically confirmed the autonomous position of science established within the realm of natural reason. The school of the first Averroism did not require mystical enlightenment in order to recognize he world. Modernity abolished this independent position of science by condemning the first Averroism in 1227 and by integrating natural knowledge into the scheme of the one ontotheological truth. It was not until Galileo Galilei, in the Paduan tradition of modern averroism, abolished this Babylonian captivity of true science, which had been lost in modern pseudomysticism and sophistry.

After the introduction of CMDA, a fundamental difference arose between *intellectus agens* as a cosmic form and individual ability of the human soul. The separated *intellectus agens* has no possibility to affect naturally the human soul, because the mediation by the *intellectus possibilis* is missing. Blund’s *intellectus formalis* is a blank slate, because he takes the forms of recognition from the sensual imagination by a twofold kind of intentionality (ch. 2.1.1). Then it becomes clear that *intellectus adeptus* of Avicenna cannot be connected with the cosmic intellect, because it would have its own substance and thus also its own place in the body. See the key polemics of the CMDA concerning the separated *intellectus possibilis* in Alexander and Themistius (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Alvernus adheres to the scheme of the first Averroism according to his writing *De potenciis animae et obiectis*. This treatise rejects the univocal concept of the active intellect as an error of Avicenna (ch. 2.2.2). The eye perceives the colors through the diaphanum and the intellect synthesizes the intelligible species through the *intellectus possibilis* as personal faculty of the soul. The appeal to Averroes’s interpretation of *De anima* abolished the basic recognition scheme of Avicennism that presupposes direct effect of separated forms on human intellect.

“I will come back to this in order to continue with what has been said so far regarding Aristotle’s opinion on the active intellect. It is true that the faculty of vision cannot be found in the visible sun, as if colored glass in the stain glass or any other substance could radiate itself by the action of light. This is done by the action of emitted sunlight on the sensually given form. Even the active intellect in us cannot produce an understanding as the only cause that would allow some intelligible form to shine in the mirror of our recognition abilities.“ [[170]](#footnote-170)

Every recognized form is received in the way of how our intellect is constituted, that is, through the mediation of immaterial receptive component of the intellect, which is fully personal. The sun irradiates the area perceived by the senses in the following step (*hoc est sola superfusione lucis suae, aliquam formam sensibilem*). The diaphanum first mediates the transmission of light to the surface and then transmits the colored light to the eye. That scenario was confirmed by Blund before the arrival of CMDA in the Latin West (ch. 2.1). The intelligible form has by itself no effective causality at the level of separated *intellectus agens*, which could justify human cognition (*non erit in intelligentia agente ex sola causa hujusmodi*). However, Alvernus, like Avicennists allows the mystical effect of active intellect in scenario of illumination. Avicenna’s *virtus sancta* enlighten the soul from the outside, as evidenced by prophetic experience and mystical enlightenment (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The same positive reception of Avicennian theology and mystical illumination is found in the treatise *De potenciis animae et obiectis*; therefore, hermeneutics consider Alvernus to be the author of this work (ch. 2.2.2). This is proved by putting his works in the one bundle with this treatise. Alvernus’s authorship is proved in the manuscript from Lincoln and also by the joint placement of both commentaries on *De anima* in the collection of Alvernus’s texts stored in the Balliol Library. That is why, even according to Callus, the Parisian bishop, according to the formal criteria, is the most suitable candidate for authorship of the treatise *De potenciis animae et obiectis*.[[171]](#footnote-171) The Parisian bishop defends Aristotle of *De anima* and of scientific corpus against the Neoplatonic Aristotle of pseudo-Aristotelian writings such as treatises *De mundo* and *Liber de causis*. Without an individual active intellect, the intellect in man would be merely a passive recipient of the forms impressed in the soul by the separated cosmic active intellect. The criticism of Avicennists of that time confirms the outstanding interpretative capacity of this philosopher, who was one of the best students of John Blund. This substantial conception of our intellect as a passive mirror was defended by *sophistae Latini*, but Alvernus rejected it. A typical representative of this school was Rufus of Cornwall with his speculative view of the intellect as a mirror.[[172]](#footnote-172) Alvernus’s commentary on *De anima* outlines a twofold interpretation of Aristotle. The new statute of the receptive intellect in the soul forms a boundary between Averroes’s treatise CMDA, on the one hand, and Neoplatonist interpretations based on the cosmology of emanations attributed to Aristote, on the other hand. After the year 1230, the first controversy about the true interpretation of Averroes arose, which bishop Alvernus decided philosophically and institutionally against the modernists coming from the Toledo school. This probably saved in the West a last remnant of critical understanding and certainly, it saved the Aristotelian concept of science. Roger Bacon and Albert the Great defended Alvernus’s philosophical position at the University of Paris from the year 1240 during the pontificate of Alvernus. His two academic protectors, who were completing their master’s degree in Paris at that time, were already known as brilliant young scholars.

Hermeneutics consider Alvernus’s defense of understanding as exposure of meaning from the front, from the real thing mediated by the senses, to be of enormous importance. That kind of exposure of the intellect is already evidenced in Alvernus’s early treatises written after the year 1220, that is, before the import of Sicilian Averroes into the Latin West. The understanding is formed by exposition from real things, because thinking has no way of keeping the original, indivisible and simple being of the thing (*in nullius ratione accipitur esse*).[[173]](#footnote-173) Alvernus defends the position of Blund, whose school founded the first Averroism. The boundary line between Avicenna and Averroes outlines the thesis about the connection of sensual and intellectual cognition, which is given by the correspondence theory of truth (Averroes’s *proportio*). Therefore, Averroes does not belong to the same group of followers of Stagirita as Avicenna, as some contemporary authors claim. According to them, Alvernus represents the concept of the soul according to Avicenna and is a forerunner of Descartes (Bazán 1969, 43–48). Alvernus’s commentary on *De anima*, however, explicitly asserts in the Sicilian line of CMDA that intellectual cognition is not possible without empirical perception (*non est possibile animam intelligere sine phantasmate*).[[174]](#footnote-174) The definition of cognition in the first Averroism rejected the doctrine of *sequaces Aristotelis* about the separated intellect that joins randomly and externally the individual material intellect in man. Alvernus defends human intellect as an individual faculty of the soul, which makes the center of various activities, including activities of the receptive and the active intellect. Later commentary on *De anima* confirms that the exposure of the soul from sensually perceived objects goes both in the direction of the receptive and active intellect.[[175]](#footnote-175) The first modernists in the disguise of *sophistae Latini* lack the conception of *intellectus possibilis*, which ties in with the intentionality in the first Averroism. Alvernus uses the classical term “*intellectus materialis*” to designate *intellectus possibilis*, but conceives it in connection with the active intellect as an individual faculty of the soul. Thanks to the different functions, both abilities of the soul are “v*ere correlativa*”and “*vere contrarii*.” Their parallelism is established in the cognition determined from the direction of the first substance. The difference between the two faculties of the soul is due to the fact that one faculty is passive and the second active; but both of them create an immaterial act of the one intellectual soul. Alvernus considers the reduction of the intellect as the highest component of the soul to a receptive organ adapted to the external active intellect to be a completely perverse solution (*perversissimus*).[[176]](#footnote-176) The contradiction in the definition of man would even be twofold. The intellect separated absolutely would reflect in the soul only the universals, and by no means the singular things. Then, the recognition of the real world would be impossible. Aristotle’s successors recognize an active role for the lower components of the soul by including them into individualized intellect, in which the second contradiction consists. They absurdly transfer the key activity of the human intellect to the external cosmic intellect, thus destroying the unity of the person. Alvernus rejects the concept of the formal intellect defined by exposure from behind, when the separated *intellectus agens* imprints hypostatized forms into the passive human soul as well as into the material intellect.[[177]](#footnote-177) Following Blund’s pattern, Alvernus rejects to bind the formal intellect to the separated active intellect and turns it into a formal faculty of the soul that synthesizes abstracted forms. Another source of rejection of Avicenna’s theory of the acquired intellect, Alvernus found it in Averroes’s criticism of Themistius and Alexander (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The classic study links Alvernus’s rejection of *intellectus adeptus* with Themistius’s definition of formal intellect, which provided another source for the introduction of *intellectus formalis* into scholasticism at the beginning of the 13th century (Baumgartner 1893, 37). In the same way as Blund, Alvernus linked the *intellectus adeptus* with the donation of meaning from the direction of the first substance and therefore identified it with the *intellectus formalis* (ch. 2.1). The preceding analyses have shown that the introduction of the dual faculty of the soul according to *De anima* eliminates Avicennist’s concept of the acquired intellect. It lost its significance in the scenario of the first Averroism that introduced a new scheme of cognition. The active intellect, which establishes human cognition, cannot be a cosmic substance, but the individual faculty of the human soul. It is exclusively Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* that fulfill this role of the immaterial medium with regard to the individually active intellect. This ability must be personal, immaterial and receptive. It forms the unity with the individual *intellectus agens*, which operates as an immaterial component of the human soul. The Parisian bishop thus argues in accordance with Aristotelian theory of abstraction in the first Averroism, and he defends Averroes’s interpretation according to the Sicilian school. The intellect recognizes the individual things through the universal species bound to the *intellectus possibilis*.

“The human intellect does not directly recognize the individual things as such, but only the universals, that is, the genera, species and other generalities, which Plato calls forms, but they should be called 'abstracted species' (*species abstractas*). (…) Cognition is not possible in any other way than through the act of that intellect possible as receptive intellect (*actionem ipsius intellectus passibilis, seu receptibilis*), which in this way takes sensorial apprehensions through the similarity that is present in both of them. Aristotle confirmed this clearly when he claimed that thinking is impossible without sensual cognition. “ [[178]](#footnote-178)

The core of the argument against the separated active intellect working in the soul is the statute of *species intelligibilis*. The synthesis of the essence of the receptive intellect (*intellectus passibilis, seu receptibilis*) and its intentional object (*species abstractas*) are opposed to Neoplatonic definition of separated active intellect, which reflects the species as universal substances. The role of *intellectus possibilis* is defined according to the first Averroism, as given in the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ch. 2.2.1). The activity of the possible intellect exists only in our soul, where it is connected with the activity of the receptive intellect. Alvernus outlines the interpretation of two intellectual faculties in the one soul as it is presented in CMDA. Averroes took Themistius’s hylic intellect (*in hoc convenit nobiscum Themistius*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3) and transformed him into *intellectus possibilis* after Alexander. The intellect cannot recognize through its own self-reflection and without receptivity, because its cognition is universal. Taking that point, it must be primarily potential with regard to the senses. Platonic ideas given as being of the third kind do not really exist and therefore cannot be recognized in that way (*imprimere, non potest, quod non est*).[[179]](#footnote-179) The human intellect has a primarily receptive character determined by sensual experience. The similarity of the form in the matter and in the intellect is the reason for cognition through universalia (*intelligibilia esse, quae hujusmodi similitudines, seu passiones imprimunt in intellectu nostro*). The key difference between Avicenna and Averroes and thus between the Toledo and Sicilian school refers to two components of individual cognition in the soul. The active intellect processes the intelligible species from the direction (*ab*) of personal active intellect (*similitudines intelligibilium impressae ab eidem intelectu nostro*). This distinguishes the active part of the intellectual soul from the receptive component, which passively takes the sensory perceptions from the direction of the senses into (*in*) the receptive intellect (*passiones imprimunt in intellectui nostro*). Once again, the connection known from Alvernus’s treatise *De potentiis animae et obiectis* comes into play, which Alvernus repeats in the later interpretation of *De anima*. The soul is at the center of twofold movement (*in—ab*). Knowledge comes from the world and is procesed intentionally through the senses; the knowledge actualized in this way is then received by the soul in our intellect (*in intellectui nostro*). The soul recognizes the world in the order of synthesized similarity, which makes the universal plan of meaning given from the direction of our intellect (*ab eidem intelectu nostro*). Let us recall the difference between “*abstrahere*” and “*ordinare*” in the anonymous scripture *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ch. 2.2.1). The intentionality in the mode of *intentio prima* operates with received sensual phantasms; the intellect takes them in the mode of *intentio secunda* in order to generate intelligible species. The passive intellect is indispensable for subsequent process of abstraction in the formal intellect, because the cognition is possible only through sensual images. Alvernus confirms the fundamental thesis of the first Averroism that makes the exposure of meaning of being from the front. Therefore, in his function as Chancellor of the university and as Parisian bishop, he presents a clear choice to modernists from schools of *Nominales*, who were influenced by the Toledo school. Either there is the soul and the multiplicity of actions as abilities of one soul. Or, we admit the multiplicity of substances in man as a result of which the multiplicity of abilities is lacking. In such an erroneous model, one substance must correspond to each faculty in the soul. The declaration of war on *sophistae Latini* of that time and the Cartesian postmodernism of today looks like this.

“I answer this person: either he recognizes that the soul has a plurality of abilities and potentialities and that it makes the first and one substance (*unam essentialiter*); or, he explains that the soul is not substantially uniform and has a plurality of substances, because it must multiply the plurality of substances in the soul according to the plurality of present abilities and faculties.“ [[180]](#footnote-180)

The unity of the person is built on the concept of the soul as it is given in the CMDA and in the first Averroism. The one soul performs various activities (*multiplicem viribus*), which are given as an actualization of various faculties. The soul is not an autonomous substance in the body, which would be more or less bound to it, since it is a form related to the real physical person. In the hylemorphic composition, the form alone cannot possess the primacy. This is done due to the body in the act of unique existence (*perfectio inquam essentialis ipsius, quæ pars illius est, et cum materia prima componit et constituit illus*; ibid, p. 66). Alvernus takes Aristotle’s definition of the soul as an entelechical form of the body and opposes it against Avicennist’s concept of the soul as an autonomous substance.[[181]](#footnote-181) Thus Avicenna’s definition of hypostatized soul as *perfectio prima* bound to the independent existence of the soul as a substantial form became obsolete. This theory of the soul according to Gundissalinus, Grosseteste rejected it in the first interpretation of *De anima* according to Averroes. The active intellect added to the soul from the outside provided the Christian Avicennists with immateriality and the separation of the human soul as a hypostasis. The active intellect, in the “*semel—semper*” given mode of habitus, adhered to the potency of hylemorphic existence (*potentia vitam habentis*, ch. 2.2.1). According to Neoplatonist and Avicennist model of Toletans, the primary perfection of the human soul forms a hypostatized intellectual cognition, which is given as habitus. Alvernus considers this view heretical. The soul would no longer be an entelechical form of the body, in which its primary perfection consists as an *actus essendi*. A human being always exists as a person, even if he thinks little or badly. The intellect is merely potency, which is added to the fundamental perfection given as the existence of the person. Therefore, according to this bishop, the independent existence of the individual soul belongs, before birth, to the heretical theory of Plato, for which the pantheist David of Dinant had been condemned. The hylemorphic theory of man as a physical individual clearly proves that the soul must be created directly by God. There can be only one and it exists in the body, because otherwise the person would not be an existing person. The early work *De Universo* rejects the idea of a world soul (*anima mundi*) and emphasizes that it is the invention of *sequaces Aristotelis*, specifically Avicenna’s.[[182]](#footnote-182) As we know, this version was explicitly rejected by Johannes Blund and ascribed to David of Dinant (ch. 2.1.3). Ultimately, the theory of a separate active intellect would have led to displacement of souls into different bodies. According to the conclusion of CMDA adopted by Alvernus, the unique soul, which makes the unique physical substance alive, includes two abilities. Moreover, it has two components (sensual et intellectual) in the mode of formal agreement (passive et active), which establishes an adequate conception of truth as Averroes’s *proportio*. Alvernus provides this key part of Averroes’s theory as a self-evident rhetorical question.[[183]](#footnote-183) The next statement incriminates *sequaces Aristotelis* of having distorted this key part of teaching about receptive intellectual component of the soul. The receptive component was turned into a material one and thus prevented the emergence of universal knowledge according to Plato and Aristotle in the soul.[[184]](#footnote-184) This part of the argumentation has great importance, because Alvernus offers twofold interpretation of Aristotelianism, according to the Toletan and to the Sicilian school. Alvernus rejects both the doctrine of the separates *intellectus agens* and the doctrine of merely sensual *intellectus materialis*. Both propositions are in contradiction with the authentic concept of cognition according to Plato and Aristotle. Alvernus’s theory of the active intellect has therefore no substantial character, because the active intellect forms the act of the soul which synthesizes the intelligible species. The first and the second Averroism does not have the same concept of the intellect, just as it does not have the same concept of the species (ch. 2.1). The active intellect, as the completion of individual process of intentionality and abstraction, makes part of different abilities of one soul that animates the hylemorphic first substance.

By distinguishing two forms of *intellectus agens* in Alvernus’s work, the basic argument of Callus against Alvernus as the author of *De potentiis animae et obiectis* becomes obsolete (ch. 2.2.2). Callus ignored this key difference in the understanding of the *intellectus agens* between Avicenna and Averroes when assessing the authorship of the treatise. He excluded Alvernus as the author of the writing on the basis of the very well-documented fait that the anonymous author refused separated *intellectus agens* as a cognizing component of the soul (Callus 1952, 138–40). He wrongly believed that Alvernus defended the theory of separated active intellect acting on the human soul. This thesis, we deny in principle. Hermeneutics follow the interpretation of Alvernus’s work taking into account Blund’s school and the dispute between the Toledo and Sicilian schools concerning the interpretation of Averroes’s corpus. We find the twofold concept of *intellectus agens* in both anonymous treatises and in the context of the same argumentation. The autonomous active intellect is defined as Neoplatonist cause of movement and cognition of cosmic intelligences. In this way, the cosmic *intellectus agens* differs categorically, generically and metaphysically from Averroes’s active, synthetic and individual faculty of cognition, which, according to interpretation of *De anima*, is integrated into the immaterial part of the soul. The definition of intellect capable of separation from the body (*intellectus qui est separabilis a corpore*) does not belong to the person as bodily substance. The first Averroism thus denotes under that term the faculty of immaterial intellect separated from the sensory component of cognition. However, this component is given in the context of the one soul with different faculties. As we will see further, this fundamental difference between the active intellect as a “*separabilis*” and the cosmic intellect of the Toletan school in the mode “*separatus*” plays a key role in the polemic between Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas. By interpreting this term of Alvernus, Siger as the greatest connoisseur of the Commentator rejected Aquinas’s semi-Averroism based on Toletan interpretation of Aristotle (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.2). The detached and therefore immaterial *intellectus agens* is defined in accordance with CMDA in both treatises as ability of human soul. Thus, a fundamental correspondence of the work *De potentiis animae et obiectis* with Alvernus’s writing *De anima* is given in the framework of the school of the first Averroism. Both writings were written in the context of the Blund’s school that played a fundamental role in the birth of the University of Paris. Moreover, the document *De pontentiis animae et obiectis* clearly states that further arguments in the subsequent interpretation of *De anima* (*de alia vero loquamur in tractatu de anima rationali*, ch. 2.2.2) are included. Therefore, the authorship of the treatise *De potentiis animae et obiectis* can be attributed directly to Alvernus and not to other students from Blund’s school. Alvernus’s successor Albert the Great took the same attitude to separated intellect in the next decade, in the work *De homine*, where a synthesis of the first Averroism was carried out (ch. 2.4.2). Siger of Brabant puts the final point behind the whole dispute by brilliant distinction of intellect into the rejected form *separatus* and the accepted form *separabilis*. The preceding chapters have given factual reasons why there is no univocity with regard to species between the first and the second Averroism. Therefore, there can also be no agreement with regard to any basic form of the individualized intellect (*intellectus possibilis, agens, speculativus, formalis*) that produces these forms of recognition. These terms have no univocal meaning as objective comparative literature presumes it. They express different meaning of being expressed in the first and in the second Averroism. The objective and critical researchers make the same mistake as Alexandrians in the time of Averroes or Alvernus. They turned the term *intellectus agens* and the term *species intelligibilis* into an objective substance, which, in various ways of thinking, is similar to Avicenna’s active intellect. We do not investigate what is objectively given in the determination of those Alexandrians. Together with the Commentator and the school of the first Averroism, we follow the manner how the meaning of being is revealed in the true metaphysics. For Callus and his contemporary successors, the following phenomenological criticism of speculative modernists applies.

“If you postulate the active intellect because of the above-mentioned necessity and use, it is all the more necessary to postulate this intellect as the potency of the soul or its faculty (*virtutem agentem, sive vim agentem*), which produces these abilities in the act of subsistently given existence (*in actum educentem ipsas virtutes*). It is clear that they do not mention this ability of the soul at all.“ [[185]](#footnote-185)

In the school of the first Averroism, the active intellect forms the potency of the soul, which is given in the hylemorphic substrate as a living body. That is why it is distinguished in a generic way from the cosmic active intellect, as it is confirmed by the real act of being a person animated by *anima intellectiva*. The human active intellect is individualized by the act of being of the real person (*hoc est in actum essendi*), which produces the given abilities (*educentem ipsas virtutes*). The activity of the intellect is tied to the existence of human being, which is actualized in the framework of the hylemorphic substance. It is absolutely clear to hermeneutics and Alvernus’s contemporaries from the school of the first Averroism (*manifestum est autem tibi*) that there is no mention of twofold character of the active intellect among the modernists of that time (*quod de virtute hujusmodi nec etiam mentionem fecerunt*). The same criticism can be applied the postmodernists of our time. The active intellect must be taken as a faculty (*ponere virtutem agentem, sive vim agentem*). The existence of the person is primary perfection and not a mythological cosmic intellect that illuminates the non-existent human corpse. The real person carries cognition as *subiectum* and *tabula rasa* through the active and personal intellect. It is launched by actual cognition that precedes it, and even in two independent instances (*imaginatio, intellectus possibilis*). The act of passive and active intellect being incarnated in this way, it valorizes the unique existence of human being. We exist as the first substance, that is, as the living person, and not as un specific corpse of *Nominales*. The active intellect becomes equally realistic in the work *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, where it is defined in the living person, and not as a separate substance.

That is why the protection of the person became Alvernus’s lifelong credo. The person is defined not only in his work on *De anima*, but also in the previous works, which were composed before the import of Sicilian Averroes to the Latin West. Therefore, Alvernus wrote the first excellent defense of the unity of the person and cognition according to Averroes, as soon as he got acquainted with Aristotle’s and Averroes’s authentic writing imported by Scotus. This phenomenological position is represented in a major way by Siger of Brabant on the basis of the brilliant interpretation of the CMDA according to the Sicilian school. Therefore, Magister Siger became the Rector of the Parisian artists on the Rue de Fouarre before the Modernists destroyed that university in year 1277. For fundamental methodological reasons, hermeneutics reject the objective, anachronistic approach to the reading of the documents. The first Averroism explicitly contests the first form of sophistic objectivity, which is still considered the only true criterion for assessing the debates of that time. The objective understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) creates a false perspective in the spirit of Heidegger’s *Irrtum* given by the objective worldview. Then, the erroneous interpretation of texts issued before year 1300 becomes an objective rule, and not a mere coincidence. The false univocity of the term “*intellectus agens*” led today’s postmodern Avicennists to join the modernist party of strife in the style of *sophistae Latini*. It is necessary to make choice between the truth and the objectivity. Alvernus criticized those Avicennists precisely because of univocal concept of the active intellect. The strict rejection of separate *intellectus agens* and the correct theory of receptive cognition given directly in immaterial intellect, set Alvernus against the school of Neoplatonists of *augustinisme avicennisant* (Gilson 1929; 1930). The dualism of body and soul as two separated substances, which was attested in the Toletan school around the year 1230, played the fundamental role in the further development of objectivity.

The years 1230–35 make a fundamental milestone in the development of Parisian school of Avicennists and Toletans that were associated to Philip the Chancellor and to the first Franciscans such as Alexander von Hales and Johannes Rupella. Oxford Franciscan Rufus of Cornwall was the most important representative of the school of modernists grouped around Alexander von Hales. In year 1236, Rufus imputed to Averroes an external connection of both intellects through the form of Avicennian *copulatio* (ch. 3.3.3). But already before that date, around the year 1230, the same external connection of substantial intellect to the cognizing person was found in *Summa Duacensis*, and even earlier it existed in pantheistic form in the teaching of David of Dinant. The well-known analysis explained why Alexander of Hales and Johann Rupella belong to the current of Avicennism, namely because of their dualistic concept of the *intellectus possibilis* and the use of abstraction in the form of *denudatio* (Rohmer 1928). Therefore, after 1240, the modernist school inspired by Toletan interpretation of Averroes as “Averroist” started a fundamental controversy with the bishop Alvernus. He was empowered by the groupe of young Aristotelians that included Albert the Great and Roger Bacon. Latin sophists promulgated the separated material and immaterial components of intellect. Their concept of the intellect has nothing in common with CMDA. They were inspired by Avicenna’s sensually given *intellectus materialis* and *intellectus possibilis* given as a hypostasis to keep the first principles of cognition. Oxford modernists created a new figure of receptive intellect around the year 1240. The sophistic simulacrum of *intellectus possibilis* was created by the fact that the first Oxford modernists, in accordance with the universal hylemorphism, introduced *materia spiritualis* into *intellectus materialis*. Through the materialization of intellect, they got a new figure of individualized receptive intellect as a substance. Then they introduced further hypostases in the form of Avicennist *intellectus possibilis*, which carries the first principles of cognition in the mode of *potentia substantialis*. Thus, in Rufus’s teaching, the modern intellect arose as a new substance of the third kind (ch. 3.2). The example of Franciscans Rupella and Rufus shows that the group of interpreters of Aristotle influenced by Avicenna misunderstood Averroes’s teaching in its basic features, because they interpreted the Commentator through Avicenna’s metaphysics. Alvernus knew these thinkers in his function as Chancellor of the University of Paris and titled them with the pejorative designation. During his tenure as Bishop and Chancellor of the university, these thinkers had already built a new school. This group of the Franciscan *Modernorum*, under the aegis of the magister Alexander of Hales (†1245) edited his intellectual testament, which became known as *Summa Halensis*. It was in this Franciscan school of modern Toletans that the first concept of objectivity arose when Oxford bachelor Rufus of Cornwall joined that circle during his studies in Paris after the year 1235. That school of the second Averroism was supported by the group of Avicennian Dominicans, which was led by the young bachelor and later the magister Robert Kilwardby. He studied in Paris at a scholastic college together with Albert the Great. Albert was Alvernus’s pupil on the question of the interpretation of *De Anima* and, together with Roger Bacon, formed the main representative of the school of the first Averroism after the year 1240. This disjunction of philosophical directions, which emerged from the reception of the Commentator in the Sicilian and the Toledo schools, represent the basic matrix of the dispute over Averroism, in which Western objectivity was born.

### 2.3.2 Dismissal of Nominalistic Statements

The preceding matrix has shown that Avicenna’s hypostatized theory of meaning characterizes the school of *Nominales* and the logical schools influenced by them. The next wave of criticism of Alvernus in his double role as bishop of Paris and chancellor of the University was directed against nominalistic doctrines of the school of so-called Grammarians (*Grammatici*). This school was criticized from the position of the first Averroism in the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius* in the polemic against the sophism of man as a corpse. The identification of the school of Grammarians is indirectly confirmed by the dispute of the Parisian logicians with the school in Orléans, which is described in one student song dated to the years 1230–50.[[186]](#footnote-186) The satire confirms that disputes between the logical schools in Paris and the grammatical schools in Orléans were common during this period. The following matrix shows that modernists John Pagus and Nicolaus of Paris belong to logical schools of *Nominales* mentioned by Alvernus. Grammatici took up the writing *Categories* on the level of Porretanic hypostases (ch. 3.1.2). Socrates’s existence in the past, which finds expression through the syncategorematic verb, becomes in the school of Latin grammarians the nominal and later objective “socraticity” attributed to the substance of the third kind. The analysis of the work *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi* has shown how the predication of the hypostatized species proceeds toward the final individual substratum that bears the collect of these determinations (*socratitas est humanitas est animalitas est corporalitas*, ch. 1.5). Alvernus’s second commentary on *De anima* rejects such being of the third kind according to Porretans. Latin sophists (*sophistae Latini*) created the categorical signification of the type “whiteness in the thing” (*albedinem ponit in subjecto de quo dicitur*) by apposition of hypostatized “whiteness” to the real white thing.[[187]](#footnote-187) Alvernus rejects the univocal supposition given by the sophism “*album albet*.” The follower of Abelard’s school adopted in the line of Blund the explanations of the CMDA and cannot admit any other origin of the signification than by the sensual and intellectual abstraction. It is produced by the effect of the first substance, whether the material or the immaterial. The true signification arises through the imposition from the direction of the first real substance, because it acts on the senses (*signa illa intelligibilia... ipsa dant animae humanae intelligere in effectu*; *Guilielmi De anima*, p. 205). The critic of the Latin grammarians is contained in the following quotation.

“Let us observe the Grammarians that preceded me and some of them who were known during my life (…). Their intention was to take the imposition of the meaning only from the words (*de verbis significabant et praedicabant dispositiones*). They put those hypostatized properties into the substance about which they made statements (*ponebantque eas in substantiis de quibus dicebatur*). Such vaguely given meaning (*quaedam vero*) that had no imposition from real substances (*non significantes ex semetipsis*), they put it into nominally determined subjects (*ponebant in subiectis*). The properties of these subjects they then signified (*dicebantur dispositiones*) by names given by the apposition (*per conjuncta sibi nomina*).” [[188]](#footnote-188)

Latin sophists do not respect the difference between the first and the second substance. They introduced the univocal concept of logical statements, abolished the imposition from the real substance and took only nominally given Porretanic hypostases (*praedicabant dispositiones*). The group of Grammarians created categorical meanings outside the second substance made by l′imposition. The logical supposition received an absolute value. Hypostasized properties were taken to be real substances as their inherent properties (*ponebantque eas in substantiis*). The predication is given as nominal correspondence of one meaning to another. Then it is possible to predicate “socraticity” with respect to the nominally determined Socrates. In this univocal scenario of modernity, it was no problem to predicate any purely nominally given hypostatized supposition. The property or categorial accident is predicated in the mode of Porretan apposition to the substance of the third kind given as the individual (*socratitas est humanitas*, ch. 1.5). The nominalists founded a new atomic substance of the third kind, which is given simultaneously in the mode of imposition (*in substantiis de quibus dicebatur*) and supposition (*in subiectis de quibus dicebatur*). From the point of view of Aristotle, Averroes, Blund and Alvernus, it is unacceptable to take the equivocal nomination in the mode of mental supposition and to change it into univocal predication in the mode of categorial imposition. These thinkers respect the hyparchical position of the first substance. The example of inherence of whiteness on the categorically predicated second substance clearly shows the difference between Alvernus’s Aristotelian predication and the hypostatized concept of Porretan *Nominales*.[[189]](#footnote-189) Alvernus draws the attention of the first modernists to classical interpretation of *Categories* (*Cat*. 2a11–16), which sees a different imposition of meaning from the first substance and a different one taken from the universals (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Unlike the critical Alvernus, modern sophists do not distinguish between the real and nominal inherence of accidents in the substance. They committed this error due to the neglect of Priscian’s grammar (ch. 1.1) because they do not have an imposition of meaning from the direction of real substances. Porretans abolished the distinction between the different kinds of supposition concerning the second universal substance in the logical and metaphysical statements (*de dicto, de re, oratio, enuntiatio, demonstratio*). Alvernus’s criticism proves the progress of modernity through the transformation of hyparchical predication from the direction of the first substance to the modern worldview (*discrete videamus*) given by the individual as a substance of the third kind. At the end of the 12th century, Avicennist and Porretan schools introduced the imposition of functions instead of substances in the thinking of the Latin West. The modernist Neoplatonists mixed the comitation of Porretan hypostases with Neoplatonic mathematics of analogies (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*). At Oxford, the same conflict took place a decade later, when Bacon criticized Nominalists that merged Kilwardby’s modern metaphysics with teaching of Sherwood’s logical school (ch. 3.4.3). The sophists forget that language speaks about reality, and they ended up in language games. Alvernus considers verbal reflections (*speculatio*) to take an endless regress of meaning. Nominalists fell under the universal mythological spell of the *Arbor Porphyriana* and had no real categorical predication with respect to the first substance, only with respect to nominally defined essences. They confused the imposition of meaning from the direction of the first substance with the supposition of accidents in the form of essence that they predicated as the second substance.

This basic criticism of modernists is present in Alvernus’s two treatises as a twofold movement of intentionality and cognition described above (*in—ab*). The intentions are in our intellect (*in intellectui nostro*) and we recognize the real state of the world thanks to the categorical thinking intellect (*ab eidem intellectu nostro*). Grammarians criticized by Alvernus do not distinguish between real being of the thing (“the white car”) and its hyparchical predication by the second substance and the accident (“This car is white”). The nominally given category without hyparchical binding to the first substance is given only in the mode of logical plurivocity. When accidents made by comitation or apposition join logical second substance like Avicennist or Porretan hypostasis, then a simulacrum of reality arises according to the dialogue *Sophistes*. The thinking of *illuminati* reflects but the ideas of their own making (*speculatio*). The following quotation shows the epochal error of the speculative grammar of the time, which was cultivated at Oxford and Erfurt in the nominalistic statements of the type “*album albet*.” Like John of Salisbury (*substantia denuo colligunt*, ch. 1.4), Alvernus claims that the school of *Nominales* made disappear the imposition from the direction of the first substance. They put a collection of hypostatized accidents in the place of the second substance.

“If the verb in the mode of inherence (*verbum inhaerendi*) expressed the imposition as they proclaim, then it would be merely in the mode of accident and would necessarily have a categorial supposition in the subject as second substance. But since the existence of the first substance (*esse in subjecto*) does not take part of statements as subjects of enunciation (*non est inhaerere subjecto*), this nominally given category would necessarily require another categorical subject as the bearer of this meaning (*inhaeret ex necessitate inhaerentia subjecto proprio*). Either the second substance would be contained directly in this subject or would be present in it through some other determination. If it were in the nominal subject by some other determination, then, an infinite regress would arise.” [[190]](#footnote-190)

Alvernus, in the name of common sense, rejected the hypostatic nature of nominalist meaning, unlike the postmodernists who do it through language games (“meaning is use*”*). The Latin sophists and nominalists Grammarians heap one hypostatized determination upon another, and take this accumulation and division of designations for Aristotle’s categorical predication. The argument of endless regress culminates in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, both the school of Parisian poststructuralism (J. Derrida), which followed Husserl’s Avicennism, and the Oxfordian school, which adopted the neopositivism of the Viennese school through the Oxfordian Fallacy (L. Wittgenstein, R. Rorty). Language is too important to be a noncommittal game, as modern nominalists claim. Aristotelian predication is guided by the metaphysical dative and by hyparchical value of the first substance. This is the fundamental path of the sun, which goes to the firmament only in one direction, and the predication must adhere to the first real substance. Modern Porretans have erased hyparchical character of the first substance and they took up their own paths illuminated by paranoid solar intellect. The reality cannot be replaced by modern hypostases and mathematical functions, because we cannot make a true statement about them in the mode of metaphysical correspondence based on the imposition from reality. The logical essence is predicated as a universal, and the logical substance as “this thing here” (τόδε τι, *hoc aliquid*) can serve as a second substance but in the mode of equivocality (*socratitas* of Porretans). Any apposition of the predicate given accidentally to another accident makes a metaphysical nonsense. In such a predication, the subject of categorically given statements is not determined by *univoce* given imposition as a second substance defined in *Categories*. And it is certainly not the univocal subject of a deductive scientific proof. Such an univocal categorical and deductive syllogism contains moreover an imposition that is made in relation to real causality of hyparchical substances. Grammarians do not have the basic structure of meaningful categorical statements. Categorial meaning of predicated accidents and nominal meaning remain in the order of logical supposition. Made in that manner, it represents but a formal correspondence with reality. Logical substitution is abstraction, since the logician is indifferent as to whether the chimera really exists or not. A logical abstraction cannot declare a rational substance to be true in relation to the hyparchical substance, because it lacks the imposition of real meaning. The metaphysical imposition is determined by the metaphysical dative that prescribes causally given transfer of meaning. It follows the order from the first hyparchical substance to the second substance as *species*. It corresponds exactly to interpretation of *Categories* (*destructio primis*; OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The *Grammatici* begin to predicate a set of accidents to their chimerical second substance, given as a hypostatized accident, in the mode of apposition. Such kind of nominalistic predication does not make a meaningful speech. In today's age of postmodern analytical or deconstructive ignorance, one verbal nonsense holds up a mirror to another until the matrix world of virtual simulacra is complete (*iret res in infinitum*). This was precisely a philosophical ratio of disputes over tritheism in the previous century between Abelard and Porretans. The apposition of accidents such as *deitas* and *paternitas* received a nominal meaning given outside of the imposition from the real and hyparchical divine essence (ch. 1.3). From the point of view of classical metaphysics, it makes a pure paranoia. Hypostatic accidents such as “*albedo*”can be predicated in the mode of equivocal universals and by apposition to a chimerical second substance. The predication of hypostatized “whiteness” to the equally hypostatized “chimera” establishes, according to Abelard and the first Averroism, the verbal statement in the order of *opinabile*. Giver such a case, it is possible to make the sophisms about the chimera *ad infinitum*, but not Aristotelian predication that relates *ad finitum* to the first real substance. The chimera described in logic statements can have a predicated apposition of whiteness. However, in the order of metaphysical abstraction, it is nonsense. The chimera does not exist, just as the truly recognized human being is not a corpse. The Grammarians grasped whiteness as inherence of universally given accidents in the subject of the statement (*inhaerere subiecto*). The modernists makes univocal statements with respect to hypostatized subject (*esse in subjecto*). In the order of logical abstraction, it does not matter whether it is a substance or an accident. All hypostasized entities have a formally identical meaning, which is given in the same logical mode (“to the essence of this car belongs this whiteness”). Of course, such an inherence is given *simpliciter*, but it belongs to logical supposition. The book of *Second Analytics* explains it by definition of the triangle. This is given in the framework of the universal essence. It entails general properties that are predicated in the mode of logical apposition and formal comitation. The real being of the first substance can be transferred in its actual simplicity by sophistical supposition (*non est inhaerere subjecto*). There is general order of signification and predication, because universal meaning exists but in the intellect. Every categorical predication is given in terms of the second substance as a subject. But the second substance, thanks to the imposition, carries original hyparchical meaning of the first substance. The sophists received by metaphysical transference only an equivocal predication within the framework of the formal “essence—hypostasis” of Porretans (“socraticity”). They replaced by that “*socratitas*” the univocal predication made in the framework of categorical second substance created with respect to the hyparchical person of Socrates. The *individuum* of Porretans is composed of an infinite series of hypostases; see the terminus *collectio* in the Porretan Avicennism (ch. 1.4). Alvernus draws the attention of sophistical creators to the indisputable fact. If they adopt the infinite apposition in the style of the modern logicians and *Nominales*, they run into an insoluble problem concerning real things (*iret res in infinitum*). Reality disappears in the modern Porretan *colligatio* and *resolutio* that produces the division of meaning in the Tree of Porphyry. Or, it comes to postmodern metaphorization made through “*différance*” that produces infinite transmissions of meaning coming from nowhere and going to nowhere. The cognitive process of *Grammatici* and the contemporary postmodernism takes place in the mirror maze of mythological “intellect—sun.” This kind of academician is led by sophistically educated Furies as rightful deities of philosophical Vengeance. Alvernus argues against paranoiac modernists that the presumed “car” of Porretans and Grammarians could never be “white” because their sophistical *individuum* has nothing in common with the existence of the first substance. The whiteness exists in the mode *per prius* as a constituent of the real thing and is not predicable. Only the real hyparchical thing grounds all meanings given by the second substance, including the predicated whiteness as un accident. With respect to this absolute and *simpliciter* given first substance in itself, the categorial predication of this accident must proceed with respect to the second substance (“This car is white”). The thought and predicated “things,” they exist as meaning only in mind. If they are to be metaphysically true in the mode of correspondence, then these universals must contain an imposition given with respect to hyparchical reality. The supposition of Grammarians makes no categorial univocity. According to Aristotle, that kind of univocity can be predicated only by the second substance. The fundamental value of the metaphysical dative applies again. Without the accidental properties abstracted by sensual cognition, we are not able to recognize what the thing is in and of itself as the first substance. Its existence stands in the past, outside of our cognition. Into our mind enters but the act of donation of its meaning, which is given by universal signification. Therefore, the writing *Categories* and *De interpretatione* presupposes that the philosophers already know the true order of cognition according to *De anima*. The Latin sophists abolished the hyparchical level of categorical statements. In Aristotle, the absolute position of the simple and first substance determines the value of the second substance in the mode of hyparchical imposition given *per prius*. The first Averroism, following Abelard, knows that the real substance determines the thinking, and not vice versa.[[191]](#footnote-191) The criticism of the first Averroism applied to metaphysical staments of modern *illuminati*. They were misled by their twisted form of parousia. Their sense of the word exists only in their mind and is produced by mythology of their own origin. It was the case of Avicenna as the firts modernist (*quasi a se*; OBJ I, Kap. 2.5).

Alvernus gives an Aristotelian meaning to inherence of accidents in substance according to the canonical text *De Interpretatione* 16a3–8, which we have already commented (ch. 1.1). The previous criticism of Latin sophists is complemented by analysis of statements produced in the logical schools of *Nominales*. The *Grammatici* of that time form another group outside the school of *Sophistae Italici*. They proclaim the erroneous concept of cognition given by exposure of meaning from behind. What is true in mathematics and logic, that is not necessarily true in metaphysics. The foundation of logical necessity lies solely in mind; metaphysical necessity needs the relations to hyparchical reality, following the metaphysical dative. Grosseteste issued before Alvernus similar kind of criticism concerning the teaching of Grammarians, in his first treatise on *De anima* (ch. 2.2.1). Grammarians of that time and today’s nominalists of language games are illuminated by mythological parousia of the word as a Porretan being of the third kind. They do not distinguish between essential logical predication in the mode of hypostatized supposition (Avicenna, Porretans, *Logica Modernorum*, Toledo school, second Averroism) and metaphysical hyparchical predication when the predicate makes the accident of impositionally predicated second substance (Boethius, Abelard, *Logica Vetus*, Blund’s school, the first Averroism). Following Abelard’s pattern, Alvernus drew the attention of sophistical Porretans from the Oxford and from schools of *Logica Modernorum* in Paris to the fact that a predication of the type “The car is white” derives from the really existing white car. It is not the *collectio* of substantial “car-ness” and hypostatized “whiteness” that come together in the mythological form of Porretan *copulatio* of nominally determined hypostases. The supposition of the Grammarians is given only in the order of equivocal *significatio*. Therefore, Alvernus calls the attention of these Latin sophists to the fact that, according to Aristotle, the categorically given imposition is given only in the order of univocal *enuntiatio*. The corpse is not Socrates from the point of view of categorial predication given by the imposition from the first substance. The statement “This corpse is Socrates” is merely a supposition in the context of homonymy and nominal predication. Only the imposition of “being Socrates ” as the second substance from the direction of the real person establishes the meaning in the framework of accidental syncategoremata, which are given by present or past forms of the verb “to be” in the sense of “to exist as being of the first substance.” Again, the fundamental difference between the metaphysical and the logical abstraction holds. The uncritical modernity had completely passed over that diffrence, since Abelard’s time. Grosseteste’s interpretation in the context of the first version of Oxfordian Fallacy introduced this fundamental error into the modernist interpretation of *Second Analytics* about year 1230. He created the first analytic (i.e., “grammatical” according to Alvernus) concept of modern science (ch. 3.1.1). Alvernus unmasked the sophistry of the school called *Grammatici* and showed the original *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of analytic philosophy of language. The true statements of future events are not possible at all; according to *De interpretatione* nothing can be said categorically about the future sea battle, because there is no imposition of meaning coming from reality. The real property is given *simpliciter* in the thing and nowhere else, because it is given actual only in the first substance. Then, the accidents can be predicated categorically in various verbal modes. The sophists in schools of the first philosophy of language were engaged in language games and they forgot, as they do today, that the spoken language should be true in relation to reality in the mode of *proportio*.

Alvernus testified to the progressive eclipse of the first substance, which Averroes had ascertained in regard to Avicenna’s metaphysics (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The imposition of meaning in early modernity proceeds from a simple denomination that is separated from the thing. It is a kind of reflection of infinite simulacra that follows the sophism of the “Third Man” known from the dialogue *Parmenides* (132a–b). It comes to an infinite series of meanings if the sens is constructed solely in mind. They are bound to the central subject of statements, but by no means to reality as an principle. In the school of Grammarians, the referential function of cognition and of language became extinct, among other things, due to the poorly understood process of cognition according to *De anima*. Around the year 1240, the school of the first Averroism described the exact reasons, how and why a fatal eclipse of the first substance had occurred in the first generation of modernists. Alvernus explained in depth that Porretans following the Toletan interpretation of Neoplatonic Avicenna and Averroist Averroes around the year 1235 merged together. They established one school of *Modernorum*, which he called *sophistae Latini, Italici* or *Grammatici*. The whole debate about the lost first substance among the first modernists has a fundamental humanistic value. Alvernus explains to the group of modern *Nominales* that their definition of the person made as collection of hypostatized determinations is not sufficient to give definition of the real person.

“If someone claimed to be true that animality makes a component of humanity (*animalitas pars humanitatis est*), then man as human being does not exist as the living being that preserves his inherent animal nature. The real man would be a composition of something abstractly animalistic and of some rest added to it (*compositum ex animali et quodam residuo*). (…) Therefore, it is true that this man is this living being, and then it is true that this humanity is given as this animality of his existence.” [[192]](#footnote-192)

Alvernus rejects the modern apposition of hypostases synthesizing the individual (*compositum ex animali et quodam residuo*). This doubtful “*residuum*” arises at the last level of the division of the Porphyry’s Tree as an *individuum*, which designates the last atomic unity made by dividing the generic meaning of “animality.” The composition of generic and specific determinations is not identical with the predication of the second substance, called “Socrates.” In that case, thanks to the imposition, these determinations have a categorical and metaphysical, and not just a universal and logical character. It means that modern existence becomes a mere accident of the hypostatized essence. In the first Averroism, there is the primacy of the first substance (*hoc homo*) and the qualities founded by it. It means that abstract division runs but on the secondary level of universal meaning. They expressed only the generic, analogously given logical qualities. Their univocal metaphysical meaning must be related to the real person (*haec humanitas est haec animalitas*). Parisian bishop follows the same line as the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius*, which for the first time in the Latin West quoted Averroes in defending the real person against the modern human corpse defined in the school of *Nominales* (ch. 2.2.1). Parisian Aristotelian and socially minded bishop opened the path to Western anti-modernist humanism, which Dante created in connection with the Aristotelian concept of person according to Siger von Brabant (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.3). Alvernus’s criticism of the Latin sophists and Grammarians is quite principled for the hermeneutics of objectivity, because it shows the beginning of modernity in its original state. The new epochal event of metaphysics (*Ereignis*) was given by the fact that the Porretan schools of Nominales (*sophistae Italici*) and the nominalists schools of *Logica Modernornum* (*Grammatici*) were in decline. Their Avicenism based on Neoplatonism was unable to cope with new form of Aristotelianism that the Blund’s school and Sicilian school had presented together since 1225. The modernists were forced to switch to a new form of Avicenism given *ad mentem Averrois*, which, by the nature of such contradictory doctrine, was accompanied by fundamental confusions and errors. According to the metaphysics and the model of cognition determined by Avicenna, these schools create an Averroistic figure of Averroes, which was inspired by the translations of the Toledo school. Due to this epochal *Irrtum*, the school of the first modernists, who called Alvernus and other thinkers *sophistae Latini*, was born in Paris during the years 1230–40. The school of the first Averroism was born about 1225 and it was formally constituted sometime about the year 1240. It came to the transfer of the philosophical chair to the newly minted Magister Albert the Great. These younger contemporaries of Alvernus knew exactly how and why a fatal eclipse of the first substance occurred in the first generation of modernists. Alvernus’s criticism shows that Porretans, bound to Toledo interpretation of Neoplatonic Avicenna and Averroistic Averroes, merged into a school of thought around the year 1235. Both modernistic schools had the same concept of the substance given by the exposure of the sense of being from behind. Instead of the first substance, they kept but an *individuum* in the mode of epochal metaphysical fallacy. Alvernus’s struggle against this school captures the point of origin of the second Averroism and thus the birth of objectivity in its *Lichtung* of truth and untruth.

Thanks to the criticism of essentialism placed outside the hylemorphic substance, Alvernus separated himself from interpreters of moderate Avicennism, to which his university colleague Philip the Chancellor (Philippus Cancellarius) belonged. His treatise *Summa de bono* (ca. 1232) adopts Blund’s division into a passive and an active intellect. He even introduces his terminus *intellectus formalis*. Alvernus’s contemporary and chancellor of the chapter of Notre Dame in Paris (†1236), however, was not radical enough to criticize Avicenna and to embrace Averroes unconditionally, as the first Averroism had done. Philip the Chancellor remained under the influence of the Toledo school. Alvernus certainly had to reject inadequate unity of the person. It was defined as multiplicity of substantial forms connected in the framework of the *triplex unitas*, which Philip had coined after the pattern of the work *Summa Duacensis* (ch. 2.2.2). According to Philip the Chancellor, the soul is connected to the body only in the mode *secundum quid* that characterizes the external connection of two substances (*coexistentia*) and not at all by the connection *per se* that characterizes Aristotelian existence of the person (Bazán 1969, 54). In the model of the first Averroism a dichotomy of the person is not possible as in the framework of such vague connection of soul and body, as presupposed by *coexistentia* of both substances in the teaching of Philip the Chancellor. But by this dual conception, within the framework of the two substances (*incompleta, completa*), at least the minimal unity of the person was maintained, which is necessary for the Christian theology. Hermeneutics defend with the editor of *Summa de bono* the fundamental difference between the theory of cognition present in the work of Philip the Chancellor and the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius*.[[193]](#footnote-193) The key difference between Philip the Chancellor and Alvernus in terms of abstraction can be found in the term “*resolutio*.” In Philip’s work, the term is of Avicennist nature and keeps the transcendental in character linked to the thinking of *Nominales*. Philip refers for the first time to the transcendental notions *ens, unum, bonum* as *primae intentiones* or using the term “*in primis*.” [[194]](#footnote-194) The first concepts of being are given *univoce* and *simpliciter* because one cannot decompose (*resolvere*) them into simpler principles. Therefore, the transcendentaliatakenat this basic level are already mutually convertible and no more divisible. Philip does not use the term transcendentia yet, but “first meanings” (*prima*) or “first concepts” (*primae intentiones*). The meaning of these concepts as first notions of being is given *communiter*, so that it belongs to the whole of being and not to this or that substance (Aertsen 2012, 113). Philip was influenced by Averroes’s commentary on *Metaphysics*. At first he took the unity and the Good in terms of the causally acting first substance at an explicit distance from Avicenna. But his interpretation *ad mentem Averrois* is finally given according to the Toledo school in accordance with Avicenna, in the paradigm of the exposure of being from behind. The classical study that captures the emergence of the transcendentalia in Philip the Chancellor ties the emergence of the first and most important transcendental notion (*bonum*) to the specific interpretation of Augustine’s work *De natura boni*, where the three basic constitutive elements of being (*modus, species, ordo*) are represented. The comitation of unity as given in Averroes with respect to the first substance (*unitas est quidam comitans substantiam*) is extended in the univocal mode to Avicenna’s type of comitation of the hypostatized properties such as animality (*unitas addita est ei super animalitatem suam*; Pouillon 1939, 53). The key passage of this study shows the whole procedure of *resolutio* in the mode of predication of the original unity of being, which is causally given directly by God.[[195]](#footnote-195) In the order of the hypostatized *resolutio* taken from the direction of God as the first cause, it is true that the *unum* as a transcendental notion acts causally in the sense of the substance of the third kind. The predication of the Good in the mode “*bonitas est bona*” shows the hypostasis of the Good as a Neoplatonic substance of the third kind. Made in such a confused way, the amphibolic predication from the Falsafa was reintroduced into Western scholasticism (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). Philip linked this predication to hypostatic nominal meaning of the school *sophistae Italici*. This meaning is given directly with God in the mode “*semel—semper*” (ch. 2.3.1). As newly predicated amphibolia, the transcendental notions define an analogical unity of being that is given outside the second substance as the last univocal unity on the level of genus. It is true that thanks to analogy the transcendentalia are beyond the equivocal predication given only nominally. The analogical and amphibolic predications of hypostatized determinations of being in the mode *per prius* founded a new unity of basic determinations of being (*passio entis*). Its foundation consists in the determination of being in the mode of Avicenna’s formal unity of being as such (*hoc esse tantum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Aertsen’s study of the emergence of transcendental notions in Philip the Chancellor pointed to the importance of the terminus *indivisio*, which is the main denominator for the definition of *ens, unum,* and *bonum* (ibid, p. 119–123). The terminus *resolutio* or *indivisio* shows the nature of being conceived in the mode of predication *per prius* that relates to the final determination done in the framework of the highest Neoplatonic genera of being.[[196]](#footnote-196) The school of the second Averroism adopted this model of ambivalent predication, including the implied differentiation of being by the logical exclusion of another possibility (*par une négation*). The negation of negation in the sense of the impossibility of a further division establishes in writing *Isagoge* the last atomic meaning of the individual (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). This indivisibility, already taken purely positively, we find as a second substance since Bonaventura and Olivi in the mode “*non repugnat esse*” (OBJ III, ch. 5.1.1). Philip’s *Summa* *de bono* defines the Good in accordance with the teaching of Porretans. The generic determinations in the framework of the Tree of Porphyry received in the concept of *resolutio* the most general character of determination of being as a particular form of individuality, which can be predicated in the downward direction, in the mode of the hypostatized property or being of the third kind. The new insight into being is given from the point of view of what makes the most general (*communissimum*) property for all genera. This kind of being creates the last specific property within the division of universals according to the Tree of Porphyry. At the very end or beginning of the division, the last individual is the Platonic Good, which stands behind being and behind the essence. Following the pattern of Neoplatonic negative theology with regard to *bonum*, the first transcendental unity finds only negative expression (*per differentiam in negatione consistentem*; *De bono*, q. 1, ed. Wicki, p. 8). The transcendental Good acquired two opposite properties in the mode of amphibolic predication. It became the measure of division and the present last indivisible atomic substance (*individuum*). These last specific properties of the whole of being are given in the Latin Avicennism as the last determination of “*ens inquantum ens*.” The Good and the Being operates as *individuum* in the sense of the indivisible substance of the third kind. It puts an end to the division of universals in the framework of *species specialissima*. The system of determination of being copies the well-known Porretan scenario of infinitesimal division of reality according to mathematical abstraction (*discrete videamus*, ch. 1.4). Philip uses for the highest genera the terminus “*concomitantes esse*,” which determines the first hypostases (*unitas, veritas, bonitas*) as the highest and most general predicates. The whole system of division and predication proceeds in the mode of comitation and apposition with regard to Avicenna’s metaphysical determination of being in the mode *ens inquantum ens*.

“There are three basic qualities which accompany the being (*concomitantes esse*): unity, truth, goodness. Unity is the first of them, the second is truthfulness, the third is goodness. In them the essence can be grasped in the order of the effective, formal and final cause, but not at all of the material cause.” [[197]](#footnote-197)

The quotation shows the first form of the future metaphysical structure of *Modernorum*, which Philip constructs according to the Toledo school. The comitation of hypostases expresses the basic properties of Avicenna’s *ens inquantum ens*. They are predicated in the modes *per prius* and *per posterius*. The effective cause takes the first place, then follows the formal and the final cause. The order clearly says that Philip takes the causality at the level of the creation of the first autonomous forms according to *Liber de causis*. Therefore, Aristotelian hylemorphic substance is excluded from the form of Porretan “exsistence” and predication. Rufus and Kilwardby added the Oxfordian doctrine of universal hylemorphism to this connection of triple causality. They founded the new form of *resolutio* according to the Oxfordian Fallacy. Following the pattern of Avicenna’s being of the third kind as *hoc esse tantum*, a new level of univocal predication is created on the level of transcendental being of the third kind, which resembles the table of categories. Inspired by writing *Categories*, the new determinations of being taken “*in primis*” received hyparchical determinations of being. The predication *per prius* with regard to Avicenna’s hypostatized being as being took the position of the being of the third kind, since being is given outside of any real subject (*ens inquantum ens*). The modernists, inspired by the interpretation of the Toledo school, adopted Avicenna’s definition of pure being that “exsists” without any subject (*ens non in subiectum*).[[198]](#footnote-198) Chancellor Philip defended Avicenna’s concept of metaphysical abstraction at the level *ens inquantum ens*, which can be considered directly as the ultimate indivisible determinations of being. The direct contemplation of hypostatic essences (*plena resolutio*) is given outside the receptive intellect. The modern intellect observes those non-existent essences as real things, thanks to the denudation of individual matter to pure univocal forms. This gave rise to a new worldview in the modern mode “*discrete videamus*.” Porretans already took up this vision (ch. 1.4). This view of *resolutio* denoted Philip’s essentialist definition of truth (*omne enim in eo quod est verum est*), which the later representatives of the first Averroism rejected. It is enough to look at the distance of Albert in *De homine* and Aquinas from the definition of truth presented by Philip the Chancellor in the statement “*veritas est indivisio esse et eius quod est*.” He had supposedly taken this definition from the philosophers (*sumitur a Philosophis*). Albert clearly states around the year 1240 that it is not included in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Aquinas quotes it without comment in *De veritate*, but no longer in the *Theological Summa* (Pouillon 1939, 60). The dichotomy in the determination of truth is a fundamental indicator for hermeneutics. This metaphysical event shows the definitive split between the Toletan and Sicilian school regarding the interpretation of Averroes around the year 1240.

The predication of *Nominales* in Philip’s school, which ties in with the new form of quasi-substance, was added to the categorical determinations of being given in the scheme of Aristotle’s categories. Philip’s terminus “*reflexa predicatio*” denotes abstractly the subject in the framework of hypostatized supposition given univocally: *bonitas est bona*. The predication corresponds to Alvernus’s criticism of the Grammarians mentioned above. The logical nominalists converted the properties of the first substance into nouns and predicated them in the form of hypostases as the essential subject (*album albet*). Alvernus distinguished himself from these sophists that made the inherent predication of accidents (*inhaerere subjecto*) to real existence the properties in the things (*esse in subjecto*). Hypostatized form of existence as being of the third kind is called by yet another terminus *De bono*, q. 9 that makes a big future: “*praedicatio concreti de abstractio*.” Philip established the term of the “concrete thing” in the modern meaning of the atomic substance of the third kind. The new being received Porretan hypostatized existence, the statute of substance and it founded the categorial predication. The terminus “*concretum*” receives the first objective determination of being in Rufus’s mode of universal hylemorphism sometime in year 1235 (ch. 3.3.2). Rufus extends the apposition of causality according to Philip the Chancellor’s primacy of efficient cause. He took that “efficient” individual predicated in this way to be an abstractly conceived middle link of deductive scientific syllogism. Transcendental determination of being as *res* and the modern *concretum* merged into a new figure of being of the third kind. It is given as modern “individual—substance—essence.” According to Philip’s transcendentalia and according to the hypostases of Porretans, the predication created a sophistical mix of the first and the second substance, to which was added the causality of the first substance in the mode of amphibolic predication done “*in primis.*” Alvernus, on the other hand, ties the whole process of *resolutio* merely to the actual composite of the first substance, which the intellect considers univocally in the categorically predicated second substance. Alvernus’s first writing denies in the above passage concerning synderesis that for natural human cognition the second degree of *resolutio* is possible. This is given as illumination by the active and separated intellect, which works in the world of pure forms (ch. 2.2.2). This possibility comes to being only in the state of mystical insight, but not in the state of normal and natural cognition. Since the universals are given in thought only through *intellectus possibilis*, they have only a potential status with respect to the existing and therefore unique first substance. The same viewpoint is taken later in the writing *De Trinitate* (*in nullius ratione accipitur esse*, ch. 2.3.1). Another thing is direct cognition of God; in this case, all scholastic scholars take illumination as the highest degree of enlightenment. But this does not mean for the school of the first Avicennism that *intellectus materialis* become a passive substance as a mirror in the human soul for the reflection of intelligible forms which are sent out to us by separated *intellectus agens*. In Alvernus’s commentary on *De anima*, parallel to the new concept of the first Averroism, there also exists the whole Avicennist structure of the human intellect, which is based on the act of self-reflection. But the reflection is involved in the hylemorphic conception of the person according to Averroes.[[199]](#footnote-199) The quotation shows that self-reflection is defined by the act of willing and thinking the intellect (*tertium genus* in CMDA). The majority of modern and postmodern commentators neglects that fact. Alvernus’s separation from Philip the Chancellor’s school opened the door to a fundamental confrontation over the conception of the so-called twofold truth. Through this ideological wrestling match, the modernists advanced in the following generation their metaphysical fallacy into the thinking of the Latin West. Understandably, this happened only after the death of this key representative of the school of the first Averroism.

### 2.3.3 Condemnation of Universal Hylemorphism

Another important point for the emergence of objectivity offers Alvernus’s testimony about the arrival of matter as *tertium ens* in the Latin West by the Neoplatonists as the Jewish thinker Avicebron (†1057) and the Arab philosopher Avempace (†1138). Aviceborn’s work *Fons vitae* reached the West about the year 1150. The first book of *Fons vitae* provides the Neoplatonic conception of matter as *tertium ens*. The introduction of matter of the third kind forms *conditio sine qua non* for the emergence of the objective being (ch. 3.2). The essence as pure potency received the properties of the substance of the third kind and entered the division of being according to *Nominales*. The universal individual got a matter of the third kind and became the objective substance. Spiritual matter began to be predicated univocally with the hylemorphic substances after 1230 (Lottin 1932). Following Averroes, Alvernus recognizes immaterial substances but no spiritual matter related to the soul or to the intellect. Bacon rejected spiritual matter introduced by the school of universal hylemorphism at Oxford and Albert did the same against the school of second Averroism in Paris.

“From this argument can be deduced that this or that animal species receives the body outside of its own nature. This opinion probably represented Albumasar. If it were so, then the human species would create its own body according to its own thinking. Such argument makes it evident that they lack the concept of the species as a universal. No philosophers suppose or say that universals could cause or receive real effects.” [[200]](#footnote-200)

The quotation fundamentally rejects the thesis that the species, from its nature as a universal, possess the capacity to form matter in such a way as to give rise to an individual body (*species animalis formet sibi corpus*). The following sentence reminds of consequences of this absurd assertion. The universal species “human being” would form the body according to its own image (*species humana formaret sibi corpus secundum ipsum*). Alvernus claims in the line of Aristotle and Averroes that universals exist only in mind. Therefore, they cannot possess the fundamental properties of the first material substance (*universali enim agere vel pati*). The bishop of Paris considers this thesis as complete nonsense, because it stands in contradiction with the teaching of all known philosophers (*non est opinio vel sermi philosophorum*). He would have been quite surprised that this nonsense became a building block of the doctrine of objectivity in Oxford and later in Paris immediately in the following decade after his death. The quotation criticizes the doctrine that can be found in the work *Speculum animae* (c. 1245) published by Rufus of Cornwall, who was studying in Paris at that time. There are some good reasons why this eloquent Franciscan, who studied and taught at the University of Paris during Alvernus’s pontificate, became the main target of his criticism. That modernist bachelor had to leave the Paris University when Alvernus was the Chancellor and he returned to Oxford around 1250. Roger Bacon as another prominent authority of the first Averroism commented on the unsuccessful studies of Rufus in Paris. Being a brilliant Aristotelian, Bacon was making an explicit criticism of his Franciscan colleague from Oxford and he gives precise dates concerning Rufus's stay in Paris (ch. 3.2). Rufus was the main protagonist of universal hylemorphism, which at first spread at Oxford. It is well attested in treatises about the year 1240. Alvernus considered that doctrine of modern sophists to be erroneous in principle. Albert the Great made the same conclusion.

The dignity of the human person was seriously endangered because of this teaching. Strict definition of the hylemorphic person in the first Averroism had practical consequences for the definition of human dignity. The defense of free will and autonomous cognition in the individual body and soul goes hand in hand with the acceptance of main conclusions of Aristotelian interpretation in the CMDA. The first Averroism, already present in the interpretation of *De anima* made by Blund, was in accordance with Aristotelian form of humanism defended by *École de Paris*. This school resolutely opposed the sophistic teaching of modernists. We have analyzed the fundamental conflict regarding the sophism of “man—corpse.” Blund’s school rejected it, following Aristotelian logical schools in the line of Boethius and Abelard (*Tractatus Anagnini, Logica “Cum sit nostra”*). Alvernus rejects the Porretan transition from animality to humanity through the assumed genera or species in the animal or human soul. Man is not an abstract concept of modern sophists, since the definition makes the imposition of meaning from the existing person as the first substance. Alvernus’s defense of the unity of the person to Avicennists therefore placed the unity of the person for the first time to the embryonic stage. According to that bishop of Paris, the hylemorphic substance is already formed in this stage and not at all by the later addition of the soul. The hypostatized determinations of the intellect and the soul in the context of the plurality of substances in man were rejected mainly for theological reasons. The nominalistic definition of the person, which, moreover, links to the separated intellect of astral spheres, abolished the responsibility for moral actions and the possibility of rewards in the heaven and punishments in the hell. Averroes’s philosophy, on the contrary, guarantees the possibility of eternal salvation thanks to individual cognition and volition. Therefore, the Commentator is called the most sublime philosopher and he does not make part of criticized Neoplatonic Aristotelians such as Avicenna. The Aristotelian line of cognition in the first Averroism is confirmed by Alvernus’s rejection of the claim to an infallible conscience, which was propagated in the form of synderesis by the Avicennists of the time. This argumentation is already present in his first writing on the soul (ch. 2.2.2). The infused cognition proceeds through the hypostatized synderesis of Neoplatonists and *Nominales* (Peter Capuanus, Roland of Cremony, Guillaume of Auxerre). The synderesis comes from the activity of Avicenna’s detached *intellectus agens* and not from Aristotle’s *lumen naturale* (Lottin 1926; 1939). Aristotelian intellect tied to the person as hylemorphic substance does not authorize the separation of hypostatized intellectual and moral faculties from personal judgment, as Avicennists and Neoplatonists suggested.[[201]](#footnote-201) According to Alvernus, true cognition is always bound to the receptive synthetic activity of the *intellectus possibilis*. This intellect, by its very nature, is in the body and therefore perishable (*corruptibilis*) because it belongs to the sphere of cognition in the mode of *tertium genus* according to the CMDA. The judgment of conscience is subject to error for this principled reason. Once again, the concept of diaphanum and intentionality in the form of the existential act of cognition according to *tertium genus* in the CMDA is in play, to create the intellect as *corruptibilis*. The formal correspondence between reality and intellect is given in the first Averroism by dual intentional status of species; therefore, it cannot be replaced by any form of the higher and infallible enlightenment of the soul. Modernism and postmodernism, on the other hand, placed the conscience as a being of the third kind above the real existence of the person and thus founded the abstract idea of human rights. This erroneous conception of synderesis passed into the ideology of liberal postmodernity, which Hana Arendt as Aristotelian thinker fundamentally criticized.[[202]](#footnote-202) After the First World War and the decline of postmodernism, the nihilistic individual emerged. Humanism as an ideological abstraction was preparing for the arrival of National Socialism through internment camps for refugees without a homeland and without citizenship. The same total domination of nihilistic individual was established in African colonies in the end of the 19th century. The humanism of the “man—corpse” prepared the invasion of totalitarian ideology. The prisoners in extermination camps became a mere matematic number made in nihilistic totalitarian mode “*discrete videamus*.”

Averroes maintains a strictly hylemorphic conception of man based on the activity of the personalized intellect. It enables acts of personal will since its nature is reasonable. Avicenna’s Flying Man and the schizophrenic Cartesian of postmodernism need the body only accidentally, as additional proof of the rational existence of the soul, of the consciousness, or of the intelligible world. Latin sophists and their postmodern successors fundamentally distrust the senses because the first substance determines their cognition only indirectly. Alvernus’s criticism of modernists takes Aristotelianism in *De anima* that is understood according to Blund and Averroes. We recognize the real single thing through the senses that are directly affected by the actuality of the thing that is not actually present in the cognition. Subsequently, the conformity of the sensible and intelligible forms arises, through intelligible reception of sensible species and its abstraction, which is primarily given by *intellectus possibilis*. Since this receptive part of the soul is immaterial and takes species in the process of intelligible abstraction, the active component of the soul must accomplish a corresponding synthesis of cognitive forms that complete the cognition of the real thing. The illumination scheme and Neoplatonic definitions of God, man and cognition are basically excluded from this scheme. A change of principle concerned the process of abstraction, which is strictly of Aristotelian origin, whereas his contemporaries still adhere to Avicenna’s *denudatio*, which holds to the multiplicity of substances in man. Alvernus, in contrast to these first modernists, defines the soul as a form of the body and not as a quasi-substance of the third kind, as it was defended at that time by his Franciscan colleagues in Paris. He takes from the Franciscans and from Philip the Chancellor the primacy of the will over cognition (*melior est perfectio voluntatis perfectione virtutis intellectivae*; *Guilielmi De anima* III.8, p. 95), but by no means their biased Aristotelianism, which is given in the Neoplatonic line of the Toledo school. The primacy of the will, given theologically by his Franciscan friends, led Alvernus to recognize Averroes’s uniqueness of the intellect tied to the personal process of thinking. There were two different interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics* in the environment of the first and the second Averroism around the year 1240. The main dispute concerned the determination of the theoretical intellect, which acts through the will here and now as the cause of practical intellect of the person (*extensione fit practicus*; OBJ III, ch. 6.1). Alvernus’s criticism concerns Neoplatonic interpreters of Aristotle such as Arnoul of Provence (Gauthier 1963) and some Parisian Franciscan and Dominican magisters.

William of Auvergne is the first Western thinker who created a unified theory of the first Averroism that influenced the theology as well. It ceased to be an Avicennian ontotheology. The successor of Blund adheres to the concept of twofold method and one truth. Philosophical truths in the framework of Aristotelian cognition of the world are followed by theological truths. The order of human nature cannot be in contradiction with the truth of Revelation. Alvernus rejects narrow definition of the theoretical intellect, which according to the platonic Aristotelianism is defined only at the contemplation in the context of mystical theology.[[203]](#footnote-203) Theoretical intellect is not a mystical faculty, but a natural quality given to all human beings. The bishop of Paris is an important witness to the defense of the autonomy of philosophy and theology, as evidenced by Blund’s treatise defining the distinct roles of philosophy and theology (ch. 2.1.3). Theology and philosophy represent two complementary ways of knowing the world and God. His successor in the episcopal see made in March 1277 a fundamental problem out of this Aristotelian-based cohabitation of natural understanding and faith. Modernist bishop Étienne, in the name of one ontotheological truth, declared the dogmatic war on the first Averroism that defined theology and philosophy as two generically different ways of scientific knowledge. Alvernus is a realist and not a dogmatist guided by academic Furies in Christian garb. The wise bishop professed the real salvation for the real person; therefore, he kept the primacy of the rational will and the individual cognition in the real person. The status of the autonomous first substance in the metaphysics led Alvernus to separate the first substance from the second, which placed him against all kinds of *tertium ens* in schools of *Nominales*. These fundamental points ensured the dignity of the person in the sense of indivisibility and full accountability of personal thinking and acting. Averroes’s *Great commentary on De anima* imported these fundamental values to the West. The first matrix of objectivity has shown that the CMDA radically defended the integrity of first substance against Avicenna in the context of the “meta-physical” project of first philosophy (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Alvernus is the first philosophical and theological defender of Averroes in the Latin West, as his writing *De potentiis animae et obiectis* confirmed it. He integrated Averroes’s teaching into philosophy and theology. He rejected the philosophy of *Nominales* and adapted Averroes’s Aristotelianism to John Blund’s interpretation that concerned twofold method of philosophy and theology. Now it becomes quite clear why the honorary title of the most sublime philosopher was awarded to Averroes alone, being separated from all other Aristotelians. His philosophy followed the first European humanism of Alfarabi and therefore it represents the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of Western humanism. The source of this humanism was in Sicily during the reign of the enlightened ruler Frederick II. and it is linked to the Sicilian school that he founded. It is quite clear why Alvernus, as a Parisian bishop who sided with the Pope in the conflict over Italy, never quotes this “heretic.” That negative political connotation underlines the history of effects that concerns the Sicilian Aristotelism. It explains the silence about the influence of the Sicilian school in Paris. This bishop and ally of the Pope Gregory IX. only minimally quotes the writing of the Commentator, which had been brought from Sicily ruled by the then victorious Frederick II. of Sicily.[[204]](#footnote-204) But the philosophical writings from Sicily, which were introduced on the soil of the University of Paris by eminent scholars such as Michael Scotus, who was directly engaged in papal service, they were accepted without objection. Thanks to bishop Alvernus, the gigantomachy of substance acquired the character of a fundamental philosophical and theological dispute, in which a new metaphysics of the West began to take shape. The group of Avicennian thinkers from the schools of *Modernorum* came to terms with the doctrine of Averroes. It was handed over by the Toledo school in the framework of peculiar development. The predication of modernists took up the univocity of hypostases inherited from vanishing schools of *Nominales*. This group was inspired by the Toledo school and created an Averroistic interpretation of Averroes. In this school of the second Averroism we must look for the origin of objective metaphysics. Alvernus’s designation *sophistae Latini* assigned to this school was taken over by Albert the Great in the ironic figure of *doctores Latini*. By making criticism of modernists and sophists of all kinds, Magister Alvernus entered the circles of the first Averroism. These philosophers were silenced by modern *damnatio memoriae*, which had been imposed on them by defeated thinkers of modernity. However, these philosophical losers made the victorious side of the power struggle over ideologically shaped “Averroism.”

The negative impact (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) of the philosophy of Alvernus let us observe the progress of the Lethe that increasingly produced and spread all kinds of falsehood concerning the philosophy of Averroes. Its erroneous acceptance is associated with the emergence of modern *Seinsvergessenheit* in Western metaphysics. The contemporary gross underestimation of the philosophical value of William of Auvergne proceeds from the one-sided interpretation of his work. There is a fundamental lack of reflection on Averroes’s influence on Alvernus’s writing, namely on the second part of *De universo* and on the writing *De anima*. The dispute over Toledo and Sicilian interpretations of the Commentator is *terra incognita* for the objectivists. It relates to hermeneutic controversy that puts the objective worldview in fundamental question. The archaic hermeneutics follow the action of Muses that founded the divine tragicomedy called “objectivity.” This original concept of gigantomachy of substance stands outside of objective vision that follows Heidegger’s epochal *Irrtum*. The method of “phenomenological How” (*phänomenologisches Wie*) involves the way in which the world, substance and species manifest themselves. In virtue of this ontological *Vor-blickbahn*, it is possible to determine the differences between the imposition and the supposition. This fundamental difference formed the core of the philosophical disputes of the years 1230–40. The same applies to the double reception of *intellectus possibilis* and *formalis*, which the objectivists cannot order in right historial (*geschichtlich*) contexts.

The reception of Alvernus works was done in the historical effect of *damnatio memoriae* and Freud’s displacement mechanism of the inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). Modernity possesses ideas given by the solar intellect in order to observe only the wishful thinking that it intents to see. The mythologic illumination directed by Furies actively resists the reception of musical and tragic truth. The truth of intellectual tragedy of Alvernus, as one of the most important founders of the University of Paris, has disappeared, and it has been replaced by an objectively tragicomic story. His real historical impact has acquired an “Averroistic” character. This defender of the unity of the person presented *ad mentem Averrois* ceases to exist truly in the history of the objective victorious philosophy. Alvernus’s work includes a brilliant interpretation of Aristotle according to the first Averroism in the mode of the Sicilian school. The bishop of Paris was *de facto* the founder of the University of Paris as a *universitas* under papal law removed from episcopal legal authority. He rejected in a qualified manner Neoplatonic interpretations of Toletans as dualistic and unchristian. This critical philosopher and theologian saw the Porretan position of all three sophistical schools of modernists (the Italian, the Latin and the school of Grammarians) as fundamentally wrong. Alvernus’s position cannot be fully accepted and understood in the Cartesian dualism of contemporary Avicennist, philosophical and theological postmodernism. The misleading interpretation of Alvernus as an opponent of Averroes was opened by Renan’s remark on the work *De universo* (Renan 1866, 225). Alvernus allegedly “rejected Averroism on each page” (*l’averroïsme y est réfuté à chaque page*). This is correct from the point of view of hermeneutics, but not in the way that modernism and postmodernism see it, since they made Averroes be an Averroist. Renan turned over Alvernus’s teaching in terms of Averroism not only once, but twice. Renan sees no difference between Avicenna and Averroes and for him the Aristotelianism of all schools flows together into one system. The archaeological interpretation of Alvernus’s writing that criticizes the first representatives of the school of second Averroism in Paris also differs fundamentally from Gilson’s position that adds this bishop to the side of *augustinisme avicennisant* (Gilson 1926, 56–80). Gilson’s interpretation influenced the contemporary exegetes in a fundamental way. Therefore, Callus did not see a correspondence between the first and second Alvernus commentaries on *De anima*. The objectivist prejudices are stronger than the evidence of formal analysis, which also proved, according to Callus, that the same author wrote both treatises. Scholastic tradition proved that point by combining both treatises into one convolutus. The contemporary authors repeat *damnatio memoriae* published in 1277 with regard to the school of the first Averroism. The confusion of contemporaries is shown in the following remark on Alvernus’s Aristotelianism. This remark has a faulty presupposition given by Avicennian objectivism, but it correctly sums up the major points concerning Alvernus’s real position.[[205]](#footnote-205) The example of ambiguous interpretation concerning the separated active intellect can be found in the writing of Teske, who correctly sees it as Avicenna’s teaching. However, he wrongly identifies it with the position of Alvernus, because he considers him a critical Avicennist.[[206]](#footnote-206) The medievalists in the age of metaphysical nihilism are objectively blind to the historicity of *a/lētheia*, which at the same time sends error and truth to mortals. The ontological comprehension directed to meaning of being is given by Neoplatonic solar intellect. The academic *illuminati* blinded in this way do not see a twofold interpretation of Aristotle. That is why the twofold interpretation of Averroes in the paradigm of the Sicilian and the Toledo school necessarily came into oblivion. Therefore, contemporary interpreters missed the decisive controversy that concerned the correspondence theory of truth given in the framework of Averroes’s theory of *intellectus possib*ilis in the years 1230–40. The objective academic prejudice given by Avicenna does not see the original *Lichtung* in which the metaphysics of *Modernorum* was formed. This blindness is objectively given. Furies are obliged to spread chthonic chaos, and uncritical thinking among *illuminati* obsessed with objective hubris. The contemporary objectivists focus on the comparison of concepts in the Porretan mode. The question “what” the intellect is, such question concerns but an objective hypostasis. They do not see the phenomenological character of intellectual cognition in Alvernus’s work. He fundamentally searched the way “how” the existing person recognizes the world. Avicennist objectivists made the same mistake in the case of Siger of Brabant as the best connoisseur of the Commentator. Mythology of solar intellect cannot serve as a valid method of interpretation for the ingenious thinkers of Falsafa and Scholasticism. They read the major philosophers to the depths and therefore found the holistic meaning in Aristotle’s metaphysics, in contrast to the divided and uncritical postmodernism. The distinction between the schools of that time and their quarrels must begin at the nature of cognition; otherwise, the interpretation takes a wrong direction. Today’s interpreters do not see the twofold phenomenon of the separate cosmic and strictly individual *intellectus agens*, which is fundamentally related to the reception of Averroes in the Blund’s school. Both forms of the active intellect are generically different. Therefore, from the point of view of scientific cognition according to *Second Analytic*, the one type of same unified knowledge is excluded. The main *crux interpretatorum* today represents the statute of the active intellect and the univocity of species in the first and the second Averroism. We have analyzed this difference in Blund’s *Tractatus De anima* and in both anonymous treatises from the years 1225–30. The interpretation of postmodern Avicennists (Renan, Hasse, Teske) and scholastic objectivist Tomists (Gilson) is based on the victorious semi-Averroism of Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus, who defended the plurality of forms in the *anima intellectiva*. Alvernus, however, would not have accepted such concept of the soul. That fait was confirmed by his successors in the Rue du Fouarre, such as magister Siger of Brabant. The plurality of hypostatized forms was defended by Grosseteste, who founded the University of Oxford sometime after the year 1225. He became the first Oxford’s modernist according to the Toledo school. The contemporary interpreters of Alvernus correctly see his criticism of Avicenna; but their objective *veritas* does not reach the core of historial and therefore tragic *alētheia* of Alvernus’s philosophy. The postmodern analyses are factually correct regarding his criticism of Avicenna, but they contain only half the truth. The commentators, deformed by objectivism, do not see Averroes’s decisive influence on philosophical and theological thinking of Alvernus, especially in his protracted commentary on *De anima*, which was intended for educated clergy of the Latin West. Hermeneutics interpreted the teaching of this representative of the first Averroism by explaining both his criticism of the *sophistae Italici, vel Latini*, and his criticism of the Neoplatonic and Arabic *sequaces Aristotelis*.

Such accomplishment was possible only after the arrival of Averroes’s works in the Latin West in two waves. The connoisseurs of Aristotle, in the Blund’s line given by Abelard, rejected Averroes’s interpretation of the Toledo school. Blund’s followers understood precisely what kind of mistakes the Toletans committed. Grosseteste in his brilliant interpretation *De anima et de potenciis eius*, shows the points that make the Commentator different from Avicenna. That explains the reason why the students of Abelard and Blund adopted the interpretation of Averroes’s metaphysics. Gauthier was the first contemporary connoisseur to understand the epochal impact of this work, because it established a new school of metaphysics. Between the years 1220–25, the Commentator received a new interpretation at the *École de Paris*. It belonged to the cathedral schools and it was transformed into the University of Paris at that time. The University of Paris was founded during the pontificate of Honorius III. (1216–27). This lawyer and economist was one of the educators of the Sicilian Frederick II. and granted the first papal privileges to the universities in Bologna and Paris. The reasoning of Blund’s school, before the arrival of the CMDA, was based on Abelard’s theory of signification formed according to *Categories* and on Boethius’s interpretation of *Isagoge*. The preceding matrix of objectivity explained that point. This tradition of Aristotelianism took in the new gigantomachy of substance the position against the school of Porretans, against the school of *Nominales* and against the sophistry of schools united within the framework of the *Logica Modernorum*. Scotus imported interpretation *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Sicilian school. It confirmed the previous conclusions made in line of Boethius and Abelard. Michael Scotus arrived from Toledo to Sicily for the same reasons as Porphyry, that is, because of truthfully interpreted Aristotle. Therefore, he clarified and confirmed to Aristotelians in Paris erroneous interpretations of Aristotle and equally erroneous translations of the Commentator. They were produced in the environment of the Toledo school influenced by mysticism of Avicenna and Neoplatonism. Grosseteste left Paris very probably after the year 1225 and thus he missed the Parisian lectures of the Sicilian school given by Scotus’s arrival in 1230. The first Aristotelian masters institutionally founded the University of Paris in the mode of the Sicilian school (Blund, Alvernus). They adopted Averroes’s authentic interpretation from the environment of the Sicilian school, formed according to Aristotle’s scientific writing and according to the real phenomenology of cognition. That is why the Commentator became the *philosophus nobilissimus* in the historical mode of Lethe given by the decline of Falsafa. However, his thinking under the influence of immortal Muses acting in the mode of *a/lētheia*, founded the Christian and academic fame of the Paris University in its original *alētheia* until the year 1277.

The status of active intellect became the main point of controversy between the Toletan and Sicilian school. Blund’s school interpreted the human *intellectus agens* in accordance with Averroes’s imported work that they first received through the Toledo school. The masters from Blund’s school, such as Alvernus and Grosseteste, could read the real Averroes, and not his Neoplatonic simulacrum. The founders of the University of Paris therefore rejected Avicennian reasoning of the Toledo school, because it was based on the erroneous modernist reading of the Commentator. The main reason was a missing concept of diaphanum and Neoplatonic interpretation of natural cogniton through mystic illumination. Both theses contradicted the writing *De anima*. In the years 1220–30, the interpretation of philosophers and logicians from Blund’s school refused to follow Neoplatonic exegesis of *Corpus Aristotelicum* brought about by Toletans. The school of the first Averroism put *Corpus Aristotelicum* in the framework of new interpretation made according to Averroes and according to the Sicilian school. This brilliant intellectual achievement under bishop Alvernus is comparable to the act of the previous generation united in the *École de Paris*. Around the year 1215, Blund’s school defended the Christian vision of person according to real Aristotle against the Neoplatonic Aristotelian David of Dinant. This Aristotelian school founded the University of Paris by defending rationality and the natural and theological dignity of the person. As a result of the decline that original critical rationality, this institution became extinct, because in the postmodern Enlightenment it did not have the corresponding Aristotelian and metaphysical *raison d’être*. Alvernus was the first philosopher and theologian in the Latin West that systematically separated two very different Aristotelian interpretations. After the pioneer Blund, he masterfully defended the authentic sense of *De anima* according to CMDA. Alvernus and his school was taken over by Albert and Bacon. They preserved in the Latin West the unity of person and original humanism of Falsafa according to the Second master and the Commentator. Therefore, one can consider this Parisian bishop, philosopher, humanist and chancellor of the University of Paris as the founder of the school that lectured the first Averroism. Roger Bacon unequivocally confirmed that fact. Today, it is necessary to reconsider the testimony of philosopher Alvernus about the difference between the first and the second Averroism with regard to Aristotle’s twofold interpretation. Knowledge of CMDA according to the Sicilian school defended by Scotus helped the first connoisseurs of Averroes’s corpus competently reject the theory based on separate *intellectus agens*, which defended the partisans of Avicennian interpretation of Aristotle. Averroes and Blund knew very well that modern *illuminati* do not read Aristotle’s writings (*moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The controversy between two schools took place around the years 1230–40 and shows the reasons why and how Averroes became an Averroist. Gigantomachy of both schools explains why the brilliant Commentator and *philosophus nobilissimus* was not and could not be an Averroist at the time of critical thinkers such as Alvernus and the young representatives of the first Averroism in Paris (Bacon, Albert). This dispute between the two schools for the honorary title of Commentator for Avicenna or for Averroes explains why the sophistic modernists attacked the “pagan” and the “Averroist” Averroes. That change occurred in the school of compilers of the *Summa Halensis* almost immediately after the death of bishop and chancellor Alvernus.

## 2.4 Synthesis of the First Averroism (Albert the Great)

Gigantomachy of the substance got a new dimension after the year 1230 in the framework of new questions. The worldview was determined in one or the other school by the affiliation to the metaphysics of Plato or Aristotle. The generation of young philosophers, such as Roger Bacon and Albert the Great, began their studies in Paris in the years 1235–40. They had to choose between the young academic contemporaries from the rank of the second Averroism (*Moderni*), such as the popular Rufus of Cornwall, and the classics of the first Averroism, such as the Parisian bishop and university chancellor Alvernus. Some philosophy students vacillated somewhere in the middle stream of Avicennian Aristotelianism as represented by Philip the Chancellor and the authors of the *Summa Duacensis* or by Franciscan compilers of the *Summa Halensis* such as John the Rupella. Because of Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotelian corpus and the sophistic grasp of Averroes, these modernists fall into Alvernus’s criticism of contemporaries called *sequaces Aristotelis* and *sophistae Latini*. These Avicennists constituted the first wave of the second Averroism. This wave is partially included in Gilson’s terminus *augustinisme avicennisant*. Some of them, moreover, belonged to Porretans schools that preserved the declining thought of the *Logica Modernorum* and the schools of *Nominales*. Moreover, they also belong to the group of *Grammatici*, which was criticized by Alvernus in the style of Abelard and Blund’s school. These Aristotelians claimed that from the point of view of the imposition, the corpse is not a human being, because it keeps only a nominal equivocation of meaning. The definitive merger and transformation of the schools of Grammarians and modern sophists of all shades took place after the year 1250. After the death of the chancellor Alvernus, the struggle for academic posts at the university flared up. The school of Modists (*Modistae*) from the first Averroism launched a polemic against the first modernists that took over all sophisms comming from Oxfordian Fallacy. The school of the first Averroism was settled at the Artist faculty of secular priests and masters on the Rue du Fouarre. Bonaventura’s school became the academic bastion of modernity, since it took up the chair founded by mendicant orders. Their faculty came into being at the University of Paris by the papal bull *Quasi lignum vitae* (1255). The representatives of the first Averroism of the second wave, which started to lecture after 1240, refused all errors of the second Averroism concerning the cognition and intellectual abilities of the soul. A new interpretation of *De anima* was needed to accomplish that task. Further, they defended the Aristotelian concept of science by connecting logic and predication with the true cognition of the first substance based on the classical interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Thanks to interpretations of *De anima* and *Second Analytics*, the school of the first Averroism defended the realist status of substance exposed through meaning coming from the front, from the direction of the first substance. The object or goal of metaphysics (σκωπός, *ġaraḍ*), which the Falsafa looked for according to *Isagoge* interpreted in Aristotelian or Neoplatonic terms, these young Aristotelians found it in harmony with the interpretation of the first science. Following Averroes’s pattern, they found the unity of being based on the physical exploration of the first substance. In all three major interpretations of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* (*De anima*—Alvernus, *Second analytics*—Albert, *Metaphysics*—Bacon), these brilliant interpreters preferred the solution of Averroes’s “meta-physics.” They actively uphold it against the group of sophistic contemporaries. Averroes, however, was attacked by Aquinas, who came to the school of the first Averroism in Paris only in the following decade (about 1252) and never completely got rid of the influence of Avicennian metaphysics.

By combining the problem of cognition in the soul and the deductive approach to the science, the decisive round of the disagreement about substance began in Paris in the years 1240–45. During that period, it came to separation of schools based on the first and the second Averroism and the objective modernity was fully established. Albert the Great, in his masterpiece *De homine* written in Paris around 1242, finalized the scholastic synthesis of the CMDA in the spirit of the first Averroism. This synthetic commentary on *De anima* was written during the first and most important controversy concerning the representants of the first Averroism (Blund, Alvernus, Albert, Bacon) and those of the second Averroism (Rufus, Bonaventura, Kilwardby). This group of *sophistae Latini* was formed by the first generation of modernists who adopted the Neoplatonic mix of Avicenna and Averroes coming from the Toledo school (Alexander of Hales, Philip the Chancellor, Jean de La Rochelle). Albert’s original work *De homine* provoked the first serious confrontation with the representatives of the second wave of modernism (Kilwardby, Rufus) and opened the next matrix of quarrels about the objective concept of being. A similar clash between the first and the second Averroism took place at Oxford, where Roger Bacon led the first group against the superiority of the modernists that took up the moderate Neoplatonism of Grosseteste. The introduction to Albert’s treatise *De homine* is of key character because he connected the teaching in *De anima* according to the first Averroism with the Aristotelian interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Grosseteste interpreted this writing around 1230 in Oxford in the spirit of the incipient second Averroism (ch. 3.1.1). The first Averroism endorses against the school of the second Averroism the principally different interpretation of science according to *Second Analytics* and different concept of cognition according to *De anima*. In this context, the first mention of Albert’s studies in Padua in the year 1222 is quite important. This school of law and artistic sciences was at that time officially established as an independent study by the masters of the University of Bologna. The preceding matrix has shown that the Sicilian court of Frederick II. (†1250) was the main bastion of the first Averroism under the leadership of Michael Scotus. This explains Albert’s authority at the Paris University right after his arrival around the year 1240. His interpretation of the corpus was done according to the Sicilian school, which the Paris University became thoroughly acquainted with, thanks to Scotus’s work in Paris in 1230. The dispute between the first and the second Averroism, Albert led it in the years 1245–48 in Paris. Albert lectures took up anew the controversy between Blund’s school and the Aristotelian Avicennists. It was clear to all artists of the time that Albert’s writing *De homine* (c. 1242) joined the line of bishop Alvernus against the Latin sophists, who were grouped in Avicennist schools of *sequaces Aristotelis*. Bacon, like Albert, wrote a commentary *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Sicilian school on the various books of *Metaphysics*. The commentaries were completed about 1245 in Paris. The next round of the quarrel between two schools began after the death of bishop Alvernus. Albert’s main commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus on the nature of soul and intellect (*De anima, De intellectu et intelligibili, De unitate intellectus*) are already written in Cologne. During this period Albert wrote commentaries on logical writings, namely on the *First* and *Second Analytics* and on *De interpretatione* (1254–56). This ended his lifelong commitment to publish an undistorted interpretation of Aristotle’s major works.

Hermeneutics must answer two main questions that elucidate Albert’s philosophical struggles during his Parisian period. On what points and how does the writing *De homine* defend the main thesis of the first Averroism? How do Albert’s commentaries on *De anima* and the treatises concerning the intellect from years 1254–57 promulgate the doctrine of the unity of the person presented in *De homine*? The polemics of the Dominican settled in Cologne with his opponents of the time explain the doctrine of the first Averroism made in years 1240–55, which is the key period of the first phase of the emergence of objectivity. The first part of *De homine*, followed by Albert’s later interpretation of *Second Analytics*, clearly shows that the philosophical opponents that he called *Latini* were followers of the second Averroism, who put forward the first concept of objectivity around 1250. Bacon, at the same time in Oxford, commented on Aristotle’s corpus in a similar manner as Albert. Bacon separated himself from the sophistical teachings of Oxford teachers such as Rufus of Cornwall (ch. 3.2). These representatives of the second Averroism defended quite a modern science conceived in Avicennian terms. It was placed beyond reality of the first substance and contested the unity of the person. Alvernus rejected this doctrine in principle. He strengthened the founding charism and *genius loci* of newly established papal authority of the University of Paris that was valid for the entire Christian West. Albert and Bacon, under different conditions, were waging the same struggle against the next generation of thinkers from the school of the second Averroism. Mendicant group of modernists set out to win academic posts in Paris and especially in Oxford. These sophist mendicants capitalized on the strong positions of power in church offices, including papal favors. These modern and quite contemporary instruments came to their “philosophical” aid in the critical year of 1255 and then again in the year 1277.

### 2.4.1 Twofold Conception of Science and Soul

The first and therefore the most important question of the treatise *De homine* (q. 1, a. 1, *solutio*) takes up the basic methodology concerning the investigation of the human soul.[[207]](#footnote-207) The definition of the intellect has a central importance in Albert’s early philosophy (Anzulewicz 2003). The exegesis follows Albert’s controversy against the modernists. Therefore, we choose the methodological approach that investigates the mode “how” the soul recognizes. This method follows the original line of the CMDA. Albert divides the exploration of the soul into an Avicennist procedure, given in the mode *simpliciter*, and the Aristotelian approach, given by the real course of human cognition (*quoad nos*). Albert took up the Aristotelian interpretation summed up by hyparchical position of the first substance. He rejected the formalist attitude to scientific cognition to be universally valid, because it does not go to reality to grasp causal effects of first substances. Again, the exposure of the sense of being runs either through the universally given essence or by the real first substance. The writing *Second Analytics* claims that we understand the real world thanks to the causality exercised by first substances (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Albert’s definition of man, according to *Metaphysics Z*, follows the action of the metaphysical dative in the past character of the original donation of being (OBJ I, ch. 1.1). The act of being (*actus essendi*) exists beyond of philosophical research (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas*). It gives this being here (τό τί) its existence given by metaphysical dative (τῷ τί ἦν, *quo est*). There is the fundamental difference between the original act of establishing the being as this substance here and now (οὐσία, τόδε τι) and the secondary recognition of this beingness given in mind and in the universal mode. In the predication of existing substance, this original event of hidden transition of being into the substance existing here and now has the past character (ἦν εἶναι). Therefore, it is not directly included in universal statements. Unlike Plato, Aristotle maintains that the being of *ousía* in reality is not the same as its *parousía* in mind. The sense of the thing is adequately recreated in cognition, but it is not identical with the real thing. The school of Modists in the first Averroism defended that Aristotle’s view. The metaphysical dative applies to the predication of causality as well. It takes place among things in reality and is predicated by middle member of demonstrative syllogism (τὸ μέσον; *Anal. Post.* 90a1). True cognition involves, in the mode of the metaphysical dative, the relation to the reality of the first substances. According to the writings *Categories* and *Second Analytics*, they act upon each other immediately and in virtue of their own causality.[[208]](#footnote-208) The middle member of the deductive scientific proof (*medium*) includes in itself as categorial univocal predication that unique causal effect of the first substances. If this hyparchical value of the real causality done by imposition is missing, then the proof can be true but, but solely as subject of logical, geometrical or mathematical abstraction. The logical definition of essence does not make the subject of metaphysical abstraction. It is the only method that allows univocal and therefore true categorical predication. The metaphysically true predication runs in the framework of the first science that investigates real substances. The core of the confrontation became the interpretation of *Second Analytics*, which the Latin West commented systematically for the first time after the year 1230. This writing extended the scenario of cognition according to *De anima* and the theory of logical syllogism in *De interpretatione* to the demonstrative proof.

Aristotle enumerates four successive principles of scientific cognition.[[209]](#footnote-209) The first principle deals with the existence of the investigated thing or appearance (τὸ ὅτι). The second one investigates the relation of the investigated phenomenon and the external thing (τὸ διότι). The third one makes the key principle, since it investigates the very existence of external thing that is acting as cause or it makes the subject of investigated phenomenon (εἰ ἔστι). Only the last step of investigation predicates the universal essence of the real thing (τί ἐστιν). The order of inquiry follows the necessity established by the metaphysical dative. It starts from the real occurrence of the investigated phenomenon in its original and effective causality. The effect of the external thing on the senses and the intellect represent the efficient cause of cognition. The scientific deduction is based on the causality, since it follows the effects of hyparchical existence determined by the first substance. If a real causality is established, then the middle member of syllogism (*medium*) predicates exactly this kind of effective relation to establish the deductive scientific proof (*demonstratio*). The conclusion already proclaims this causality in a general way, with regard to the universally predicated essence. The scientific proof is done in the context of the valid deductive syllogism, that is, in logical universality and metaphysical necessity, to express the validity of necessary causality applied on the level of real substance. It comprehends this causality in the past character of the *quidditas* and therefore relates it to the universally defined essence in the mode of truth as scientific correspondence. According to Aristotle, the scientific investigation of the world is at first entailed by existence of the first substances in reality and by their causal effects. When the unique effect of things in reality is given, this reality is adequately predicated in the demonstrative syllogism. Thanks to the sequence of the steps three and four (i.e., the primacy of the real existence and the subsequent recognition of the universal essence) the main thesis of *Second Analytics* is valid that such kind of scientific knowledge is necessary and universal. The causality is given in the reality *simpliciter*, in the framework of actual first substances. The middle member of the deductive syllogism (*medium*) has a unique position in the demonstrative proof, because it predicates the real causality of the first substance in the universal and potential mode *per posterius*. The real causality is given in the unique actual mode *per prius*. Therefore, the scientific conclusions are only potentially given, with respect to real things. We know in thought that the thing given in its real being either is or is not. The unique thing is given *simpliciter* and *actualiter* in reality, just as universal cognition is given *simpliciter* and *potentialiter* in the intellect of the real person (ζητῶμεν τὸ ὅτι ἢ τὸ εἰ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς, *Anal. Post*. 89b38). The existence or non-existence of the thing is directly linked to the middle member of the demonstrative proof, which also is or is not, as is the thing investigated (ἔστι μέσον αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ibid, 89b39). The existence of the first substance possesses an absolute primacy because it is given as actual and *simpliciter* (τὸ εἰ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς, *Anal. Post.* 89b38). The factual necessity is given *simpliciter* and *actualiter* in first real substance and it is represented *simpliciter* and *universaliter* by *demonstratio* in the middle member of the syllogism.

The scientific cognition of the first real substance finds expression in the first three principles of *Second Analytics*. Therefore, they are absolutely important and their recognition guarantees the correct predication of the essence as the first principle in the order of scientific research. The necessity is given *simpliciter* in reality by singular and real substances; their effects are reflected in the necessary conclusion of scientific statement that is given *simpliciter* as deductive syllogism of the first logical figure. The necessary and general demonstrative syllogism reproduces on the level of metaphysical necessity and therefore *ex post* the original and unique causality *a priori* given state of the world. Thanks to the causality that is real in the world of substances, the truth is declared as true correspondence. Following this procedure, Averroes’s concept of truth involves true statement in the mode of *proportio* that relates to real existing substances. The order of the principles of cognition repeats in *Second Analytics* the basic procedure of *Categories*. It involves the hyparchical position of the first substance, which in modality *per prius* determines the imposition of the second substance. The potential and general necessity of the deductive syllogism ensures that the cognition produced in *demonstratio* is not on the same level as the empirically recognized individual things. The beginning of the second book of *Second Analytics* repeats the order of axioms defended in the first book. First, we must recognize the existence of the thing and then ask about its essence (γνόντες δὲ ὅτι ἔστι, τί ἐστι ζητοῦμεν, *Anal. Post.* 89b34). Albert takes this procedure of scientific cognition to be an obligatory rule. The exploration of *Second Analytics* passes through the point of view taken from the direction of the first substance. It is given immediately (*inmediate*) in the middle member of the proof. By this causal connection, the medium of the syllogism is also true (*vere*). The fundamental error of modernity was, and is, that it did not follow the order of principles that establish the corresponding trajectory of cognition. The following quotation shows *Lichtung* of the controversy about the future form of objectivity.

“In the first step, the principle of cognition is given as first, true, and immediate (*primum, verum, et immediatum*). The principle emerges from the primary given act of being which is given by itself as true being (*principium illud per se est in esse vero*). Therefore, the real thing, in virtue of its actual being, determines necessarily the recognized object that determines the cognition in principle (*sit determinatum ad hoc quod sit proprium ad principiatum*). If it were otherwise, the real first principle would determine the cognized object not by itself but by something else. Therefore we say that the first principle is given by itself (*ex hoc quod est per se*) and therefore it is the first to come. Namely, it is the first by itself and not by something else, and by this existing nature, it is the first principle. Thus it is also true: namely, the principle is given as true because it is recognized as such, namely, that it exists (*propter quod cognoscitur de ipso quia est*).” [[210]](#footnote-210)

Albert establishes after Averroes’s example the truth as correspondence that starts in being of the first substance as the first principle (*per se est in esse vero*). This principle of reality (*immediatum*) keeps the methodological primacy and it determines the other two principles of cognition. The quoted text enumerates them with respect to the first substance (*primum, verum*). The primacy concerns the principle *immediatum*, which is given by the imposition of meaning from the first real substance. Only the first substance is given in itself, immediately and directly (*per ipsum est principium*). Therefore, we recognize things in the deductive mode, which is secured by the metaphysical dative, since the existence and causality of real things are given a priori (*propter quod cognoscitur de ipso quia est*). The primacy adheres to the real thing, since there is no other real causality that can be given beyond it (*per privationem anterioris*).[[211]](#footnote-211) The principle of primacy given by the hyparchical substance must be distinguished from the primacy of the essence, which is in the order of cognition. Then it is valid that the primacy of the first substance given in the mode *immediatum* is different from the imposition given in thinking. It establishes the gnoseological mode *per prius*, where the second substance relates to the real thing (*prius comparatum ad rem*). The writing *Categories* makes it clear that this gnoseological primacy holds the species as the closest predication following the being of the first substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The real existence as cause precedes and ensures the order of cognition. Thus, it determines the temporal sequence given in cognition (*notius autem dicitur per comparationem ad noscentem*). The exposure of the sense of being from the front offers the following order of the first principles.

“With the first three principles of cognition it is like this: the first principle is contained in the second and the first and the second in the third. The first principle of cognition is true as real existence of the thing (*est in vero per se*). For this very reason, the first principle is true in itself. Thus it is the cause of everything that follows.” [[212]](#footnote-212)

The order of cognition relates *per prius* to the *inmediate* first substance. This present reality is truly given by itself and in itself. This kind of real necessity ensures that cognition necessarily remains scientifically true, that is, in the univocally predicated imposition of meaning from the direction of the first real substance. It is given in the mode *primum* and *inmediate*. The original act of being (οὐσία, τόδε τι), which establishes the being as here and now existing substance, works in the scientific judgment through the first principle *immediatum*. Its causality subsequently establishes the cognition of this beingness, which is given in thought and only in the universal mode. According to Albert, the axioms of cognition according to *Second Analytics* start from the existence of the real substance that keeps its own causality. The thing is or is not, and this necessity is inserted in the order of the actual being. The existence or non-existence of the thing connects to the middle member of the demonstrative judgment. It incorporates or does not, the effects of investigated real substances. Then it is valid that the cognition in the mode of scientific truth corresponds to the things in reality. The thing acts as the cause because the first substances exist really in the mode *inmediate* and *per se*. Albert interprets the writing *Second Analytics* in the spirit of the school of the Modists and clearly distinguishes three basic levels of meaning with respect to causality.

“In being given in that real way, the cause must necessarily be the first in the order of being. Therefore, it is more evident (*notius*) in the order of cognition, and therefore it is also a cause with respect to effects generated in the secondary order. This is the manner how Aristotle conceives it.” [[213]](#footnote-213)

Let us now return to the principal thesis of *Categories* 2a14–16, which determines the twofold status of predication *per prius* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The quoted commentary repeats this order. The cause holds to primacy in the order of being because it exists in the immediately given first substance (*prius in ordine essendi*). The donation of being in the metaphysical dative (*primum*) establishes the first principle of cognition given in the existential mode *per prius*. The scientific proof, which follows the order given by the metaphysical dative, forms the categorical imposition (*notius in ordine cognoscendi*) that establishes the predication of the second substance in the universal deductive mode *per prius*. The cognition in the framework of the *univoce* imposed second substance establishes the deductive proof. Scientific knowledge is given by representation of causally acting substance in the middle member of demonstrative judgment (*causa in influendo esse causati*). Later, the Modists called the predication as *modus significandi*. That proceeding (*modus* *essendi*, *cognoscendi*, *significandi*) is based on the cognitive schema of the CMDA and it presents the first critical scientific methodology in the scholasticism. The modernists in time of Albert did not understand it truly and they made a modern simulacrum of science based on Oxfordian Fallacy instead of it.

The scientific proceeding defined in such a way is fundamentally different from the concept of Porretans and *Nominales*, as shown by Albert’s polemic with modern humanism. Albert′s contemporaries created a predication of man based on the essence defined as supposition. Such a definition exists only as a logical concept in minds of modern *illuminati*. Their undoubtedly certain and immediate insight into the essence of man replaces the real causality of the person, which passes through the imposition into the middle link (*medium*) of scientific definition (*demonstratio*). The logical supposition of the corpse is not the metaphysical imposition of the real person. Mind of *illuminati* creates the imposition out of itself, thus replacing the causal effect of the middle link in deductive proof. Albert emphasized the first three principles of cognition in *Second Analytics* are fundamental. Kilwardby abolished them as unnecessary (ch. 3.4.1). The eclipse of the first substance brought about the eclipse of the person as well. Albert rejected the interpretation of the solar eclipse given in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy according to Rufus and Grosseteste. Against the distorted view of the modernists, he defended the interpretation of *Metaphysics* proposed by the Commentator. According to Albert, the astronomical solar or lunar eclipse in the *Second Analytics* is an example of researched effect of the first substances. Therefore, the eclipse entails two kinds of interpretation.[[214]](#footnote-214) Either the syllogism is understood in the order of causality and the substances that exert the causal effect on our cognition; or the medium is taken into the syllogism nominally or as an essence. According to Albert, such a demonstration is not complete, because it does not go to the causality given in the middle link of the deductive proof. Both ways of scientific knowledge of the first and the second Averroism manifest in the years 1240–45 the historial concealment (*alētheia*), which reveals the epochal *Irrtum* of modernity. The dispute over the nature of science has a fundamental value for the definition of man. The quarrel took place already in the previous decade, between the modernists and the representatives of the Blund’s school. Albert takes it up again, from the position of the first Averroism. The first solution made in the introduction to the treatise *De homine* rejects the essentialist definition of man. Followers of Oxfordian Fallacy like Rufus defended it, because they favored interpretation of the *Second Analytics* according to Grosseteste (ch. 3.1.1). The subtitle of Albert’s first treatise has an important connotation. The notion of man is given according to the philosophical interpretation, which defends human existence as the first substance existing in himself (*De homine secundum statum ejus in seipso*). In an equally fundamental way, Heidegger’s Aristotelian work *Sein und Zeit* in existentialist modality “*secundum statum ejus in seipso*” rejected Husserl’s Avicennistic phenomenology. The first Averroism, according to Aristotle’s pattern, must go to the things themselves and not to their formal or eidetic appearance in academic mind. After the decline of Delphi, un *illuminatus* modern considers himself the navel of the world. The reasoning of writing *De homine* was written a decade earlier before publication of the commentary on *Second Analytics*. The humanism of modernists stands for sophistic cognition, which did not comprehend the correct interpretation of *De anima* according to the Sicilian school. With regard to the real world, our cognition is merely an accident, because it adds to the thing the additional determination of the recognizability. This determination is in the order of mere potentialities. The first given reality of the first substance is in the mode *per prius*, and the adequate mode is then in the cognitive mode called *notius*. Aristotelian order of knowledgeis primarily related to things in reality (*prius comparatum ad rem*). The first substance shapes cognition because, it is actually existing in contrast to potential cognition given in the context of the second substance. In the potential mode of cognition, however, the universality is primarily given to the knowing subject (*notius ... ad noscentem*). It corresponds to the second order given by the supposition of universal meaning coming from the genus (*Cat*. 2a15–16). Aristotelian *demonstratio* emanating from reality is not a modern *speculatio*. Modern cognition proceeds from the parousia of the essence, which is revealed in the thinking of modern *illuminati*. Albert’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* explicitly rejects Kilwardby’s definition of scientific proof. In the same way, the writing *De homine* rejected the interpretation of *Second Analytics* that the bachelor Rufus of Cornwall presented as a student and lecturer in Paris. The writing *De homine* declated the war against the teaching of modernists in the following parapgaph.

“If we determine the thing exclusively according to general definitions, in the framework of the general substance and according to the general nature of the thing (*ratione substantiae et naturae*), then it is not recognized in its real being, which is determined as a part of the existing thing and as a real nature. We recognize the thing as a universal concept (*in universali tantum*). But then we recognize its characteristics only in the essential possibility, and this is an imperfect form of cognition. Therefore, it is also necessary to recognize the real characteristics of the thing according to manner how the things are subject to the effect of one thing on the other (*determinatis passionibus subjiciuntur*). In this way, they are given in their real being and in the real nature. This makes the cognition of the thing in its real form and nature (*modus sciendi rem in particulari et in propria natura*), which we know from Aristotle’s *Second Analytics*. “ [[215]](#footnote-215)

We now want to apply this text to the nature of cognizing soul, because this is the basic question in the first part of the treatise *De homine*. The essential definition made in the mode *simpliciter* does not go to reality. By virtue of the universality (*in universali tantum*), this kind of cognition is only potential with regard to the real thing (*non scirentur partes nisi in potentia*). To investigate the human being and the soul in this way is an insufficiently made scientific proof (*scientur imperfecte*). We have to look for general principles of what the soul really is (*ratione substantiae et naturae*). The formal approach takes up the recognition of essences and defines personal acts of the soul only formally, which is imperfect in terms of the first substance as a source of imposition. True cognition begins in full in the world of real substances and their causal action. The recognition must begin with the real acts of the soul in the body, which experiences something sensually (*determinatis passionibus subjiciuntur*). These mental abilities of the hylemorphic person cause the cognition as the principle. They operate in the mode *immediatum* and take the causality from the real world (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, ch. 1. 1). We recognize the intellectual abilities as a concept through the real causality of the person that establishes the order of the scientific proof. Only at the end of the *demonstratio* are the acts of the intellect and the soul predicted in the fully substantiated and generally deduced nature (*esse determinatum partium suarum et natura*).

According to Albert, the fundamental error of modernists lies in the fact that thinking does not go to the first substance, but to its potential and universal essentiality given only in mind. In the thinking of *illuminati*, the parousia of essence replaced the real existence of the person. Essential definition cannot establish the scientific proof, since the predication of causality given by the metaphysical dative is missing. The definition of human being in the identity mode of the *essentia* is not the same as the definition in the ipseity mode of the *quidditas*. The abstraction based on logical *resolutio* and *demonstratio* cannot entail the existence of the person, but only formally determined properties and principles of man as such. Albert indirectly says that Rufus’s interpretation of the *Second Analytics*, which he certainly knew from the time when they both studied the philosophy in Paris, is not sufficiently scientific (ch. 3.3.1). Rufus offered the first modern interpretation of the middle link of scientific proof according to Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Anal. Post.* 73b27, which the following chapters will analyze. The modernists from the ranks of *Latinorum* do not go to the first substance and its causal effects. These sophists are satisfied with the essential definition, which they consider a scientific explanation. By rejecting Avicenna’s metaphysics, a new controversy began that changed the destiny of Western science. The first and second Averroism differs in the statute of scientific cognition, since there was the incompatible interpretation of *Second Analytics* in both schools. Albert endorses the deductive proof according to the interpretation of *Second Analytics* given *ad mentem Averrois* in the Sicilian school. Avicenna’s and Averroes’s metaphysics must be critically evaluated according to scientific probity that promulgate the one or the other version of metaphysics as the first science. The fundamental conflict between Albert and the Latins concerns the predicative value of the middle link (*medium*) in the scientific deduction. The school of the first Averroism asserts, against the mythology and mysticism of modernists, that true science follows the imposition of real causality. Only that imposition is capable of establishing a univocally given supposition in true syllogism as a universal deduction. Again, the above-mentioned approach to scientific methodology is considered *adaequatio* in four steps. True causality is absolutely and primarily necessary, because things really exist. Therefore, this necessity makes them the only candidate for establishing scientific truth as a concordance of reality and intellect. The correctly created judgment then concerns both types of necessity. The causality in the middle link of the syllogism is of absolute importance, since it must be conceived in the truly and exclusively given way of metaphysical imposition. If not, then there is no univocity of scientific statements. The causality of the first substances determines the scientific judgment according to the principle *ex inmediatis*. Now it is evident that the same proceeding of *Second Analytics* applies in the case of scientifically correct knowledge of human beings. The cognition in the soul goes to the reality of what the soul is in its act (*secundum quod determinatis passionibus subjiciuntur*), and not only to the nominal definition of the soul. This fundamental position establishes the true philosophical anthropology of the West, because it rejected the modern simulacrum of man as a corpse. This ontological way of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) can establish the scientific and metaphysically true study of the intellect and *anima intellectiva*. Albert proclaims it in the introduction of *De homine*.

“And this is fundamentally necessary, namely, that the principle of scientific deduction, which consists in the middle link of the syllogism, entails the being of thing in reality (*est quid est*). The definition therefore concerns real effects of causality (*diffinitio passionis*) that must be distinguished from formally predicated effects (*dicens esse passionis*). Such kind of the definition includes causality as the imposition in the predication (*causam in esse demonstrationis*). Therefore, the definition directly entails the way how causality is given in real terms (*id est, quare insit*). “ [[216]](#footnote-216)

The statement determines fundamentals of deductive scientific proof (*principium demonstrationis*) with regard to real presence of the thing that is recognized by its effects in reality (*diffinitio passionis*). The demonstration must relate in the middle link of the statement to what the thing is in its being (*id est, quare insit*). The criticized opponents remain with the mere naming (*appellatio*), which establishes but formal statements about effects of the first substance (*dicens esse passionis*). The modernists are unable to recognize the manner, how the soul operates as the form of the body that is the first real substance. To accomplish such a task, the modernity and contemporary exegetes have to learn the exact sense of intellect as *tertium genus* in CMDA. The real *ousía* is not a mythopoetic *parousía* of essence that arises in the intellect of *illuminati*. Albert’s criticism concerns Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s interpretation of the scientific proof, as we will explain in more detail later.

The treatise rejected the approach of the second Averroism in another key point. Let us examine the fourth objection of the cited *solutio* in the first question of *De homine*. According to *Modernorum*, the exploration of the soul stands and falls with the Avicennian principle of the first science based on the truth as *certitudo*. Albert clearly separated two types of certainty and two modes of cognition of the soul that they imply. The soul as a principle of the body is not defined with certainty as an object of intellectual reflection (*certitudo simpliciter*). This is the anthropology of the “Flying Man” and the contemporary virtual matrix, or the “Brain in a Vat”, as mythologizing scientists postulated it in the Avicennism of that time and in the Cartesianism of today. A typical example is Kilwardby’s position quoted further; the certainty of truth grows in the measure of universalization associated with the contemplation of pure forms (*certa est de simpliciori et priori et abstractiori*; *veritas… certior est et de certiori*, ch. 3.4.2). Albert’s above-mentioned interpretation of *Second Analytics* postulates that formal, *simpliciter* made definition of the soul and of man does not possess a sufficient degree of scientific truthfulness. Modernists make scientific definition of the body as the cause (*causam in esse demonstrationis*) only in the mode of the nominally conceived effect of the first substances (*dicens esse passionis*). It is a typical example of plurivocal logical enunciation (statement called “*de dicto*”) without *univoce* given supposition that comes from a metaphysical imposition as the only way of making the scientific proof (statement called “*de re*”). The difference between Aristotelian “*esse passionis*” and Porretan’s “*dicens esse passionis*” is so insignificant for today’s interpreters. They are influenced by academically trained Furies in such a manner that they do mention it at all. Therefore, the existence of real things in modernity became a logical predicate; in the age of postmodern metaphysical nihilism, it became only an *opinabile*. Let us recall Alvernus’s criticism of the nominalist school of Grammarians (ch. 2.3.2). The definition based exclusively on the universal statement cannot guarantee full extend of the scientific deduction. The concept of the soul as the animating principle of the body is twofold, because it is considered from two different points of view that establish the certainty of cognition. The first modernists from the Toledo school put the real effect of the first substances in oblivion, because they followed the interpretation of Avicenna’s first science in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. Albert, in the new constellation of the struggle for the unity of the person, took up Grossesteste’s point of view known from the first treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ch. 2.2.1). This position shaped the anti-modernist humanism in the school of the first Averroism. Albert defends the realistic cognition of the soul according to Averroes’s metaphysics of “substance *qua* substance.” The certainty of cognition does not come from the hypostatized mystical intellect of *illuminati*, but from the real existence of man as the first substance (Heidegger’s *Dasein*). The existence of the first substance creates the primal necessity, which is adequately stated due to the imposition (*certitudo secundum quid*). This thesis has a principled character for the further development of the controversy over the unity of the person.

“One thing is the certainty taken in itself (*certitudo simpliciter*) and the second thing is the certainty with regard to the real thing (*certitudo secundum quid*). The certainty taken in and of itself comes from the abstract principles by which we recognize something else as evident. Therefore, the cognition given according to the soul is more certain than cognition given according to the body. Namely, the soul is the cause of being of the individualized body (*esse specificum corpori*) and the determining principle of how this body is animated and to what extent it exists naturally. Therefore, the soul is safer in how it recognizes its own body (*esse corporis talis*) by itself (*ex ipsa*). The evidence given on the basis of being of the real substance (*secundum quid est*), which takes place through the senses and the imagination, belongs to the body to a far greater extent (*haec magis competit corpori*). This is what Aristotle had in mind when he said that the soul is the principle of the living organism. “ [[217]](#footnote-217)

The certainty of criticized *Latinorum* is given in terms of general, nominally defined essence given by the definition of the principles (*certitudo simpliciter est, quæ est ex principiis*). But the principles, with regard to their universality, they are a pure possibility. Like this, we know the body only in the sense of universal species (*esse specificum corpori*), which is given by the corresponding general definition (*rationem diffinitivam*). The definition in the mode *simpliciter* guarantees only a general specification of the soul (*in quantum est animatum corpus et naturale*); it does not grasp its factual reality, which is given by the causal effect of the first substance. Real causality, which is stated by imposition, establishes knowledge in the mode *secundum quid*. The quotation therefore defines the cognition of the soul in the empirically experienced body. The real body is animated by the soul as a principle, and this in its natural act of sensually experienced existence (*haec magis competit corpori*). The formal definition of soul and human being as species does not entail the actual being of the personal soul living in the body as the first substance (*esse corporis talis*). Albert clearly states that the certainty coming from the personal act of intellectual knowing and it concerns the first definition of *anima intellectiva*. Intellectual understanding must begin with the mental acts of the body, and not from Avicenna’s Flying Man. Scientific (and not modern) intellectual knowledge is based on a real existential necessity and on the actuality given through the body as the first substance. Only this procedure according to the first and most important principle *ex inmediatis* confirms the validity of the proof according to the *Second Analytics*. Aristotelian conclusions make it clear that the middle link of the demonstrative proof (*medium*) entails the causality of the first real substance. The general essence does not entail the real existence, since it is only the physical existence of the person that is subjected to causal effects. The cognition made *ad sensum* go to the act of the soul in the real *actus essendi*, which affects the real body (*ex ipsa cognoscitur esse corporis talis*). Because we recognize the world sensually and through the imagination, the certain cognition must begin with these mental phenomena (*certitudo… ad sensum et phantasiam*). The body acts in the world in virtue of physical causality and in virtue of entelechy as an organism. We recognize the external things through the senses, because the real world influences us as *causa efficiens*. Therefore, the sensually given recognition of the soul is certain in the manner that the soul recognizes itself from itself (*ex ipsa*).

In the next generation, the most important Aristotelian Siger of Brabant defended a similar view of the intellectual soul by referring to Aristotle’s scientific writing and to CMDA (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.2). The soul does not recognize itself primarily *simpliciter* in direct insight, as Avicenna and the postmodern Cartesians proclaim, but sensually through the body. Only the sensually created cognition based on the real causality in the world, paves the sure path to the demonstration of what the soul is, in the reality of the hylemorphic body (*ideo certior est*). Cognition proceeds primarily from the existence of the first substance that establishes causal effects in the mode *ex inmediatis*. They can be given, for example, as an act of cognition. Only that method of cognition according to Averroes’s metaphysics of “substance *qua* substance” justifies the scientific cognition of man. It follows the correct reading of CMDA in the mode of the Sicilian school. Albert rejects to justify the cognition of the soul as hypostatized concept of being of the third kind. In this point he defended the Christian value of the person promulgated by his teacher Alvernus. The teaching of Toletans makes eidetic cognition of the world and man according to Avicenna. Modernists are unable to distinguish between the general definition of the soul as the principle of the body and the causal effect of the soul as animating principle of the existing body. Once again, the twofold conception of *simpliciter* given meaning of the first substance must be taken into account. The simplicity is effectively upheld in real things, but potentially abstracted in universal notions. The last sentence of the quotation asserts that this intention explains Aristotle’s teaching of the soul (*hoc intendit Philosophus*). With emphasis on the definition of the soul from the direction of the sensual experience of the hylemorphic first substance, Albert backed bishop Alvernus in his polemic against the representatives of the second Averroism. According to the classical Aristotelian model, Albert refers to causal effects that establish the scientific cognition of the soul in the body (*esse corporis talis*). Albert rejected Gundissalinus’s essentially given definition of the soul and approved the interpretation of the Blund’s school given in the treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*. The writing *De homine* rejected the humanism of man as a corpse given in the Toletan school and enforced the teaching of the Sicilian school for the new generation of students following the humanism of Blund’s school. The first Averroism defends the definition of man and humanities in the mode of *proportio* according to the CMDA. The subsequent interpretation of Oxfordian Fallacy in the second Averroism shows that both interpretations of the *Second Analytics* contain the metaphysics that entails different concept of man, because the term “soul” carries a different meaning. The introduction to *De homine* rejected the teaching of the group called *Latinorum* on an absolutely fundamental point. Avicennist school takes the meaning of the middle link (*medium*) only with regard to the essence. Unfortunately, the order of cognition according to the essence makes but the very last link in the order of the first triad of scientific proof. Albert comprehends the soul through the principle associated to effectively acting first substances. The soul recognizes itself in the phenomenological mode of being the first substance (*esse corporis talis*), which corresponds to the concept of *tertium genus* in CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Realistic cognition concerns the determination of quantity as a determination of the first substance. The quality and quantity belong only to the first substance and not to the hypostatized abstraction, which *Moderni* take as an example for scientific cognition. Porretan concept of hypostatized corporeity in the doctrine of *Nominales* is a pure abstraction for Albert. Modernity is unable to see the act of the real physical substance in its causality (*passio*). The interpretation of *Latinorum* is rejected in a fundamental way because it is not real, and therefore not sufficiently scientific. The modern sophists go to the “things themselves” as essences. They maintain the certainty at the level of the species or the postmodern noemata, since the notion given *simpliciter* is sufficient for their concept of science. The recognition of the soul can reveal the fullness of scientific truth through the abstract experience of the “Flying Man” conceived by Avicenna, or through the separated *res cogitans* of Descartes that Husserl rehabilitated.

In the decade following the publication of *De homine*, Albert started direct polemics with representatives of the second Averroism. The above-quoted commentary on *Second Analytics* (ca. 1255–57) confirms that fact. At the same time, he published the commentaries on *De anima* that fundamentally reject the interpretation of the intellect and the soul presented in the context of so-called *opinio Latinorum* (ch. 2.4.3). Kilwardby’s commentary on *Second Analytics* was perhaps written in Paris and at the same time as Albert’s work *De homine* (ch. 3.4.1). Kilwardby reduced the six principles of cognition in the framework of *demonstratio* to only three. Thus, three principles related to the demonstrative proof of the first substance (*ex veris, et primis et inmediatis*) disappeared from his interpretation of the *Second Analytics*. This interpretation was first introduced by Robert Grosseteste around the year 1230 in Oxford as part of the further analyzed Oxfordian Fallacy. Albert’s commentary on *Second Analytics* repeats the argumentation of *De homine* we have commented on above. Citing Averroes, Avicenna and all Peripatetics, Albert rejects the statute of universals as *tertium ens*. The declaration of a philosophical war to the second Averroism in Albert’s commentary on *Second Analytics* looks as follows:

“Let everyone say what he wants. I don’t want to impose my opinion on anyone, as I understand Aristotle. But I have absolutely no understanding for the assertions of those who say that the universal is given in the intellect as the subject, in the mode of being as a hylemorphic individual (*individuum esse*). “ [[218]](#footnote-218)

The mentioned chapter deals in detail with the reduction of the principles of cognition, which Rufus and Kilwardby adopted. Their interpretation of the *Second Analytics* turned the universals into a kind of individual substance, which is contained in the intellect as the hyparchical substance (*individuum esse in intellectu sicut in subiecto*). For the same error, Alvernus criticized the school of Grammarians. The unique being in the first substance (*esse in subjecto*) is not the same as the inherent nature of the universal occurrence in the universal subject of the statement (*non est inhaerere subjecto*, ch. 2.3.2). Albert, like Alvernus, clearly rejects the statute of the universal as *tertium ens*. The modernists understand the individual in thinking in the manner of the Porretan first substance (*universale per esse individuum esse*). The introduction of *De homine* showed that the controversy concerned the statute of species, which the commentary on *Second Analytics* takes up again. Albert takes the line of the Commentator against Theophrastus, who defended direct vision of forms in the receptive intellect. The commentary establishes a clear difference between the universal concept and existence of the real substance. The abstracted contents of the intellect make the universally given cognition of real things.

“The species of the intellect is the understanding of the intellect. What is comprehended by the intellect (*id quod intelligitur*) is intellectual by its being and universal by its potency. “ [[219]](#footnote-219)

The recognized species therefore belongs to the sphere of intellectual cognition, because the intellect presents universally given contents (*intellectuale secundum suum esse*). In terms of real actuality, these universals are only potential being (*universale secundum suam potentiam*). The recognized form has the status of a potentially made intentional object (*intellectualle*), and therefore it cannot be the hyparchical substance. Instead of synthesizing intelligible species, modernists introduced a new type of species as a pseudo-substance. This mythological substance is endowed with causality and its imposition forms the subject of “scientific” judgment. In a similar way, Alvernus criticized the approach of Latin sophists. The teaching of *Grammatici* issued from schools of Porretans and *Nominales* do not distinguish between the real property of the first substance and the inherent nature of the accident. They predicate the accident as hypostasis endowed with causality (*album albet*) at the level of the second substance. Albert’s criticism of modernists concerns the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* that modernists turned upside down. Abstract knowledge of individual essence is given *simpliciter* and potentially. In the order of logical abstraction, this process of cognition was confused with knowledge of the hyparchical first substance. It is also *simpliciter* given, but in reality. Once again, there is a classical problem of interpretation concerning the atomic substance as given in the writing *Isagoge* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). In contrast to the universals, the existence of the first substance is actual. That is why knowledge is only accidental and potential. Albert’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* rejected the determination of hypostatized substance as *tertium ens*. That kind of substance is given on the basis of general definitions or the direct insight into the universal. Both treatises clearly show that the interpretation of *Latinorum* contains a false metaphysics, which then mistakenly establish a deductive scientific proof (*demonstratio*). The choice of Averroes’s exploration of the real substance over Avicenna’s insight into the abstract essence is not accidental, because the Dominican of Cologne adheres to it all his life. Albert follows Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle according to the Sicilian school, which commented in this spirit on Aristotle’s scientific writings and the recognition of animals. The writing *De anima* takes the line of the CMDA done *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Sicilian school. Therefore, Albert has a different interpretation of the CMDA than semiaverroist Thomas Aquinas, who comments on *De anima* according to the Avicennist interpretation of the Toletan school (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). Thomas took Averroes for an Averroist, which Albert understandably cannot tolerate.

Hermeneutics defend the basic methodological approach in the treatise *De homine* against contemporary objectivists. We have investigated Albert’s Aristotelian approach that concerned the concept of *resolutio* and the interpretation of deductive *medium* according to the *Second Analytics*. It was strictly separated from Avicenna’s and Kilwardby’s direct intuition of essences. They take up the essence through the active intellect as separated substance. The most important is the assertion that the soul is an act of the person as a hylemorphic composition, which is given as a physical body, i.e., as the first substance.[[220]](#footnote-220) Hermeneutics therefore does not confirm the conclusions in Wéber’s study concerning *De homine*, including his criticism of Gilson.[[221]](#footnote-221) In the interpretation of *De homine*, Wéber took up the thesis of Neoplatonic interpretation of the soul from the position of essentialism (*l’essence de l’âme est substance par soi*; Wéber 1991, 123). He mistakenly distinguished between so called “essentialist” interpretation of Albert and “Neoplatonic” interpretation of Aquinas. Wéber’s analysis of Albert’s essentialism starts from modernist prejudice that Averroes was an Averroist. Hermeneutics follow a different view of this matter. Albert interprets *De anima* according to Averroes’s “meta-physics” based on the primacy of the first substance, which was not the case of Avicenna′s essentialism. Thomas Aquinas rejected Averroes’s interpretation as Averroistic, which foresighted Albert avoided. Therefore, Thomas’s writing *De unitate intellectus* necessarily proposes the dualistic interpretation of modern Alexandrians, which Siger clearly demonstrated and refused. Albert is an Aristotelian *ad mentem Averrois* and therefore preserved the unity of the person according to the phenomenological approach, as it is given in *De homine*, although Siger criticized him in certain very precise points as an Avicennist (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.4). Albert considers the course of cognition according to the analysis of *Categories*, which had been systematized for the West by Alfarabi in the above-mentioned interpretation (OBJ I, ch. 2.1). Albert builds on this anti-modernist tradition. He distinguishes the primary relations of causally acting things with each other and the secondary apprehension of those relations in the act of universal cognition. That knowledge proceeds from the imposition of meaning that comes from real things. According to the same scientific method, humanities have to study human being. That approach was first proclaimed in Paris by John Blund against David of Dinant, and after him by Alvernus against modern *sequaces Aristotelis*. These thinkers founded a Christian version of Aristotelianism. Outraged modernity punished them by erasing their real teaching from academic memory (*damnatio memoriae*). The modernists replaced their sound doctrine of the unity of the person with their Averroistic simulacra, fabricated by academic Furies. They follow the defensive (and unconscious) strategy known as “*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*.” The very modern academicians led by demonic powers of Vengeance “see” everywhere demonic products of their paranoiac mind.

Albert knows well that the hylemorphic things that exist outside of our mind have an *actualiter* and *simpliciter* given substantial being, which determines the potential cognition. Therefore, he rejected metaphysical construction of *Nominales*, since it is based on an erroneous predication *per prius*. This predication omitted the hyparchical position of the first substance. The difference between the essentialist worldview of modernity and the approach to the world from the point of view of the real *actus essendi* of the first substance has a fundamental importance for Albert, and he repeats it in his later commentary on *De anima*. The contemporary attentive readers of Albert’s work noticed this realist attitude, but did not derive any fundamental conclusions for Albert’s metaphysics from this attitude (Wéber 1991, 125–26). The cognitive process of *Doctores latinorum* culminates in the act of the acquired intellect, which meets the active intellect in the act of instantaneous intuition. Educated in logical schools of Porretans, the modern *illuminati* changed the order of predication to the concept of Avicennistic truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. They gave a formal certainty in the mode “*notius*” as the basis for determining what is in the mode *per prius*. They abolished metaphysical imposition coming from external reality. Modernity perceives with complete certainty the world of universal forms in direct intuition. The first modernists of the Latin West, such as Grosseteste, Rufus and Kilwardby, claim that the intellect comes to cognition through direct insight into the first principles. These principles do not require any sensually perceived first substance. Such enlightened self-knowledge recognizes the external thing to an insufficient extent, according to the mode of truth as assimilation. The cognition of the world corresponds to the primary certainty of the intellect, which already exists in itself. Such perception lies outside the recognition of statements related to real things. The principles of cognition are eternal and given in themselves; against them, it stands the unreliable and contingent personal experience of external world. Such principles of cognition do not in and of themselves require a sensually perceived first substance. The univocal character of *tertium ens* is necessary to preserve that mythological connection to external reality. In this Avicennist line stand the already cited postmodernists Descartes, Arnauld and Husserl. Albert does not consider the intuition given in this way as scientific cognition in the sense of *Second Analytics*. Modern essentialism does not take into account hyparchical causality of first substances, which is categorically stated by second substances (*ex inmediatis*).

The exposure of cognition from the front or from the back necessarily provoked another dispute over the nature of *resolutio*. Hermeneutics explored the concept of *resolutio*, which had arisen around the year 1230 among Parisian Avicennists led by Philip the Chancellor (ch. 2.3.2). Nominalists introduced the concept of hypostatic Porretanian species such as *albedo* that was predicated in a univocal manner (ch. 1.4). After rejecting the substance of the third kind, such notions becomes heavily criticized. The school of *Grammatici* took these hypostases for second substances and used them in the modern categorical predication done in the mode of the Oxford analytical school. Albert’s definition of the first principles of cognition rejects the teaching of Parisian Avicennists and upholds the tradition of Blund’s and Alvernus’s school.

“The determination of universals (*resolutio*) starts from the hylemorphic first substance and extends to abstract forms. These are given *per posterius* in relation to the first substance, just as the effect is given in the cause. The order of being starts with the first substance in the sensual being and in its perception. General being is not taken as hypostasis (*per se*) or by general concepts of sensuality, but only as a recognized accident of the first substance. Therefore, it is true that this white color belongs to this person and the abstract person is given in this real person. This is how one goes to the first universal thing, which justifies the division (*ad primum in quo stat resolutio*). “ [[222]](#footnote-222)

Following the *Isagoge*, the quotation clearly sees that *individuum*, as the *primum* in the series of division, is the last universal with a completely minimal meaning (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The path to universal meaning begins with the hylemorphic substance, which is given in the order of being *per prius*. The determination of universals begins with the immediately given sensory experience of the first substance, which has a causal and accidental effect on the senses (*immediatum sensibile est sensuum*). The term “*resolutio*” refers to the causal effect of the first substance perceived with the senses (*sensuum*). This real effect does not exist in the form of hypostatic “substance—species” as *tertium ens*, nor in the general concept (*non quidem per se vel commune sensatum*). With regard to the actual existing thing, human cognition makes an accident (*per accidens*). Albert turned the determination of cognition from Neoplatonic concept towards the real things and rejected abstract division of reality according to being of the third kind done in the Tree of Porphyry. The first substance is not a hypostatized *individuum* of Porretans, but a universal and therefore merely a potential second substance. The whiteness does not exist in Albert’s *resolutio* as a *per se* given accident, which univocally replaces the first substance in the supposition mode “*album albet*” as it was the case of Grammarians. The logical schools of nominalists put into the imposition even complete imaginary hypostases such as chimera (Ebbesen 1986). The science of the first Averroism must be unconditional and true by following metaphysics of the real first substances. The newly defended predication *per prius* is once again related to the first substance rehabilitated by Averroes. The first substance due to its actuality establishes the potential system of universals and their division.

The philosophical anthropology based on the realist metaphysics given as “substance *qua* substance” established the twofold meaning of human beings. Albert clearly distinguishes the *Lichtung* of modern humanities. They are untrue in their nature, since they represent the unscientific manner of studying the reality. They do not follow the necessity on the level of the first substances. Understandably, the existing person belongs to this reality, since we are the first substances. Either we consider the whole of being and man with the help of modern understanding, which is determined by the recognition of hypostatized abstract forms as *tertium ens*. Or, we follow the path of cognition, which is determined by the causality of real things. Both modes of cognition are incompatible, because they study a completely different kind of being. According to Parmenides, the path of non-being is unpassable *simpliciter*. Given the completely different meaning of the terms used, it is impossible to introduce a single concept of philosophy, as all objectivists do, since they follow the impassable path of *tertium ens*. Albert and other connoisseurs of true Aristotelianism knew very well that the first and second Averroism do not have the same concept of being. The essence is not hyparchical substance. It was shown by the twofold interpretation of *Categories* and *Second Analytics* according to Avicenna’s metaphysics and according to Averroes’s “meta-physics.” The first way of cognition is defined according to Avicenna’s abstract insight in the logical mode “*ens inquantum ens*”, and the second according to Averroes’s predication following the predication of “substance *qua* substance.” Let us now return to the introductory and entirely fundamental part of the work *De homine*, which defends the scientific knowledge of the soul. It was confirmed by the later interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Albert criticizes the nominalistic definition of species.[[223]](#footnote-223) They do not follow the metaphysical imposition from reality, but only the logical supposition based on equivocal abstraction. Cognition cannot be based on self-cognition of the illuminated intellect done in the framework of the abstract division of the genus into lower parts in the Porphyry’s Tree.

The necessity of thinking and making truthful conclusions is given from the reality. It ist based on the exposure of being from the front, which Albert shows by a new definition of habitual thinking (*habitus*). The modern *illuminati* inspired by Avicenna followed Neoplatonists and then keep the recognized contents in a separate form of memory and thinking based on the permanently given first principles. Let us see the term “*habitus innatus*” of later modernists and Descartes’s innate idea of God. Albert clearly sees in the commentary on *Second Analytics* that the principle that shapes the scientific character of the demonstration of his opponents is not taken from reality, but only from the cognition made in thinking alone.

“Some claim that scientific recognition is defined in the soul in the way that deductive judgment is grasped in and par itself (*habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem*). But that would not relate defined knowledge to what is deductively defined from reality (*non erit deffinitio demonstrata de deffinito*). The proposition '*ex*' denotes either the cause or the circumstances made out of real effects of causes. The premises that imply this kind of causality establish the kind of habitus (*talis habitus*) determined by effective causes.“ [[224]](#footnote-224)

According to Albert, all that is sufficient for the deductive proof of modernists is the fact that the notion of something is formally correct in the thinking of the knower (*scientiam in anima*). The quote emphasizes that such logical conclusions are not taken from reality. The emphasized first principle of cognition (*ex*) given by the causality of the first substance must relate to actual *demonstratio*. Therefore, Albert endorses cognition in the mode of *habitus acquisitus*, because the soul is *tabula rasa* in its essence and must receive all cognition from the senses. The scientific demonstration is determined according to the first and most important principle *ex inmediatis* of *Second Analytics*, that is, by recognizing the real cause (*notat causam*). Albert clearly sees that the scientific proof of “*Doctores latinorum*” has lost its grip on reality due to hypostatized nature of logic. Cognition must flow from reality to species, because the Aristotelian truth makes a real correspondence. The fundamental difference between the first and the second Averroism is given by the twofold exposure of the sense of being from the direction of the essence in thinking or from the direction of the first substance in reality. From the point of view of the twofold interpretation of the science, it becomes clear that the science of the soul is twofold as well. Either is the philosophical anthropology given from the direction of the abstract definition of man; or, it is the philosophical anthropology due to causality the first substance that imposes the corresponding cognition of man (*rationis, et rei*).

“We maintain that the soul can be understood in two ways, namely according to the general definition and according to the real thing (*in duplici consideratione, scilicet rationis, et rei*). The general definition refers either to the universal or to the particular subject. The same applies to logical reasoning. The soul can be examined in two ways: Either it is examined as it is given in reality, which falls within natural philosophy. Or the soul is given as it is given as a substance in relation to the changing and perishable body, which is the view of the first philosophy.“ [[225]](#footnote-225)

The second question in *De homine* refused Avicennist perspective for the study of the soul as scientifically inadequate. The reason for this is evident. The falsely established imposition of “*anima intellectiva*” has misled the modernists. They don't know what they're really talking about, because they've established the mythological domain of *tertium ens*. The logical abstraction that establishes modern cognition has no truth given by metaphysical abstraction related to the first substance (*haec enim are principia cognitionis et non esse*). Avicennists are guided by essential definition of the soul, which for Albert represents a reduction of complex cognition of metaphysics to a mere logical abstraction (*principia cognitionis*). The logic taken in itself does not guarantee the cognition of real causality in the modality *ex inmediatis*, as it is required in the writing *Second Analytics*. Following the sophistry of modern *demonstratio*, Avicennists make the definition of the soul that does not include the predication of the causality, in virtue of which we recognize the world in a real and actual way. On the other side, there is the perspective of Averroes in the framework of *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, which entails twofold being of the first substance. Let us see the previous interpretation of Averroes’s metaphysics of real substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The quotation from the commentary on *Second Analytics* confirms changed habitus of modern thinking that Albert rejects as unscientific. The causal effect in reality shapes thinking, because the opposite attitude is pure paranoia. This sophistic model was defended by Sherwood’s analytical and logical school at Oxford, which was rejected in principle by Bacon (ch. 3.4.3). The interpretation of scientific knowledge of the world, man and God caused a principal controversy concerning the analytical and realistic interpretation of the *Second Analytics*. On the one hand, there were Grosseteste, Rufus and Kilwardby; on the other hand, Alvernus, Albert and Bacon.

This fundamental confrontation over the status of truth, science and European humanism started at the University of Paris in the years 1240–45. The causality was replaced by formal deduction and the first substance became a Neoplatonic effective hypostatized form. Quotation of Albert rightly confirms that the modern *illuminati* make the miraculous “science” in their mind only (*scientiam in anima*). Albert’s treatise protects the philosophical dignity of man. He clearly sees the historial way that (*Wie* of Heidegger) made the eclipse of the first substance in modernity. The person recognizes the world in the mode of essence, and thus the sophistic simulacrum of the person as a modern subject came into being as well. Modern humanity no longer recognizes itself, because the modern human being transformed its own cognition into a chimerical and paranoid one. The eclipse of the person as the first substance established the school of *Modernorum* in the modality of epochal *Irrtum*. The transformation of the intellect into Porretan hypostasis given in the soul shows the eclipse of man as the first substance. Cognition does not proceed from the actual thing in reality, which has a causal effect on our cognition through the metaphysical dative; the thing has determined the event of the donation of being for the man and the same thing has gone into the past. Modernity lives in the academic cave of Plato, which Furies, after the demise of the first substance in modern philosophy, modified for a paranoid postmodern consciousness. In this chaos of the third world, given outside the real world, the modernists observe miraculous revelation of knowledge that they consider to be a genuine eidetic parousia. Such *illuminati* create reality in virtue of specific habitus of their thinking. They appropriate the world in an absolute way, in the modern nature of *Ge-Stell* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The indeterminate energy and activity, which is originally inherent in every substance in the context of *habitus* as an accident (ἐνέργειά τις; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2), now passes to the human demiurge as the only effective substance. His knowledge of reality is power, since the *illuminatus* makes a new kind of paranoiac causality. Then it is true that every sense of being is carried by the Western subject and by the practice determined by it. The meaning of being is given as a habitual recognition made by the active demiurgic intellect. For the school of *Modernorum*, reality forms a component of the habitually given demiurgic energy. It flows into the instrumental reason and the self-will, limited by nothing (*nihil*). Both faculties constitute a nihilistic practice that is essentially inherent in the modern subject as absolutely given representative of modern God. The concept of “*absolutum*” must be understood on the basis of the concept of modern science interpreted above, which made a methodological absolutist break with critical reason. Reality is given in a separate way (*absolute*) from the autonomously conceived essence. The historical determination of modernity is given by the transformation of *habitus*. It ceased to be an indeterminate energy and activity, and became a demiurgic and substantial foundation of humanity, in the manner of Porretans (*humanitas*). The historial event (*Ereignis*) of the transformation changed the truth into the objectively determined habitus. Such event in style of Kafka’s novel “*Verwandlung”* determines the entire epoch by the truth as demiurgic unconcealment of being. That concept of habitus and scientific truth appeared in the years 1240–45. Avicennist modernity revealed for the first time all epochal possibilities, which make its real intellectual property (Heidegger’s *Ereignen*). Hermeneutics must analyze that historial event of the transition of being into a new concept of truth that opened the period of Anthropocene. Its nihilistic nature is given by transformation of the first substance into its simulacrum given in human consciousness as parousia of the essence.

### 2.4.2 Personal Cognition and Universal Intellect

The previous interpretation explained Albert's criticism of nominalist explanation concerning *Second Analytics*. Modernists abolished foundations of Aristotelian science, which builds up knowledge on the causality of real first substances. Scientific research of reality stands or falls with the primacy of the third principle called “*immediatum* or “*ex inmediatis*”” that points out the first substance as the place from which true cognition proceeds. The separation of the first Averroism from the school of *Nominales* of that time concerns the concept of science, the interpretation of the soul, the definition of scientific cognition and the philosophical determination of man. Albert, as well as Alvernus and Bacon, explained Averroes’s interpretation presented in the first Averroism of the Sicilian school. Therefore, they rejected the production of different forms of being of the third kind. The most important point of disagreement between Albert and the school of *Latinorum* was the status of species and the role of receptive and active intellect in the scheme of cognition. Albert clarified the unity of intellect around the year 1240 as did Blund, Grosseteste, and Alvernus. The rejection of Neoplatonic modernists based on Aristotelian interpretation of science and cognition according to *Second Analytics* and *De anima* represents Albert’s lifelong decision. The introduction to *De homine* confirmed that logical and essentialist solutions do not go to the first substance because they terminate at the level of logical abstraction. The introductory part to *De homine* (q. 1, a. 1) analyzed in the previous chapter clearly established that we should first and fundamentally investigate the soul on the level “*quoad nos*,” that is, taking into account real acts done in the body. Let us now return to the introductory quotation from *De homine*, where the certainty of knowledge is determined in terms of the soul as part of the real substance (*certitudo secundum quid*). Knowledge in the human soul is based on causal effects of the body as the first substance (*anima est causa dans esse specificum corpori*). Albert adheres to Averroes’s double definition of the soul because it is given by the realist interpretation of the *Second Analytics* within the framework of the twofold science of the soul defined above (*rationis et rei*). Therefore, he ignores the abstract division of the intellect according to Avicennists based on hypostatized “*gradus*” according to the Toledo school.

The difference in the metaphysics between the first and the second Averroism can be seen in the doctrine of the intellect. Albert starts from Avicenna’s definition of the soul and takes its teaching about four forms of intellect on the formal level.[[226]](#footnote-226) However, he supplements this definition by the division according to Averroes that contains but three basic kinds of intellect (*tres species intellectus*).[[227]](#footnote-227) The word “*vere*” clearly indicates that the division into three components is fundamental for Albert and takes precedence over Avicenna’s formal definition given by growing measure of self-reflection and actualization of various forms of intellect. The definition in *De homine* does not determine the abstract relation of potency and immaterial form given by Porretan hypostases (*gradus*), but threefold nature of real activity of the intellect (*species*). Avicenna’s division is but abstract one, dividing the components of the intellect into genera and species according to Porphyry’s Tree. This objective division does not make a scientific cognition of the soul, because it works only with the formal concept of intellect and not with the real act of thinking in the unique person. The intellect, as a universal notion, represents a logical definition in the order of potentiality and not a scientific definition in the order of the metaphysics of the first substance.[[228]](#footnote-228) The gradualism of Avicennists is given only abstractly and does not correspond to the true way of cognition. The abstract definition characterizes the different form of potentiality given by the division of genus into species. Another thing is the exploration of actual acts of intellect in the existing person as the first actual substance. By virtue of unique *actus essendi*, the person establishes a personal *operatio* of the intellect divided according to such and such a specific activity (*species*). Again, the fundamental difference between the species of the first Averroism given by the act of thinking and the abstract and univocal concept of species of the third kind must be taken into account. Hermeneutics follow twofold path of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) directed to human intellect, which is fundamentally different *ad mentem Averrois* done in the exegesis of the Toletan or the Sicilian school. Even two members of the Sicilian school as Thomas Aquinas and Albert are different, as far as their interpretations of the Commentator is concerned. Inspired by the Toledo school, Thomas took Avicenna’s gradualness of cosmic intellects as a basis for the definition of *intellectus possibilis*, which he conceives individually He rejected the separated possible intellect sophistically attributed to Averroes (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). Albert cannot make such sophism because Avicenna’s definition of intellect as *gradus* merely indicates the abstract determination of being (*esse diminutum*). The act of intellect does not refer to Avicenna’s abstract form, but to the living human being investigated in the framework of the unique existence as an actual being of the first substance. For Albert this means that the scientific investigation of man must go in the modality *per prius* to the existential activity of the thinking person, and only afterward to the species of the intellect as an abstraction given in thinking. The question of gradualness can be resolved only at the very end, when the concept of intellect as a universal meaning is established, let us see Averroes’s definition of *quartum genus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Modernist and postmodernist sophistry of the intellect as being of the third kind cannot see nuances of Albert’s Aristotelian interpretation based on distinction of intellect between *gradus* and *species*. Albert proceeds from Averroes’s phenomenology of the specific intellectual act of thinking. The interpretation begins with the existing person in the modality *tertium genus* and then proceeds to Avicenna’s abstract categorization of various forms of intellect as *quartum genus*. The intellect given in the first mode refers to existential act of the person. Therefore, this cognition has a scientific character given by real causality in the mode *ex inmediatis*. In the second act of cognition given by the system of abstract gradualness, the defined human intellect is a logical abstraction, which has no full scientific character. The school of *Modernorum* has not noticed this fundamental difference in the approach to the intellect according to Avicenna and Averroes, until today. Following *De anima*, the school of the first Averroism assumed the fundamental division of the intellect into three parts. This division is generically different from Avicennist stages of the abstracted intellect conceived as a universal concept.

Averroes and after him Albert had to solve the problem of material intellect as receptive faculty engaged in the act of existence as *ipsum*. This act of thinking is given in the understanding of the person as the first substance. The act of thinking refers to this or that component of the intellect as a specific ability of the soul (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The writing CMDA claims that the passive and the active component of the intellect must be given in the individual act of the speculative intellect, which is the active part of personal soul in the mode of ipseity.[[229]](#footnote-229) Albert’s division of the intellect as Averroes’s modality of *tertium genus* respects the line of the CMDA. Albert investigates the central part of the argument of Aristotle’s conception of the intellect (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14–15). The quotation analyzes the real activity of the intellect in the animate body in the mode of reception, synthesis, and the resulting concept (*transmutans, transmutatus, transmutatio*).

“Then three species of intellect are given (*tres species intellectus*). In all cognition, which passes from potency to act, there are only three components, namely, the transforming, the transformed, and that in which the change takes place (*transmutans, et transmutatum, et illud in quod est transmutatio*). Since the intellectual soul varies with respect to cognition according to what is transformed, there are only three forms in the intellect: the active intellect which transforms, the possible intellect which is transformed, and the speculative intellect in which this transformation takes place.” [[230]](#footnote-230)

As we already know from the introduction to *De homine*, the science of the soul is twofold, according to the nature of the middle member of the scientific syllogism (*rationis et rei*). The specific nature of the intellect must be twofold as well, because its signification is taken either from the abstract metaphysics of *Latinorum* or from the metaphysics of the first substance according to Averroes. Then the intellect as a species has a twofold character. Either it is given in the essential meaning according to Avicenna’s typology of intellect (*quattuor sunt gradus*); or, it is given in the specific meaning of intellectual faculties, which are taken according to the definition of the soul as the first substance (*totum*) performing various activities (*totum praedicatur de omnibus partibus*). Let us remind the inspiration of this definition in the CMDA, since the unity of the organism as entelechy (*totum*) determine all parts (*in omnibus*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Only this division, according to the *Second Analytics*, fulfills the requirements of scientific proof. The imposition of meaning starts from the real activity of intellect, whose subject is the person as the first actual substance. The enumerated three species of intellect (*tres species intellectus*) do not have the same categorical meaning in the first and in the second Averroism, because the writing *Categories* is not interpreted in the same metaphysical way. Hermeneutics have already emphasized several times that the term “*species*” does not have the same meaning in both schools. Citing the controversy between Averroes and Theophrastus, who, like the second Averroism, defended the direct intuition of forms in the receptive intellect, the commentary on the *Second Analytics* draws a clear distinction between the two kinds of species. The first kind is given in the intellectual act (*secundum suum esse*) and the second as a universal notion (*secundum suam potentiam*).[[231]](#footnote-231) The universal species represents an abstract expression of the genus given by the specific difference. The universal being in mind is not the same as the specific meaning of the intellect predicated “de *omnibus partibus*,” with respect to the first substance as the source of real causality that produces the cognition. In the second case, the embodied intellect is the existential bearer of cognitive acts (*subiectum*). The way, in which the intellect is apprehended, corresponds to twofold character of species. The resulting act of the intellect is thus twofold in the actuality of its cognition (*intellectus speculativus*), just as there is a twofold nature of the species.

“The speculative intellect has the twofold character of substrate and of concept (*habet duo, scilicet subjectum, et speciem*). But the subject is not the same in all men. The concept must be seen in two modes, namely, as a definition of the thing (*ratio rei*) and as an accident of the activity of the soul (*accidens animae*). From the point of view of definition, the speculative intellect is the same in all men. But as a true accident of the soul, the speculative intellect is different in all living beings.” [[232]](#footnote-232)

Intellect is understood either as actual mental state of the person that performs the act of knowing (*subjectum*); or as the formal faculty of the immaterial intellect that produces the universal contents of thought (*species*). Intelligible species must necessarily be twofold, since they relate to the concept of intellect taken in two different perspectives. The imposition entails the personal act of cognition that takes place in the soul (*accidens animae*), which the intellect produces through the causal act of thinking; then, the abstraction of it can be made in the concept. This specific approach to cognition, according to the first Averroism, is fundamentally different from the objective, universally given species, since species as a concept defines the essence of the thing (*ratio rei*). The twofold path of metaphysical comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) defines the principal difference between the two conceptions of intellect. The unity of intellect taken in the context of existential act of cognition in the person is categorically different from the abstract concept of the intellect common to all human beings. Averroes traced this ambivalence in the difference between the intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. Albert, in the conclusion of the quoted *solutio*, separates these two meanings of species as a concept and species as existential act, because they do not have the same determination of being (*universale est accidens animae, non est ratio rei*).[[233]](#footnote-233) The scientific definition follows the path of the metaphysical dative by referring to the real substance existing beyond the thinking (*ratio enim est quidditas rei et substantia*). Albert adopted the division of CMDA in the new context of the first Averroism dating back to the Blund’s school. The key term represents the *species intelligibilis* given in the process of abstraction, which completes the process of cognition (*res intellecta*). The speculative intellect is an instance that is responsible for the final *transmutatio* of sensual ideas into intellectual cognition. Therefore, the *intellectus speculativus* completes the receptive and synthetic operation of the lower kinds of cognition. The representatives of the second Averroism and contemporary postmodernism simply passed over this twofold division of the intellect as well as the twofold interpretation of Aristotle according to Alvernus (ch. 2.3.1). The dominant understanding of Albert’s analysis in *De homine* is objective and therefore deformed by victorious crusade of modern Avicennism. This historial destiny of being (Heidegger’s *Irrtum*) secretly operates in virtue of repressed *alētheia*, which publicly exposes itself as mythological *veritas* of modernity. The erroneous path of *Modernorum* consists in the false interpretation of conflicts that characterize the emergence of objectivity and the most significant metaphysical disputes of the years 1240–77.

After the twofold nature of intellect as a personal achievement and as a universal concept, we can go through the doctrine of remaining two faculties of the intellect, namely the *intellectus agens* and *possibilis*. We begin with the question of *intellectus agens*. Like Alvernus, Albert rejects the theory of separated active intellect acting from outside as an independent substance on subjective *intellectus possibilis*. Albert gives the direction of the cognition (*Vor-blickbahn*) in accordance with the theory of the first Averroism according to the Sicilian school for the soul as *tabula rasa*. Like Blund and Alvernus, he rejects the theory of the cosmic soul, which was present in the Aristotelian Neoplatonism of the time, that Dinant and Rufus professed. Albert’s first commentary on *De anima*, which was written during Rufus’s stay in Paris at the time of bishop Alvernus, will be analyzed later (ch. 3.3.4). Albert fundamentally disagrees with Augustinian Avicennists. The cosmic soul conceived according to *De anima* is metaphysical nonsense. The stellar intelligences as pure forms do not exercise the thinking as an activity dependent on the body. The cosmic intelligences have to possess the intellect in direct action as an immaterial substance.

“We follow Aristotle and Averroes in saying that the cosmos has no soul outside the cosmic intelligence, as stated above in *De coelo*. Similarly, we say that human intellect is connected with human soul; it has only abstract being and does not contain in and of itself any intelligible content. It acts as such only in the possible intellect through the phantasms, as Averroes explicitly said in the commentary on *De anima*.” [[234]](#footnote-234)

The active intellect has cognition only from the phantasms. Its activity depends on the receptive component of the intellect (*agere ipsa in intellectu possibili ex phantasmatibus*). The sophists are not able to distinguish between both sides of one and the same individually given intellect. Those *Quidams* keep the universal definition of the active intellect in a sophistic way. They take the intellect as an individual (and not personal) act of the soul that is conceived as another kind of *tertium ens*. The intellect as abstracted universal species is not the same as the intelligible species produced by the intellect, although both species are immaterial and given in the mode *simpliciter*. The cosmic soul presented in Dinant’s pantheistic mode has no possibility of existence because it would have to receive the phantasms. Blund and Albert take it for an absolute nonsense (ch. 2.1.3). The cosmic intellect contains the life as pure thinking and it is absolutely separated from the human soul, which derives the actuality of cognition only from the senses. Albert rejects the distorted apprehension of the speculative intellect of Avicennian modernists, which is in conflict with the theory of CMDA. He rejects Grosseteste’s thesis about active insight into the first principles of cognition, which all *Moderni* adopted (ch. 3.1.1). The following quotation rejects the definition of habitual intellect with innate principles of cognition according to Themistius and the Toledo school. Descartes and Kant took up that modern definition.

“Some say that the definition of the speculative intellect must be understood in terms of the habitual attitude of the first principles of cognition, since this cognition forms an integral part of our nature. Such intellect is supposedly *immortal*, that is, indestructible, because it cannot be suppressed. Supposedly, it is *eternal* because it is not given only in potency.” [[235]](#footnote-235)

Modernists want to be immortal and eternal in their paranoid thinking, which makes a quite laudable piece of scientific mythology. The modern intellect is given as a substance separate from the body, which reveals in the act of intellectual anamnesis permanent principles of cognition and eternal ideas (*intellectu speculativo quoad habitum principiorum*). Then the actuality of the intellect is given in itself as a permanent possibility, which belongs to its nature (*connaturalis est nobis*). Modern intellect actualizes cognition on the basis of the act of self-reflection. The habitual attitude of the principles of cognition within the framework of the hypostatized intellect as a substance of the third kind defines Avicenna’s intellect of the “Flying Man,” Cartesian act of *cogito*, and Kant’s *a priori* given forms of cognition. The founder of modernity Rufus defines for the first time the capacity of cognition as a permanent disposition of thinking (*esse tale*), when thinking as a substance is capable of drawing conclusions from itself (*potentia duplex est, essentialis et accidentalis*, ch. 3.3.1). The thinking of *Doctores latinorum* defined in this way is necessarily *hoc aliquid*, a real substance and later Cartesian *res cogitans*. Averroes fundamentally rejected this solution of *Modernorum* conceived in the manner of Alexandrians. After him, Albert and all the representatives of the first Averroism did the same. Albert claims that the intellect is capable of the individual act only thanks to its potency. It is the only way how the soul can know everything. The passive and the active components of the intellect are defined in terms of Averroes’s theory of diaphanum that distinguishes two kinds of activities (*De homine*, q. 55, s.c., ad 2; p. 475b). The light activates through the invisible diaphanum the colors that we are able to see. The recognition exists between the color and the eye’s potential ability to see, which is activated by the exposed surface. The relationship between the intellect and the thing recognized is based on the similarity. The cognition starts from the thing that we perceive as *species sensibilis* through intentionality. The immaterial receptive component as *intellectus possibilis* is then activated by phantasms, which are actualized as *species intelligibilis* in personal *intellectus agens*. In the writing *De homine*, this procedure determines the cognition coming from the first substance. It makes the only source that is fully in actuality and determines the subsequent accidental cognition of both components of the intellect (*ita actio intellectus agentis non est nisi in possibili*; ibid, q. 55, *solutio*; p. 476a). The following question about the possible intellect distinguishes the acts of intellect from the abstracted intellectual forms.

“Averroes says in the third book of the commentaryon *De anima* that the possible intellect is imperishable according to its substance, but perishable according to species which are in it. In a similar way, the musician has a diminished musical ability when he stops playing; however, his human being remains untouched.” [[236]](#footnote-236)

The quotation distinguishes the immaterial part of the intellect as second substance (*incorruptibilis secundum suam substantiam*) and the personal ability of the reception of the immaterial species. The reception works within the framework of abstraction made by the embodied intellect. The musician can stop playing because this is in his power. By doing so, however, he merely limits his accidental ability to produce music, but his existent substance remains the same. The person carries as substance this ability whether the given musician uses it currently or not. Once again, the well-known division in CMDA of the intellect as an abstract notion (*quartum genus*) and changeable cognition of bodily subject (*tertium genus*) comes up. The division again concerns the twofold nature of *intellectus possibilis*. Either the intellect is taken from the point of view of the formal act, i.e., from the inviolable essentiality of the receptive component as such, or from the point of view of its real *operatio*, which is given in the existent person. Albert sees in the mode of CMDA the receptive intellect as a concept (*quartum genus*), which is abstracted from the act of personal thinking (*tertium genus*).

“The possible intellect is imperishable according to substance and potency, but perishable by its activity that makes its inherent actuality (*per actum qui est in ipso*). This changeability makes it forget the contents of understanding. This is how the statement of Aristoteles should be understood.” [[237]](#footnote-237)

The first view comprehends the intelligible soul from the point of view of unchangeability and therefore immateriality. Albert is well aware of the Commentator’s interpretation in the key section of CMDA III.5. Following him, Albert rejects the status of material intellect connected only to the bodily senses. The receptive component of the intellect is immaterial and so are its acts. Thanks to this immaterial abstraction, which is based on the immaterial receptivity of *intellectus possibilis*, there is the formal unity of intellectual content, because we keep the same meaning. But the immaterial receptivity is given as an intentional act thanks to diversity of subjects, because thinking is a free personal activity to be perfected or deteriorated. Averroes offers the original concept of *intellectus possibilis*, which fulfills the basic requirements in *De anima* for the activity of human intellect bound to the body as a hylemorphic substance. Following Blund’s pattern, Albert distinguishes between the creation of a species within the personal intentional act and the formal understanding of *species intelligibilis* considered in the process of abstraction. Blund took it as activity of *intellectus formalis* (ch. 2.1.1). Then it is evident that this resulting understanding given as the result of abstraction, it is common to all human beings. Universal notion is not a Porretan substance of the third kind.

“Averroes argues that the intellect is vulnerable because of the changeable content of knowledge, not in terms of its essential nature. The universal as the essence (*universale secundum quod*) is the same for all people. But then, it is not a personal achievement of the intellect, but it is given as a species in the universal intellect, which is the bearer of these contents (*species quae est in intellectu sicut in subjecto*). Since they are not the same subject, also the species is not the same.” [[238]](#footnote-238)

Albert makes a precise distinction that concerns three faits. First, the vulnerable and personal *intellectus speculativus* is one of many faculties of the soul that makes the unique form of the hylemorphic substance (*intellectus corrumpitur corruptione intelligibilium*). Secondly, the intellect as an abstracted form of thought represents an impersonal substrate, a carrier, a subject, etc. (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*) of certain activities which are proper to it from the point of view of its immaterial nature of cognition (*in intellectu sicut in subjecto*). Third, the intentionally created *species intelligibilis* arises in the process of abstraction of the personal intellect (*species quae est in intellectu*). These species are not a false *tertium ens* of objectively thinking modernists, and they must be precisely distinguished with respect to the dual form of the intellect. Either they are given as intentional *species intelligibilis* in the process of abstraction and they are mutable. Or, they are understood as essences, in which case these species are given as the formal and universal content of the general intellect. Then, we obtain a specific concept of intellect, which is common to all thinking human beings capable of abstraction and it is therefore immaterial and imperishable. This twofold approach according to Albert offers the resulting solution of the unity of intellect in the mode of *intellectus speculativus*. We find the finished synthesis in the writing *De homine*, q. 57, where Albert, referring to Averroes, comments on the unity of intellect. Referring to CMDA, the first Averroism, , distinguished both the intellect operating at the level of a person (*tertium genus*) and the intellect as a universal concept (*quartum genus*).

“Averroes, in the third book of the Commentary on *De anima*, says that for all men there is only one concept of speculative intellect.” [[239]](#footnote-239)

This sentence concerns the speculative intellect as a universal notion and not as actual existence. Therefore, the quoted entity refers to resulting universal cognition that produces the speculative intellect as concept. The cognition is specific, since it is common to all people from the point of view of meaning they produce. The intellect unified in this way entails universal meaning. That species makes common to all men in the abstracted mode *quartum genus*, thanks to its essential individuality, immateriality, and generality. L′intellect grasped in its immateriality and generality brings forth universal concepts. According to the interpretation of *Categories*, the unity of the double speculative intellect (a concept, an act of the person in the body) must be supplemented by double nature of “*species*.” Either the sense of “*species*” is determined by the metaphysical imposition, i.e. by the illumination of the sense of “*species*” coming from the hyparchical first substance. Or the sense of “*species*” is determined by supposition, i.e. by illumination coming from behind, from the higher universal concept given as *genus*. Then it is true that in the first case the concept of “*species*” relates to the changeable intentional object given in the existential act of the intellect. In the second case, the species belongs to the general concept conceived as abstraction and relates to specific human intellect given as abstraction. The unity of both definitions of the intellect can be done only by the exposure of being from the front, because the *intellectus agens* and *speculativus* work only through the receptive *intellectus possibilis*. Since we understand everything through the senses and in the body, the abstraction is accomplished with respect to this causally given activity. Then we make the scientific deduction of human intellect, in the modality of truth as *proportio*. The predication follows the imposition of existential *intellectus possibilis* as the first predicated species that stands next to the bodily made operation of thinking in the person as the first substance (*ex inmediatis*). This unique position as causal *medium* in the middle member of deductive syllogism safeguards the *univoce* made supposition of both other kinds of active intellect (*agens, speculativus*) that assure the unity of intellectual contents for all people. The possible intellect predicated in such a true manner cannot be the hypostatic substance of modernists. Therefore, the CMDA refused the *intellectus possibilis* of Themistius and Alexander separated from the bodily recognizing person. The receptive component of intellect is merely the potency of the soul, because it makes part of the actual existence of the real person. Thanks to this universal receptivity of *anima intellectiva* in the body as the carrier of cognition (*subiectum*), the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* is able to accept all species that are given by sensual experience. The possible intellect possesses the real cognitive ability to become a subject *in potentia* for everything that is intelligible due to sensual phantasms. Therefore, the human intellect is neither a Cartesian actual substance nor a Porretan pseudo-substance given in the form of Neoplatonic hypostasis. This would be an actual intellect and not a potential intellect and it could not recognize everything possible. The receptive part of the intellect is not sensual as in the case of Avicennists and Alexandrians. The purely hylemorphic nature of *intellectus materialis* cannot form a unity with the active intellect that is another immaterial faculty of the soul.

Albert summarizes Averroes’s synthesis of both forms of the intellect from the point of view of *intellectus possibilis*.[[240]](#footnote-240) It is perishable and therefore distinguished in each person. Its real act (*intellecta speculativa*) is bound to the first real substance. The immateriality as formal unity of thinking makes the intellect to be the one and eternal as Averroes’s *quartum genus*. Again, we must take into account the distinction of the concepts of the intellect according to the relation between the first and the second substance (*Cat*. 2a11–16). Either, *intellectus possibilis* is a personalized act of thinking producing the species; or, it makes a formal substrate of mankind as a species producing universal contents and cognitions. Then the intellect as species at the univocal level of predication corresponds to universal cognitions which are given at the level of humanity as a species. Between these two forms of intellect (existential act, abstract concept), there is no third species of intellect like Avicennist, Porretans or postmodern being of the third kind. Albert therefore rejects in principle all theories of *Modernorum* of that time, since they insist on sensual essence of *intellectus possibilis* similar to Alexandrians that were present in time of Averroes. We will not mention all the problems that the false theory of the material intellect produces, because the first matrix of objectivity concerning the Falsafa described it in full. All the key properties of intellect given in *De anima* are resolved solely in Averroes’s philosophy of possible intellect done in CMDA. This is the basic thesis of all representatives of the school of the first Averroism. It was rejected by the two semi-Averroists coming from this school, namely Thomas Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus. These semi-Averroists take the unity of intellect in dualist ways according to the Toledo school. They have either the substantial (Aegidius) or the formally hypostatized intellect (Aquinas). Albert defends the interpretation of *De anima* according to the Sicilian school in all essential points. The authentic interpretation of *De anima* according to the CMDA connected all components of cognition to the act of the existing person. Albert proved that separated active intellect operating in the soul according to *sequaces Aristotelis* is nonsense and a sophistical simulacrum. According to Averroes and Albert, such separated intellect could not understand anything (*intellectus agens secundum se separatus a possibili nihil intelligit*; q. 55, solutio, ad 1; p. 476a). This *intellectus possibilis*, due to its immaterial and thus universal receptivity, takes up separated contents of the first completely separated intelligences (*actum intelligendi habeat quemdam ab intelligentiis separatis*). But it is possible either only after death, when it is separated from the body as an immaterial component, or exceptionally in a prophetic dream (q. 56, a. 4, solutio, ad 4; p. 484a). Alvernus proposed the same theory before Albert (ch. 2.3.2). Albert took this immaterial receptivity of the possible intellect to integrate theologically required Augustinian illumination based on Avicenna’s *intellectus sanctus*.

Let us look at the key part of the commentary on the third book of *De anima* written about the year 1255. Albert fully rejects the doctrine of modernists called “*opinio Latinorum*” (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 11). The quoted part contests the teaching of Augustinian Avicennists; it partially takes Avicenna into account, but Albert argues from Averroes’s position. According to Avicenna, the *intellectus possibilis* forms only one part of the soul. It is the reason why it cannot be an individualized substance, in the manner of *hoc aliquid*.[[241]](#footnote-241) According to Albert, Avicenna in that point joins the position of Aristotle and the Commentator (*Avicennae dicta accipiamus*). That Avicennism is mistaken, for which Siger later criticized Albert (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.4). The criticism of *Latinorum* shows the development of objective being. Following chapters take up the analysis of main representatives of the second Averroism around the year 1250, such as Pseudo-Grosseteste, Rufus and Kilwardby. Albert’s modern contemporaries, following Avicenna’s pattern, created a new version of Neoplatonism. The learned *Latini* transformed the concept of *intellectus possibilis* in the first Averroism into a pure simulacrum, following the dialogue *Sophistes*. Albert rejects the dualism of the Latins made in the style of *sophistae Latini* rejected by Alvernus. They double reality and human person in the model of universal hylemorphism.

“The rational soul is said to be individualized in two ways (*duplici individuitate*). They claim the soul to be an autonomous first substance (*hoc aliquid*) due to its incorporeal and spiritual matter (*per materiam incorpoream et spiritualem*). This matter carries the soul as form (*est subjectum formae ejus*). From this form comes to another individuation outside its nature (*individuans extra naturam ejus*). This time it is the material body, and the soul makes its actualization (*quod est corpus cujus ipsa est actus*). With this, however, it is said that this individualized form is in itself an autonomous substance (*in ipsa secundum esse est individuata forma*).” [[242]](#footnote-242)

The quotation describes the modern definition of intellect as Porretan hypostasis and later Cartesian first substance. Again appears the fundamental error of modernity, which sees no difference between the single thing as *individuum* and as the first substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). New first substance arose due to the universal hylemorphism given by the matter of the third kind (*per materiam incorpoream et spiritualem*). Done in that way, a simulacrum of the first real substance came into being (ch. 3.2). New identity joined classical definition of the soul as the immaterial form animating the material body as the first substance. New simulacrum exists only in thinking, but it got the characteristics of the real substance (*quod est corpus cujus ipsa est actus*). This simulacrum represents a new type of being of the third kind (*hoc aliquid*). The individualized matter of the third kind makes the hypostatic subject that in the next step determines the substantial character of modern intellect. The spiritual matter became the new carrier of the form and formed a new subject of intellect (*quae est subjectum formae*). The doubling of reality is repeated in the definition of soul and intellect. The Latins made of the one rational soul two individual entities (*individuam duplici individuitate*). This atomic substance they consider univocal with respect to the first substance (*ipsa secundum esse est individuata forma*). The form was hypostatized due to the matter of the third kind, following the pattern of Gilbert’s subsistence (ch. 1.4). The intellect and the soul received an existence of its own, since they became the substances of the third kind. The form individualized in this way is given univocally in reality and in thinking. Therefore it goes from the objective and eternal essence into the first substance (*individuans extra naturam ejus*). The quotation precisely defines the Cartesian turn of modernists that made out the soul as an independent atomic substance. This turn occurred in 1235–40, when the soul was objectified in the manner of the Neoplatonic quasi-substance. The soul received an identity outside of material individuation in the body.

By doubling the soul (*duplici individuitate*), the Latin and objectively educated West created a new mythological subject. This amazing creature “recognizes” mythologically (i.e. objectively) a non-existent objective being of the third kind. The new way of *Ge-Stell* is now complete and the Western demiurge started the period of Anthropocene. Mad modernity cannot create the Earth as the first substance, so it imagines a nihilistic simulacrum instead of it. The commentary on the third book of *De anima* describes exactly how the modern subject came into being. It excluded the correspondence of the intellect with the first real substance from the process of cognition. The emergence of the objective subject brought about the fundament to make the construction of modern science in the mode of Heidegger’s *Irrtum*. The birth of the redoubled subject and reality as simulacre established the metaphysics of modernity. The modern version of *intellectus possibilis* and its demiurgic production brings the Neoplatonic term “redoubled Being” back into the scene (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Modern schizophrenic subject also needs the corresponding mythological object in the form of the Porretan species, which possesses all characteristics of being of the third kind. Albert’s quarrel with the Latins in the cited chapter 11 concerns the way the modern *intellectus possibilis* recognizes the modern world, since both mythopoetic phenomena are the corresponding image of modern thinking (*proportio*). Adepts of the second Averroism rejected Aristotelian abstraction and created from the species a new substance of the third kind (*esse individuatum*). Albert discards such an objective being, since it exists exclusively in thinking of modern *illuminati*.

“They maintain that the intentions in the possible intellect must be considered in two ways. How they are given in the process of abstraction (*prout sunt abstractae*) and what nature they keep in relation to what is abstracted (*prout habent esse in abstrahendo*). The first way shows them as universal forms, which are separated from matter and from its properties. The second way gives them an individual existence in the possible intellect (*esse individuatum in intellectu possibili*).” [[243]](#footnote-243)

In the first step, the Latins recognize the intentionality of the possible intellect, including the Aristotelian form of abstraction from the imagination (*sunt abstractae*). This gives rise to the classical status of the *species intelligibilis* in the first Averroism, because the resulting species are universal and immaterial (*formae universales liberatae a materia*). But the second activity of *intellectus possibilis* has nothing in common with the reception and the synthesis of intelligible species according to *De anima*. On the second floor of cognition and abstraction, the *intellectus possibilis* operates as Neoplatonic hypostasis on the matter of the third kind. The hypostatized Porretan species are pressed into that matter. These species “exsist” according to the work *De causis* through the impriting of autonomous cosmic forms into hylic reality, which was shown in Proclus’s interpretation of substance (OBJ I, ch 1.3.1). The intentionality of the second Averroism took up Avicenna’s denudation to create a new species of the third kind that came out as an abstracted object (*habent esse in abstrahendo*). Intelectual forms became objective entities, which were equipped with a pseudo-form and pseudo-matter in the abstracting intellect. Such “hylemorphic” substances become exchangeable with first substances. We find the invasion of Porretan “exsistence” as eternal essence into the philosophy around the year 1235 in Rufus’s terminus “*exsistere*” (ch. 3.3.2). The *species intelligibilis* received the hypostatized being in the possible intellect (*habent esse individuatum in intellectu possibili*). Albert probably alludes to the quoted definition of the possible intellect from the work *Speculum animae* (ca. 1245), which he certainly knew from Rufus’s lectures in Paris. The last sentence of the quotation rejects the demagogy of modernists with regard to “numerically” unified or diversified receptive intellect that was falsely attributed to Averroes. The modern species are the materially individualized beings of the third kind, which are universally given by division within the framework of the Tree of Porphyry (*esse individuatum*). The Latins created an individual as a sophistic simulacrum in the form of a specific universal, which has a univocal being both in reality and in the intellect. The individual arose in the process of denudation and is predicted in the Porretan version of categories. As a result, the predication of beings of the third kind acquired the character of an existential statement. The assumption conceives one’s own creation of thinking as objective res in the absolute mode, which is given without regard to the existence of the real thing. Then the real person, corpse and chimera have the same objective meaning, which is given only in the intellect as universal supposition. Augustinian and Porretan modernism revived in its own way the old dispute of the Neoplatonists about the indivisible substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The modern species do not have the intentional status of *species intelligibilis* as in the first Averroism, because the species of Porretans has the univocal character of being in the manner of the first substance (*individuum*). Modernist univocal species can be found in the separated cosmic intellect, in the hylemorphic things, and in the human intellect. The recipient and bearer of these universal hylemorphic beings must be individualized by spiritual matter. Such a universal *intellectus possibilis* is numerically identical among all peoples as a mytological and modern *tertium ens*. This chimera is first and foremost cosmic, eternal and imperishable in nature (*quartum genus* of CMDA). Second kind of possible intellect as an individual first substance, that is, as Porretan *individuum*. It is different from the other immaterial forms by taking the spiritual matter of the third kind (*tertium genus*). Such a sophistic simulation of CMDA gave rise to Averroist definition of *intellectus possibilis*, which became a hypostatized Porretan substance of the third kind (ch. 3.2). This substance took form in the system of universal hylemorphism. The first model of this simulacrum created Rufus in writing *Contra Averroem* around the year 1236 (ch. 3.3.3). This work turned the Commentator into a Porretan Averroist, which Alvernus, Albert and Bacon resolutely rejected. The modern intellect represents a substance of the third kind, capable of Avicennian or Cartesian or Husserlian reflection. As a modern simulacrum, the intellect, thanks to its own independent activity, produces a modern version of the species as a pseudo-substance given directly in the receptive intellect (*esse individuatum in intellectutu possibili*). This individualist worldview takes place in the mode “*discrete videamus*,” also in accordance with the modern imposition that no longer refers to the real thing in order to establish scientific cognition (ch. 1.5). Instead of imposing the first substance, the modernists use universal supposition made out in mind (ubi est *subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur*, ch. 3.3.1). Rufus’s quotation defines such a speculative position that we comment later on. Kilwardby took up the position of Rufus and next his school known from the anonymous *Erfurter Traktat*. They established autonomous being of the intellectual substance in Cartesian terms as the basis of cognition (*quaestio quid est intellectus non supponit quaestionem si est res, sed si est intellectus*, ch. 3.4.3). This dubious individuality of the intellect as a pseudo-substance was justified by Rufus’s “concrete and truthful” definition of the possible intellect (*intellectum possibili praedicatur concretive et vere*, ch. 3.3.4). Today we know those conceptions as the thesis about the numerically different intellect, which is a classic simulacrum of Averroist modernism and postmodernism. The second Averroism did not understand the twofold character of the receptive intellect according to CMDA. Modernists therefore created their own sophistic simulacrum that mythologicallyl reproduced double nature of intellect decribed in CMDA. They created a new atomic substance of Neoplatonists such as Simplikius had done before them (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The school of *sophistae Latini* did that transmutation of the first substance in its nihilistic simulacrum as *tertium ens* for the first time. Alvernus and Albert used therefore un ironic name “*doctores Latini*” to describe the new school of such “philosophes.” Albert criticizes above all the mendicant colleagues from the school of second Averroism, while bishop Alvernus, as a secular priest and rector of the university, aimed at the diocesan clergy of the newly created Paris University. The sophistic subject and Averroist version of *intellectus possibilis* were necessary to create the modern object as *tertium ens*. The new relationship “subject—object” led to the eclipse of the first substance. The real thing received its duplicate in the form of “*esse individuatum*,” which began to play the role of the first substance.

Albert’s contemporaries (*Moderni*) duplicated the hyparchical substance. Modernists as new demiurges introduced the matter and the form of the third kind according to the archetypal procedure of the first modernist in the dialogue *Timaeus*. The demiurge of Plato had before him an ideal world of mathematical and geometric forms, which he had to replicate in problematic and unreliable matter. The mythical cosmic craftsman then created a faithful and true simulacrum of the original world of ideas, to the extent that the chaotic nature of indefinite causality let him to do so (τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, *Tim*. 48a7‒8). We must take into account the “disobedience of matter” mentioned by Rufus (*inoboedientia materiae*, ch. 3.3.2). Albert claims that the school of Latin sophists create duplicates of the first substances and deal with them as with real substances. In such a case, they do not seek the truth of the world. They took up objective relation “subject—object” in order to observe their own paranoid creations. The truth of modernity was no longer a correspondence between intellect and thing and became a component of demiurgic correctness made by the subject (*rectitudo*). The knowledge is determined by Avicenna’s certainty based on being of the essence (*certitudo*). This certainty of essence as the first act of being (*esse proprium*) forms the first principle as l′*actus essendi* (*quo est*). Such certainty and rectitude produced by the modern subject established the fundamental meaning of being in modern metaphysics (*certitudo qua est*).[[244]](#footnote-244) Albert’s commentary on the third book of *De anima* shows that the subject became a sovereign place of production of reality. Franciscan Bonaventura contributed in a significant way to that development. His modernist school begins to fully operate at the University of Paris from the year 1255. It is no wonder that Bacon as classical Aristotelian considered these sophists insane thinkers (*insaniunt contra veritatem*, ch. 3.4.2). Each of these modern simulacra is taken in the mode *absolute*, that is, separated from the reality of the first substance. Nevertheless, even the modernity must recognize that the idea of the house in mind does not exist in the same way as the physical construction in reality. The substitution of the first substance for the thought construct takes place in various ways; however, there is always a constitution of being of the third kind, which connects both worlds in the modern form of the ontotheological or mathematical diacosmos. The Falsafa of speculative Alfarabi, Ibn Adi, and especially that of Avicenna, has clearly shown that any construction of being of the third kind must be carried out in the ontotheological scenario, which is a condition *sine qua non* for modern metaphysics. Avicenna introduced ontotheology into the scenario of emanations of forms from the active cosmic intellect as a *Dator formarum*, which Christian scholasticism rejected. The scholastic version of this doubled being, called the *exemplar*, influenced the ontotheology of Western modernism shaped by Avicenna’s and Augustine’s philosophy until the year 1230.[[245]](#footnote-245) Bonaventura created the modern realm of specimens reflected by God. The constitution of the objective being by Duns Scotus followed, and subsequently the postmodern constitution of being in the order of mathematical ontotheology (Leibniz). The mathematization of the world replaced the dogmatic mythology of scholasticism. The mythological commencement (*Beginn*) of *via* *Modernorum* dominates the subsequent stage of modernism and postmodernism. At the present time of full nihilism, metaphysics lost even the attachment to its modern origin given by Latin Alexandrians (*nullus enim est sciens et perfectus apud eos nisi qui est Alexandreus*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The ontotheological structure replaced the missing causality of the first substance that Aristotle’s and Averroes’s metaphysics fully upheld. In the epoch of metaphysical and scientific-technical nihilism, it remains but the production of the postmodern intellect that separated itself from the physical body. That kind of metaphysical paranoia was accomplished in the modality of Heidegger’s *Irre*. Let us now conclude with the main theses in writing *De homine* that dealt with the first wave of modernists active in Paris in the years 1240–45.

* The intellect is immaterial in its receptive and synthesizing component. It is the ability of the soul as a hylemorphic form of the body, which exists as the unique person.
* The unity of the person is based on the causality in the framework of an existential act of *anima intellectiva*. The *intellectus agens* as a personal and active faculty of the soul depends on its activity on the receptive component of the *intellectus possibilis*.
* The intellect is a pure *tabula rasa*, since the human cognition proceeds only from the senses. The immaterial possible intellect is potential in an absolute manner, since it separated both from the material senses and from the cosmic active intellect. Therefore, it basically depends on sensual apprehensions, since only these are available *in actu*.
* Due to the proceeding of causality from the effective to the formal one (that is, from *species sensibilis* to *species intelligibilis*), the cognitive scheme is based on the exposure of the sense of being done by the frontal vision of the reality. The imposition of meaning starts with the first real substance. This ensures the scientific knowledge of the world in the Aristotelian concept of truth as *adaequatio*.
* The substantial unity of intellect is made as personal *actus essendi* that corresponds to Averroes’s *tertium genus*. Such existing *intellectus possibilis, agens* and *speculativus* form the immaterial cognitive abilities of the person that exercises the act of unique existence. These mental faculties are supplanted in their act on the hylemorphic hypostasis of the first substance given as an existing person (*subiectum*). This architectural unity of the intellect is transitory and perishable, since it is made as activity of the unique soul and personal faculties.
* The universal form of *intellectus possibilis*, given as a pure abstraction, creates the specific unity of the human species, which is different from the animal world and the cosmic intelligences. Such specificity is the universal concept, the meaning of which, thanks to abstraction, is separated from the existential act of understanding (*quartum genus*).
* The specific concept of humanity based on this type of receptive intellect is imperishable as long as humanity exists as an abstraction. The true imposition of the *species humana* requires the existence of at least one case of anti-modernist thinking coming from the real person as the causal source of this humanistic unity that is made specific due to the metaphysical imposition (*species humana*).

The hylemorphic unity of the person makes the only substance for all forms of the intellect that makes a specific faculty of the soul. The soul makes the entelechy of the body; various operations of this or that kind of intellect belong to the faculties of the soul. From the very beginning of writing *De homine*, Albert emphasizes that definitions of human intellect can be diverse. The intellect can be understood both according to the faculties of the soul and according to the different kind of *resolutio*. It is given either with regard to the real thing or to the essential definition in the framework of the twofold science of the soul (*rationis et rei*). The unity of true cognition must be established for all people on the principle *ex inmediatis*, by the causality of the thinking person that imposes the sense in this way. In scientific judgment, the universally true cognition follows the personal process of cognition of this or that person, in order to keep *proportio* to reality. The same, understandably, also applies to the recognition of personal intellect in the mode of *tertium genus*. The intellect, as an abstract species, is in Averroes’s sense of *quartum genus*, to be the faculty of human species to think universals as an immaterial universal realm given in human thinking. Unfortunately, modernity turned the *intellectus possibilis* into a separate and mythological Averroist substance.

Albert unequivocally defended the theory of the first Averroism when he lectured in Paris (1240–48). This school was the only one that understood the integral Christian concept of the person, because it interpreted the entire chain of causality and cognition, both materially and formally. The theory of the intellect conceived according to Aristotle and presented *ad mentem Averrois* in the Sicilian school integrates all key components of the theory of truth as *proportio*. The determination of cognition proceeds from the direction of the external thing. It passes through material and singular cognition of the thing in the senses, to reach the immaterial and universal cognition of the same thing in the intellect. In comparison to the bishop Alvernus, Albert better integrated the formal proceeding of Avicennists into the first Averroism. That interpretation certainly appreciated his Dominican colleague Kilwardby from the school of *Latinorum* that Albert fundamentally rejected. These two philosophers were also very important bishops at the time of the quarrel of learned *Latinorum* after the year 1255. A public philosophical and theological dispute between both thinkers and the high-church dignitaries would have acquired a power character, which in the end should have been resolved by the pope or by the local council of bishops. That was the reason, why the bishop Albert, who was in Cologne and not in Paris, was not on the black list of so-called Averroists in the year 1277. He would certainly have belonged there, since he endorsed the same scheme of cognition as famous commentator Siger of Brabant. Throughout his life, Albert defended the doctrine of the first Averroism, which was defended in Paris by the philosopher, theologian and wise bishop Alvernus. Alberts successors took other paths. Aquinas turned Averroes into an Averroist and, at the same time, he rejected the dualism of the modernists as nonsense by using the Aristotelian point of view. Latin sophists tried to reconcile Avicenna and Averroes in the way of Neoplatonism. The tragicomic result of their efforts changed the history of the West.

### 2.4.3 Albert and Modernists

The controversy apropos the *intellectus possibilis* in the writing *De homine* had a philosophical character, which was limited to the narrow circle of Latin interpreters of Aristotle. However, after the publication of *De homine*, Albert confirmed critical position of Alvernus’s theological commentary on *De anima*. He became aware of devastating consequences of modernist attitude for Christian theology. Both interpreters of Averroes were partisans of the Sicilian school, since they defended the unity of the person according to CMDA. The conflict with modernists concerned the concept of man as one or more substances. The philosophical unity of the person and the Christian doctrine of man and the theology of redemption were at stake. Bishop Alvernus defended the same line against Latin and Italian sophists. The introduction of commentary on *De anima* includes programmatic explanation made by a reserved thinker. Albert outlined a lifelong program of commentaries on Aristotelian corpus and explains why he undertook this major work.

“First I will explain Aristotle’s science according to my knowledge, then opinions of other Peripatetics and further Plato’s view and finally I give my own opinion. In judging these questions, we fundamentally reject the theses of learned Latinists (*omnino abhorremus Doctorum Latinorum verba*). According to our judgment, one cannot find a solid core in them. They neither offer a truth of science nor resort to right words.” [[246]](#footnote-246)

The criticism condemns, in the name of the school of the first Averroism, a group of Albert’s contemporaries whose conception of truth has no scientific character (*scientiam veritatis nec ostendunt*). Their verbalism does not create a categorical predication that relates to causality of the real thing (*nec verbis propriis attingunt*). The quotation proves the growth of influence of the second Averroism after death of bishop Alvernus. In Oxford, this direction was reliably established since the year 1240. Inspired by Porretans and *Nominales*, the group called *Latini* received Avicebron’s work *Fons vita.* They made use of his concept of *materia prima* (ch. 3.2) to create a modern substance included in the classification of *Arbor Pophyriana*. At the end of division, it appears the modern *individuum* endowed with spiritual matter of the third kind. A new hylemorphic substance of the third kind came to being by combining the individual as a form with the spiritual matter. This abstract term joined the categorical predication of modernists and it entered in the division of universal meaning as a kind of species. Rufus’s terminus “*species obiecti exsistentis*” (ch. 3.3.4) emerged sometime about the year 1245. It denotes the objective hylemorphic substance. In the next decade, a similar concept of Grosseteste’s school at Oxford linked to it (ch. 3.1.3). The modernists used Avicebron’s *materia prima* to make a new version of *intellectus possibilis*. The substance takes the form of Neoplatonic *materia prima* or *materia spiritualis* as the highest genus for matter on the level of intellect. Due to the passive character of *materia prima*, this simulacrum given as atomic substance has the capacity of unrestricted receptivity. It meets the requirement of *De anima* to assure the universal receptivity of intellect. Taking the materialized pseudo-form, the *intellectus possibilis* became a quasi-substance that received a numerical individualization according to the matter of the third kind. By this transformation, the modernists saved the *intellectus materialis* according to the CMDA as fully receptive and fully immaterial faculty. Thus, in the circles of the first Latin modernity, the sophistic simulacrum of Averroes’s *intellectus materialis* came into being. It received a peculiar kind of immateriality that had nothing in common with the original hylic intellect of Alexander and Avicenna bound to the senses. The modernists definitely lost the possibility to recognize Averroes’s original reasoning. Therefore, they made out of him the scapegoat of their own incompetence (*Leviticus* 16:10) and drove him out into the wilderness of academic and ecclesiastical *damnatio memoriae*. Albert observes in the years 1254–57 the import of Neoplatonic matter through Avicebron’s work *Fons vitae* that began to determine the modern notion of *intellectus possibilis*. He disagrees with Porretan interpretations of hypostatized potency because this path is not an Aristotelian one. The important part of Albert’s commentary on *De anima* rejects the concept of the possible intellect as a modern quasi-substance. The confrontation concerns Avicebron’s claim that the possible intellect is universal as matter (*intellectus possibilis est communis sicut materiae*). Albert reminds the Latins that Avicebron’s philosophy regarding the possible intellect can have an Aristotelian interpretation in addition to Neoplatonic one.[[247]](#footnote-247) The preceding matrix has shown that the little word “*sicut*” plays a key role in the form “*quasi*” in determining the nature of the receptive intellect from Alfarabi to Averroes. This assertion contains the core of disagreement between the first and second Averroism.

“Avicebron wanted to say that generally taken potency of the possible intellect is like matter (*potentia intellectus possibilis communis est sicut materiae*). Therefore, it is separated from the determinacy of forms, which this intellect contains only potentially and not actually. Indeed, the possibility of this intellect is general because general meaning (*universale*) is contained in it in this way.” [[248]](#footnote-248)

The first Averroism asserts that materiality in the definition of intellect means only universal receptivity, because intellect is the immaterial faculty of the soul. In the first Averroism, the intellect could never be a substance. It makes a faculty of the soul, which is not a substance but an animating form of the body. The second Averroism simply passed over this meaning and, with the help of matter of the third kind, created from the intellect a modern Cartesian substance. Neoplatonic *materia prima* became an independent genus as univocally conceived form. The new *tertium ens* was used for the construction of Averroist *intellectus possibilis* that received objective properties tied to its sophistical substantiality. The modern intellect is and is not the first substance, since it exists in the mind of *illuminati*. Such mythological imposition prevents it from being the second substance expressed by the metaphysical imposition. Further, the *intellectus possibilis* is and is not the *individuum*, due to univocally conceived *materia prima*. It is a hyparchical form and at the same time, it makes the divisible substance of the third kind as a universal notion in the Porphyry’s Tree. Moreover, this modern *intellectus possibilis* is and is not common to all men. Its individualized potentia is taken as *ens* *commune*, by erroneous concept of matter of the third kind. The introduction of spiritual matter into the essence of the intellect changed the Aristotelian doctrine in the direction of Neoplatonism. The modernists created another being of the third kind after the pattern of Simplicius and other Neoplatonists.

Albert, like Alvernus and Bacon, could not participate in such capitulation of critical thinking, which the school of modernists accomplished first in Oxford and then in Paris. The definition of intellect in the mode of universal hylemorphism meant for Albert the complete denial of Aristotelianism. This modern solution is complete nonsense; it is beyond reasonable philosophical thinking and it abolished the unity of the person. Therefore, Albert decided to make an integral interpretation of Aristotle’s work, so that similar nonsense would not occur in following generations. Roger Bacon does the same at the same time by writing the works *Opus maius* and *Opus minus* (ch. 3.4.3). In defending authentic Aristotelianism against sophistical Latins, neither of them achieved any success. The present epoch definitely confirmed it in the modality *de fine*, that is, by contemporary metaphysical nihilism. The present era took over from modernity the schizophrenic nature of man divided into some substances and the paranoid view of the world inhabited by substances of the third kind. The first Averroism of the Sicilian school fundamentally rejected such destructive worldview and humanism. In the first Averroism following the interpretation of CMDA, the *intellectus possibilis* is personal as *tertium genus*. The universal intellect is in the abstracted mode of *quartum genus*, taken from the formal point of view of immateriality. The intellect makes the second substance (*subiectum*) to upheld universal contents on the level of humanity as *species*. The abstracted and not at all hypostatized possible intellect produces on the level of humankind a universal form of *species intelligibilis*, which is common to all men capable of philosophical form of abstraction. The actual subject of intellect is the hylemorphic composition of the person, which is the actual unity of body and soul. Aristotelian thinkers of all directions, interpreting the metaphysics *ad mentem Averrois*, knew that the study of the human intellect is one of the greatest problems of philosophy. The question of the unity of the intellect belongs to the realm of the real connoisseurs, of which the Latins scholars of the time were not suited. The interpretation of objectivity must find the beginning of the controversy about modernity in Albert’s commentary on the *Third book of De anima* (c. 1255). Albert draws the attention of modern sophists to a key passage in the CMDA, using the same words as Averroes (*questio valde est difficilis, et maximam habet ambiguitatem*; CMDA, p. 402.431). Dominican of Cologne holds the same position.

“This dispute is extremely difficult, and we must invite to it only those who are sufficiently educated in philosophy. The rest can hear the words presented; however, they do not possess the gift of comprehending their meaning.” [[249]](#footnote-249)

The sophists of Albert’s time parrot the text of CMDA about the unity of the intellect (*verba quidem audire possunt*), but are not able to understand the real content of this unity (*ad intellectum eorum non sunt idonei*). The followers of the second Averroism understood CMDA in their own way, which is why they attacked Averroes and his Latin knowers as Averroists. Albert’s commentary on *De anima*, similarly to Averroes in CMDA, explains all errors of Arabs, Greeks, Alexandrians and *Modernorum*, who neither then nor nowadays are able to see the real essence of intellect connected to unique existence of the person. Just like Averroes, Albert sets himself the task of interpreting Aristotle’s work in such a way that its main metaphysical choices and concepts clearly emerge. The thinker of Cologne rejected the basic form of the newly emerging metaphysics of *Modernorum* as a tragic error of thinking.

Hermeneutics seeks the place where the epochal error (*Irrtum*) of Western thought has entered the space of full disclosure (*alētheia*). The change in the concept of truth made possible the manifestation of a different type of being that is objective and therefore, from the point of view of Aristotelianism, false. This fundamental event in the metaphysical thought of the Latin West (*Ereignis*) established the epoch of objectivity, because the being of substance (*ens*) received a new meaning. The key term of new gigantomachy concerns the status of the first substance (*esse ratum*). The substance is established as modern certainty in the intellect, which follows the exposure of being from behind. Or it is an *esse ratum* given by Aristotelian categorical definition of the substance based on the apodictic scientific judgment, which follows the exposure of being from the front. In the case of the exposure of the sense of being, Albert defends the opposite perspective as the second Averroism. Modern ignorance (ἀπαιδευσία, *Met*. 1006a6) proposed the theory of truth as a simulacrum of correspondence. In this way, a new form of metaphysical error is introduced. It eclipsed the first substance and changed the classical metaphysics in the nihilistic form. The quotation rejects false hylemorphism of the soul given in the school of learned Latins and shows the epochal turn in the thinking of the Western subject.

“Science, which is in the soul, and other intellectual faculties as well, they do not have real and certain being of the thing as it is in the world (*non habent esse reale et ratum in natura*), but as it is in the soul (*in anima tantum*). Such being of the thing is weak (*hoc est esse debile*) and with regard to the real being, it is something else than the real existence. Such determinations of being are correctly assigned not at all to singular real things, but to intelligible forms.” [[250]](#footnote-250)

Albert considers the first substance as a firmly given being because it exists outside of mind, in external reality (*esse reale et ratum in natura*). The term “weak being” (*esse debile*) belongs to a universal created in the process of abstraction, which establishes general and potential cognition in the soul (*scientia quae est in anima*). Such a general thing does not possess the actuality and stability or firmness of the real existence. It makes a propriety of things outside of ourselves (*esse reale et ratum*) that is separated from the things in the soul (*in anima tantum*). Hermeneutics take the dividing line between “*esse ratum*” and “*esse debile*” to be the boundary stone (*terminus*) between the first and the second Averroism. The word “*debilis*” denotes either the existence in the intellect, or in the real world. The Magister in Cologne defended against Kilwardby the principle *immeditate* from *Second Analytics* as a fundamental determination of science (ch. 2.4.1). Albert bequeathed to subsequent generations of thinkers a fundamental dilemma that established the crossroad of Western thinking. Modernists gave the status of a weak being (*esse debile*) to the first real substance; the status “*ens ratum*” received being of substance produced by intellect. Modernism reversed the metaphysical dative and changed the direction that made donation of being. The original Aristotelian donation proceeded in the mode of actuality from reality to the intellect. Neoplatonic donation goes exactly the other way around, since the parousia of the sense of being is given in the thinking of modern *illuminati*. Their solar intellect mythologically illuminates the totality of being and gives it a paranoid sense made out by the subject. Modernity is dominated by its own metaphysical hubris, which in turn is manipulated by modern Furies. The controversy about the *esse ratum* and the *esse debile* has for the hermeneutics of objectivity the key character of the historial event (*Ereignis*) that establishes a tragicomic figure of metaphysics in the Latin West. Latin Averroists introduced a new history of the thinking called *via Modernorum*. The original unconcealment of the objectively given being (*a/lētheia*) entered the space of the effective manifestation (*alētheia*) through the new foundation of metaphysics. Aristotelian being manifests itself as an objective being.

The new status of *esse ratum* abolished the original meaning as hyparchical first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The displacement of metaphysical dative, which directs the categorial predication towards the hyparchical substance, was a conscious choice of thinkers in the school of the second Averroism. The further chapters devoted to the second Averroism show that Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventure changed Aristotelian primacy of the hyparchical first substance into the metaphysical primacy of the essence. The eclipse of the first substance reached the terminal phase marked by aberrations of modernists and postmodernists. The second Averroism changed the principles of metaphysics codified by Boethius, who with Aristotle held to the primacy of the first substance. The predication *per prius* outside of the real substance had not been possible at all in the first Averroism, because it would have annulled the scientific knowledge of reality. Science would have become a metaphorical enterprise based only on homonymy, now finalized in nihilistic postmodernism of Derrida and Rorty. The dispute about metaphysical “debility” of intellect acquires terminal meaning in the mode of truth as *alētheia*. Through this conflict, the modernity entered famous *via Modernorum*. Its philosophical path begins in the positivist history of effects. The original unconcealment of the objectively considered being in the mode of commencement (*Anfang*) changed into a permanent unconcealment of objectivity by establishing the strong intellect of modernity (*Beginn*). The paranoia of modernity entered in the terminal phase to be the historical fact by changed meaning of *esse ratum*. Having rejected the classic metaphysics of the weak intellect facing the strong reality, modernity took up the broad and comfortable path of epochal insanity (*Irre*).

Albert’s polemic with modernists shows circumstances when the doctrine of Modists (*Modistae*) was born, which began to spread in the next decade. The first treatises called *De modis significandi* from the school of the first Averroism contested the teaching of Oxfordian Fallacy and they appeared about 1255 (Martinus de Dacia, Boethius de Dacia). Albert’s commentary on *De anima* takes up that line and testifies to accomplished turn of modernity. In the preceding decade, it had took up the position of epochal *Irre*. Aquinas comments on the statute of the first substance as Albert, see quotation from the *Second book of Sentences* written around the year 1257. The existence of things in the form of confirmed being is given in the external world (*esse ratum et firmum in natura*).[[251]](#footnote-251) Therefore, the substance of the thing is distinct from its separated recognition of the essence of the thing in thought (*res a reor reris*). Unfortunately, Thomas interprets the primacy of *esse ratum* in the mode of Avicenna’s metaphysics presented according to the Toledo school. However, he conceived the primacy of the first substance in the spirit of the first Averroism, let us see in the first important work *De ente et essentia* (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). The last witness of scholastic *alētheia* given by the epochal turn of the first substance to the essence is the first postmodern metaphysician Francisco Suárez (†1617). The Spanish Jesuit handed down to the present nihilistic time an objective concept of *esse ratum* as a defined essence according to Avicenna (*quidditas*). The thing is exposed as Scotus’s logical substance and according to Avicenna’s metaphysics (*res dicitur a quidditate, quatenus est aliquid firmum et ratum*).[[252]](#footnote-252) Suárez understands the sense of being in the mode of postmodern *veritas.* The exposure of being come from behind, from the direction of objectively conceived essence of the thing identified with its beingness (*qua ratione dicitur quidditas realis*). The concept of *esse ratum* of Suárez as the last scholastic and the first postmodernist testifies that modernity has completed the process of metaphysical oblivion of being in the first hyparchical substance. The preceding scholastic sophistry of Latins passed into the postmodern *veritas*, which is given in the mode of *metaphysica generalis*. The being of the third kind became a simulacrum of reality by sophistical words of the first *Modernorum* and it dwells among us since that time. Albert, on the other hand, with Aristotle and Averroes, defends the “weak reality” against the “strong sophists.” Ever since Socrates and Gilbert de La Porrée, sophists have been taking small things and turning them into big things. Under the leadership of Furies, the non-existent individual became an objective first substance. Albert says at the beginning of commentary on the third book of *De anima* that the group of *Latinorum* have understood Aristotle’s teaching in an totally wrong way.

“These people, beyond all doubt, have never correctly understood Aristotle’s intention. From both presuppositions, namely, that the intellect is immaterial and separate, it follows necessarily that it cannot be an individual substance. What they say is pure nonsense (*ideo nihil est quod dicunt isti*). Moreover, they claim that the soul is a hylemorphic and individual being, which they cannot prove by any argument, only by referring to Boethius that every being related to the first principle must be determined by that being. Thus, they take the soul as composition of this or that hylemorphic substance (*esse hoc et hoc*). Like this, we cannot deduce that the soul as a single thing is composed of matter and form.” [[253]](#footnote-253)

Albert’s quote clearly shows that modernists conceive of first principles according to Gilbert’s hypostatized existence as individualized substance *(in omni quod est circa primum, est hoc et hoc*). The modernists interchanged the first real substance with an imagined essence endowed with matter of the third kind. Such erroneously founded cognition gives the soul a hylemorphic character and thus makes of it a single substance (*animam… esse compositam et individuam*). The quotation summarizes the Averroist dilemma built on two premises. These premises, according to the Latins, allegedly contradict each other (*ex duobus his concessis*). The intellect, according to them, cannot be an immaterial and individual faculty of the soul given in modus *separabilis*, as it is solved in the CMDA. According to modernists, the human intellect is immaterial and separated (est *immixtus*, et *separatus*) exclusively as an individual substance. The dilemma of the second Averroism, which is wrongly attributed to the Commentator, is pure nonsense from the philosophical point of view (*nihil est quod dicunt isti*). This group of modernists took Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* as separated immaterial substance of cosmic character and, in the mode of Avicenna’s *copulatio*, they added it to the hypostatized species of the substantial intellect given in the individual body. This gave rise to the conception of the so-called “numerically distinct” and “numerically one” intellect. By this sophistical copulation, contradictory to the argumentation of the CMDA, the philosophical disputes of that epoch are defined until today. The semi-Averroist Aquinas produced a canonical interpretation of averroistic intellect made in that way. Albert alludes to Rufus’s dilemma in the work *Contra Averroem* (1236), where this sophism had been explicitly formulated for the first time (ch. 3.3.3). Rufus claims that Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* is immaterial and a universal substance and therefore it cannot be in the singular real body. Albert knew this Rufus’s work from his student days in Paris, when he wrote the first part of the treatise *De homine*. At the time that the commentary on *De Anima III* was written, Albert could read the first and the second book of Bonaventura’s *Sentences*, which take a similar standpoint as Rufus did (ch. 4.1.2). The thesis of the wrongly understood univocity and substantiality of the *intellectus possibilis* having been made, all followers of *Latinorum* after Rufus repeated it. Then the *Latini* got into an insoluble contradiction even towards the definition of the soul according to Avicenna. They put into the soul as the form of the body the multiplicity of substantial forms (*hoc et hoc esse materiam et formam*). The modern intellect received the character of a substance known as Cartesian *res cogitans*. Latins did not understand Aristotle’s teaching in its basic sense (*nunquam bene intentionem Aristotelis intellexerunt*). The real lover of wisdom can do nothing else than to defend the truth against sophists. By a false reference to Boethius, the group of *Latinorum* brought into metaphysics a kind of Neoplatonism based on univocal predication of first principles. The Latins, determined by thinking based on the Oxfordian Fallacy, assume the certainty of the essence (*esse proprium*) as the first principle of being as it is in Avicenna’s teaching (*certitudo qua est*). The previous chapter interpreted the origin of this theory of truth as certainty. Albert regards this nonsensical dualism, adopted from the falsely interpreted Avicebron, as a broad and convenient path to metaphysical nihilism (*nihil est quod dicunt*). Albert’s solution follows tradition of the first Averroism within the framework of Averroes’s concept of *intellectus possibilis*. Albert's criticism therefore does not apply to Aquinas′s semiaverroism, which interpreted Avicenna in terms of Averroes′s metaphysics of substance *qua* substance. We have already set out Albert’s basic outlines in the preceding chapters, including citations of the important chapter 11 from the commentary on the third book of *De anima*. The distinction between the *tertium* and the *quartum genus* according to the CMDA has clearly shown that the philosophy can connect both claims, but not at all in the paradigm of modern sophistry. Albert’s criticism from the years 1255–57 confirms that the first Averroism rejected in principle the concept of hypostatized existence. This concept was propagated by modern Porretans in the mode of universal hylemorphism.

Albert’s theses are of fundamental importance with regard to the first power struggle between the mendicants and the Artistic Faculty in the Rue du Fouarre, which reached its climax in the year 1255. The Pope resolved the dispute in favor of modernists (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The magisters of the Artist faculty defended the interpretation of *De anima* according to the bishop Alvernus. That’s why Albert as Alvernus’s best Parisian student came to their aid. From the point of view of Aristotle’s metaphysics, interpreted *ad mentem Averrois* andaccording to the Sicilian school, new Alexandrians committed a fundamental error, which the following chapters investigate in the analysis of Oxfordian Fallacy. The modern sophists destroyed the categorical predication *secundum quid*. They replaced the imposition with the predication in the mode *simpliciter*, according to the univocal model of the *ens inquantum ens* given by Avicenna. The first Averroism determines the metaphysical unity of being within the framework of the first substance. He cannot agree with the sophistical substitution of the sense of being. The logical univocity was common in the schools *Logica Modernorum* because they misunderstood various kinds of abstraction. From the point of view of Aristotelian *Logica Vetus*, it is the typical case of an error called “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*.” The imposition of metaphysical meaning in the mode *secundum quid* is not a supposition of the logical meaning, which is given but in the mode *simpliciter*. Moreover, the first substances cannot exist as such in human intellect. They do not exist even in the absolutely simple divine intellect, since otherwise it would not be simple. This makes the return to the model of Platonic ideas, which would have been the end of Aristotelianism. The learned Latins confuse the intentional meaning synthesized by the immaterial intellectual faculty of the soul and given in the mode *simpliciter* (essence, species intelligibilis, universals, qualia, eidetic meanings, etc.) with *simpliciter* given real entities in the world. The modernists repressed the imposition of meaning from reality in the mode of epochal oblivion of the first substance. They solved the metaphysical horror arising from the emptiness of the first substance (*horror vacui*) by producing simulacra. The modernists absolutized the supposition according to the modern logic of Porretans as sophistical categorical imposition “*secundum quid*.” Guided by Furies, modernists performed a tragicomic parody of mysteries by creating an objective revelation of being. In the mode of *epokhē*, they extinguished the real world and then created it *ex nihilo* as being of the third kind. The first Averroism explained in vain to Latin sophists that the first substances are given *simpliciter* in the mode of effective causality. With regard to the substantially given bodies, the predication is given as a second substance. The deductive judgment of science must maintain this real causality in the middle link of syllogisms, following the mode *ex inmediatis*. Modernity turned the universal essences into the first substances, thereby changing the doctrine of *Second Analytics*. Albert’s commentary fundamentally rejects the basic thesis of the modernists about the individualized *species intelligibilis*, which make *individuum* as a substance of the third kind.

“This opinion presupposes that the universal is given in the soul as a substantial subject, and this is absolute nonsense.” [[254]](#footnote-254)

The universal notions in the soul are not given as *tertium ens*, because the soul in the body is the form of the person. According to Albert, the universal meaning is synthesized as the immaterial meaning of the real thing. The universal hylemorphism of modernity makes the universals in the soul to be hypostases by comprehending them as first hyparchical substance. This being of the third kind is created *ex nihilo* in the soul by the fact that the first modernists individualized the soul through the generic concept of matter of the third kind. This gave rise to the modern simulacrum of substance, which is at the beginning of the path of the Latin West to the mathematical models of reality and to financial derivatives. That kind of “strong” thinking defeated a “weak” reality and thus established the epoch of the Anthropocene.

In the process of cognition made by *intellectus speculativus*, Albert distinguishes more clearly than Alvernus both the subjective act of the intellectual capacity of the soul and the result of the abstraction producing the universal essence. The polemic against the modern Alexandrians closely follows the CMDA commenting on *De anima* 417b22‒25.

“The intellect is actualized towards the highest perfection from the universal concepts and these are located in the soul (*a rebus universalibus, et iste sunt in anima*). Aristotle said that ‘these concepts are as things in the soul’ (*iste quasi sunt in anima*). Then he explained that these intelligibilia are in the mode of the first completion of cognition in the soul, just as the sensibilia are in the mode of the first completion of cognition in the senses. They are sensual intentions (*intentiones ymaginabiles*) that actualize both modes of cognition; from the point of view of universality, these are only in potency and not in actuality. Therefore, Aristotle said that the universal things are only apparently existing in the soul (*et iste quasi sunt in anima*), and declined to say that they are as real there, since the universal intentionality is different from the sensual intentionality. He went on to say: *And through this man can understand, etc.*” [[255]](#footnote-255)

This is the key part of the commentary on *De anima III*, in which the status of the *quidditas* is solved according to the exposure of being from the front. The cognition mady by *intellectus possibilis* follows the determination of passive intellect by the hylemorphic thing that activates the immaterial intellect through the senses. According to Neoplatonists, the separated *intellectus agens* performs the cognition, let us see the model of Avicenna’s *denudatio* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The quotation shows that, according to the correct interpretation of the CMDA, this Averroist simulacrum cannot exist. The Commentator’s interpretation does not allow any Neoplatonic being of the third kind. In the spirit of the first Averroism, Albert rejected any substantiality of the *intellectus possibilis*. Al-Ghazālī, Avicenna and the Toledo school define the *intellectus possibilis* as a substance and Aquinas as a quasi-independent form in the soul. Hermeneutics classified the intellect hypostatized in one way or another as a kind of exposure of being from behind. Albert’s critique of modernists concerns already mentioned dispute about the meaning of Avicebron’s assertion that the possible intellect, like matter, is universal. The transformation of the *intellectus possibilis* into the *intellectus materialis* of modern Alexandrians bought about fatal consequences that were not long in coming. In the period between 1240–50, a whole series of contradictions arose, which characterize the later controversies about Averroism. Let us now enumerate at least some of the dilemmas that Albert and, after him, Aquinas ascribe to the group of modernists called *Averroistae* that was in Paris and in Oxford in the following decade after 1250. In the version of those learned *Latinorum*, the matter became a genus that operates outside the hylemorphic composition, making the system of modern transcendentalia given as *tertium ens*. The difference between the imaginary and the real being disappeared. The world of modernists became a great sophistic simulacrum, accomplished by contemporary virtual manipulations of reality. The Averroist *intellectus possibilis* became a substance of the third kind and destroyed the substantial unity of the person. The Cartesian dualism arose between the substantial soul and the body and further between the sensual and intellectual cognition. Modernity solves the relationship of two substances, the body and thought in the system of Porretan or postmodern *colligatio*. By no means do they solve the act of thinking and cognition, which is given by twofold intentionality of the senses and the intellect. The second Averroism is expressed in the postmodern “Mind—Body Problem” that produce today’s world of medial simulacra. Such “*colligatio*” or “*copulatio*” of two incompatible substances does not create an adequate relation between the senses and the intellect at the level of effective and formal causality. Based on the illuminated intellect and Husserl’s vision of essences, modern intentionality produces in the creative thinking of modernists a kind of univocal Porretan species or postmodern *eidos*, in which the reality of the first substance merges with its cognition. The modern sophists abolished the truth as Averroes’s *proportio* made with regard to the causality of external things and the intellect. Aristotelian theory of truth as correspondence disappeared and the modern conception of truth as assimilation of all accessible beings of the third kind appeared instead. These Porretan species are localized in Augustinian memory of the third kind (*locus specierum*) and they are now stored and manipulated in cloud databases. The modern concept of hypostatized *intellectus agens* considers cognition primarily in thinking and in the databases, instead of first passively accepting it from external reality through intentionality. All these errors taken together gave rise to paranoia of modern intellect. It directly considers the non-existent substance of the third kind, which had been introduced into Cartesian postmodernism by Arnauld for the first time (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The modern *intellectus possibilis* became a quasi-substance on the basis of the univocally conceived matter of the third kind. Modernists have no diaphanum, since they misunderstood intentionality and made erroneous definition of species as Porretan hypostases. The real things changed into a simulacrum divided into several separated substances. This simulacrum of the person is connected with the body into a schizophrenic subject in the mode of modern or postmodern copulation of mythological substances. The modern Western subject, created in the mode of *colligatio*, forms the greatest capital of modernity, because it has powerfully subjugated the world. Finally, it killed modern God, whom Avicenna had created. The collateral damage, unfortunately, cannot be avoided. The new schizophrenic demiurge produces set of quasi-substances, following the fatal and necessary path of modernity in the nihilistic mode of *Irre*. The Latin sophists founded the new round of perplexity in the modern philosophy, which deepened the epochal error of metaphysics determined by Neoplatonic meaning of being according to the first *Modernorum*. Modern sophistry after defeating the first Averroism destroyed the doctrine of the soul, the identity of the person, the conception of truth as the correspondence of the embodied intellect and the knowledge of singular things. Man became a specific corpse, which, in fact, the totalitarian movements and wars in the 20th century took to the completion, as well as vulgar economism of oligarchic neoliberals in the beginning of the 21st century.

Contemporary nihilistic worldview is anticipated in the critique of Averroism in Albert’s commentary on the third part of *De anima*. Albert’s philosophical works written after the year 1250 investigates modern species as a sophistical simulacrum of reality. It cannot be related to the single real thing such as “running Socrates.” We recognize external things by their representations in thinking and not by hypostatized notions. According to Albert, the Latins cannot solve the problem of reference, since they have no relation to the external thing mediated by the senses and formalized by the intellect. By abolishing the metaphysical dative, they lost the truth as a twofold correspondence as Averroes’s sensual *similitudo* and intellectual *proportio*. Albert explains to confused Averroists the doctrine of Peripatetics presented in the work CMDA. The recognized species being universal, it cannot be individualized in the intellect. Cognitive forms are created in mind as *intelligibilia*. They exist only in the act of the intellect that is intentionally directed towards sensible or intelligible species. The species are synthesized in the process of sensual or intellectual abstraction. The recognition passes through accidental mode, with regard to the actual, simpliciter existing thing. Likewise, the real singular thing carries the universality only potentially in itself. To be recognized, it needs the act of intellect, because it exists in and for itself in *simpliciter* given actuality. The conclusion of the polemic clearly defines both fundamental problems of modernity: the intellect separated from the senses and the impossibility of true cognition. According to Albert, Averroes already treated both of questions correctly in the CMDA vis-à-vis the modernists of the time (*istae duae ultimae objectiones sunt Averrois in commento libri de Anima*; *Liber III De anima*; ed. Borgnet 5, 349a). Presented in the mode of the Sicilian school, Albert established a complete schema of general cognition concerning the real things. Modern and postmodern Latinists have not solved it until today. The causal effect of the external thing on the bodily senses forms the basis of understanding, because it actualizes the intellect as *tabula rasa*. The cognition is causally actualized in the senses and in the intellect as two complementary receptive faculties of the soul, which are given materially, on the one hand, and immaterially on the other. The passive reception follows in the first Averroism the sensual cognition, which brings the actuality of the real world to the intellect. In the thinking, only the potential and universal forms exist and they cannot be in the actuality. The modern concept of matter as being of the third kind is absolute nonsense according to Albert, because *tertium ens* does not exist in reality. There is no way, how it could be done. If the intelligible forms were really individualized, the modernists would have an individual donkey or a stone in mind. If this form was given as a universal intellectual substance in the manner of the intellect of stellar spheres, the hypostatized species of donkey would be recognized through the separate active intellect of stellar spheres. They would not need the actual existence of things in reality for intelligible knowledge. Latin Averroists introduced the matter of the third kind in the intellect to avoid this criticism. Thereby, they changed the metaphysical error of modernity into its nihilistic form and entered the *via Modernorum*. The learned Latins degraded the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* to a pseudo-material *intellectus materialis*. They followed the pattern of Alexander, Neoplatonic Themistius and Spanish thinkers of the Falsafa as Avempace (†1138). The modernists did not create the new diacosmos in a philosophical fairy tale as for example the dialogue *Timaeus* and Jamblichus’s interpretation. They gave the new reality directly into the soul and into the thinking of the Western subject. According to Aristotelians like Albert, the Latins claimed absolute nonsense. The objectively real stone is predicated univocally in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Modern thinking separated itself from reality in such a way that it recognizes the real stone only in itself. The objective form is accessible in the mind through the eternal divine copy, which ensures the ontotheological scenario of cognition. The objective form of each being is considered through the eternal divine specimen. To do this, it is necessary to divide man into several separated substances. Finally, modernists cannot objectively distinguish the living person from a corpse.

In the age of metaphysical nihilism, we admire the triumph of postmodern truth as *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. In Albert’s time, the first use of modern truth theory took place as the assimilation of *tertium ens*. This mythological nonsense was declared a true and scientifically correct worldview. However, at the beginning of *via Modernorum*, Parisian masters recognized the Commentator as the most respected philosopher. Following the book *Second Analytics*, they could not accept the destruction of Aristotelian critical science. The first Averroism, defended by Aristotelian thinkers, rejected the sophistry of *Modernorum*, because they created a simulacrum of an objective intellect in the manner of *tertium ens*. The following quotation shows Albert’s way of thinking according to the *tertium* and *quartum genus* in the CMDA.

“Similarly, scientific cognition is given from the general things which arise (*fiunt*) from individually preserved cognitions and sensual experiences (*ex multis memoriis et experientiis*), which are the same in all men. This we have already said above, that these personal and unique cognitions contemplated by the speculative intellect stand in unity with what the abstract and general speculative intellect is (*speculativi intellectus sunt unus in eo quod speculativi intellectus sunt*). These cognitions are such and such, according to the cognition of individual persons. In this point we agree with the view of Averroes, because the general intellect in the mode of abstraction is distinct from our personal act of cognition.” [[256]](#footnote-256)

Related to the real thing, the cognition makes *adaequatio* or *proportio* of it in the intellect. It makes the reconstruction of the reality to create the immaterial similarity of the concept to the external thing. This capacity of the existing real human soul produces a universal and immaterial cognition, which adequately reflects the world of the first substances. The quotation shows that the abstraction of the intellect as species in the mode of *quartum genus* cannot produce cognition of the person, because the universal concept has no real possibility to do so. The immaterial cognition fully depends on the existing person. Therefore, we must generically distinguish four different forms of cognition: 1) the real existence of the thing outside ourselves; 2) its sensuous reception; 3) its intelligible abstraction; 4) the final abstract view of all these existential and causally given acts of the person. The “intellect” of modernists is in fact but the fourth genus of intellect. It is a universal cognition in the meta-discourse that describes how the intellect works from the point of view of human nature. Therefore, the concept works as *quartum genus* because it abstracts from the existential act of immaterial understanding of man in the mode *tertium genus*. Averroes, Albert, and after him Siger and Dante updated Al-Ghazālī’s conception of human nature (*fiṭra*), which does not link to *intellectus adeptus* as in Avicenna’s scenario, but to *intellectus possibilis* as *quartum genus* in CMDA. On the formal side, the argument against Avicennists agrees with the interpretation of *De anima* proposed by Parisian bishop Alvernus (ch. 2.3.1). Albert’s critique, however, is much more elaborate, because it includes Avicenna’s intentionality into Averroes’s scheme. By distinguishing the intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus* according to the CMDA, Albert created the first complete model of causal and real mental activity predicated as categorial imposition in the mode *per prius*. Albert argues scientifically according to *Second Analytics*. Il explicitly rejects the scenario of modernism advocated by Parisian Avicennist school of Bonaventure, modern representatives of Grosseteste’s school such as Rufus, and Oxford branch of modernists gathered around Kilwardby. Albert fundamentally disagreed with these schools of modern Avicennism. The modernists in Oxford edited Grosseteste’s spiritual testament under the title *Summa philosophiae* (ch. 3.1.3), in the same manner as the Parisian Franciscans published the *Summa Halensis* in Paris. The publication of these two treatises locates original workshops of modernity to Paris and Oxford. According to Averroists inspired by Toletan interpretation of Averroes, cognition makes a separated active intellect for all people. In the soul exists the materially given possible intellect in the form of being of the third kind. The exposure of the receptive intellect comes from the substantial separated hypostasis known as *intellectus agens*. Averroist interpretation of the CMDA let the numerically one *intellectus possibilis* separate works on human *intellectus materialis*. The individualized material intellect connects to this separated possible intellect in the mode of *copulatio*.

Albert’s interpretation of the third book of *De anima* took the authentic interpretation of CMDA according to the Sicilian school. The modernists annihilated the theory of truth as correspondence and the unity of the person. The eclipse of the first substance in modernism is confirmed in the following quote, which distinguishes the exposure of being from behind according to the Toledo school or from the front according to the Sicilian school. The modernists in the line of Al-Ghazālīs and Avicenna offered a synthesis of cognition correctly in form, but defined it in Neoplatonic metaphysics of the solar intellect. The quotation clearly sees the changed trajectory of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) directed to meaning of being. Modernity prefers hypostatized material intellect composed of *materia spiritualis*. The model of *conversio* of the possible intellect in the direction of the active intellect contains all disadvantages of the exposure of the sense of being from behind. According to Albert, this concept is absurd, because man would cease to think as a person.

“The intellect accepts recognized forms by the fact that active intellect purifies the forms and adds them to possible intellect (*agens, denudat eas et conjungit eas intellectui possibilis*). Since every intellectual form is assumed from the active intellect, it is necessary that the possible intellect is always turned towards the active intellect.” [[257]](#footnote-257)

The modern cognition takes *intellectus agens* through the exposure from behind. It forms *intellectus possibilis* as spiritual matter and imprints denuded forms in it. Like this, there is a storehouse of Porretan species in the human soul, which make the simulacrum of the real world. Augustinian *memoria* operates as a storehouse of the species of the third kind. The separated active intellect then draws these species of the third species into modern knowledge through the act of Platonic anamnesis. Modernity postulates the actuality of the species as first substance, which acts on the receptive faculty of the soul through the storehouse of these “essences—substances” in the special kind of memory. Albert, by protecting the twofold act of intentionality according to the CMDA, fundamentally rejects the concept of *memoria* as *locus specierum*, as it was in the Averroism of Bonaventura and Pecham, in the form of species of the third kind (*sunt in anima sicut actus in potentia, hoc esse non potest*).[[258]](#footnote-258) This pseudo-actual being of the third kind (*hoc esse*) does not enter in the Aristotelian memory because it cannot exist at all. Therefore, the modernist conception of cognition based on the assimilation model of truth is flawed in principle. In the mode of contemporary metaphysical nihilism, there is no cosmic *intellectus agens* in charge, but its global surrogate in the form of artificial intelligence. It pushes the being of the third kind as the seal in the dialogue *Theaetetus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2) into the spiritual matter, now created by cloud databases. Albert rightly objects that this scheme of cognition according to the Toledo school is Platonic and not at all Aristotelian. According to Albert, the *Moderni* piled up all errors of Neoplatonists in one heap. From Avicenna took the exposure of being from behind made in a substantive manner (*conversio possibilis ad intellectum agentem*). Avicennist certainty concerns the essence taken in speculative mirroring of univocal forms that passed from the separated intellect to human cognition (*exsistere1*). These forms issued from the separated intellect enter the acquired intellect to create the corresponding eidetic vision. The cognition arises as a Porretan form through the process of denudation (*productio*); or, through division in the framework of amphibolic predication, when the generic division of *Arbor Porphyriana* leads to the final individual unity of meaning (*resolutio*). The intellect of modern *illuminati* or Cartesian *cogito* rectifies in the mode of truth as Anselm’s *rectitudo* and Avicenna’s *certitudo* the occurrence of reflected hypostatic forms in real things (*exsistere2*). Through this twofold movement of unity from the objective *exemplar* to the essential form and from the essential form to the real thing, modernity found the ultimate determination of being in the new kind of metaphysical foundation (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). The same type of the *tertium ens* derives from the hylemorphic first substances. Averroists placed it in the Augustinian *memoria*, which became a storehouse of immaterial species (*locus specierum*; OBJ III, ch. 4.3.1). The memory preserving the species of the third kind became a new place from where starts the cognition of the self-reflecting *intellectus agens*. Since the postmodern Avicennist John Locke, that self-reflective memory became a site of individual (and not personal) identity. The modernists imposed the activity of separated *intellectus agens* on the act of will and on the individual cognition through the system of Porretan hypostases of all kinds. The price paid for this philosophical confusion includes all the errors of *Latinorum* condemned since 1240 by advocates of the first Averroism. In their thinking was born the first humanistic tradition of the West, in which man was defined not as a specific corpse, but as a causally acting and existing person. The schizophrenia of the modern subject caused the extinction of this tradition of humanism in the epoch of forgetfulness of being, together with the school of the first Averroism. The paranoia of the modern hypostatized intellect destroyed original humanism of the person based on the correct apprehension of the *intellectus possibilis*. The tragicomedy concerned the academic exorcism of modernist errors observed in the mirror of their own faulty Averroism. In fact, modern thinkers condemned their own mistakes in April 1277. The condemnation was led by capable Furies, in Freudian style of the inversion to the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*).

Albert, in the next part of the commentary on the third book of *De anima*, agrees with the process of abstraction of Arabic Neoplatonists (Avempace, Abubacher) coming from the phantasms in accordance with Aristotle’s writing *De anima*. But, preceding analyses of cognition in Avicenna have shown that Aristotelian *abstractio* from the senses has only a propaedeutic character in Avicennism (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Averroes, on the other hand, defines the fully formal character of *species intelligibilis* by linking it to sensory cognition, when an immaterial and universal meaning is created, due to the causal action of the real thing upon the senses. The chapter 11 from Albert’s commentary on *De anima* confirms that this interpretation differs from Neoplatonic interpretation of Averroes according to the Toledo school. Toletans used the separated *intellectus agens* as cause of human cognition, in the mode of exposure from behind (*nos autem dissentimus paucis ab Averroe*, ibid, p. 385b). Albert knows that Averroes rejected Avicenna’s metaphysics in principle and unequivocally for correct reasons. But if we take as the basis of Aristotelian metaphysics the Commentator’s doctrine of the first science on substance *qua* substance, then we can integrate his project of the first science with Avicenna’s metaphysics, which is in the world of the pure abstraction of the *ens inquantum ens*. Again, the scientific proceeding of *De homine* applies (*prius comparatum ad rem*, ch. 2.4.1). We must first establish the real causality and then predicate it universally. According to Albert, the metaphysics of the first substance enables the critical integration of Avicenna, but only in the second step. The contrary approach of Toletans and modernists represents a fundamental error in thinking. The original aim of the first science disappears, which according to the canonical thesis of *Metaphysics* is the investigation of the first hyparchical substance. Moreover, Avicenna’s metaphysics is absolutely flawed in definition of the person and cognition, which endangers the Christian doctrine of redemption. Albert disagrees with Averroes interpretation according to the Toledo school and Aquinas for these principled reasons, because he follows the line of bishop Alvernus vis-à-vis Neoplatonic *sequaces Aristotelis* (ch. 2.3.1). Following the CMDA, Alvernus separates the cosmic active intellect from the synthetic human faculty given in the soul as *tertium genus*. The bishop of Paris rejected Aristotle’s interpretation according to the so-called “Arabs” and explicitly included Avicenna in the group of defenders of the separated *intellectus agens* acting from outside of the human soul. Albert, in Alvernus’s line, disagrees in principle with the view of the Arabs (Avempace, Abubacher) in that the abstraction is carried out from the separated *intellectus agens* and that the *intellectus possibilis* is reduced to the sensual and thus the vulnerable part of the soul, i.e., to Alexander’s hylic intellect. The basis of the first Averroism of the Sicilian school is the rejection of all forms of separated intellect in the human soul. The second Averroism takes effective intelligible forms as hypostatic species and it considers them identically in things and in the intellect. The essence given in the active intellect is said to act on the human intellect in the framework of effective causality, since it is primarily given in the actual cosmic *intellectus agens* as the first immaterial substance. In the first Averroism, no form is given directly in the intellect. There are but sensually recognized, synthesized, intended and intelligible contents, which are manifested in the form of *species intelligibilis*. This species must be at first perceived by the senses and synthesized in the form of *species sensibilis* from the first actual substance given separately in reality. The species ensures the form for abstraction on the level of the active and speculative ability of the soul, which creates the resulting concept and the reflection of this concept. The first Averroism summed up the process of cognition in relation to the first substance by the causally conceived intentionality and in the mode of diaphanum (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Cognition begins through the senses given in physical organs, because they are receptive directly, in the mode of efficient causality. The correspondence of cognition and thing is predicted by the medium in demonstrative syllogism. Following the formal causality, we predicate the real causal effect of external first substances. The immaterial synthesis of recognized forms into a concept is implemented by the final ability of the soul. This ability is called *intellectus speculativus*. It is given at the last level of intellectual reflection in the mode of *quartum genus*. At this last level, the intellect is capable of reflecting the concept created in the individual act of the *intellectus agens* as a categorical and true unity of universal meaning within the framework of the *species humana*. Let us see Albert’s division of the soul into three individual acts of cognition (*transmutans, transmutatum, transmutatio*, ch. 2.4.2). In the mode of correspondence, true cognition establishes a univocal reference to the reality of the first substance, which is given by the categorical cognition of the second substance. The modernism inspired by Avicenna replaced the effects of external things with the help of the exposure of the intellect from behind, mistaken as effect of autonomous forms. These forms were later found in mathematics. These beings of the third kind also exist univocally in the real things. Let us see Bonaventura’s *exemplars*, which Aristotelians like Bacon, Albert and Aquinas had rejected as metaphysical nonsense. The active intellect looks at these *exemplars* directly in the process of *denudatio* and hands them over to the receptive intellect. That *intellectus possibilis* is cosmic immaterial substance for Averroists. This copulation between two kinds of intellect runs through cognitive connection between the *intellectus adeptus* and the *intellectus agens*. Alfarabi created this model (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). The receptive intellect accepts hypostatized species from the separate *intellectus agens*. Such kind of receptivity created out of human being joins the modern subject in the mode of Avicennist *copulatio*. These species are kept in Augustinian form of memory as *tertium ens*. Neoplatonic solar intellect is incorporated as Avicenna’s *Dator formarum*. It mythologically copulates with the possible intellect and then generates resulting cognition as *intellectus* *in effectu*. At this level, modern cognition at the level of the person is already a free act. Hermeneutics shown how the creative power of intellectually potent Muses, through this epochal error, created the modern subject. Since Descartes, soul and body have been copulating with each other in an all-academic *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. Both substances of the third kind have been trying for several centuries to give birth to a non-existent postmodern subject, of course, under expert guidance of goddesses of academic Revenge.

The modernists compare the species given by Aristotelian abstraction with the species preserved in Augustinian memory as a *locus specierum*. By comparing two species of the third kind, the truth arises as a speculative *certitudo*. The next level of truth arrives as Anselm’s *rectitudo* by the fact that modernists compare these species placed in the Augustinian *memoria* with eternal *exemplars* of these species in modern God, in mathematics, in theoretical models of all kinds, or in angelic or cosmic intelligences. The speculative scheme of reality turned upside down in the second Averroism, because no first real substance guarantees cognition. After the death of modern God, this illusion of truth in mathematics associated with the postmodern Cartesian world and contemporary nihilistic economics. The definition of postmodern “capital” clearly indicates that it is to be found only in the mind (*caput*) of *illuminati*. Their thinking enlightened by neoliberal Furies makes the basic capital of this interesting epoch. The fantastic knowledge doubles reality in a paranoid way. The following part of Albert’s commentary defends CMDA by exposing the errors that characterize modern cognition. Albert rejects Averroist model of the one truth based on the system of simulacra and substances of the third kind. The quotation ranges Aristotelian *abstractio* and Neoplatonic *denudatio* into two separate levels of cognition. According to Albert, they can never meet directly, only in a mediated way.

“The knowledge established by phantasms is of two kinds (*duplex scientia ex phantasmate*). In the first sense, it comes directly from phantasms, because the form that is to be understood (*ipsa forma intellecta*) has its being directly in the individual thing (*forma habens esse in particulari*). In the second case, the cognitive form is not given as the hylemorphic single thing (*forma intellecta non est secundum esse in particulari*); however, the effect of these separated phenomena is manifested through the senses. Then the effect of such a hypostatic intellectual form makes the direct cause that affects human intellect. In this way, we recognize the separated cosmic forms. “ [[259]](#footnote-259)

The first recognition follows the classical path through abstraction from the phantasms, which receive the original being of the singular form given in things (*forma habens esse in particulari*). The expression “*habens esse*” does not mean the identity of the form in the intellect and in reality in the sense of hypostatized habitus of Porretans. The intellectual form is always universal and given only in thinking. Cognition proceeds in the order of abstraction from the thing to bodily senses. The matter exists in reality and the mind cannot access it directly, because the metaphysical dative applies. The external substance makes the cause of the cognition by exposure of sens coming from the front. That makes the theory of truth as the correspondence between thing and thought. Modern speculation observes the cognitive form as *tertium ens* in real things. The second case of cognition concerns the hypostatic immaterial intelligences and forms that exist beyond hylemorphic substances (*intellecta non est secundum esse in particulari*). There is no direct illumination that makes those forms directly accessible to human intellect. Human thinking has receptive sensitivity only through *intellectus possibilis*, and it cannot share active faculties coming from the separated *intellectus agens*. The mystical rapture and the illumination have access to intellectual forms (*sic cognoscimus separata*), but only by means of Aristotelian way of reception that runs through the senses and receptive intellect (*in sensibili manifestantur opera ejus*). Modernism, led by Chthonic powers of darkness, turned the mystical enlightenment into a normal process of recognition. The active separated intellect of modernists projects cognitive forms directly into human mind, because the hypostatized *intellectus agens* is the real cause of modern cognition. The active separated intellect of modernists projects recognized forms directly into human intellect, because the hypostatized *intellectus agens* is the active cause of modern cognition.

Gnoseology is based on *certitudo* and *rectitudo* of the modern subject. The foundation of knowledge does not need the real world to create science. We need to assimilate the panoply of *tertium ens* to create the *verisimilitudo* of the world. Illuminated mind processes the forms coming from the separated *intellectus agens*. It makes the intellect as autonomous substance or as Cartesian *res cogitans*. The classic metaphysics defined that kind of demiurgic production of meaning as predication called “*in artificialibus*.” The modernists exchanged the recognition of the world with its imaginary creation in the diacosmos, as Jamblichus and Simplicius did it for the first time (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). According to the first Averroism of the Sicilian school, this predication defines exclusively the artisanal production. The act of cognition is fully receptive and it makes but an accident of the real world. It cannot make the reality *ex nihilo* in mind, since the human being is not the divine Creator of the cosmos. The same tragicomic error, given by incorrect application of the predication *in artificialibus*, Bacon attributed to modernists at Oxford (ch. 3.2). The quotation of Albert confirmes that modernists took the causality at the level of essences and they proclamed their effect as *univoce* given form that operates in the demonstrative proof (*per opera sicut per effectum venitur in causam per intellectum*). Their demiurgic intellect took up directly the real thing in virtue of Porretanian species of the third kind. Then they predict the truth in the mode *in artificialibus*, which is possible for mathematical and logical abstraction, but by no means for metaphysical cognition of the real world. Albert rejects the concept of the separated intellect. It operates in the mode of artisanal production to form the receptive matter of the third kind given in the *intellectus materialis*. Avicennist Aquinas inspired by the interpretation of the Toledo school ascribed to Averroes this theory of *intellectus possibilis* operating in the mode *in artificialibus* (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). Following the line of reasoning of the CMDA together with bishop Alvernus, Albert rejected any intervention of separated cosmic intellect in natural human cognition. The previous argumentation of the writing *De homine* was confirmed in full. Therefore, we can never recognize the cosmic intelligible forms and the angelic intelligences as they exist in and of themselves, since human cognition is actualized by sensual imagination. The modern cognition is not scientific, but “speculative” according to the word “*speculum*.” Modern thinking makes the reflection of itself, since the *tertium ens* in reality reflects the *tertium ens* in thinking, and vice versa. Augustinian memory of the third kind serves as a storehouse of Porretan species, which the thinking uses at will. One reflects the other, in the mode of necessarily given correctness and certainty. According to Albert, this gave rise to sophistic cognition of separated forms, which make use the causality of separated intellect and not hyparchical first substances. Only the cosmic intelligences can make such kind of cognition, since they possess the intellect as the immaterial hyparchical substance. God can also know the world by thinking it creatively, but we cannot. Our cognition based on sensual abstraction is only potential and only in thinking. The following quotation proves the emergence of philosophical modernity and at the same time it denounces that theory as a fundamental failure of the mind. Albert refused to take *via Modernorum*.

“And this is the path that almost all contemporary Latins take (*via quam fere sequuntur omnes moderni Latini*). But they fundamentally differ from Peripatetics. If cognition were merely a property of the soul alone, then science would not be knowledge given in the intellect and be valid always and everywhere. Peripateticians are unanimous in asserting that the universal sense in its actuality is only in the soul, and that the hyparchic subsistent form exists only in cosmic separate intelligences. This is the argument of Avicenna that everyone agrees upon.” [[260]](#footnote-260)

Albert considers the cognition given outside the causal relationship of the first substance to be insufficient to establish the science, since it rests exclusively in the subject (*si enim scientia sit qualitas in anima*). Such cognition would end at the level of mathematical abstraction (ch. 1.5). The modernists do not follow even Avicenna, whom they regard as their most important authority (*haec est objectio Avicennae, in quam omnes concordaverunt*). The postmodernists continue on this path even today, because they no longer understand the doctrine of classical Aristotelianism. The modernity absolutizes the Platonic cave of Cartesian thinking separated from reality (*id quod est intellectu*), since it depreciated the sensual cognition. Albert reminds modern colleagues that even Avicenna considers metaphysics at the level of *ens inquantum ens* and not as abstractly conceived notions that are connected univocally with nominal essences. Mathematics, separated from the causal effect of the first substance by abstraction, cannot establish a metaphysical unity of being, which relates to the universality based on real causality. The formal causality of logicians produces knowledge only in the modality of “*discrete videamus”* (ch. 1.4). Aquinas begins his academic career in the writing *De ente et essentia* (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1) with the same critical attitude against modern Avicennism. The conclusion of the commentary considers the theory of twofold or even threefold substance in the soul as the greatest nonsense of all errors (*quod tanto est absurdius caeteris quae dicta sunt*, ibid, p. 418b). The teaching on the plurality of substances in man goes against the teaching of all Peripatetics and against Avicenna’s metaphysics as well. Albert claims that this schizophrenia of the intellect corresponds to schizophrenic worldview of learned Latins. The following quote rejects the eidetic view of modern *illuminati* as absolute nonsense.

“The human intellect is hypostatized by the light of active intellect, and this light culminates in the fact that it gradually establishes the connection with the separated cosmic intellect. As a result, the speculative intellect becomes a disposition that enables the connection between the human and the separated intellect (*intellectus speculativus quasi dispositio media conjunctivus istius*). This is practically the same as when they claimed that the active intellect initially has only a weak cognitive light (*lumen debile*), with which it recognizes the divided forms at the level of the speculative intellect. Then, it receives the strong illumination (*lumen forte*), due to which it recognizes the separated intelligences and forms. Like this, knowledge of essences separated from matter and knowledge of separated cosmic existences join each other.” [[261]](#footnote-261)

The speculative intellect of modern gnostics and *illuminati* no longer needs a material reality to recognize the world. The modern intellect is not born in this world, just as the modern subject is not born in this world. In the search for the full truth, the intellect of *illuminati* makes a kind of sophistic correspondence. It joins the separated active intellect, because the causality of that separated intellect makes the middle member (*dispositio media*) in the deductive syllogism of modern speculative intellect (*fit intellectus speculativus quasi dispositio media conjunctivus istius*). The illuminated intellect of *Modernorum* experiences this higher mystical or gnostic connection. The *illuminati* first use the weak light of the speculative intellect (*quod agens habet primo lumen debile*) to examine the essences that exist in a Porretan way. Modernists abstract that being of the third kind from the materially given substances (*intelligences quidditates quas a materia separatas habet*). After that, the strong intellect of *illuminati* is capable of full insight into the world of existing cosmic immaterial substances (*postea acquirit lumen forte, per quod intelligit separata*). In the case of Grosseteste, we find this procedure in the twofold definition of science (*scientia, intellectus*) and in the case of Bonaventura in the twofold insight of pure essences (*resolutio semiplena and plena*). The method of weak and strong illumination is adopted by phenomenological reduction in the mode of Descartes’s or Husserl’s *epokhē*. After the separation of eidetic contents from the world, the transcendence of *noemata* appears in the full immanence of separated consciousness. The postmodern *illuminati*, enclosed in the cave of immanent consciousness, observe the world in the light of the strong solar intellect, which directly exposes eidetic contents. Plato still knew the original dialectic of seeing and knowing; therefore, he sent the philosopher out of the cave (OBJ I, ch. 1). The modern philosopher, led by Furies, does not need to leave the mythological cave. He set up his own form of secular academic mysteries illuminated by his own solar intellect. Marx’s critique of the ideology of German idealism precisely observed that the concept had become reality and ideologically blind *illuminati* did not even notice it (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.4). According to Albert, the paranoia of modern intellect derives from teaching of Avicenna and Avicebron. Moderns take *quidditas* of the thing and essentiality created in the act of cognition as *univoce* given substances. Moreover, they identify them with separated forms of cognition that exist at the level of separated cosmic intelligences (*quidditates separatorum*). In this sophistic way, the active intellect of *illuminati* is connected with the separate world of forms and intelligences. The modern view was replaced by Leibniz’s mathematics and the Cartesian or Husserl’s way of observing eidetic contents in pure consciousness. The modernists, on the basis of a revised Avicennism, created a new series of beings of the third kind, which are based on mathematical abstraction, as well as on logical concepts inherited from the extinct schools of *Logica Modernorum*. The autonomous intellect of *Modernorum* follows the path of Platonist demiurge known from the dialogue *Timaeus*. Modern intellect became fully creative. It has its own hypostatized existence and, in addition to it, it received the matter of the third kind. The enlightened intellect of Latins needs material reality and sensual cognition only as an accident. Artisanal production of ideas means that the subject produces the object of cognition, because it imposes on them subjectively given meaning. Albert shows the first *Lichtung* of modern fetishism that transformed the world to the postmodern form of capitalist ideology analyzed by Karl Marx (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.4). The receptive intellect was connected with the first substance and its factual causality apprehended by the senses. It ceased to be bound to the deductive syllogism of *Second Analytics*. Therefore, the interpretation of *Second Analytics* became the cornerstone of the controversy between the first and second Averroism since the year 1230. At that time, the Latin translation of Averroes’s commentaries done by Michael Scotus were published as well. Following chapters devoted to the emergence of Oxfordian Fallacy investigate the conflict between the two interpretations of *Second Analytics*.

The work *Libellus de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* (ca. 1256, finished in 1263) summarizes all Albert’s fundamental objections to the second Averroism and outlines the fundamental errors of this school in an exegetical overview. The arguments of polemical writing against Averroists repeat to a large extent the arguments of preceding treatises on the soul and the intellect. The style of writing confirms that Albert considered the quarrel with sophists as closed on the philosophical level. The writing does not add new arguments to those that we know from the previous commentary on *De anima*. The theses deal with the unity and individualization of the intellect. Avicennist Johannes Pecham rejected Albert’s thirty final answers and made their criticism according to the second Averroism (OBJ III, ch. 4.3.1). Albert postulates the *intellectus possibilis* as an immaterial potency of the human soul, which can accept everything and as potency is individualized by personal *intellectus agens*. This is the position of the CMDA that takes the individuation of immaterial *anima intellectiva* in the body. Albert does not want completely abandon Avicenna’s ontotheological position, because he integrated it into the Commentator’s “meta-physics” in the above-mentioned mode *per posterius*. Important is the Article 25, which summarizes the definition of the intellect with reference to the causality of the First cause.[[262]](#footnote-262) The key sentence of the quotation shows direct connection of personal active intellect to the First cause (*ad intellectum agentem secundum quem dependet ad causam primam*). Albert adheres to ontotheological determination of human intellect coming directly from God, namely within the framework of its connection with the creative *Causa prima*. Bishop Alvernus held similar theological point of view (ch. 2.3.3). Albert therefore consented to a hypostatization of active intellect in the semi-Averroistic mode, in which the human intellect is exposed directly to effects of the First cause. The human intellect is an indirectly hypostatized potency given in the soul, which was created directly by God (*potentia ... ad intellectum agentem secundum quem dependet ad causam primam*). This was also the view of Grosseteste and Bacon, who considered the human *anima intellectiva* to be a primary form created directly by God (ch. 3.2). The direct creation and preservation of human intellect by divine Intellect keep its permanent immateriality and unity. The intentionality in the form of the potency given in the direction of God as the first cause is needed by Albert in order to circumvent a construction of the intellect as an independent substance. Aquinas goes even further and makes the *intellectus materialis* individualized by the act of the individualized soul in the body. The soul behaves like a hypostatized form. This ontotheological structure of the intellect, partly given according to Avicenna, ensures the immortality of the soul. These remnants of Avicennism are present to varying degrees in Albert, Bacon and Grosseteste, and Aquinas also takes them over in his writing *De unitate intellectus*. Siger rejected this semi-Averroism of Albert and Aquinas in his exact analysis of the CMDA. He clearly distinguishes generically different position of philosophy and theology concerning the immortality of the soul. Siger rejected Albert’s and Aquinas’s definition of the intellect as partial hypostasis (*intellectus quo intelligit*) and he submitted another possibility of the act of the intellect in the existential mode “*homo ipse intelligit*.” However, these disputes took place within the first Averroism, which adheres to the substantial unity of the person and resolves the immaterial status of the *anima intellectiva* according to the primacy of theology or philosophy. Albert’s treatise on the unity of the intellect defends the individualized act of thinking and, following Alvernus’s pattern, separates the teaching of Arab philosophers from Averroes that was for Alvernus the *philosophus nobilissimus* (ch. 2.3). Albert, like Alvernus, emphasizes the danger of modernist teaching for Christian theology due to false status of intellect conceived as a hypostatic form. That kind of intellect was imported from Arab thinkers according to Neoplatonic scenario of the book *Liber de causis*.

“They constantly assert that the intelligences or the intellect give the forms, because the intellect is the first source of the forms. (…) They use the following argument for this: because the causality is given to the forms in their formal higher existence, they act as causes at the level of the existence of the lower forms. It is supposed that the being of form, insofar as it is formed, cannot be other than the individual; the lower formal causes receive the causality from the forms of the higher order (*reducuntur causae in suas causas passivas*).” [[263]](#footnote-263)

The second Averroism proposed hypostatized *intellectus agens* that causally grounded knowledge through objective being of cognitive forms in the soul (*causa earum in esse minus formali*). Since the form has univocal character, its causal effect is also univocal as well.[[264]](#footnote-264) Thanks to its actual existence, the higher form enables the lower forms to enforce hylemorphic causality (*reducuntur causae in suas causas passivas*). This “*reductio*” of active immaterial form to its contingent occurrence in passive matter fundamentally shaped the modern metaphysics. Albert is probably alluding to Rufus' notion of objective existence (*exsistere*). This is given at the level of causally acting form according to the Neoplatonic scenario given as a modern *resolutio* from higher forms to lower ones (chap. 3.3.2). Modernists latins reduced the existence of the first substance to a mental construct. They put eternally given forms through the act of Porretan “exsistence” in the process of cognition. The permanent essence shapes the contingent material reality to create an “exsisting” *individuum* as an entity of the third kind. The quotation defines a new form of objectivity in the term “*esse formale*.” Its origin will be analyzed in Rufus’s teaching (*species obiecti exsistentis*, ch. 3.3.4). Let us recall that the first Averroism works with the process of abstraction and being of abstracted forms that exist only in thinking. Therefore, Aristotelians cannot accept the philosophical fairy tale about mythological descent of hypostatized forms in the world and into the thinking of modern *illuminati*. In the first Averroism, *individuum* cannot exist as a modern kind of *tertium ens*. Modern thinking observes an objective diacosmos in the truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. After seven centuries spent on walking the path of modernism and postmodernism, this metaphysical error seems completely normal. The scheme of cognition made by “insane” (Bacon) or the “ridiculous” (Albert) modernists is based on the emanation scheme of Avicenna’s cosmic *intellectus agens*. This modern derivation of forms determines the demiurgic approach to reality according to the predication *in artificialibus*. According to Albert, such Neoplatonic cognition made in virtue of effective formal causality concerns only one and very specific way of cognition provided by artisanal creation (*hoc enim videmus intelligendo et in operando per artem*; ibid, p. 439b). Similarly, the interpretation of metaphysics according to Bacon’s first Averroism makes a fundamental difference between the predication related to the demiurgic projection and the causal effect of the substances in reality.[[265]](#footnote-265) In mathematical predication, abstracted matter is given only as a universal notion (*materia tantum*). In the mode *ex nihilo*, the creation of a meaning in thought cannot establish a hyparchical meaning that runs only by the imposition of the first substance. Intention of the craftsman (*universale quod es in artificialibus*) establishes a universal predication, but not a univocal definition of causality according to the *Second Analytics* (*non retinet… ratio causalitatis*). The cause as artisanal know-how differs from the causality of the first substance acting in reality. In the thinking of the artisan, the form of production has only a secondary status with regard to the already given reality (*forma enim artificialis non est nova natura vel essentia*). The producer establishes correspondence on basis of universal knowledge of creation, creative ideas and habitual knowledge of cause and effect (*rationem et proprietatem predicationis*). As a result, causality from the pure form given by matter in the mode of abstraction has a different status than causality, which is given in the metaphysics of the first substances. It is no longer a question of accidental and potential predication within the framework of the theoretical intellect, but of creation within the framework of the practical intellect, which has a singular and causal effect in reality. Formal causality in the process of cognition of authentic Aristotelianism applies only to a very limited extent to the matter that is created in the process of artisanal or artistic creation (*in artificialibus*), or to its abstraction in mathematics. The art does not require the first substance as an effective cause of production. The craftsman carries his production idea within himself and pushes it into the material. For this fundamental reason, this type of active cognition refers to another component of the intellect that connects to the human volition that operates as cause (*intellectus practicus*; OBJ III, ch. 6.1). It is clear that the character of this practical intellect will fundamentally differ in the first and second school of Aristotelians. Similarly, the logician or mathematician works in the world of abstractions. In this world of universals they make what is logically true, and they do not care about what is metaphysically real. Bacon argues against the universal hylemorphism: the matter given in mathematics and geometry is merely the subject of formal statements (*hoc materia artificialis de artificialibus predicatur*).[[266]](#footnote-266) Albert and Bacon regard demiurgic concept of matter as being of the third kind to be an error of uncritical thinking. Modernists do not know what they really do when they are thinking. The modern demiurge degrades the reality of the first substance in the process of denudation to be a material for mathematical abstraction. It became an effective form, let us see Rufus’s notion of “*scibile*.” After the year 1250, Bonaventura introduced the predication *in artificialibus* into the ontotheological structure of new metaphysics based on the second Averroism and the analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*. As a result, the hyparchical position of the first substance changes into the recognition of “substance—species.” Such species “exsists” in the modern diacosmos or it is extracted from the Augustinian memory of the third kind. Aquinas attacked the univocal formal causality of Latins with arguments similar to those of Albert in his work *Summa contra Gentiles*.[[267]](#footnote-267) The artisanal formation of matter has no creative character with regard to reality (*impossibilie est quod prima inductio formarum in materia sit ab aliquo creante formam tantum*). The craftsman creates with real matter, and the logician works only with abstract matter in thinking. Therefore, both forms of matter are fundamentally separated from each other, and there is no being of the third kind between them. The human intellect is originally a *tabula rasa*; that is why it cannot create hypostatized forms, let alone to bring about a substantial reality made *ex nihilo*. Aquinas rejects the above-described modern *resolutio* of universal hylemorphic forms coming from the separated *intellectus agens*. It is numerically one for all people and, moreover, separated from the individual soul. Albert emphasized it a decade earlier that the active intellect of the Latins works through the metaphor of the sun, which irradiates the soul from the outside and causes recognition in it (*hoc idem est quod irradians super animam facit in eam intellectum*; *De unitate intellectus II*, p. 440a). Such hypostatized intellect determines human cognition from above, since meaning of being come beyond the first substance, that is, by exposure from behind (*reductio causarum*). As far as the identity of presumed Averroists is concerned, the fourth argument is very important. Albert refused the definition of intellect based on sophistic interpretation of *Second Analytics*. The modern intellect primarily determines itself as a quasi-substance in relation to the material intellect that contains the spiritually given matter. The group of modern *illuminati* created the world in thinking like the Platonic demiurge Timaeus, making use of the predication *in artificialibus*. They projected this abstract world into reality in order to establish the objective worldview. They carried out the assimilation of both ways of cognition in the modern concept of truth, given for the first time in Rufus’s term “*coaequatio*” (ch. 3.3.2). The first Averroism takes such theory of truth and cognition strictly unacceptable. Taking into account the real thing, the exposure from the front excludes the possibility that the intellect in the act of cognition accepts an effective causality coming from the recognized thing. In the mode *per prius*, the Aristotelian intellect is merely a receptive potency given as *intellectus possibilis*. This universal receptivity guarantees a conception of truth as correspondence. The intellect is *tabula rasa* in relation to the reality, and as a result, the soul is potentially all that is recognizable. Averroists fell into the illusion of universal creation and the assumption that their demiurgic intellect can create everything possible. Therefore, they added an effective causality to the intellect to create a new relation to reality. At the beginning of modernity, it was clear to some critical philosophers that man is not the divine Creator. Compared to God and cosmic intelligences, human being has a completely different intellect. Albert draws the attention of modernists to the fact that they do not have the right definition of the intellect. It must be “*inmixtus*” according to *De anima* and CMDA.

“If something does not define or determine something else by itself, it remains universal and is one and the same everywhere. The separated intellect does not by itself define and determine the material being (*aliquid*); therefore it remains universal everywhere. After all, if the intellect determined something out of itself, then that would be its own matter. But such material intellect does not exist at all. That is why the intellect cannot determine an external being out of itself. (…) Averroes interpreted these arguments in an excellent way, but in other words.” [[268]](#footnote-268)

Avicennist theory proceeds from a univocal form and from the primacy of separated active intellect, which acts as efficient cause on the level of hylemorphic reality. In contrast to the modernist creation of being *ex nihilo*, Albert emphasizes that the human intellect cannot create a recognized being by itself in the act of cognition. The intellect does not possess its own matter, because *intellectus materialis* of the Commentator is a pure cognitive and potential faculty of the soul. Modern creation of an internal object as simulacrum replaced classical knowledge of the real thing. Modern cognition arises from the fact that the active intellect appears as Avicenna’s “*forma formarum*,” endowed with causal efficacy to establish the downward order of forms. In order to create a substance of the third kind, this intellect has at its disposal, as a *Dator formarum*, another being of the third kind, namely the *materia spiritualis*. That kind of Averroists intellect stands is in clear contradiction with Averroes’s teaching, who was not an Averroist. Once again, Alvernus’s definition of this group as *sophistae Latini* comes to the stage. The correct interpretation of Averroes must be upheld against them (ch. 2.3.1). The seventh argument refuses the doctrine of the second Averroism concerning the emergence of the modern individual based on *materia spiritualis* with the help of division in the Porphyry’s Tree. Therefore, the intellect of Averroists must be quasi-material, as it is in all postmodern concepts.

“It is said that the species outside of matter has an indivisible nature, which can individualize itself only through matter. This individualization has accidental character by the fact that the species gets into matter (*hoc accidit ei in quantum est in materia*), but in itself the species is not material (*non secundum se*). All the more, this supposedly happens in the case of being, which is the specific species for the other species (*quod est species specierum*). The intellect is given as a specific species for the other species. Then, it cannot individualize itself otherwise than through matter. But the material foundation of the intellect is in contradiction with its character and its definition.” [[269]](#footnote-269)

The intellect of modernists appears as a kind of super-species (*intellectus est species specierum*). Therefore, this hypostasis is only one, divided, imperishable and it produces human cognition in the mode of the conjunction. This specific intellect individualizes itself in the individual being through spiritual matter (*intellectus materialis, adeptus*). The resulting conjunction of both intellects manifests itself on the human level in the form of the Porretan *species specialissima*. It determines the material substrate through division into a last meaning that cannot be further divided (*individuum*). The quasi-substantial intellect of Averroists has received material individuation. Then in the act of cognition, it translates this quasi-material individuality to cognized forms as well. The quotation shows a typical Averroist construction of *Latinorum*. The group of Latin sophists received the interpretation of CMDA according to Neoplatonic teaching of the Toledo school. The modern *intellectus possibilis* numerically l′un became a *tertium ens* according to misinterpreted teaching of Averroes. It joins mythological human individual (and not the real human person) in the act of thinking that differentiates individual contents of thought according to a mythological matter. This is total madness. The group of Latin sophists took it for the interpretation of CMDA according to Neoplatonic interpretation of the Toledo school. The one numerically identical *intellectus possibilis*, according to Averroes’s misinterpreted teaching, connects with individual human being thanks to materially different act of thinking. Albert rejects such theory of species, which are given in the intellect with the help of matter of the third kind. According to Albert, this conception of receptivity is nonsense, and for two reasons. Firstly, thinking would have a material imprint of recognized things in the kind of sensual imago, and by no means a universal immaterial cognition. Secondly, thanks to the actualization of this quasi-matter, the intellect would become a separate substance in the soul. It would become a storehouse of essential meaning given quasi-materially (*intellectus est species specierum*). Therefore, the cosmic intellect would be the subject of thought, not the existing person. Albert considers the theory of cognition based on the universal hylemorphism to be completely erroneous. It contradicts the real course of human cognition established in the scientific proof according to *Second Analytics* (ch. 2.4.1). According to Albert, such Neoplatonic theory of cognition and intellect came to being in an erroneous interpretation of *Second Analytics* within the framework of *Logica Modernorum* (*fundatur super propositiones logicas*). The chapters devoted to the Oxfordian Fallacy show where and how originated the analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*.

The polemic in the writing *De unitate intellectus* involves the unity of the intellect in the person and the specific unity of knowledge for all men. The sophistic interpretation of the second Averroism is rejected especially in arguments no. 25 and 28. Erroneous definition of cognition necessarily leads to erroneous definition of *intellectus possibilis*. The receptive intellect must be immaterial and separated from Alexander’s and Themistius’s *intellectus materialis*, see all the above-mentioned key points against the modern Alexandrians. That is why Albert’s interpretation of *De anima* makes difference between the intellect in the CMDA as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. On this point, the Averroistic misinterpretation of Averroes’s teaching on the unity and diversity of the intellect becomes evident. Averroists influenced by Avicenna did not understand basic arguments of CMDA. Let us see Albert’s above-mentioned criticism that concerned the incompatibility of two premises, which, according to the Latins, contradict each other (*ex duobus his concessis*). Averroists in the line of Rufus’s writing *Contra Averroem* (ch. 3.3.3) did not understand the Commentator’s teaching on the *intellectus possibilis* at all. Argument no. 27 paraphrases Rufus’s false dilemma attributed to Averroes in the form “either the individual *intellectus materialis* numerically distinct; or the one immaterial *intellectus possibilis* cosmic.” Albert rebuffed that conclusion of the second Averroism that is erroneous in both points. The individualization of thinking would be achieved in an absurd way, either by importing a matter of the third kind into the purely receptive intellect, or by creating a numerically one possible intellect for all people that determine human cognition from the outside. Let us recall the hesitation of the anonymous author of *Summa Duacensis*, who was unable to solve the same problem because he had abandonned the first Averroism of the Blund’s school (ch. 2.2.2). Averroism works either with the individual *intellectus materialis* or with the numerically one immaterial *intellectus possibilis*. This mythological substance comes from outside and it joins the modern non-existent individual. According to Albert, this dilemma of individual and cosmic receptivity is completely nonsensical. Averroism did not understand the possible intellect according to *De anima* and reduced it to the hylic intellect of Alexander and Neoplatonists.

“It would mean that the reception of possible intellect would be the same as in the matter. Everything included in the form of recognition from the individual things, it is supposedly material and it is perceived as matter. However, this contradicts the receptive intellect as a separate form, which, according to the Philosopher, is the definition of *intellectus possibilis*.” [[270]](#footnote-270)

The defense of the unity of the intellect according to the CMDA emphasizes to the modernists that the receptive component of the intellect cannot be material or actualized, because the receptive faculty exists only potentially in the soul. The intellect must be separated from the matter, and as pure noetic potency (τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά), in order to know everything (πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι; *De anima* 429a17‒18). This line was masterfully explained in Averroes’s interpretation of CMDA. Albert finalized the first Averroism and interpreted Averroes’s definition of *tertium* and *quartum genus*. The well-known solution of Latin Averroists, which had been attributed to Averroes, contradicts the interpretation of *De anima* in all major points. There is no personal act of cognition, and no definition of immaterial intellect (*inmixtus*), which is generically different from the senses (*separabilis*). Modernism turned the *intellectus possibilis* into an Averroist simulacrum defined as a cosmic hypostasis with immaterial being (ch. 2.1.3). Dinant even added this simulacrum to divine essence in the mode of pantheism, which the modernism inspired by monotheistic Avicenna fundamentally rejected. Albert criticizes the assertion that the receptive intellect is separate from the personal faculty of cognition.[[271]](#footnote-271) That is why Albert has to defend Averroes’s possible intellect as *tertium genus* against modern sophistry. The act of the existing person contrasts to immaterial abstraction, which is common to all humans. The abstraction makes the intellect to be a universal species, and therefore as *quartum genus*. This abstraction is not an Avicennist substance of the third kind.

Albert’s answer to summarized arguments of Averroists is already contained in the seventh and eighth answers of the work *De unitate intellectus*. Remaining parts od the book elaborate these passages in more detail. The receptive intellect is in a certain sense a *species specierum*, because the soul is potentially everything. But this activity is carried out in a completely different way from Averroists solution given in Rufus’s *Speculum animae* that makes the first definition of the objective species (ch. 3.3.4). Rufus is the first consistent modernist that defends the speculative conception of the intellect, in which body and soul mirror each other through the simulacrum of the intellect.[[272]](#footnote-272) The first sophistic critique of Averroes makes the immaterial and numerically uniform *intellectus possibilis* operate as a mirror to reflect the impersonal power of the separated cosmic intellect. Such a theory reminded the followers of Blund’s school of pantheistic version of the cosmic receptive intellect in the work of David of Dinant. Therefore, the dispute of the modern mendicants with the secular artists on the Rue du Fouarre had a fundamental character. At the stake was the twofold conception of theology as the revealed doctrine and the universal ontotheology. The modernists fighting under the flag of objectively conceived orthodoxy had to destroy the classical thinkers in an authoritarian way, which was carried out for the first time during an academic purge in the year 1255 and definitely in the year 1277. Through this revolutionary act, the modernists opened the way to the *metaphysica generalis* and to the death of modern God. Albert’s classical *revolutio*, citing Averroes, emphasizes that thanks to the immateriality and the receptivity given by the *intellectus possibilis*, both individual and universal cognition is possible. All points confirm that Albert endorsed the authentic Averroes against sophistic Averroists, which his teacher Alvernus had done before him in Paris. The modernists inspired by Avicebron insist on “exsistence” of spiritually given matter in the intellect. This created a new *tertium ens*, which is given *univoce* in reality and in thinking. Albert’s concept of the *intellectus possibilis* fundamentally excludes the creation of being of the third kind. Albert preserves the intellect as an act of the existing person. The essence of the confrontation over the intellect between the Averroists and Albert is hidden in this statement.

“We do not agree with Avicebron that the rational soul is composed of matter and form, but claim that it consists of potency and the act.” [[273]](#footnote-273)

The first thinking substance consists of two different faculties, the active and the passive. The receptive intellect, through immateriality and pure potency, guarantees the division between the potency of intelligible species and the reality of external things to be recognized. The receptive intellect takes the real thing in its intellectual mode, but it does not create it. There is no *creatio* of being of the third kind, but Averroes’s *proportio* with regard to the truth of the externally existing and internally recognized thing. Representatives of the second Averroism insist on the impossible alliance between the two substantial kinds of intellect. The defense of the receptive intellect follows twofold cognition presented in the context of *intellectus speculativus* (ch. 2.4.2). Albert repeats the point of view stated in his commentary on *De anima*.

“The speculative intellect exists according to the person in whom it operates. Then it is necessary to consider its receptive basis (*subjectum ipsius quod est patiens*) in the same way, because the speculative intellect in living persons is given in those personal carriers. Likewise, the possible intellect is individualized by personal instances of the speculative intellect, and therefore it is acting in those living persons. Therefore, different forms of the possible intellect exist in different persons.” [[274]](#footnote-274)

The senses have a receptive and synthesizing character and are individual according to the body. The intellect must have the same character; its essence must be immaterial and universal in actual existence of the person (*speculativus intellectus qui est factus et generatus multipiciter secundum ea in quibus sit*). Understandably, both requirements must fulfill the receptive character of intellect, because it forms the immaterial act of *anima intellectiva*. Therefore, the *intellectus possibilis* exists in persons as their personal ability that thinks the same universal contents (*possibilis intellectus multiplicatur secundum numerum speculantium*). The problem of Averroists lies in the fact that they have no correct interpretation either of *De anima* or of CMDA. With false reference to Averroes, they present an absurd combination of pseudo-substances that destroy the unity of the person. Alvernus and Albert consider this erroneous Cartesianism *avant la lettre* to be a fundamental problem. Their main argument against the doctrine of *Latinorum* concerns the universal hylemorphism, by which the modernists deny the entire tradition of Aristotelian philosophy. The universals cannot be in things, because *ens rationis* exists only in the thinking of the knower. Moreover, human cognition proceeds from the first substance, the universal meaning of which is merely abstracted and it is not given in any autonomous universal form.[[275]](#footnote-275) The first abstraction proceeds at the sensual level. Albert very well knows that the eye is not a subject of colored light, because the eye is not colored in itself when taking up the color. The eye passively receives the colored thing through the sensual diaphanum. The synthetic knowledge arises in the soul and not in the eye. The receptive intellect is not a real subject of the recognized thing, as the modernists claim. Psychic ability to recognize something fundamentally differs from the recognized thing by its potentiality and immateriality. Cognition forms another kind of diaphanum, because it conveys the universal aspect of the thing.

Let us now look at Albert’s version of above-mentioned remark made by Bacon about insane doctrines that his contemporaries proclaimed at Oxford (*insaniunt contra veritatem*, ch. 3.4.2). Albert indirectly comments on the first purge of Aristotelians that made part of the Sicilian school in the rue de Fouarre. He defended them in his commentaries on *De anima* and in the treatises on the intellect written around the year 1255. The rejection of erroneous theories of the second Averroism begin by an explicit appeal to Averroes (*secundum expositionem Averrois*) and finds the following continuation:

“Some of them claim that there are three substances in man. It is so ridiculous that I will not comment on this. No Peripatetic claimed this, but some Latins have come up with this. They have no idea of the nature of the soul and I have rejected it in many treatises.” [[276]](#footnote-276)

Albert does not intend to discuss with people who do not know the basic philosophical alphabet. Their arguments are absolutely ridiculous (*non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum*). The criticized Latins do not know the nature of the soul and therefore make up their mythological theses (*Latini naturam animae nescientes hoc confinxerunt*). In a similar way, Alvernus criticized the Latin sophists of his time (ch. 2.3.1). Albert’s criticism is clearly aimed at the group of *Modernorum* at Oxford, who was known to introduce the theory of universal hylemorphism (ch. 3.2). Adam of Buckfield explicitly quoted the criticized threefold substantial view in his commentary on *De anima* written about 1240 at Oxford.[[277]](#footnote-277) According to Albert, the arguments of Latins are so weak that they do not deserve the designation “arguments.” They are a pure invention that contradicts the previous philosophical tradition. We also find a similar formulation in writing *De intellectu et intelligibili* that addresses the Oxford analytical school founded by Rufus and Kilwardby.[[278]](#footnote-278) Albert cannot recognize a substance of the third kind. Either the substance is perceived absolutely *per se* as a universal essentia in thinking, or it is a principle of the actual thing, which, however, is *simpliciter* given in reality (*esse rei*). Then the essence can be attributed only in the mode of *universaliter* and this essence exists only in intellect as a universal form (*universale non est nisi in intellectu*). The predication of the form is only “*de re*,” because the universal meaning can never be “*in re*.” The predication “*in re*”is possible only in logic and mathematics. In these sciences, essences make the medium of logical abstraction. However, the principle “*ex inmediatis*” according to *Second analytics* relates to the causality of first substances. In the thing, the essence exists in the form of *quidditas rei*, as the hyparchical first substance, given *in actu* and *simpliciter*. Let’s compare this criticism with the approach of anonymous *Treatise of Erfurt* from Kilwardby’s school. The anonymous author, following the pattern of Descartes and Husserl, ensures the universal being of the third kind through the self-reflection of the intellect (*universale secundum aliquid esse*). He observes this eidetic substance directly “*in rebus*” and predicts this *tertium ens* in a univocal manner as a first substance (ch. 3.4.3). The summary of arguments against *Latinorum* and their materially conceived intellect is contained in the treatise *De intellectu et intelligibili* (ibid, pp. 487–489). It sums up the complete thesis concerning the relation between intellect and soul (*tripliciter homini unitur intellectus*). This thesis follows the following principles: 1) the personal nature of the soul exists in the real person; 2) immaterial potency of the intellect creates universal meaning; 3) participation in the universals is made through the act of personal active intellect. Principal arguments against the Latins (ibid, pp. 454–458) follow the line of Sicilian school and Siger of Brabant. In support of his arguments, Albert quotes the natural scientific works of Aristotle (*De animalium*) together with the writing *De anima*. The opponents from the school of *Latinorum* distorted the Commentator’s teaching. They do not interpret the Commentator in the spirit of the tradition of *Peripateticorum*, but through the Neoplatonic falsafa (*philosophi Arabum*).

The term “*ad mentem Averrois*” does not mean the same metaphysical interpretation of the Commentator in the school of the first or second Averroism. Different conception of cognition, truth and metaphysical being separate both schools. In Albert’s work, hermeneutics proved the conflict between the Sicilian and Toledo school that existed in terms of the interpretation of Averroes’s corpus. The interpretation of metaphysics made “*ad mentem Averrois*,” presented twofold paradigm of modern and anti-modern Aristotelianism. Necessarily, we adopt the same critical attitude that Albert used against “*Doctores Latinorum*” to critique the work done by contemporary scholars. Therefore, in the contemporary interpretation of Avicennian objectivists, Albert got the sticker of a moderate and a bit confused Averroist, in contrast to the philosophically infallible anti-Averroist Thomas Aquinas. From the point of view of modern *Irrtum*, this is entirely logical and objectively true, because Avicennian medievalists compare two simulacra. Then it is true that such a confused interpretation of Albert’s philosophy made in the mode of universal objectivity reflects the confused interpretation of his teacher Alvernus. In reality, it was exactly the opposite. Aquinas was the semi-Averroist, as the next matrices and the final interpretation of political philosophy will show. The first difference between two conceptions of Aristotelian corpus was already present in Alvernus’s teaching. That follower of the Sicilian school separated Averroes’s interpretation as authentically Christian and he put criticized *sequaces* *Aristotelis* on the other side (ch. 2.3.1). The fundamental moment of departure between the two schools was the doctrine of the separated *intellectus agens* and its influence on human cognition. Albert and Bacon, following Alvernus’s pattern, defended the difference between Neoplatonic Avicenna and Aristotelian Averroes. This distinction dates back to the Paris school of the first Averroism constituted by Blund’s interpretation of *De anima*. Scotus’s reading of the CMDA confirmed it after the year 1230 (ch. 2.1.3). The connoisseurs of Aristotle uphold the line of the first Averroism according to the Sicilian school of Michael Scotus. It was done against the Toletan Avicennists from the school of the second Averroism, who established themselves in Paris and Oxford around the year 1235–40. Their interpretation of Averroes adhered to the line of Neoplatonism according to Avicenna, because they did not see an important connection between the scientific writings on cognition of animals with human cognition given in *De anima*. We have already mentioned that modern Toletans read *De anima* backwards, from the third to the second book. The new struggle of both schools begins in 1270, when Albert’s pupil took over the baton of criticism concerning Averroism. Aquinas already had in his hands the original translation of *De anima* and Proclus’s *Elementa theologica et physica* made by William Moerbeke. He decided the dispute of both schools in the spirit of victorious semi-Averroism. Hermeneutics interpreted the identity of Averroists in the mode of the *alētheia*. It was necessary to recover the original meaning of Albert′s quotations in relation to authentic teaching of Averroes and to separate them from Latin scholars who were his contemporaries. Following this methode, we presented a complete line of anti-Averroistic polemics about the unity of the intellect, which are contained in Albert’s commentaries on *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

## 2.5 Gigantomachy of the First and Second Averroism

John Blund was the first Latin Aristotelian who interpreted Aristotle’s *De anima* in such a way that Neoplatonist *tertium ens* was eliminated from the process of cognition. The importance of this thinker lecturing in Paris and maybe in Oxford is comparable to the leading role of Alfarabi in the Baghdad School of Wisdom (OBJ I, ch. 2.1). This first Aristotelian of the Falsafa recognized the importance of real Aristotle separated from Neoplatonism of Al-Kindī. Alfarabi became Blund’s predecessor. Blund separated Aristotle’s philosophy from Avicenna by renewing the Aristotelian form of Western metaphysics as cognition given in the human soul. Blund’s interpretation of *De anima* was adopted by the first Averroism that rejected Neoplatonic forms of *tertium ens* with emphasis on adequate form of cognition attested by Averroes. The opposed way of thinking in the school of the second Averroism constitutes the modern matrix of objectivity. That process took place in the schools of *augustinisme avicennisant* that Étienne Gilson described for the first time. The synergy of the Commentator and Avicenna into a project of the first science forms another chapter of high scholasticism, which this work cannot explore in depth. We have commented on the integration of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism in Alfarabi and then set apart Averroes’s metaphysics. The project of the first science of Albert and Siger of Brabant is connected to Averroes’s thinking. These thinkers understood and corrected errors of Avicenna’s metaphysics given by the eclipse of first substances Aquinas only partially accomplished that task. The first tensions between two metaphysics appeared around the years 1225–30. It arrived to the first conflict between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy. Gigantomachy of the substance received a new impetus in the first third of the 13th century, when Aristotelianism reached the West through Averroes’s commentaries. To some extent, the pattern familiar from the previous matrix was recurrent when Avicenna’s writings entered cathedral schools of Latin West in the second half of the 12th century. The traditional schools of logic and metaphysics brought about by Boethius and Abelard accepted with great reserve Neoplatonic import of Avicenna, which came from the school of Toledo translators. Avicenna’s teaching, on the other hand, was fully accepted in logical schools influenced by Porretans and by teaching of *Nominales*. Clairvoyant minds like John of Salisbury or Godfrey of St. Victor saw fundamental errors of Porretans and their modern logic. Godfrey claims only paranoid thinkers could defend such worldview (*hoc crediderit menti alienus*, ch. 1.6). Their successors in Blund’s school adopted an equally critical attitude after the arrival of Toletan translations of Averroes’s corpus.

The pattern concerning the reception of Avicenna came again in use. Followers of Blund’s school accurately recognized the original Aristotelian thought of the Commentator and they refused Neoplatonic interpretation of Toletans made according to Avicenna. Blund’s school replaced Abelard’s logical semantics with complete Aristotelian structure of cognition and signification according to Averroes’s interpretation of *De anima* and its “meta-physics” given by the primacy of the first substance. The new division of metaphysics followed the succession of three interconnected spheres, which proceed in the order of cognition according to the hyparchical position of the first substance (*ordo essendi, cognoscendi, significandi*). This order was formally codified by the school of Modists from the first Averroism of the Sicilian school. Following John of Salisbury, the first Averroism sealed the decline of the Nominal schools. The approach of Blund’s school starts from Aristotelian interpretation of the key phrase *De int.* 16a3–8, which establishes the fundamental link to the writing *De anima*. After the year 1200 and after the establishment of the Paris University, the dispute shifted to interpretations of *De anima*. First, it was marked by interpretation made by David of Dinant in the spirit of Aristotelian pantheism. The dispute over the nature of cognition between Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism took on a confrontational character after Aristotelianism reached the West through commentaries of Averroes. Hermeneutics have shown that four different events were involved, which cannot be united in the history of one single reception. First, Averroes’s corpus was interpreted through the paradigm of the Toletan or the Sicilian school, whose representatives belonged to the preceding currents of Neoplatonism (*Porretans, Nominales, Logica Modernorum*) or Aristotelianism of Boethius (*Logica Vetus*, Abelard’s school, Blund’s school). This resulted in a different reception of Averroes’s corpus according to this or that school of Porretan or Abelardian Aristotelians. Second, the Commentator’s writings migrated to the West in two waves. The first wave came from Toledo around the year 1220 and the second wave of writing from the workshop of translators that Frederick II founded in the Sicily. Michael Scotus brought this teaching to Paris in the year 1230. The combination of these four historical phenomena has caused that we have four different interpretations of Averroes’s corpus related to the combinations of two schools and two receptions. The objectivist approach to reception of the Commentator is methodologically aberrant. This metaphysics is based on false univocity that proceeds from Neoplatonic vision of the substance as being of the third kind. Averroes considered the exposure of the being from behind as a fundamental error of thinking. Therefore, we have to consider very carefully what kind of Averroes’s corpus the scholastics had in mind in the years 1230–70 and to which school of interpretation belonged the authors in question. Various intermediate stages probably cannot be determined clearly, due to the lack of sources.

The cognition made on the basis of Blund’s interpretation *De anima* opened a new stage of metaphysics after the year 1200. Especially the first wave of Averroists took up the paradigm of the Sicilian school. These scholars respected the line of Aristotle’s scientific works given in connection with the writing *De anima*. In the new scenario of *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*, the mediating functions retain the sensual imagination of animals and the receptive intellect of man based on the senses. The first Averroism rejected the conception of man as a corpse and created a common world of life and cognition for all living beings. This group of Blund’s disciples worked with their master at the cathedral school (*École de Paris*) founded by Abelard. They defended the integral Christian Aristotelianism of Boethius and Abelard against David of Dinant. In doing so, the Blund’s school distinguished two forms of Aristotelianism: the authentically Christian defense of the person and the heretical Neoplatonic version, which triumphed at the cost of disintegration of the person and the death of modern God in the Latin West. For this act of interpretation, affected by postmodern *damnatio memoriae*, Blund’s school obtained the consent of Innocent III to found the University of Paris that was placed under papal authority in the year 1215. Since the year 1230, Christian interpretation of Aristotle followed the line made *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Sicilian school. Therefore, the ban on the study of Aristotle’s writings was lifted in the next year at the University of Paris. In the paradigm of the Sicilian school, the world of life looks completely different from Neoplatonic diacosmos outlined by the Toledo school. This school was the first to translate a part of Aristotle’s scientific works; but Toletans applied them in the scheme of cognition made by denudation and illumination. The dispute about the cognition given by illumination from the Neoplatonic solar intellect was probably the reason why Michael Scotus moved from the Toledo school to the court of the ruler and intellectual Frederick II the Sicilian, where a different interpretative paradigm of Aristotelian corpus prevailed. The thinkers at the court of Frederick thoroughly studied the Arabic compilation of Aristotle and produced a brilliant writing on falconry (*De arte venandi cum avibus*). Let us recall the key role of Scotus’s translation of the work *On the Life of Animals* (*Kitāb al-hayawān*). This writing compiled Aristotle’s scientific writings (*Historia animalium, De partibus animalium, De generatione animalium*) into one didactic whole. Perhaps at the University of Bologna or directly in Sicily, where principal ideas, translations, and thoughts emerged that linked Aristotle’s animal cognition to the writing *De anima*. The first Averroism, in the view of the Sicilian school, fundamentally rejected the path of the Avicennist *illuminati*. They founded the thinking of modernism the decade after the year 1250. Modernism took man as a specifically defined corpse because logical abstraction does not start from the first real substance. Cartesian figure of man as the incarnate intellect follows the concept of “Flying Man” outlined by Avicenna. The modernists annihilated the common world of cognition and life and prepared the postmodern era of scientific-technical nihilism. The model of the common world of Descartes and Husserl consists in the mathematics, which is a typical inheritance of the Toledo school. Modernists observe the world in Porretan mode “*discrete videamus*.” Neoplatonist cognition does not need the senses; this non-existing modern subject enjoys direct insight into the world of cosmic intelligences. Therefore, it does not share with the common life world with other living beings, which the first Averroism founded in sensual intentionality. The modern subject was made to achieve the higher level of illumination; therefore, it has nothing in common with materially living beings. The modern subject became an uninvolved observer of the hylemorphic world and it found its place among the angelic beings. Modern cognition comes through direct involvement of cosmic intelligences. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. The angelic being does not have to care about the common world of life, because by its destiny it belongs to the demiurgic diacosmos of objective spirits and not to hylemorphic nature of the world. The worldview of postmodernism follows the paradigm of the Toledo school. Heidegger and his hermeneutics of facticity made honorable exception since 1920. He has returned Aristotelianism to existentially conceived Sicilian school. Aristotelian science takes the first the natural sciences as biology and physics, and then the metaphysics follows. In such holistic cognition, animal and human cognition established the unified architecture of hierarchically connecting (material and immaterial) faculties of the soul. The authentic humanist project of the West was born of such holistic knowledge. In its center is the person as the first substance that is inserted into the common world of nature and living beings. Meanwhile, the humanism, which was based on the existential conception of the person, was lost with the advent of the school of *Modernorum*. According to Aristotle, the mathematical abstraction does not provide a real picture of the world, wherein the first substances act causally upon themselves. The war of objective modernism against the common life world is confirmed in the sixth part of *Discours de la méthode* (1637), which makes modern subjects to be *maîtres et possesseurs de la nature*. Postmodern Furies have completely manipulated that kind of thinking. The postmodernism of Descartes, Hobbes and Maleblanche transforms the animal into animal machine (*bête-machine*). The objective humanism defended in the model of the truth as assimilation of being of the third kind brought about the new era of the conquest of the world: the Industrial Revolution, the World Wars, the totalitarian regimes, the global warming and the mass destruction of all living creatures. The classical defense of the person lost another battle with metaphysical nihilism in the totalitarianism of the 20th century and is losing as well in the present epoch of the Anthropocene.

Following Albert, hermeneutics places the emergence of the second Averroism in direct relation with the group of thinkers called *Latini*. They have a problem with cognition because they introduce two forms or even two substances in the soul. Such mythology created *ex nihilo* the first substance and made the individuation of intellect through *materia spiritualis*. The learned Latins determined the cognition of universal contents not by reception of sensual impressions, but as collection of hypostases actively formed in demiurgic thinking. The cognitive forms come directly in the intellect as individual substances. Avicennists think through Augustinian and mystical eye of the soul (*mens nostra, qui est oculus animae*, ch. 1.4). The hypostatized soul became a place that produces modern simulacra, hypostases and pseudo-substances, and it makes being of the third kind. This mythopoetic view of the non-existent mirages of reality beguiled the Latin West. The manner how the soul is actualized by cognition (*passio animi*, *De int*. 16a7) divided Platonists and Aristotelians. The middle member of the scientific judgment received the determination of the causal *passio* not from the effects of the first real substance, but from the abstract determination of the atomic substance as a being of the third kind. It exists but in mind of *illuminati*. Following ancient Neoplatonists, modern academics love all kinds of illusions; especially, when it comes to the products they′re making by their own gnosis. The causality of the first substance acting on the senses was abolished. The worldview linked to the direct philosophical or mystical contemplation of autonomously subsistent forms through Avicenna’s cosmic *intellectus agens* or mystical *intellectus sanctus* came in its place. The next matrix performs analyses of *Second Analytics* made by Grosseteste, Rufus and Kilwardby as the main representatives of the school of the Second Averroism. Gilson rightly saw that Avicennian Augustinianism abolished the basic scheme of aristotelian cognition. Aristotle based it on the imposition of meaning from the first substance, by the exposure of intellect from the front. The production of univocal species of the third kind replaced in the Averroist modernity the original causal relation to reality that is mediated by the senses. The first Averroism defended the primacy of the first substance as *ens ratum*, because the sense of being is given from real substances. The reality of hylemorphic things is given *simpliciter* and therefore *actualiter*. Therefore, it shapes human cognition, which is given *universaliter* and only potentially. According to Albert’s interpretation of Aristotelianism done in the line of Sicilian Averroes, the concept in human thought keeps only the statute of a weak being (*esse debile*), whereas the real first substance adheres to the statute of the actual and therefore solid being (*ens ratum*). The second Averroism of the Toledo school, under the leadership of its intellectual hubris, turned this scheme all the way round. It established a new sense of being by illuminating the cognition from the direction of autonomous higher forms, essences, species and so on. In virtue of their transparency and certainty, these entitiers form a natural environment of an independent speculative spirit. After the bracketing of hyparchical position of the first substance accomplished by Porretans, the strong and firm intellect of *Modernorum*, under the leadership of Furies, started to play the main role. The academic and mystical *illuminati* recognize in the modus *per prius* their own mind and forms that exist beyond the real hylemorphic world. This gave rise to metaphysical paranoia of the West. The wise philosophers of the end of the 12th century and the first half of the 13th century had warned against it, unfortunately in vain.

Until the middle of the 13th century, the sense of being took place at the intersection of the first and the second Averroism. That new kind of *Ge-Stell* created a new theory of truth as certainty bound to the subject. Anselm introduced it for the first time in the term *rectitudo*. The modern intellect is sure and firm (*ratus*) thanks to its own actuality and certainty with which it directly contemplates universal forms. The metaphysical status *ens ratum* creates the fundamental terminus that reveals historiality of metaphysical Being (*Geschichtlichkeit des Seins*). This event of historicity characterizes in the modus *a/lētheia* the history of the philosophy of the Latin West. From the point of view of *Lichtung*, these two figures of the truth and untruth are bound to “*ens ratum*.” They reveal two epochal forms of the unconcealedness of being (*alētheia*) within the framework of this or that configuration of metaphysics. The truth is either given in the weak intellect (*intellectus debilis*) as Aristotelian correspondence between the thinking and the first substance. Or the modern demiurge produces the cognition *ex nihilo* in the strong intellect and the truth is given as modern assimilation of being of the third kind. The hermeneutic question of superiority refers to the concept of “*esse debile*.” It reveals blind superiority of the modern intellect or the critical prudence of the classical intellect. It outlines in the musical mode of *a/lētheia* the fundamental *Lichtung* that makes the coexistence of truth and untruth. The next matrix of objectivity shows how the conception of the weak intellect shaped by the existence of the first real substance became “debil” and unfashionable since the year 1230. The mythological intellect of *Modernorum* is fully hyparchical and fully productive, and therein lies its blind power of erroneous knowledge. The modern intellect does not need sensual reality, since it creates its simulacrum in the higher form of knowledge. He then finds the evident actual forms in retrospectively in the “weak” or “debilitating” reality, which is merely contingent, materially given, and recognized by the senses. This epochal manifestation of the sense of being (*Ereignis*) characterizes the unconcealment of being (*alētheia*) since the beginning of the 13th century. The modern worldview realized for the first time in the school of the Porretans became a historical *factum* of the West. The West’s paranoid view of the world explains why today’s world can be directed by those chaotic and nihilistic *illuminati*. Under the leadership of neoliberal Furies, they manipulate the half of the world through corrupted politicians, virtual bank debts and simulacra of financial derivatives. Theory of chaos became one of the fundamental tools of modern science since the works of I. L. Prigogine (†2003). The new form of digital colonization brought into being by totalitarian ideology of the West, signifies another phase of political nihilism and colonialism, which emerged after the Second World War and after the disintegration of colonial empire of great Western powers. Godfrey, in the quoted epigram from the *Fons philosophiae*, shows how the predecessors of modernists covered the world with their sophistical excesses produced as genera of the third kind (*sit tot generibus rerum mundus plenus*, ch. 1.6). The archaeology of objectivity exposing the error of contemporary metaphysics and nihilism must excavate this fossil of Western nihilism from the accumulation of postmodern *damnatio memoriae*. The present global nihilism must have come into being sometime and somehow, and this beginning exercises a hidden domination over everything that follows. Hermeneutic archaeology, inspired by the thought of Heidegger, must therefore determine the place of the original dwelling of objectivity in the years 1230–50. Following the pattern of the introductory methodological nuance given in the triad of historiality, historicity and historie, we must describe the event of the metaphysical *Lichtung* where objective *tertium ens* “exsists” in its original a*/lētheia*. Leaving this place, the objectivity went out of the historial hiddenness into the unconcealed historicity of effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). It was done in the framework of the Western history of nihilistic, philosophical, scientific, technical and finally digital-technocratic objectivity. Hermeneutic of thinking emerges in the mode of archaic archaeology as *factum* of objective history, which is given in the mode of objective *veritas* manipulated by objective knowledge of regional sciences. Both preceding matrices have shown the basic *res gestae* of new thinking until the beginning of the 13th century. The Falsafa and the early scholasticism founded the *Lichtung* of objectivity, whose archaic interplay of truth and untruth manifests understanding of being in the next epochs. The historical event of metaphysical truth as *a/lētheia* has its origins in the Falsafa. Its continuation in the Latin West produced two interpretations of Averroes in two schools (the Toledo and Sicilian school), which established two versions of metaphysics (the first and second Averroism). The corpus of Averroes came in two waves and this arrival strengthened both already existing Aristotelian schools (Blund’s school and school of *Modernorum*) in their interpretation of *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The eclipse of the first substance, rejected by Averroes, became an objective fact in the interpretation of modern medieval studies, with the honorable exception of some critical connoisseurs to which this study is greatly indebted. That is why the myth of objectively given Averroism was able to prevail for such a long time.

# 3. The School of Second Averroism (Matrix III)

The third matrix of objectivity describes emergence and development of the second Averroism after the year 1230 when it came to full unconcealment of objectivity. Again, it is necessary to find the trace of Apollonian semantics, which methodologically determines the reading of texts. The introduction to the second part defined the Latin term “*matrix”* according to the doctrine of Neoplatonists and Valentinian Gnostics. The effect of the commencement is given in *Geviert* of Pythagorean harmony, which has received objective and Gnostic character (*Bythos et Sige, Nus et Veritas prima quadriga*; OBJ II, introduction). Hermeneutics investigate the modern Gnosticism in the light of Apollonian semantics, following the archegetic dative (*dativus archegeticus*). To understand next matrices of objectivity, it is necessary to take up the repertoire of Heidegger’s thinking.[[279]](#footnote-279) The lecture called “*Bauen Wohnen Denken*” (1951) connects the truth as epochal unconcealment to the movement of *Geviert*. This hermeneutic concept describes the historial sense of Being. It represents the final phase of Heidegger’s concept of *Lichtung* as well.

“In saving the Earth, in receiving the Heaven, in awaiting the Divine, in guiding the Mortals, the act of Dwelling (*Wohnen*) occurs as fourfold conservation of *Geviert*.” [[280]](#footnote-280)

The objectivity came into being in the Latin West (*Wohnen*); it started the history of effects out of this place (*Bauen*); archaic hermeneutics have to investigate that objective thinking and worldview (*Denken*). Let us briefly describe four metaphysical concepts that form the analogy for establishing the phenomenology of scholastic *Geviert*. Gigantomachy of the substance involves four schools of thought, which founded different histories of reception concerning the philosophy of Avicenna and Averroes, and therefore they changed the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle.

The first pole of *Geviert* emerges around the year 1200 due to new interpretation of Aristotle’s writing *De anima* in the framework of revised Avicennism (Johannes Blund, *Tractatus de anima*). This school around 1225 accepts the philosophy of Averroes to solve specific questions and rejects the Avicennist interpretation according to the Toledo school (*in hoc erravit Avicenna … plus placet nobis sensus Aueneroist*, ch. 2.2.1). According to Gauthier, the first Averroism emerged in this environment. This school upheld the Aristotelianism founded by Abelard around 1110 in Sainte Geneviève Abbey. The key event was the polemic with the heretical Aristotelianism introduced by David of Dinant, which demonstrated the value of the exegesis of Aristotle in the Blund’s school for the Christian West. The University of Paris was founded as an expression of gratitude, since the Christian Aristotelianism of this school became a core value of then-educated West. The cathedral magisters schooled by Abelard founded the University of Paris and created the first authentically Aristotelian based unity of the person and personal cognition. Their first spokesman was William of Auvergne, Parisian bishop and Chancellor of the University. In the nihilistic era of postmodern thought, the University became extinct because it did not maintain the original unity of metaphysics and personal worldview. This unity had been bequeathed by founding *res gestae* of original Christian authorities such as Blund and Alvernus. Oxford University established the objective thinking of modernity as a historically efficient *factum*. As long as this aberration of Western rationality continues, this school has a metaphysical *raison d’être* to exist. After the year 1230, Blund’s school accepted the interpretation of the Commentator according to the Sicilian school. The role of the philosopher and bishop Alvernus is of key importance and contrasts with the problematic era of his modernist successor Tempier. Contemporary objective medievalism considers the chancellor Alvernus to be an Averroist. Hermeneutics, on the contrary, consider the academic founder of the University to be the best representative of the first Averroism of those days. The forward-looking chancellor of the Paris University saved the true Aristotle for the Latin West. Aristotle presented in the perspective of the Sicilian school became a philosophical protector of Christianity after the year 1230. Thanks to contribution of Commentator as *philosophus nobilissimus*, Alvernus affirmed the uniqueness of the human person vis-à-vis modern Neoplatonists. In his capacity of the bishop and the chancellor, he made possible the full reception of Averroes’s writing at the University of Paris. Without this wise bishop and philosopher from Blund’s school, the following school of the first Averroism and humanism would not have arisen (Albert, Bacon, Siger, Dante). Alvernus’s interpretation stood against the paradigm of the Toledo school, which was given in the Neoplatonic spirit of *sequaces Aristotelis*. The classically learned bishop saw errors of *Nominales* (*sophistae Italici, Grammatici*) and confusion of the first representatives of modernity, to which around 1240 belonged the Franciscan school publishing *Summa Halensis* and the Dominican Robert Kilwardby. Alvernus accuses these thinkers, called *sophistae Latini*, of several fundamental errors. First. They adopted the doctrine of Porretan nominalists from schools of *sophistae Italici* and *Grammatici* that destroyed the primacy of the first substance. Second. These sophists are not able to distinguish between Neoplatonic and authentic interpretation of Aristotle. They introduced into the interpretation of the Corpus problematic teaching of Arabic Neoplatonic philosophers and Avicennism handed down by the Toledo school. Thirdly, due to their sophistry, the central part of the Christian doctrine was destroyed, namely the unity of the person. Alvernus’s solemn declaration at the Paris University has a fundamental importance, taken the point of view of the unity of the person demolished by objective philosophical nihilism of the West and by corresponding concept of modern science. Bacon quoted this declaration against the representatives of the second Averroism. In the soul, the intellect exists only as an individual capacity of cognition, due to individual acts of intentionality and abstraction. The separated *intellectus agens* makes a component of the cosmic sphere, because it exists as an autonomous substance and subsistent immaterial form. This interpretation rejects the humanism of *sequaces Aristotelis* based on emanation theories of Neoplatonism and teaching of separated intellect according to Avicenna. Alvernus clearly defended the thesis of the first Averroism, that is, the exposure of cognition from the front, from the real thing mediated by the senses (*impossibile est intelligi sine fantasmate*). Therefore, he formed a theory of abstraction according to the first Averroism and. Alvernus took up Blund’s interpretation of *De anima* and his theory of *species intelligibilis*. He reintegrated it into newly arrived philosophy of CMDA according to Sicilian school that Michael Scotus explained in Paris. This interpretative achievement stands in fundamental contrast to the intellectual confusion of modernists in schools of second Averroism. They had the same opportunity to recognize philosophical truth, but instead of it, they chose a mythology based on ontotheological fabulations. The philosophical rehabilitation of the chancellor and bishop Alvernus is a matter of academic honor for the present generation. The same task should accomplish Oxford University in the case of Roger Bacon, whose key role in the establishment of the school of the first Averroism we will consider later on. The school of *Modernorum* endorsed by mendicant magisters, did not set out on a triumphant march against the magisters in the Rue du Fouarre until after the death of this outstanding scholar and prescient bishop, that is, after the year 1250. Alvernus is the key author of the Christian interpretation of Aristotle in the mode of CMDA according to the Sicilian school. Gilson and his contemporary followers attributed this interpretation to the semi-Averroist Aquinas, who unfortunately adhered to the pluralism of forms (but by no means of substances) taking the concept of the person according to the Toledo school. Alvernus’s and later Albert’s criticism was aimed at Avicennist scholars such as Rufus of Cornwall and Kilwardby. Rufus left Paris after unsuccessfully defended his modern interpretation of *De anima* presented in the work *Speculum animae* (c. 1245) and returned to Oxford. Bacon dates this fundamental confrontation over modernism to the year 1250 and explains why Rufus had to leave Paris (ch. 3.2). Thanks to the influence of bishop Alvernus, the school of the first Averroism dominated the Parisian University. It changed fundamentally after his death. The winner of the first contest between the first and the second Averroism was Albert the Great, who unfortunately left Paris for Cologne. After the departure of Bacon and Albert from the University of Paris, it came to eclipse of the first substance at their *alma mater* and the influence of modern objectivity started to grow. The eclipse of the first substance in metaphysics came after Blund's death, after the departure of the best representatives of first Averroism from Paris, and then after the death of bishop Alvernus. This concurrence of events gave rise to *via Modernorum* established by Bonaventure, Rufus and Kilwardby, who founded the school of second Averroism.

The second point of *Geviert* is established in the treatises dating back to the second half of the 12th century. They introduced a new concept of enlightenment around 1170, bringing together Avicennism (Gundissalinus, *Liber de anima*) and Augustinianism (*De spiritu et anima*). This line is clearly represented by the complete school of translators and thinkers in Toledo (John of Seville, Hermann of Carinthia, Adélard of Bath, Gérard of Cremona). A distant founder of this school is Isidore of Seville (†636), more precisely his philosophical-theological compilation called *Etymologiae*. Isidore was rightly declared the patron of computer science, because he was the first to introduce an alphabetical classification providing the first nominalistic version of *Arbor Porphyriana*. The school of the second Averroism further developed nominal and conceptual meaning of such etymology. This philosophical mysticism follows Platonic vision of reality in the dialogues *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus*. The philosophy of the Toledo school followed Islamic and Jewish mysticism. It passed in Neoplatonic schools of the Latin West that practiced the nominalism of Porretans in the framework of *Logica Modernorum*. The previous logical schools of *Modernorum* in Paris based on Platonic nominalism, they gradually became extinct after the advent of Blund’s school. They were replaced by schools of the second Averroism formed by Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. An extreme example of the first wave of modern Avicennists was David of Dinant, who created the pantheistic version of Aristotelianism. The Jewish thinker Baruch Spinoza (†1677) did the same in the postmodernism. After the reception of Avicenna in the second half of the 12th century, this school integrated into its system Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Metaphysics*, which appeared in the first partial translations into Latin at the end of the 12th century. Modernists used for interpretations of Aristotle Neoplatonic doctrine of two faces of the soul (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1), which formed Aristotelianism of modern Avicennists and Augustinians. The partisans of the second Averroism classified the Commentator’s writings in the paradigm of the Toledo school, that is, in full concordance with the prevailing Neoplatonism of Avicenna. These modernists modeled Aristotle’s teaching after Avicennist dualism of the lower and higher components of cognition. Aristotelian concept of phronesis was interpreted in such Neoplatonic way (Gauthier 1963). Therefore, they gave the key term of Aristotle’s corpus a dualistic character (*Summa Duacensis*, anonymous commentaries on *Ethics* about 1240). The cited *Summa Duacensis* (1230) proves what a confusion caused Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* in the camp of thinkers around Philip the Chancellor influenced by Avicenna and nominalist thinking. The definition of the receptive intellect in the paradigm of Toletan interpretation of the CMDA represented the basic *crux interpretatorum*. Modern Neoplatonists integrated the *intellectus possibilis* into their system according to falsely intepretered CMDA. They defined it as a cosmic separated immaterial substance in order to keep up with the pantheist model made by David of Dinant. This philosophical confusion was considered a modern form of Aristotelianism because it combined the two main Arabic commentators into one form of paranoid metaphysics. The schools of *Nominales* received that kind of Aristotelianism given *ad mentem Averrois* through the revised Avicennism. In the years 1230–40, Gilson’s notion *augustinisme avicennisant* summed up the context of that school. Modern reception of Averroes in Avicennist paradigm can be attested in the works of Philip the Chancellor (*Summa de bono*) and Jean de La Rochelle (*Summa de anima*). The role of Jean de La Rochelle (†1245) is very important for the early history of objectivity. He protected by his authority the Franciscan school of the first modernists grouped around the publication of *Summa Halensis*. The Oxford bachelor Rufus of Cornwall lectured in this hotbed of Parisian modernism, and Bonaventura started his studies in this school. The crisis of modernists in Paris erupted after the year 1245. The new Franciscan *magister regens* Odo Rigaldus probably refused to protect those modernists. Rufus was unable to defend his interpretation of *De anima* against Albert the Great as the new *magister regens* of Parisian artists. He had to leave Paris afterwards, which was the decision of Franciscans and not the Parisian masters at the university. The school of Augustinian Avicennism introduced the categorical predication of universals and the first dualism of the soul and body as two separate substances. This group, active in Paris, creates the new school of *Modernorum* and bishop Alvernus named it *sophistae Latini*. The situation at the University of Paris in the years 1230–40 can be characterized by the second reception of Averroes, in the mix of the Sicilian and the Toledo school. The universal hylemorphism rejected by the first Averroism in Paris is connected with Rufus’s academic career. After his defeat in Paris, this first modern objectivist moved to Oxford dominated by Oxfordian Fallacy and universal hylemorphism. The chancellor and archbishop Kilwardby and after him, John Pecham, defended those modernists. In Oxford, Rufus survives in peace the short era of the first Averroism of the Sicilian school in Paris, which lasted less than ten years. The new round of gigantomachy started at the University of Paris after the year 1250, when the Sicilian school lost its important ecclesiastical and academic protector. After the death of bishop Alvernus, Rufus returned at modernist school of Bonaventure in Paris as *spiritus agens* by promoting new ideas. After his return to Bonaventura’s school, a new story of objectivity begins in the mode of full *veritas*. After the death of bishop Alvernus, modernists opened the new school by official attack on Averroes as a pagan heretic. At the Oxford University, dominated by Oxfordian Fallacy, there was but a changing of guards of the second Averroism when the modernists obtained the complete victory. Grosseteste went as bishop to Lincoln and in the years 1245–50 Franciscan Rufus and Dominican Kilwardby changed from Paris to Oxford.

The third and the fourth pole of *Geviert* that concerns the controversy that follows the development of metaphysics in the Latin West after the year 1250. The third pole of *Geviert* came about in Oxford, on the one hand, and in Paris, on the other. The group of thinkers around John Pagus, inspired by declining schools of *Logica Modernorum*, presented in Oxford around 1230 Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle’s logical writing, mainly of *Categories*, which complemented the interpretation of *Second Analytics* that Grosseteste published in the same year. The analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* took up Anselm’s concept of truth as *rectitudo* and Avicenna’s *certitudo*. That modernization of Aristotelian Corpus produced the decisive event of modern thinking that we explore under the term “Oxfordian Fallacy.” The modernists, influenced by Augustine’s Neoplatonism and by Avicenna prospered well under Grosseteste at Oxford that was *magister regens* of the Franciscans here from the year 1230. Meanwhile, he strongly rejected the polemical outbursts of modernists against Aristotle. These Franciscan and Dominican students formed the group of modern *illuminati* that came from Oxford to Paris in 1235–40 to accomplish master’s studies. Unlike Grosseteste, those young Oxford modernists accepted the doctrine of universal hylemorphism before 1240 and exported it to Paris. Moreover, Rufus of Cornwall and Robert Kilwardby imported the analytic interpretation of *Organon* given in Oxford in the circles of Porretan and Nominalists schools. In Paris, this school of logical analysts existed as well. Let us see the interpretation of *Categories* according to logical schools of *Nominales* such as Nicolaus of Paris (Nicolaus Parisiensis, ch. 3.1.2). Meanwhile, the development of the analytical school called *Grammatici* slowed down due to criticism of bishop and chancellor Alvernus that followed the line of Abelard’s school and its defense of Boethius’s metaphysics. The schools of *Logica Vetus* defended this classical metaphysics as well. Another factor that slowed down the arrival of modernism at the Paris University was the arrival of the Sicilian interpretation of Averroes presented by Michael Scotus since 1230. The logical and univocal concept of being dated back to already dissolved schools of *Nominales*. It made possible the first systematized insight into hypostatized version of *tertium ens*. This first wave of effective modernity goes to already mentioned Franciscan community around Alexander of Hales, which was supplemented by academic *illuminati* from Oxford such as Rufus and Kilwardby. Around the year 1245, the Oxford modernists did not lead easy life in Paris and were the target of academic criticism. After defending the universal hylemorphism brought from Oxford, this criticism turned into direct scorn of eminent philosophers as Albert and Bacon. The main support of these modernists in their rough and dark times (1240–50) were the logical and nominalist schools in Paris. However, they died out due to influence of Blund’s Aristotelian school. Its conclusion confirmed the second arrival of Averroes’s corpus interpreted according to the Sicilian school. The attack on Averroes as the most honored philosopher was a suicidal enterprise in Paris around the year 1240–50, thanks to magnificent interpretations of Alvernus, Albert and Bacon. This trio of brilliant interpreters separated Aristotle from the Neoplatonic interpretation and rejected Rufus’s work *Contra Averroem* (ca. 1236) that presented modern criticism of the Commentator. After Aristotle’s rehabilitation (1231), the Commentator as a brilliant interpreter of Aristotelian corpus became the new target of the first modernists. The first Averroism of the Sicilian school created the kind of Aristotelianism compatible with Christianity. The same task accomplished Averroes and Al-Ghazālī in the Falsafa one century before. Toletan interpretation of Averroes underwent an interesting development during this period. The modernists at Oxford influenced by Oxfordian Fallacy merged with the Augustinian and Avicennist compilers of the *Summa Halensis* in Paris. The school of the second Averroism was formed in 1235–40 by fusion of two branches of *Modernorum*: the Oxford Porretans and the Parisian Avicennists. The group of editors *Summa Halensis* led by Rupella and the Avicennists around Philip the Chancellor founded a new school of thinking. The bishop Alvernus noticed it well and named this group *sophistae Latini*. After him, Albert chose the mocking title *Latini* or *doctores Latini*, which mainly concerned his Dominican colleague Kilwardby. Bacon at Oxford was equally critical of the first modernist, Rufus of Cornwall. After Bacon’s expulsion from Oxford to Paris, Bonaventure becomes his new target as *spiritus agens* of the school of the second Averroism. Oxford Porretans, who professed the analytical paradigm of Oxfordian Fallacy, merged with the school of Porretan logicians and Avicennists around Philip the Chancellor (*Grammatici*) and with the Franciscan school of Alexander of Hales (*sophistae Latini*). They created the complete third pole of *Geviert* in which the concept of Western objectivity was formed. The main sign of the new school became the exposure of being from behind and the plurality of substances in man. Albert names this group after the year 1250 with the ironic title *Averroistae*, because these modernists adhered to the Toletan interpretation of the DMCA that presented Rufus in writing *Contra Averroem*. The synthesis of the Parisian and Oxford branches of the second Averroism creates a new concept of *tertium ens* in 1240–50 that established modern objectivity (Rufus’s *Speculum animae*, Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientarum*, the anonymous *Summa philosophiae*). According to Bacon, the school of the second Averroism was born in Paris, where the Oxford baccalaureates did their master’s studies. These Latin sophists, meanwhile, were unable to study at the Artistic faculty in the Rue du Fouarre, dominated by connoisseurs of Aristotle from the first Averroism, until Alvernus’ death (ch. 3.2.3). During Alvernus’s pontificate, the modernists withdrew from this faculty to their religious schools, as evidenced in dispute of academic mendicants with secular magisters such as Aristotelian and rector Guillelmus de Sancto Amore in the Rue du Fouarre. The followers of the second Averroism, as the Dominican Kilwardby in Oxford or the Franciscan Bonaventura in Paris, had to go over to the counterattack against the so-called Averroists from the school of the first Averroism. The academic positions and ecclesiastical offices of all representatives of the second Averroism were threatened with accusations of heresy, at least until the death of bishop Alvernus. The Franciscan Bonaventure begins a triumphal march of modernism after the year 1250 with an attack on Averroes as a heretical philosopher. The decisive struggle between the school of the first and the second Averroism took place after the emergence of the first faculty of modernists at the University of Paris in the years 1255–77. Franciscans led by Parisian Bonaventure and by Oxford modernist Rufus had to conquer the most important university of the West. After depart of Alvernus, it ended the brief but important reign of the critical philosophy connected to the episcopal authority in Paris. The death of this Aristotelian chancellor joined the departure of philosophers such as Bacon and Albert that endorsed the school of the first Averroism of Sicilian provenance. It changed the balance of power and made possible the academic and authoritarian arrival of modernist’s schools. The academic start of *via Modernorum* can be dated to the papal bull *Quasi lignum vitae* (1255) that confirmed the creation of two chairs run by mendicant orders at the Parisian University. The new faculty of the first modern philosophy had to cope with established interpretation of Averroes’s corpus in the Sicilian and Toledo school. A remake of Averroès according to Avicennian aristotelianism has been done to join the newly promulgated teaching of Oxfordian Fallacy at the University of Paris. Modernists made scorn of Averroes and, in part, of Aristotle as well. Their hybris gave rise to the first modern Aristotelianism based on analytical interpretation of the *Second Analytics*. In the year 1254, the academic mendicants refused to swear to the statutes of the papal university. Rector Guillelmus de Sancto Amore presented that case of academic disobedience in Rome. Pope Innocent IV gave justice in the dispute to the secular magisters in the bull *Etsi animarum* issued at the end of the year 1254. But ten days after the death of Innocent IV, a new bull called *Quasi lignum vitae* (1255) was issued by Pope Alexander IV, which confirmed the position of mendicant magisters. This academic patron of mendicants became the father of modernity because of his authoritarian interventions in the course of the Parisian University (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The Babylonian captivity of modernists lasted until 1255, when mendicant orders established their own chair at the University of Paris. This year, the academic controversy between mendicants and secular masters culminated. The school of the first Averroism lost it for the first time due to the forced departure of the prominent artists from the Rue du Fouarre. Major victims of modernists were the rector from the Rue du Fouarre, magister Guillelmus de Sancto Amore and others of his colleagues. The second and much more thorough cleansing at the Faculty of Philosophy instigated by modernists followed in April 1277, when secular artistic masters from the school of second Averroism, such as Henry of Ghent, sided with the mendicants. Bonaventura’s project of the transformed Avicennian metaphysics is completed by his religious colleague Duns Scotus, who teaches first at Oxford and then in Paris around 1300. This modern *intelligentia spiritualis*, which originated in Oxford, by no means established the triumphal age of the Holy Spirit according to Joachim of Fiore, but the objective nihilism of the West.

The fourth pole of the district is formed by the reformed school of the first Averroism in the Rue du Fouarre, to which Dante Alighieri in the *Divine Comedy* attributed an immortal fame in heaven. This last and most important group for hermeneutics builds on the interpretation of *De anima* by John Blund and again reads Aristotelian writing *De anima*. According to Averroes’s first Aristotelian reception (*De anima et de potenciis eius*), it put the Commentator’s metaphysics against teaching of Porretans and Toletans. In the spirit of the Sicilian school and following Alvernus’s work *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, accomplished the criticism of modernists. The school of Siger of Brabant (called *pars Sigeri*) completed Albert’s defense of the unity of the person proposed in *De homine*. The school of the first Averroism defends against the Toletans correct interpretation of *intellectus possibilis* and intentionality according to CMDA. The first Averroism of bishop Alvernus defended the Commentator’s teaching regarding *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* in the context of the real person as one substance (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*). Gauthier named this school of Aristotelians with the term “first Averroism” because, despite the repeated church prohibitions, they studied the then-known part of *Corpus Aristotelicum* absolutely carefully. These thinkers, scattered from Toledo to Oxford, Paris and Bologna to Sicily, understood the fundamental importance of Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* for personal cognition. It was the first *respublica* of philosophers, which created the common destiny of the West in the Falsafa and in the Christianity. For the development of this school in Judaism, a study on independent Aristotelianism in the form of the Sicilian school has so far been missing. Anyway, the influence of the second Averroism in Jewish circles was overhelming. The documents of the influence of the Toledo school on the influence of speculative Judaism can be found in a great variety throughout the entire 13th century. Dante also knew it through Jewish mystics and philosophers as Maimonides, Abulafia and others. The founders of the second Averroism worked with an incoherent concept of separated intellect according to the Toledo school. This concept was defended by theologians of *Summa Duacensis* in the school of Philip the Chancellor about the year 1230. The school of the first Averroism introduces Averroes as an authentic Commentator of Aristotle against Avicennists and Nominalists of the time and they made use of his metaphysics for Christian theology. Parisian bishop Alvernus as chancellor of the University rejects the being of the third kind defended by the second Averroism. The chancellor and archbishop condemned the theory of the separated cosmic intellect. Modernism established the cognition of the world by exposition of being made from behind and destroyed substantial unity of the person. The first Averroism brought to the West the concept of person and a theory of truth as a correspondence between thing and intellect based on Averroes’s terms *proportio, dispositio* or *consimilitudo* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Thanks to Averroes’s metaphysics, Alvernus and other thinkers distinguish the Neoplatonic from Aristotelian interpretations of the Corpus. They established the age of classical Aristotelian scholasticism. Finally, during his stay in Paris, Albert the Great presented the first systematic conception of individual cognition and intellect for this group in his work *De homine*. At Oxford, the Franciscan Roger Bacon performs the same critical work. He studied and lectured in Paris in the years 1237–45, also at the time of bishop Alvernus in Paris. His work focuses on the interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphysics in relation to the school of second Averroism (*Metaphysica*, 1240–47). The work of Albert and Bacon concludes the first round of Averroes’s positive reception in the Latin West. Later, Thomas Aquinas joined them, albeit quite problematically. He completed the novitiate (1245–48), made the first stay in Paris as a student and later as *regens master* during his second stay (1269–72). The second round of the reception of Averroes opens in the following matrix the dispute about Averroism, in which the representatives of the second wave of both schools were engaged. The second Averroism is defended by the sophistic school constituted by Bonaventura in Paris after 1250, and by Kilwardby’s students at Oxford. Albert the Great and partly Thomas Aquinas defended the doctrine of the first Averroism. Aquinas was summoned to Paris at the end of the year 1269. At this time, the artistic master and rector Siger of Brabant brilliantly presented the first Averroism and he made the intellectual peak of this school. Dante’s words of glory for Siger in the *Divine Comedy* prove that this thinker had understood the Commentator most brilliantly of all previous Western tradition. The secular priest, who taught at the famous address of Rue du Fouarre, shared the fate of Averroes, who was ostracized by the Islamic and Christian modernists. Siger’s tragedy recalls the Aristotelian greatness of Abelard that was the predecessor of the first Averroism (ch. 1.3). Siger ended as badly as his predecessor, Rector Guillelmus de Sancto Amore that was expelled from the Artistic faculty after the disputes with the mendicants in 1255. The intellectual confusion of modernists did not represent the majority opinion of educated Parisian artists such as Siger from Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. This was demonstrated by the artistic decree on twofold method of philosophy and theology of 1 April 1272. It was published by the school of the first Averroism according to the Sicilian interpretation of the Commentator. It partly concerned the semi-Averroists from the Toledo school of the first Averroism, such as Thomas Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus. They were lecturing as masters in Paris at that time (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). Around 1270, Johannes Pecham was dismissed from the school of second Averroism in Paris because, like Rufus, he did not stand up to the criticism of the secular artists from the Rue du Fouarre and Aquinas. His critic Aquin left Paris as well when the Decree of the Artists was issued in 1272. Aquinas attacked the modernist school of Pecham at the same time as he made criticism of the masters in Rue du Fouarre. They did not accept Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle, because his semi-Averroistic interpretation of *De anima* did not give a fundamental answer to Siger’s repeated objections. Finally, some of the modernist masters from the Rue du Fouarre, such as Henry of Ghent, took a stand against the group of Siger supporters (*pars Sigeri*). The development after the year 1272 went inexorably in the direction of the condemnation of the group of the first Averroism at the Artistic faculties in Paris and Oxford in April 1277. Modern *illuminati*, under the influence of truth as a subjective certainty and correctness, used other means for the implementation of their sophistry than philosophical debate. Echoing the intellectual apostasy of modernists, Albert refused to attend the University of Paris at the time of the most serious dispute with the second Averroism around the year 1270. He should have answered well-founded criticism of Siger von Brabant, the best Aristotelian of the time and the greatest connoisseur of CMDA at all. Certainly, in the spirit of correct interpretation of CMDA according to the Sicilian school, he should have rejected Thomas’s semi-Averroistic interpretation of the intellect, which had been made according to Avicennism of the Toledo school. Albert did not consider Averroes to be Averroist, which, on the contrary, Aquin clearly asserted from the beginning of his university career to the end. What would have happened if famous academicians as Albert and Bacon in the fateful period 1270–77 had brought the cracked philosophy of Latin sophists around Bonaventura and Aristotelian semi-Averroists (Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius Romanus) back to the full truth at their alma mater in Paris? The intellectual history of the West would probably have developed quite differently ever since.

Modern Gnosticism in the West defeated true Aristotelianism. The objectivity emerged in the schools that made epochal victory of gigantomachy concerning the objective substance. Their truth refers to a collection of mythological being of the third kind, became the norm of the thinking of the West in the mode of ancient gnostic couple “*Nus et Veritas*.” Scholastic modernity, by means of the defensive mechanism known as *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil* supplanted all other Aristotelian schools and led them into gnostic darkness and silence (*Bythos et Sige*). However, it is the place of archaic hermeneutics and Apollonian historicity as well. The victory of logicians and academic *illuminati* cannot be other than totalitarian. Under the leadership of logical Furies, they apply Aristotle’s Law of the Excluded Third to the history of thinking. Both historical and apocalyptic *facta* (see the original meaning of the words ἀποκαλύπτω and *facere*) reveal a twofold defeat of Aristotle’s metaphysics and arise from hidden historicity founded in gigantomachy by commentators in the Falsafa and in the Latin West. Both branches of Western thought fought a similar duel of thinking, in order to recognize truly the world in the framework of Platonism or Aristotelianism. The similarity of confrontations in the Latin West between philosophers and theologians is connected with the development after the decline of Falsafa and the transition of Islam to a theological interpretation within the framework of the *Ilm al-Kalām* or *Mutakalim* schools. The work of Al-Ghazālī brings about the most important philosophical guide concerning the modernist battle of Islamic theology and law. This critical Muslim theologian rejected Neoplatonic Aristotelianism and his criticism created the transition between the Falsafa and the thinking of the *Mutakalim* school. Philosophy had exactly the opposite effect in the West than in the Islam. Neoplatonists and modernists in the Islam lost to victorious theologians. They opted for legal and fundamental understanding that practically abolished the philosophical thinking of the Falsafa. Therefore, modern God did not die in the Islamic West in the process of secularization, because this simulacrum could not arise in Islam at all. In the Latin West, the philosophical modernists prevailed through the theologians with the help of the theory of one truth based on the system of Neoplatonic ontotheology. After the destruction of the first Averroism, this school created the very powerful and later moribund God of *Modernorum*. This simulacrum ended its service in the era of Nietzsche, when, in his opinion, that God definitely choked himself by modern theology (*Gott erstickte an der Theologie; und die Moral an der Moralität*; *Nachlaß* 3.7; KSA 10, 54). Hermeneutics added to this saying that it was God of *Modernorum* and he suffocated himself by objective metaphysics. Nietzsche saw it exactly and described poetically, under the guidance of divine Muses.[[281]](#footnote-281) The offensive of Latin sophists authoritatively dominated the Artistic faculty in the Rue du Fouarre. From there, sometime after the year 1240, they were expelled by the statement of the chancellor and bishop Alvernus about the incompatibility of Neoplatonic teachings on *intellectus agens* with the Christian conception of the person according to Sicilian interpretation of CMDA. The school of the second Averroism returned victoriously to the seat of philosophical wisdom under the aegis of ecclesiastical law and order. The order was given by the condemnation of anti-modernists from the first Averroism both in Paris and in Oxford in April 1277.

The history of modernism shows the figure of double *Irrtum* that concerns the metaphysics of the West. The Islamic form of historical error is characterized by the defeat of the Falsafa, because the critical theologians as Al-Ghazālī have won. His dispute with Avicenna ended victoriously by Islamic jurists and caliphs that defended cultural traditions of various Arab and Persian cultures linked together by monotheistic faith. The second form of historical error in the Latin West is characterized by victory of philosophy in the version of Latin sophists. They seized the University of Paris and the University of Oxford as a source of power and defeated Averroes’s philosophy at the university. Let us recall that, unlike modernist Oxford, the defense of unity of the person according to Averroes was the founding element of the Paris University. The tragic fate of Western thought is revealed in Averroes’s critical philosophy that was rejected by theological Islamists and Christian modernists. The truth of philosophy represented by Averroes becomes an official untruth, rejected by Islamic and Christian theologians, both in the school *Mutakalim* and in the second Averroism. That is why this ingenious scholar and interpreter of Aristotle is affected by twofold form of *damnatio memoriae*. After Ibn Rushd’s death, the dogmatic rejection of authentic Aristotelian philosophy, its conception of truth and cognition, founded both tragic versions of *via Modernorum* of today’s West: the theological fundamentalism of Islam and the objectivist fundamentalism of modernity. Each of two directions of speculative thinking sees history through its own epochal error, presented dogmatically. Islam and Christianity make the speculative thinking of both schools. This is given by this or that development of metaphysical nihilism or legal fundamentalism. Made in the mode of unconscious collective mechanism of inversion into the opposite, the twofold dogmatic thinking of the West projects its perfect, i.e., historically completed *alter ego*, into the diabolical others (see the original meaning of διαβάλλω). It is no wonder that both directions of theological and philosophical dogmatic have been incompatible since the Crusades to this day. An honorable exception of both schools of thought makes the truth of critical sages and poets. Thanks to the favor of Muses, they see the musical truth, which is obvious to all who have the ability to keep the real and just worldview.

## 3.1 Analytical Interpretation of *Second Analytics* (Robert Grosseteste)

The first Latin interpreters, who followed the interpretation of Averroes according to the Sicilian school, understood the writing *De anima* in an innovative way. The treatise *De potenciis animae et obiectis* criticized Neoplatonist theory of cognition and rejected the concept of separated *intellectus agens* (ch. 2.2.2). The Blund’s school and its eminent spokesmen, the Parisian bishop Alvernus and Albert the Great, created around the year 1240 an integral philosophical personalism separated from Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle according to the Toledo school. This second group of Averroes’s interpreters did not seek a difference between the metaphysics of Avicenna and Averroes as the first Averroism, but on the contrary a fundamental agreement. Influenced by Neoplatonism and Augustinianism, the second Averroism followed Alfarabi’s project of unified metaphysics in the style of Avicenna, which had been handed down in the Latin West from the Toledo translation of Alfarabi’s writing *De intellectu* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The translation of Toletans shifted the paradigm to Neoplatonism. The Latin West performed unification of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism by connecting Avicenna and Averroes. The Toletans first read the writings of the Second master in the paradigm of Avicenna’s metaphysics and then they did the same with the corpus of the Commentator. Following harmonization of Plato and Aristotle already given in the Falsafa, Latin scholars created from the philosophy of Avicenna and Averroes an original Aristotelian synthesis *ad mentem Averrois* in the mode of the Toledo school. The sophistical unification of Avicenna and Aristotle in the Latin West echoed Al-Kindīs Neoplatonic school in the Falsafa, which similarly unified Aristotle and Plato through the teaching of the Second master. The price of this unification was the abolition of diaphanum and destruction of original function of *intellectus in potentia*. The synthesis of Avicenna and Averroes was inspired by Augustinian Neoplatonism and created a problematic concordance of both thinkers in the years 1235–40 that founded *via Modernorum*. After the reception of Averroes, Blund’s school understood very early that the philosophical starting points of both metaphysics were diametrically different. In a similar way, ancient Neoplatonism differed from authentic Aristotelianism. Introductory part investigated Porphyry’s separation from Neoplatonists based on different interpretations of *Categories*. The first Averroism created an integrated project of metaphysics, since Albert united both versions of metaphysics under the primacy of the Commentator (ch. 2.4.3). Avicennist doctrine of being as *ens inquantum ens* was considered logical abstraction that was subordinated to metaphysical doctrine of “substance *qua* substance.” Latin commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima* from the school of the second Averroism is found in the Erfurt manuscript (Quarto 312) dated around 1240. Its author is Rufus of Cornwall (Wood 2001, 121). Avicennian reception *De anima* in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy occurred at the same time, as evidenced by Rufus’s academic controversies at Paris University in the years 1240–50. But Aristotle’s logical and scientific writings had already been commented on a generation earlier in the paradigm of modernists. In addition to twofold interpretation *De anima* according to the Sicilian or the Toledo school, logical writing *Analytica posteriora* play a very important role. Jacob of Venice (Iacobus Veneticus Grecus) made the first Latin translation of *Second Analytics* in the first half of the 12th century. His opus was followed by translations of two anonymous authors (*Aristoteles Latinus* IV.1–4) in the second half of the 12th century. The generation of young scholars in Paris and Oxford read *Second Analytics* through Averroes’s commentary. The twofold reception of Averroes explains the fact that a twofold reading of *Second Analytics* presented *ad mentem Averrois* emerged in the Latin West. The interpretation of *Second Analytics* in the first Averroism of the Sicilian school can be found in Albert’s writing *De homine* (ch. 2.4.1). His criticism of sophistical modernists defended Aristotelian definition of scientific proof. About the year 1240, it emerged a fundamental and irreconcilable difference between the metaphysics of modernists and classical Aristotelians at the University of Paris. The work *De homine* took the position of Christian humanism and Albert refused errors of modernists. The reason for new gigantomachy of the substance between the first and the second Averroism was the different interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Modernist version came into being about the year 1230 in Oxford and this interpretation followed Avicenna’s metaphysics. It was obvious to Aristotelians from Blund’s school, since at the same time Scotus’s interpretation of Averroes came to Paris according to the Sicilian school. The dispute over the nature of science concerned philosophical determination of man; let us see the quoted exegesis of twofold recognition of the soul in the introductory part of *De homine*.

The generation of philosophers at Oxford in the years 1230–40 absolutized the essence taken *univoce* and took it for the first substance. Logical essence done in the *simpliciter* mode entered categorical predication in the form of imposition instead of the first hyparchical substance. The *illuminati* at Oxford took the essence as an *individuum* of *Nominales*, in the manner of atomic substance made by schools of Porretans. The individualized essence was declared the real acting cause by identifying it with the middle member (*medium*) in scientific proof. The second statement of deductive syllogism has become quite sophistic and mythological. This transition from real causality to modern science profoundly changed the nature of deduction that forms the basis of scientific proof (*demonstratio*). The mythological *medium* based on the substance of the third kind separated modern science from the first substance and from real causality. Neoplatonism started this transformation by introducing the indivisible substance as hypostatized *species* in Simplicius (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1) and later in the framework of Porretan *individuum* (ch. 1.4). The first modernists created an objective simulacrum in the form of essence acting as a real cause. This being of the third type changed the status of scientific cognition. The second part of syllogism as *medium* of scientific proof got meaning of the unique real thing. The logical essence replaced the imposition of meaning from the first substance and its real causality. At the same time, this medium in the second statement of deductive syllogism is universal, because it is stated in the mode *simpliciter* as an essence. Therefore, it matches formal definition of the middle member of the syllogism that must be universal. That was the approach of the school of Grammarians in Paris. Alvernus rejected that philosophical error attributed to the school of Latin sophists (*praedicabant dispositiones, ponebantque eas in substantiis de quibus dicebatur*, ch. 2.3.2). The middle member of deductive scientific syllogism acquired an ambivalent status as substance of the third kind. In the modernist school, it came to drastic formalization of Aristotle’s original statement: “To know real being of the thing is the same as to know the efficient cause of its existence(τὸ τί ἐστιν εἰδέναι ταὐτό ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν, *Anal. post*. 90a31‒32). Aristotle defined the existence of the real thing (διὰ τί) by efficiently acting causality between the first substances in the mode of physical or biological *passio*. The real activity of first substances was transferred in Porretan schools of logic to the permanent essence determined as hypostatized and eternal form. Then the corpse became an “existing” human being in the order of objective causality. The determination of man was univocally related to the essence (*humanitas*) as well as to the first real substance (*hic homo*). This error of modernity, both anonymous treatises of Blund’s school commented it above. It founded the main controversy during the first reception of Averroes’s metaphysics in the years 1225–30. The dispute about the status of “dead man walking” runs either in the mode of the imposition of Aristotelians or in the mode of absolute supposition of Porretans. It concerned the way of scientific cognition of the world, and not only the categorial predication. The concept of being did not keep the same value in one school or in the other because the metaphysical sense of being had changed. Metaphysical status of the first substance differed according to the school of first and second Averroism. Christian Aristoteliciens as Alvernus defended Averroes’s metaphysics and thus the authentic approach to the interpretation of scientific cognition according to *Second Analytics*. The first Averroism, which received the metaphysics *ad mentem Averrois* in the mode of “substance *qua* substance,” had no problem with the defense of hyparchical first substance. Following the metaphysical dative, categorial meaning is determined in the mode *per prius* by the imposition from the first actual substance. The metaphysician first recognizes the real things and afterwards defines their universal essences. Since no dead man exists as a living being, it is not possible to define the essence in the mode *absolute* according to the pattern of Neoplatonists. It cannot be interpreted as metaphysical substance separately from the first existing substance. The logician can do it in the framework of univocally conceived abstraction, but not at all the metaphysician, since his cognition follows the first existing substances. Categorical predication relates to real causal effects in the world. The corpse cannot establish anything specifically human in the world; only an existent person can do it. The dispute “man—corpse” proved that neither school recognizes the world in the same way and therefore cannot have the same version of scientific proof. After the conflicting analysis of the CMDA of first and second Averroism in the years 1225–30, another major conflict broke out in Blund’s school and in Philip the Chancellor’s school. It concerned the nature of science, which Albert resolved in favor of first Averroism in the introduction to *De homine* (ch. 2.4.1). The interpretation of the *Second Analytics* separated both schools from each other because of the different statute of the first substance.

The analytic reading of *Second Analytics* started by introducing Neoplatonic terms into classical metaphysics. We call this problematic approach by the term “Oxfordian Fallacy.” The University of Oxford did not arise from the transformation of a cathedral school into an academic Christian institution protected by papal authority, which gradually integrated other local important cathedral and episcopal schools. Oxford, unlike Paris, grew out of an independent college of students led by the magister (*magister scolarum Oxonie*, 1201). The first known magister was Edmund of Abingson (Giraldus Cambrensis). He completed magisterial studies in Paris and began lecturing about the year 1214 in Oxford with the right to be remunerated by students (*cathedram magistralem ascendit*). The document dated to 1221 mentioned the Chancellor of University for the first time. The first Oxford interpretation of Aristotle’s scientific and metaphysical writings acquired many Neoplatonic traits in the mode of Avicennism according to the Toledo school.[[282]](#footnote-282) The Oxfordian school of the second Averroism is the godfather of objectivity. It completed the eclipse of the first substance by introducing the sophistical interpretation of the scientific proof. Albert the Great fought against this pseudo-Aristotelian interpretation during his stay at the University of Paris. Throughout all his life, Bacon was engaged in this struggle, both at Oxford and in Paris. Because of this, unlike the bishop Albert of Cologne, he ended up under house arrest as an academic dissident. In the version of Oxford philosophers, the epochal *Lichtung* of modernity emerged when the first substance became a mere accident of scientific cognition. This school formed the third pole in the above-mentioned *Geviert* of historicity (ch. 3). The analysis of the anonymous writing *Summa theologiae* shows the formation of this pole in two phases (ch. 3.1.3). Oxford’s *illuminati* during their studies in Paris after 1235 joined the Parisian school of modernists who edited *Summa Halensis* and created a new metaphysics (ch. 3.2). In the second round, this group began to integrate with the Thomism in Paris and at Oxford. The key event was Aquinas’s commentary on the second book of *Sentences* about 1257 that presented a modernization of Avicennism (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). Aegidius Romanus played the key role in the emergence of modern Thomism in Oxford and Paris. He became the first Thomist in the mode of *sophistae Latini*.

Archaeology of objectivity investigates *Irrtum* of contemporary metaphysics and nihilism. This fossil of objectivity muste be released from deposits of modern and collective defense mechanisms such as “inversion into the opposite.” The school of *Modernorum* projected its own errors into the doctrine of its philosophical opponents and turned them into so-called Averroists. The collective loss of philosophical and academic memory is still present today in Porretan thinking of modernity and postmodernity due to blindness concerning the first substance. Heidegger’s epochal *Irre* runs through three different ways, in the framework of the triadic structure of understanding. The blindness concerning the historiality of Being (*a/lētheia*) reveals the historicity of being in the metaphysical truth (*alētheia*). New course of the history of scholasticism in Oxford and Paris brought about the objective truth (*veritas*) of *tertium ens* based on the Oxfordian Fallacy. The struggle of the school of the first and the second Averroism reveals the dispute about the so-called twofold truth. We must interpret it anew. Hegelian and positivist interpretations of the Middle Ages make use of schemes of the objective being. The hermeneutic triad of historicity, history and historicity has no influence in that kind of philosophy. Objectivists do not see the truth in the mode of *a/lētheia*, because the *Lichtung* of this truth does not exist objectively. Just as for the first modernists, there was no diaphanum. Therefore, there was no *intellectus possibilis* of Aristotle, Alfarabius and Averroes that could exist in accordance with CMDA. Commentator’s criticism of Avicenna’s metaphysical “obscurity” has shown that there is no concordance between those two most important thinkers of the West on the question of first philosophy. According to the CMDA, the school of first Averroism has been commenting on *De anima* since 1225–30 in both anonymous writings interpreted above. Before that, the Blund’s school had already accomplished the authentic Aristotelian interpretation *De anima*. Gigantomachy between the first and the second Averroism concerned the reception of the writings of Aristotle either in Avicenna’s or in Averroes’s way. The Latin scholasticism takes over the dispute between Averroes and Avicenna and modifies it in an original way in the direction of the objective worldview.

The school of *Nominales*, under the leadership of Gilbert de La Porrée, univocally connected the essence with the existence. Porretans created *ex nihilo* the first substance as being of the third kind. A further transformation of this *tertium ens* took place in the first half of the 13th century in the group of thinkers of the second Averroism from the Toledo school. They announced the doctrines called “*opinio Latinorum*” that Albert refused. The interpretation of the first matrix in 1225–40 was devoted to the emergence of objectivity in various kinds of interpretations that concerned the writing CMDA. The basic metaphysical attitudes of *doctorum Latinorum* from the years 1250–55 are identical to the group of *sophistae Latini* rejected by bishop Alvernus in the years 1240–45. The first Averroism rejected the metaphysical concept of the world worked out by those modernists. The opponents upheld the tradition of Aristotelian cathedral schools, which were engaged against the Neoplatonic schools of *Nominales*. The modern view of the decadent world “turned inside-out” (*À rebours*,J. K. Huysmans) originated from sophist interpretations of Averroes that remains a black sheep for modernists to this day. The group of Augustinians and Avicennists interpreted Averroes in the years 1230–40 according to Neoplatonic paradigm of the Toledo school. The sophist interpretation of CMDA made by these learned Latins earned them the ironic nickname *Averroistae*. The task of learned Latins, who founded the worldview of modernity in the years 1240–45, was not easy and they lost the first round at Paris University. Nevertheless, at that time they already dominated Oxford, where Aristotelian Roger Bacon fought against their “insane thinking.” However, even in Paris the sophists were quite diligent and persistent. The interpretation of Aristotelian corpus in the paradigm of the Sicilian or Toledo school provoked a fundamental dispute that far exceeded the philosophical disputes regarding the doctrine of faith of Abelard with the Porretans of the time and the school of the *Nominales*. After the death of university rector and bishop Alvernus, the progress of the compilers of *Summa Halensis* was unstoppable. The last matrix interpreted the beginning of the whole dispute from the point of view of Alvernus and Albert the Great. These brilliant Aristotelians and first connoisseurs of Averroes according to the Sicilian school were the top representatives of the first Averroism. The first Averroism claimed that the definition of person directly connected to the cosmic intellect, was not compatible with Christian doctrine. Albert’s writing draw attention to problems of Christian faith that was endangered by losing unity of the person. The same school defended the unity of the intellect after the year 1250. The second Averroism struggled with the great problem of how to defend against the accusations of heresies given in doctrines of so-called “Arabs.“ Porretan individuals, hypostatized species in the things and in the thought, the world viewed through separated active intellect, definition of the person as a specific corpse, furthermore, stratified into the multiplicity of incompatible substances—all these objective achievements of thinking made the integral part of the first Latin modernity. Bishop Alvernus officially condemned the doctrine of *sequaces Aristotelis* at the University, let us see the question of separated *intellectus agens* in the man. His solemn declaration at the University of Paris, Bacon cited it to contest Avicennist version of monopsychism (*intellectus agens non potest esse pars animae*, ch. 2.3). According to Aristotelians of the Sicilian school, Latin sophists endangered the autonomy of the created world. Those were the points that the first Averroism defended through Aristotle’s position concerning the hyparchical status of the first substance. Latins modernists destroyed the unity of the person by introducing into it the multiplicity of substances. Porretans constituted *Lichtung* of nihilistic humanism in the work *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi* by adding the Avicennian comitation to the Aristotelian categorical predication. Neoplatonic abstraction known as *individuum* replaced the imposition of meaning made in virtue of the living person. Modernism founded scientific concept of the second substance completely *ex nihilo*, at the level of logical supposition (*sic es verus homo veritate humanitatem comitante*; ch. 1.5). Augustinian Avicennists in the school of Porretans and Grammarians hypostatized these emanations and began to predicate them as substance of the third kind (ch. 2.3.2). The modern subject plays the role of Avicennist *Dator formarum* and it began to predicate such hypostatized accidents in relation to the atomic substance of the third kind. The modern individual and a new form of Porretan metaphysics came into being through the collection of such hypostases. The use of Avicennian comitation in modern Aristotelianism reveals the controversy concerning the *exemplars* in works of Grosseteste and Bonaventure. The main theological problem represented the emanation of hypostatic forms that are flowing directly from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens* into the creation. This *intellectus agens* is defined as Avicenna’s *Dator formarum*. In the Latin West, this theory came into circulation through the comitation of hypostases, which had been introduced by Avicenna.

The ecclesiastical criticism of the second Averroism as a heretical doctrine was a very serious accusation for that time. But fortunately for the incipient second Averroism, these objections were raised around the year 1245 by wise philosophers and only on academic ground. The group of Latin sophists, after the death of Bishop Alvernus, began to impose their opinion by other means than philosophical argumentation. To defend modern sophisms, influential representatives of the second Averroism had to use all the means at their disposal: philosophical, theological, power of academic posts and religious colleges. Finally, in the years 1270–77, the modernists also resorted to authoritarian intervention by ecclesiastical institutions. Repressive decrees, inquisitorial trials, and partial excommunications established the first history of effects concerning the modernism. Theological attacks led by ecclesiastical and academic institutions were the best defense against the so-called Averroists from the first wave of the reception of Averroes in the Sicilian school. Since the second Averroists under bishop Alvernus had limited influence in Paris, they authoritatively established the results of their research first in Oxford under rector Kilwardby and his successor Pecham. These two major representatives of sophistical modernism ended their ecclesiastical careers as archbishops of Canterbury. Avicennist and Aristotelian Duns Scotus made the final synthesis of thinkers in the second Averroism. They were established at the Oxford University since 1230, where they founded the first school of modern objectivity. The preceding matrix has shown that this crisis broke out as early as the 12th century at the cathedral schools. They were inspired either by Aristotelian Abelard or by Neoplatonist Anselm of Canterbury and led by followers of Gilbert Porretanus. These modernists were influenced by Avicenna (*Nominales, Grammatici*). The dramatic situation arose in the Latin West when the schools of *Logica Modernorum* adopted universal concept of essence given *simpliciter* and replaced with this concept the original *simpliciter* given singular existence of the first substance. The individual of Porretans and *Nominales* received the statute of the first substance according to Aristotle’s writing *Categories*. The chapters devoted to the dispute between Abelard and Anselm shown the important fact. Because of these substitutions, the *Nominales* created a new conception of truth that did not require a correspondence of intellect with the real thing. The investigation of the essence started without regard to the real existence of the thing, to which *Second Analytics* and *Categories* eminently refer the knowledge of essences and causality. According to classical Aristotelians in the line of Abelard and Boethius, this essential simplicity exists only in the framework of logical or mathematical abstraction, that is, only in thinking. The religious schools in the line of Abelard’s *Logica Ingredientibus* taught logic in connection with the metaphysical thinking. Thus, the above-quoted writing *Tractatus Anagnini* interpreted the writing *Organon* according to line of Porphyry and Boethius, in the spirit of authentic Aristotelianism (ch. 1.6). The first Averroism from Blund’s school took up this tradition subordinating logic to metaphysics in the dispute with modernists, right after the emergence of the Paris University. Blund and his school were godfathers in the birth of the Paris University after the year 1200. That hidden authority of commencement in the form of historiality has produced hidden effects. It came to dissolution of the University during the French Revolution that opened the period of postmodern Cartesianism. The end of scholastic modernity is given by the revolutionary chaos of the French Enlightenment, whereby the University of Paris became extinct.[[283]](#footnote-283) The dispute between two schools intensified after the year 1230, both in Oxford and in Paris. A new interpretation of *Categories* and *Second Analytics* emerged in the school of Augustinians influenced by Avicennism, both in Oxford and in Paris. The declaration of war to “insane modernists” or to “heretical Averroists” opened a new round of gigantomachy of the substance.

### 3.1.1 Birth of Oxfordian Fallacy

Critical interpretation of the modern worldview found another source of objectivity. It took its roots in double definition of scientific knowledge according to *Second Analytics*. After Boethius’s translation of the *First Analytics*, the next translation was compiled by the monk Thierry of Chartres around 1140; however, the *Second Analytics* spread much more slowly (Ebbsen 2010). Aristotelian school had no problem with the interpretation of this writing because *Second Analytics* tied in with Aristotelianism of Boethius and Abelard as well as with logical treatises presented by the Anagnine school (ch. 2.1.3). After importing Averroes’s corpus according to the Sicilian exegesis, the school of the first Averroism was certain that the interpretation of *Second Analytics* corresponds to the line of interpretation of *Categories, Physics, Metaphysics*, to Arabic compilationcalled *Life of Animals (Kitāb al-hayawān)* and *De anima*. The key interpretation *Anal. Post.* I.4–10 according to the school of the first Averroism shows the nature of science which contests the view of modernists in all important points. Already quoted Guillelmus de Sancto Amore played the main role in the struggle against the second Averroism. His commentaries on the *First* and *Second Analytics* are waiting for a critical treatment (*Glossae totius libri Priorum, Glossae totius Posteriorum*). Hermeneutics assume that his interpretation of *Analytics* should be done in the paradigm of the first Averroism according to the Sicilian school. This would explain his central role as leader in the school of the first Averroism after the departure of Bishop Alvernus. He was appointed as the rector of artists in the Rue du Fouarre. Clearly, this eminent opponent of the second averroism had to leave the University during the first cleansing instigated by modernists in 1255. His successor Siger of Brabant suffered a similar tragic fate. Albert’s commentary (*Analytica posteriora*; ed. Borgnet 2, pp. 233–524) has already been interpreted. We must wait for critical evaluation of *Commentaries on th*e *First* and *Second Analytics* (*Glossae super Analytica Priora, Posteriora*) and the work *Scriptum super logicam veterem*. The latter was written by Magister Guillelmus Arnaldi of Toulouse (†1242). The writing *Codex* *of* *Barcelona* (*Cod*. *Ripoll 109*) contains Arnaldi’s both cited commentaries on the *Analytics* (*Ripoll*181ra–228vb; 229ra–253va). This manuscript and the *Manuscript of Merton College* (*Ms. 275*) provide important testimony on interpretation of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* after arrival of the Sicilian school. The introduction to Albert’s writing *De homine* rejected the teaching of the second Averroism that included faulty Aristotelian interpretation of *Second Analytics* (ch. 2.4.1). Therefore, we have interpreted the position of the first Averroism in Albert’s early works that defended *ad mentem Averrois* the unity of the person and the right order of cognition in *anima intellectiva*. His scientific deduction founded Christian anthropology following the path of *Second Analytics* according to the Sicilian school. It includes both his first interpretation of Aristotelianism in the work *De homine* and his commentary on the *Second Analytics*. The latter was written a decade later, during the first round of quarrels with modernists at the University of Paris (1255–56). We explained that the defense of authentic Aristotelianism against Dinant’s pantheism founded the University of Paris. The neglect of this archetypical thinking and truth given in the mode of the commencement brought about the dissolution of the University in the age of postmodernity. The University of Oxford takes its commencement at the opposite pole that is determined by thinking of modern *illuminati* and by the eclipse of first substance. Western modernists have conquered the world and have never forgotten their *alma mater*. John Blund went to Paris very soon and his influence in Oxford was minimal. Roger Bacon represented the interpretation of Abelard’s Aristotelianism and he developed an interpretation of Blund’s school that took up the metaphysics of the Commentator. An Aristotelian scholar could not have a quiet life at the university manipulated by modernists. Bacon became an academic dissident in Oxford and ended up like William Ockham, who became the last defender of the first Averroism in Oxford. His expulsion from university and sophist interpretation of his metaphysics in the paradigm of nominalism definitely constituted the character of this university as a bastion of *Modernorum*.

Robert Grosseteste became a key figure that set in motion the epochal influence of Oxford. It is necessary to distinguish the Oxford phase of his thinking from the preceding phase of the first Averroism during his studies and lecturing in Paris. At that time, he wrote the treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ch. 2.2.1). In the course of his Parisian studies, this scholar defended Aristotelian line of Blund’s school. This teaching defends the cognition of the human soul and human intellect that comes from the hyparchical first substance. But he never completely excluded the actualization of *intellectus possibilis* from behind, from separated *intellectus agens*. Probably already in Paris but especially in Oxford, Grosseteste adhered to the second wave of Aristotelianism given by return to Neoplatonism. Grossesteste left the University of Paris constituted by Blund’s school, and went to less important and provincial Oxford sometime before the year 1230. It is appropriate to ask about philosophical reasons of his departure from the University of Paris. He was one of the founding fathers together with bishop Alvernus in the years 1215–25. Both scholars were the main representants of Blund’s school and they successfully contested the philosophy introduced by David of Dinant. However, Grosseteste defended all his life Neoplatonist and Avicennist cosmology of *sequaces Aristotelis*, which was associated with the defense of the cosmic *anima mundi*.[[284]](#footnote-284) Blund’s school rejected this doctrine as heresy connected to Aristotelianism of Dinant. Grosseteste took up the cosmology influenced by the Toledo school and by David of Dinant. The chancellor and bishop Alvernus could have hardly tolerated such teaching when he rejected the heresy of *sequaces Aristotelis* at the Paris University. Another important point of the dismissal concerns Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics*. The introduction of Oxfordian Fallacy was in contradiction with the above-mentioned interpretation of Albert. He was very probably named *magister regens* of artists at the time of Alvernus’s activity in Paris. Albert presented the methodology of science strictly *ad mentem Averrois* in the line of the Sicilian school (ch. 2.4.1). The last important reason is the already interpreted contradiction between Albert’s and Grosseteste’s commentary on the writing *De anima*. There is a different attitude towards the plurality of forms in the soul (ch. 2.4.2). Alvernus, as bishop of Paris and chancellor of the university, could not admit any pluralism of substances or forms in man, because this doctrine would have abolished the unity of the person as Boethius’s indivisible first substance. The year 1228 can be taken as *terminus* *post quem* to establish Grosseteste’s arrival at Oxford. In that year the magister Alvernus became the Archbishop of Paris. As Blund's successor in the *École de Paris*, Alvernus founded the *Université de Paris*, which took over the teaching of this famous school. The *École de Paris* facilitated the founding of the university in 1215 that received full pontifical rights in 1231. The interpretation of *Second Analytics* shows the problematic features of Grosseteste’s teaching. He lectured on Aristotle in that controversial way very probably during the final phase of his stay in Paris until 1228. Grosseteste became a *persona non grata* at the Paris University. Albert the Great became the new *magister regens* and in fact, he took over Grosseteste’s leading position. The exclusion from the papal university in Paris can explain, why the document that enumerated first chancellors at Oxford University does not mention his name. In the year 1231, the office took his Parisian contemporary, magister Ralph de Maidstone or magister Ralph Cole. Grosseteste became the lecturer and magister of Oxford’s Franciscans in 1230 and established the age of modernity through a new interpretation of *Second Analytics*. After his arrival at the Franciscan College, Oxford becomes the site of an official *universitas* of magisters and students presided over by the elected chancellor (1231). First, Grosseteste founded intellectual *raison d’être* of Oxford University, which is still valid. Second, his arrival in Oxford about 1230 is connected with the transformation of colleges according to Parisian model. This dual activity of Grosseteste as teacher and manager of studies established the founding event (*Ereignis*) of Western modernity. Grosseteste's activity at Oxford founded the global village of modernists that lasts until the contemporary age of metaphysical nihilism.

The epoch of objectivity is opened by Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros*), which was probably written in Oxford about 1230. If it was written in Paris, it certainly became the main reason for the departure of this Toletan scholar from the *alma mater* dominated by thinkers of the Sicilian school. The treatise changed scientifically recognized meaning of being in such a way that it coincided in the main points with the school of Porretan nominalists (*Grammatici*) rejected by Alvernus. This was an additional reason for Grosseteste’s departure from Paris, because he had almost certainly lectured on Aristotle’s logical and scientific writings in this spirit before the year 1230. His interpretation of *Second Analytics* joined Porretan interpretation of *Categories* according to modern logicians such as John Pagus or Nicolas of Paris around 1230 (ch. 3.1.2). Grosseteste preserved in Oxford Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima* according to Blund’s school and the theory of meaning according to Abelard’s interpretation of *Categories*. However, he defined the person partly in the spirit of Avicenna, by plurality of hypostatized forms. But the person remained one substance, which presents an Aristotelian solution of the first Averroism. The thesis of Grosseteste about the plurality of forms in the soul was adopted by Avicennist Thomas of Aquin. That is the reason, why Bacon and Ockham as representatives of the school of the first Averroism in Oxford invoked Grosseteste’s interpretation *De anima* against modernists. Grosseteste’s commentary on *Second Analytics* forms the first integral interpretation of this book in the Latin West. This commentary established the scientific worldview according to the model “*discrete videamus*” of Porretan school (ch. 1.4). It is the first analytical approach to the interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Grosseteste reads Aristotle’s *Analytica* in the Avicennian paradigm of the Toledo school. This tradition is confirmed in Kilwardby’s commentary on *Second Analytics* (ch. 3.4.1). The main representatives of this school were Rufus and Kilwardby. They came to Paris about 1235 to study for master’s degree. Albert’s commentary on scientific deduction in *De homine* and his later interpretation of *Second Analytics* refused Oxfordian Fallacy, which had been established by interpretation of Rufus and Kilwardby. These two representatives of Oxford radicalized Grosseteste’s original position, which was not accepted in Paris. According to interpretation of the first Averroism given by Albert’s *De homine*, the writing *Second Analytics* follows the interpretation of substance according to the canonical passage of *Categories* (*Cat*. 2a11–16)). According to paradigm of the Sicilian school and *Second Analytics*, the basic principle of scientific proof is bound to the existence of the real thing sensually recognized in the mode *ex inmediatis*.

Hermeneutics seek in the first modern commentary on *Second Analytics* musical unconcealment (*a/lētheia*) of objectivity. The objective path of ontological comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) in Grosseteste’s commentary determines objective scientific cognition in its truth and untruth. The direct insight into the first principles of cognition is considered as a basic component of illuminated thinking. Direct vision of hypostatized forms can recognize not only real effects of the first substances, but the higher world of cosmic intelligences and autonomous forms as well.

“Knowledge of the first principles made by direct vision of the intellect (*intellectus*) is the higher form of understanding than knowledge made by an empirical reason (*scientia*). In that case, the first principles of knowing are not recognized directly in intellectual insight, but by means of empirical cognition. This is the worse way of knowing than intellectual intuition (*peior dispositio quam intellectus*).” [[285]](#footnote-285)

The quotation confirms the primacy of cognition of first principles in the act of direct intuition of pure forms. Like the first substances, they are in the modus *simpliciter* (*simpliciter prima cognoscuntur*). The intellect performs direct insight into the first principles, because this kind of intuition makes part of its essence. Discursive rationality (*scientia*) must advance to the first principles of cognition by a more complicated path made by conclusions of the deduction based on the causality that is appprehended by the senses (*peior dispositio*). According to Grosseteste, the judgment based on empirical cognition shows the first principles of cognition only indirectly. From the point of view of categorical predication, it becomes clear that the imposition of meaning in the new form of metaphysical vision does not proceed from the first hylemorphic substance, but from the universally given supposition. This supposition is based on immanent, permanent and actualized possession of the first principles of cognition in the soul (*melior dispositio*). In Aristotle’s metaphysics, the proof given by mathematics or geometry corresponds to this definition. Direct intuition entails both, the first principles of these sciences and the definition of recognized essences. The soul by itself is predisposed to direct recognition of the universal form, which entails the higher level of knowledge than empirical science. Neoplatonic approach to cognition establishes the concept of science through direct intuition of first principles. This view corresponds to Anselm’s definition of truth in the mode of twofold *veritas* (ch. 1.2). The knowledge of natural sciences is derived from the vision of pure forms, rather than from the sensually perceived reality. Writing *Second Analytics* explicitly rejects such proceeding. It would destroy the unified architecture of cognition based on actualization of mind from the first existing substance. Let us quote the part of *Second Analytics* that makes definition of the apodictic proof.

“The apodictic proof refers to hyparchical being of existent entities (ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι τῶν ὅσα ὑπάρχει), which is given to these entities in the mode *per se* (καθ' αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν). This being of *per se* existing entities is given in two ways (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς). Either this being makes the hyparchical existence in the real subject that exists *per se* (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι); or the hyparchical being is given as the universal subject that exists *per se* (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς).” [[286]](#footnote-286)

The analytical interpretation of this passage by means of Oxfordian Fallacy establishes the Western objectivity. The cited part investigates twofold predication *per se* (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12). The first round runs through logical abstraction and the second one through metaphysical abstraction. The mathematical entity or abstracted essence (par ex. the geometrical definition of triangle) received the definition that differs from the hyparchical first substance existing *per se*. The hyparchical nature of *simpliciter* given logical being exists directly *per se* (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν). However, its hyparchical existence requires another subject who becomes one with this hyparchical being as its bearer (ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς). The act of donation of such hyparchical being (τί ἐστιν) comes from another subject of the same universal nature. Such hyparchical being can exist only in the intellect (ἐν τῷ). The intellect is an immaterial subject possessing its own actuality as the first substance (*tertium genus* of Averroes) and can provide the immaterial hyparchical being in the act of donation (τί ἐστιν). The metaphysical dative comes from the human intellect as the original subject bearing the fundamental *actus essendi* (ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς). This hyparchical predication defines the universal essence in the mode of logical abstraction. The logical form as universal meaning keeps hyparchical existence in itself, because the content of thinking exists *per se* in the moment of its intellectual reflection, as Descartes stated (*cogito ergo sum*). In this way, the kind of essence is predicated, which receives its subsistence beyond the real first given substance.

The categorial cognition of real substances cannot be some kind of abstract cognition of general concepts essentially given in thinking. The real first substances exist in the hyparchical mode *per se* in itself (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), that is, outside of our mind. Their hyparchical being is universally given in us, but in a different way than existence of logical essences. The scientific predication is directed to real things in the general mode of categorical predication. It is given in the universal mode *ex inmediatis* that refers to the *actus essendi* the first hyparchical substance (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι). The secondary universal meaning is given in view of primary being of the first substance that exists *per se* in reality. This gives rise to the second form of scientific predication made with respect to existing real things. In this case we predicate the universal meaning *per se* that is made of “this real being” (ἐν τῷ). Its hyparchical being entails universal meaning (ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς) that is not identical with universal meaning of logic. The secondary creation of meaning related to reality is not the same as the primary coming into being of meaning in mind; that is why there are twofold meanings of hyparchical existence (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς). The imposition of meaning from the hyparchical substance is needed in order to arrive at universal notions given *per se*. Metaphysical cognition and predication are guided by real existence of the hyparchical first substance (τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν), and not by parousia of essential meaning in mind. This parousia requires a further substrate for its existence, namely the physical existence of the person (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι). The result is a different procedure of scientific deduction and proof in the case of a real astronomical eclipse and in the case of proof concerning mathematics or geometry.

A fundamental fallacy of analytic philosophy concerns the determination “ἐν τῷ” that involves the metaphysical determination “αὐτοῖς” (*Anal. Post.* 84a12). The following sentence states that the first kind of predication refers to the potential logical essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, 84a14). But it is a fundamental mistake to take that mode of essential parousia made by mind and by the logical supposition to the same level as the meaning of existing things made by metaphysical imposition (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, 84a13). A properly constructed scientific proof should go from “ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ” (a13) to “ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς” (a14). Then a univocal categorial predication is defined by hyparchical existence of the first substance in reality. Aristotle follows the basic argument of *Cat.* 2a14–15 that explains how the second substances univocally and categorically predicate the first substances (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν; OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Metaphysical predication respects the donation of being from reality because real things causally and therefore adequately determine true thinking. Archaic hermeneutics, in the mode of *a/lētheia*, places in this twofold universal determination of essences (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι/ν) the emergence of modern objectivity in the mode of the so-called objective dative (*dativus obiectivus*, OBJ III, ch. 4). The original text of *Second Analytics* explicitly defines twofold nature of universal attribution given *per se* (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς). The introductory interpretation of *Metaphysics Z* described being of substance according to the act of the original (i.e., in the perfectly closed past) donation of being into an universal entity defined in appropriate way (τό τί ἦν εἶναι; OBJ I, ch. 1.1). The act of donation gives the existence to “this being here” (τό τί) in the original event, before it comes to the transition of “this being here” into the past. The recognized being is no longer present in its original act of existing. In the being of secondary substance given as *quidditas*, the original donation already receives the past character (ἦν εἶναι). The new being given in cognition and predication became an essential copy of this original being that is a real subject of movements and changes. Hermeneutics called this act of donating being to the existing entity the “metaphysical dative” (*dativus metaphysicus*). The same attitude must be taken in the scientific predication of causal effects of first substances. Science predicates the original event in the world, which causally grounds the deductive judgment. The universals, like the real first substances, are given in the mode *per se*, but, unlike them, they exist only in the human intellect. The being of the first substances appears in the scientific proof only in a past form through the signification of the second substance, because the abstract notion in the proof is given as parousia of directly considered essence in mind. In the case of universal scientific cognition predicated of real substances, the form of the metaphysical dative (ἐν τῷ) is not at firts place shaped by abstraction in thought, but by the hyparchical being of the first substance (τί ἐστιν). The representation of this real being and causality given by *quidditas* is ensured by the middle member of deductive syllogism (*medium*) and by the main principle of recognition based on direct imposition of meaning (*ex inmediatis*). This passage must be read according to Aristotle’s general intention that is determined by twofold nature of the first science. The logician, the mathematician, and the geometrician cannot predicate the original hyparchical state of the world existing outside ourselves. This, however, the metaphysician must do, in the mode of adequate cognition of truth (*De anima*) and the univocal categorical predication (*Categories*) arising from it, and by means of true scientific deduction (*Second Analytics*). Logical abstraction cannot provide any basis of scientific statements related to reality. The way of scientific cognition must be in accordance with the hyparchical position of first and second substance in *Categories*, since it corresponds to true cognition of the world according to *De anima*. The science must seek the unity of being according to the “meta-physics” of the first substance given by metaphysical abstraction.

The second step of hermeneutics must clarify the fundamental question of “how” (*Wie* of Heidegger) the univocal determination of necessity is created in the analytic philosophy that founded Oxfordian Fallacy. Grosseteste, Rufus, and Kilwardby analyzes the key part of *Second Analytics*, which characterizes three conditions of universal predication (καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό, *Anal. Post*. 73b26–27). The predication of universals covers all determinations thanks to hyparchical meaning (κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ). The universal is given by itself (καθ' αὑτὸ) and in itself (ᾗ αὐτό). After enumerating these three conditions, Aristotle proceeds to assert that both forms of predication given in the mode *per se* (καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό) belongs to the identical type of universality. Due to this definition, those universals have common hyparchical being (καθόλου, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν, *Anal. Post*. 73b28). What becomes fateful for the modern epoch is the determination of the way in which the universals are given in the hyparchical mode that is proper to them (ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν). If hyparchical predication contains twofold being of the subject, then the necessity of deductive statement (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) must also have a twofold nature. The following example of hyparchical universality comes from the definition of the section and the triangle. Universality belongs to the section due to the point that keeps the hyparchical and univocal necessity (καθ' αὑτὴν τῇ γραμμῇ ὑπάρχει στιγμὴ). The definition of the triangle follows the same pattern, to which the section belongs in the same way (*Anal. Post*. 73b30–31). It is clear from the context that Aristotle understands the term “ὑπάρχει” (*inesse*) in the mode of hyparchical univocal necessity of geometrical or mathematical definitions. Universal being is given as hyparchical in mind and thus necessarily in mode *per se*. Because the universal meaning exists in thinking in its essential identity (καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό), it necessarily exists as hyparchical being of these universal “things” (ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν). In the case of logical, geometrical or mathematical abstraction, universality makes the constituent of hyparchical being (καθόλου ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν), since such determinations are made only in mind. Therefore, this necessity belongs to the first mode of universally predicated necessity, which takes up hyparchical being in universal predication. Real things, on the other hand, carry the hyparchical being and necessity in themselves (κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ). Their predication follows the necessity established by the metaphysical dative. Therefore, the predication must follow the other order established by the imposition of meaning. The fatal and tragic ambiguity concerns the universal predication given in terms of hyparchical universal meaning (ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν, *Anal. Post.* 73b28). The dative referring to being of the “thing” (τοῖς πράγμασιν) has a fundamental importance for the manifestation of objectivity. It established categorical predication in the mode of *dativus obiectivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). Hermeneutics must determine the ontological status of this modern “pragmatics.” This being cannot have a univocal meaning as far as the necessity is involved (καθόλου, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν, *Anal. Post*. 73b28). There is a twofold hyparchical predication due to the different subject of cognition that is given either due to the metaphysical imposition or the logical supposition (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς). The hyparchical logical essence cannot determine the cognition of the first real substance. The effective cause of the logical predication is the human intellect and not the external reality. In the case of mathematical proof and logical abstraction, only the cognizing subject is the guarantor of hyparchical being. Aristotle is a realiste and he rejected the primacy of eidetic science made by Plato. He ordered this kind of cognition to the second place, after the metaphysically given *demonstratio* of the real world.

Around the year 1230, the twofold scholastic exegesis of *Second Analytics* established the path of future metaphysics. The reason of division is twofold interpretation of necessity in the hyparchical mode “*inesse*.” That double modality determine the founding event (*Ereignis*) that establishes the donation of being in modernity. The dative determines the double nature of metaphysics due to twofold hyparchical order of being (*das Seiende*). The founding necessity exists by dual primary imposition of Being (*das Sein*). In the first case of donation, the necessity of the second substance is established from the direction of real things (τοῖς πράγμασιν1). It follows the path of the metaphysical dative and necessity of such essence involves the hyparchical being due to the metaphysical imposition of meaning (*inesse1*). In the second case, the universality is created as the essence in mind and donation of being in mind forms the hyparchical being (τοῖς πράγμασιν2). That kind of subsistence is based on logical abstraction given in the mode of logical supposition (*inesse2*). Logical essence entails its own kind of necessity that does not need the metaphysical dative. It makes an abstract *esse* given only in thinking. The double form of necessity given by double donation of Being in metaphysics clearly shows that a metaphysically true science must determine the double mode of correspondence; let us see the term *proportio* in CMDA. This correspondence reflects the double donation of hyparchical and necessary being. Then we have a dual form of scientific proof given by a dual form of hyparchical necessity and thus a dual form of categorial predication. The genus determines the final categorical univocity of meaning, and here we have two generically different donations that concern Being of being. The theory of double truth established in *Second Analytics* is inevitable because the unity of metaphysics as the first science must be preserved. The dative indicates the original mode of unconcealment (*Es gibt* of Heidegger) for objectivity. In case that these different generic meaning of universality is confused together, there is an objective predication of universality in the chaotic third mode of being. This *tertium ens* is manipulated by analytically capable Furies that took their residency at Oxford since the year 1230. Let us see the analysis of *dativus obiectivus* in Rufus′s teaching (ch. 3.3.4). The divine powers of Chaos and *illuminati* influenced by them do not have to follow the Exclusion of the Third. They took the third path of thinking called *via Modernorum*. The supposition of universality is given in new definition of “thing” as being of the third kind (*inesse3*). This *tertium ens* is predicated in the form of the objective dative that relates to universality of being of the third kind (τοῖς πράγμασιν3). This mythological being created the hypostasis of a new type and established the new way of metaphysics. The hyparchical predication of modernity no longer distinguishes between the donation of being coming from reality (metaphysical necessity) or from thinking (logical necessity). This gave rise to a new type of equivocal scientific predication and confused categorical necessity (metaphysical and logical) that we call “Oxfordian Fallacy.” From the point of view of the first Averroism it was evident that objective predication of the third type makes a fatal error. It got a false scientific status due to nominalistic interpretation of *Second Analytics*. This sophistic objective dative (τοῖς πράγμασιν3) establishes objective donation of mixed universality that reminds the amphibolical prediction of Neoplatonism (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). It created a new entity as the universal and individual being of the third kind according to Oxfordian Fallacy.

The analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* forms the fundamental *Irrtum* of modernity. Albert precisely understood it at the very beginning of his academic career. This Aristotelian thinker of the Sicilian school attacked in his work *De homine* the fundamental sophistry of that proof. The school of *Latini* offered wrong interpretation of both triads of the principles of scientific cognition (ch. 2.4.1). The imposition of meaning from first real substance establishes a universal supposition in the deductive scientific judgment, which predicates the universal necessary bonds between the second substances. The first triad of principles must predicate universality in mode *ex inmediatis* according to hyparchical being of the first substance. This presupposes the metaphysical form of abstraction given by the categorial imposition of meaning that relates to the first substance. The second triad of principles of cognition carries universality in itself, because logical and mathematical concepts have a hyparchical being in the thinking. Given the case, universality is predicated in the mode of logical identity of being as hyparchical and consequently necessarily given abstraction. The composition of twofold necessity creates the scientific proof of true metaphysics. The imposition brings in the existential necessity of real things that are uniques. The proof therefore follows the first triad of principles. The supposition is thus created *univoce*. The demonstration can state true universality that entails the real causality, due to second triad of principles. Then the metaphysical necessity is enriched by the logical necessity. Then we have two forms of necessity: one hyparchical in reality and the second suppositional in thought. The imposition of hyparchical necessity given by real existence of the first substance in mode *per se* and *simpliciter* makes an adequate supposition solely in the mode of metaphysical and not of logical abstraction. Porretans and *Nominales* at Oxford bracketed the principle of reality for scientific proof by abolishing the main principle of recognition *ex inmediatis*. Aristotelian interpretation showed that the second triad of principles of cognition differed from the first by a different mode of necessity and abstraction. The introduction of identity between the essential and the hyparchical predication abolished the basic thesis of *Second Analytics* about twofold figure of proof (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διτττῶς, *Anal. Post.* 84a12). The identity mode ceased to respect the ipseity of first substance in scientific predication. This analytic error established the first version of Oxfordian Fallacy. The following quotation from Grosseteste’s interpretation shows the original *Lichtung* that englobes the truth and the untruth of modern objectivity. The key sentence identified the demonstration of the hyparchical first substance with the parousia of hyparchical essence (*demonstrativa scientia et demonstratio sint idem*).

“Scientific cognition is given in deductive syllogism truthfully, primarily, and immediately really (*ex veris, et primis et inmediatis*). It is better known than the conclusion, since it precedes the conclusion and makes the cause of conclusion (*prioribus et notioribus et causis conclusionis*). The way of real cognition and the proceeding of formal proof are the same and both triads of principles apply together (*sint idem et* ‘ex’ *sumatur communiter*). Then we can conceive the cognition within the framework of above-mentioned directly observed first principles (*ad ‘ex’ … dictum originaliter*) and within the framework of first principles that related to matter and to real causes of cognition (*ad ‘ex’ dictum materialiter*). Therefore, I maintain that in such propositions, the material definition is approved as well, due to the formal definition (*probatur diffinitio materialis de suo diffinitio per diffinitionem formalem*), as stated above.” [[287]](#footnote-287)

Grosseteste starts the correct order of knowledge according to Aristotle, as first three principles of cognition come directly from reality of first substances: *ex veris, et primis et inmediatis*. These principles outline univocal categorial imposition of being that pertains to first substances. To this triad he adds the second triad of the already formal principles of the deductive syllogism, which concerns the properties of premises in the judgment (*prioribus et notioribus et causis conclusionis*). The introductory definition of the demonstrative judgment connects both sets of proofs in the preposition “*ex*.” The cognition of real things is given in the first triad and the formal predication of universally recognized concept links to it in the second triad. The epochal *Irrtum* of modernity is given by ambivalent use of the preposition “*ex*,” which connects both triads of the first principles of cognition according to *Second Analytics* (‘ex’ s*umatur communiter*). The terminus “*communiter*” indicates Heidegger’s *Ereignis* when modern *metaphysica generalis* was born as univocal ontotheology. The epochal error of modern science is given by analytic view of the logician that created mythological source of truth established by falsely used prepositions, “*ex*.” Heidegger’s “*Es gibt*” relating to the original donation of Being is located in this mythological source of modern truth. The quotation no longer distinguishes between the metaphysical determinations of predication (*ex1*) at the level of hyparchical first substance (*impositio*), and the subsequent logical triad of formal logic (*ex2*), which ensures the logical principles of judgment (*suppositio*). According to this quotation justifying the “scientific” cognition of *Modernorum*, both groups of three principles are interchangeable (*‘ex’ sumatur communiter*) to create the univocal mixture of all six principles. This is correct from a formal and logical point of view. However, according to the classic and not modern interpretation of *Second Analytics* given above, we must clearly define the imposition in the metaphysics. Otherwise, no real science obtains but a postmodern metaphorical and mythopoetic tales. Without the imposition, there is no concept of truth as correspondence between reality and intellect. The metaphysical dative obligatorily determines this or that kind of donation of being and assigns each science its proper place (*ortus scientiarum*). The primary value that makes meaning of being is given in the existence of the real thing. This means for science that the determination of universal meaning must proceed from the original place of science, where the causality and necessity exist in a hyparchical way. This real hyparchical causality is then predicated in the metaphysical *demonstratio* as a univocal and universal statement, since it follows the path of the metaphysical dative. Within the framework of authentic Aristotelianism according to *Second Analytics*, it becomes clear that the first form of necessity for the logical, mathematical and geometrical *inesse* applies only within the framework of the potential universally and abstractly given being of logic. The second triad of principles of recognition ensures only the formal, logically valid necessity of scientific deduction, but not the causal, metaphysically valid necessity of scientific demonstration. Such proof is ensured by the first triad of principles, which is determined by hyparchical being and the real causality of the first substance. The metaphysical ipseity of the thing is not its logical identity. Therefore, the Aristotelian person in the existential act of thinking (*tertium genus*) and as abstraction (*quartum genus*) is something quite different from the modern subject (*individuum*) given as being of the third kind. The school of the first Averroism knew and defended this fact until its dissolution in 1277.

The logical analyst can take both necessities univocally, but not the metaphysical scientist. Both types of universally predicated, inherently given necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει) refers both to categorial predication in the mode of determinacy of *per se* and *simpliciter* defined first substance. Essential predication is given in the mode of logical abstraction *per se* and *simpliciter*. An interchange of both triads of recognition principles is not possible because of the hyparchical imposition based on real causal necessity. In the metaphysical proof, the reality is recognized adequately and necessarily. Causal necessity of the first substances is contained in the middle member of the judgment according to the principle *ex inmediatis*. After that, it determines the second triad of principles. The cognition goes in a metaphysically necessary way from reality to thinking, that is, from the first triad of the principles to the second triad. The imposition of being coming from the first substance makes the first member in the series of cognition. The formal supposition of the second triad is based on logical necessity given as parousia of meaning in the thinking. Therefore, the astronomical eclipse has the hyparchical form of necessity given in reality to be considered as scientific proof in the order of truth as correspondence between intellect and real things. In this case, the scientific necessity of natural and human sciences differs from the formal deduction given by the logic of necessity in the framework of geometry and mathematics. The first necessity is given by mutual actions of real first substances that are active in making the eclipse (Sun, Earth, Moon). The second necessity concerning the definition of the triangle is given only in the human thinking as logical abstraction. This fundamental difference between twofold universality and necessity in *Second Analytics* proves the validity of metaphysics as the first science. The analytic school based on Oxfordian Fallacy does not make any generic difference between both kinds of universality and necessity. It works in the scenario of univocity given by logical or mathematical abstraction and defends the abstract worldview established by Porretans. Objectivity was born from the fact that the cognition of the intellect separated itself from the sensually perceived reality and acquired the status of absolutized parousia of meaning. The sens of the world comes directly in mind of modern and postmodern *illuminati*. In the case of scientific judgment (*demonstratio*), the already absent causality in the past mode of *quidditas* is given by the univocally predicated causality in the middle member of the judgment. Thus the direction of predication in Aristotle’s science is determined by the orthotomy in the dialogue *Sophistes* (ch. 1.4). Aristotle’s path of dialectical scientific understanding is given by the real state of the thing and follows the original donation of real being into cognition. In the metaphysics given *ad mentem Averrois* in the Sicilian school, there can be no interchange of the first triad of principles of cognition with the second. Taken the metaphysical abstraction, it is principally and basically excluded that both principles are univocally interchangeable (*sumatur communiter*). There is no being of the third kind and therefore no modern way of the intellect, which is given as objective *itinerarium mentis*. The intellect must follow the being of the real thing in the mode of truth as correspondence. Aristotle clearly states that the necessity predicated categorically in both modes does not have the same generic meaning (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς). The first triad has metaphysical character and is determined *per prius* by the real thing. Such universal meaning of the real and unique event enters the second triad of logical formalization, which creates the deductive scientific proof. Therefore there are only two ways of cognition. The principle of metaphysically given Exclusion of the Third necessarily excludes the third way of modern chaos directed by modernist Furies (‘ex’ *sumatur communiter*). The primacy of the modern supposition given in the second triad establishes a new form of cognition, which only secondarily moves towards the universal imposition of meaning from the first substance (*ad 'ex' dictum materialiter et dictum originaliter*). Influenced by the Toledo school, Grosseteste affirms that the priority of cognition does not belong at all to the hyparchical determination of the causally acting first substance, but to its formal determination. It subsumes in itself material being of the world (*probatur diffinitio materialis de suo diffinitio per diffinitionem formalem*). The sophistry lies in the fact that this is not a formal logical error, but an error made by the metaphysical imposition of meaning (*fallacia secundum quid*). Grosseteste exposed the meaning of being from behind, from the formally determined essence. It corresponds to the above-mentioned twofold conception of science that Grosseteste divided into a lower empirical and a higher theoretical component.

Let us now quote the introduction to the second part of *Second Analytics*, which establishes scientific cognition. The quotation accurately enumerates the sequence of the four steps that determine the deductive syllogism.[[288]](#footnote-288) The order of principles begins with the general *maior* statement. It is recognized fact as the factual object of judgment in the given appearance (τὸ ὅτι). Further follows the reason why the given thing happens (τὸ διότι). Then follows the predication in the middle member of the syllogism, which states whether the given phenomenon exists in real terms at the level of causality of the first substance (εἰ ἔστι). The resulting conclusion provides a general causality given in the form of universal existence (τί ἐστιν). Grosseteste performed an exchange: the existence of the real thing and its causality predicated in the middle member of the deduction (εἰ ἔστι) was changed for the essence (τί ἐστιν). But the nominalist modern essence as *tertium ens* cannot be given in the mode of metaphysical imposition as the premise of syllogism, but only in the mode of logical supposition. Therefore, the essence is given only at the conclusion of scientific proof. The metaphysically correct supposition is univocal, but only in the case of correctly made imposition of meaning from really existing causality. That is, why the middle member of deductive syllogism is of absolute importance in the full scientific proof. The analytic logician does not need to care for it, since he makes use of another kind of hyparchical necessity. By interchanging the third and fourth steps, scholars at Oxford produced a new interpretation of *Second Analytics* that sent scholasticism on the broad and convenient *via Modernorum* and to nihilism of metaphysics. This exchange degraded metaphysical unity of the first real substance to an abstract unity of the essence given only in mind. It came to the replacement of the imposition of meaning determined by reality by a mere supposition given in human thought as universal essence. This interpretation, according to the classical logic of Aristotle, Boethius and Abelard, represents the type of sophistical error called “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid.*” Both triads of principles are entirely equivalent in the new interpretation and there is no difference between them. It contradicts the fundamental architecture of categorical predication established on the hyparchical first substance (οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως, *Cat*. 2a11). The convertibility of both triads assume in the quotation makes a univocal formal swap between imposition based on the causality and universally predicated supposition. This, of course, can be found in the writing *Categories* quoted above. However, it makes the second part of the quotation that establishes the universal supposition in the reverse order of predication from universal meanings from the genus to the species (*Cat*. 2a15–16). Therefore, the second way of understanding is only logical and purely dialectical and not at all metaphysical. Modernity, blinded by the solar intellect, cannot see this subtle difference, which determines the sense of Aristotle’s metaphysics as the first science of the real being. Grosseteste devaluated the first principle *ex inmediatis*, which ensures the recognition of the first substance and its causality (τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, *Anal. Post.* 71b10–11). He exchanged the essence for real existence by abolishing the primacy of real thing. The key question of *Second Analytics* asks about the actual existence of the thing (*an sit*, λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι; *Anal. Post.* 93b29). According to the metaphysical dative, the question of the essence appears only *per posterius*, because the thing must exist in the first place (ὅπερ ἔχοντες ὅτι ἔστι, ζητοῦμεν διὰ τί ἔστιν, *Anal. Post*. 93b32). The conversion of both triads of principles based on the Avicennian primacy of the essence led to eclipse of the first substance. In analytic perspective according to revised *Second Analytics*, it does not matter whether we state the imposition with respect to the metaphysically determined existence of the thing or we logically define its ideal essence in the mode of supposition. Aristotle was a critical thinker; the intellect must recognize the real lunar or solar eclipse, which is made by the effects of real causality. In this case, there is a genuine correspondence between thought and thing. According to correctly done direction of predication (see orthotomy of *Sophistes*), Aristotle cannot predicate the scientific judgment all the way round. The proof must start in reality instead of idealized essence or its abstraction given in the logic and the mathematics. The first principle *ex inmediatis* (ἀμέσων) relates *Second Analytics* to the recognition of the first substance in its causality. This principle was problematic for Grosseteste because it takes the empirical cognition to be the fundament of knowledge. The causality of the first actual substance, which determines Aristotelian cognition, was no longer the first principle of modern cognition.

Let us now return to Albert’s criticism of this modernist approach. This is given in the introduction to the work *De homine* by defending the principle *inmediate*, which he takes from the interpretation of the same passages in *Second Analytics* (ch. 2.4.1). The canonical phrase “*ex veris, et primis et inmediatis*”in Grosseteste’s interpretation according to Oxfordian Fallacy does not denote a metaphysical second substance, but a logical essence. This put an end to critical science based on the metaphysical imposition. There is no possibility of univocity in logical supposition with respect to the first substance, because the logically created hyparchical necessity is given in itself and not with respect to reality. If the essence constitutes the subject of the first triad of principles, then the cognition does not start at the empirical recognition of reality and the Aristotelian principle *ex inmediatis* is considered secondary. Grosseteste determined the necessity of hyparchical position of the first substance (*inesse*) in the scientific deductive judgment from the second triad of principles. The deduction does not proceed in the mode *per prius* from the reality of the first substance, but from the universal essence in thinking. Let us recall the original source of this sophistry in Avicenna’s scheme of cognition (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Aristotelian abstraction makes a disposition (it does not determine) the soul of *illuminati* to assume higher forms (*ad recipiendum emanationem*). Therefore, according to Avicenna, the middle member of the demonstrative judgment already contains in itself the necessary universal conclusion (*sicut termini medii praeparant ad recipiendum conclusionem necessario*; *Liber de anima* V.5; p. 127.48–50). It is not necessary to actualize the middle member in the deductive syllogism coming from *species sensibilis* as the source of cognitive causality. Avicennist’s interpretation of Grossesteste does not preserve the Aristotelian dichotomy of science that follows from metaphysics to logic. For Aristotle, science remains dichotomous because the hyparchical predication of two sciences differs in genus and thus in principle. Grosseteste abolished this generic distinction between two sciences and replaced it with hierarchical construction of a single universal science. In the new Neoplatonic scheme of deduction, the natural sciences (*scientia*) are subordinated to theoretical knowledge (*intellectus*). This scientific simulacrum was consecrated in postmodernism by *metaphysica generalis* and in the age of metaphysical nihilism as “Unified Science.” Direct Avicennist view of the first principles is inadmissible for the Aristotelian theory of science. The intellect is no longer a *tabula rasa* and cognition are not actualized from sensual experience. The critical scientist does not recognize the world like a modernist angel. In this case, the actualization of intellect necessarily proceeds from the separated cosmic intellect. If Grosseteste already proclaimed this analytical conception of unified science in Paris, then he could not establish the unity of “meta-physics” as the first science *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Sicilian interpretation. Therefore, he belonged to the school of *sequaces Aristotelis*, although because of different reasons than Avicennist modernists in the school of Philip the Chancellor or Neoplatonists in the school of the Abbey of St. Victor. These Porretans were unable to offer a sound philosophical critique of Dinant’s Aristotelian pantheism, only Blund’s school could accomplish this task in full. The Parisian University was constituted in the struggle against the Aristotelianism of Toletans, defended the real science and the real humanism of the undivided person. After Alvernus’s nomination as bishop and chancellor of the new papal University, Grosseteste could no longer hold the post of *magister regens* at the university, although he certainly belonged there in view of his erudition and abilities. Albert the Great took this post and his first great controversy at Paris University about 1240 pitted him against Grosseteste’s two most distinguished Oxford students, Rufus and Kilwardby. Grosseteste’s departure to academically second-rate Oxford was inevitable, and here he encountered Avicennist academic soulmates. This Aristotelian Toletan formed original sophistical baccalaureates at the local Franciscan College in the years 1230–35. They were gifted with an extraordinary mythopoetic talent for metaphysical constructs. To this circle belonged above all Rufus of Cornwall. In the year 1230, the Oxford University, in the person of Grosseteste, chose the interpretation of the *Second Analytics* according to the Toledo school. In the same year, the magisters from Blund’s school, inspired by Scotus and his corpus of the Commentator, founded the Parisian University *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Sicilian school. Divine Muses founded the metaphysics on the level of *a/lētheia*, which complements and modifies in a fundamental way the theory of Kretzmann and Libera regarding the so-called “Oxford—Paris Split.” They conceived that theory but in the framework of objective difference between logical schools (Libera 1982). The archaic difference between the two universities reveals in the hidden influence of *a/lētheia*, the modern and classical interpretation of the truth and being of Being in its original historicity. The hermeneutic triad thereby shapes the contemporary history of both institutions, given by their historic existence (Oxford) and non-existence (Paris).

Definition of science in the school of the first and the second Averroism was divided by interpretation of the solar eclipse according to *Second Analytics*. Aristotle brings an example of scientific proof due to position of the eclipse in two processes (*Anal. Post*. II.8; 93a29–31; 93a36–b3). He builds the scientific explanation of the eclipse on the reality of the astronomical bodies as the first substances. Their real causality grounds the general explanation given by the deductive judgment. By introducing the metaphysical dative, the empirical experience of the eclipse is distinguished from the universal predication of this phenomenon in the scientific proof. The first Averroism saw clearly that the proof involves the univocal imposition relating to the real causality of astronomical bodies. The modern eclipse (ἐποχή; OBJ I, ch. 1.1) of Aristotle’s scientific interpretation of the real given astronomical eclipse had an epochal impact on the theoretical model of Western sciences. Modernity changed meaning of *Second Analytics* in the context of Oxfordian Fallacy by rejecting the metaphysical primacy of science. The real causality of astronomical bodies plays only second fiddle in the new interpretation.

“The eclipse in the mode of permanent simplicity (*simpliciter semper*) is given in the definition of its causes (*est in rationibus suis causalibus*), and no single eclipse phenomenon is permanently given in definition that entails the causality (*nulla tamen particularis eclipsis semper est in sua ratione causali*). Whether this is true or what Aristotle certainly did not mean to say, namely, that the eclipse permanently exists. He wanted to say that the syllogistic conclusion by which the eclipse is scientifically proved (*conclusio in qua demonstratur eclipsis*) is contained in the saying, which enjoys permanent validity whether the eclipse takes really place or not (*sice eclipsis sit sive non sit*).” [[289]](#footnote-289)

Again, the typical ambiguity of this assertion can be seen. It is given by passing over the real direction made by the imposition in the scientific proof. The scientific validity of the eclipse is given in the modality *per prius* in the general explanation of the second triad of principles (*simpliciter semper est in rationibus suis causalibus*). It is formally and logically correct that science exists only in the modus *simpliciter semper*. The scientific explanation needs in its universal validity no more real course given by the causality of the first substances. However, in Aristotle’s explanation, the real causality in the universal predication is held by the middle member of the scientific judgment, without which no natural sciences would exist. Again, it came to interchange of hyparchical predication done in the framework of the second form of necessity that contains the principle *inesse*. The hyparchical necessity of metaphysics disappeared and was replaced by the logical necessity. Grosseteste does not distinguish between the definition of causality at the level of the first substances and in the logical judgment, which means a violation of the first principle *ex inmediatis*. The statement connects both determinations by abolishing the autonomy of metaphysical proof and exchanging it with logical deduction given in the universal predication (*in sua ratione causali*). The quotation made according to the Porretan logic “*semel—semper*” asserts that the logical necessity given by the conclusion (second triad of principles) is always valid; but the empirical event need not always occur (first triad of principles). The concept of necessity is wholly univocal, which according to classical Aristotelianism is a fundamental categorical error. It does not concern the level of logical thinking but that of metaphysics reasoning. The imposition is always universally given; but thanks to the principle *ex inmediatis*, its univocity is stated in terms of (ἐν τῷ) what is the hyparchical and real causality (*Anal. Post.* 84a13). Then the first real substance upholds the subject of universal statement (ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, *Anal. Post*. 84a14). Sophistical modernists committed a fundamental error because, according to Aristotle, the metaphysical meaning (*secundum quid*) is predicated merely in terms of reality by the imposition of real causality in the middle member of the deductive proof. The modernists erased scientific proceeding made in the mode of metaphysical abstraction, since they abolished the imposition of real causality in the minor statement of *demonstratio*. They replaced the metaphysical meaning made *secundum quid* with the logical meaning made *secundum simpliciter*. This fallacy of the type “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*” founded scientific cognition in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. It had already existed in schools of Porretans and, in Alvernus’s time, in schools of Parisian Grammarians. In both incubators of the second Averroism it is asserted that the supposition applies in the mode “*semel—semper.*” Grosseteste founded the middle member of scientific deductive proof by illumination taken from behind, from the direction of the eternal principles (science as *intellectus*), instead of from the front, from the direction of empirical *scientia*. Therefore, in the resulting scheme of *demonstratio*, he lacks the imposition of meaning coming from reality. The cited interpretation of the solar eclipse generously passes it over as a mere contingent event (*sive non sit*). The construction of science according to *Second Analytics* is interpreted in terms of Porretan *resolutio*, that is, with the help of deduction or the “resolving” of knowledge (ἀναλύω) from the subsistent first principles of cognition. Being subsistent, they do not require a categorical relation to reality. Aristotle would never have said the formula “*sive non sit*” with respect to the real course of the eclipse. Scientific and thus metaphysically true predication must respect the fundamental way that makes scientific judgment as determined in real terms by the causality of first substances. Since real eclipse exists, we can predicate its universal necessity. The scientific necessity is given in the mode of metaphysical necessity, which is derived from the interaction of the first substances in the mode *simpliciter*, because the scientific judgment predicates the causal relations between the real astronomical bodies. According to Aristotle, the causal action of astronomical bodies is given in the hyparchical mode *per prius*. Without it, there can be no science based on actions among the first substances. But for theoretical sciences, necessity applies in relation to the generically distinct second substance. It is universally predicated through the logical or mathematical abstraction that is hyparchical in the abstraction. The logical necessity is given *simpliciter*, but in a completely different order of being, because it exists only in the thinking of the subject. It makes the abstraction of real relations. Therefore, there are two ways of knowledge. Logical and mathematical relations are not univocally transferable to metaphysical cognition that entails real relations. This applies to knowledge of the solar or lunar eclipse of unique astronomical bodies. The *simplex* given mode of logical necessity is not equal to the predication of the real substance. That fact exactly distinguishes the Aristotelian logic from the modern one. By introducing the universal-logical (*simpliciter*) given essence instead of the essential-metaphysical (*secundum quid*) essence, we cannot univocally replace the causal relations in the middle member of the proof. In the case of the eclipse, these relations are first given in reality, which implies the scientific imposition in the metaphysical mode *secundum quid*. These relations as categorically predicated, they exist in the modus *simpliciter* and *per prius* in the act of being the first substance, where nothing can be added to it. The imposition of its being establishes scientific cognition in the modus *per posterius* through categorial predication within the framework of *demonstratio*. In such a case, it follows metaphysical necessity made out of the metaphysical dative. Logical relations, in such a case, exist in the mode *simpliciter* et *per prius* made in the manner of univocity. The order of deduction is correct as far as truth as *adaequatio* is concerned; the univocal imposition made in the mode of metaphysical potentialities precedes the equally univocal supposition made in theoretical thought.

Let us now return to Grosseteste’s introductory quotation on the twofold conception of science, which shows the original *Lichtung* of modern *metaphysica generalis*. The first mode of being *per se* is taken after Porretan hypostases and Avicenna’s *ens inquantum ens*. Empirical cognition (*scientia*) is subordinated to this cognition through intuition of pure hypostatic forms (*intellectus*). The analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* conveys in the mode *per prius* an insight into the pure essences existing *per se*. Vision of those essences given only in thought and universally got priority over the real first substances in the world. The first cognition is direct and necessary (*cognitio primorum principiorum*), the second is given only contingently and with regard to the sensually perceived first substance (*scientia*). According to *Second Analytics*, such proceeding is valid for mathematical and logical procedures, but it cannot be applied in the case of the scientific cognition of the real first substances, such as solar eclipse. The substance in the mode *simpliciter* becomes in the first case on the level of the metaphysical abstraction and in the second case only on the ideal level of the mathematical or logical abstraction. From the original text of *Second Analytics,* it is clear that both modes of scientific cognition and predication are separated from each other by the different mode of necessity. Both modes of predication *per se* are generically different in the mode “διττῶς.” According to categorical predication, no common science can exist with respect to generically distinct second substances (hyparchical and logical). There would be no univocal statement with respect to the second substance as a guarantor of univocity. The transition of cognition from one genus to another is not possible.[[290]](#footnote-290) The second substances are the ultimate units of univocal meaning in Aristotelian categorical predication. The univocal position of genus as the last unit of univocity is given by the fact that it predicts the universal meanings with regard to the second substance, which takes the place of the first substance (*supponit pro*). Mathematics exists in the mode *per se* that differs from astronomical bodies. The passage quoted from Grosseteste’s interpretation proved a metaphysical error in the interpretation of scientific knowledge as it is interpreted sophistically in the mode of the Toledo school and the Grammarians. Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* in Oxford concealed the immediate reality of the first substance with the cloak of metaphysical ambiguity and shaped future evolution of the West. Let us now cite another ambiguity of Western modernity (*aliquantulum obscura*), which forms an epochal complement to the “obscurity” cited above. Using this term, Averroes criticized contradictions in Avicenna’s metaphysics (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The epoch of the eclipse of the first substance in the Latin West started by following quotation, which confirms Avicenna’s victory.

“This is evident from the cognition given immediately in reality (*inmediate ex proxima*), because because we recognize best first the premises and then the conclusion. The interpretation of this part, in my opinion, is somehow unclear (*in hoc loco quia est aliquantulum obscura*). The principles of such cognition are sometimes not really the first, since they are proved by the first principles (*quandoque non prima, sed probata per prima*). The first principles are the first because they no longer contain other principles in themselves and also do not arise from other principles.” [[291]](#footnote-291)

The first analytical commentary made the primacy of the first substance unclear in the first triad of the principles determining scientific cognition in the hyparchical mode *per prius*. The principles of the second triad determining the formal recognition of judgment must always be given, whether in the presuppositions or in the conclusion (*probata per prima*). Moreover, they are not subject to the contingent existence of the first substance (*non contingunt*), and therefore they are the first in the order of being (*non sequitur ex alio*). That is why they are also directly visible in their eternal evidence and certainty, which is given by the ontotheological structure of modern metaphysics. But this would mean that the first principles are self-sufficient in relation to cognition and they no longer need anything else. However, this would not be a human recognition, but a purely angelic one. In the mode *per prius* the being of the essence is defined as the first principle, which *per posterius* determines the second triad of principles of the deductive syllogism. Aristotelian doubling of scientific demonstration in the sense of the adverb “διττῶς” is abolished. A hierarchy of knowledge is established in the mode of Neoplatonic deduction of forms from the superior genus (*intellectum*) to the inferior and determinate species (*scientia*). The parousia of essence revealed in the mind of *illuminati* replaced the principal causality given by statements that follow the metaphysical dative. The *demonstratio* in the form of essentialist parousia is revealed in mind of *illuminati*. Such a splendid revelation replaced the causality conceived univocally, which is given by predication in the mode of the metaphysical dative. However, Grosseteste was a classically educated Aristotelian and therefore knows very well that the ambiguity cannot be on the side of logic, because there are but true and false statements. The ambiguity is given on the side of equivocally conceived causality and necessity. Pure logical proof does not need any recognition of real phenomena. The work *Analytica Posteriora* received a Neoplatonic interpretation at Oxford. Hermeneutics of objectivity found in that way a fundamental answer to the question of “how” (*Wie* of Heidegger) the being is perceived in the preleable ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) of modernity. The causal effect of the real thing was taken over by universally conceived essence. It replaced the real existence of the world by epochal effectiveness of modern diacosmos. His modern version in Latin sophistry is based on Oxfordian Fallacy. Modernity has produced objective mythology instead of scientific proof. Scientist mythology is made by a false interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Grosseteste founded in Oxford a new form of Platonic cave. Under mythopoetic guidance of Furies, he created a new kind of philosophical chaos. Academic mendicants at Oxford constituted an epochal new form of *intelligentia spiritualis* (ch. 3.1.2). Modern intellectuals began to view the world through objective illumination. The meaning of the world is revealed in the parousia of almighty intellect, which is enlightened directly from the world of higher intelligences and by God of *Modernorum*. Today philosophical adepts from all over the world are initiated into these main mysteries of intellect. The chthonic Furies are certainly quite satisfied with the objective course of this divine comedy. From the underworld, today they supervise the digital creation of scientific indexes and virtual finances. The analytical concept of science follows Avicennist intuition of the essence in the modality *hoc esse tantum*. This essence replaced the real first substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). A similar perversion of metaphysics could not be carried out in critically thinking Paris at the time of the first generation of Averroes’s connoisseurs. The new discrete worldview of Oxford analysts derives from preceding schools of Porretans, since they defined the concrete individual in the same way (ch. 1.5).

Let us look at the interpretation of twofold modality given *per se* (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς) in the interpretation of *Second Analytics* mentioned above. Grosseteste abolished the original form of Aristotle’s twofold predication (the logical and the metaphysical) related to the first substance. He replaced it with twofold being of the substance of the third kind according to Porphyry (διτττὸν τὸ εἶναι; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). There is only one kind of logical necessity, but two modes of being: a real being and a mythological and later objective *tertium ens*. Because logical necessity is considered an absolute value, then the logically consequential and paranoid illuminati must doubled the world. Where the first Averroism sees the first singular substance and two modes of predication, modernity sees a real being and a *tertium ens* whose meaning is confirmed in one objective predication. The metaphysical error of modernity is based on the fact that the universalia given in the mode *per se* exist but in the thinking. They can never be exchanged with the first substance, because this possesses a completely different kind of being *per se* that is actualized in reality. Through the doubling of being into the archetypal diacosmos and the real cosmos, a new univocal metaphysic of *tertium ens* arose in the mode of modernized Neoplatonism. There is a new *Lichtung* of objectivity, where all entities are universally and univocally given out of themselves and for themselves (καθ' αὑτὰ).

“For this, it must be said that the universals are principles of cognition and are separated from the phantasms in the pure intellect that can contemplate the original light that is the First cause. Thus the universals are principles of intelligible things (*principia cognoscendi rationes rerum*), which exist in an uncreated way and eternally in the first cause (*increate ab eterno existentes in causa prima*). The cognition of created things, which were and are eternally in the first cause, are the definitions of the created things and their formal and exemplary causes. These formal determinations are creative as well (*ipse sunt etiam creatrices*). These determinations Plato called ideas and archetypal world (*ydeas et mundem archetypum*). These are genera, species and principles that make being of existent things and their cognition. Insofar the intellect takes the intuition of that kind, then it contemplates in these principles most truly and clearly not only created things, but also the very first light, in virtue of that all is known.” [[292]](#footnote-292)

The true and certain cognition does not begin through sensual abstraction, but through the pure intellect separated from phantasms (*intellectum purum et separatum a phantasmatibus*), which is able to contemplate the light of the divine intellect (*possibilem contemplari lucem primam*). It is not difficult to recognize in this passage the influence of Avicenna’s highest form of enlightened intellect (*intellectus sanctus*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). In this divine archetypal sphere are the original forms of created things (*in causa prima eternaliter sunt rationes rerum creandarum*) and also the effective causality for the exemplary cosmic forms at the level of immaterial intelligences (*causae formales exemplares*). The direct vision of Avicenna’s divine intellect as *Dator formarum* explains why the analytic cognition does not begin with the reality of first substances. Porretans and Cartesians reach it only in a secondary way. First, they mystically join the sphere of autonomous forms in God or in the cosmic sphere of eternal forms and mathematical ideas. A fundamental problem is the causal efficacy of cosmic forms. Modernists can receive it directly through the separated *intellectus agens*. This means that human intellect joins directly cosmic *intellectus agens* that creates independent hypostases or forms in the soul. Similar teaching could not be proclaimed in Paris at this time, since it presupposed the enlightenment of thinking from the direction of the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. Another important part of the quotation shows how this cognition proceeds. The order of cognition (*cognitiones rerum creandarum*) follows deduction made by the descent of autonomous forms according to the scenario in Neoplatonic work *Liber de causis*. The higher forms as fundamental archetypes and exemplary ideas descend from the divine thought, where they were in an eternal state (*fuerunt in causa prima eternaliter*), and they act secondarily in creation. Such vision contemplates the atomic substance of Neoplatonists as being of the third kind (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). In the process of abstraction, the intellect arrives at the evidence of the specific substances with the help of pure intellectual intuition (*intellectus purus potest in his defigere intuitum*). This new worldview based on the eidetic insight, gave the Oxford *illuminati* the right and evident sense of all being (*verissime et manifestissime cognoscit res creatas*). In epochal darkness of Oxford Platonic cave, after the extinction of the real world of the first substances, a new age of analytic philosophy arrived. The objective reality is recognized in the mode of Avicenna’s *certitudo* and Anselm’s *rectitudo* because it is given by *more geometrico* according to the deductive scenario *Liber de causis*. The world of eternal species existing in modern God organizes the formal production of being, going from the higher forms downwards, to the lower forms. The release or division of forms to the lower units of cognition (ἀναλύω, *deducere*) is tied to the division of universals according to the Porphyry’s Tree. The archetypal genera and species have univocal and substantial character (*genera et species et principia tam essendi quam cognoscendi*). The quotation defends the direct apprehension of this “species—substance” that belongs to the archetypal sphere of cognition. The new way of science is based on the ontotheological structure of metaphysics. The pure intuition of active creating forms brings the philosopher up to contemplation of the first source of intellectual illumination, through which he then cognizes the creation (*ipsam lucem primam in qua cognoscit cetera*). The key sentence shows the procedure of cognition. The material things are exposed from behind by the intuition of the active pure intellect (*cum intellectus purus potest in his defigere intuitum*). The intellectual intuition of the first principles evidently cognizes the material created things (*in istis verissime et manifestissime cognoscit res creatas*). Grosseteste also adds to the view of Platonic ideas and archetypes direct Avicennist intuition of Porretan hypostatized genera and species. These universals form an integral part of the process of individuation according to the Porphyry’s Tree, to reach the last essential and no more divisible entity called “*individuum*” (ch. 1.4). This procedure of abstraction in the form of Avicenna’s *denudatio* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1) can be found in the same decade in the concept of *resolutio* of Parisian magister Philip the Chancellor, the first theorist of the conversion of transcendentalia (ch. 2.3.2). Neoplatonic forms are operative in our cognition directly according to the deduction *modo geometrico* given in the *Liber de causis*. Now it becomes clear why Grosseteste had to go from Paris to academic exile in Oxford. Pope Gregory IX overruled the votum of the chapter Notre Dame and he appointed Alvernus as the new bishop of Paris in 1228. This eminent representative of Blund’s school could not allow the promulgation of similar doctrines at the Parisian University. Grosseteste’s intellect, presented in the manner of Neoplatonists and Avicenna, has direct insight into the universal forms contained in separated active intellect and in individual material things as well. For this fundamental reason, the *anima intellectiva* is an Avicennist hypostatic substance and not a *tabula rasa*. Grosseteste separated himself from Blund’s school by radicalizing in the second stage the exposure of being from behind, in the direction of the *intellectus agens*. This exposure was already present in his interpretation of *De anima* (ch. 2.2.1). Grosseteste defends Averroes against Avicenna according to the Toledo school, Alvernus defends him according to the Sicilian school. Both interpretations of the Commentator are incompatible and they cannot establish a kind of unified metaphysics.

Let us return to fundamental difference between two anonymous commentaries on *De anima*, which were published in the years 1225–30. The two writings clearly show different nature of *intellectus agens* and *intellectus formalis* (ch. 2.2.2). Alvernus′s first writing on De anima (*De potentiis animae et obiectis*) was probably written before 1230 in response to Grosseteste′s toletan expositions of cognition and science, which he delivered in Paris. Grosseteste wrote the first commentary on *De anima*, which was based on the school of Blund (*De anima et de potentis eius*). And we may also rightly assume that he had already presented a new interpretation of *Second Analytics* in Paris in 1225–28 (the appointment of Alvernus as bishop and chancellor), which he published in Oxford (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros*, 1230). This interpretation was obviously written in the spirit of *sequaces Aristotelis* that Alvernus condemned, and it was incompatible with teaching of the Sicilian school of the first Averroism. In the Toledo school, influenced by Neoplatonism and Avicennism, the full unity of the person was not possible. This was clearly shown in the later disputes between Toletan Aquinas and Sicilian Siger. An example of direct eidetic insight into the actual form is represented by Grosseteste’s definition of exemplar, which became a new substance of the third kind (*dicitur simul exemplar et quo res est*).[[293]](#footnote-293) Bonaventure takes over the key part of this definition (*exemplar dicitur solum forma, quæ est in mente artificis*) and makes of it the first ontotheological construction of objectivity (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The quotation shows the connection between the intuition of hypostatic forms given from behind and the demiurgic predication “*in artificialibus*,” which makes the ontotheological basis of objectivity. Grosseteste follows Aristotelian line of interpretation and therefore rejected the Platonic ideas as independently existing substances. But he works with these ideas in the form of exemplars (*formales exemplares*). Those exemplar forms can be considered in the act of evident cognition (*lucem primam in qua cognoscit cetera*). This eidetic vision of modern demiurge à la Avicenna, Descartes and Husserl enables to recognize pure being in evident way (*verissime et manifestissime cognoscit*). The certainty of cognition corresponds to the level of higher immaterial substances, which are contemplated in the act of the enlightened intellect. The first regard of Neoplatonic and Augustinian eye of the soul is given unclearly in the material substances. The evidence of cognition is in pure forms of higher human intellect, which receives the radiation of spiritual forms. The intellect must be awakened to receive the higher form of illumination and cognition, which lies in the world of separated forms and intelligences and finally in God as the Giver of forms and the first principles of cognition. Seduced by the power of their paranoid intellect, the demiurgic *illuminati* have placed themselves in the divine place that Parmenides reserved for Goddess of Truth. Grosseteste founded the first philosophy of objectivity from this position of the divine eye established by Toletans. The substitution of the essence for the metaphysics of substance is given in the mode of the archaic untruth (*a/lētheia*). The modernity is based on the mystical form of deduction, which is caused by the effect of deceptive Muses. They were expelled from the territory of modern science deprived of reality ; they sent analytical Furies instead. Divine Muses control the manifestation of false mysteries of science and reason celebrated by modern *illuminati* from the hidden musical truth of Being. It has been unfortunately manifested in Oxford since 1230 through the work of chaotic Furies. Archaic hermeneutics follow original effect of divine powers. A sense of the world built on Oxfordian Fallacy represents an tragic and insane cognition of reality (μανία).

Grosseteste interprets *Second Analytics* according to abstraction in the mode of Porretan logic rather than abstraction in the mode of Aristotelian metaphysics. His interpretation connected for the first time the thinking of *Logica Modernorum* with the Aristotelian conception of science. The writing *Second Analytics* indeed contains an assertion about direct intellectual insight into the premises of judgment (ὑπόληψις τῆς ἀμέσου προτάσεως, *Anal. Post*. 88b37). Direct insight into the connection of the premises of scientific proof, however, is always linked to the actuality of the immediately given first substance. Aristotle praises the ability of sharp thinking to perceive the conclusion without syllogism, viz, as it is immediately given in reality (ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου, *Anal. Post*. 89b10–11). This passage, however, must be read according to Aristotle’s overall intention. The mode of scientific cognition must be consistent with the hyparchical position of first and second substances in *Categories*; it corresponds to the theory of cognition and intellect given in *De anima*; it seeks the unity of being according to “meta-physics” of the first substance given by metaphysical abstraction. The Oxford school linked the interpretation of *Second Analytics* to Gilbert’s concept of subsistent essence (*esse namque subsistentia est, non substantia*) and associated it with Avicennism (ch. 1.4). By including the substance of the third kind in the scheme of cognition, the analytic philosophy of the West was born. The next generation after Grosseteste constituted the dualism of body and soul in the mode of universal hylemorphism. The first form of this dualism also emerged at the same time in Paris, within the framework of Augustinian Avicennism in the works of the type *Summa Duacensis* (ch. 2.2.2). In the epoch of the scholastic eclipse of the first substance, Grosseteste repeated ancient Neoplatonic scenario of doubled being according to Porphyry (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The interpretation of the *Organon* and especially of the *Second Analytics* according to the Toledo school was fundamentally flawed in the key point mentioned above (*Anal. Post*. 84a11–12). The error of the Porretans had been pointed out earlier by the classical schools of *Logica Vetus*. Modernity does not distinguish between logical and metaphysical abstraction, which is defined as a fallacy of the type “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*.”

Schools of *Logica Modernorum* and after them Grosseteste, Kilwardby and Rufus changed the sequence of the basic axioms of research. Albert rejected that proceeding in his writing *De homine* (ch. 2.4.1). The logician and mathematician work in the logical abstraction. They do not become aware that this kind of abstraction is given in the mode of *simpliciter* beyond the metaphysical abstraction. Logicians in their generically given science have made an unwarranted leap into the categorical predication of metaphysics. In the sphere of metaphysical abstraction, signification is determined solely by the imposition of meaning from the direction of the real recognized first substance in mode “*secundum quid*.” The corpse is not a man, since the imposition of the meaning “man” in the order of categorical statements in the metaphysics reports to the living person. Both Albert and Bacon rejected the idea of abolishing imposition and replacing it with logical abstraction. One cannot pass from logic and mathematics into metaphysics, only from metaphysics into logic. Therefore, the mind must follow the unchanging path of the Sun in the firmament to determine the real causes of the astronomical eclipse. Oxfordian Fallacy proposed erroneous predication “*secundum quid”* because it abolished the hyparchical position of the first substance. The reality determined by the first substance *per se* was changed into a purely formal predication. The analytic predication is given in the mode *per se*, but by no means in the same hyparchical meaning as the metaphysical abstraction. The analytic interpretation abolished the primacy of the first triad of principles and considers them *per posterius*. By univocal connection, the fundamental generic distinction between logical and metaphysical predication given in the mode *per se* disappeared (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διτττῶς, *Anal. Post*. 84a12). This error characterizes analytic philosophy to this day. Thinking of modernity does not entail classical Aristotelianism, but modern Avicennism. Grosseteste defines cognition in the mode of the Toledo school, which he assimilated to that of the Nominales prevailing at that time in the Oxford school. The necessity of science is deduced from the mathematical proportion and from the second triad of the principles of *demonstratio*. The necessity in the form of supposition includes only the formal relations of the deductive syllogism, which do not relate to the existence of the first substance given in reality. The complete figure of Oxfordian Fallacy establishes the procedure of cognition of modernity in the *epokhē* from the reality of the first substance. The new metaphysics of the analytic modernity runs in the mode of the epochal aberration to take the third way of cognition, which is outside of Plato and Aristotle. In the newly constituted analytic form of science, the Toletans do not need any determination of the scientific proof from the causality of the real substance. Formally and logically determined essence substitute for causality in new kind of deductive reasoning.

“Therefore, it is true that we must necessarily know the existence of the thing in order to know its essence, because the knowledge of existence (*scire quia est*) precedes the knowledge of essence (*prius est quam scire quid est*). Against this, however, Aristotle argues as follows: All that we know by scientific judgment must be substance. If we inquire whether this substance is known by causal effect (*si demonstratur quia est scitur per causam*), then we know it anyway by its definition (*ergo scitur per diffinitionem*). Therefore, causality and the definition are identical (*idem est causa et diffinitio*). Consequently, the definition of what the thing is in its essence (*quid est res*) is first accepted (*prius accepta est diffinitio*), before the existence of the real thing (*quia est res*). Therefore, we have the definition and know what the thing is, which, however, cannot be done without the fact that the thing exists.” [[294]](#footnote-294)

The first sentence of the quotation establishes the axiomatic sequence of cognition that starts from the existence of the thing to the essence (*scire quia est prius est quam scire quid est*). Grosseteste’s interpretation only seemingly respects the letter of the text about the primacy of the existent substance with respect to the essence (τὸ διὰ τί ζητῶμεν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστι, *Anal. Post*. 90a1). The next phrase changed this meaning all the way round. Invoking Aristotle (*sed contra hoc opponit Aristoteles*), it exchanges the primacy of the existence of the thing with nominally conceived logical supposition of the thing. This is a typical example of analytical interpretation in Oxfordian Fallacy. The minor statement in the deductive syllogism is established by the exposition of being made from behind. Instead of imposing the causality from reality, the middle member of the syllogism received only the nominal suppositional character as general definition. They reversed the order of predication *per prius* in the original doctrine that starts from the existing thing. The analytic science starts in the knowledge from the universal essence given in the intellect. Aristotle categorically distinguishes the generic univocity of scientific cognition from the other generic univocity given in mathematical analysis. The modern interpretation is no longer metaphysical and categorical, but logical and analytical. The quotation put essence sophistically before existence. The causality given among the first substances is conceived univocally, and even perfectly identically, in the nominalistic *medium* of the syllogism (*idem est causa et diffinitio*). The primacy lies with the suppositional definition of essence (*prius accepta est diffinitio que dicit quid est res*). The quoted conclusion is pure sophistry. It claims that quoted scientific definition is based on real existence of things, because otherwise their definitions could not be given in the essential form (*scitur quid est res et nondum scitur si est res*). The first modernist believes only that a true cognition of reality exists because he postulates it by the logically valid series of proofs. The final reason for true knowledge is given by the exclusion of another possibility (*quod est inpossibile*).

The real world has the right to exist because it does not contradict modern logic. The postmodernist Leibniz finalized this modern postulate by the theorem of sufficient reason (*principium rationis sufficientis*, ch. 3.5). The analytic interpretation made the logical word a substantial body and made it dwell objectively among us. The mysterious glory of this tertium ens is proclaimed and celebrated by today’s analytic philosophy in the age of metaphysical nihilism. The direct cognition of reality is given only by the form of the lower empirical scientia and is therefore unclear and erroneous. Therefore, scientific truth must be deduced from the higher and permanent necessary principles and forms considered within the framework of *intellectio*. Oxfordian analytic school associated both modes of attribution in a univocal way that Aristotle explicitly distinguished. The writing *Second Analytics* asserts that scientific cognition can be established univocally only within the framework of one and the same genus as the ultimate guarantor of true meaning. This conception of univocity tied to genus has a key significance in *Second Analytics*. Scientific cognition of the real causality on the level of first substance is generically distinct from the theoretical causality of mathematical notions and logical essences. The school of the first Averroism therefore distinguishes fundamentally between logical and metaphysical abstraction, because they are two generically different forms of the hyparchical necessity. Therefore, it gives an entirely different meaning to logical supposition and categorical imposition. Aristotle postulates a univocal connection of scientific deduction to the first substance. It acts through actual causality, which is represented by the minor statement in the syllogism. This first hyparchical substance is predicated *simpliciter* in the scientific proof, because it is given necessarily by its own act of existence. In contrast to Oxfordian modernism and Cartesian postmodernism, Aristotle goes to things themselves by following the metaphysical dative. This approach is fundamentally different from modernist parousia of essence. It is revealed in illuminated mind and then predicated in the form of hypostatized essence as *tertium ens*. Aristotle predicates the astronomical eclipse according to the real causality of the Sun and the Moon as first substances that directly participate in the appearance of the eclipse. Then the predication proceeds according to necessity in hyparchical first substances, that is, in the mode “*ex inmediatis*” (ἂν δι' ἀμέσων, *Anal. Post*. 93a36). In the same place, it is asserted that this principle establishes by its existence the medium of the deductive syllogism that follows real necessity (εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι δ' οὔ, *Anal. Post.* 93a36). According to Albert, this principle is contained in the axiom “*inmediate*” and is directly related to the first substance in reality (ch. 2.4.1). The second universal substance comes into being by the imposition of sense coming from the hyparchical first substance. That proceeding establishes the univocity within the framework of the one genus. Oxfordian Fallacy violated the key principle of true scientific cognition, which is given by the correspondence of the intellect to effects of real things. The imposition of the unique necessity given by the real causality was abolished and replaced by the universal supposition of the logically given necessity. The analytic interpretation abolished the causally based procedure of cognition with respect to reality, to which the scientific *demonstratio* is primarily directed in the order of metaphysical abstraction. The transformation of the real principle of cognition into an ideal construct forms the basis of the thought of the school of *Modernorum*, which introduced the analytic interpretation of the *Second Analytics* at Oxford in the years 1230–35. The cited fallacy of Latins belongs to the framework of logical fallacies discussed at that time and condemned in the school of *Logica Vetus*. Bacon confirmed it in the polemic against Kilwardby’s school (ch. 3.2). Modern science begins with the eclipse of the first substance. The eclipse of the real Sun as an astronomical body has disappeared, and with it the causal effect of reality on our cognition. The modern *illuminati* began to play Pythia, who prophesies in the dark cave. Aristotle, on the other hand, calls for a healthy and critical mind that sensually recognizes the world of the real first substances.

The new interpretation of *Second Analytics* established the historial event (*Ereignis*) of blindness to reality. We observed archaic and epochal manner, how (*Wie*) the first *Irrtum* of modern metaphysics arose in the mode of *peccatum originale*. The historicity of effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) shaped the different path of both schools and explains the positive history of modern and postmodern science. Grosseteste’s commentary shifts causal effects of first substances that make the astronomical eclipse towards the intuitive insight into first principles (*intellectus*). The procedure of Grosseteste’s deduction is erroneous in relation to the metaphysics related to first substances. From the point of view of *Logica Vetus*, which defends the Aristotelian approach of knowledge and truth as a correspondence, the analytical science presented within the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy represents a pure sophistry. The corpse is not a human being in the order of the metaphysical abstraction given by the imposition, although the specific definition refers to the corpse as a “human being” in the logical supposition. The problem of Oxfordian Fallacy is based on the abolition of the metaphysical imposition and its sophistical replacement by a logical supposition. The necessity of an imposition predicted from the real relations of the first substances is not properly distinguished from logical necessity. This group of hyparchical logical meaning includes mathematical numbers, geometric figures or Porretan hypostases. However, the real thing is necessary because it exists in itself, and not because of existence of logic. We find a similar mistaken statement in Avicenna’s interpretation of the *Second Analytic*. It foreshadows the development of the second Averroism by hyparchical position of the genus as the first substance.[[295]](#footnote-295) According to Avicennism, individual things contain hypostatized forms only to an insufficient extent and only thanks to their participation in the higher order of being. Man recognizes these forms through the *intellectus adeptus* and through the special form of abstraction given as denudation of the independent autonomous forms. In the process of Avicennist *denudatio* these pure and autonomous forms must be free from contingent matter. The school of the second Averroism adheres to Avicenna’s twofold conception of science as *scientia simplex* and *scientia cogitabilis*, which primarily takes the intuition of hypostatized intelligible forms (*virtus intellectus simplicis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). In such mythopoetic Neoplatonic and later Avicennistic diacosmos emerged the higher science of *illuminati*. They observe the essences first and later take up the lower science of less enlightened Aristotelians that investigates the real world. Under the leadership of absolutely logical Furies, Grosseteste changed the real path of the Sun, to which Parmenides relates the identity of the reality and thinking (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, *Parm*. B 3). Plato respected this path in the dialectical process of orthotomy and separated the sophistic simulacra from reality (*Soph*. 265a1). Aristotle transferred this orthotonomy back to the reality of the first substances in the principle of the metaphysical dative that *Second Analytics* follows through the principle *ex inmediatis*. The analytical interpretation founded the categorial predication on a completely convertible wandering (*Irre*) in the realm of shadows and the sophistic simulacra given in the modus *communiter*. The *illuminati* have their own solar intellect in thinking and they take all directions in their cave. This modern analytical *veritas*, however, symbolizes the chthonic chaos according to the original musical truth as *a/lētheia*. Therefore, the thinking of the modern is guided by the demonic Furies as deities of Chaos and Darkness. The odyssey of nihilistic modernism is guided by its own solar myth. Modernity has created a paranoid form of the solar myth and its chaotic and nihilistic odyssey can never return to the commencement of knowledge. This was not the way of the first Averroism, defended at that time in Paris.

According to Oxfordian Fallacy, the foundation of cognition comes from the universally postulated essence predicted in the mode of logical and mathematical supposition, and not from the causally acting first substance predicted in the mode of causal imposition. This fatal confusion constitutes the fundamental metaphysical error of the modern and postmodern nature of science made in the analytical philosophy. The second triad of the first principles was replaced by the first one, which created a new sense of being. The real astronomical phenomena are explained within the framework of formal and logical deduction and not within the framework of causally and metaphysically given deduction. True science refers to the real causality of the first substances. Logical abstraction keeps hyparchical value but at the level of the second triad of principles. It cannot fulfill this requirement on the level of the first triad, since it has no connection with reality. According to the above-mentioned quotation of the *Second Analytics*, this logical necessity is stated only as a component of abstracted meaning of the level of supposition. In contrast to the categorical predication of real causality and necessity (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, *Anal. Post.* 84a13), the quotation clearly proves that the hyparchical status of logic exists only in thinking. The Aristotelian physics and biology, which are considered in the Sicilian school *ad mentem Averrois*, have been replaced by the modern logic and mathematics of the Toledo School. Metaphysics finally became extinct as a completely unnecessary ballast of logic in the analytical branch of the neo-positivist *illuminati* of the Vienna Circle. The modern mathematical nature of the world began with the analytical interpretation of the *Second Analytics*, which was praised by the Avicennist Husserl in his last work *Die Krise der europäischen Wissenschaften und der transzendentalen Phänomenologie* (1936). The academic completion of the solar myth is given shortly before the start of the global production of human corpses in the Second World War. It was completed with two nuclear explosions over unprotected civilian cities. From the point of view of the first Averroism, the modern and postmodern Porretans committed the cardinal error, which caused an actual crisis of European science due to a lack of metaphysical distinction at the level of the real being. The *illuminati* do not see the crisis of science they have caused. The mythological interpretation of *Second Analytics*, doubled being as a real being and a *tertium ens*. It established a new metaphysical perspective, which determines the objective reality of the world instead of the real one. Under the leadership of iluminated Furies, analytical sophists and scientists see the world through direct intuition of the intellect based on the first principles given in thinking. Thanks to the modern hubris, this enlightened intellect stands far higher than empirical scientia. The absolutely important deductive syllogism of *Second Analytics*, which scientifically recognizes the real phenomena, forms only the accident of the theoretical insight into the pure forms. Analytical philosophy ignored the relationship with reality as unimportant. In demonstrative judgment, the formal essence or definition supplanted the original causality related to the causal interaction of the first substances. Scientific rationality build up in Oxfordian Fallacy keeps the same univocal form of predication as the sophisma of the dead man, which in the previous decade 1225–30 separated the first Averroism from the interpretation of the Toledo school.

In the decade from the year 1230, a new gigantomachy about substance started between Aristotelianism and *via Modernorum* to prolong gigantomachy between Averroes and Avicenna in the Falsafa. Averroes’s critique of Modernism (*quod contingit Modernis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4) reacted to the eclipse of the first substance by Porphyry (OBJ I, ch. 1.3) and then challenged the modernity created by Avicenna. This event of thinking shaped the history of the Latin West. It interpreted metaphysical being according to both founders of Falsafa and in the context of Aristotle’s twofold predication of universality. Modernity abolished this difference and took its own path to follow uncritical understanding of *tertium ens*. Grosseteste solved gigantomachy in the early period according to Blund’s school in the mode of hyparchical predication. It was set out in his treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* with regard to disputes over the definition of dead man (*dead man sophism*, ch. 2.2.2). The corpse is not a human being in the context of the imposition of meaning related to reality, but in the context of Porretan supposition. Modern analytical interpretation followed exclusively the one path of hyparchical signification outlined in *Second Analytics*. As a result, the status of universality and necessity changed from the dual metaphysical and logical conception upheld in the first Averroism to a univocal and objective version according to Oxfordian Fallacy. Because of this interpretation of Aristotelian corpus, Grosseteste had to move from Paris to Oxford, where the Porretan and Avicennist school of magisters ruled around the year 1230. The Sicilian interpretation *ad mentem Averrois* was prevalent in Paris thanks to the Blund’s school and Alvernus. The first Averroism exercised a little influence at Oxford. Bacon brought this interpretation to his *alma mater* from his studies in Paris sometime after the year 1245. However, his interpretation in the spirit of the Sicilian school had no chance against Grosseteste’s and Rufus’s school, which had already existed a decade earlier in Oxford (ch. 3.2). The twofold donation of being in the mode *per prius* from the recognized reality and from the cognizing subject separated schools of the first and the second Averroism. Each school began to recognize the substance in a different model of truth. The principle *inmediate* was defended in the framework of the first triad of Albert’s principles in the Aristotelian science related to the first substance (ch. 2.4.1). For hermeneutics, there is a fundamental difference between Albert’s Aristotelian interpretation of *Second Analytics* and the logical conception *ex inmediatis* in Grosseteste’s modern interpretation. This history of the metaphysical and logical being has escaped contemporary medievalist studies due to the objectively given blindness of modern science that follows the identitary mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. Modernity has no phenomenological method to investigate metaphysical shift in the mode of being and the twofold necessity in the mode of hyparchical *ipse* and the logical *idem*. For Aristotle, the sequence of the first of principles to the second triad is obligatory and determines the course of cognition. Albert clearly defended it the interpretation of dual cognition of the soul in *De homine*. The exegesis has shown that this interpretation is based on Averroes’s interpretation according to the Sicilian school. Only the causal effect of one thing on another (*diffinitio passionis*) establishes the scientific *demonstratio*. Albert related the middle link of the deduction to what the thing is in the order of real causality (*id est, quare insit*). If cognition begins to determine cognition primarily from the general form, from the second triad of principles, then the reference to reality is absent in the demonstrative proof. Logically and objectively, this proof lacks nothing at all. The definition of science, which is given as a metaphysical evaluation of scientific cognition in the mode of universality related to the hyparchical being (καθόλου ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν) distinguishes fundamentally the school of the first and second Averroism. The reason for defense the first substance in the first Averroism with is now obvious, as the criticism of bishop Alvernus with regard to the school of Grammarians shows (ch. 2.3.2). For these reasons, hermeneutics investigate the triumphal march of modernity in its original *Lichtung* of truth. The learned sophistry of *Latinorum* in Oxford and in Paris founded its untruth. The history of effects started by academic defeat of modernists in Paris in 1230–50. During the pontificate of bishop Alvernus prevailed the truth of the first Averroism. Taken the perspective of obscurity that concerns Being dwelling in the mode of *a/lētheia*, divine Muses have instigated in Oxford since the year 1230 a chaotic interpretation of cognition which is musically referred to as the “path of misguided contemporaries” (*via Modernorum*).

The interpretation of *Categories* in the framework of the analogical predication given around 1230 points to *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of modern univocal metaphysics based on the term “*analogia entis*.” This evolution will be analyzed in the next chapter. Once again, the dilemma of Porphyry’s threefold interpretation of atomic substance is repeated (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The metaphysical insight into the unity of being in the school of the first Averroism was taken according to Averroes’s metaphysics as a science about the first substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The categorial determination of the second substance implies real effects of first substances in the world. In this it differs from the similarity of relations given only in thinking. Analogical predication entails effects of first substances in the mode of common nature or similarity; or, it projects this causality into reality, for example, as a formal or final cause. Aristotelians cannot take analogical predication at the same univocal level as categorical predication because analogical similarity is only external in relation to predicates. The analogical predication presupposes the weak form of similarity between the first and the second substance. Such similarity cannot replace the univocal relation of causality in the framework of categorial statements of science that makes use of the middle member in the deductive and scientific proof. The analogical predication is given on the level of abstraction missing real effects in the world and therefore belongs to the realm of mathematics and geometry. Mathematics based on analogy is generically different from physics and metaphysics based on the real action of the first substances. The first substance given *simpliciter* guarantees by its hyparchical value the only possible way to ensure the univocal predication within the framework of the second substance. The school of the first Averroism rejected universal application of predication *in artificialibus* in the mode of analogy, which lays the foundation of the modern worldview through mathematical analogy. The different approaches to the attribution of unity (categorical versus analogical predication) have a crucial importance for subsequent confrontations between the school of first and second Averroism. The rejection of analogical predication for the justification of metaphysics points to the next round of interpretations concerning Averroes’s corpus, which the first and second Averroisms did in a different way. Modernists made disappear the difference between the metaphysical categorical predication. They used the analogical mathematical predication instead of metaphysics, which representatives of the first Averroism rejected in principle. Bacon, Albert, and Aquinas separated the formal recognition of the essence done in the order of mathematical abstraction from the metaphysical abstraction. It reflects the original unity of being on the basis of the real causality of first substances. Aquinas made an explicit and fundamental criticism of Avicennists and Porretans around the year 1258 by defending the metaphysical principle of “*separatio*” (Geiger 1947). Gilson, Geiger, and after them McInnerny emphasized the importance of Aquinas’s terminus “*separatio*” in his original interpretation of Boethius’s writing (*Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, qq. 5–6).[[296]](#footnote-296) Hermeneutics must complement the interpretation of these authors regarding the role of Avicenna because it understands the word “*separatio*” in the original meaning of Latin *terminus*, i.e., as fundamental dividing line between the first and second Averroism. The first Averroism took Avicenna’s definition of metaphysics, but rejected the abstraction as *denudatio* that determines analogical explanation of *Categories*. Therefore, Avicenna’s definition of the first science cannot establish the ultimate metaphysical unity of being in the mode “substance *qua* substance” since it makes it but at the analogical level of “*ens inquantum ens*.” The first Averroism, in contrast to modernists and postmodernists, knew very well that the Avicennist determination “*ens inquantum ens*” is a logical abstraction. Albert and after him Siger from the Sicilian school therefore put Avicenna’s determination only in the second place behind the metaphysical determination of substance according to Averroes. This concept of twofold scientific method and one truth adequately related to the reality of the first substance and to God as the First cause. Theology as revealed cognition of God was separated from philosophy and therefore both sciences were saved in their generic distinct knowledge. The theological cognition of God is generically distinct from the rational cognition of God as *causa prima*. The preceding interpretation of Oxfordian Fallacy has shown that modernity created an ontotheological simulacrum of God as the first and supreme essence. The modern God was no longer a person and became an individual essence. That *factum* was decidedly not good for his modern “exsistence” that is given exclusively in human mind. In the Falsafa, Aristotelian theologian Al-Ghazālī rejected Avicenna’s theory of the one truth given within the framework of unified ontotheology. That theory led to the death of God in Latin modernity (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). Averroes confirmed and concretized this theological position vis-à-vis modern Avicennists in the work *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*. In the case of Latin Avicennists, bishop Alvernus took over Al-Ghazālī’s theological role. Averroes resolved the relationship of natural and revealed theology according to *Metaphysics Lambda*. He created a theory of double method and double science linked to a single truth (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). We find a similar solution concerning generic difference between theology and philosophy in works of Bacon and Aquinas in the first Averroism. The history of this dispute in the context of gigantomachy of substance confirms that a fundamental metaphysical separation emerged between first and second Averroism. Therefore, the hermeneutics defend the different ontological statute of metaphysical abstraction as *separatio* in the first Averroism, which is fundamentally different from the univocal *resolutio* of the second Averroism. In that case, the unity is given by analogical predication of hypostases as modern categories. The modern *resolutio* created around the year 1230 a new kind of ontotheology with univocal and analytical concept of one truth. The new form of being as the highest genus introduced the concept of *analogia entis* and produced postmodern *metaphysica generalis*. This proceeding made the concept of “one truth” which is present in the academic idol called Unified Science. The school of the first Averroism defended the twofold method and the twofold, generically different cognition of one and the same reality. It is fundamentally different from the sophist accusation of so-called twofold truth, which was ideologically and authoritatively enforced against judicious Aristotelians. They understandably assumed one truth as the correspondence of thinking to the first real substance. Their notion of passive intellect was such that the soul could be everything thanks to the causal cognition of reality (*quodammodo omnia*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Then the generic types of cognition concerning theology, philosophy and logic could not be combined with each other to form a general metaphysics of the modernists and to form today’s nihilistic ontology of postmodernism. The recognition of God could not be predicted as ontotheological unity of being within the framework of analytical philosophy. Aristotelianism rejected the sophistry of modernity and therefore excluded all versions of Oxfordian Fallacy. The quarrels in Paris, which took place around the year 1240, show that Avicenna’s and Averroes’s metaphysics had two different concepts of the first science. Therefore, they do not have the same path to God as the last unity of being, although they understand the divine Being as the last goal and the highest truth of wise thinking. We reach God through the critical mind only through the recognition of the real substances as the first cause of them. The first Averroism probably knew the way of proof to God according to Averroes’s metaphysics (*dalā'il* OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The modern sophistry imputed the accusation of twofold truth in the form of a simulacrum called “Averroism” to those educated and critically thinking Aristotelians who saw the difference between twofold type of metaphysical and logical cognition. Postmodernism influenced by Renan’s interpretation of Averroism repeated this metaphysical error (ch. 2.3.3). Moreover, the first Averroism rejected to define the truth as *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. The logical predication of essences in the mode *simpliciter* is merely equivoque and analogical and does not keep up with the imposition of hyparchical causality coming from first substances. The dispute over the interpretation of *demonstratio* according to *Second Analytics*, for all the reasons listed above, acquired the character of an epochal event of thinking (*Ereignis*) at academic Oxford and for the whole of modernity. The eclipse of the first substance occurred around 1230 not only in the interpretation of *Second analytics*, but also in the interpretation of *Categories*. The nominalists joined the interpretation of Toletans concerning *De anima*. Avicennist’s interpretation of the CMDA runs in the paradigm of hypostatized solar intellect, which exposes the meaning of being from behind. Thus, we return to the donation of metaphysical being (ὑπάρχει, *inesse*) discussed in the previous chapter. The analytical interpretation changed the statute of hyparchical predication, now given by the universals conceived as being of the third kind. Modern form of hyparchical necessity is given by the exposure of being from behind. The essence represents a permanent cosmic or mathematical form, which is revealed *ad hoc* in the contingent existence of this or that thing. From the point of view of gigantomachy concerning the modern substance, it repeats Neoplatonic interpretation made by Ammonius. He changed the categories into separate genera, which characterize the highest genera of Platonic being. Avicennists John Pagus and Nicolas of Paris around 1230 published that kind of modern commentary on *Categories*. It came to creation of new categorical predication, because the first substance takes a universal meaning from a different source than the real existence of the first substance. For Alfarabi and Grosseteste, the essence of the unique thing is exposed simultaneously from the front and from the back, i.e., both from the first substance and from the world of autonomous forms. Hermeneutics explicitly add the word “simultaneously” to the twofold exposure in Grosseteste’s way of thinking. The emergence of the ontotheology bound to the cognizing subject instead of the first substance reveals the un-concealment (*a/lētheia*) of the further matrices of objectivity in their truth and untruth.

### 3.1.2 Individual and modern God

By departing from the thinking done at the start of the Parisian period, Grosseteste produced a sophistic *epokhē* of classical metaphysics to inaugurate the victorious era presided by Oxfordian Fallacy. This is another reason why he had to leave Paris after the year 1228. For the Aristotelians as Alvernus and Albert, the formal interpretation of the principle *ex inmediatis* makes clear violation of the fundamental structure of science. According to Sicilian interpretation of the Commentator, the school of the first Averroism defends the imposition of meaning from the first existing substance. The real necessity exists in the necessary existential mode, *simpliciter* and *per se*. Therefore, a categorical and scientific signification of this original necessity is required, because one cannot add anything to the existence of the thing in reality. It is true that the metaphysical identity of the first real substance is not the same as its logical identity. The primacy of mathematical abstraction proves another characteristic of the new interpretation. The analytical school, following the pattern of the analyzed writing *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, absolutized mathematical abstraction and took it as the basis of meaning (ch. 1.5). The writing *Second Analytics* takes the equivalence of essence and existence only for mathematics and geometry. These sciences abstract from the reality of the first substances and work at their level only with universally given essences. A transition from mathematical abstraction to metaphysical is not possible, since the number and the geometric figure exist only in thinking, and not in reality. Therefore, the predication is not identical with respect to the Porretan individual and to the Aristotelian second substance. Its value makes the result of the imposition of the first real substance. The corpse as modern individual is not an existing human being as the first substance. Socrates exercises his causality, which is not the same as that of the corpse. That is why *Second Analytics* had to be reinterpreted in the school of the first Averroism in order to save the original meaning of the demonstrative proof. The recognition of the real world must be in harmony with the basic character of cognition, as it is interpreted in the scripture *De anima*. The categorical predication lost its hyparchical attachment to the real first substance in the school of Oxfordian Fallacy, and this recognition is not given in the model of truth as Aristotelian correspondence or Averroes’s *proportio*. The analysis of Avicenna’s abstraction has shown that the ultimate goal of cognition as a direct insight into the eidetic essences exists in the sphere of immaterial separated intelligences. Their object of cognition is only subsistent immaterial form. The human *intellectus sanctus* can retain this recognition of the cosmic intelligences according to his powers. In a similar way, Grosseteste proceeds in the above-mentioned recognition of the first principles by accomplished *intellectus* and less perfect *scientia*. Grosseteste has the scheme of intuitive and innate recognition of the principles given as innate habitus (*sunt in nobis ab initio potentia*).[[297]](#footnote-297) The quotation foreshadows the future Cartesianism, since it is based on Avicenna’s innate active intellect, which is given in the model of the “Flying Man.” Objective necessity, following the pattern of the atomic substance of Neoplatonists, became another winged word of modernity that took root. The first example of objectively necessary predication was made by Avicenna in the mode *equinitas tantum* and *hoc esse tantum* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Due to the objectively predicted universality, the demiurge appropriates the real things (*dativus possessivus*; OBJ III, ch. 4). Such appropriation of the world is possible; but if it turns into a scientific cognition of reality, it makes a paranoia. In the cited definition, Aristotle separated the predication of universality with regard to hyparchical being of first substances from the logically predicated universality. There is nothing third in science, because the recognized entity exists in virtue of hyparchical necessity either in reality or in thinking. The being of geometric universals in thinking (“triangle” or “straight line”) is generically different from the unique being of the real and therefore necessarily *per se* first given substance (“this existing car”). Universality must be expressed with regard to the first substances, because it does not form a component of their being, as in the case of logical general things given only in thinking. The intellect of analytical *illuminati* took the place of the first substance, displacing the causality of the real substance in scientific proof. This metaphysical event, through which the demiurgic subject appropriates all meaning of being, laid out the epochal path of modernity in the mode of Heidegger’s lunacy (*Irre*). The analytical-logical formulation of this error was taken care of by the metaphysical error, which is given as founding of Oxfordian Fallacy. The objective dative put the universal being in Avicenna’s mode *ens inquantum ens* directly in the real things. The modern science within the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy sophistically predicts the hyparchical being of “things themselves” in the mode *per prius* from the direction of the human intellect and not from reality. Analytical deduction predicts the existence of the third kind in real things in the mode of objectivity established by the nominalist worldview. This worldview victoriously replaced the previous error of Porretans. In modernity, objectivity manifests itself as a historical and historical *factum*, which is created only by man, i.e., as a necessarily given universal truth of modern science. The original passage from *Second Analytics* postulates a twofold view of the necessary predication, because both the first substance and the universalia exist *per s*e and *simpliciter*. But only the being of the first substance is real, because each universal meaning is given only potentially, since it is formed by abstraction in thinking of the subject. By absolutizing this subjective and demiurgic form of hyparchical predication in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy, a new *factum* of modern science was created. The carrier of the original meaning of being is not the real world, but the cognizing subject. The following history of analytic philosophy, in the epoch of postmodern metaphysical nihilism, represents the positive *veritas* of this inviolability of being made in the mode of essential and logical abstraction. Man becomes the modern giver of cognitive forms to be modern God in order to replace ancient Avicenna’s Giver of forms. By predicting universality from the front in the direction of hyparchical real things or from the direction of hyparchical logical universalia, a new *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of Western science is constituted in the archaic mode of *a/lētheia*. This fundamental ambivalence, which is given by twofold interpretation of the attribution given *per se* (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12), determines the interpretation of *Second Analytics*. The first Averroism following Averroes, chose the first solution of the metaphysical donation of meaning from the direction of real things. The second Averroism following Avicenna, chose the demiurgic creation of meanings given in the modern subject. As a result, a new type of objectively determined diacosmos arose in Western thought, the Neoplatonic version of which we have analyzed in works of Jamblichus and Simplicius. Grosseteste interpeted *Secondes Analytiques* at Oxford in the paradigm of analytic philosophy. Introducing the solar myth, divinely chaotic Furies led the enlightened modernists into the underworld given as the realm of objective human corpses. These academic mysteries are celebrated at appropriate philosophical congresses and by scientifically awarded representatives. The critical philosophy, given already from the time of Parmenides and Heraclitus by Muses and in the real mysteries, does not like these modern black masses of the objective-analytical type and prefers to read Dante’s *Divine Comedy*. The death of modern God in the mythopoetic thinking of modernity is logically inevitable and forms a necessary component of nihilistic metaphysics of the West.

New interpretation of being does not require any first real substance to serve as direct cause for cognition of the world. Modernism believes that archetypal specimens exist either in the divine intellect or in the mathematics. The existence of real things is now postulated in the logically thinking demiurge due to dogmatic beliefs of modernists. They try to create an objective world after mythopoetic dialogue *Timaeus*. The first Averroism declared this modern creation *ex nihilo* to be nonsense, because the existence of the real thing precedes its potential recognition. The modern and postmodern Cartesians disregard the reality of first hyparchical substances, because they do not need them for evident deduction of knowledge. It makes a typical case of sophisms “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*.” The error arose from a univocal predication of hyparchical necessity, which has double hyparchical being given, on the one hand, in the first substance and, on the other hand, in the universal predication. Modernity makes the construction of first substance as *tertium ens* in the ontotheology. The mythological creation starts from the existence of separated *prima causa* as it was the case of Descartes as well. The analytical interpretation carried out the unification of science in the mode of logically comprehended essence and oriented path of modernity to the future *metaphysica generalis*. The following quotation shows the first modern deduction of the objective existence of the thing from its essence.

“Metaphysical proof proceeds from effects of existing first cause, which exists in and of itself (*per effectum de causa prima quia ipsa est*). We do not know about the existence of this substance as a genus from its own causality, because that cause as such does not exist in any other cause. But the existence of every other substance and accident can be proved by the causality and by the definition (*potest demonstraci per causam et diffinitionem*).” [[298]](#footnote-298)

The quotation shows the modern ontotheological argumentation. Grosseteste replaced the first substance with an abstract notion of *univoce* and essentially given causality (*causa prima quia ipsa est*). The logical identity replaced the metaphysical ipseity. Averroes and his followers knew exactly what kind of *significatio* they had in front of them when the causality of *causa prima* was predicated. The middle link of deductive syllogism (*medium*) in the modern deductive proof makes only a simulacrum, which applies to *causa prima* as essence. The existence of the real causality is not necessary for that kind of logical scientific proof. Even the real causality of God can be replaced by the essential definition of divinity (*divinitas* of *Nominales*), because they exchange the first triad of principles of cognition with the second. Paranoid modernity observes divine “exsistence” in the essential mode that entails the divine ipseity. This is absolute nonsense for the first Averroism, because we recognize God through natural knowledge only in the mode of his causal action. The first modern analyst needs the essential fact of God as the first, *absolute* given genus; otherwise the entire construction of the analytical scientific proof collapsed. God exists as a substance absolutely *per se*. This hypostatized and fully habitual characteristic of modern God, demanded by analytical logic, makes him a source of primary causality (*causa prima*). Descartes proceeds in the same way, since he needs God as the first cause for the same ontotheological reason. The ipseity does not refer to the actually given creative causality as in the first Averroism. The analytical interpretation relates to the ipseity of eternal divine essence as *tertium ens*. In the order of Oxfordian Fallacy, this essence enjoys a causal statute, which is given as *causa prima* by logical universality instead of metaphysical causality of God. The essentially conceived ontotheological God of modernity and postmodernity played the fatal role of *individuum* *primum*, as given separately from the other essences. Its causal effect, given in the Commentator and in the first Avicennism according to reason as a natural path to God, is now a completely secondary kind of Grosseteste’s *scientia* for the insufficiently enlightened empiricists. Averroes’s proof (*dalā'il*), in the spirit of *Second Analytics*, is given solely by causality. It is the only scientifically true possibility of following the metaphysical dative concerning the completely separated divine essence (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Modern God became merely a generic essence (*de hoc genere substantia non scitur per causam*), which was ontotheologically necessary as ultimate reason for thinking. Hermeneutics found the original beginning (*Beginn*) that brought about the death of God in nascent nihilism of modern metaphysics. Modern God became the highest genus in the manner of the Neoplatonist Johann Scotus Eurigena (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). In his Neoplatonic thinking, God conceptualizes the created essences objectively, that is, as forms and exemplars. This gave birth to ontotheological justification of the objective being, which is bound to the substance of the third kind (*esse cuiuslibet substantie specialis*). Nietzsche is absolutely right in saying that modernity killed its God, and even more by doing so by its own hands. It cannot be otherwise in scientific mythology of modernity. The hermeneutics found a *corpus delicti* and the criminal. Grosseteste outlined the first objective version of the idle first essence in the ontotheological mode *deus otiosus*. The new “gay science” (Nietzsche) in the thinking of *illuminati* no longer requires any real causal effect of God as the first cause. This was postulated by a lower science according to the first Averroism, and before that in the Aristotelism of Abelard. The interpretation of the *Book Lambda* in *Metaphysics* interpreted *ad mentem Averrois* does not define the ontotheology and mythology that entails the necessary essence of God, but only the effect of the *causa prima* given within the framework of the “meta-physics” of substance *qua* substance. Grosseteste turned the scheme around in a modern and sophistical way, because he deduces the causal effect of God as the first cause in the “*semel—semper*” mode established by absolute substantiality of God. Thanks to the eternity of the divine essence secured in this way, we can in the subsequent ontotheology ensure existence of real substances in the order of the effective causality of divine creation. Moreover, we positively know that God really created the world in the mode of *semel*. Then, in the style of Avicenna’s emanation or analytical deduction, we can predict downwards the divine causal effect, comming from the direction of absolute substantiality. However, the Aristotelian Grosseteste rejected the scenario of Neoplatonist emanations. The world of created substances is given by God’s action as the Creator separate from creation, and not by the emanation directe of divine substance. That would be pantheism as David of Dinant proposed. The ontotheological scenario of “God—essence” defined in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy established the first theoretical possibility of the deduction of the world done *ex nihilo*. The original divine species descends into contingent existence. Instead of Avicenna’s comitation, modernists introduced Aristotelian predication of Porretan hypostases given in the mode of categorical predication according to Oxfordian Fallacy. God creates the world *ex nihilo* according to objective causal scenario. Due to the divine essence put instead of causality, this ontotheological scenario follows Avicennist comitation of the univocal hypostatized “form—essence” that descend to the world as described in *Liber de causis*. The first Averroism conceived God according to the Aristotelian categorical predication, which is given from the effects caused by real substances. Human intellect is affected by them and ascends to their immaterial first cause. This is the path to the unmodern God, who, like the First Mover, shows himself to apodictic thinking in the mode of causality. Averroes’s proof (*dalā'il*) was later defined by the first Averroism as the path of thought (*via*) to God. Authentic Aristotelianism recognized scientifically verified effects of the *causa* *prima* in creation. The first Averroism allowed God to be God, because the question of the revelation of God in his own being does not belong to philosophy. God possesses a unique essential being in the highest degree; therefore, maximum caution is required in the universal predication of his hyparchical causality. The mythopoetic tales of *illuminati* came under the spell of divine idolatry. They like to speculate about it in their academic sessions, even after the postmodern death of this most venerable simulacrum.

Grosseteste’s commentary established a univocal conception of causality and essence. He extended the abstract definition of causality and justified the knowledge given in such a way by creating a new ontotheology. The new outline of ontotheology upholds the hypostatic structure of being that makes foundation of modern metaphysics. Hyparchical being of God as the first cause was opposed to the prohyparchical being of God (see Porphyry, OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1) as the first essence. This exchange of being done in Oxfordian Fallacy created the major event of modern metaphysics (*Ereignis*) that brought about the death of modern God. Heidegger’s term “*Fehl Gottes*” describe the darkness given by the eclipse of the modern God, in connection with the poetic worldview of Hölderlin.[[299]](#footnote-299) Nietzsche concludes the epochal disappearance of modern God by writing his death certificate and brilliantly stating the *rigor mortis* of ontotheology. Its disappearance ushered in the nihilistic thinking that emerged from postmodernism of Descartes. The execution of the first substance and of modern God on the scaffold made by nihilist mind dissolved the most important fundament of cognition given in the principle *inmediate*. The first Averroism knows that there is no form of univocal universality or necessity that would connect us with real God. Following *Second Analytics*, the first Averroism introduced a truth of the philosophy and the theology that differed according to specific genre. The defense of critical thinking about God was the last institutional action of wise masters of the first Averroism in 1272 before their academic annihilation in 1277 (OBJ III, ch. 4.6). This proceeding separated the first Averroism from the univocal deductive proof of God’s existence, which was completed by Duns Scotus by his masterful eclipse of the first substance (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). The science of nihilistic modernity is not subject to any restrictions imposed by twofold nature of hyparchical necessity. It will be shown by Scotus’s version of modern deduction (*resolutio*). Er created the deduction of objective being coming from the primary sphere of divine rationality.

Grosseteste is the first known Latin author who, in the interpretation of *Second Analytics*, made a univocal exchange of the second triad of principles for the first. The exchange of the sequence of cognition from the original mode *per prius* for the first triad of principles into the mode *per posterius* founded the analytical interpretation of the *Second Analytics*. That kind of Oxfordian Fallacy led to the displacement of the first substance out of metaphysics. As Alfarabi before him, Grosseteste stands at the crossroads between two different interpretations of Aristotle. His interpretation of the *Second Analytics* caused a shift to modernity. It made unclear the predication of universal meaning of the second substance with regard to the first hyparchical substance. The first triad of principles forms the basis of cognition, as it is defined in the mode *per prius*. Modernity has depreciated it in the new interpretation, putting it on a par with the second triad. The controversy between both levels created a univocal predication that canceled the imposition of meaning coming from reality. The beginning of objectivity contains the following statement, which changes the position of substance in Western scholasticism *per modum Aristotelis*. Grosseteste’s commentary on the sentence “*universale semper et ubique est*” (*Anal. Post*. 87b32) can be read in two ways, in the Aristotelian and in the Neoplatonic exegesis.

“By universals we understand, according to Aristotle, the forms that are found in the essence of the individual things and through which (*a quibus*) the individual things are what they are in their being (*sunt res particulares id quod sunt*). Then it is true that the being of generally conceived universal being is no other than the being of the universal given in each individual thing.” [[300]](#footnote-300)

A fundamental problem is *univoce* made doubling of meaning of “being” for the individual things (*sunt … id quod sunt*), which establishes a new perspective of understanding of being (*Vor-blickbahn*). If we take predication *per prius* done by imposition according to original intention of *Categories*, then the determination of universals comes from the first existing substance that is made as unique and *simpliciter* given being (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Taken that case, the meaning of being is determined in accordance with *Categories* and *Second Analytics* by the exposure of meaning coming from the front, from the hyparchical first substance. Then the statement would be valid in the original Aristotelian sense, also in the twofold value of *per se* given universal attribution, see the above-mentioned interpretation *Anal. Post.* 84a11–14. Either universalia form a part of *per se* hyparchical being given in logical abstraction; or, hyparchical *per se* predication takes the nature of abstract universal meaning, because the thing exists in reality. Again, the fundamental problem lies in the essence. Aristotle conceives it in metaphysical universality and necessity, but Grosseteste takes it as logical abstraction, which he considers to be metaphysical. If we take the quotation as hyparchical metaphysical predication (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12), then the statement is valid in Aristotelian sense. William Ockham, as the last representative of the school of the first Averroism, quotes this passage against the school of Oxford’s Scotists as proof of Grosseteste’s classical Aristotelian attitude.[[301]](#footnote-301) Bishop of Lincoln, according to Ockham, makes a distinction between the universality of the second substance in scientific proof and the uniqueness of the first substance in reality. Grosseteste enjoys the same status as Alfarabi in the Falsafa, if we investigate historial effects of *a/lētheia* in gigantomachy of the substance. His legacy founded two traditions of interpretation. The most important is the school based on Oxfordian Fallacy (Rufus, Kilwardby); Bacon and Ockham defended the lost cause of the first Averroism at Oxford. Hermeneutics stand at the end of the historical development of nihilistic metaphysics and considered this declaration *de fine*. It claims against Ockham that the quotation is unfortunately given in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The definition of universals is conceived as a second substance in the form of *quidditas* as universal essence. In the primary mode, the quotation makes the predication of the essential form related to the particulars (*in quidditate particularium*), from which it derives the sense of the actual first substance (*a quibus sunt res particulares*). The determination of the relation between the particular and the universal is given by the illumination from behind, from the universal forms (*a quibus sunt res particulares id quod sunt*). In this scenario, the universals directly establish the being of first substances, since the particulars receive their determination of being from the universals (*a quibus*). If we consider knowledge of the real world and not the realm of mathematics, then this is exactly the opposite way of exposing sense of being than the original text of *Second Analytics* states it. According to classical Aristotelianism, the cognition follows the metaphysical dative by the transition from the singular being of the first substance to universal categorical predication done at the level of the second substance. The categorical predication refers to hyparchical bond between the first and second substance, because the real existence establishes categorical imposition. What exists uniquely in reality is predicted to be univocal and universal with regard to the species as the first unity of metaphysical meaning. The true predication of the essence emerged in the last step, in the form of the fourth principle of cognition. Taken the fundamental proceeding of *Analytics*, the essence determines the last member in the order of universality: what is the universal essence of the recognized thing (ζητοῦμεν δὲ τέτταρα, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστιν, *Anal. Post*. 89b24‒25). On the contrary, Grosseteste’s interpretation shows that essence is given as the hyparchic basis of individuals. Categorial predication proceeds from essences as autonomous forms, from which (*a quibus*) abstraction proceeds as Avicennian denudation to real things. Aristotelian science postulates the imposition only on the basis of real causal effects of the first substances. This was shown by Albert’s principle *inmediate* or *ex inmediatis* defined by the first Averroism. We have commented on the primacy of reality in the theory of truth as correspondence in contrast to the second Averroism. It changed the second triad of cognitive principles with the first triad. The quotation comprehends the term “*a quibus*” in Neoplatonic meaning that considers the universalia as autonomous and higher forms. Porretans and *Nominales* established those forms as individual entities by dividing them the realm of universals according to *Arbor Porphyriana*. They do not follow the order of reality, where the path of the sun goes only in one direction, in order to rise again in the morning. The path of modernity does not need to go to real things. Modernity has its own solar intellect and *illuminati* under the leadership of Furies can go in the Platonic cave as they see fit. Therefore, modernists remain in the underworld and are guided by metaphysics and mathematics of Plato’s cave. Eidetic blindness of modernity follows not hyparchical, but prohyparchical doubling of being according to Porphyry (διττὸν τὸ εἶναι; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Then being as transcendentalia are signified as Plato’s highest genus, which is given by Neoplatonist doubling of the One. Things are not themselves by their own existence, but by the essence of eternal forms. This gives the basic model of predication *in artificialibus*, which was supplemented in the logical interpretation of *Categories* introduced about 1230 as well. Following chapters describe that development. Bacon, Albert and Aquinas attacked fatal errors in the thinking of modern interpreters. Modernists contested the basic principles of Aristotelianism. The analytical interpretation in fact adhered to the Neoplatonic model of emanations. Platonic formes changed into Porretan mode of comitation of hypostatized substances in “*semel—semper*” mode. Bishop Alvernus in the first Averroism criticized that doctrine when he rejected teaching of Porretans and Avicennists in schools of *sequaces Aristotelis*. Modern metaphysics adhered to the primacy of definition and form, which are attributed to beings in downward direction, following the descent of higher forms into the lower realm of reality. In doing so, modernists lost the theory of truth as correspondence based on existing first substances. In the same way, they lost the concept of critical deductive science according to *Second Analytics* that processes from real causality to universal forms in thinking. The causal effect and the enumeration of definitions have a univocal character established in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. The predication refers *per prius* to the divine essence and *per posterius* to species. The quotation shows that causality is separated from real first substances and linked with nominal definition of the substance as a modern *individuum*. Rufus engaged this line of thought in Oxfordian Fallacy when he finished his analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* around the year 1235. From a metaphysical point of view, three types of substance (the first, the second, *individuum*) are fundamentally different from each other. They are separated by different being given either as hyparchical existence in reality or as abstract being in thinking made due to the imposition and the supposition. The order of deduction to create a true knowledge runs either by the causal imposition or by the essential supposition. That fact is of principled nature, because the metaphysical perspective separates the school of the first Averroism from the second one. In the second case of ontotheological deduction, the modern theory of the one truth is defended in the style of Oxfordian Fallacy. The unity of modern truth is based on ontotheological necessity that is mythological in its nature. Modernity has created *ex nihilo* a divine *individuum* that by its enlightened thinking, guarantees the correctness and certainty of all *tertium ens* that it produces. The theory of one truth imported the divine individuality into modern philosophy in the mode of ontotheological necessity. The worldview made by that univocal necessity conceives contingent existence of things as a deduction of hypostatized “substance—essence” that is conceived as species or exemplar. The thinking of *illuminati* regards the world as transient reality of first substances subjected to naissance and extinction. In the same style, the division of the genus into species and individual in Porphyry’s Tree proceeds according to schools of *Nominales*. Rufus of Cornwall radicalized analytical concept of “*exsistere*” in such a way that he abolished original hyparchical sense *ex inmediatis* given in *Second Analytics* (ch. 3.3.2). Let us recall Gilbert’s definition of the first modern “exsistence” as participation in being of the essence (*participatio, qua subsistens*, ch. 1.4). Porretans entity with an atomic meaning (*individuum*) appears at the end of the division. It is made in the mode “*qua*” that modernity takes for *actus essendi*. Such nonsense fits perfectly into the analytical definition of the middle link of mythological proof. The Porretan individual is a substance that is hyparchical, individual and universal at the same time. The middle link of the demonstrative syllogism contains an individual thing formed by the substance of the third kind. Neoplatonist matter was introduced at Oxford in the following decade after analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* as universal hylemorphism (ch. 3.2). The first Averroism could in no case allow such an interpretation of science and reality. According to Albert, Averroes and Aristotle, the cognition of the world in the order of *demonstratio* is determined by the first substance. In modern times until Descartes, modern God as an absolute substance makes the source of cognition. This absolute substance is given in the mode of the first individual, which has the absolute character in the “*semel—semper*” mode. The process of cognition begins by Cartesian deduction, i.e., by implementation of hypostatized “exsistence” coming from this original source, by using Avicennian comitation and logical deduction. For the first time, Grosseteste scientifically determines the manner in which the modern individual descends (*exsistit*) from the higher forms of exemplary essences into the lower actualization of these eternal forms given in contingent reality and matter.

The eclipse of first substance in the Latin West was instigated by a misinterpretation of the real eclipse of astronomical bodies. This sophistry founded the modern science due to the analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*, which was built in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. Since the founding of the University, the scholars at Oxford became guardians of that mythologically defined scientific grail. They themselves had created that relic and have guarded it quite productively ever since in their shrine as modernist *ortus scientiarum*. Following archaeological hermeneutics, we have found the original place of modern science as it is located in thinking of modern *illuminati*. Archaic hermeneutics reject the objective vision of modernity that reduced the principles of knowledge to one mythological univocal meaning. The identity of being in logical abstraction is not an ipseity of being in metaphysical abstraction. The terminus “*idem*” of univocal logic is incapable of distinguishing the nature of “*ipse*” in the metaphysical abstraction. We will meet this difference again in the debate between Siger and Aquinas concerning the status of cognition in the human soul. The key part of Grosseteste’s interpretation concerns the quoted passage *Anal. Post.* 84a11–14. The essential predication *per se* exists in two variants (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal. Post.* 84a12). Grosseteste does not take this doubling of essences *per se* (καθ' αὑτὰ) as an original dichotomy in the mode of logical and metaphysical predication. He created a dichotomy of science according to writing *Liber de causis*. The emergence of objectivity entails direct cognition of essentiality in created things, which eternally pre-exist in the First cause. Thanks to this form of existence hidden in the First being, the first principles of cognition relate to the creation as its formal and exemplary causes. It is a typical Neoplatonist view according to Anselm of Canterbury. Therefore, the primary rational forms are productive in the order of matter as well. Such kind of metaphysics certainly could not be lectured at the University of Paris, which had just defeated Aristotelian pantheism that David of Dinant proclaimed. Let us recall the circumstances of Grosseteste’s departure from Paris, which coincides with Scotus’s interpretation of the first Averroism at the University around 1230. This interpretation had to reject the school of Avicennists around Philip the Chancellor (*Grammatici*), as well as the schools of *Logica Modernorum*, which followed the line of Porretan nominalists (*sophistae Latini*). But these schools submitted themselves to authority of bishop Alvernus when he founded the school of the first Averroism at the University of Paris. It was probably not so difficult. The monastic schools of that time were really independent and had sovereignty and privileges given by tradition honored for several centuries. Bishop Alvernus demanded from the colleges in Paris only a minimal degree of philosophical unity given by Catholic doctrine. The key dispute was over the unity of the person, which was threatened by heresies such as Dinant’s pantheism (ch. 2.3.3). But Grosseteste, unlike his other academic colleagues, left the University of Paris around 1230 to teach at the Franciscan College of Oxford. At that time, the Oxford University was dominated by modern logicians (John Pagus) and Avicennists linked to Porretan schools of *Nominales*. Brilliant Aristotelian John Blund left this university dominated by modernists that followed Neoplatonic line of Anselm of Canterbury. He probably left Oxford as soon as the University was founded. Magister Blund remained in Paris in the Aristotelian group of Abelard’s cathedral school (*l’École cathédrale du Cloître de Paris*). Blund’s affiliation to this line of authentic Aristotelianism is proved by his metaphysics following *Logica Vetus* that founded the school of the first Averroism. Grosseteste began to teach as magister at the Franciscan College in 1230/31, when he renounced the line of the first Averroism given by Scotus’s lectures in Paris. Hermeneutics consider this date as *terminus a quo*, which determines the beginning of Grosseteste’s activity in Oxford. Objectivity emerged from an intellectual environment that this outstanding scholar shaped personally. The interpretation of *Second Analytics* made a conversion between the first and the second triad of principles of cognition in the paradigm of Oxfordian Fallacy and this change occurred against the background of the new interpretation of *Categories*.

Grosseteste solves the fundamental problem of modernity that looks for a strong intellect. The act of direct intuition mystically contemplates the permanently given universals that are directly in singular things. How to do it, that is a hard nut to crack even for Grosseteste (*dubitabile est*). This critical Aristotelian knows very well from the metaphysics conceived *ad mentem Averrois* that universalia have no existence outside of thinking. His modern successors, and after them postmodern Descartes and Husserl, no longer doubted the absolute capacity of mind, which is able to see those eternal principles in material things. Let us recall musical truth of the epigram concerning the insane worldview that Porretans brought about (*cum sit tot generibus rerum mundus plenus*, / *cuius genus nomen est semper sit egenus*, ch. 1.6). They imported the manic world of their generic products (*mundus plenus generibus rerum*) in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. Modern *illuminati* put their belief in what was really impossible, but objectively possible, and even evident and eternal. A more detailed interpretation of this approach can be found in the chapter with Rufus’s commentary, who comes up with another analytical version of the *Second Analytics* in the same decade as Grosseteste, around the year 1235 (ch. 3.3.1). Kilwardby then follows the path of both predecessors and confirmed the interpretation of *Modernorum* in an authoritative manner as the Rector of the College at Oxford and later as the Archbishop of Canterbury. This Dominican modernist successfully completes the philosophical sedisvacancy after the famous scholar Anselm of Canterbury, who founded the concept of truth as *rectitudo* (ch. 1.2). It is no wonder that mathematical abstraction would do enough for modern thinking that manages the mythopoetic production of cognition. Modernity proclaims the dualism of cognition and reality; therefore it needs direct contact with the higher world in order to ensure its beliefs in the realm of *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. After the eclipse of first substance, modernists have no other certainty than the direct vision of eternal exemplars, which are given in the divine or then only in the human thinking (Grosseteste’s *intellectus*, Descartes’s *cogito*, Husserl’s *eidos*). The departure of metaphysical abstraction according to Aristotle was compensated in the second Averroism by philosophical mysticism according to Neoplatonism. The basis of scientific knowledge of the analytical school in Oxford became Neoplatonic mysticism, which is given as *ascensio* and catabasis of the purified soul to God. The causality and the existence of the first real substance is confirmed by God through his anabasis into the enlightened soul. That proceeding repeats Descartes in his postmodern proof of God’s existence. The second Averroism asserts that the weak intellect, which dwells in reality with the first substances, is limited to the cognition of sensual forms. Thus, this weak empirical intellect is dependent on the senses and therefore separated from the active intellect or from the Cartesian *cogito*. This hypostatized and therefore strong intellect as *cogito* is directly linked by an innate idea to the essential definition of postmodern individual God. This idol of modern mind then operates as *causa prima* in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. In that case turns the thinking all the way round, since the exposure of being runs the meaning from imaginary essence to real existence. The previous matrix has shown that Parisian bishop Alvernus considered the concept of mystical intellect as an autonomous component of the soul to be an idea of some stupid people (*imbecilles quidam*, ch. 2.3.3). Let us recall Albert’s defense of “*esse debile*” against Averroists coming in Paris from Grosseteste’s school (ch. 2.4.3). According to Albert, the term “weak being” (*esse debile*) denotes a universal given by abstraction, which establishes the general and thus only potential cognition in the soul (*scientia quæ est in anima*). The general notion in the soul predicates “firmness” and “solidity” of the existing real thing (*ens ratum*). In the soul, there is only the weak form of potential being (*in anima tantum*). The second Averroists and their modern descendants disputed the basic thesis of *Second Analytics* that real things do not contain universals (τὸ μὲν καθόλου μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, *Anal. Post*. 85a31). The eclipse of the first substance fundamentally changed the position of the middle member of the deductive scientific judgment. It lost the imposition from reality and received the universal supposition from the cognitive subject. The modernists as Rufus and Bonaventura were in Paris before Descartes and Husserl. The analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* enabled the new generation of philosophers influenced by Grosseteste to make a fundamental choice between first and second Averroism. They deleted the unreliable existence of first substances from the scheme of cognition right in the first round of modern meditations on the first philosophy.

After the solar eclipse, which was analytically transferred to the eclipse of the first substance, a fundamental problem was on the table. It would torment the whole Cartesian modernity built on mathematical exactness of pure eidetic forms. How should cognition move from the evident and true formal intuition to the real world? Aristotle and after him Averroes did not know this fatal problem of modernity and postmodernity, because they did not live in the epoch of the eclipse of first substances. The deduction building the scientific proof starts from first substances and theirs effects that are transposed into deductive syllogism. The imposition of meaning arrives *per prius* from causality of real things. The deduction does not come from the supposition of abstract meaning, the essence or the definition presented only in thinking. Since the first substances as Sun, Earth and Moon do exist, then in the mode of the metaphysical dative and by scientific deduction we can also find general causes of the lunar or solar eclipse. The analytic commentary on *Second Analytics*, on the other hand, deduces the first substance by exposing them from behind, by dividing the universals within the framework of *Arbor Porphyriana*. In this way, Grosseteste ensures the permanent validity of cognition. The deduction runs all the way round, by descending from the highest to the lower genera (*id est illud de quo proprie debet fieri demonstratio, sicut totum in parte*).[[302]](#footnote-302) The quoted passage concerns the division of genera and species as far as to the individual. It shows the primacy of the supposition based on abstract individuals and displaced the recognition of real things (*accipere a superiori extra singulare quam singularia*). The concept of univocally conceived being of the third kind causally connects to the cognition through divine *exemplars*. They are imprinted in a Platonic manner in the human *intellectus adeptus* using the the terminus “*impressio*.” A similar vision of being enlightened from behind as in the case of Oxfordian Fallacy, Alexander of Hales in Paris lectured it around the year 1235. With reference to Avicenna, Alexander of Hales predicated univocal transcendental concept of being and the causality connected with it (*ens est prima impressio intelligentiae*).[[303]](#footnote-303) Using the term *impressio*, the writing *Summa Halensis* designated divine primary causality that works in the creation (*primum est in ordine causalitatis est prima impressio*). These first perceptions of being (*primae conceptiones*) are given in the act of direct eidetic vision of being. Grosseteste took over that line of thinking. The correctness of cognition arrived in the years 1230–35 in the framework of objective deduction. It is outlined as deduction of contingently existing things from their eternal being given in modern God. This way of modern deduction, Duns Scotus completed it in full a later on. According to Grosseteste, only the weak (*debilis*) intellect depends on the cognition from below, i.e., from hylemorphic first substances. In Avicenna’s scheme of four kinds of intellect (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1), it corresponds to ability of intellect to draw syllogistic conclusions on the basis of sensual experience (*intellectus in effectu*). The division of the intellect established dual conception of empirically given cognition (*scientia*) and the direct eidetic insight into the active creative principles (*intellectus*). Grosseteste has to create a new Jacob’s ladder for modern *illuminati* enlightened by solar intellect. They should climb up and down freely between objective Earth and Heaven, empowered by their own angelic cognition.

“The weak intellect (*intellectus debilis*) cannot raise itself to the recognition of those true genera and species. Therefore it recognizes things only through accidents, which are essential and true consequences of things (*consequentibus essentias veras rerum*). In the weak intellect, the accidents are effects of genera and species; therefore, the principles are only for recognizing things, but not for coming them into existence (*principia solum cognoscendi et non essendi*). How they are given according to these two modes of genera and species of vulnerable things in a permanent way, that is the great question.” [[304]](#footnote-304)

The second Averroism takes direct insight into the genera and species that exist eternally as pure hypostases (*ascendere ad cognitionem horem verorum generum et specierum*). Due to the duality of cognition and insight taken from Avicenna, the problem of “debilitating” intellect arose in the modern age, since it is merely empirically based. This unfortunate *intellectus debilis* proceeds in such a way that it first cognizes the accidents in things (*cognoscit res in accidentibus solum*) and then goes through the conclusions to real being of things (*consequentibus essentias veras rerum*). This is the normal procedure of *Second Analytics* made by *demonstratio* attached to the existing real relations and causality. These relations find the universal expression through the middle member of judgment. Aristotelian intellect draws conclusions from the cognition of the first substance (*scientia*) and not from the act of direct intuition of the first principles of cognition (*intellectus*).

### 3.1.3 Demonology and Modern Logic

Grosseteste’s commentary on *Second Analytics* emerges at the same time as it came to transformation of writing *Categories* into a logical treatise conceived in the perspective of Porretan analogy. Aristotelian interpretation of Boethius was transformed into Porretan concept of categorical predication made by hypostases that were considered atomic substances of the third kind. This change followed the extinction of logical schools of *Nominales*. They joined schools of the second Averroism formed by Toletans interpretations of Avicenna and Averroes. Neoplatonic interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics* (Gauthier 1963) and purely logical approach to writing *Metaphysics* went hand in hand with modern interpretations of *Categories* that dates to commentaries written after 1230. Modern interpretation of categorical predication follows Ammonius’s commentary on *Categories* dating back to the 3rd century. Ammonius hypostatized the accidentals as being of the third kind, following Neoplatonic predication (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). His commentary removed the categorial relation of accidents to the second substance. Ammonius predicated accidental properties according to Plotinus’s predication of the highest genera of being. The categorial predication is not determined by hyparchical relation between the first and the second substance and received a new status within the analogy of being. There was a shift from the imposition of hyparchical categorical meaning to the pure supposition of immanent meaning made in thinking. Magister John Pagus wrote the first modern commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories* around 1230 (*Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*). The category is equivalent to the Neoplatonic term “*genus*” and expresses gradual value of being coming from the highest genus to lower units of universal meaning. The preface to the modern edition of this commentary shows that Pagus considered *Categories* to be a treatise of modern logic.[[305]](#footnote-305) The commentary harmonized the interpretation of *Categories* with hierarchical division of universals within the framework of Porphyry’s Tree. Pagus created a new system of predication (*ordinatio*). At the level of categorical predication, the system of Porretan’s *ordinatio* represents a new version of Philip’s *resolutio* (ch. 2.3.2). The categories acquired the univocal character of Neoplatonic supreme genera. The original source of new interpretation is above-cited Bernard of Chartres that hypostatized predication of substance (*significatio substantialis*) and accidents (*significatio accidentalis*; ch. 1.1). At the same time that Grosseteste was writing the commentary on *Second Analytics*, magister Nicolas of Paris was writing his commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*. His interpretation continues the Pagus’s line of Porretanism learned in schools of *Nominales* and the univocal predication according to *Logica Modernorum*. Nicolas transferred the categorical predication given in the mode of “substance—accident” into an analogical predication given as division of universals made by Porretans.[[306]](#footnote-306) The categorial predication represents the universal unity of meaning (*dicibile incomplexum ordinabile*), which is analogically assigned to all ten categories (*est commune analogum ad omnia decem*). In this analogical predication given in the mode *per prius* the primacy lies with Neoplatonic atomic substance (*quod est per prius dicitur de substantia*). That substance of the third kind establishes the system of deduction as the primary unit of logically given meaning, to which the other accidental determinations are secondarily assigned in the mode of analogy. The categorial predication lost its metaphysical meaning in the school of modern Porretans and became a mere logical instrument in the mode of analogy. The second substance is given in the logical mode of univocity or analogy with the first substance and arrived at the same metaphysical level as accidents. Analogy makes disappear the imposition of meaning from the first substance to the second. The analogy taken in the manner of Neoplatonists such as Jamblichus and Simplicius confirmed the primacy of mathematical abstraction that Porretans instituted (ch. 1.5). The logical abstraction concerning being as univocal genus caused that the predication of hypostatized accidents, originally given in the mode *per posterius*, reached the same level as the predication *per prius* determined by being of the second substance. According to Alvernus, in the school of Grammarians, the accidentals became hypostatized parts of atomic substance as being of the third kind (*dispositiones ponebant in substantiis de quibus dicebatur*, ch. 2.3.2). The new interpretation of *Categories* led to the eclipse of the first substance and accelerated the decline of truth as correspondence between real thing and thinking. Logic and mathematics operate with being that is not Aristotle’s second substance as categorically given by relation to the first hyparchical substance. Logic cancelled metaphysical abstraction at the level of mathematical abstraction because categorical predication and analogical predication are taken *univoce*. All properties are given in the order of logical abstraction, in the univocal mode *simpliciter* and *per se*.

Modernists in the mode of analogical correctness declared the corpse to be a man, because they hold to absolutized supposition given by hypostatized way of predication. The corpse was once a human being and is therefore in the mode of species for ever a human being. This specific determination of humanity cannot disappear because the corpse is the last, not further divisible case of division that passes from generic *humanitas* into a Porretan *individuum*. The polemic of Alvernus and early Grosseteste in the years 1225–30 against the school of Grammarians strikes at this fundamental start of modern philosophical nihilism. Porretans were incapable of distinguishing between the order of being of the thing and the order of its predication (*esse in subjecto non est inhaerere subjecto*, ch. 2.3.2). Representatives of the first Averroism reminded them of that fact, in vain. John Pagus and Nicolas of Paris belong to the group called *Grammatici* because of their Neoplatonist nature of categories as univocal Porretan hypostases. They were criticized from the perspective of the first Averroism in the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius* (1225) and later by bishop Alvernus. The commentaries of both aforementioned Porretans predicate the hypostatized accidentals in terms of equally hypostatized substance of the third kind. By introducing the analogical predication of Porretan hypostases, the imposition of meaning from the reality was nearly abolished. Then it was no longer a problem for modernists to take these essences and hypostases as atomic substances of the third kind and to apply them according to the Toledo school to interpretation of *Second Analytics*. They considered this interpretation *ad mentem Averrois* as authentic Aristotelian exegesis. New form of univocity operates within the framework of analogy conceived as categorical predication. It makes disappeared the fundamental difference of hyparchical predication, which is given in one way with respect to real things and in another way with respect to general notions (*Cat*. 2a11–16). The original inspiration for Pagus’s and Nicolas’s interpretations is not writing *Category* but *Metaphysics*, which these modern logicians interpret through Neoplatonic primacy of mathematical analogy. This point explains controversy between the Toledo school and classical Aristotelianism of Blund and Alvernus before Scotus’s arrival in Paris in 1230. The first Averroism uses the example of analogy according to Averroes’s *Commentary on Metaphysics*, where an important extract comments on analogical predication (*Met*. 1003b5–16). Aristotle offers as an example the analogical predication with respect to the term “health” and “cure” in the mode *per prius* and per posterius, which is related to the substance and the accidents. According to Averroes, the real thing determines categorial univocal meaning (*quia constituunt per illam*) by its causality, because the predicates are real in the actualized substrate (*subiectum est eorum*).[[307]](#footnote-307) The analogical form of unity is given only in the thinking, because universal meaning is constituted with respect to externally acting factor (doctor) or to the intended goal of activity (health). The imposition of meaning in the case of the analogical similarity already comes from the reality. The cure makes causal effects given in the predication *in artificialibus*. Therefore, it is possible to predicate analogical relations *per prius* and *per posterius* with respect to the first substance of the doctor as the effective cause (πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, *Met*. 1003b9). Averroes takes the example of health and medicine as analogical attribution, which is given in terms of the externally given goal or factor (*quia est agens aut finis eorum*). However, the factor and the goal of the activity do not have the same status in terms of causal meaning as predication at the level of relation “substance—accident.” The causal activity of healing does not belong to the person of the doctor in a hyparchical way, but only as his accidental ability. According to Aristotle and Averroes, the analogy cannot establish a categorical univocal predication because it has no hyparchical meaning, although it has the imposition from reality. The unity given by analogy stands as an external element to things considered. The unity is projected into them thanks to the similarity of relations given in the framework of common nature (πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν, *Met*. 1003b14). The hyparchical position of the first substance separates categorical constitution of unity from the lower, merely analogical form of unity given in thinking of the subject. This is why classical Aristotelians such as Bacon and Albert rejected the “gay science” (Nietzsche) of modern *illuminati*. Modern science transfers categorical predication based on *demonstratio* according to *Second Analytics* to another kind of predication called “*in artificialibus*.” Modern science is created by a specific “*List der Vernunft*” (Hegel). Its source are those “*imbecilles quidam*” that Alvenus criticized. Modernity exchanged the categorial predication based on relations of first substances for predication given by analogical relations created in the mind of modernists. According to Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals*, the ethos of modernity is created by metaphysically weak but otherwise quite cunning *illuminati*.

William Ockham, quoted in the previous chapter, shows that until the year 1300 there was a twofold tradition of interpreting *Second Analytics* at Oxford, which was based on the metaphysics of Grosseteste. Ockham became the last witness and the keeper of the Commentator’s interpretation, linking it with the Aristotelian interpretation of Grosseteste’s philosophy from his Parisian time, when the bishop of Lincoln had been a faithful follower of the Blund’s school. The school of young Oxford modernists led by Rufus rightly understood that Grosseteste defended Neoplatonic predication in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The group of Porretan interpreters of *Categories* (Alvernus‘s *Grammatici*) from the declining schools of *Logica Modernorum* must be distinguished from Oxford modernists. They came to Paris around the year 1235 to finish their master’s studies. We have explained their approach to Aristotle in the framework of analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* done in the perspective of Oxfordian Fallacy (Rufus, Kilwardby). These young Latin scholars were honored by bishop Alvernus with the title *sophistae Latini*. It is not at all a coincidence that the representatives of the first Averroism (Alvernus, Albert, Bacon), in full accordance with the dialogue *Sophistes*, considered these scholars to be sophists.[[308]](#footnote-308) The sophist actively creates images in imagination, they make mythological tales in the interpretation of *Second Analytics* acoording to Oxfordian Fallacy. They followed Porretan interpretation of *Categories* and produced a variety of being of the third kind. The sophistic group of modernists, influenced by Porretan interpretation of *Categories*, provides not only a confused interpretation of *Second Analytics*, but a confused interpretation of CMDA as well. Albert rectified their errors by interpreting scientific knowledge of the world and of the soul in the work *De homine* (1242). The modern deduction of meaning does not follow the metaphysical imposition, but the logical supposition. Albert rejected in principle the supremacy of logic; let us see his polemic with modernists about the status of *esse ratum* (ch. 2.4.3). The first Averroism disallowed nihilistic consequence of Oxfordian Fallacy, which expulsed the first substance from scientific cognition. Aristotelians of the Sicilian school rejected the doctrine of metaphysical *illuminati* in principle. They reversed the scheme of cognition in *Second Analytics* and let pass off this simulacrum as an authentic Aristotelian interpretation until today. The modernity introduced a sophistic difference between “weak” existence of hylemorphic first substances (*ens debile*) and “strong” being of autonomous universal forms that exists beyond hylemorphic reality (*ens ratum*). The hyparchical bond between the first and the second substance changes into a univocal predication that runs in the mode of Neoplatonic analogy or Avicenna’s objective comitation. Alfarabi introduced this interpretation in his work *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* through the amphibolia, which defined a new type of predication linking Aristotelianism with Neoplatonism (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). According to Alfarabi, the descent of forms from the world of immaterial spheres continues in the mode of categorical predication *per prius* that runs with regard to hylemorphic substances as well (*descendere usque ad formam corporalem ylealem*; OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). It came to new vision of being in the Latin West. Grosseteste as a connoisseur of Falsafa adopted Avicennism according to the Toledo school. He certainly knew this metaphysics from his studies in Paris at the Blund’s school before the arrival of Scotus’s interpretation. Bishop Alvernus assigned the philosophy of Alfarabi to Neoplatonic group of *sequaces Aristotelis* (ch. 2.3.1). Grosseteste declared Neoplatonic worldview in the form of *anima mundi* and supported the school of Grammarians; he could no longer stay at the University of Paris. The following passage from Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* establishes a new *Vor-blickbahn* of Western metaphysics as a modern ontotheology.

“Where the existence occurs in its localized being of individual things, the universals simultaneously occur in the individual things made in this way. Then we can legitimately assert (*nisi forte dicamus*) that the universals are omnipresent, because the intellect is the place of the universals (*intellectus est locus universalium*). This omnipresence of universals is the same as their being in the intellect (*universale ubique esse est ipsum in intellectuu esse*), because the intellect is everywhere in its own way. (…) If the universals are given as ideas in the Divine intellect, then they are omnipresent in the manner by which the omnipresent effect of the first cause comes to being.” [[309]](#footnote-309)

The universals are, on the one hand, in things and, on the other, in the intellect; everywhere they have the same way of univocal being. Where there is divine or human thinking, there is also general meaning. The quotation hypostatized accidents at the level of substance and added independent categorical value to them. It is a typical proceeding of Porretans. In Aristotelianism, it is true that only accidents bound to the substance can have a determination in the way of the categorical determination “where” (*ubi*) or the “location” (*positio*). The new interpretation of accidents gives to the universals equivocal value with a categorical determination of position (*loca autem universalium sunt ipsa singularia*), which relates to being of universals as such (*in quibus sunt universalia*). Only under these conditions can we assert (*nisi forte dicamus*) that the universals are omnipresent. This reservation shows the hesitation of the first modernist of the Latin West. According to the above-mentioned way of “*aliquantulum obscura*,” he suspects that there is some catch in his interpretation. John Pagus similarly harmonized the interpretation of *Categories* with the hierarchical structure of universals in the framework of Neoplatonism. However, in classical Aristotelianism, the accidents are not the second substance, but merely say something about it through categorical meanings, which are bound to real determinations of the first substance. The conclusion of the quotation contains a fundamental change in the ontological plan of being, which is already clearly presented in Avicennist scenario of the Toledo school. Thanks to ontotheological connection between divine thought and its creative effects (*per modum quo*), the general things conceived as substance become an omnipresent effective being (*universalia ubique sunt per modum quo causa prima ubique est*). Grosseteste postulates a causal predication for the universals in the mode *per prius*, which is given in the order of creative causality. The term “*per modum quo*”gives to universal meaning an existential value in the mode of *actus essendi*. Thinking in the order of creative being establishes the real existence of being (*quo est*). As a result, a quasi-categorical predication *per prius* was created for universalia of the third kind, which are placed in divine thinking (*universalia sunt ydee in mente divina*). In this archetypal sphere, the universals acquire an ontotheological value, which ties in with the demiurgic world of dialogue *Timaeus*. It is only on the second floor of created reality that general things become a hylemorphic component of the first substance. Bonaventure completely built up this ontotheological building of objective existence in two floors (*regula agentis increati et creati*; OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The connection of categorical predication with Neoplatonic ontotheology gave rise to a new form of *tertium ens*. The following generation of learned Latins at Oxford put all that into practice.

The deduction of universals according to Porphyry’s Tree was already introduced in schools of *Nominales*. Now, it became an inspirational model for the new ontoteology. It appeared in schools of *Modernorum* around the year 1230, based on the above-mentioned interpretation of *Categories* and *Second Analytics*. According to the quotation of Grosseteste, the universals are predicated with regard to *ubiquity* of intellect, which is superior to hylemorphic first substances (*universale ubique est quia intellectus est locus universalium*). The intellect is somehow everywhere, because the soul is somehow everything through intellectual cognition (*anima est quodammodo omnia*, *De anima* 431b21). The soul operates as *locus universalium* and later becomes a *locus specierum* in the school of the second Averroism (OBJ III, ch. 4.3.1). With regard to the soul as *anima mundi*, modernity can predict the universals as with regard to that archetypal place, which takes the place of the first substance as it was in *Categories*. As a result, the soul became a substance of the third kind, which the followers of Grosseteste’s school accomplished in full. They came to Paris from Oxford around the year 1235. If we add to this omnipresence of the intellect as Porretan hypostasis the fact that Grosseteste and Rufus defended the teaching of *anima mundi*, then we have an almost complete scenario of pantheistic divine intellect according to David of Dinant (ch. 2.1.3). The modernist development of Grosseteste at Oxford was achieved in a radical form by his students Rufus and Kilwardby, who began their master’s studies in Paris after the year 1235. According to Alvernus’s declaration, the teaching on the separated *intellectus agens* as external component of the human soul was not allowed to be promulgated at the University of Paris. The intellect cannot be a substance in the first Averroism, since it is merely a faculty of the soul, which is neither a first substance, but the unique form of the body. Grosseteste shifted the predication of *Second Analytics* from the effects of real substances to the predication of *univoce* hypostatized universals, which corresponds to the paradigm of the Toledo school. The hypostatic and eternal essence took the first place in the hierarchy of categories, which had previously been held by the second substance. Grosseteste knew the teaching of the Sicilian school after the year 1230 and acknowledged that Averroes’s “meta-physics” and cosmology was based on the primacy of the first substance. Therefore, as a young graduate of the Blund school, he rejected the Porretan definition of man as a corpse, which was based on Gundissalinus’s definition taken from Avicenna’s metaphysics (ch. 2.2.1). However, the position of the universals changed fundamentally due to the introduction of ontotheology into categorical predication. As a result of the new interpretation of the categories, they are directly in things and, according to modern Aristotle, they became an object of categorical predication (*universalia in re*). Grosseteste is the first modernist because he was the last thinker of the victorious group of Latin sophists to see fundamental problems of new categorical predication made by Grammarians. He personally introduced it into the interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Alvernus’s dispute with this group showed that *Grammatici* combined into a single unit the meaning of nominally determined first substance (*unitas nominis*) and the categorical signification made at the level of the second substance in the syllogism (*unitas enuntiabilis*). This sophistic metaphorization of the world mixed both forms of predication. Aristotelian Abelard rejected it as well, while he was fighting against Avicennist followers of Anselm. Kilwardby’s interpretation of Categories is directly linked to Grosseteste’s categorical *epokhē* that took depart from the first substance and to uphold the new statute of universals (Hansen 2012, 86\*). Kilwardby was directly criticized by Albert the Great for the metaphysical ambiguity regarding the statute of the first substance in the scientific proof (ch. 3.4.1). Hermeneutics summarizes the new features of categorical predication and scientific cognition under the term Oxfordian Fallacy, because the main protagonists of this change lectured at Oxford in the years 1230–40. New status of substance and universality fundamentally changed the nature of cognition and the scientific proof as interpreted in *Second Analytics*.

The exchange of essence with existence in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy necessarily changed the theory of truth. Aristotelian correspondence of the categorical intellect with real things received only a secondary position in the metaphysics of modern *illuminati*. Latin sophists changed the scheme of categories into the highest genera. Illustrated mind of *Modernorum* explores eternal exemplary forms, instead of hylemorphic substances. For analytical philosophy at Oxford, it was not a problem to find an alternative model to replace the truth as an Aristotelian correspondence. The local thinkers knew very well Augustinian concept of truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo* according to Anselm of Canterbury (ch. 1.2). The new thinking is inspired by the truth of Porretans (*semel est verum, semper est verum*), which is justified by the appeal to Anselm’s theological Neoplatonism. Grosseteste’s treatise *De veritate* defines analytical concept of truth as *rectitudo* in accordance with Anselm’s deontological position. The treatise *De veritate* shows the new architecture of *rectitudo*, in which the cognition according to *De anima* is incorporated on the lower level of truth.

“The truth of things is their being as it should be (*veritas rerum est earum esse prout debent esse*), and their correctness and conformity to the Word by which they are eternally manifested. Since this correctness (*rectitudo*) can only be observed in thinking, it differs in this form from the correctness given in the visible entities. Then Anselm’s definition of truth applies when he says that it is the correctness given only in thinking. This definition must be supplemented by the highest truth, which is the rectifying rightness (*est rectitudo rectificans*) with regard to the truth of things. They are true as rectified correctness (*sunt rectitudines rectificatae*).” [[310]](#footnote-310)

The quotation defines Anselm’s conception of truth, which does not have the character of conformity to reality, but to ontotheological nature of God (*rectitudo et conformitas Verbo*). The truth is given normatively outside the matter, in what things are in God as the eternal Word (*veritas rerum est earum esse*). The human intellect looks at this truth from the direction of God in order to arrive in the realm of created things. Onto-theological correctness forms the ultimate measure of what things are and what they are supposed to be (*debet esse*). With regard to real things, the truth makes a supreme deontological measure based on eternal correctness of being. Created things always possess that certainty thanks to their existence given by God. They speak about them within the framework of the order and harmony of creation (*quo aeternaliter dicuntur*). This level of truth concerns Augustinian ontotheological manner of correspondence. It has no source in the human intellect, as was the case of the first Averroism. Things reveal by themselves divine truth and divine glory, the eternal measure of which forms the basis of their meaning in the mode “*quo*.” This mode of being establishes their act of existence. The truth is not primarily in the intellect, but directly in things, because these say mystically about God’s glory. The analogy of God, the intellect and the thing is in the mode *per prius* that no longer requires to be determined from the actually existing thing. Reality is exposed from behind, and modern truth corresponds to this as assimilation of iluminated thinking with the world of ideal meaning. The determination of correctness proceeds in the mode of correctness as creative demiurgic activity (*rectitudo rectificans*) versus the deontological passivity of things. They are true within the framework of ontotheologically rectified correctness (*rectitudines rectificatae*). Man became a secondary demiurge. He participates in deontological determination of things by means of analogical rectification of being in the mode of truth as *rectitudo*.

Therefore, in the cradle of the Oxford Franciscans, the first *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of capitalist demiurge came into modernity. Bonaventura and Olivi developed the full version of that globally effective modern mythology. Through the introduction of the analogy originally given in mathematics, a new kind of deontological truth emerged, which shows how things should be within the framework of divine correctness (*debet esse*). The truth of modernity is possible only in the ontotheological scenario, which ensures the basic form of *rectitudo* through the universal tripartite link between God, man and things. Thinking, enlightened by the higher truth, is separated from the senses by its immaterial essence. Instead of referring to the first real substance, it refers primarily to the truth of the eternal Word of God (*conformitas Verbo*). The lower level of truth includes Aristotle’s truth as *veritas*, which relates to correspondence of cognition to materially given substances (*rectitudine corporali visibili*). The correspondence goes primarily not to the hylemorphic first substance, but to God. The correctness of the creative divine subject is given as the highest norm and form of correctness. The quotation testifies to the first form of *analogia entis*, which will create the basis of later metaphysics. The two-story building establishes the analogy of the totality of being in the mode “creating word—created things,” which analogously corresponds to dichotomy “cognitive mind—recognized things.” God became a unique element to build up modern architecture of being, because he is a founding element of the ontotheological triad. By transforming God into the first mathematician, the modernity at Oxford inaugurated the death of anthropomorphic God in Western thought that Leibniz and Nietzsche completed in full. The primary place of truth is in modern God, where *illuminati* can see his eternal truths directly, in virtue of the act of their enlightened thinking. The secondary place of truth is given in mind (*rectitudo sit sola mente*). It is the only instrument that can recognize the original conformity of the real thing with the Word of God. The thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy determines the truth in pure ipseity (*ipsa veritas*), which is placed outside hylemorphic first substances. The modern theory of truth is possible only on the basis of the analogous and univocal predication given by the changed statute of categories. Grosseteste comprehends the truth in the mode of Augustine’s correspondence of inner and outer word. The following definition of truth mixes the predication of meaning at the level of mere naming (Abelard’s *oratio*) with the categorical predication (*enuntiatio*).

“Let’s define the truth in the usual meaning as a true saying. The truth, as the philosopher proclaims, is given according to him nowhere else than meaning given by word in the real thing (*in re signata*). This is the truth, which some call the ‘correspondence between word and thing’ and the ‘correspondence of the thing with regard to the intellect.’ But the Word is truer when it sounds in our mind than when it sounds externally. The intellect forms a concept through the external word. But all the more it becomes true in the case of the correspondence between the inner word and the thing than between the outer word and the thing. If the inner word were a pure correspondence between itself and the thing (*si ipse sermo interior esset adaequatio sui ad rem*), then it would no longer be a true word only, but a truth in its fullness (*ipsa veritas*).” [[311]](#footnote-311)

Grosseteste combines both traditional conceptions of the truth of Abelard and Anselm and puts them together into one definition (*dicere veritatem orations enuntiativae*). The definition of truth refers to the perception of the thing existing in reality (*in re signata*). The quotation follows the definition of truth in writing *Metaphysics*, which is related to the univocal predication of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not (*Met*. 1011b26–29). Just as in the case of scientific cognition, Aristotle’s categorical predication is omitted. The univocal relationship between the first and second substance in the model of the second Averroism takes place by new position of categories as amphibolic determinations of being according to Alfarabi. The new certainty comes from the enlightened subject and not from the causal relationship between things and intellect, which makes fundamentals of true predication in Aristotelianism. The truth in itself (*ipsa veritas*) is given by considering the first principles of cognition with the help of intuition into the interior of the soul and intellect (*veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei*). The more inner and more spiritual the intuition of modern and postmodern *illuminati* becomes, the truer it is, because it approaches the divine word reasoning in the soul (*sermo, qui intus silet*). This part of the quotation takes the Stoic inner logos (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) in the form of Augustine’s *verbum mentis* as the basis of truth and communication of meaning.[[312]](#footnote-312) The last sentence clearly shows that the truth as a *rectitudo* is ultimately based directly in the word, because the inner word makes a truth outside of transient reality (*ipse sermo interior esset adaequatio sui ad rem*). The intuition of the correctness and certainty as Augustine’s statement about inner truthfulness (*verior sit sermo, qui intus silet*) contains both the logos of the Stoics and Augustine. Later, it changes into Descartes’s *epokhē* to be the evidence based on the inner act of the *cogito*, and it finished as Husserl’s eidetic intuition. It is necessary to follow the dialogue *Sophistes* when the absolute word produces a simulacrum that determines the nature of truth. The ontotheological scenario of Latin modernists is implicitly sophistic. Alvernus as main representative of the first Averroism condemned it explicitly. Aristotelian notion of double knowledge and double method according to *Second Analytics* followed the correspondence of reason to the real thing. The analytic *illuminati* at Oxford placed the truth of the absolutized word in the first place. Moreover, they proclaimed their own sophistic verbal production (later called “speech acts”) to be a part of divine revelation. Such a philosophical abomination could not go unpunished. That is the reason, why modern educated Furies hold Oxford and its Anglo-Saxon branches as their headquarters of Chaos and Vengeance. The true and righteous Muses respected the struggle for the lost cause at the University of Paris and let it die in peace, just like modern God died. The intellectual insight into the principles of cognition forms the basis of quoted *enuntiatio*, in which the inner truth of consciousness is revealed as *rectitudo* of the modern subject. Categorical statements about the truth with regard to reality are superfluous. They are replaced by illumination of intellect that makes tripartite relationship of itself, the Creator and the creation. Truth as certainty and correctness received a completely modern character and indicates the path to Descartes’s and Husserl’s postmodern Avicennism. Modernists carry the source of truth in themselves and not in contingent reality (*magis erit veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei, quam exterioris*). To determine the truth of the world, it is enough to dwell quietly in the interior of the modern soul or consciousness in the manner of Avicenna, Descartes and Husserl. The truth of these modern Porretans is in the evident mode “*semel—semper*” as the final horizon of correspondence and it is the one, unique truth common to all (*illa est summa veritas*). In addition, it is not subjected to contingent changes (*sunt simul in uno tempore*).[[313]](#footnote-313) Hermeneutics remind that this conception of truth is possible only in the ontotheological construction of metaphysics, where the unity of being is established by logical abstraction. Modern truth does not confirm in the demonstrative statement either that things are, or that they are not (*Met*. 1011b26–29). The notion of truth separated the act of correspondence from real first substances. Once again, Neoplatonic mode of truth applies. According to *Metaphysics*, the truth is given at the level of the first determinations of being, see the above-cited twofold determination of being as actualized and true (*Met*. 1026a33–b2; OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). According to modern *Nominales*, every thing has its inherent truthfulness, which is given by relation to divine truth, which stands outside of space and time (*non fuit verum, nisi veritate sua*). A new instance of validity arose, which is given separately (*per se*) thanks to immanent, eternal and necessary truthfulness. Moreover, this truthfulness is given within the framework of ontotheological horizon (*veritas aeterna est et summa*). The nominal term “*summa veritas*” replaced Aristotle’s reality of the first substance. This terminus involves the reduction of truth as Aristotelian correspondence, which concerns reality and intellect, to the truth as *rectitudo* et *certitudo*, which concerns the essence produced by the modern subject. A similar form of deduction was done in the interpretation of *Second Analytics* in the case of the transfer of univocal concept of causality from the *causa prima* to the act of “*exsistere*” that concerns the hypostatic “substance—essence.” That kind of *tertium ens* is separated from the reality of the first substance. Augustine’s theological concept of signification had been related to the eternal Word (*rectitudo*); it gradually merged with Avicenna’s concept of metaphysics as a *certitudo*. New theory of truth made it possible to establish a new logic and thus provided the necessary foundation for the metaphysics of *Modernorum*. The modern *rectitudo* does not have to worry about the real state of things. In order to determine what man is in the nihilistic mode of Oxfordian Fallacy, it is sufficient for first modern humanists to define the corpse and the rest of the ontotheological triad as modern subject, modern God and modern truth. Grosseteste’s determination of truth made possible the expansion of the Western subject. The modern subject recognizes the world in the mode of complete *Seinsvergessenheit*. Modernity can no longer see Aristotelian truth as the correspondence between thought and the real being of the first substance. God, as the guarantor of modern truth, has been replaced in postmodernism by Leibniz’s mathematics. After the death of modern God in the 19th century, this honorary function of the guarantor of truth for the whole of being (*rectitudo rectificans*) has taken the Western subject through the nihilism of truth given by structural differentiation, metaphor and language games. According to Jan Patočka’s *Heretical Essay on the Philosophy of History* (1975) published in the samizdat, the twentieth century put on display previously hidden totalitarian possibilities. They were unleashed by the turn to the mortal subject as the only eschatological guardian of being.

The definition of analogical truth as *rectitudo* allowed for another important change. The change in the concept of truth as correspondence enabled the assimilation of simulacra established by modern form of logic. It proceeds from new interpretation of *Categories* and *Second Analytics*. Oxfordian Fallacy given by the new interpretation of *Second Analytics* gave birth to a new kind of logic constructed outside of truth as Aristotelian correspondence. The beginning of modern logic can be found in Augustine’s work *De libero arbitrio.*[[314]](#footnote-314) Eternal truth of mathematical and logical proceedings (*regulae numerorum*) correspond to eternal wisdom that comes from God (*regulae sapientiae*). The union of logical and metaphysical necessity in the system of Oxfordian Fallacy joined the reinterpretation of Aristotelianism. The mathematically based divine wisdom given in modern Augustinianism complemented the faulty metaphysics based on Oxfordian Fallacy. That conjuction of two modern mythologies created a new form of ontotheology. Grosseteste translated Augustine’s conclusion about immutable mathematical truth (*incommutabiles sunt regulae*) into modern ontotheology. As a philosopher he quotes another sentence from the mentioned work (*incorruptibilem numeri veritatem dixi mihi et cuilibet ratiocinanti esse communem*, *De libero arbitrio voluntatis* 8.21). The statement connects the immutable truths of mathematics with universal being (*esse commune*). Christian analysts from Oxford have no doubt about the supreme truth given in teaching of Augustine and Anselm. They established a new definition of “supreme truth” (*summa veritas*) as the correspondence of two subjects that is based only on hyparchical logical necessity (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, *Anal. Post*. 84a14). The supreme guarantor of this correspondence is logically and necessarily modern God and the modern metaphysician (ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς). After the death of the first Guarantor, postmodern philosophical nihilist and professional mathematician manage artificial intelligence systems owned by multinational corporations to do this absolutely important job. The cited correspondence between metaphysical logic and mathematics, any reasonable person can understand it, according to Neoplatonist Augustine and modernist Grossesteste. This universally conceived being is determined according to Avicenna’s concept of *ens inquantum ens* and in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The modern God settled in Oxford became a true mathematician under the guidance of analytical teaching of Aristotle, Augustine and Grosseteste.

“*‘By means of this inviolable truth, given by numerical addition, I establish for myself and for every reasonable person common being* *of that reason*.’ [*De libero arbitrio* *voluntatis* 8.21] Therefore, this truth is eternal and in virtue of that reason it becomes the highest truth (*per hoc summa veritas*). In the same way, taken such commencement, it has been true that ‘something will be true’; it would not be true if it did not have this truth. This truth is eternal and the highest. In a similar way, derived truths of the type ‘if it is a human being, then it is an animal’ apply as well. Due to this fact, it is true that every truth predicted in this way has the character of the highest truth.” [[315]](#footnote-315)

The quotation transferred mathematical relations into ontotheological structure of metaphysics determined by Anselm’s notion of truth as “*summa veritas*.” This modern diacosmos runs according to archetypal logic “*semel—semper*”. Everything that is logically and correctly derived from this highest truth, it is guaranteed by modern God and therefore it is considered the highest truth. For the school of the first Averroism, which is not guided by modern Furies, this conception of scientific deduction is a pure paranoia when it is applied to reality. Aristotle’s book *De interpretatione*, which examines the predication, warns logicians that the concept of being in metaphysics does not follow the logical necessity. That kind of necessity is given in syllogistic statements based on hyparchical nature that founds the process of internal inference. Therefore, we must carefully distinguish, in what sense (logical or metaphysical) the existence and non-existence of things are necessarily given. It means that we must distinguish exact generic nature of the necessity in question (τὸ ὂν ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἔστιν, *De Int*. 19a25–26). The interpretation of *Second Analytics* showed the same thing by distinguishing two forms of hyparchical universality and necessity due to abstraction in thinking and due to abstraction of things in reality (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12). The previous analyses have confirmed that the combination of Porretan modern logic with Neoplatonic interpretation of *Categories* around the year 1230 gave rise to a univocal concept of necessity. Grosseteste confirmed that fact in his analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*. The interpretation moderne of Toletans changed hyparchical predication and the nature of imposition. The original text of *Second Analytics* insists on primacy of the principle “*ex* *inmediatis*” and on twofold distinction of meaning as “*inesse*” (ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν, *Anal. Post*. 73b28). Abolition of those principles lead to grave consequences in modern logic. It definitely passed into the school of the second Averroism, and it became a new form of metaphysics.

In original Aristotelism, the primacy of real existence comes before the recognized essence and thus determines the hyparchical form of necessity predicted within the framework of the metaphysical dative. The existence of the real substance determines the middle link of deductive proof by the principle of causality. Should the logic state the events in the world, and not the mathematical entities in thinking, it must follow the metaphysical abstraction, which is hyparchical due to existence of first substances. We recognize the world through the exposure of meaning from first substances. They represent the basic event of metaphysical donation that constitutes meaning of being. If the metaphysical necessity given by the first real substance is missing, then the form of logical necessity given in the statement about first substances and their causality cannot be determined either. Therefore, treatise *De interpretatione* asserts that tomorrow’s naval battle is metaphysically indeterminable. Since nothing is given in reality, the future contingent events cannot be logically determinable as true or untrue. There is no truth-value coming from metaphysical necessity that can be assessed to them. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* Whether or not the future naval battle will occur, there is no real fundament to establish that kind of necessity. For the non-existent event in the world (and by no means for the mathematical entity given in thinking), there is no hyparchical existence, according to which one could truthfully predict the universal metaphysical, and subsequently also logical necessity. Since the subsistent form is not in reality, the statement cannot be determined in thinking. There is no imposition of meaning from reality, therefore no metaphysical kind of necessity that can passe from reality to thinking. This attitude respects the above-mentioned Aristotelian difference between the real *ens* and the formalized *esse* within the framework of axiomatic primacy of *Second Analytics*. The existence of real things necessarily determines the universal meaning of the second substance as the first universal species made by the imposition in the first triad of cognitive principles. Given that metaphysical necessity based on reality, the logical necessity of universal essence of the second triad of principles in demonstrative syllogism can be deduced as true universal correspondence. Therefore, Alfarabi as an Aristotelician refused to determine the logical statute of future contingent events. According to him, the logicians of Asharite Neoplatonic school are mistaken when they predict determined logical meanings to future contingent events, because they mix metaphysics with logic (Wisnovsky 2003, 220). According to Alfarabi, there is a fundamental difference between being, which is necessarily conceived in a logical sense, and being, which is necessary thanks to its own existence. Alfarabi commented on *Second Analytics* and knew well that the existence of first substances determines the truth value of judgment according to the principle *ex inmediatis*. Asharites made the first invasion of modern logic into metaphysics thanks to Neoplatonic validity of the future contingent events. They evaluated them in ontotheological “*semel—semper*” modality established in virtue of eternal meaning derived from principaly made Good and Evil. Following their reasoning, Avicenna defines the necessity as a purely formal concept, separated only from the pure impossibility.[[316]](#footnote-316) Avicenna created for the first time a system of pure formal predication, which is separated from the first real substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The analysis of Avicenna’s metaphysics has shown the manner, how the new system of essentiality was created with the help of a formal negation. Such theory of truth is separated from all realities established by first substances. Avicenna’s next important step on the path to the new logic was the ontotheological status of matter as a pure, archetypal possibility given in the cosmic *intellectus agens*. Neoplatonic intellect uses the matter of the third kind in the diacosmos to form the objective being (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). Matter became the potential recipient of necessarily given forms. The result was logical equivalence between necessity, potentiality and contingency (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). For Avicenna, the objective species receive their necessary determination within the divine stream of forms that emanates from the active intellect as the giver of these forms (*Dator formarum*). This mythological position of *tertium ens* outside the hylemorphic reality permanently secures the ontotheological value of the new logic. *Ex nihilo esse logicum fit*. The connecting line between the diacosmos of forms and the world of things was drawn by Avicenna’s common nature of the third kind. The determination of the individual through *quidditas* is established by superordinate generic “substance—form” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). Porretans adopted Neoplatonism of the Falsafa and transformed it into Oxfordian Fallacy. They took *univoce* both types of necessity by exchanging the first triad of principles of cognition with the second. Modern logic arose by changing the classical interpretation of *De interpretatione* in the direction of Avicennism. Under influence of Avicenna, the metaphysical necessity given by the act of being the first substance (ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης, *De Int*. 19a26) is grafted onto new metaphysics as logical necessity. The next source of deterministic logic of future contingent events came from theologians as Algazel. They determined the contingent future on the basis of binary given divine providence.[[317]](#footnote-317) Modernity took ever that kind of ontotheological scenario by introducing Augustinianism instead of teaching of Islam related to *Iqtisād*. Let us see the above-mentioned quotation of Grossseteste’s *De veritate*. It made final mixture of Oxfordian Fallacy and Christian mythology based on modern God of Avicenna to elaborate the modern logic of Latin West. Aristotle’s *causa prima* and Augustine’s *veritas aeterna* relate to Avicenna’s horizon of ontotheological determinations, which are given within the framework of archetypal validity ensured by the cosmic active intellect.

Clearly, classical Aristotelianism could not accept such nonsense. The schools of *Logica Vetus* understood necessity in two modes, because they knew from Boethius the difference between logical and existential statements. An example of this clear distinction between the two types of necessity is provided in writing *Logica “Cum sit nostra”*.[[318]](#footnote-318) The person that is sitting now makes a typical example of the contingent necessity given as accident. The necessity of the past state, even God cannot change it, because he would thereby deny the proposition about identity and transform the past in the manner of today’s science fiction. This necessity can be related to real sitting Socrates, and then it applies in the manner called “*relative*;” or we take it in the mode of logical abstraction, and then it applies in the manner called “*absolute*.” The metaphysical mode of necessity bound to the existing thing was called *relative* and thus related to the real thing outside of ourselves (*respective*). This confirmed Abelard’s primacy of hyparchical categorical predication (*enuntiatio*), which is necessary to ensure the truth in scientific proof (*demonstratio*). Since Socrates exists as a substance, he is accidentally sitting and we can make metaphysical *univoce* given statements about this real state of things. They run in the mode of “*relative*” given necessity. The mode of necessity in the framework of logical abstraction was considered as separately given (*absolute*). This purely logical abstraction considers meaning separated from the existing being. The absolute form of necessity stands in and of itself within the framework of separate logical abstraction, while the relative form relates to the existing state of things in the world. Logic does not have to follow this path, because it works in a different mode of abstraction; classic logicians must be aware of this fact. Logic without metaphysics is blind, but it is logically true. This sums up the tragedy of paranoid modernity in one sentence. Once again, twofold nature of hyparchical predication is respected, which is given by double modality of “*simpliciter*” that conferred necessity based on the real substance and on the abstracted essence. Within the logical schools in classical Aristotelianism, there was no problem with formalization. Logicians understood the difference between two modes of metaphysical and logical necessity (*relative—absolute*) and their modality. This was given in view of the accidental or substantial form of this necessity (*per accidens—per se*). The last level must distinguish what kind of substance is (material and changeable, immaterial and permanent). In the case of the accidents, logic could add temporal determinations given as present or past (Socrates is sitting now, or in the past). Within the framework of *absolute* given logical abstraction of being, the metaphysical necessity of the existence of the thing was transferred to its formal equivalent. In that case, statement abstracted from metaphysical imposition of meaning from the existing thing. Then the corpse is a human being, which, however, applies only within the framework of logical abstraction and not metaphysical reasoning. The second Averroism in Grosseteste’s school changed the logic of Porretans into a kind of new metaphysics. The modernists brought about logical version of Oxfordian Fallacy, swapping the third step of the recognition of existence with the postulate of a permanent essence. This was only a secondary step of recognition in *Second Analytics*. Let us see the previous chapter and the quarrel about the principle *ex inmediatis* done by Albert (ch. 2.4.1) and then by Kilwardby (ch. 3.4.1). The schools of *Logica Modernorum* underwent a deep transformation in the years 1230–50. Avicennists of the Toledo school transferred the teaching of *Nominales* to the new theory of truth, scientific cognition and categorical predication. See the quoted and frequently debated example of truth in the Porretan mode *semel*—*semper*, which comes from God as *summa veritas*. Modern logic no longer distinguished between the logical and essentially given fiction that is separated from hyparchical reality and metaphysical statements. To paraphrase Goethe's classic phrase “poetry *and* truth” (“Dichtung *und* Wahrheit”), modern mythological metaphysics is based on a third way of being called “poetry—truth” (*Dichtung—Wahrheit*).

Grosseteste is the first known author of scholasticism, who transformed Aristotle’s indefinite status of future contingents into a logically determined one (Noone 1997, 263). The first Oxford’s analytic philosopher translated the future contingents into the horizon of eschatology and metaphysics. That horizon was given by theological speculation about the necessary advent of Antichrist. Eschatology offered to Oxford analytic logicians the opportunity to definitively fix logical meaning due to eschatological mode “*de fine*” in order to ensure the predication of future contingent events. The primacy of divine essence and truth over contingent existence generates a distinction between necessity and possibility that the classic logic considers in the mode “*absolute*.” The mode “*relative*” does not apply to the first substance, but to eternal essence taken as eternal truth in the form “*semel—semper*.” Essence made out of logical necessity applies *univoce* to metaphysical necessity. Such mythological logic can evaluate even future contingent events. Modern *illuminati* consider any contingency in the past and in the future as aspects of formally predestined truth and untruth, which is accomplished in the postmodern logic of Leibniz. The devalorization of the principle “*ex inmediatis”* to the formal principle of logic is evident. Metaphysical necessity is carried out from the hyparchical existence of the first substance (*deducere*), since what is given in reality that is recognized in thinking. The analytical version of logic makes use of Oxfordian Fallacy that set the priority of logical universal principles of knowledge over the necessity coming from reality that is secured by the first triad of cognitive principles. Modern interpretation predicts the contingent existence in the mode *per posterius* and sets it against the eternal “form—essence” given *per prius*. As a result, a new form of *tertium ens* was created in logic, which ties in with Porretan concept of the atomic “substance—species.” The introduction of truth value into the categorical hypostases of Porretans gave rise to a form of logic given by the necessity of the third kind. The new logic was placed outside the classical metaphysics and logic that were bound to reality. Therefore this radically separated thinking is necessarily considered in the manner “*absolute*” made in the system of classical logic. Due to Oxfordian Fallacy, the modern logic pretends to be done in a metaphysical mode of necessity made by the imposition of meaning coming from real substances (“*relative*”). This necessity of the third kind made possible the transformation of classical Aristotelian logic into the modern version of Grosseteste and later also into Leibniz’s postmodern version of calculating God (*cum Deus calculat ... fit mundus*). The new form of necessity of the third kind is founded in Augustine’s and Anselm’s determination of truth as an eternal divine *rectitudo*. Avicennist logic adds to this the necessary *certitudo* made by modern *illuminati*. The subsequent *veritas* as a logical predication of eternal divine correctness and truth of divine judgments are given in the fact that absolutely given divine necessity arrives in contingent events or not.

Modern metaphysics seconded by logical interpretation of *Categories* follows the deductive scenario as the descent of eternal universal forms to contingent real things. The realization of meaning is accomplished by descending of determined necessity in the order of eternal truth (*summa veritas*) into the contingent order of future events (*veritas enuntiationis*). The deduction does not come from the imposition, but has its own hypostatized, ontotheological supposition. The higher truth as *rectitudo* in God is carried out into the lower truth of *veritas* given in creation. In this new type of deduction, it is true that the necessity of the third type determines contingent events on the lower level thanks to eternal existence of higher and more permanent forms. The model of modernists was the deduction made according to Neoplatonic writing *Liber de causis*.[[319]](#footnote-319) The determination of being runs according to above-mentioned quotation of Grosseteste that separated the mode of creative activity (*rectitudo rectificans*) from the secondary truth of things. These are true within the framework of rectified correctness (*rectitudines rectificatae*). This ontotheological deontology provides the foundation of new logic of *Modernorum*, which Leibniz took over in the postmodernism. What should be, that is considered logically true and that wishful thinking of *illuminati* makes the nature of modern necessity. Either the thing is conceived from the point of view of the necessary archetypal form fixed in divine mind, or from the point of view of its contingent transition from eternal form to reality. The above quotations show the meta-logical nature of contingent truth as *veritas* in the higher truth as *rectitudo*. Coming from above, the higher form determines the lower form of contingency, in which it is really and sensually manifestable (*exsistit*). See the first modern conception of “*exsistere*” in teaching of Rufus (ch. 3.3.2). This development was completed after the death of modern God by nihilistic formalization of logic in work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. They absolutized formal logic of mathematics (even Frege did it) to make a logical and necessary funeral of dead metaphysics of *Modernorum*. In the 20th century, modern logicians became objective philosophers who logically and necessarily abolished metaphysics. This started in the second Averroism due to the introduction of Avicenna’s *absolute* given logical necessity separated from the first substance. Avicenna gave to the West the first metaphysical absolution from reality. As a result, the statute of necessity changed fundamentally and shifted towards the analogical and univocal interpretation of *Categories* discussed above. Since then, modern necessity is given within the framework of Christian eschatology and mysticism. The divine essence defined by Grosseteste in the mode of ipseity (*causa prima quia ipsa est*, ch. 3.1.1) represents a type of logical necessity posited *absolute* and *per se*, because it is separate from creation and has no accidental changes. Modern logic, influenced by schools of *Nominales*, forgot Aristotle’s warning in *De interpretatione* about the primacy of the first real substance that determines adequate thinking. The modernists placed the essence above existence. That meta-logical meaning considered *absolute* acquired the univocal character of the first substance. Grosseteste separated necessity from the real substance and placed it in the ontotheological scenario, as was the case with Avicenna. Grosseteste certainly knew the writing *De sacramentis* by Hugh of Saint-Victor in Paris. The treatise probably defined for the first time in scholasticism the determinism of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) with regard to future contingent events.[[320]](#footnote-320) Future contingent events were indeterminable in classical logic. Now they are determinable because modernity has created a calculating God and taught him to think correctly. In the second step, modernity tied these contingent events to the free will of the modern subject. This imposition of the necessity (*Ge-Stell*) is bound to the absolutely given power of the subject; it founded the completely virtual world we live in today.

The speculation about the necessary arrival of Antichrist shows, in the mode of Heidegger’s *Lichtung*, the origin that forms the fundamental mythology of formalized logic in the Oxford’s school. The absolute logic of *illuminati* took an ontotheological character, as well as the whole modern metaphysics, which emerged from it. The necessity determined by the relation to existing things (*relative*) began to be predicted in order to evaluate the arrival of Antichrist as an absolutely given fact (*necessarium per se*). The contingent nature of this event is given to us in the uncertainty as to whether Antichrist will come in the future or not. But at least we know that he must come because God’s Word is *summa veritas* and establishes the ultimate horizon of truth as a *rectitudo*. Grosseteste combined the future arrival of Antichrist univocally with both kinds of necessity (*necessarium* *respective et absolute*). However, these two types of necessity are explicitly distinguished in the cited treatise *Logica “Cum sit nostra.”* Classic schools understood logic in the original Aristotelian meaning established by *Categories* and *De interpretatione*. From the point of view of Aristotelians, the arrival of Antichrist cannot be rationally decided. Antichrist is not a first real substance and its existence is postulated as a matter of faith. He does not make any matter of intellectual cognition, which is determined by existence of the actualized first substance. All the more, the future arrival of Antichrist is undetermined, because this substance does not exist at all in real terms and is even supposed to come in the future. Again it is evident that the logical essence of Antichrist in the mode *absolute* (like the essence of the chimera) is considered to be metaphysical species, that is, the second substance made through the imposition. The latter generates the metaphysical necessity in the mode *relative* (like past existence of Socrates or Christ) due to the imposition of meaning from the reality. For the first Averroism, the arrival of Antichrist is not a matter of statements related to recognition of the real thing, but a matter of the Christian faith. Chthonic powers of Chaos that reigned in mystical Oxford could not tolerate that lower truths done at the level of *intellectus debilis* could determine such a serious matter as the arrival of this important demonic actor. Grosseteste represents a new Aristotelian protagonist of the Toledo school, who believes in one truth as *summa veritas*. This truth is essentially and irrevocably contained in the eternal Word of God. Under the leadership of biblically literate Furies, there is nothing impossible for the enlightened modern spirit. The essential faith of modernism and postmodernism can move even objective mountains. Therefore actually non-existent Antichrist received the honorable function to be the founding father of modern logic. Speculation about the coming of Antichrist is, in the order of Christian faith, a determined truth like Aristotle’s correspondence of the intellect and the first substance. As a Catholic priest, master of theology, founder of the Franciscan University College in Oxford and bishop of Lincoln, Grosseteste knew with ontotheological certainty that Antichrist was coming. This truth of faith must be confirmed by logic and metaphysics, the latter of which, moreover, is based on theological meaning of contingent free will. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a new logical predication of future events in the realm of truth as *rectitudo*. That kind of logic is not determined by uncertain existence of first substances in reality. Given that case, the arrival of Antichrist would be as indeterminable as Aristotle’s future naval battle, and God’s Word would no longer be considered *summa veritas*.

The work *De veritate propositionis* builds on the treatise *De veritate* and shows new logical value of future events with regard to the coming of Antichrist. This future necessary event replaced Aristotle’s necessity coming from the first substance. The non-present and future events associated with demonic Antichrist received the metaphysical value of hyparchical necessity based on existence of the first substance. Because of this metaphysical and mystical *Irrtum*, the modern logic came into being. Aristotle would never have allowed that logic and metaphysics should be based on demonology (albeit the biblical one); it concerns classical schools in the line of Boethius and Abelard as well. The first modernist and a devout *illuminatus,* Grosseteste elaborated with the help of hypostatized eschatology a new kind of relation in the logical class “*necessarium relative*,” which was originally valid exclusively for the predication of real hyparchical substances. The new sophistic form of metaphysical and logical necessity is determined in view of the future contingent event that “is” the arrival of Antichrist. Modern deduction runs from the logical valence given *absolute* and *per se* to the potential possibility given only by accident. It remains therefore undetermined for the time being with regard to truth and untruth. The ontotheological fact of future necessary arrival of Antichrist is as yet undetermined for us as to the accidental nature of that event. However, its indetermination is inserted into essential *rectitudo* of his existence guaranteed in the Bible. The essential fact of the arrival of Antichrist is necessary in the mode “*necessarium per se*,” that is fully separated (*absolute*) from the present state of things in reality. The only thing that is unclear is the future advent of this demonic being, which has been contingent until now. Another possibility, i.e., the non-existence of Antichrist, is excluded under the penalty of excommunication. Grosseteste introduced theological dogmatics and demonology into Aristotelian logic and thereby changed it into modern formal logic. Demonic powers of Chaos and Revenge in the underworld certainly rejoiced at this positive and objective development of modern logic. Thinking of Oxford *illuminati* has been detached from the reality of the first substance. They established the beginning of *via Modernorum*, which leads straight to the contemporary underworld. The new version of Oxfordian Fallacy is hidden in the sophism regarding the established necessity (*ponere necessitatem*), which is given according to the necessity and universality of the third kind interpreted in the previous chapter. The following quotation introduces a new *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* of modern logic.

“It is rightly said that the truth of the proposition ‘Antichrist is’ does not apply so far, because this would necessarily mean that he is there. This truth is given in the mode of unfinished and indefinite being (*huius veritas est esse incompletum et indeterminatum*). Then we must determine the necessity of this truth and state it in the prospective statement (*ponere necessitatem super assertionem de futuro*) that will occur (*quod erit*), that is, with regard to the future existence of this matter (*existentiam rei futurae*). The proposition such as ‘Antichrist will be’ or ‘Antichrist is in the future’ is not necessarily true (*est vera non necessaria*) but only in a contigent way, and and in this contingently present form it can be false.” [[321]](#footnote-321)

The arrival of modern necessity is hidden in the assertion that Antichrist’s coming is given in the mode of being of the third kind (*esse incompletum et indeterminatum*). There is no imposition of meaning from the existing reality, since dogmatically given supposition is sufficient enough. A corresponding modern necessity of the third kind (*ponere necessitatem super assertionem de futuro*) is logically envisaged for such an incomplete and unclear event. The poetic truth of modern logic is given in the assertion “*idem enim est*,” which clearly shows the *idem*-character of new metaphysics based on the scheme of Oxfordian Fallacy. In mythological modernity and its “*fröhliche Wissenschaft*” (Nietzsche), we objectively and necessarily need the future arrival of Antichrist in order to acquire logical and metaphysical validity of modern logic. Classical logic and aristotelian science are not so cheerful, because the existence of Antichrist as the first substance is not given here and now. That nonperson lacks hyparchical imposition and therefore it is impossible to predict in the logic anything about his arrival. The modern concept of logic abolishes the difference between metaphysical and logical necessity. The new form of necessity applies in the mode of Avicenna’s absolute simplicity. Such a *positum* moderne is tied to the direct insight into objective essences of the type “*equinitas tantum*” or “*hoc esse tantum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The predicted logical event in the mode of ontotheological metaphysics, i.e. “Antichrist arrives in the future,” is a pure Porretan essence conceived in the modality *simpliciter*. Its present non-existence is given by a false metaphysical imposition. Such an ontotheological (and wholly demonic) determination of *tertium ens* is determined by paranoiac nature of philosophical “faith.” *Ex nihilo esse necessarium et logicum fit*. The demiurgic word of modern faith forms objectives and therefore non-existent essences such as Antichrist. The quotation postulates two basic conditions with regard to positive arrival of Antichrist. This eschatological event necessarily occurs in the future (*ponere necessitatem super assertionem de futuro*), because it cannot fail to occur due to divine intention (*secundum quid sui iam est et habet necessitatem*). Such modality “*secundum quid*” is a pure myth from the point of view of classical logic. Antichrist does not really exist and we cannot see intentions in God’s head, albeit the future ones. Scientific evidence and its metaphysical necessity cannot in any way state the existence of demons such as Antichrist. A classical metaphysics works with real causality of hyparchic first substances. Porretan necessity of the third kind built up dogmatic intuition of modern *illuminati*. Under the leadership of Furies, they observed non-existent Antichrist as unquestionably as the normal person sees first substances. Modernism has gone completely mad. Such a “vision” of demonic creatures is possible because modernists are capable of a miraculous intuition into the divine essence. This is quite logical, for they themselves have created this modern God in their own image and intellectual likeness. The *illuminati* have established the mythological *rectitudo* of future events in the mode “*semel—semper*” before the creation of the real world. On the basis of belief in divine potency, they began to predict future events even before the birth of physical time. Physical time only comes into being through the movement in creation. It is then necessary that the consequence comes later than the cause. As far as God in eternity is concerned, the cause and consequence are given simultaneously without temporal consequence, because God is absolutely simple. From our perspective, these archetypal causal states in God, which refer to the future (the arrival of Antichrist), cannot be determined as true or untrue. However, we already know by believing in the truth of prophecies that this foreseen truth of Antichrist’s coming pre-exists as a hypostatized possibility in modern God. He thinks everything possible through the act of his intellect in eternity. Then it came to pass that God created a problematic angel at the commencement of the world, who became Antichrist by the act of his free will. That is why God, as the creative cause of Antichrist, also knows his potential effects in the future.[[322]](#footnote-322) In this primary form, the hypostatized potentiality of future Antichrist has the necessary and eternal status of contingent truth in God. From an Aristotelian point of view, this procedure is impossible and completely contradictory. The logic given by metaphysical necessity has no real existing and causally acting first substance. Its existence provides the necessary imposition of meaning within truth as *adaequatio* for true, i.e. adequate predication. Grosseteste′s contingency entails an eventuality that is given as indeterminacy of a future and even necessary event. This is utter nonsense. Antichrist does not even exist as a causally acting first substance. Then it is not possible at all to make statements about his accidents or even about his contingent future events. Grosseteste hypostatized logical possibility that exists here and now only in the potency (*veritas incompleta, indeterminata*). This potency is stated as *positum*, also, it is essentially given. The arrival of Antichrist is given as a fundamental *Ge-Stell*, which forms the founding event (*Ereignis*) of modern logic. This positive potency is in fact already essentially given, thanks to eternally given necessity of Antichrist’s “exsistence.” It entails deductive presence of Antichrist in divine intentionality made in “*semel—semper*” mode. The untruth is therefore only uncertainty in the sense of yet unfulfilled, but necessarily given positive potency, which has not yet been actualized. After the exclusion of the third possibility, both logical possibilities remain, the true one and also the false one (*quia possibile est, quamlibet talem esse falsam*). The necessary arrival of Antichrist has so far been given as possible necessity that arrives in the order of contingent indeterminacy. But Antichrist either comes or does not come; another possibility is excluded. The determination of future contingent events arose from the introduction of truth value with regard to being that is given at the level of mere potency (*esse incompletum*). However, such being is already determined in the minimal portion of hypostatized Porretanian being (*antichristus est*). This being of the third kind in the form of Antichrist receives a logical value made as propositions about the Excluded Third (“he comes— he does not come”). That ontotheological deduction holds because God and Bible are true. Like this, Antichrist “came into objective being” (*exsistit*) on Earth, first at Oxford. It's worth noting with Nietzsche that *sophistae Latini* finally created a complete underworld of modernity. The *Nominales* in Abelard's time made a modern God; the modernists in Oxford added a modern Antichrist to it. Thererefore, objectively necessarily, an apocalyptic history made through *via Modernorum* was set into real motion.

Grosseteste stands at the beginning of nihilistic era, which predicts the necessary arrival of modern Antichrist. This interesting figure created modern logic in the school of Oxford’s modernists and it has been living among us in various disguises since that time. In the school of Toletans at Oxford, Avicenna received an Aristotelian cloak. Modern God created in Oxford is no longer Avicenna's donor of hypostasized forms (*Dator formarum*). His intellect and intentionality have become the fundament of metaphysics to deliver truth as *rectitudo* in the mode of eternal production and supply of divine truth (*Ge-Stell*). These anthropomorphic characteristics of modern God are defined as *summa veritas*. His absolute and eternal *rectitudo* forms the basis of modern logic, which guarantees the immutable truth of theological statements in the “*semel—semper*” mode, such as coming of Antichrist. Their truth value is already secured in divine providence before the creation of the world. The human subject is connected to modern God by umbilical cord of the same intentionality and logic. Just have a look at the course of Descartes′s meditations on postmodern philosophy. This new mytological “Man—God” has become the ontoteological *tertium ens* in order to guarantee modern truth as an evident certainty (*certitudo*). The demonic determination of modern logic appeared to have a great eschatological future, since dead God of modernity has been replaced by living banksters. In the same Avicennist way, today’s banksters are fabricating financial crises. After the death of modern God, they put themselves in his place. In the era of banking nihilism, it is therefore quite logical that contemporary banksters are doing God’s work.[[323]](#footnote-323) Especially after the above-mentioned mortgage crisis, which has been one of the largest and unpunished bank robberies of mankind so far. The postmodern visionary “observes” financial derivatives that are built on the same form of hypostatized necessity and potentiality. A contract of the type “futures” resembles Antichrist in the fact, that it is a financial derivative determined by logically necessary, yet indefinite arrival of the asset. The derivatives are “derived” directly from the modern logic (*deducere*). The future Antichrist or the financial derivative exists as a determined “substance—species.” Under the leadership of Furies as financial wizards based in the City of London and Wall Street, repeated crises occurred in the sphere of chaotic bank nihilism. Let’s take the mortgage crisis from 2006–2009 as an example. Instead of biblical necessity concerning the future coming of Antichrist, we must substitute a nihilistic necessity of algorithmic system. In the mode of “*esse incompletum*,” came an apocalyptic event called “Collateralized Debt Obligation” (CDO). The arrival of that event consists of mathematically based speculations concerning future value of mortgages. Entering the order of logical necessity, the bank value was created as an essence by using a mathematical algorithm. Due to certification authority of banksters, this essence acquires the character of objectively true first substance. The introduction of “nominal value” as a mythological essence (*Ge-Stell*) instead of the first real substance had fatal consequences. Demonic necessity in the age of nihilism robbed savers of their real money and lifetime savings. It was clear to Aristotelians as Abelard and the first Averroists that no truthful value can be attributed to future arrival of Antichrist or nihilistic financial derivatives. The order of pure logic is void, since hyparchical determination of the first substance is absent. The future Antichrist and the financial derivative speculate with the future as logically determined reality. The demonology of pious *illuminati* or agnostic banksters does not follow hyparchical necessity at the level of first substances. Modernism proceeds differently from critical Aristotelians. Positivist eschatological logic is illuminated by Furies from chaotic underworld, and not by the first real substance. The logical valence of both future events is ensured in ontotheological scenario of truth as the biblical or banking *rectitudo*. Each *esse incompletum* is already determined by God or by rating agencies. That kind of *summa veritas* of these two possibilities is given in advance, that is, in meta-logically certain form made by modern *illuminati* or by nihilistic banksters.

Grosseteste starts from Avicenna’s duality between the necessity and the contingency. The necessity is always true; the contingency has both options available in the mode *possibiliter*. The logical valence is not yet determined from the point of view of concrete truth value, but already has a firmly given logical meaning in the field of truth and untruth of the third kind (*possibiliter*), which is given beyond contingent reality. The pure potency became a hypostatized first substance (Antichrist, CDO derivatives). The eschatology of Oxford Franciscans and Dominicans founded modern metaphysics given by Oxfordian Fallacy, which is based on the pure possibility of truth as an essence that has not yet actually occurred. What was fundamentally indeterminable for classical logic based on metaphysics, that is only contingently indeterminable for modern, dogmatically and eschatologically thinking *illuminati*. Hypostasized possibility of Antichrist′s arrival is guaranteed by the unchangeable fullness of truth in modern God. Theology and mystical faith follow the necessary action of divine providence. Postmodernism brought modern *summa veritas* into the mythological necessity controlled by Shiva’s dance of media manipulations. Money talks and people listen. The brave new world of Anthropocene era is produced by legion of powerful economic and ideological simulacra that establish the virtual realm of post-truths. Aristotle, and after him the first Averroism, refused to carry out a similar operation with regard to non-existent first substance. Since there are no events as “future naval battle,” there is nothing to determine in consistent logical thinking. Grosseteste and, after him, the second Averroism proceed differently. The necessity of the metaphysical dative was replaced by parousia of meaning revealed in enlightened thinking of *illuminati*. Since the Antichrist is definitely coming, there is always something to be determined in the mode of permanent determination of truth (the mode *semper*). This eschatological truth is given by God (the mode *per se, absolute*). Modernity establishes the truth value of contingent events *modo geometrico*, by objective “exsistence” of the essence. The modern necessity applies through Neoplatonic deduction of being of the third kind. The last source of deduction is Avicenna’s *Dator formarum*, and after his death, that is but a nihilist bankster. Regarding the reality of the future arrival of Antichrist, the founder of Oxfordian Fallacy did not worry. In order to philosophically define his future advent, he replaced the missing first substance with the nominal expression “*esse incompletum*.” This new demonic essence has the same logical-objective value as financial derivatives.

Let us now return to the above-mentioned notion “*veritas incompleta*.” Such kind of truth characterizes knowledge of eternal and necessary events when they descend to the level of contingent events. The quotation compares the present uncertain state of affairs with the future security of all things in God as an eternal and perfect truth.

“Everything that causes darkness in these sayings (*generat caliginem*) is given by the fact that the variability of things seems to contradict their necessity, which is given as an eternally present immutability in divine thinking and cognition (*immutabilis praesentialis in mente et scientia divina*). The same applies to divine necessity, which is given as immutability of divine truth. It is present in what was and what will be, because this cannot be determined at the present time. We cannot determine these contingent propositions from the point of view of divine necessity given here and now, because the divine truth is not limited like this (*non finibilis est eius veritas*). We cannot determine this from any other contingency, because this would not be true without an original commencement; and, from this original divine possibility arises the contingency of things.” [[324]](#footnote-324)

The definite metaphysical and logical value is kept in divine thought in Porretan mode “*semel—semper*.” However, this original validity is not obvious to us here, on the Earth. The contingency of real things is temporarily excluded from the relation to divine necessity (*contingentia rerum in ipsis videtur repugnare necessitati*). The original form of necessity exists as an eternal presence in the thinking and reflection of God (*immutabilitas praesentialis in mente et scientia divina*). This ontotheological horizon ensures the permanence of truth, and provides a firmly determined present truth (*immutabilitas praesentialis veritatis*). That kind of truth refers to other two contingently determined time dimensions (*in his de praeterito et de futuro*). It is the moment when the vision of modern *illuminati* starts. Under the leadership of Furies, they observe the thinking of modern God as an infallible mathematician and logician. See the above-mentioned logical determination in the modality done *absolute* and *per se*. From such a solid foundation of truth in divine mind, it makes no problem deducing every modern necessity. It relates primarily to divine providence and its future intentions (*ex parte aliqua est necessitas propter hoc*). The unchanging divine intentions are determined in the mode of transcendent necessity given outside of ourselves. However, our intellect is moving with regard to contingent and indeterminately events given in the future, which is given purely potentially (*ex parte alia contingentia*). The arrival of Antichrist is not given to us with regard to his full truth. In divine thought, this arrival is truly determined, although for the time being only in potency, because this significant event has not yet occurred. The same applies to further financial crises produced by financial speculations and gambling in the age of metaphysical nihilism. The potential determination of future events in divine thinking ensures its minimal truth value (*veritas incompleta*), which is given by excluding the opposite possibility. The coming of Antichrist known by God excludes the possibility that he does not come (*sine initio non fuisse vera*). Thanks to the exclusion of another possibility, logical validity is given in divine presence, because its eternally determined potentiality determines the contingency of things (*ex qua potentia sequitur rerum contingentia*). The eternal truth is necessarily given in the infinite divine thought (*non finibilis est eius veritas*); for us it is given only in the limited mode, which allows the possibility of the opposite, because it is given contingently. For us, it is not yet decided here and now, whether Antichrist is coming. But in divine thinking this is already necessarily true and his providence is clearly reflected in the plan of salvation. After the death of modern God, this providence is replaced by mathematical algorithms.

Once again, Porretan scenario of univocal transcendental deduction applies. Lower contingent meaning and truths come from the higher and eternally necessary forms of logical valence that runs with absolute certainty. At the lower level, Aristotelian contingency and the indeterminacy of future events apply, because they have not yet their determined beginning. Without this definite beginning, there are simply no future things and thus no logical value. But at the level of modern God, as a supreme mathematician and modern logician, this beginning of future events is given in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*.” Modern logic reacted to effects of Oxfordian Fallacy given in metaphysics and categorical predication. Modernists created a new category of logical truth of the third kind. As a result, it came to logical and objectively given determination of future contingent events such as the naval battle, the arrival of Antichrist and speculative bubbles. This certainty is given in the mode of truth valid in separated divine thinking (*absolute*). For this kind of necessity, there is no imposition of Aristotelian necessity, which is determined by presence of real things. Therefore, the absolute truth of objective arrival of Antichrist and speculative financial bubbles are in the mode of future contingent events, that is, as a hypostatized potency (*huius veritas est esse incompletum et indeterminatum*). We have analyzed this form of “exsistence” given deductively. It goes from the higher forms into the lower ones on the basis of changed categorical predication around 1230. The *illuminati* in Oxford contemplated divine intentions and banksters in London perform God’s work; both groupes observe the world from absolute position of divine providence. Then, every event in the world is determinable in the mode of formal logical validity. In future contingent events, this validity is indeterminate, but they have the necessary value as potential affirmation or negation, which is eternally given in God (*in mente et scientia divina*). Jamblichus’s scenario of being as “Limited—Unlimited” was again introduced in the dialectics of infinite and finite truth that determines formal logic. In the same style, Simplicius applied the formalist limitation of space with regard to eidetic time (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Antichrist must come, because this statement entails the meta-logical necessity that transcends our limited cognition. Modern logic is objectively controlled by demonic powers, which is quite correct and objectively necessary. But the necessity of Antichrist’s coming is given as an indefinite possibility with regard to the future, because it is accepted in the mode of our limited cognition. But this indefinite necessity exists in the determined mode of the truth guaranteed by God. It means that events in question will certainly occur in the future. In the given case, we already know from biblical writing *Book of Revelation* that Antichrist must come. As a result, logically determined truth-values given by the exclusion of the third possibility were introduced into indeterminate events such as future naval battle. Modern sophistry proclaims that at least the naval battle will take place or will not take place, which at first sight looks quite logical.

The last representative of the first Averroism made a fundamental criticism of this sophistry that Oxford’s modernists have practiced ever since. William Ockham refers to original Aristotelian position and to logical errors hidden in confused modern statements (OBJ III, ch. 5.4.2). The new logical determination seems to work just as universally as the divine plan of salvation. Therefore, we look into that plan from human thinking and cognition, albeit from the point of view of the contingent and limited nature of truth given here and now (*veritas incompleta*). The above-mentioned quotation shows that mystical *illuminati*, equipped with the telescope of modern logic, reliably and necessarily look into the world of eternal and unchanging truths in divine thought (*immutabilitas praesentialis veritatis in his de praeterito et de futuro*). The counterfactual logic became all-powerful instrument of modernism and postmodernism. All future events are in the order of potential, but positive necessity given in the false metaphysical mode *relative*. It is supplemented by nihilistic consequences given by the theory of chaos. Grosseteste’s commentary on *Second Analytics* absolutely values eidetic insight into the first principles (*principia cognoscendi rationes rerum*), because in this way we are able to look into the archetypal spheres of divine intellect (*increate ab eterno existentes in causa prima*, ch. 3.1.1). His treatises on truth and free will have shown that the science of *Modernorum* transformed metaphysical, previously indeterminable potency into an ontologically determined contingency of things and events (*ex qua potentia sequitur rerum contingentia*). These hypostatized beings of the third kind either happen or do not happen in the future. The introduction of demonology, dogmatic and eschatological ontotheology fundamentally changed schools of *Logica Modernorum* in the style of Hegel’s “*Aufhebung*.” They ceased to exist as logical schools and became the faculties of modern metaphysics. This cheerful science of demonic modernity gave nightmares to critical Aristotelians thinkers, but the modern progress is unstoppable. The plan of secular salvation and the arrival of corresponding demonic powers given at the end of time are determined today on the stock exchange. Both redemption events of metaphysical nihilism are given *absolute* in the classical logical mode. In spite of Aristotle, future contingent events received a new ontological status. Their prediction is possible thanks to newly introduced ontotheological horizon of divine eternity and absolutely given history of salvation that assure the logical valence of future events. This gave rise to modern ontotheology and mathematized formal logic. By introducing the unitary science, the first modern *illuminati* outlined a new concept of God, which is the necessary guarantor of their worldview. This man-made anthropomorphic simulacrum appeared to have a great future. Starting from Leibniz, modern God already bears responsibility for all sorts of evils in the world, and human mind had to justify this impotent modern God. Leibniz’s insight corresponds to Grosseteste’s insight into the world of Neoplatonic exemplars, let us see the mathematical and philosophical term “*la région des vérités éternelles*” (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.3). The onto-theo-logical science of modernity brought about the new concept of possibility, which received the ontological status of being of the third kind. In divine thinking, this possibility makes the objectively determined possibility with an eternal and necessary truth value. On the Earth, it initially has an indefinite and contingent character, which is already logically determinable thanks to the higher level of meaning. In the next generation, Duns Scotus took full advantage of the new status concerning “*ens* *possibile*” in order to establish the metaphysics of possible in its holistic architecture.

In the environment of Oxford academic *illuminati*, a new subject of the West emerged in the years 1230–35. Thanks to Grosseteste, modernists became potentially omniscient, but in a different way from what Aristotle intended in the thesis on universal receptivity of the soul (*De anima* 431b21). The new worldview has an objective character, because its necessity is given in the mode of logical univocity, following an *absolute* and *per se* given possibility. Modern cognition refers to definite state of the world given in divine thought. We recognize this condition only potentially (*per accidens*). But no one could reasonably doubt the future coming of Antichrist around the year 1230, just as no one today doubts the validity of modern logic and mathematization of the world based on it, or the nihilistic version of *summa veritas* proclaimed by rating agencies. Grosseteste understands the necessity in the univocal, *simpliciter* given mode related to God’s eternity and immutability. In this ideal world of divine cognition, later replaced by mathematics, the necessity is always true. But we are living here on the Earth, therefore we do not yet know the whole mode of this truth; therefore it is given only by the exclusion of any other possibility. The intellect leads the logical determination of future events away from the eternal archetype and into contingencies in “Either—Or” mode, where they can be eventually true and eventually false. Eponymous writing of Søren Kierkegaard (1843) declared the war of this then Hegelian logic. The emergence of a new logic, conceived in view of the arrival of Antichrist, was developed in the environment of mystical Franciscan spirituality, which followed the visions of Joachim of Fiore (†1202). The transformation of logic into metaphysics took place in the environment of the academic spiritual intelligentsia at Oxford that awaited the necessary arrival of Antichrist. The ontotheological speculations of these mystical group played a key role in the emergence of Western objectivity. The future events received a metaphysical and logical validity with reference to the eschatological horizon of biblical *Book of Revelation*. Around the year 1254, the Franciscan monk named Gerhard made the compilation of works published by Joachim of Fiore. The book circulated under the name *Evangelium aeternum*. This writing was banned as heretical by Pope Alexander IV in the year 1256. The enlightened spirituals, who were active on an academic level, conceived a modern version of the *intelligentia spiritualis*, which had to lead the third stage of human history according to the Holy Spirit. Fiore’s and Gerhard’s realm of the Holy Spirit was realized by academic *illuminati* in Oxford and Paris for the entire Latin West. They introduced new logic into metaphysics and objective concept of causality into science. Objectivity became a new gospel of modernity, eternally young in virtue of this visionary spirit. Another wave of speculative scientists and ideological form of this *intelligentia spiritualis* was created in the postmodernism of the 19th century. The main protagonists were absolutely objective philosopher Hegel, the positivist and scientific Comte and critical political economist Marx. The contemporary *intelligentia spiritualis* took the form of analytical philosophy in the style of the formal onto-theo-logicians and their Anglo-Saxon concepts such as Reformed epistemology, which innovated the thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy in the age of metaphysical nihilism. The postmodern *illuminati* of all kinds are spiritual children of first schools that inaugurated *via Modernorum* in the years 1230–40. These academic thinkers in Oxford despised the “heretic” Aristotle and his metaphysics. Therefore they created an intellectual environment that produced new forms of being of the third kind. In the following generation of *illuminati* came Peter Olivi, Franciscan, mystic and founder of capitalism (OBJ III, ch. 5.1.1). Rufus at Oxford and Bonaventure in Paris created in the next generation an Aristotelian mythology of one modern truth based on the Bible. Masters in Rue du Fouarre rejected such attempts in their declaration of 1272. The first modernists in Oxford made Aristotle a Christian in order to be able to judge him as a heretic. Their successors did the same with Averroes since the year 1250. In the polemic “*contra* *quosdam modernos*” in the work *Hexaëmeron* (ca. 1235), Grosseteste condemns the attack of these modernists against Aristotle. The quotation shows the original *Lichtung* of the doctrine of one truth, which postmodernism keeps in the methodology of Unified Science.

“We add this against these contemporaries (*contra quosdam modernos*), who struggle against Aristotle and his interpreters, and even against the interpreters from ranks of Christian saints. They have turned Aristotle into a Christian apostate and, in their strange blindness and arrogance (*mira cecitate et presumcione*), they think to interpret Aristotle better and more truthfully from the unclear Latin translations than the classical, both pagan and Christian philosophers, who knew his undamaged work in the original Greek. They make fools of themselves and try in vain to turn Aristotle into a Christian. So they waste their time senselessly as well as the time of other educated people. By making Aristotle a Christian, they make themselves heretics.” [[325]](#footnote-325)

Criticism condemned the attack of contemporaries on Aristotle as sophistry, and at the same time rejected attempts to link the Philosopher to Christian theology. Grosseteste once again confirmed his affiliation to Bund’s school, which respected the generic distinction between theology and philosophy. Like his Oxford successor Bacon, Grosseteste was a critical philosopher and therefore could not allow a sophistic syncretism in the question of cognition, which attacked the leading principles of Aristotelianism. At the time of this polemic, around the year 1235, he already had Averroes’s commentaries in the version of the Toletan and Sicilian school. Since he knew Greek, he also knew Aristotle’s original commentaries. As we will see later, Grosseteste’s quoted sentence against the contemporaries who take up arms against Aristotle (*contra ipsum Aristotilem et suos expositores*) may deal with Rufus’s work *Contra Averroem* (c. 1236). In these circles arose a new concept of being of the third kind that was inspired by Augustinian Avicennism. Grosseteste introduced the first metaphysics of such Porretan being, but continued to adhere to it in the mode “*aliquantulum obscura*,” that is, within the framework of Aristotelian metaphysics given by the Commentator. Grosseteste’s followers in Oxford and Paris already saw the matter in quite a different perspective. The first appearance of Franciscan modernists in Paris caused horror in the local circles of the first Averroism, let us see the testimony of Bacon (ch. 3.2). Grosseteste publicly distanced himself from these Aristotelians in the above-mentioned quotation. His critical review was written at a time when his students, like Rufus, came to Paris for master’s studies. Aristotelianism of these Neoplatonists, Porretans and partisans of universal hylemorphism resembled in some features to pantheistic heresy introduced by David of Dinant. Around the year 1235, Avicenna’s minimal portion of intentional being (*hoc esse tantum*) survives in the metaphysical-theological limbo following the example of Grosseteste’s *esse incompletum*. Hidden in its primordial *a/lētheia*, that *ens obiective* awaits the arrival of philosophical Antichrist or Messiah, who establishes the millenarian rule of objectivity. The hermeneutics of objectivity will discover this eschatological figure, which heralds the last epoch (*novissimum*) of metaphysical nihilism, in works of Franciscan thinker Rufus of Cornwall. This master at Oxford, rejected by Alvernus and Albert, radicalized Grosseteste’s teaching in the direction of Avicennist Neoplatonism.

### 3.1.4 Metaphysics of Objective Being

Grosseteste is the first known author who interpreted *Second Analytics* and *Categories* in the sense of modern Avicennism that got rid of Neoplatonism. Aristotelian interpretation of the Commentator according to the Toledo school has become modern metaphysics. The abolition of schools of *Logica Modernorum* brings an indirect proof of great transformation. When obscure problems of modern logic like “Dead man walking” acquired metaphysical status, modernity produced the first virtual world. Metaphysical necessity, tied to the relation between things in the world, was transformed into logical abstraction and categorical predication. The first modernists in Oxford and Paris in the second third of the 13th century created an ambivalent synthesis of being, which was given by univocal predication of logical and metaphysical meaning. The statements bound to hyparchical predication of the first substance shifted to the logic, which is determined by absolutely conceived supposition. The modern imposition created *ex nihilo* started the predication of future events. The classical logic was given *relative*, in view of the first hyparchical substance that exists *simpliciter* and *per se* beyond human mind. New logic was set in the horizon of absolute truth given as *rectitudo* of divine providence and as *certitudo* of biblical revelation. Franciscan *spirituales* at Oxford linked future contingent events such as the coming of Antichrist to the horizon of eternal truth given by Joachim of Fiore’s eschatological reading of *Apocalypse*. The introduction of dogmatics into logic abolished the indetermination of accidental future events. The analytical interpretation of Aristotelian corpus within the Oxfordian Fallacy showed the path of the new school of thought endowed with speculative spirit of *intelligentia spiritualis*. The devaluation of existing substance and of sensual knowledge reinforced eschatological mysticism and metaphysical paranoia of modernists. They have got direct insight into the realm of eternal universals that are exemplarily given in divine thinking as being of the third kind.

The new concept of truth, categories, logic and metaphysics proves that the second Averroism could not grasp the cognitive function of *intellectus possibilis* according to Averroes. On the contrary, the first Averroism had no problem with the explanation of Aristotle’s receptive intellect. The Blund’s school carried out the correct reception of the CMDA within the concept of *intellectus in potentia*, which linked to the new conception of intentionality (ch. 2.1.2). For modernists in Oxford and Paris, the Commentator became a bone of contention and especially his writing CMDA. Bacon brings the testimony of it following bishop Alvernus that clearly separated erroneous teaching of his contemporaries from authentic interpretation of Averroes. Bacon knew very well from his student years in Paris around 1240 that the writing *De anima* can be interpreted in different ways. The interpretation of Aristotle according to the Toledo school goes to Neoplatonism and this line is incompatible with Averroes’s metaphysics and with interpretation of the CMDA. Let us now cite the key quotation from Bacon’s *Commentary on Metaphysics*, which, following Alvernus’s pattern, establishes the unity of the person in the paradigm of the Sicilian school.

“The active intellect is active in the individual in such a way that it requires the speculative intellect for its activity, and thus, according to the Commentator, the active intellect makes a part of the soul (*intellectus agens secundum Commentatorem est pars anime*). But according to Alfarabi, Aristotle, and Avicenna, it is given as a separated substance (*est aliquid aliud*).” [[326]](#footnote-326)

The unity of the person according to the Sicilian school and the interpretation of CMDA follow the line of bishop Alvernus. Bacon separated the interpretation of Averroes from the interpretation of the Toledo school. Toletans read the CMDA according to Alfarabi’s Neoplatonic translation of writing *De intellectu et intellecto* (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). After the death of bishop Alvernus, his disciples Albert and Bacon set about the lifelong task of interpreting authentic Aristotelianism against the school of the second Averroism, which was based first in Oxford and then in Paris. The school of *Modernorum* linked the interpretation of Averroes with the Toledo school and they read le Commentator through the metaphysics of Avicenna. The separated intellect joins the human soul in the mode of *coniunctio*. The integration of Averroes in the paradigm of the Sicilian school into the system of Avicennist *Latinorum* became problematic from the year 1230. That kind of exegesis became impossible since the years 1245–50. But the modernists, after the sophistical interpretation of *Second Analytics*, *Categories* and *Metaphysics*, had to reinterpret also the writing *De anima*, which the CMDA explained in an ingenious way. Thanks to the intervention of thinkers from the school of the first Averroism, the treatise *De anima* was included in the curriculum of regular lectures at the Faculty of Arts in the Rue de Fouarre. The decision dates back to the year 1255, when the Faculty of modern mendicants was founded at the University of Paris.[[327]](#footnote-327) It brought the conflict between the secular and mendicant masters to the open confrontation. Modernists had to present their own interpretation of *De anima* to protect their academic positions. By separating themselves from classical philosophical education, these exalted sophists became our contemporaries and opened the path called *via Modernorum*. The foundations of objective being can be found only indirectly in Grosseteste’s work, which the previous analysis shown. Real founder of objectivity is his student Rufus of Cornwall around 1245, let us see following chapters.

A main testimony that dates the emergence of objectivity to Grosseteste’s school, we find it in the anonymous treatise *Summa philosophiae*. Modernist school of Grosseteste’s students published this work after the year 1264. The treatise *Summa philosophiae* relates Grosseteste’s teaching and shows one of the sources of objectivity that emerged in the next generation of *Latinorum* atOxford. The emergence of objectivity proceeds in two steps to create a new form of being of the third kind. First, the eternal essence is given in the mode *per prius*, and then its contingent form is defined in terms of the real hylemorphic substance. In a first step, the receptive faculty of the soul must be defined according to Oxfordian Fallacy and confronted with the notion *intellectus in potentia* defended by the first Averroism. The unknown author from the school of the second Averroism takes the definition of *intellectus possibilis* according to Thomas Aquinas (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). He presents the cosmic version of this intellect that completely refutes the teaching of CMDA.

“When we speak of the possible intellect, we mean two things. This intellect is nothing other than substance or spiritual intelligence (*substantia vel spiritus intelligibilis*), to which a certain form of potency belongs. This potency forms the accidents of things and is somehow related to being of the soul or spirit given in such a way (*quoddam consequens quoddam esse animae vel spiritus*). But the truer form of the possible intellect is given in fact that the intellect is not the essence, but the actual existence (*substantia non est, sed subsistentiae*). Indeed, this intellect is only accidental (*per accidens*) in possibility (*quatenus possibilis*).” [[328]](#footnote-328)

The author follows the essentialist definition of intellect given in two steps (*duo dicimus*). He tries to integrate the substantial intellect as a Porretan hypostasis into the receptive component of human intellect. The possible intellect is a certain form of imperfection of cognition given on two levels, that is, on the cosmic and the human level. Porretan and Avicennist figure of *intellectus possibilis* is given by devaluation of *intellectus agens*. This immaterial cosmic intelligence was created as actual substance and keeps a certain potentiality. This gave rise to a typical Averroist scenario of the possible intellect as a separated cosmic substance that joins externally the human soul in Avicenna’s mode of *coniunctio*. The intellect is intelligible substance or intelligible spirit (*substantia vel spiritus intelligibilis*). This *intellectus possibilis* of the second Averroism is a substance *in potentia*, which is not a complete substance (*substantia non est, sed subsistentiae*). That subsistence is important because it connects the cosmic intellect as a separated substance with the human contingent act of thinking. The second step recalls that *intellectus possibilis* exists as mere possibility, that is, as an accident with respect to the first real substance (*possibilitatem, quae est rerum accidens*). Eternal forms can exist accidentally in hylemorphic reality. This gives the possibility of contingent knowledge of eternal form in Aristotelian scenario of knowledge. The nature of the possible intellect is contained in the assertion that it somehow follows (*quoddam consequens*) the activity of the soul in its immaterial cognition. The scheme of the anonymous Avicennist suffers from the same ambiguity regarding the possible intellect as cited *Summa Duacensis* written thirty years earlier (ch. 2.2.2). Averroist form of *intellectus possibilis* as an imperfect separated substance is once again reinforced, let us see both expressions “*quoddam.*” The second imperfection concerns the *intellectus possibilis* as an indeterminate and contingent cognitional potency in human beings. Both forms of intellect are in fact substantial and subsistent entities. But the modern sophist endeavors that the possible intellect is somehow (*quoddam*) directly in man and does not look like a cosmic hypostasis. The first form of intellect exists as created cosmic form; the second form potentially “exsists” because of human process of cognition (*subsistentiae*) given by descent of this cosmic *intellectus agens* into contingently given human cognition. The possibility to take up the cosmic form of intellect always exists in us; therefore *intellectus possibilis* must be hypostatized as well. If the *intellectus in potentia* would not be a hypostasis, then it could not accept the substantial active intellect coming from outside. By this difference between the two hypostases, the definition of the possible intellect was solved. Taken like that, the *intellectus possibilis* ceased to exist as an independent component of knowledge because it became a mere imperfection and limitation of the cosmic and independent *intellectus agens*. The hypostatized intellect makes as contingent possibility merely an accident of the eternal active intellect that is the giver of intelligible forms. These forms can also be found in the contingent, hylemorphically given first substances. Then the scheme of active intellect as independent substance and receptive intellect as a contingent faculty of the soul is valid. Receptive intellect in us is imperfect, because it mediates the cognition of changeable things through the senses. There is no talk about receptivity as a separate act of *intellectus possibilis*, because the possible intellect does not have ist own definition as an autonomous ability of the soul. The cognition potency is given as an accidental imperfection with regard to eternal and necessary *intellectus agens*. The active cosmic intellect is given primarily as independently existing substance, which shows a certain amount of potency in the realization of its ability. The hypostasized potency of *intellectus agens* applies in the sense of its limitation and contingency. The active intellect sinks downwards and thus becomes *intellectus possibilis*. The cosmic substance receives human subsistence as the contingently given potency of the active intellect, which works here and now in the concrete act of cognition. The author of this cosmic *intellectus possibilis* is Thomas Aquinas. However, he attributed that cosmic non-sense to Averroistic Averroes (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). The treatise *Summa philosophiae* was written in the environment of the second Averroism and interprets Grosseteste’s teaching in an Avicennist direction, which is not contained in his original texts. The writing shows a fundamental change in the second Averroism, which took up the doctrine of the first Thomism around the year 1265. This development is shown by the analysis of the Oxford manuscript *De anima* (OBJ III, ch. 4.3.2). In the decade after 1230, followers of Oxfordian Fallacy embraced Avicenna’s metaphysics, by rejecting Averroes’s metaphysics. The result of this analytical interpretation of *Modernorum* based on Avicenna’s metaphysics, was the thesis about the multiplicity of substances in man. Today we know this sophism as “Mind—Body Problem.” The same teaching is asserted by the anonymous writer. Apart from the body, he establishes one mental substance given in the twofold mode of Rufus’s terms “*potentia substantialis*” and “*potentia* *accidentalis*” (ch. 3.3.1). The active intellect is given as cosmic subsistent hypostasis in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper.*” The receptive intellect forms merely an accidental realization of the active intellect, which is engaged in this or that act of human cognition. The hypostatized intellectual imperfection is everywhere because every act of cognition contains some degree of potentiality and ambiguity. The hypostatized body and also the intellect have the character of ultimate indivisibility (*individuum*), which is bound to the atomic concept of Porretan substance. Therefore the receptive intellect is individualized in the human being, i.e., it is not further divisible.

Modernity could make the individualization of hypostatized intellect according to Avicenna. But it certainly cannot be done with the thinking of real person (*tertium genus* in CMDA). This was shown in the dispute between Albert and the group of the second Averroism in the writing *De homine*. The anonymous writer of *Summa philosophiae* rejected Aristotle’s doctrine of two faculties in the soul. As a Porretan and Avicennist, he saw two substances in man and not two potentialities of the soul. Moreover, he had to reject Averroes’s interpretation in CMDA because he individualized the possible intellect by spiritual matter. Thus he obtained numerically different instances of the possible intellect in each human being. The first Cartesian does not require an autonomous *intellectus possibilis* as a faculty of the soul in the sense of Averroes’s *tertium genus*. In his scenario of hypostatic union of two intellectual substances, this is not necessary. The modern *intellectus agens* operates as an independent substanc. It is connected to the possible intellect as hypostasis in virtue of *colligatio*, that is, by accidental act of cognition. This sophist cannot understand the argumentation of the writing CMDA concerning *tertium* and *quartum genus*. The following quotation shows the complete scheme of Averroism in the Oxford school of modern Avicennists. Taking the position of Avicenna, they criticize the doctrine of numerical unity of *intellectus possibilis*, which was sophistically attributed to Averroes. Semi-Averroist Thomas Aquinas and after him Aegidius Romanus from the school of the first Averroism professed that teaching in an original way. The quotation shows that new version of Averroism in the school of *Modernorum*.

“Therefore Theophrastus and Themistius erred, and after them Averroes, since they gave a numerical multiplicity to this unique possible intellect in all men (*unicum intellectum possibilem in omnibus individuis hominum*). The most mistaken was Aristotle, who considered the active and the possible intellect as two different substances. Only Avicenna contradicted opinions of that previous generation (*inter veteres*).” [[329]](#footnote-329)

The unity of the intellect is given in such a way that we the active intellect “exsists” as an individualized substance in every human being. This substance has its own individual imperfection as potency and contingency of thinking. The hypostatized active intellect is in every human being independently like the later *res cogitans*. Averroes supposedly individualized *intellectus possibilis* in numerically distinct exemplars, which the author rejects. The doctrine of the Commentator is interpreted sophistically through the Porretan hypostases and through Avicenna’s concept of metaphysics and intellect. The author completely bypassed explanations of CMDA and even the interpretation of Grosseteste himself. Based on the teaching of Averroes and Aristotle, Grosseteste denied the plurality of substantial forms in man. Modern scholars at Oxford as proper *sophistae Latini* falsified Grosseteste’s philosophical testament. Through this fundamental error in interpretations of the Philosopher and the Commentator, Averroism emerged as the official doctrine of Oxford modernists. Bonaventura’s school in Paris adopted that kind of Averroism. The anonymous author considers these two philosophers as the most important representatives of the intellect conceived as a substance. It is given in two hypostatized forms, as active and passive. The quotation shows how Averroes became an Averroist. He wore this Thomistic disguise from about the year 1257. Aquinas adopted that doctrine in the style of a modernized Avicennism, which was created by adopting the “meta-physics” of the Commentator. Grosseteste disagreed with this reasoning. Therefore, he attacked Oxford’s modernists of the preceding generation for their misinterpretation of Aristotle (*contra quosdam modernos*, ch. 3.1.3). Siger continued this line with a criticism of Aquinas (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.4). Quite understandably the magisters in the Rue du Fouarre did it as well, since Siger represented them in a masterful way. Very important is the distinction of opinions concerning Avicenna in the new school. It separates itself from the opinions that were handed down from previous generations (*inter veteres*). This citation makes the beginning of *via Modernorum*. The schools of *sophistae Latini* in Oxford and Paris produced their own metaphysics, which distinguished itself from the first Averroism on the basis of a completely confused interpretation *De anima*. These sophists, under the leadership of academic Furies, adopted a defensive position in the mode of “*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*” and then accused Averroes of their own errors. The history of *via Modernorum* began at the moment when Averroes became an Averroist, i.e. between 1257 (Aquinas) and 1264 (*Summa philosophiae*). The author of *Summa philosophiae* keeps the sophist line of modern Averroism, which is given by the doctrine of numerically distinguished possible intellect in all people. This doctrine goes from Theophrastus and Themistius to Averroes and finally to Aristotle. Only Avicenna is excluded as an explicit opponent of this doctrine (*solus manifestius Avicenna contradicit*). Thomas Aquinas, a decade earlier, regards Avicenna’s definition of *intellectus possibilis* as consistent with the Catholic view of the person (*ad intellectum possibilem, ejus opinio est quam tenemus secundum fidem catholicam*; OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). This is exactly the opposite attitude than hold the rector of the university and bishop Alvernus in Paris. He praised only Averroes as an authentic continuator of Aristotle and explicitly rejected the Neoplatonic Avicenna. The quotation shows that the modern Avicennists conceive themselves around the year 1265 as a new group of thought. Based on Oxfordian Fallacy, they made the group that opposed to classic interpretations of *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

The *illuminati* at Oxford joined forces with the Parisian school of modernists who edited the work *Summa Halensis*. This group created a new metaphysics around the year 1240 in the mode of epochal *Irrtum* that is still working (ch. 3.2). In the second round, this group began to join forces with the incipient Thomism in Paris and in Oxford. Thomas presented Avicenna’s modernization around the year 1257 when he edited the *Second Book of the Sentences* in Paris. Aegidius Romanus played a major role, since it became the first Thomist in the mode of *sophistae Latini*. Grosseteste, as a graduate of Blund’s school, could not allow an incursion of Avicennist dualism into the unity of the person. He would have disputed thereby the founding *res gestae* of Paris University as a Christian institution of true philosophical thought. Therefore, he criticized the school of young modernists formed in 1230–35 at the Franciscan College in Oxford. His writing *Hexaëmeron* quoted above confirmed it. The subsequent generation of *Latinorum* radicalized the thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy. They proceeded similarly to Avicenna in the Falsafa, who shifted the interpretation of Alfarabi’s doctrine towards Neoplatonism. Grosseteste founded the Oxfordian Fallacy. This gave rise to metaphysical dispute between the *via Antiquorum* and the *via Modernorum* taken by Rufus and other modernists from 1235 onwards. The connection of active and passive intellect in the treatise took up the difference between *potentia substantialis* and *potentia accidentalis*, which had been introduced into the Franciscan school by aforementioned Rufus. Grosseteste’s school performs a similar synthesis. Modernists combine some elements from the authentic teaching in *De anima* with the interpretation of Avicennist Porretans.

“According to Averroes, everything that is in the mode of the receiver is for the time being deprived of the essence of what is received. The subsistence of what is assumed rests only in hypostatized relation to form (*anitas sola sui relatione ad formam*), because this hypostasized relation has a naturally given capacity of realization (*naturaliter ipsius perfectivam*). Through the act of this subsistence (*sub qua*) the form receives the actual existence. This is possible only if cognition exists only in the potency which is given with respect to actuality.” [[330]](#footnote-330)

The first part of the quotation determines the nature of the receptive intellect according to Averroes (*denudatum est a natura recepti*). The soul is *tabula rasa* and the receptive intellect does not contain own contents in order to ensure the universal cognition according to Aristotle (*anima quodammodo est omnia*, *De anima* 431b20–21). Unfortunately, the quotation does not bind this act of cognition to the existence of man as the first substance, nor to the act of the individual soul as entelechic form of living body in the actual person. This is clearly shown by the Porretan term “*anitas*,” which is used as hypostasis for the existentially given act of intellect. The writing CMDA fundamentally rejects such theory. Original Aristotelian basis of the term “*anitas*” defines the subsistence of the cognized thing in the context of question in *Second Analytics* concerning the real existence of the thing (*an sit*, *Anal. Post*. 93b29). The representative of Oxfordian Fallacy changed existence for essence, which Grosseteste accomplished for the first time in his analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* (ch. 3.1.1). The subsistence of the recognized thing is defined in relation to bizare active intellect (*naturaliter ipsius perfectivam*), which has been given an immaterial existence as a hyparchic “substance—form.” This hypostatized form, with its own actuality, is by itself capable of completing the act of cognition thanks to the hypostatized relation to the cognized form (*anitas sola sui relatione ad formam*). The thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy connected the existence of things with their essence (*anitas1*) and considers them directly in the modern intellect defined as hypostasis (*anitas2*). Rufus introduced this scheme of cognition as univocal identity of the atomic species of the third kind in the term “*coaequatio*” (ch. 3.3.2). Both forms are connected by hypostatized category of relation (*relatio*), which had been introduced by a Neoplatonist Simplicius (πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). Avicenna adopted that Neoplatonic view and later Porretans influenced by him did it as well. Abelard rejected these hypostases in principle (ch. 1.3). That kind of Avicenna’s denudation does not require a receptive faculty of the soul directed to the real thing. The concept of the receptive intellect in *Summa philosophiae* turns out to be entirely confused. The intellect in its hypostatized subsistence (*anitas2*) receives every subsistent form given as being of the third kind (*anitas1*). Both hypostases (the *anitas* of the intellect and of the thing) correspond to each other in the mode of correspondence according to Porretan *individuum*. The preceding quotation concerning *intellectus possibilis* and this quotation concerning the new “exsistence” of intellect as “substance—form” confirm one fact. During the years 1250–60, at Oxford the modernist and parallel world of things and their cognition came into being, which stood outside real first substances. Both forms are connected by hypostatized category of relation (*relatio*), which had been introduced by Neoplatonism. Avicenna adopted the Neoplatonic view and Porretans influenced by him. Albert rejected that group of dubious *Averroistae* (ch. 2.4.3) that Kilwardby represented. These learned Latins grasped causality as the effect of *univoce* given essence in the demonstrative syllogism. The essence operates as the cause in the mediating member of the demonstrative proof. The cognition doubled the external first substance by Porretan *tertium ens*. Albert principally refused the doubling of reality. Bacon carried out a similar criticism of Rufus and Bonaventura (ch. 3.2). In the writing *Second analytics*, cognition is merely an accident with regard to the primary necessity of real first substances. Since a unique eclipse of astronomical bodies is taking place in reality, we recognize it universally in thinking.

The anonymous writers from the school of the second Averroism established the intellect as a subsistent form in the mode *per prius*, while Aristotle defines it in the mode *per posterius*. That being of the third kind is defined as a hypostatized potency (*sub qua*). This potency has its own hypostatized being. The intellectual form establishes by itself a new *actus essendi* as a contingent occurrence of this form (*formam naturaliter ipsius perfectivam*). In the modern scenario of Oxford Averroists, the form of recognized thing lies in the potential concept that forms a hypostatic substance. It represents a contingent existence of the eternal form in the material world and thereby establishes our cognition. The term “*anitas*” represents one of the first definitions of the objective being, which is based on problematic interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Modernists see the world of necessary, objectively given forms of the third kind. These forms have their own causal effectiveness as the first substances. Let us recall the effect of Oxfordian Fallacy, which in analytical philosophy has exchanged the existence of the singular thing for the universal essence. This “third world” of Jamblichus’s diacosmos and Islamic Falsafa is made of eternal forms and it contrasts with contingent existence of these forms in reality. The enlightened intellect of modern *illuminati* observe Porretan *species specialissima* or Grosseteste’s *exemplars* as hypostatized forms in the new diacosmos of modernists. In the first step, the intellect abstracts the forms from the hylemorphic compositions given in reality. Then, in the process of denudation, he rises to the ontologically higher, purely intellectual forms, in which the final completion of the material forms is based. The new worldview in the mode “*discrete videamus*” (ch. 1.4) finally found a corresponding form of intellect. This discrete union of two forms of *tertium ens* produced after the year 1250 a new substance of the third kind, which possesses the basic properties of objective being (*anitas*). This Latin version of Avicenna’s “*equinitas tantum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2) is given in the form of the sophistic simulacrum. The new simulacrum of reality connects essence and existence through the act of objective being of form (*anitas*) as a new kind of *tertium ens*. This form of the third kind has hypostatized subsistence of Porretans (*subsistens jam est aliqua subsistentia*, ch. 1.4). The first modernists needed a substitute for the first substance in order to change the relations in the Divine Trinity into independent hypostases given as divine Persons. We find the new definition of Porretan existence in the Paris writing about 1245 when Rufus defined the modern concept of objective existence for the first time (*species obiecti exsistentis*, ch. 3.3.4). The anonymous author shows that the new Western subject created a new object in his image. The thing exists in the same time in potency and as an actualized form (*forma essentiali*), therefore quite objectively.

“The material thing, given as substance, has two components, namely the thing in pure potency and in actuality (*re in pura potentia et actu*); and, an objective form existing in the world, which completes this potency of the thing (*forma essentiali eiusdem potentiae perfectiva*). The objective form is manifested in theoretical insight through the mode of metaphysical deduction (*resolutio manifestat*). All passive powers can be converted to this *simpliciter* given potency (*potentia passiva ad potentiam simpliciter reducatur*); and likewise, the real form of the existing thing can be converted to this form given *simpliciter* (*omnis actus et forma ad formari simpliciter*). That kind of being, as an objective actual entity, is composed of both elements, that is, of the objective potency, which is given with regard to the objective form given in this way, or in this form, which is predicated and given in the real individual thing.” [[331]](#footnote-331)

The author sees in the real individual composition (*res materiata*) two substantially given entities, which together form a special entity (*substantialiter ex duobus consistit*). Modern thinker decomposes the hylemorphic thing into an objective meaning (*re in pura potentia et actu*) and a real hylemorphic composition, which undergoes changes (*forma essentiali eiusdem potentiae perfectiva*). The analyst of the Oxford school took up the real substance in process of denudation (*resolutio*). He divides it into two components that makes a new entity of the third kind. On the one hand, there is the ideal potency made of matter (*ad potentiam simpler reducatur*), and on the other hand, ther is the ideal form (*omnis actus et forma ad formari simpliciter*). Thus, the objective form is given in matter and form, and a new form of objective being is created as a result of their composition. Let us recall the criticism that John of Salisbury made of *Nominales*. They first decomposed substances and then reassembled them (*substantialia denuo colligunt*, ch. 1.4). In the postmodern form of objective science, this *tertium ens* corresponds to hypostatized “physical” properties, which are separate from the causality of the first substances. These properties are determined mathematically. The real thing is exemplarily given in the subsistent objective form, which, through the act of modern “*exsistere*,” passes into the contingent existence in reality. The thing “exsists” through the transition of the ideal form into the random occurrence here and now, where it receives various accidents that establish its individuation (*compositio*). The second Averroism “composes” the first substance as a Porretan individual (*actualiter ex duobus componitur*). The objective necessity and immutability are in full extent only in *exemplares* in God, which set them outside reality of the first substance. This objective simulacrum of the first substance can be updated contingently in the matter as a hylemorphic first substance (*hac forma vel ista penitus signata et individuali*). In the process of composition, the eternal form takes the individual form given in the matter of the third kind. Avicebron designed this teaching for the first time (ch. 3.2). The modern individual thing came into being as objectively given entity (*res*) of the third kind.

The process of reducing the real first substances to their objectively given principles (*resolutio*) corresponds to opposite process when exemplars are actualized in the matter. They come out from modern God into real existence (*reductio*). Both processes are univocal, because they concern one and the same hypostatized Porretan form. The catabasis of forms into the lower reality (*reductio*) must be supplemented by the anabasis of intellect into the world of objective forms (*illuminatio*). The recognition of *illuminati* must, in the act of pure intuition, bring the contingent existence of fallen forms back to their ideal being (*resolutio*). The composition of the individual arises in the process of accidental actualization (“exsistence”) of the objective form, that modern God reflects in his mind as an *exemplar*. In the realm of ontotheology, the exemplars are eternally given in hypostatized divine thought, whereas reality exists only sensually and contingently. This double operation of the descent of forms from the diacosmos and the ascent of the intellect into the diacosmos creates mythological vision of the netherworld (*mundus imaginalis*;OBJ I, kap. 2.3.3). It makes double contemplation of the objective world as *tertium ens*. Either the meaning of being is permanently fixed in the model of theoretical sciences, because they directly observe eternal hypostatic forms. Or we have an empirical form of *scientia* of Grosseteste, where hypostatic forms are derived from contingently existing first substances. The objective composition of empirically recognized things and their objective deduction establish the objectively true substance in the sense of Avicenna’s *certitudo* and Anselm’s *rectitudo*. It came to creation of an analogous union of original double meaning of *inesse* (ch. 3.1.1). The primacy of existence (εἰ ἔστι) before essence (τί ἐστι) lost the original meaning defended in the *Second Analytics*. As a result, a new model of discrete worldview was created, in which reality can be assembled and disassembled according to changing needs of the modern subject. The anonymous writer of *Summa philosophiae* created a parallel hylemorphic substance, which Albert condemned as absolute nonsense (*non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum*, ch. 2.4.3). The thinking of *illuminati* is essentially separate from the body. Like Bonaventure and the entire Cartesian postmodernism, they can go up (*resolutio*) and down (*reductio*) on the mystical Jacob’s ladder of objectively constructed beings. As a result of this chaotic odyssey of the modern solar intellect, modernism emerged under the leadership of Furies. Odysseus went back to his native Ithaca following the path of the Sun and Dante arived to Siger as the best philosopher of his time (OBJ III, ch. 4.4). The quotation shows an objective vision of the paranoid world, which is composed of objective matter (*re in pura potentia*) and objective essence (*forma essentiali*). These two hypostases are combined together to form an atomic substance (*individuum*) that receive a contingent existence in the world (*res materiata*). Modernism and postmodernism do not recognize the real world. They deduce and reduce various essences in order to lead out (*deducere*) objectively given cognitive forms. We came finally to death of modern God that killed himself in the process of unsustainable deducing. According to Nietzsche, modern God choked on modern theology. It is a tragicomic process that is objectively necessary. After his death, these eternal forms are supplied by mathematics. In today’s neostructuralist postmodernism, in the nihilistic epoch of thinking and financial derivatives, only the metaphorical movement of meaning, given by the binary difference between the one and the zero, is sufficient for objective deduction.

The sophistry of speculative modernity, which creates objectively credible simulacrum of reality, has a minor catch, which the first Averroism permanently pointed out. Formal and subsistent specimens do not exist as first substances. They are given merely in the manner *obiective*, that is, as an intentional object of cognizing intellect. The second Averroism, on the other hand, defended the path of direct vision (*per viam considerationis*) of various forms manifested in the process of composition or resolution. Later denudation made an *epokhē* of Descartes and Husserl to create another substance of the third kind. Aristotelianism rejected the “cheerful science” of paranoid modernity. Such *tertium ens* cannot be perceived sensually. Because there is no imposition, you cannot recognize such a thing in a scientific manner. Albert considered these sophists to be absolutely ridiculous thinkers and refused any discussion with them. They changed first substances into a simulacrum following the dialogue *Sophistes*. Following the pattern of Grosseteste, the second Averroism argumented that normal discursive cognition proceeds within the framework of *intellectus debilis* and the empirical *scientia* produced by it. But knowledge of *illuminati* is not tied to “debile” intellect of Aristotle. Grosseteste’s commentary on *Second Analytics* took up the weak intellect, in order to produce a lower form of empirical science. But this Aristotelian was still metaphysically sane enough that he rejected the criticism of “heretical” Aristotle, because he knew original teaching of Averroes according to Blund’s and Sicilian school. After Grosseteste’s departure to Lincoln, modern Aristotelianism in Oxford was represented only by Avicenna transformed into analytical philosophy, which makes postmodern Averroism to this day. Modern *illuminati* produce the science better and more enjoyable under the leadership of Furies, because they do not bother with the contingent reality. The mathematicians like Descartes or Husserl go back to the “things themselves.” The hypostatized intellect of Averroists enjoys a direct insight into the first principles and the objective forms. These *noemata* are speculatively reflected in enlightened thinking (*speculum*) and they can be found in contingent reality as well. Therefore, the new gay science had to be created by an metaphysical nihilist Nietzsche. He rightly abolished this dubious speculation as a destructive remnant of Platonism. His creative superman is endowed with a pure will to power and by no means with paranoid intellect of Platonic modernity. The parallel world of metaphysical weaklings and dreamers turns modern man into a frail creature captive in the world of Platonic simulacra. Nietzsche nihilistically completed the process of modernity by returning to the unified subject, which, thanks to denial of Platonism, became an insane superman of a new kind.

Avicennian successors of Grosseteste observed a new kind of being. Taking into account this mythological reality, they created a new concept of evident science, which is generated in a new type of intellect. Therefore, the first modernists had to revise the concept of truth, because Aristotelian theory of correspondence does not take into account modern mythology. Therefore, they invented a correspondence between the intellect of the third kind and the being of the third kind. The previous chapter has shown that Grosseteste offered a definition of the truth, which he related to Anselm’s *rectitudo*. The new definition of truth is not founded on the correspondence between the intellect and the real world. Modernists built up a subjectively given evidence based on internal intellectual intuition (*certitudo*). The modern intellect recognizes hypostatized intelligible contents in the act of assimilation of various kinds of *tertium ens* and not in the process of intellectual correspondence. Objectivity dwells in the mythological realm (“*mundus imaginalis*” of Sufism) and is given in the mode “*semel—semper*” outside the demiurgic subject. The assimilation of these hypostatized forms takes place in enlightened intellect of objectively cognitive *illuminati* (*ad scibile intellectui obiectum*). The intellect accepts objective forms given in advance in the diacosmos as a new kind of *scibile* (metaphysical, scientific, economic, colonial, ideological, etc.). Modern truth is defined in the mode of correspondence with the world “existing” in this way (*adaequatio actualis vel etiam habitualis*). As we shall see later, the demiurgic conception of objectivity had been introduced by Bonaventure a decade earlier, around the year 1250. The connection between subjective and objective *scibile* established a new historical habitus of the Western subject and a new history of the West. Of course, today’s nihilistic *scibile* is not generated by mysticism of Islamic Sufism or medieval *intelligentia spiritualis*, but by the army of white collars hired by multinational corporations associated with contemporary structures of Deep state. Now let’s look at the new version of objective relativism. The intellect observes directly being of the third kind (*scibile*) in a universal and generic way.

“It is obvious that the actualized or even the habitual correspondence concerns the intellect and its recognized object (*ad scibile intellectui obiectum*); or it concerns the understanding that considers everything to which the intellect can refer. Cognition is given on the basis of the genus to which knowledge refers (*scientia enim de genere est relativorum*). The correspondence between the intellect and the thing lies only in the potency and can be understood with regard to the intellect, to the thing or to the both.” [[332]](#footnote-332)

In the process of *denudatio*, it comes to creation of the form of the third kind (*scibile*) that is conceived in univocal manner. This form is recognized in direct eidetic intuition as an intellectual object of cognition (*intellectus ad scibile intellectui obiectum*). The relationship to this object, which is conceived as a quasi-substance, either arises in the act of cognition (*adaequatio actualis*) or is habitually upheld by thinking as a Porretan type of discrete seeing and cognition of such a corresponding world (*habitualis respectus*). Scientific cognition is realized not through the relationship with reality, but with regard to the hypostatized relationship, which establishes the objective object of cognition in the mode of correctness and certainty (*scientia enim de genere est relativorum*). The mind creates a correspondence as to the object of cognition, which is constituted by intellect in the mode of generic univocity with separated generic reality. The objective *scibile* represents the first substance in the process of correspondence. Then, truth makes a correct correspondence between the objective “thing” in the “*mundus imaginalis*” and the same thing in the mind; both “things” are given as pure potency (*adaequatio vero intellectus et rei in sola potentia tantum*). The classical metaphysics responded that such potential notion is based only on the logical supposition and not on the metaphysical imposition of meaning from the real world. Aristotle would say that cognition is an accidental potency of the intellect, but with regard to *simpliciter* given thing that exists in reality. This real thing has a causal effect on our cognition through the senses, so the correspondence is made as univocal and categorical. The quoted text of the treatise does not mention definition of truth as a correspondence between intellect and the real thing, because it is not necessary. The eidetic insight into hypostatized species makes the basis of new correspondence. In order to create a definition of truth, the anonymous treatise does not require any analysis of Averroes intentionality or an *intentio* within the framework of the first Averroism. The potential correspondence between the subsistent and the contingent form (*scibile*) is always present, because it is evidently manifested in the intellect. This is the reason why objectively determined truth can go in a completely undifferentiated way to any member of the demonstrative proof: to the real thing, to the intelligible content in thinking, or to both at the same time (*a parte intellectus tantum, aut a parte rei tantum, aut a parte utriusque*). The actuality and permanent ability of cognition given in this way (*actualis vel etiam habitualis*) come from the cognition that does not establish the relationship with the first real substance. After the decline of the first substance, sophistic thinking must proceed from some Avicennist, pseudo-really set up hypostasis. The effective cause of cognition is *intellectus agens*, which works in man through insight into being of the third kind. The efficient actuality is delivered in the process of cognition from already mentioned exposure of being from behind that *intellectus agens* provides. The activity of the intellect originates in itself, because it represents an autonomous form. Avicenna’s “Flying Man” makes the origin of modern knowledge. He does not need external reality for true cognition, or only as an accident. The scenario of compilers of *Summa philosophiae*, we found its original form in the work of Rufus of Cornwall. Let us now summarize basic elements that are necessary to make the new worldview that established the objectivity.

* It came to eclipse of the first substance and to the dissolution of effects comming from real causality that are contained in the middle link in the scientific proof. This gave rise to a new concept of science in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy.
* The various types of hypostases and beings of the third kind, they received causal determination to create the middle link of demonstrative judgment; those formes of *tertium ens* passed to scientific cognition in the form of modern *scibile*. The new form of cognition needs a new cognitive habitus of the subject, which created a new habitat of modern science (*ortus scientiarum*).
* The reflexive evidence of the cognizing subject replaced the imposition of the meaning of the first substance with reflexive supposition made as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. Such mystical enlightenment founded higher science of *illuminati*, which needs the active intellect as an independent substance in the soul. This worldview of modern underworld passes beyond the real world of contingent first substances.
* The truth is based on direct eidetic insight into always present and hypostatized first principles of cognition. They are evident in the intellect and are present before any real act of cognition. As a result, a new conception of truth arose in the mode of univocal assimilation of objective species in the mode “*semel—semper*.”
* The truth as absolute certainty (*certitudo*) of the modern subject has its origin in the absolute correctness (*rectitudo*) of modern God. This causally effective simulacrum became an integral part of objectively created thinking of modern *illuminati*. The correspondence of both mythological subjects is made due to Oxfordian Fallacy that needs an analogical form of ontotheology (*analogia entis*). The death of modern God is therefore firmly connected with the death of the modern subject that was fully accomplished in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism and the age of Anthropocene.
* The logical determinism of future contingents entails the mode of *absolute* and *per se* given events that are predicated in the manner called *univoce*. The necessary arrival of Antichrist in modern philosophy confirmed the eclipse of the first substance. The hyparchical position of the first substance no longer determined the metaphysical form of universality and necessity.
* The logically necessary but currently indeterminable coming of Antichrist compels academic *illuminati* inspired by Avicenna to build a new age of Holy Spirit under the aegis of objectively interpreted Averroism. This group of enlightened academicians is dominated by victorious spirit of *intelligentia spiritualis* (Joachim of Fiore). They consider themselves at the top of the world modern progress (later as leader of revolutions and evolutions) and they took themselves to be a new school of thought (*via Modernorum*).

In the epochal formation, the role of Grosseteste resembles Alfarabi’s role in Falsafa. The key postulator of analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* opened the ruling era of Oxfordian Fallacy. However, he still strived to respect the original meaning of Aristotelian metaphysics. Grosseteste confirmed Aristotle’s teaching in *De anima*, which is tied to the hylemorphic body and to the soul as unique form of the body. He rejected the multiplicity of substantial forms in man. Therefore, from the point of view of the doctrine of the soul, Bacon classified him as a defender of the first Averroism (ch. 3.2). However, the overall structure of being shows Neoplatonic and Avicennistic orientation of Grosseteste. He designed the process of cognition according to the scenario of *Liber de causis*. The orientation of higher forms towards the lower ones (*processio*) is completed by enlightened human thinking at the level of the sublunar sphere. Based on the metaphor of Neoplatonic solar intellect, the vision enlightened by exemplars (*spiritus visivus*) establishes ascending movement of the soul. The spirit can reach the realm of immaterial and eternal forms (McEvoy 1977). Augustinian triad (*intelligentia—memoria—amor*) corresponds to three components of ever-higher degree of cognition (*opinio—ratio—intellectus*). These intellectual forms correspond to three fundamental processes of abstraction and cognition (*abstractio—denudatio—illuminatio*). The model of cognition *per prius* and *per posterius*,, defined in the original version of *Organon* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3), is turned upside down in the scenario of the second Averroism. Therefore the dispute around the year 1240 concerned the emergence of *via Modernorum* and the defense of Aristotle’s metaphysics and science according to the Sicilian school. Albert coined this anti-modernist philosophy in the first part of *De homine*. After the reception of Averroes, the ontological statute of substance made in the framework of *Categories* or *Isagoge* came into play. This dispute was already present in early scholasticism. It was the question concerning the determination of substance from the point of view of Neoplatonic (Gilbert, *Nominales*) or Boethius’s and Aristotelian interpretation (Abelard, *Tractatus Anagnini*, *Logica “Cum sit nostra”*). The next round of gigantomachy after the reception of the CMDA since the years 1225–30 was based in the struggle of Toletans or Sicilians concerning the nature of metaphysics and cognition based on the concept of *intellectus possibilis*. The conjunction of Avicenna’s Latin translation of *De anima* and Avicebron’s work *Fons vitae* formed the basis for a new vision of reality, which is fully documented in the work *Summa philosophiae*. It was written in the next generation after Grosseteste’s death. Therefore, hermeneutic archaeology must find and interpret the origin of modernity in the first generation of Oxford students in the years 1230–35.

## 3.2 Modern Simulacrum of Man and the World

The chapter dedicated to Alvernus mentioned his critical reaction to the arrival of the matter of the third kind (ch. 2.3.3). The West took this theory mainly from Jewish (Avicebron) and Arab (Avempace) thinkers. Avicebron’s work *Fons vitae* (ca. 1150) establishes the view of reality in the mode of modern dualism. Grosseteste put it as a twofold concept of science (*scientia, intellectus*). His disciples, inspired by this scheme of cognition, created a new version of the individual being, which also got the matter of the third kind. The work *Fons vitae* introduced the doubled reality in modern thinking.

“Know that the primary form (*prima forma*), insofar as it combines with the higher form of matter (*altiori materiae*), establishes an intelligible species (*constituit speciem intelligentiae*) and brings this species to existence (*eam ducit ad esse*). Similarly, the quantitatively determined form (*forma quantitatis*), insofar as it connects with the inferior matter (*materiae inferiori*), creates a corporeal species (*speciem corporis*) and leads this species to existence (*eam ducit ad esse*). The quantitative form is therefore added to the intelligible form.” [[333]](#footnote-333)

The quotation shows a demiurgic derivation of the lower world from the higher forms according to the dialogue *Timaeus* and the work *Liber de causis*. The first divine form produces a diacosmic form and matter in the order of the intelligible cosmic substances that have formal physical determinations (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). These diacosmic substances produce real hylemorphic matter on the lower floor of reality. The intelligible and material world have the same ontological structure of matter and form.[[334]](#footnote-334) The difference between the *species intelligentiae* and the *species corporis* attest Neoplatonic dualistic concept of being that refers to difference between two forms of substances. Both species are hypostases on the level of the first substance, because they exist as hylemorphic single things thanks to the twofold matter. The original cosmic form is connected with the matter of the higher species (*prima forma quando coniungitur alteriori materiae*). Conjunction of form and matter of the third kind created a new atomic substance that “exsists” in the Neoplatonic diacosmos as intelligible species (*constituit speciem intelligentiae*). Avicebron postulates a new type of hylemorphic being of the third kind, which replaced intentional *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* that were in the first Averroism. The new hylemorphic substance of the third kind is given both in the material and in the intelligible world. The predication of this spiritual substance canceled the fundamental metaphysical difference between the first and the second substance.[[335]](#footnote-335) The first level of reality creates a composition of Neoplatonic form and substance to create a subsistent first substance. This entity of the third kind, considered a kind of quasi–substance and quasi–subsistence, makes the future basis of objective being. Then follows the decisive little word “*similiter*,” which establishes a new form of the cosmological deduction done in a mythological way. The second floor similarly establishes the subsistence of hylemorphic compositions. It connects the lower kind of form and substance in the hylemorphic world and not in the world of pure forms (*forma quantitatis cum coniugitur materiae inferiori*). The quotation shows the parallelism of two species. The transition from the higher matter to the normal one establishes mythological determination of material bodies. The objective mode of existence is based on the new form of deduction (*ducit ad esse*). It produces no longer cosmic forms as in *Liber de causis*, but atomic substances as bodies of the third kind. Modernity established an existence of the new world due to deduction of substances from the diacosmos into the lower reality. The verb “*ducit*” represents *Lichtung* of the modern concept of existence. That deductively defined “exsistence” of being of the third kind, Rufus introduced it for the first time in the term “*exsistit*.” This species does not originate in the process of abstraction made from the hyparchical first substance. It is a mythological product done in the thinking of *illuminati*. Thanks to parousia of meaning according to *Liber de causis*, that objective being established a kind of hylemorphic reality. Neoplatonic species of Avicebron has nothing to do with intentional *species intelligibilis* of the first Averroism, which is obtained by recognizing the first real substance. In this way of knowing, the species is merely an intention of intellect. The second Averroism, following Avicebron’s pattern, created objective “body—species” as a mix of first and second substance in order to create a new version of atomic substance (*individuum*). These individuals have their own hylemorphic existence on the level of exemplars. They descend into lower reality by taking the form of material and formal contingency. This metaphysical Docetism founded the objective worldview in modernity. The new *species corporis* represents a Neoplatonic hybrid of the third kind. The potential essence takes the actuality of hyparchical existence. The parallelism of two kinds of species establishes a new form of correspondence of understanding and reality, which are fundamentally separate from Averroes’s *proportio*. Avicebron defines and deduces the existence of real bodies on the basis of reflection that brings the higher forms in the lower ones (*speculatio*). The hylemorphic form of bodies reflects the original higher perfection of specific bodies in the diacosmos. The next part of the quotation determines the quantity as subsistent form that receives intelligible hypostatized forms (*forma quantitatis erit conferibilis formae intelligentiae*). The scenario of Simplicius and Philoponus is repeated, in which the corporeality is defined in the demiurgic diacosmos outside of real hylemorphic bodies. Avicebron stepped on the path of Neoplatonists that created the first form of parallel universe. Concerning two forms of the substance, the master tells the student the following statement.

“The intelligible form is one and it is simple. The quantitatively given form is manifold and given as a composite of that one form (*forma uero quantitatis est multae unae compositae*). As intelligible form is nearest of all forms of higher matter (*propinquior materiae alteriori*), likewise the quantitatively given form is nearest of all forms to lower matter (*propinquior materiae inferiori*).” [[336]](#footnote-336)

The difference between the pure intelligible form (*forma intelligentiae est una simplex*) and the lower kinds of forms is based in division of formally given extension of the third kind. The transformation of diacosmic physical qualities into their material determinations establishes the lower world of hylemorphic substances (*forma uero quantitatis est multae unae compositae*). The intelligible forms of Avicebron have their own *simpliciter* given matter in the diacosmos (*materia alterior*), which is essentially different from the lower form in the real world (*materia inferior*). The quotation follows Neoplatonic kind of doubled being. This two-stage model of subsistent being invaded metaphysics of *Modernorum* through the dual model of Bonaventure’s ontotheology (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The specific matter forms the abstract corporeity of lower species. It takes “exsistence” due to the descent of higher forms into the lower hylic world (*forma intelligentiae est propinquior materiae alteriori*). Mathematically determined corporeality entails the higher matter. Due to the descent from the world of spirituals forms and spiritual substances, it comes to determination in the lower sphere of hylemorphic substances and their material forms. A key role is played by transition of higher substances into the lower ones in the mode of similarity, which makes the physical qualilites appear in both registers (*forma quantitatis est propinquior materiae inferiori*). Thereby a similarity of two forms of quantity arises in the mode of speculative mirroring of the higher form in the lower one (*sicut forma intelligentiae ... similiter forma quantitatis*). This second step of deduction establishes the material determined species, which is determined as hylemorphic “body—species” (*constituit speciem corporis*). Therefore, a species given in such a way can be divided up to the last indivisible part of the universal meaning (*individuum*).

Representatives of universal hylemorphism in Oxford introduced this being of the third kind equipped with the matter and the form of the third kind as a new surrogate of the first substance in the years 1235–40. The division of universal entities according to the Tree of Porphyry (ch. 1.4) received a powerful impulse by introducing the matter of the third kind to form a new substance of the third kind. Moreover, a new theory of truth as a speculative reflection of the diacosmos and of reality came into being as well. The quotation from writing *Fons vitae* shows that Neoplatonic modern physics plays a key role in the transition of intellectual forms to lower ones (*forma quantitatis erit conferibilis formae intelligentiae*). Oxford Porretans conceived the transition of forms from the diacosmos to reality on the primacy of mathematical abstraction. The mathematically given quantity and extension transformed into a physical subject in the lower world of material bodies. Modernists in Oxford connected intelligible and corporeal species by mathematically determined proportion and introduced analogically given univocity of being into metaphysics (ch. 3.3.2). By extracting of species and forms from the higher sphere (*exsistere*), Neoplatonic determination of bodies of the third kind passed over into the sphere of lower hylemorphic substances. The quotation shows the exposure of being from behind, from the world of cosmic forms. To this process of “concretization” of higher forms in lower ones (*concretum*, ch. 3.3.1) corresponds the intuition of academic *illuminati* of lower forms that makes them ascend up to original *exemplars* of things. We have interpreted this process by the term “*resolutio”* in Philip the Chancellor (ch. 2.3.2). By introducing hylemorphic individuals in the model of mathematical analogy and truth as a Neoplatonic similarity of the higher and lower world, modernity received a decisive impulse to form a new categorical predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. We have analyzed this predication in interpretations of writing *Categories* around the year 1230 (ch. 3.1.2). The analogical universality of substances ensures that substances of the third kind arise in the world of separated forms both on the level of the cosmic intelligences and on the lower level of reality. In this earthly world the substance is characterized by numerically defined extension that is given in the hylemorphic body. But the original extension “exsists” one floor higher as body of the third kind, which is equipped with spiritual matter. Let us return to the initial quotation from the *Fons vitae*, which defines the extension as purely intelligible determination of the form (*forma quantitatis erit conferibilis formae intelligentiae*). This two-story building of reality entails subsistent being of the lower form derived from the higher form. That architecture of metaphysics acquires a key meaning in the ontotheology of *Modernorum*. Bonaventura’s termini “*materia confusa*” and “*materia spiritualis*” (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.1) show the manner how Augustinian Avicennism processed Avicebron’s connection between specific form and universal substance. Oxfords analytical philosophers such as Rufus processed Avicebron’s determination in such a way that it corresponded to Aristotelian predication. Key tool was the interpretation of *Metaphysics Z*, which explores the first principles of the substance. In relation to the unity given in categorical determinations of being, the matter is taken separately in the mode of logical meaning taken *absolute* that was taken in the hyparchical mode (λέγω δ' ὕλην ἣ καθ' αὑτὴν, *Met*. 1029a20). Such abstracted matter as logical notion carries only indefinite determinations. It cannot be related either to accidentals of substance or to any definition (μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν, *Met*. 1029a20‒21). The quotation shows that Aristotle establishes the indeterminacy of matter in relation to categorical determinations of the second substance. According to *Second Analytics*, this is possible only in the mode of logical predication, because hypostatized being of universals exists only in mind (ch. 3.1.1). Modern Avicennists adopted the discrete worldview of Oxfordian Fallacy and combined the logical abstraction with the metaphysical one. Then they began to predicate Aristotle’s definition of matter in the metaphysics taken *simpliciter* and *univoce* (καθ' αὑτὴν). Latin sophists were influenced by Neoplatonic Avicennism that linked to scientific knowledge from the year 1230 in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. They rejected the categorical determination of the matter given by the imposition from the first real substance in the mode *per prius*. Avicebron’s terms “*species intelligentiae*” and “*species corporis*” began to operate within the Oxfordian Fallacy as Porretan individuals. They formed the middle member of scientific proof in the form of causally effective essence. A key role is played by Avicebron’s term “*species corporis*” that established modern determination of matter of the third kind. It makes an element that exerts an effective causality established on the universal and potential level. This abstraction corresponds to Grosseteste’s analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics*. The essence played the same role as *simpliciter* given middle member of deduction (ch. 3.1.1). The concept of formally conceived matter joined with the formal concept of the body conceived as substance of the third kind. By superimposing it on Neoplatonic interpretation of *Categories* in Oxford and Paris originally found in Ammonius (ch. 3.1.2), a new atomic substance of the third kind emerged in the mode *per prius*. This individual is simultaneously species, body, substance, and Porretan hypostasis. Aristotelian scenario entails the categorical predication of this strange mythological being. The second Averroism received after the year 1230 a new instrument for the “material” creation of unity and multiplicity of substantial forms. They started to connect them to Aristotelianism given *ad mentem Averrois*. This operation was absolutely impossible in Averroes’s metaphysics. All schools of the first Averroism rejected it. The modernists, who professed the theory of universal hylemorphism, therefore made the Commentator an Averroist, pagan and heretic. Learned *illuminati* at Oxford had previously done the same with Aristotle, see Grosseteste’s testimony (ch. 3.1.2). The modern substance acquired contingent characteristics of physical bodies. The inevitable consequence of this new conception of science and cognition was the multiplicity of substantial forms in man. They were distributed into two floors of reality that were relied by mathematical analogy. Academic Furies learned a new form Neoplatonism in order to direct from the underworld chaotic thinking of first modernists at Oxford. They created the new Heaven and the new Earth for themselves, both based on maniac parousia of metaphysical essence. New metaphysics relates to a non-existent being given only in mind. Under the leadership of Furies paranoia is a strictly logical matter that is placed outside of metaphysical abstraction that ceased to exist in the brave new world of universal hylemorphism. Reality is no longer necessary, since the thinking of modernity is fully self-sufficient.

The emergence of the matter of the third kind according to Avicebron made a substantial new unity of the human soul in the framework of two substances. This unity is based on the concept of universal hylemorphism (Bazán 1969, 42). Let us recall that writing *Summa Duacensis* and Philip the Chancellor advanced the multiplicity of substantial forms in man as *triplex unitas* (ch. 2.2.2) around 1230. This is the time when Avicennists created the first Averroistic image of Averroes. The followers of universal hylemorphism in Grosseteste’s school began to interpret Aristotle and the Commentator according to the same doctrine. Like this, the second simulacrum of Averroes was created at Oxford in the Toletan mode according to learning of *sophistae Latini*. Professing universal hylemorphism, Avicennists took from the metaphysics of the Commentator only those elements that fit into their modernist worldview. The fusion of Oxfordian Aristotelianism under the aegis of Oxfordian Fallacy with the Avicennism of Parisian *Grammatici* occurred after the arrival in Paris of the Oxfordian baccalaureates coming for master’s studies around the year 1235. The connection of both sophistic schools formed the new wave of the second Averroism. Alvernus called them *sophistae Latini*, which Albert shortened to *Latini*. Albert honored the confessors of this school *Latini*, who, moreover, introduced the universal hylemorphism into logical sophisms, with the ironic name *doctores Latini*. He rejected any academic discussion with them. All the cited representatives of the first Averroism, Alvernus, Albert and Bacon, were witnesses to the emergence of this school and they became fundamental opponents of modernism around 1240. The group of *doctores Latini* led by Rufus of Cornwall had to defend around the year 1245 in the University of Paris the totally unchristian doctrine that professed the multiplicity of substances in man. Moreover, the cognition of that crazy modern subject was determined from behind, by separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. This doctrine was condemned by the Chancellor of the University and Parisian bishop Alvernus sometime about the year 1240. Separated cosmic intellect as an independent substance cannot form a part of the human intellect (*intellectus agens non potest esse pars animae*, ch. 2.3). Rufus and the other modernists were protected by the authority of Jean de La Rochelle, who was *magister regens* at the Franciscan College in Paris until 1245. After his death, the magister Odo Rigaldus stepped in; he very likely let Alvernus and Albertus to examine doctrines of modernists. The result was clearly negative, as Rufus left the University of Paris and returned to Oxford. After the publication of *De homine* (1242), Albert became *magister regens* at the Dominican College of the University of Paris. Kilwardby, who was already the master, left the University of Paris and returned to Oxford for the same reason as Rufus. There is a great question as to whether Rufus received a master’s degree at Paris University during this period. According to Bacon, Rufus began teaching the *Sentences* at Oxford in 1250, after his academic exile from Paris. The period between 1245–50 is important because Rufus had to defend his opinions published in the work *Speculum animae* during his master’s studies in Paris (ch. 3.3.4). The previous matrix has shown by the example of Alvernus and Albert that educated philosopher of the Aristotelian Blund’s school that founded the first Averroism considered modern interpretations of substance, matter and bodies made according to the universal hylemorphism as philosophical nonsense.

The dispute between two schools took on a dramatic character after the year 1250. It concerned the unity of man, the unity of the soul, the nature of intellect, the definition of truth and the theory of scientific knowledge. Adam of Buckfield, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Robert Kilwardby, Bonaventure and other modernists linked Avicebron’s dualism with Aristotle’s teaching of the soul. Important study discovered the original source of this dualism (Callus 1939) by tracing the plurality of forms in the soul in teaching of two Oxford magisters (Adam of Buckfield, Richard Rufus of Cornwall). Buckfield’s commentary on the *Sentencia super librum de Anima* (c. 1243) was based on Averroes’s commentary on CMDA I.92. It confirms that the first Oxford masters rejected Averroes’s solution of one substance and different faculties of *anima intellectiva* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Modern Porretans took the intellect as a hypostatized entity, which led both lower faculties of the soul to the apex. Key character was given to intellectual faculties of the soul as hypostatized forms following the pattern of Avicenna and *Nominales*. The core of the dispute between the first and the second Averroism involves a part taken from Buckfield’s treatise *De anima*, quoted in the footnote, which subordinates the possible intellect as potency to the active intellect as substance by exposing it from behind (*esset in potencia respectu forme nobilioris*).[[337]](#footnote-337) We have analyzed this scenario applied to the *intellectus possibilis* in the preceding chapter by the example of the work *Summa philosophiae*. In the Neoplatonism made after the *Liber de causis* every higher form possesses its own subsistence. The “form—species” completes in the mode *perfectibile* the activity of lower forms. In the case of the human soul, it is the vegetative and the animal function. The soul is composed of different hypostases that are hierarchically defined in predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. Buckfield outlined the whole system as follows.

“Lastly, it may be said that intellectual faculty of the soul relates to other constituents of the soul just as specific difference completes the genus. Difference predicates nothing with respect to the determinations which come from an external source, but only testifies to the actuality and perfection of what was previously imperfect.” [[338]](#footnote-338)

The predication does not follow the hylemorphic substance given in the real physical body, because the soul makes a separated immaterial form (*non similiter se habet virtus intellectiva ad alias*). The predication separated the intellectual part of the soul from the other substances due to hypostatized categorical predication introduced in Oxford around 1230. The higher form has its own subsistence and completes in the mode *perfectibile* the activity of lower forms, which in this case are the vegetative and animal components of the soul. Buckfield replaced the specific difference between genus and species with the Avicennian scheme of entelechy, whereby the higher forms determine the lower (*actualitatem et perfeccionem eiusdem quod prius fuit imperfectum*). The system of Neoplatonic deduction defines the soul according to the exposure from behind. The hypostatized higher form of the intellect, in the mode of *perfectio*, establishes the unity of the soul within the framework of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of substances. The predication of intellectual hypostases in man then proceeds in the scenario of the higher form which completes the lower forms of the soul through the immaterial separated intellect. Buckfield, Rufus and their school began in a Porretan way to divide the person, which the first Averroism defined as Boethius’s indivisible first substance. Porretans introduced into the actuality of *simpliciter* given first substance the division according to the Neoplatonic perfection of forms given as being of the third kind. In order to carry out such a nonsensical operation, Buckfield and Rufus had to abolish the difference between first and second substance emphasized by Aristotle, Boethius, Abelard and Averroes. Further, they had to introduce a new conception of substance, form and potential being according to universal hylemorphism. By combining these modern forms of being of the third kind, a schizophrenic concept of modern person divided into several objective substances emerges sometime around the years 1235–40 at Oxford. The scientific knowledge of this mythopoetic simulacrum warrants Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The unity of man is built according to Avicebron’s dualism. The substances of the third kind are created by analogical connection of bodies given first in the diacosmos and then in reality. Buckfield comments in the cited work on a passage from *De anima*413a4–10. Regarding the immaterial intellect given in the soul as *inmixtus*, he concludes that the intellectual part of the soul is an independent substance.

“There is no other choice left to those who want to separate the intellectual soul according to its substance from the body, but not the soul as sensual and vegetative substance. On this it is evident that it is not a question of one substance, but of two distinct substances.” [[339]](#footnote-339)

Buckfield asserts in the key part of his interpretation of *De anima* that the intellectual soul is distinct with respect to vegetative and animal components “*secundum substantiam*.” Therefore, two entirely distinct substances (*alia et alia*) exist in the soul. The explanation has shown that the pluralism of substances in man has the source of origin according to the work *Fons Vitae* in the two-story construction of subsistent forms given *modo geometrico*. The second Averroism represented by Adam of Buckfield defined the intellect as a higher form, which has a subsistent character and according to sophistic interpretation of CMDA it comes to the human being from outside. A complex critique of this absurd view was carried out by Albert in the name of the first Averroism already in the work *De homine*. He defended the authentic doctrine of the CMDA about the unity of the person as the only hylemorphic substance (ch. 2.4.1). Buckfield’s commentary on *De anima* shows mental confusion of Avicennian modernists, which is attested around the year 1230 (ch. 2.2.2) in *Summa Duacensis* in Paris and after the year 1260 in *Summa philosophiae* at Oxford (ch. 3.1.3). The first modernists created a sophistical simulacrum of the real human being, which has made an epochal success story. These modernists, questioned in Paris around 1245 by the school of the first Averroism, were not able to reconcile Aristotelian intellectual capacities of the soul as a form of the body with Neoplatonic collections of substances of the third kind. That heritage, they took it over from Porretans and Avicennists settled in Oxford. Chancellor and bishop Alvernus in Paris officially criticized both Porretan schools (*sophistae Italici, Grammatici*) in the name of Blund’s school. Avicenna belonged to the group of rejected Neoplatonists (*sequaces Aristotelis*). They professed the heretical doctrine of separated *intellectus agens*, which in the mode of efficient causality establishes cognition in the human soul. The original source of the plurality of substances in the human being we find in the Toledo school. Let us see Gundissalinus’s work *De immortalitate animae*, which defines the intellect as a Neoplatonic “form—species” (*intellectus in se ipso, in esse suo et in specie sua, forma est*).[[340]](#footnote-340) The Oxford school adopts Gundissalinus’s definition of the soul according to Avicenna as an intelligible species, which has its own subsistence in the diacosmos of immaterial forms. This definition seemed to coincide with the classical definition of the soul as an entelechic and immaterial form of the body. The second source of universal hylemorphism is given by the origin of universal matter by the term “*helyatin*” by Gerhard of Cremona. The material as the Greek *hylē* and the Arabic word for “wholeness” founded a new conception of matter by mixing those two traditions.[[341]](#footnote-341) The substance got a universal determination and it made possible to predict the analogical matter in the mode of Abelard’s “*totum integrum*” (ch. 1.3). The second Averroism found the original source of matter as pure potentialities in Averroes’s work *De substantia orbis*.[[342]](#footnote-342) As a result of the synthesis of Oxford’s universal hylemorphism and Toletan Avicennism, the human soul was created as a mix of two or even of three substances. With regard to the lower material components, the immaterial intellect plays the role of the subsistent superordinate form, which is immaterial and therefore survives passing away of the body. It is quite understandable that *intellectus possibilis* began to play the role of Avicebron’s hypostatized *materia spiritualis* for equally hypostatized *intellectus agens* that operates in man as an immaterial “substance—form.” The key passage containing the core of Averroistic nature of *intellectus possibilis* as numerically unified spiritual matter can be found in the quoted commentary on *De anima* written by Buckfield.[[343]](#footnote-343) The third variant of the interpretation mentioned by him concerns the concordance of theologians and philosophers (*concordare philosophos cum theologis*). It can be found as the theory of one modern truth elaborated by Rufus of Cornwall in the work *Contra Averroem* written about 1236 (ch. 3.3.3). The advantage of universal hylemorphism for modernists lay in the fact that spiritual matter unified the intellectual soul and the person. This unity is given *per se* within the framework of the one objective hylemorphic substance. To that substance, lower hypostatized components of the soul, one animal and one vegetable, can be analogously assigned *per posterius* in the accidental mode. This model of hypostatized predication corresponds to Neoplatonic interpretation of *Categories* that prevailed around the year 1230 by Porretan John Pagus (ch. 3.1.2). Albert rejected the definition of man as a collection of three modern substances, which is predicated in the Porretan mode as collection of hypostases. He refused to discuss such absurdity (*non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum*, ch. 2.4.3). The modern unity of the person in the mode “*triplex unitas*” was considered in the school of the first Averroism as an absurd theory that contradicted the philosophical tradition of all Peripatetics. These classically educated people would probably have been quite surprised if they had come to postmodern artistic faculties of the contemporary West. The chaotic postmodern subject is composed as mythopoetic *copulatio* of objective substances and disparate collection of being of the third kind. They are assembled into sophisticated collections of nihilistic matrix world. The dualistic solution of the first *Modernorum* turned expressly against Grosseteste’s interpretation of *De anima*, as evidenced by his attack against these dubious Aristotelians around the year 1235 (ch. 3.1.3). Following the Blund’s school, Grosseteste rejects the concept of the soul as an autonomous Neoplatonic form.[[344]](#footnote-344) His commentary on *De anima* considers the universal hylemorphism applied to definition of the soul to be nonsense. Even according to Augustine, the spiritual matter does not have the status of hylemorphic substance. The founder of modernism at Oxford does not agree with Avicenna’s argument on this fundamental point and adheres to the diaphanum as a key component of light transmission (ch. 2.2.1). But his successors at Oxford were already following the path of the Augustinian *Modernorum*, inspired by Avicennism and universal hylemorphism. Callus has shown that Buckfield and Rufus took as main authorities the Neoplatonic writings attributed to Augustine, such as the work *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* (Gennadius of Marseille, †496), and further anonymous pseudo-Augustinian writings, which were created in the second half of the 12th century in the schools of *Nominales* (*De spiritu et anima*). Due to the plurality of substantial forms, the unity of the person disappeared. It is clearly shown in the work *De homine*, written at the same time. Albert interprets in *De homine* the passage CMDA I.92, which is quoted by Buckfield, but he did it in the spirit of the first Averroism (ch. 2.4.2). Albert did not make the Commentator a modern Averroist, but interpreted his teaching within the framework of the one hylemorphic substance. The soul makes an immaterial form of the body and immaterial intellect is one of specific faculties of this soul. The rejection of Averroes as an Averroist led to the first official dispute over modernism at the University of Paris in the years 1240–45. Already at the time of his Paris studies, Grosseteste defended the teaching of the first Averroism regarding the fundamental unity of the person as the first real substance. That Oxford scholar, like Bishop Alvernus, rejected the teaching of modernists, in which the person disintegrated into several substances.

Rufus failed academically during Grosseteste’s time as rector of Franciscan College at Oxford. Taken from the point of view of Christianity, his interpretation of the person in the style of *sequaces Aristotelis* was openly heretical. The proposed *terminus post quem* regarding Rufus’s departure from the Franciscan College in Oxford to Paris is based on the same scenario as in the case of Grosseteste’s departure from Paris to Oxford after the appointment of magister Alvernus as bishop of Paris (1228). Grosseteste was appointed bishop of Lincoln in the year 1235. He could certainly not tolerate Rufus’s unchristian opinion on the plurality of substances in man, because the Oxford University fell within Grosseteste’s jurisdiction. After modernist destruction of the person, Rufus had no choice but to go to academic exile in Paris to accomplish his master’s studies. This controversial Franciscan joined the school of local modernists grouped around the edition of *Summa Halensis*. In the years 1235–40 in Paris, there is an official difference between Toletan and Sicilian interpretations of Averroes regarding the unity of the person and the question of human cognition according to CMDA. This sparked a dispute between the first and the second Averroism, which can be attested by the fact that Alvernus officially rejected the universal hylemorphism (ch. 2.3.3). The answer of modernists was given according to Avicenna’s metaphysics, which included the interpretation of Averroes according to the Toledo school. The immaterial intellect is given in the soul as a hypostasis or substance and it connects the human individual with the cosmic *intellectus agens* as a cosmic subsistent form. According to modernists, the person represents a sophisticated collection of subsistent forms. Or the definition of the person runs according to CMDA, which is interpreted in the mode of the Sicilian school, that is, according to the primacy of the first real substance. Then the person is determined according to the real existence of the intelligible soul as the form of the body, which has various abilities, including the immaterial way of understanding the world. The controversy between Aristotelians and modernists broke out in full force after Alvernus’s death. In response to the confusion of modernists, the masters in Rue du Fouarre ordered that the scripture *De anima* must be lectured at the Faculty of Arts as an integral part of Aristotelian corpus (ch. 3.1.4). The statutes of the Paris Faculty of Philosophy, dating back to 1255, required the mandatory study of the then-known *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The work *De anima* was commented on together with Aristotle’s logical and scientific writings. It confirms the teaching of *Logica Vetus* according to Abelard and the interpretation of *De anima* according to the Sicilian school of the first Averroism. The sophists of the second Averroism took a completely eclectic approach to the interpretation of the third part of *De anima* and of CMDA III.5‒6. They created an Averroistic monopsychism in the form of the numerical unity of *intellectus possibilis* (ch. 3.3.3). The comments on *De anima* therefore had to reflect the points of view that are peculiar to the school of the first and the second Averroism.

Once again, there is an ambiguity concerning Grosseteste’s teaching. He laid out the specific unity of the person that opposes multiplicity of substantial forms in the soul. However, his followers at Oxford introduced that theory. Grosseteste was not an Avicennist in the interpretation of the soul, which distinguishes his theory of the soul from the theory of cognition presented above. The first modernist at Oxford adhered to substantial unity of the soul and made criticism of erroneous Aristotelism of his students. The soul cannot be an independent substance next to the body, but only a form in the body. The reason lies in the fundamental difference between the existence of the human intellect and the intellect of separated cosmic spheres. The interpretation of intellectual part of the soul and the unity of man is inspired by Averroes’s comments on Aristotle’s cosmology. Grosseteste starts from *Physics* VIII.4 (the movement caused by an instrument), from *Metaphysics* XII.7 (relation to the Immobile mover) and from *De anima* III.12 (sensory perception of animals). He needs these parts of Aristotle’s corpus in order to establish a scheme of cognition as the transition from potentiality to accomplished form. The intellectual movement of the first stellar sphere contrasts with movements of the human soul as hylemorphic composition. In both cases, the intellect is driven by desire to imitate the Immobile mover (κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν, *Met*. 1072a26). But the accomplishment of such desire ist not the same for the human intellect and the intellect of astral spheres. There, it is given as a pure actualized form. Human being is a composition of form and matter, and its intellectual cognition depend on the act of abstraction provided by senses. Therefore, Grosseteste rejected the universal hylemorphism in reference to Augustine’s definition of the soul.[[345]](#footnote-345) The following quotation shows the exposure of cognition from sensual reality, because the actuality of the first substances is the source of human cognition. In man, as a hylemorphic first substance, there is no subsistent intelligible form as cosmic intelligences are. In the second commentary on *De anima*, Grosseteste rejects the cosmic intellect in man for the same reasons as bishop Alvernus, with whom he had studied at Blund’s school in Paris. After the year 1230 he repeats the original point of view on the unity of the person that defended in his writing *De anima et de potenciis eius*. Grosseteste gives the soul a direct causality over its own action, since the soul is the source of the movement (*anima est agens motum*; *De motu supercaelestium*, ed. Baur, p. 95.4). The detached cosmic *intellectus agens* have this in full; also the human soul has a source of motion in the immaterial sphere. But man must realize this movement through the body, also in intellectual activity “*in artificialibus*” given by production. The geometrically defined triangle, and a fortiori any other product, do not come into being only in the mind, but must be fashioned in matter. The only directly recognizable subsistent forms are in matter, and all other intelligible forms are present to us only in potency.

“By this he [Aristotle] meant that the movement of these [material] forms is the cause of cognitive forms (*causa exitus eius*). These forms exist in their potency because of the abstraction given either in relation to the act or in relation to the forms in matter. For the forms have a double being (*duplex esse*). By actual existence (*esse in actu*) is meant their material existence, and their potential existence (*esse in potentia*) they keep in the abstraction.” [[346]](#footnote-346)

In contrast to the purely simple and fully actualized forms in the sphere of cosmic intelligences, the unity of human intellect with the higher sphere is given only “*secundum esse*,” that is, according to the immaterial essence of thinking, and not, “*secundum substantiae*.” The orientation of intellectual desire is directed to the Immovable mover (*exitus*) is given in humans by transition from potency to the act in the body as a hylemorphic substance. The possible forms become actual in the process of abstraction (*est in potentia in illis formis abstractis ad actum*). This procedure of cognition is fundamentally different from the eternally actualized cosmic forms, which are immaterial substances. We are not pure intellectual forms like cosmic intelligences. We recognize intelligible forms in the human way of sensory cognition. This distinction of forms is given according to Aristotle and is interpreted *ad mentem Averrois* of the Sicilian school. That teaching has a principal character since it excludes the plurality of substances in man. The reason for substantial difference between cosmic and human intellect is that the only actualized forms available to us are always given but in matter. Thinking is only a potential activity. Therefore, the intellect needs for its work the matter, which it forms according to the idea given in the spirit. Every craftsman works like this, since it transforms the formally given idea into matter. The causality of human intellect as an active form that creates in the mode *in artificialibus* through matter is fundamentally different from higher cosmic forms. These intelligences create intelligible hyparchical substances directly, through the act of substantial and fully actualized thinking. Human thinking is given only in the order of potency and never of actuality. The cosmic intelligences, through the act of thinking, they create intelligible forms. Human thinking cannot do this, because it exists in the body. If human thinking creates the things in reality, then only through the body as an instrument. Grosseteste defends the same point of view as bishop Alvernus, since *intellectus agens* of cosmic intelligences is generically different from human intellect. The human soul is not a pure immaterial form, because it comes out from the forms of vegetative and animal soul, both of which are entelechically active in the body. Grosseteste defines the human intellect in the mode “*separabilis*” done by the Commentator’s and not in the mode of “*separatus*” made by Porretans. This intellectual faculty of the soul completes the entelechic unity of organisms. Such unified nature of man did not exist in the Toledo school.

“No part of the plant is the totality of the plant, just as a part of the animal is not the whole animal, but each of the parts of the plant lives vegetatively and each part of the animal feels. The form of the intellectual soul is given in the other way, since it comes to these forms of the soul (*superveniens his*). The intellectual part of the soul makes the form that is not materially situated (*advenit formae non situali*); that form cannot be brought out of the immediately given substantial physical form; human being receives it from another form situated outside the body, i.e., from the first form.” [[347]](#footnote-347)

Grosseteste adheres to Averroes’s definition of the soul as a body-animating entelechic form and refuses Avicenna’s soul as a substantial hypostasis. The same attitude expressed his first treatise on the soul *De anima et de potenciis eius* since it refused Gundissalinus’s interpretation of the soul according to Avicenna (ch. 2.2.1). The soul is not merely a part of the body (*nulla enim pars plantae est planta, nec animalis animal*). The intellect cannot be some form of the hypostatized species, which is given in the soul as a genus for two reasons. The organs of both lower forms of the soul are given in the quantitatively determined and transient body (*situalis*).[[348]](#footnote-348) But the soul, as an animating form of the living organism, determines them not as parts, but from the point of view of its activities as the whole. The same applies to a greater extent to the immaterial intellect, which comes to the soul as a determination of the higher form of intelligence given outside the physical determinations (*forma non situale*). The intellectual component of the soul does not come through the activity given in the sense organs in the body (*situalis*), but is given directly, because it is not materially situated in the body (*immediate advenit formae non situali*). The major point is the fact that the soul is a form of the body as a first real substance, but it is not materially situated in the body. Therefore, the soul is given by God as the first form (*immediate a forma non situale, scilicet prima*). The human intellect has its seat in no bodily organ like the senses, because it is a direct act of *anima intellectiva*. The act of immaterial part of the soul complements the already given mental activities, which in turn are given by the act of the soul as an animating form. The substance can only be one of what exists in *actus essendi*, that is, as a hylemorphic composition. Grosseteste is the author of the work *De anima et de potenciis eius* for this fundamental reason, because this argument distinguished Averroes’s definition of the person from the specific and individual corpse of Porretan Avicennists. The further reason for the rejection of plurality of substantial forms in man is shown due to recognition of the soul. It links to the process of sensual abstraction, which in turn is the fundamental starting point of Blund’s school to refuse the teaching of Neoplatonic modernists.

“The rational soul is connected with the body not only in the way of the mover, but also by means of understanding through the physical faculties (*intelligens mediante virtute corporea*). The rational soul cannot understand without phantasms (*intellegit enim non sine phantasmate*), which is an act of sensual faculties (*actus virtutis sensitivae*).” [[349]](#footnote-349)

The dualistic thesis of the Avicennists and Cartesians presupposes the external effect of the soul on the body (*anima ut motor*). It is related to the intellect taken “*secundum esse*,” i.e., to the immateriality of thinking that formally coincides with the act of the cosmic intellect. The key feature is the connection “*non solum… sed etiam*.” The previous quotations have shown that the intellectual part of the soul is immaterial, which is why it, unlike the senses, is not attached to the body. But man is not a pure intellect and he will never be in this world, although he has the ability to recognize the separated intellectual forms. The proceeding of human intellect “*secundum substantiam*,” in contrast to stellar spheres is tied to abstraction and existence of intellect in the body (*intelligens mediante virtute corporea*). The continuation of this quote shows the dilemma of the beginning modernity.

“The actual form, which is at the same time the exemplar and through which the thing exists, is not connected with the thing, but it is abstracted, is simple and separated. This is the first form, but how this first form exists, it is difficult to explain.” [[350]](#footnote-350)

By endorsing the *exemplar*, Grosseteste has to partially cancel original teaching of the Blund’s school, which he had defended in Paris. The specimen is not considered directly in its being, as with the Porretans, but is abstracted by the material thing (*exemplar… non est coniuncta rei, sed abstracta*). This view has a fundamental agreement with the already mentioned treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius*. Due to the problematic status of the exemplar, Grosseteste teaching at Oxford is no longer able to defend the unity of intellect, soul and body within the framework of the one subsistent act of existence (*difficile est explanare*). This is typical interpretation of the CMDA according to the Toledo school, which turned Averroes into an Averroist. Thomas Aquinas defended the intellect as a hypostatized form of the soul according to Grosseteste, which is shown by his polemic with Siger.

Grosseteste professes the plurality of forms in man, but by no means the plurality of substances in man. The essence of man as unique substance is connected with the act of cognition as faculty of this hylemorphic person (*totum integrum*). The soul is the immaterial form of the human person as one substance. At the very beginning of his intellectual career, Grosseteste rejected Gundissalinus’s definition of the soul following Avicennism of the Toledo school that created two different hypostases in man. After the year 1220, the young scholar, who was educated in the environment of the Blund’s school, definitely broke away from modern Avicennists and Porretans in the question concerning the unity of the person and human cognition. The key point of separation was the unity of the person that makes the cornerstone of Christian doctrine. On this point, Grosseteste agreed with his university colleague Alvernus. One generation later, young representatives of the first Averroism educated in Paris chose the same path (Albert, Bacon). Grosseteste’s commentary on *De anima* was familiar with Boethius’s and Abelard’s distinction of the individual thing in the context of the first and the second substance (ch. 1.3). The quoted chapter analyzed Boethius’ saying “*totum autem hoc animal*” (*Boeth. In Porph. Isag*. III.10), whereby the whole of the first substance in reality (*totum integrum*) and it is different from meaning of this substance in mind (*totum universale*). This difference oriented Abelard and later Blund’s school against Porretans. The corpse is not a human being, because the imposition of meaning is absent from the hyparchical first substance (*totum integrum*). Grosseteste used Abelard’s argument to reject the Avicennistic dualism of soul and body as two autonomous substances. In the context of Averroes, the soul is understood as the completion of lower components of the soul (*perfectio animae*) and their division follows the Aristotelian line “act—potency” and by no means Avicennist line “essence—accident.” Any form of hylemorphism for the soul is nonsense, since it would turn the soul into a actualized substance.

“The soul has the twofold ability of perfection and potentiality. Therefore, we state the soul as a twofold wholeness (*dicitur totum dupliciter*), namely the actualized whole (*totum perfectum*) and the wholeness given in the possibility, i.e. virtually (*totum potentiale sive virtuale*). The completely given whole is defined as a real act of being (*ex parte essentiae eius*) that is in the soul (*inest animae*). The virtual whole is given with regard to possible being (*ex parte potentiae*). Therefore, it is not a true conclusion that the soul possesses an actualized wholeness, i.e., quantity.” [[351]](#footnote-351)

The quotation follows precisely the hyparchical mode (*inesse*), by distinguishing the wholeness of the soul as Aristotle’s *tabula rasa* (*totum potentiale*) from accomplished ability tied to the act of the person’s hylemorphic existence. The soul makes perfection of the body and the intellect makes perfection of the soul. The resulting unity of these acts (*totalitas perfectionis*) is substantially given in the body. The soul has its own act of subsistent being, which separates it from the hylemorphic composition of body and soul. Therefore, the soul entails a physically given quantity in the body as the first substance. If the soul is conceived in potency, then it is given as an abstract concept of cognition and it cannot have quantity at all. Only the hylemorphic whole makes the actual act of being and is given as existing substance (*totalitas perfectionis inest animae ex parte essentiae eius*). In the case of the unity of the person, Grosseteste does not follow the path of Oxfordian Fallacy. The hypostatized concept of the soul as the essence, or even as the first substance in universal hylemophism, is nonsense and it does not fit into Aristotelian philosophy. In contrast to young sophists at Oxford, Grosseteste knew real meaning of CMDA according to the Blund’s school. Therefore, he knows exactly what is the intellect as a *tertium genus* in the CMDA (*totum perfectum*) as an existential act of the soul; and, what is the view of the soul from the point of view of abstraction in the mode *quartum genus* is (*totum potentiale*). The essence of man as the one substance is given with the act of cognition as potency of the hylemorphic person (*totum*), because the soul makes the immaterial form of the body. Grosseteste separated the potential whole of the soul in the form of Aristotle’s *tabula rasa* (*totum potentiale*) from the actualized unity the person that has the ability to recognize something (*totum perfectum*). The act of the intellect as a part of the soul depends on the real existence of the person. The intellect has no existence of its own in the original state of pure potency, because not even the soul possesses one. The position of the soul in the context of *inesse* is already contained in Grosseteste’s first work *De anima et de potenciis eius*, written in Paris. In the context of hyparchical *inesse*, it is true that only the organism is a living being and not, for example, the corpse or external excrement such as spilled blood or sperm (ch. 2.2.1). This difference between the hyparchical and hypostatic predication of organisms is of fundamental importance, because it distinguished the Toletans interpretation of hypostatized (i.e., Averroist) Averroes from hyparchical Averroes according to the Sicilian school.

Let us recall the key argument of the first Western reception of Averroes, which was put against the identitarian view of the human corpse defended by the Porretans and the Toletans. Grosseteste’s lifelong interpretation of *De anima* includes a clear distinction of the soul according to double hyparchical *inesse* (ch. 3.1.1). Such distinction fundamentally defends separation of the person as *tertium* and *quartum genus* in the CMDA according to the Sicilian school. The modern identity of an *individuum* is not the ipseity of the person. New round of this debate started in the years 1270–72 between Siger and Thomas of Aquin. Grosseteste rejected the interpretation of the person according to the Toletans. They reduced that twofold kinds of *inesse* into one hypostatized *tertium ens* in the manner of Avicenna. Such mythological soul of modernists as a substance then habitually possesses the possibility of existence (*potencia vitam habentis*, ch. 2.2.1). This is the Neoplatonic definition of existence as substantial habitus added from the outside as a substance or immanently held as hypostasis. Simplicius introduced this definition when he converted the habitus into an independent hypostasis (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). Such human being would be a corpse with the hypostatized possibility of being a human being done in a accidental or contingent manner. As a representative of the Blund’s school, Grosseteste absolutely excludes such possibility. All important points about the unity of the person are found in his first work *De anima et de potenciis eius*. Therefore, the writing includes the lectures in Blund’s school. It was written after the critical reception of Averroes, which contested the teaching of Toledo school. The key fact for the reception of CMDA in the West is due to the fact that it was probably already known around 1225 and was correctly interpreted according to the Blund’s school, i.e., outside the Avicennist paradigm of the Toledo school. This corresponds to Gauthier’s dating of the writing around the year 1225. Hermeneutic reading considers the origin of the writing between 1225–30. The objective identity of both figures of Averroes in contemporary comparative medievalism follows the mode of *tertium ens*. The simulacrum of Averroes is not the same as the distinction of his philosophy in the mode of *tertium* and *quartum genus*. According to CMDA, the true ipseity of *anima intellectiva* means that the act of thinking is tied to the existence of a unique person in the mode of *tertium genus*. Therefore, the true Averroes manifests himself only in the imposition mode of *alētheia*, i.e., in the conception of the “meta-physics” of the first substance *qua* substance. The hyparchical position of the person as a hylemorphic substance followed the line of the Blund’s school and the CMDA before the year 1230. Then followed the second work *Tractatus beati Roberti Grostesto Lincolnensis episcopi de anima*, which already was written at Oxford. The bishop Alvernus made identical proceeding that consists of two commentaries on *De anima*. He wrote the work *De potenciis animae et obiectis* (1230) against Neoplatonic interpretation of the Toledo school. This work defends the authentic nature of cognition made *ad mentem Averrois*. The work sums up Alvernus’s lectures and contests the teaching of various Porretans and Avicennists schools. Sometime after the year 1240, Alvernus wrote the second interpretation of *De anima* in the spirit of the Sicilian school (*Guilielmi De anima*). The work completely separated the Commentator from the rest of Aristotle’s Neoplatonic interpreters, and from Avicenna as well. There was no that kind of separation in Grosseteste′s thinking. His interpretation *ad mentem Averrois* in the question of metaphysics was shaped by the paradigm of the Toledo school. In the question of the unity of the person and cognition, Grosseteste belongs to the side of the first Averroism. He defends with Alvernus the interpretation of Aristotle according to the Sicilian version of the Commentator (*philosophus nobilissimus*), which was separated from the Neoplatonic Aristotle explained according to the Toledo school (*sequaces Aristotelis*). Grosseteste rejected Gundissalinus’s definition of the soul that created two separate substances in man, since Toletans defined the soul as a substance of the third kind. Rufus adopted that modern Neoplatonism, that is why he founded the school of the second Averroism at Oxford.

The school of *Modernorum* at Oxford transformed definition of the person from the plurality of forms to a plurality of substances. Rufus defended this definition at Oxford until 1235, and after his departure to study in Paris, Adam of Buckfield maintained this teaching. This is evidenced by Callus’s study that conducted an analysis of texts written by the aforementioned magister around 1240. His division of the person in plurality of substances did not result from the definition of the soul according to Aristotle, but from the division of hypostatized reality according to Porretans and to Neoplatonic dualism in the work *Fons Vitae*. All these signs distinguish the school of the second Averroism from the school of the first Averroism. Porretan and Avicennist representatives as Buckfield and Rufus shifted the interpretation of *De anima* to Avicennism. From the year 1235 on, they publicly proclaimed in Oxford the pluralism of substances in man. As the bishop of Lincoln appointed at that time, Grosseteste had to intervene against this heresy. Rufus as the main critic of Aristotle was sent to Paris. The development of Rufus’s philosophy shows that Grosseteste’s *inesse* of the soul conceived as Averroes’s *tertium genus*, was transformed into a Porretan hypostasis. Rufus created a sophistical simulacrum of Averroes’s personal intellect as a *quartum genus*. In this way, Rufus made Averroes to be an Averroist about the year 1236 in the work *Contra Averroem* (ch. 3.3.3). Grosseste rejected this approach in principle about the year 1235 by criticizing the modernists (*contra ipsum Aristotilem et suos expositores*, ch. 3.1.3). Those expositors interpreted Aristotle according to Avicennism of Porretans that was learned in schools of *Nominales*. Let us return to the cited definition of the twofold predication of the soul. The hyparchical existence in the mode *inesse* shapes the predication of the essence according to correct interpretation of *Second Analytics*. This is given by hyparchical being of the real thing, that is, by the real person existing in the body (*totalitas perfectionies inest animae ex parte essentiae eius*). The young modernists, in contrast to their founder, already fell completely under his spell of Oxfordian Fallacy. Therefore, they interpreted Grosseteste’s quotation in the key part “*inest animae ex parte essentiae eius*” completely sophistical, that is, in the objective analytical mode of Porretan *inesse3* (ch. 3.1.1). By introducing the soul as an essence, modernists as Rufus created another autonomous substance of the third kind in the non-existent Porretan subject as *individuum*. Porretanian definition of human being as a corpse received another substance of the third kind to create quite a modern philosophical Frankenstein. Under the powers of Chaos, it came to disintegration of the person at Oxford to make the collection of disparate substances of the third kind. Let’s recall the previous analysis regarding the interpretation of *Anal. Post*. 84a11‒14. The objective donation of being (*dativus obiectivus*) was created with regard to the twofold form of universal predication (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, Kap. 3.1.1). When Grosseteste and Rufus about the year 1235 stated the same *inesse* in the case of the understanding of the human soul, they did not mean the same thing. Rufus and his school worked with Porretan interpretation of the soul as *inesse*3. There were two substances in man, the physical one and the intellectual one. The soul, as a substantial totality, represents yet another independent subsistent form (*potentia substantialis*) and its real cognition is given by the contingent acts of the soul (*potentia accidentalis*). The difference between the substantial human powers producing contingent acts is a typical sign of the Oxford modernist school founded by Rufus (ch. 3.3.1). Alvernus, Grosseteste, Albert and Bacon declared it clearly : modern nihilistic view of existence as an external accident added to some hypostatic substance of the third kind was a heretic teaching and a kind of philosophically stupid doctrine. As we know today very well from analytical courses of universities managed by postmodern Furies, the aforementioned lover of wisdom have lost their cause.

Roger Bacon provides crucial information, when and how the transition from the first Averroism to the second Averroism occurred at Oxford. His commentary on the third book *De anima* (*Distinccio tercia de anima*) dates this change and pinpoints exactly when previous concepts ceased to be valid. There are two important indications in the text. The first mention indicates that the change took place in the time when Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* was published in the year 1245 and promulgated “ten years ago” (*ab annis decem igitur inolevit opinio*). The second dating relates to Grosseteste’s critique of the modernists, documented in the essay *Hexaëmeron* (1235), and is dated “twenty years ago” (*ante viginti annos*). This means that Bacon’s cited writing should be dated around 1255.[[352]](#footnote-352) Bacon’s harsh criticism of modernists responds to the first successful attack led by mendicants at the University of Paris against the magisters in the Rue de Fouarre. Mendicants obtained the dismissal of magisters from the school of the first Averroism, and the Pope allowed them to establish the first chair of modern philosophy at the University of Paris. This frankly horrified all Aristotelians in the school of the first Averroism. For them, the expected coming of Antichrist began by execution of common sense in the academic philosophy. Moreover, the Pope Alexander IV personally blessed this modernist abomination by issuing the decree *Quasi lignum vitae* (1255). During this period Albert writes the main commentaries on *De anima* against the same opponents as Bacon did his criticism. Let us now see to what constellation of thinking may be dated the break in philosophy that is connected with the rise of the second Averroism.

“Just twenty years ago, everyone claimed that only the intelligible part of the soul is given independently, and that the vegetative and animalistic parts are produced from the potency of the substance by the natural process. This was claimed by theologians from England and taught by all philosophers.” [[353]](#footnote-353)

Bacon claims that the first generation of Aristotelians at Oxford adhered to the concept of the soul as a separate immaterial form (*sola anima intellectiva*). It corresponds to the correct interpretation of Averroes according to Grosseteste. The intellectual part or the faculty of the soul comes to already present, sensual activities in the human organism (*quod vegetativa et sensitiva in homine producantur de potencia materie per viam nature*). This view was shared by both theologians and philosophers, because, according to Bacon, it corresponds to common sense. This definition corresponds to Grosseteste’s conception of the intellect as a non-material form (*immediate advenit formae non situali*). It comes to complete (*superveniens*) the two already given forms of the corporeally given soul (vegetative, animal). Bacon indirectly mentions this English scholar by clearly pointing out the authentic Aristotelian sources of this theory.

“The whole philosophy claims that only the intellect was created [directly from God], and also all theologians who are worth something, and all philosophers twenty years ago, and so far all Englishmen who are recognized by others as educated. They prove this not only by the authority of Aristotle, but also by rational arguments.” [[354]](#footnote-354)

Since the immaterial intellect cannot be given in the body as a sensible form of life, this part of the soul must have been created directly by God (*solus intellectus creature*). This is Grosseteste’s conclusion quoted above with regard to the intellectual part of the soul as a *forma prima*. Bacon indirectly quotes the key argument from Grosseteste’s two writings on the soul. This reasoning is given in the theory of sensual cognition based in the body (*situalis*) and intelligible cognition, the carrier of which is the immaterial soul (*forma non situale*). Siger’s school, in the version of Boethius of Dacia, connected with this theory by referring to intellectual faculties of the soul with respect to the body in the so-called “*obiective*” mode (OBJ III, ch. 4.3.1). The references of Bacon to writing *De anima* and *Metaphysics* as well as to Avicenna and to Averroes agree with Grosseteste’s above-interpreted view. Bacon quoted them indirectly, but with sufficient clarity. He also mentions that very important group of thinkers (*omnes Anglicani qui satis inter alios homines sunt et fuerunt studiosi*) proclaimed that teaching. He points out that such concept is consistent with the Christian doctrine and applies on the basis of Aristotelianism and of rational arguments of all sorts (*non solum per auctoritates Aristotelis et aliorum philosophorum, set per raciones*). Hermeneutics place the Franciscan magister Adam Marsh (Adam de Marisco) in the ranks of this group of authors of the first Averroism. He became a lecturer at Oxford in 1238 and was a friend of Grosseteste. Marsh defended Averroes as an author consistent with the Christian conception of the unity of the person. At the same time, bishop Alvernus took this position in relation to the similar group of theologians called *sophistae Latini* in Paris, where Marsh is attested as a follower of Alvernus (ch. 2.3.1). Bacon took the same line by explaining that the thesis about the substantial plurality in man is absolute nonsense. We want to quote this part as a whole. It contains Bacon’s strongest condemnation of *Modernorum*, since he was the representative of the first Averroism. His declaration was done at the time when that school was officially recognized at the University of Paris.

“They have no justification for this nonsense, which would be worth a debate. Therefore, they claim things rather than prove them. It is not clear to me what they could quote as an argument for these fairy tales. I would rather move on to what is much worse, a much greater error, and an evil heresy, even the worst of all. In my time, these errors did not occur, because it was clear to everyone that they are heretical and violated both faith and philosophy; due to great stupidity of these arguments, they were not commented upon at my time either (*nec dignati sumus movere questionem de hiis propter stulticie magnitudinem*).” [[355]](#footnote-355)

Bacon considers the thesis of modernists to be madness (*hanc insaniam*), which is not worth arguing because it is based on a number of unproven assertions (*magis asserunt quam racionentur*). Albert dissociates from that nonsensical interpretation of *De anima* in a similar way (*non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum*, ch. 2.4.3). The assertion about the stupidity of the whole theory (*hac fantasia*) corresponds exactly to Albert’s characteristic of the *opinio Latinorum*; they do not at all pay attention to real sense of Aristotle’s texts (*nec verbis propriis attingunt*, ch. 2.4.3). Bacon directly called these theories a heresy, citing the previous philosophical and theological tradition concerning the unity of the soul, which Grosseteste represented. The existence of the new school is indirectly proved in Bacon’s harsh criticism in the early commentary on *Metaphysics* (*Quaestiones primae*), which takes the field against Rufus of Cornwall (Noone 1997, 253). At the end of the quotation, Bacon refers to Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* (1245). Bacon did not comment directly on this work, because he considered it complete nonsense. But this problematic work of Rufus must have been commented on *ex officio* by Alvernus or Albert from the title of magisters holding the post of *magister regens*. After their verdict, Rufus was likely to leave Paris and to return in Oxford (ch. 3.3.4). It is no wonder that a sharp quarrel broke out among the learned Franciscans. Most of them followed the modernist Rufus and his disciple Bonaventura. The modernist branch of Latin sophists solved the search for truth with Bacon’s internment and they forbade him to teach (OBJ III, ch. 4.2). In the next part of the quotation, Bacon clearly states that at the time of his master’s studies in Paris (about 1237–47), such claims would never have existed. Moreover, it would immediately become clear to any educated person that this is a heresy. Historical facts and the controversy between the first and second Averroism correspond to his opinion. In the years 1240–45, the philosopher and bishop Alvernus worked in Paris, and Albert the Great wrote his work *De homine* here. Before them, Blund’s school and Grosseteste had been already proclaiming the doctrine of the unity of the person. These top representatives of the first Averroism defended Averroes and his conception of the unity of the person according to the CMDA in connection with the Blund’s school and the first reception of Averroes around 1220–25. According to the Grosseteste’s interpretations of *De anima* written in Paris around 1225, and the second version already written in Oxford. With regard to interpretations of the soul and the definition of the person, those scholars belonged to the current of the first Averroism in Blund’s school . Grosseteste was an advocate of the plurality of forms in the soul. Therefore, he criticized the theory about the plurality of substances in man, which modern Aristotelian sophists had coined in Oxford after the year 1235. Bacon joined the tradition of thinking of the first Averroism and rejected philosophical innovators such as Rufus of Cornwall. In the late work devoted to the defense of Aristotelian science, Bacon already openly states that it was precisely Grosseteste, whose idiosyncratic and incorrect interpretation of Aristotle (*neglexit omnes libros Aristotelis...per experientiam propriam*) sent thinking on the dangerous path of Oxfordian Fallacy.[[356]](#footnote-356) Let us commemorate Averroes’s critique of Avicenna, who based the interpretation of Aristotle on the cognizing subject and not on the first substance (*quasi a se*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). Rufus was lecturing in Paris at the same time after 1235. He brought from Oxford to Paris the doubling of intellectual part of the soul as a quasi-form and quasi-substance according to Avicebron. This is evidenced in Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* (about 1245). After its publication he had to leave Paris. The above quote has shown that Bacon refuses a discussion with these people because of their blatant stupidity (*propter stulticie mangitudinem*). The quotation proves that in Oxford in the decade 1235–45 there was a change given by the introduction of the plurality of substances (and not forms) in man. Albert considered these representatives of *Latinorum* to be ridiculous thinkers. A true philosopher cannot seriously discuss the philosophy with them. The powers of modern chaos were just beginning to move in that time. Against them stood a group of critical and educated academics who supervised the teaching of the greatest Christian University. After its demise, after two World Wars and during the planetary destruction, there is nothing to be laughed at. Man as an individual has become the modern objective corpse. The chaos spread by academically educated Furies passed from the thinking of scholastic *illuminati* to the Anthropocene epoch. Bacon clearly indicates dubious theological authorities that this group used to support their claims.

“Avicenna and Averroes and all philosophers say the same thing and agree with the Christian belief that only the intelligible part of the soul was created in God’s image. Nothing stands against it, just some authorities of two books that are not even authentic, namely *De spiritu et anima* and *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*. Their author is not Augustine, as educated theologians know very well; even if others think that they were written by Augustine.” [[357]](#footnote-357)

Once again, we see that this group corresponds to Oxford masters and sources mentioned above. Buckfield and Rufus quoted that writings in defense of their theses. The criticized concept of the soul, abstraction and cognition corresponds to modernist school prevailing in Paris at that time. Gilson called that movement “*augustinisme avicennisant*.” Bacon cannot recognize the substantial multiplicity in man. From the theological standpoint it is a clear heresy, which, moreover, contradicts all Peripatetic philosophy. Now we pass to the key part of Bacon’s reasoning in the second part of *Distinccio tercia de anima*. It characterizes the teaching of these masters and the time of their emergence.

“Ten years ago, an erroneous and well-known person gave rise to the view that outside the rational soul there is a kind of specific substantial difference (*differencia substantialis specifica*), which is led out of the matter as potency (*educta de potencia materie*) and defines man as animal species. The intellectual part of the soul is not a component of this whole, but a special animalistic soul, which is assigned to common, generally given animality; made in that way, a new animalistic species came into being. But something like this stands in absolute contradiction with Aristotle’s philosophy and with all the known authorities.” [[358]](#footnote-358)

The new *species specialissima* in the form of the human animal soul (*anima sensitiva specialis*) divides the higher general genus by that specific difference. Moreover, this Porretan division is bound to Avicebron’s twofold matter (*addita ad naturam sensitivam animalis communem*). This can lead to a doubling of the atomic substance. Porretans, influenced by the doctrine of universal hylemorphism, added a new meaning to the classical definition of man given on the basis of abstraction. Bacon’s quotation says that Porretans work with a substance given in the mode of matter of the third kind and they derive the individual from it (*differencia substantialis specifica educta de potencia materie*). The unity of men becomes an absurd theater. New substantial nature of man is deduced from the matter of the third kind in the manner of Porretans. It is a form logically deduced from that objective matter (*educta*). As a result, the “human being” is created as a “species—body—substance” in the manner of Avicebron quasi-materially defined “form—species.” The modern *Nominales* as Rufus and Buckfield reintroduced Neoplatonic version of *Arbor Porhyriana* into categorical predication. They do not divide abstract universals in thinking, but substances and bodies of the third kind that are considered to be individuals. Bacon rejects a definition of man made by such species, since it should have established the individuality in the order of Porretan hypostases (*ponit hominem sub specie animalis*). According to such specific definition of modernists, the corpse can be a human being; but by no means in classical metaphysics, where the imposition of meaning comes from the first real substance.

Bacon claims in the quotation that “ten years earlier” a new form of substance was introduced by some “erroneous and well-known person.” This birth of objectivity and the modern subject, we must find in Rufus’s original text (ch. 3.3.4) and analyze it. Bacon’s criticism is clearly aimed at the definitions of man according to the then Oxford schools of Nominalists around the year 1240. Adam of Buckfield and Rufus of Cornwall are the first known authors at Oxford who changed the nature of the soul from form to substance. Both philosophers introduced a new definition of the soul on the basis of the plurality of substantial forms, which were defined by predication *per prius* running from the genus to the species. Buckfield applied to the determination of the soul Grosseteste’s difference between the substantial forms given in the realm of stellar forms and exemplars and the things in hylemorphic reality (*secundum complecionem et incomplecionem*).[[359]](#footnote-359) The higher form determines the lower form, which reflects the higher form on the lower level of reality. Rufus added the doctrine of universal hylemorphism to these Porretan definitions and created the first objective simulacrum of reality. In his commentary on *Sentences*, Rufus explicitly rejects the theory that the formal determinations of man are given only *intrinsece* in the soul, since they have but a potential and universal meaning. Since the species and the universals are hypostases and thus substances of the third kind, they define the human being from the outside as well as from the inside in a univocal way (*semper per unam viam procedunt ad esse*).[[360]](#footnote-360) The quotation of Rufus shows that first modernists combined the statute of the first and second substance, that is, the act of existence and its general meaning given in mind. To the division on the level of the individual made by Porphyry, they added the objective “exsistence” defined as a hypostatized act of rational or animalistic part of the soul (*sensus facit animal, racionale vero hominem*). As a result, the definition of man changed to a pluralism of substances, or rather to the pluralism of Porretan hypostases. The composition of man in the mode of universal hylemorphism of modern Porretans as Rufus, Alvernus described it in the criticism of the school of Grammarians (*compositum ex animali et quodam residuo*, ch. 2.3.2), Grosseteste rejected it in his criticism of Toletans as Gundissalinus. That is why Grosseteste is the author of the work *De anima et de potenciis eius* and that is why Bacon refers to him against the young students from Oxford that came to Paris for master’s studies around the year 1240. Grossetetste made the same criticism of these Oxforder modernists ten years earlier. This coincidence again confirms that the last defenders of early Averroism considered Grosseteste their fellow traveler. But in the next decade, when Bacon wrote his work *Distinccio tercia de anima* about 1255, the representatives of Oxfordian Fallacy in the Franciscan College were already in charge and not Grosseteste (†1253). He had resided as bishop in Lincoln since the year 1235. Dominican Kilwardby perhaps became rector of Oxford as early as 1245, because he had to leave Paris at the same time as Rufus. This would reliably explain the consolidated power of modernists at Oxford until 1250 that Bacon criticized in his commentary on *De anima*. Let us return to the use of Augustine made by Porretans. Bacon rightly considers the quoted writings as inauthentic. Philip the Chancellor and the entire school of later *Nominales* starting with Rufus stood on authorities who regarded the soul as an independent substance with regard to the body (Augustine, Nemesius, Alcher of Clairvaux, Alfred of Sareshel). This indication is important; hermeneutics of objectivity can prove the merger of both schools of the second Averroism in the years 1240–45. The group of *Nominales* as Avicennian followers adopted Avicebron′s universal hylemophism and they came from Oxford to Paris about 1235. They joined the school of *Grammatici* that had been systematically teaching in Paris since 1230. That school of Modernists took up metaphysics of Avicenna made *ad mentem Averrois* according to Toledo school to mix that modernism with already dying schools of *Logica Modernorum*. This gave rise to the resulting current of the second Averroism, which Alvernus cites as *sophistae Latini*. Albert knows them under the name *Latini* or *doctores Latini*. The schools around Alexander Hales and Philippe Chancellor in Paris made it possible to synthesize the two schools of Aristotelian Avicennism that had developed in Oxford and Paris. This first group of *via Modernorum* appeared at the University of Paris in 1235–40 ; those *illuminati* caused a real consternation among Parisian scholars of the time. The main founders of modernism were Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventura. Those learned sophists publicly lost the first round of academic competition with the representatives of the first Averroism. Modernists no longer lost the second round (1255). In the third round, those Modernists, led by the dogmatically educated Furies, completely destroyed the representatives of common sense (1277). In the period 1240–45, the University of Paris became a stage for historical events, in which objectivity became disclosed as *veritas* in the school of second Averroism. Alexander Hales gathered a number of new thinkers as he was the magister regens of theology at the University of Paris after joining the Order of Franciscans (1236). He gradually handed over the Faculty of Theology to them, as they edited his work *Summa Halensis*. In this environment the second averroism was born and it was connected with the plurality of substantial forms in man. This synthesis was presented around the year 1236 by Johannes of Rupella in the work *Summa de anima* cited above (ch. 2.3.1). However, the academic school of *Modernorum* originated in Oxford and not in Paris. Bishop Alvernus did not allow the group of Neoplatonic *sequaces Aristotelis* to proclaim the plurality of substances in man at a Christian university, which, moreover, they tied in with the universal hylemorphism and the *intellectus agens* of cosmic spheres. The victory of chaotic Aristotelianism in the modernized version previously made by David of Dinant is possible only today in the academic world, namely after the victory of the Cartesian group of *Modernorum*. Cartesian postmodernists connect their substantial soul and body through the innate idea of God as a cosmic intelligible *cause* of the third kind, which, moreover, is directly considered in their own thinking as a Platonic innate idea. The contemporary nihilistic version of Cartesianism transformed this humanistic nonsense into pure animality. It is presented as a collection of scientific findings in the field of cognitive neurosciences. This approach corresponds to Rufus’s definition of man in the mode of universal hylemorphism (*educta de potencia materie*), criticized by Bacon. With regard to the unity of the person in the second Averroism, hermeneutic approach distinguishes the phase of the plurality of forms in man (since 1230); then the phase of plurality of substances in man that started after 1240 in the framework of universal hylemorphism. To the being of the third kind, which was already given at Oxford as Grosseteste’s exemplar, Avicebron’s twofold matter is added as another kind of *tertium ens*. Introduction of universal hylemorphism established a new division of Porretan hypostases done in Porphyry’s Tree. This sophistry is clearly described in Bacon’s quotation above (*ponit hominem sub specie animalis*). The plurality of substances in man was completed around the year 1250, when, according to Bacon, the quasi-substantial division arose on the basis of Avicebron’s matter of the third kind (*differencia substantialis specifica educta de potencia materie*).

Bacon′s treatises testify to the emergence of the modern individual in three phases, which are linked to each other in the history of philosophy. In the first phase, the Porretan division of hypostases is linked to scientific cognition within the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. In the second phase, the universal hylemorphism of soul and intellect appears, which is linked to new interpretations of *De anima*. This modern “humanism” had been known at Oxford since 1235, when Grosseteste rejected this Augustinian Aristotelianism for the first time. In the third phase, young modernists left Oxford to study for their master's degrees in Paris. They joined the local school of Latin avicennists, who published the writing *Summa Halensis*. This group was gradually enlarged because of their *apaideusía* concerning the profound misunderstanding of writing *De anima* et CMDA. From 1240 onwards we can summarize the first representatives of *via Modernorum*, which consisted of these groups: the school of *Grammatici* criticized by Alvernus; extinct schools of *Logica Modernorum*; Avicennists from the circle of Philip the Chancellor; Parisian Franciscans who joined Bonaventure to publish *Summa Halensis*; Oxford Franciscans who professed their allegiance to Rufus; modernist Dominicans who gathered around Kilwardby. At the end of the journey of the first latins *Modernorum*, the objective individual thing and the definition of the person given as an objective *individuum* are created, in Rufus’s writing *Speculum animae* (1245). The concept of matter according to Rufus’s objective version of universal hylemorphism can be found in Bonaventura’s first commentary on the Sentences, which was published around the year 1252 (OBJ III, ch. 4.1). Bonaventura established two orders of being according to the hylemorphic matter and the new quasi-matter, see his term *materia spiritualis*. According to Bacon, this is nonsense, because the individual defined within the framework of universal hylemorphism would produce a simulacrum of the first substance. We find a similar criticism of *Latini* in Albert’s works (ch. 2.4.3). If we refer the specification of “*opinio per hominem erroneum et famosum*” to the situation of modernists in Paris around the year 1245, then Rufus and the local Franciscan school led by Bonaventure in Paris were the target of Bacon’s criticism.

“Due to ignorance of both previous topics, many of them adhere to the thesis that the dead Caesar is a human being and that the dead man is an animal, that Christ was a human being in the Triduum [i.e., after death and before the resurrection]; there are gross errors and stupid things like that which concern the limitation and the use of concepts in propositions, and in addition, they concern the contingency, the necessity, etc.” [[361]](#footnote-361)

The quotation shows criticism of modernists that was made by representatives of the first Averroism. The first case was the confrontation about the sophism concerning the dead man, which is mentioned in the treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ch. 2.2.1). Bacon rejects the nominal definitions in the realm of metaphysics, since they are situated beyond the categorical predication. The former is based on the existence and on the causality of first substances in reality. As a corpse, Caesar cannot be a human being that is given by the imposition of meaning coming from the real substance. Something else is the syngategorematic predication of verbs in the past and present, which proceed grammatically from the correctly determined imposition, which was already the case with Abelard (ch. 1.3). Hermeneutics also located the question of contingency and necessity of future events (*circa necessitate et contingencias*), mentioned and rejected by Bacon, in Grosseteste’s logic and his determination of future contingent events (ch. 3.1.2). The quotation covers the entire netherworld of Oxford’s modernism, including the schools of Porretans, which were criticized by Bishop Alvernus in the term *Grammatici* (ch. 2.3.2). In his last work, *Compendium studii theologiae* (1292), Bacon also considers the religious brother Rufus to be the author of the most important theological and philosophical errors, which led to the decline of theology in the 13th century. Rufus of Cornwall was *spiritus movens* of the second Averroism until about the year 1250, when he had to leave Paris. The indication of one historical event that was fundamental for the emergence of Western objectivity, follows in Bacon’s *Compendium* right after the quoted part.

“I knew the author of these gravest and stupider mistakes very well. His name was Richard of Cornwall and he was very well known in the group of [modernist] fools. But among the wise people, he was thought to be a madman, and was condemned in Paris for the errors he invented and announced when he solemnly read the *Sentences* here, and also afterwards, when he taught the *Sentences* from the year 1250 at Oxford.” [[362]](#footnote-362)

Let us recall that this testament of Bacon’s thought, written towards the end of his life, was edited by the last representatives of declining school of the first Averroism. They had a whole history of disputes before their eyes. The quoted year 1250, when Rufus began to teach his sentences at Oxford, can be considered the official birth date of *via Modernorum*. According to Bacon, Rufus is the author of fatal errors that he produced during his stay in Paris (*reprobatus Parisius propter errores quos invenerat*). Bacon recalls that Rufus’s theses were condemned by a number of wise men who considered them philosophically insane (*apud sapientes fuit insanus*). These wise men certainly included William of Auvergne, philosopher, theologian, bishop and the critic of Latin sophists and Albert the Great. Rufus and Kilwardby certainly belonged to the group of *Latinorum*, which Albert knew from his studies in Paris since the year 1240. The following chapter interprets these “worst and stupidest mistakes” that Rufus had made during his studies in Paris. Their research is of fundamental importance because Rufus’s first stay in Paris up to the year 1250 established modern objectivity. Rufus then continued to teach the new doctrine as *sententiarius* at Oxford (after 1250) and later as Parisian magister and regens of the local Franciscan College (1253–55). This is exactly the time when the major controversy broke out between the secular magisters in the Rue du Fouarre and their mendicant counterparts (ch. 3.3.2). Bacon certainly knew very well what he was talking about. His first stay at the University of Paris is documented around the years 1237–47, when Rufus, Kilwardby and Albert lectured here.[[363]](#footnote-363) In addition, the credibility of Bacon’s remarks on the disputes of the years 1270–77 is now proved, see analysis of his writing *Communia naturalium* (Hackett 1997a). Instead of the *ad hominem* contemporary commentaries devoted to Bacon’s temperament, it is necessary to analyze the philosophical background of his criticism. Aristotelian Bacon, in accordance with Parisian masters of the first Averroism, considered Rufus’s teaching to be insane (*insanus*). However, he could boast a great success among poorly educated Parisian students.

Bacon alludes to Rufus’s disputes at the University of Paris, which can be considered a *terminus post quem* of the dispute over the interpretation of Aristotle’s corpus between the first and the second Averroism. Albert repeats that vehement criticism directed at the address of erroneously learned Latins doctors around 1255, when he writes the commentary on *De anima* and introduces the monumental interpretation of *Corpus Aristotelicum* (ch. 2.4.3). The same situation is repeated two decades later, as evidenced by the concluding words of Thomas Aquinas in his polemical treatise *De unitate intellectus* (1270) against the next wave of modern nominalists (*de falsi nominis scientia*). Thomas directed the treatise against the unnamed Parisian Magister, who was self-confident in front of the philosophical bunglers who were unable to judge such complicated questions (*coram pueris qui nesciunt de tam arduis iudicare*; ed. Leonina 43, p. 314.436). Aquinas’s criticism was no longer directed at Rufus or Bonaventure, but at their Parisian successors from the school of second Averroism. This was Pecham as *magister regens*. The academic representatives of *Modernorum* worked in Paris around the year 1270 in a manner similar to that of contemporaries called *sophistae Latini* or Rufus’s famosity “*apud stultam multitudinem*.” Defeated modernist Pecham had to leave Paris in 1271 and he moved to Oxford, just as did Rufus before him at the latest in 1250. Similar accusations against the new type of sophists can be found at that time, see, for example, Gerard of Aberville or Nicolas of Lisieux (Libera 2004, 522). These secular masters from the Rue du Fouarre led the campaign against mendicant modernists. Similar errors that destroyed the unity of philosophy and theology (*quasi due contrarie veritates*) were adopted by “numerous students at the artistic faculty of the University of Paris” (*nonnulli parisius studentes in artibus*). That sentence was taken from the introduction of the well-known Condemnation of the 219 errors by the Parisian Bishop Etienne of March 7, 1277. Bishop Étienne's decision was made in the exemplary mode of modern sophistry, which was conducted by academic Furies in the mode “*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*.” If there were modernists among the artists in the Rue de Fouarre, they would have failed the first test in interpreting the scripture *De anima*, which they were required to know according to the Sicilian interpretation of CMDA. According to Bacon, the Mendicant faculty of modernists taught literally “mad” doctrines, of which the school of the first Averroism was accused. As can be seen, the manipulated trial of the first nominalist modernists against the Aristotelian Abélard had another aftermath, worthy of the school named *sophistae Latini*. Let us recall the original source of this “madness,” which was first recorded in the work *Fons philosophiae*, which parodied the world according to *Nominales* (*solus hoc crediderit mentis alienus*, ch. 1.6.). We need to examine the main source of academic horror that concerned chaotic teachings of modernists. The school of connoisseurs of the first Averroism decried those errors for a decade. Rufus and some of his contemporaries, such as Adam of Buckfield and Kilwardby, confirmed verbally Aristotle’s scheme of cognition determined by real first substances. During their studies in Paris, they added to Aristotelianism given by Averroes’s commentaries, the Neoplatonic metaphysics of *Nominales* and the univocal *Logica Modernorum*, to crown the whole chaos by introducing universal hylemorphism. No moderate Avicennist à la Philipp the Chancellor or Alexander Hales dared to produce such a sophistic nonsense. Rufus’s lectures since 1240 show that Aristotelian nominalists integrated the Commentator into Avicennian scheme of metaphysics through Porretan universal hylemorphism. The most important Franciscan modernists gathered around the editorial office of the work *Summa Halensis*. They needed the harmonization of Averroes’s Aristotelianism in the mode of the Toledo school with Avicennism of transcendentalia (Parisian branch of modernism) and with the teaching of Porretans associated with universal hylemorphism (Oxfordian branch of modernism). This sophistic creativity of *Modernorum* combined all errors into a tragic mix of nonsense. Their better educated colleagues considered it to be a philosophically insane doctrine. After Rufus’s departure to Oxford, Bonaventure continued the attacks on Averroes that Rufus started around the year 1236. Grosseteste considered ridiculous Rufus’s interpretation of Aristotle taken sophistically *ad mentem Averrois* in the paradigm of Avicennism and Neoplatonism. Therefore, he condemned these modern thinkers for their admirable blindness and puffiness (*mira cecitate et presumcione*, ch. 3.1.3). Bacon’s analysis confirms that point. After the criticism of Grosseteste about 1235, the modernist Rufus had to leave Oxford and was sent to Paris for a master’s studies. The first synthesis of modern objectivity can be dated in Rufus’s academic impact as a *sententiarius* at the Franciscan College in Paris to the year 1250 and to the emergence of Bonaventura’s commentary on the Second book of *Sentences* (about 1252). Bonaventura founded the Parisian school of second Averroism in an ideological and institutional manner (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). Albert gives this group the ironic title *Averroistae* sometime around the year 1255 when he wrote the commentary on *De anima* by completing his previous writings on the unity of the person and human cognition. At the same time, Bacon was writing the above-quoted commentary on the third book of *De anima* (*Distinccio tercia de anima*) directed against the Oxford′s branch of modernists. The first Averroism cannot accept any entity of the third kind, because it should have abolished the true recognition of reality and turned man into a modern corpse. Like Albert, Bacon recognized clearly that the source of flawed cognition in the school of the second Averroism is an erroneous interpretation of the central part of *Second Analytics* that modernists presented in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The indirect founder of the second Averroism, Robert Grosseteste was appointed bishop of Lincoln in 1235 and from 1240 reformed the Oxford University from the economic side and reorganized the study system. His activity is followed by another important figure of the second Averroism, Robert Kilwardby, rector of Oxford University and Archbishop of Canterbury. These connections confirm that the whole dispute between the first and the second Averroism concerning the unity of the person escalated at Oxford sometime in 1235 and continued after Rufus’ arrival in Paris. The writing *Contra Averroem* published about 1236 is an important witness to the emergence of Averroist simulacrum of Averroes. Grosseteste could not allow such a sophistical and erroneous interpretation of the Commentator to be lectured at Oxford. The attack on the CMDA would have legitimized the doctrine of the plurality of substances in man. No Christian University at those times could tolerate such inhuman modernist doctrine. Therefore, due to the decision of the Franciscan Order, Rufus moved to Paris to complete his master’s studies there. On the other hand, he received a certain protection since he was unknown in Paris. At that time, a head-on collision occurred in Paris between the Sicilian and the Toledo school, which interpreted the Commentator’s writing CMDA. The conflict culminates with Rufus’s unsuccessful defense of his original interpretation of *De anima* around the year 1245. The first modernist school of mendicants was dissolved to this date in both religious schools of Dominicans and Franciscans. The accomplished magister Kilwardby is the first to go back from Paris to Oxford, followed by unfortunate Rufus without a magister degree (1250). At that time, only Bonaventura held up the flag of Parisian modernists, since he was about to finish his master’s studies. In the decade after the year 1250, the second reception of Averroes begins, which has different features than the first wave analyzed by Salman, Gauthier and other connoisseurs of the Middle Ages (OBJ III, ch. 4). The entire initial dispute between the first and the second Averroism in the period from 1230 to 1240 belongs to the turbulent period of the Paris University after the riots and the strike in 1229. The mendicant orders rejected the strike of secular magisters and founded their own studies after the year 1231. Dominican Roland of Cremona was the first mendicant master of theology at the University of Paris. The religious studies were soon opened to secular students, which caused further tension between the diocesan and religious magisters. The dispute between the first and second Averroism unleashed a new round of gigantomachy around the substance dated to the years 1255 and 1277.

Hermeneutics of objectivity is interested in that “insane” way of thinking (Bacon *dixit*). Modern sophists raised potency to the level of actualized being and at the same time raised the accident to the level of substance. The advent of modernity shows Rufus’s commentary on *Second Analytics*, which we supplement with corresponding texts in Rufus’s commentary on *Metaphysics* and on *De anima*. He wrote them very probably at the beginning of his studies in Paris. The key problem for the school of the first Averroism was the radical form of Oxfordian Fallacy, which Rufus imported from Oxford to Paris. The eclipse of the first substance occurred due to wrongly conceived causality in the middle link of the deductive proof. Let us now repeat Bacon’s exact position on the ontological statute of causality from his commentary on *Metaphysics*, which was written around the year 1245 (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*). The categorical predication in scientific judgment follows the imposition of hyparchical causality to form a metaphysical type of universal predication. The introduction of causality into the middle link of scientific deductive syllogism distinguished this type of metaphysical necessity in the causally determined predication from formal categorical signification based on logical necessity. That kind of second substance can be predicated as an essence, see the example of the definition of the triangle according to *Second Analytics*. However, the essence is not capable of a causal effect in reality according to the metaphysical dative, since its being is given only in thinking of the cognizing subject.

“In the third way, we say that the formally determined entity is neither actually nor potentially represented in real things, but solely by causality. This generality is given by real causality and not by the formal predication (*hoc est universale per causalitatem et non per predicationem formalem*), and this universality is not [logically] predicable (*tale universale est non-predicabile*).” [[364]](#footnote-364)

The predication based on the causality of the middle link of the judgment states the real causality of the first substance. This predication is not a formally given predication that is stated in the framework of logical abstraction. The imposition of causality in the deductive proof could not be done in the framework of Porretan predication of *Categories*, which was widespread at that time and made use of hypostatized *predicabilia* (ch. 3.1.2). Bacon does not allow the universal notion to be a substitute as *tertium ens* for real causality. It was the case in the second Averroism and Oxford’s modernists. The necessity given by the real causality makes the imposition of the meaning. The truth as correspondence is established in that way. There is, on the one hand, *per se* necessary reality of things; on the other hand, there is the necessity that arises through universal predication. The necessity *per se* of the first substance establishes the necessity of the second substance in universal predication (*in pluribus formaliter, set solum causaliter*). In this way, the first triad of metaphysical principles of knowledge connects with the second triad of logical principles. The universal scientific definition of the eclipse is given because the eclipse actually occurred. Therefore, scientific predication refers to univocal categorical relations when the imposition of meaning is taken from real effects of first substances predicted by the middle link of syllogism (*hoc est universale per causalitatem*). The primary causality of first substances is predicated in the scientific proof according to the hyparchical mode cited above (*Anal. Post.* 84a13). The first hyparchical substance then correctly carries the universal subject of the statement (ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, *Anal. Post.* 84a14). Bacon clearly sees that causality in the middle link of the judgment is neither a first substance nor the resulting universal essence given in the conclusion. The predication of real causality follows the action of the first substance (ἐν τῷ τί) in the metaphysical dative (ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν). The deduction in the scientific proof differs in that way from general statements related to the formal essence of the triangle. Given its necessity as formal one, cognition of logic, geometry and mathematics proceed at the level of logical abstraction, where hyparchical being of universals is given in thinking (*Anal. Post.* 84a14). Therefore, the predication of generically different natural sciences must go to actual actions of first substances in the mode of the metaphysical dative. Only in this case the universality of the deductive judgment is given *univoce* and causally, i.e., in the mode of categorical imposition of real causality based on effects of real first substances. Once again, the dualism between Albert’s principle “*ex inmediatis*” and Grosseteste’s principle “*inmediate*” is at play. The dispute concerns the primacy of the first triad of the principles of cognition of *Second Analytics* that the interpretation of Oxfordian Fallacy canceled. The univocity between the real causality and the formal predication makes consider the cause as logical essence (see Bonaventura’s *ratio causalitatis*; OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). According to Bacon, such kind of predication is not possible. These are two different orders of cognition. They are described as Aristotle’s difference between the universality predicted by hyparchical existence of the first substances and the universality of logical abstractions given as hyparchical entities in thinking. Metaphysically, it is about two different orders of being, which the correspondence theory of truth must accurately distinguish. Bacon, like Albert and Alvernus, rejected the modernist worldview made through Oxfordian Fallacy, because he considered it insane. Therefore, he rejected the univocal, formal predication given in mathematics for the scientific judgment about real causality. Mathematics cannot determine the causality of real substances, because their relations are given only due to logical abstraction. At the same time, Bacon rejected the analogical or even univocal theory of *Modernorum*. So-called scientific recognition of the second Averroism brings the two different universal species into correspondence, according to Avicebron’s pattern. The one species is predicted in the pure form, after which its contingent occurrence is established in the hylemorphic composition. The first Averroism did not allow syncretism in the cognition of the first substance. Bishop Alvernus demonstrated for the first time by separating Averroes’s interpretation of metaphysics from Neoplatonic *sequaces Aristotelis*, which were influenced by Avicenna’s metaphysics (ch. 2.3.1). It should be noted that discernment between the different types of Aristotelianism was very difficult for scholars for many reasons in the years 1230–50. Only the best of them were capable to complete this task. Therefore, modern Furies finally won the victory. After authoritarian interventions at the universities, there were no more critical Aristotelians left. The ever-new and interesting philosophical and sophistic mythological tales, which was practiced in the mode of cultural hegemony (OBJ III, ch. 4.6), attracts academic adolescents of all kinds (*stultam multitudinem*) much more than critical thinking. Since ancient times, this thinking has been following the musical path of one wisdom, which is given by the cosmic orbit of the Sun. In Plato’s cave, it is possible to virtually simulate all sorts of academically funny and interesting narratives; the modern odyssey of chaotic thinking can go absolutely everywhere under the whip of “gay science” made by Furies.

The harmonization between Aristotle and Plato was a very complicated thing for the Latins, see the thinking of Falsafa in Alfarabi and Averroes. The work *Liber de Causis* and other Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle, which had been handed down from Byzantine and Arabic sources, were regarded as authentic writings of the *Corpus*. Most authors of the 13th century considered Avicenna’s philosophy to be an authentic successor of Aristotle. They were mainly influenced by the Toledo school. The synthesis of Plato and Aristotle was not a real problem until the year 1220. Aristotelianism passed into Avicennianism, and this mixture dominated the epoch undisturbed by the other currents of Scholasticism. Philosophical opponents consisted only in Boethius’s interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus in the version of the Blund’s school that uphold the tradition linked to Abelard. We have shown this situation by the conflict of two schools, whose representatives were Abelard and Anselm. Then Averroes entered the scene with his original theory of intellectual cognition based on the primacy of the first substance. This interpretation was clearly defended by the Sicilian school in connection with biological works of Aristotle. During the years 1230–40, scholastic masters unanimously recognized the genius of the scholar from Córdoba as the authentic Commentator. According to Gauthier and other authors, this fact constitutes the essence of the first Averroism. The first connoisseurs from the school of the first Averroism, such as perhaps the still living Blund, but certainly Alvernus and early Grosseteste made a fundamental distinction between Neoplatonic and Aristotelian interpretation of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* according to the Toletan and Sicilian school. Established in the order of critical and brilliant thinking, this epochal event (*Ereignis*) saved Aristotelian concepts of science and the substantial unity of man for the Latin West. Let us remind that, according to the CMDA, a single lover of wisdom is sufficient for the historical existence of the *alētheia*. That real first existing substance can generate true sense of being for entire confused humanity. Divine Muses value wisdom in the maximum way, whereas the punitive academic Furies have to lead all blind objectivists at once as one modern individual subject. The dispute between the first and the second Averroism is documented in the second decade of the Latin reception of Sicilian and Toletan interpretations of Averroes. The place of the dispute between the first Averroists and the modernists in the years 1240–45 was the Paris University. Modernists lost this first round until the year 1255. That is why they imposed an objective *damnatio memoriae* on this defeat. The touchstone of the division between the second and the first Averroism was the statute of the possible and the active intellect as an integral faculty of the soul according to the CMDA. The second Averroism produced two intellectual substances (*intellectus possibilis, agens*). Modernists then tried in vain to somehow connect these substances given in the mode of the intellect as *inmixtus* with the body as another substance. The arrival of dualistic and Averroist interpretation of Aristotle is indirectly proved in translations of *Nicomachean Ethics* at that time. The versions of the Toledo school were influenced by Averroes.[[365]](#footnote-365) We will analyze the conflict over the status of practical intellect and political rationality at the end of the work (OBJ III, ch. 6.2). Aristotelian Avicennists and first modern Cartesians took over Proclus’s and Avicenna’s teaching on the two faces of the soul (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Cognition directs the thinking illuminated from the separated active intellect and not from the material thing that shapes sensual cognition. The Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle’s dual conception of the soul are based on the *Ethica Vetus* (Burgundio of Pisa c. 1150), from which emerged the quoted *reportatio* of the lectures of the unknown master from Paris.[[366]](#footnote-366) Although cognition begins with the senses, it has full autonomy with regard to sensually formed object in the phantasm. A similar dualist style is also used in the commentary on *Ethics* by the unknown master, which was written around the year 1235 and is based on the interpretation of *De anima* according to Avicenna (*Commentaire d’Avranches*). The anonymous writer takes up Avicenna’s *Liber de anima* I.5 after Gundissalinus’s translation and interpretation (*duae vires sive duo intellectus sunt animae rationali quasi duae facies*; Buffon 2007, 104). The second part of the soul has a purely contemplative and mystical character, which is turned to God as the highest Good, from where all the wisdom refreshing the soul is generated (*respiciat sursum ad contemplandum suum superius quod est Deus*, ibid). These interpretations of *Ethics* according to the paradigm of the Toledo school follows the solar intellect. They have an Avicennian character and they influenced in a fundamental way modern interpretations of *De anima* around the year 1240. The being is enlightened in the intellect of modern Porretans and Avicennists from the direction of separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. Albert writes the magnificent work *De homine* against these interpretations of *Ethics* done in the school of the second Averroism.

The arrival of Averroes’s commentaries from the Sicilian school transformed the Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle in several directions. The previous chapters have shown that in the years 1225–30 a new paradigm of cognition and truth emerges in the first Averroism, which integrates Averroes’s comments of the *Corpus* in critical attitude to the Toledo school. This “Sicilian Aristotle” had already been partly introduced by Blund’s school in the version of both anonymous writings on *De anima*, which had been written by Grosseteste (1225) and Alvernus (1230). During this time, the lectures and translations of Scotus after the year 1230 confirmed the new reading of the Commentator. Averroes became the *philosophus nobilissimus* for Alvernus and the whole school of the first Averroism, because he uphold unity of the real person and worked with the complete project of unified “meta-physics” based on the primacy of the first substance. Aristotle’s ingenious Commentator turned the perspective of cognition back to reality. The intellect is exposed in the mode *per prius* from the direction of the first substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The basis of interpretation of the second Averroism after the Toledo school is mainly Averroes’s commentary on *Physics* and on *De caelo*, which supplemented Avicenna’s cosmology. The Sicilian school relied on Averroes’s *Great commentary on* *De anima* and the *Great commentary on* *Metaphysics*. They carefully read Aristotle’s biological treatises on the cognition and life of animals, because they justified the understanding of *De anima* by the correct procedure of reading from the first and second books to the third. The mystical modernity of Toletan *illuminati* and later Cartesians do not have to worry about the living organisms. Their existence is objectively summarized under the specification of the corpse, which explains the extermination camps of the 20th century. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, man has become a virtual, digitized fata-morgana. This is demonstrated by crises caused by financial derivatives and by current disinterest of global elites in devastating effects of their own making. The example of bishop Alvernus showed the first case of successful distinction between Averroes and *sequaces Aristotelis*, whether in Falsafa or in Scholasticism. Modernist followers of Neoplatonic Aristotle defended the Neoplatonic interpretation of *Corpus* and defined the soul of man by separated *intellectus agens* (ch. 2.3.1). If any scholastic in the years 1235–40 acknowledged a fundamental difference between Averroes and Avicenna, then he did away with the Neoplatonism and its ontotheological model of being of the third kind. The best interpretation of Averroes and *De anima* has been done in the first Averroism based on the Blund’s school; however, the modern sophists distorted the interpretation of its founder. During the interpretation of *Second Analytics*, Grosseteste wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics*, which helped him to define the unity of the first substance in terms of *anima intellectiva*. In his seventh book, the first quotation from Averroes’s commentary on *Physics*, which has been known in the West since 1225, is documented (McEvoy 2000, 85). But the interpretation of *Second Analytics* was already written in the style of Oxfordian Fallacy, although Grosseteste was aware of the basic problem that analytical interpretation brought about (*aliquantum obscura*). The reception of Averroes at Oxford is attested according to the paradigm of the Toledo school. Let us see quoted Adam of Buckfield, the first Oxford commentator of *De anima*. His work *Sentencia super librum de anima* contains paraphrases of the CMDA, but these were interpreted in the framework of Averroism influenced by Avicenna (Callus 1939, 422). Callus’s study on plurality of substantial forms shows that the criticism of Albert directed at “*quiddam Latinorum philosophorum*” in his work *De anima* directly concerns Buckfield’s commentary on *De anima* (ibid, p. 431). The followers of the first Averroism, such as Albert and others, rejected the definition of *intellectus possibilis* proposed by those first Latin modernists. Following Neoplatonists and Avicenna, they connected univocal and nominal species with the concept of the substantial intellect.

Let’s look at the key point where arose an objective homogeneity of the world. The dualistic conception of man came into being at the moment when the exposure of being came from the *absolute* given *intellectus agens*, i.e., without attachment to the receptive *intellectus possibilis*. Following Avempace, Albert’s commentary on *De anima* connects this dualism with authors of Neoplatonic Falsafa.

“Avempace, who came after them, added to this that the person defined by the intellect has two abilities: the first human is given in that it recognizes through phantasms. The second ability is already divine in nature, because it is the trace of separated cosmic intelligences. The intellect based on human faculties understands the concepts taken from matter; through the divine faculty, it understands the separated intelligible forms.” [[367]](#footnote-367)

After the introduction of Avempace’s strong intellect, its doubling occurred (*homo secundum intellectum habet duas vires*). The weak intellect remained bound to cognition given by abstraction from bodily phantasms (*in quantum colligatur phantasmatibus*). The enlightenment starts from the first substance, but it requires only the weak (*debilis*) intellect. It represents Grosseteste’s concept of science as Aristotelian *scientia*. The strong mythological intelligence of *Modernorum* guided by the Furies is in search of traces of the original separate forms that can be found in creation (*vestigium intelligentiae separatae*), following the pattern of Bonaventura and other mystics of modernity. Those *illuminati* need not to study the process of abstraction, where the *species intelligibilis* are formed and where the cognition starts on the level of bodily senses that apprehend real first substances. In the model of *illuminati*, the *intellectus possibilis* became merely a contingent realization of the direct insight into hyparchical forms. They were created by the subsistent and separated *intellectus agens*. During the years 1230–35, the first foundations of a new metaphysics were created, which was explicitly given in the context of the later *via Modernorum*. Due to the integration of the universal hylemorphism into the Avicennian school of *Nominales* in Oxford and Paris, a new movement arose about 1240, which we have called the second Averroism. This school emerged from Avicennism and established an objective sense of being that transcended the limits of Avicenna’s metaphysics. The emergence of the second Averroism indicates the campaign of Bacon and Albert against the nominalist contemporaries. Parisian bishop Alvernus called them by generic designation *sophistae Latini*. The modern sophists in Paris and Oxford inspired Albert and Bacon to interpret the authentic thinking of Aristotle and the Commentator. Albert called the actions of these *Latinorum* “fairy tales” and Bacon “madness.” Bishop Alvernus condemned similar errors at the University of Paris by separating the cosmic and the human *intellectus agens*. Alvernus’s best students, Albert and Bacon, then spent another two decades defending the authentic message of Aristotle’s *Corpus* against modern sophists. Through this epochal act, which followed Aristotle’s writing *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, they founded the authentic project of Western science, which was based on true Aristotelianism of *Second Analytics*. Albert and Bacon completed the third matrix of objectivity, which was given by the emergence of the first Averroism. Their defense of the first Averroism opened the next round of gigantomachy. The new round of dispute about objectivity begins after the departure of bishop Alvernus (†1249) and is given by the beginning of Rufus’s lecturing at Oxford in 1250. He officially taught the first version of the modern *Sentences*. The bachelors at the Artistic faculty in Rue du Fouarre already read Aristotle’s *De anima* as a compulsory reading and under their influence they complete the master’s commentaries on the *Sentences*. Important protagonists of the dispute over Averroism were Franciscan Bonaventura of Bagnoreggio (†1274) and the subsequent school of *Modernorum* under the leadership of Pecham. On the other side of the philosophical front there were two fundamentally different Aristotelians, Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas.

## 3.3 Objective Nature of Essence (Rufus of Cornwall)

The modern gigantomachy concerning objective substance emerged around the year 1170, when Averroes began to comment on Aristotle’s most important treatises in an original way and launched a fundamental criticism of Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī. In the Latin West, Avicenna’s reception started in the Toledo school. Latin scholasticism adopted the vision of Avicennist substance done in the Falsafa and reshaped it into the objective form of metaphysics. The preceding chapters have shown how Neoplatonic traditions influenced by Avicenna were taken up by *Nominales* and in Porretan logical schools. This analysis coincides in part with Gilson’s terminus “*augustinisme avicennisant*.” Around the year 1230, the second Averroism introduced new interpretation of *Categories* and changed the nature of scientific cognition in *Second Analytics*. Hermeneutic archaeology is mainly interested in the way how the sense of being is exposed in the field of original *Lichtung* that produced new formes of Western metaphysics. Coming from this place of historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*), truth and untruth of Averroism emerged as the fundamental error of metaphysics (*Irrtum*) and founded the historicity (*Geschichte*) of the objective worldview. Positivist history of philosophy (*Historie*) follows the path of *tertium ens* that made the history of objective effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). The transformation of history follows the triple transformation of truth from divine *a/lētheia* of Muses to *alētheia* of the first philosophy a finally to *veritas* of metaphysics. It ended in Western objective nihilism of “post-truths.” Approximately in the year 1230, a new form of metaphysics emerged in the Latin West that was composed of several schools. They took up gigantomachy of the Falsafa already in decline. The most important school was authentic interpretation of Averroes according to the Sicilian school. The archaeology of objectivity distinguishes four different currents in the reception of Averroes in the Latin West, according to the historiality given in the *Geviert*, from where new forms of thinking of Western metaphysics emanated (ch. 3). First: the Avicennism was given in the school of Porretans and Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle elaborated in the framework of nominalistic *Logica Modernorum* that bishop Alvernus rejected (*sophistae Italici, Grammatici*). Second: Blund’s school introduced the classical Aristotelianism by elaborating a new interpretation of *De anima* in the line of Boethius and Abelard (*Logica Vetus*, classical metaphysics). Third: the first Averroism was brought into being after the critical reception of Averroes coming from the Toledo school. The work *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ca. 1225) was integrated in the school of the first Averroism of Sicilian provenance present in works of Alvernus, Albert and Bacon. Fourth: the second Averroism started in Grosseteste’s analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*, which the school of first modernists linked to universal hylemorphism. The modernism given in this form started to be propagated in Oxford and in Paris about 1235. In Oxford, modernism took root because Grosseteste went to Lincoln as a bishop, in Paris as well, because the Oxford modernist Rufus came there for studies. His interpretation influenced the following generation, which interpreted Averroes’s writing in the mode of the Toledo school according to Avicennist nominalism and universal hylemorphism. Alvernus and Albert rejected such ideas (*sophistae Latini, doctores Latini*). Bacon as the best interpreter of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* around the year 1245 called new doctrines coming from Oxford to be heretical and insane (*insaniunt contra veritatem*). The commentaries on *Second Analytics* and *De anima* reveal complicated history of reception of both Aristotle and Averroes. They manifest basic events of thinking (*Ereignis*) that shaped the historicity of the West. Gigantomachy between the first and the second Averroism makes the intersection of both diagonals that connect four points in *Geviert* of Western historicity. The eclipse of the first substance, which is formed at the intersection of both diagonals, shows the historial way in which (see Heidegger’s phenomenological “*Wie*”) the being is denoted in modern metaphysics. The eclipse made foundation of various ways in which metaphysics and scientific cognition are grounded. The hermeneutic triad of historiality, historicity and positivist history takes a new shape through the confrontation of two schools in the years 1245–55 at the University of Paris. It was the time and place when the decisive round of gigantomachy took place. The best philosophers of the Falsafa transmitted this controversy in the Latin West. This complex strife about metaphysic being in the Falsafa and in the Latin West constituted the basic event of thinking that founded the history of Western philosophy in the epoch of monotheism. The modern God was born and died during that time. Determination of man according to Oxfordian Fallacy created a new worldview. The modern subject has recognized the meaning of Being according to unconcealment (*alētheia*) of the world that founded the nihilistic nature of Western metaphysics. The metaphysics took up the direction called *via Modernorum*. The second Averroism prepared this path by creating the theory of cognition, which was deformed by wrong interpretation of the CMDA. Averroes became an Averroist. This historial event (*Ereignis*) established the turn of being from the existing substance to the objective non-existing fiction and founded a new history of the West. Being of the third kind was handed down by Avicennist Falsafa and transformed in the modern interpretation of Aristotelian *Organon*. It required a new subject of cognition that corresponds to specifically defined corpse of Porretans. Modern “humanism” switched from the existing person as the first substance of Boethius to the non-existent *individuum* as substance of the third kind. The West discovered its objectively true nature and the history of modern conquistadors started with the lost Crusades. The second Averroism founded the modern human sciences on the non-existent human being as a corpse that was defined as plurality of substantial forms. Reformed Porretans carried out a reduction of metaphysics to logic and introduced the division of being of the third kind using the schema of *Arbor Porphyriana*. It was done long before Foucault’s work *Les mots et les choses* (1966). Foucault as representative of post-structuralism follows but the divisions and classifications made since the 17th century in postmodernism. The second matrix has shown that this classification and corresponding worldview had already emerged in the second half of the 12th century in the Porretan approach “*discrete videamus*.” The modern subject was born in the second Averroism a one century later, as commentaries on *De anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* dates about 1240 prove it in a sufficient manner.

The first Averroism defended by Bacon referred to the new metaphysics as a product of insane mind. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the emergence of the new nature of the world and man. We have to find the original *Lichtung* where the first concept of objective being was born. Franciscan Rufus of Cornwall became the main protagonist of the New Age. Controversies mentioned by Bacon that regards Rufus’s lectures in Paris (ch. 3.2) can be traced to collection summarized in the commentary and lectures on *Second Analytics* (*Sententia super libros posteriorum analyticorum Aristotelis*, ca. 1232–34) and further in the introduction to *Metaphysics* (*Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, ca. 1231–35). This was followed by commentary on *De anima* (*In Aristotelis De anima*, ca. 1231–35) that introduced a new subject of cognition.[[368]](#footnote-368) The first stage of the second Averroism was completed by attack on Averroistic simulacrum of Averroes (*Contra Averroem*, 1236). Rufus terminated son stay in Paris by publishing apologetic work *Speculum animae* (ca. 1245). He tried to defend his controversial doctrine in the collegium of critical Parisian magisters and before chancellor Alvernus. Bacon recalls in the remark quoted above that Rufus’s defense was not accepted. The first modernist coming from Oxford was ridiculed in circles of Parisian artists. We date this event to the year 1245, when Jean de La Rochelle died and Magister Odo Rigaldus takes his place. The group of Parisian *Modernorum* lived through hard times. Rigaldus probably ordered the disputation of Rufus’s theses summarized in the work *Speculum animae* (ch. 3.3.4). Rufus was unable to defend his “philosophy” in Paris of these times. This is indirectly testified in Albert’s remark about oddity of these doctrines based on universal hylemorphism. He refused to discuss them because of their insanity (*non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum*; ch. 2.4.3). Kilwardby under Albert’s pressure (he was after all, the magister regens of the Dominican College in Paris) had to do the same and returned to Oxford in the year 1245. Rufus returned to Oxford as well and in the year 1250 began lecturing in the academic environment already shaped for one generation by thinking made in the spirit of Oxfordian Fallacy. Sometime in the year 1252 he returned as magister regens to the Franciscan College in Paris, where Bonaventure called him to give lectures. His second arrival in Paris was certainly noticed. He came at the same time as publication of the first part of Bonaventura’s Sentences (1252). It was too much insanity for the school of the first Averroism. Aristotelian masters could not remain silent to this double “madness” of modernists. Another round of the controversy over modernism began, which reached its climax in the years 1255–56. The Pope liked the modernism of mendicants. By exercising his power over the university, he made the first purge of anti-modernist philosophers in Rue du Fouarre. The modernists became the official part of the University of Paris as they had been since the beginning at the University of Oxford. The philosophical thinking of Catholic Rome run by academic Furies made the stalwart of ecclesial power to uphold the progress of paranoiac modernists. The history of modernity in Latin part of Western Europe makes a complete tragicomedy, produced under guidance of divine Muses.

Rufus’s first commentaries made in Oxford and Paris in the years 1231–37 contain *in nuce* all elements that contributed to later development of modernism. His radicalism made by adoption of universal hylemorphism far exceeded Grosseteste’s cautious interpretations. The Bishop of Lincoln, following Alvernus’s pattern, was aware of fundamental differences between Averroes and Neoplatonic school. He publicly attacked Neoplatonic interpreters of Aristotle at Oxford around the year 1235. Being a Christian philosopher from Blund’s school, Grosseteste could not tolerate the spread of modern heretical teaching at Oxford University about the plurality of substances in man. Oxford received guaranteed autonomy from Pope Innocent IV only at the time of the full reign of modernists (*Querentes in agro*, 1254). Magisters at Oxford influenced by the first Averroism had already asked for the papal status in 1238; but zealous powers of chaos made it impossible for them.[[369]](#footnote-369) Nevertheless, thanks to Grosseteste’s work, Oxford formally kept the same mission as the Parisian University, to defend Christian thinking. Rufus joined the Franciscan Order during his baccalaureate studies and went to Paris to next part of studies. There he joined the group of thinkers around Jean de La Rochelle and Alexander Hales, who, after the latter’s death, completed the publication of *Summa Halensis*. In this environment emerged the accomplished school of the second Averroism, which established the third pole concerning the historiality of *Geviert* (ch. 3). During his stay in Paris, Rufus radicalized the school of *sequaces Aristotelis* that Alvernus publicly rejected. By introducing universal hylemorphism into the interpretation of metaphysics done *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Toledo school, he created a new version of the first science. Bacon considered it insane, Albert ridiculous, and Grosseteste stupid. Rufus created a sophistical simulacrum of Averroes and founded the objective Averroism, on which stands the argumentation of newly created school of *Modernorum*. Grosseteste’s students influenced by Rufus and Kilwardby were gathered to publish *Summa philosophiae* around 1265 (ch. 3.1.3). They carried out a similar synthesis of objectivity at Oxford as Bonaventura’s school in Paris that published *Summa Halensis*. Oxfords modernists applied to doctrine of their master the modernized version of Oxfordian Fallacy that included the universal hylemorphism made according to Rufus and Kilwardby and linked to the Porretan logic. These reformed Avicennists created an objective simulacrum of Grosseteste’s doctrine in the mode of analytic philosophy. The result of the synthesis of the Oxford Averroists was the theses on the separated intellect in man and the multiplicity of substances in man. Such abomination Grosseteste rejected in principle in his time. The preceding chapters have shown that in the crucial defense of the unity of the person, Grosseteste rejected a transition to Neoplatonism and remained an authentic Aristotelian on this issue. Bacon attacked Oxfords *illuminati* in the cited work *Distinccio tercia de anima* (ch. 3.2). Ockham did the last round of gigantomachy against Scotists at Oxford, he was sent to exile and the school of the first Averroism was dissolved.

Grosseteste was *spiritus agens* of Oxford University and he represents for hermeneutics a figure of *Alfarabius redivivus*. The school of the first Averroism in Oxford (Bacon, Ockham) invoked him in the dispute about the pluralism of substances in man; on the other hand, his doctrine was radicalized in the school of the second Averroism. After Rufus’s return to Oxford, a second source of modernism and objectivity emerged since 1250. It was guarded in academic and ecclesial circles by Dominican Robert Kilwardby (†1279), rector of Oxford University and Archbishop of Canterbury. After his death, his disciple, Franciscan John Pecham (†1292), assumed the key role of guardian of Modernism, which was tied to the aforementioned academic and ecclesiastical functions. After his death, the school of the second Averroism expires both in Oxford and in Paris. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus accomplished the funeral, since they carried out Hegelian *Aufhebung* of the first and second Averroism into the modern version of objective metaphysics. Tragicomedy of postmodern metaphysics is most visible in the fact that contemporary philosophy takes both representatives of modern Avicennism (Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus) to be fundamentally opposed. Importance of Rufus for the development of modernity and objectivity is comparable in the history of Latin scholasticism with Duns Scotus, who leads Rufus’s revolution in Oxford to its culmination by creating a new metaphysics. Being the eminent representative of “*sophistae Latini*”, Rufus gave the Oxford University the initial impetus to modernity by radicalizing the Oxfordian Fallacy into the new form of metaphysics. The unity and survival of this university is therefore tied to maintenance of Grosseteste’s and Rufus’s objective form of that metaphysical and scientific fallacy. Both forms of epochal *Irrtum* were rejected in principle in the University of Paris about the year 1245, and both representatives of modernity were sent back to modernist Oxford. Taken from the standpoint of archaic hermeneutics made by Muses, it becomes clear why the Paris University finally expired with full admission of Oxfordian Fallacy at the end of modernity. The archaic truth cannot coexist with mythopoetic untruth made by insane modernists. The end of metaphysical necessity related to the end the university since it made its *raison d’être* in the commencement. The University of Oxford victoriously follows the mode of logical and historical necessity made by Furies, since it accomplished another *raison d’être* of modernity. Therefore it dominates the objective academic enterprise and the production of Western science through its American offshoots. The sophisticated system of corporately conceived science is given by authoritatively established knowledge and objective ratings. It has been founded on the basis of Rufus’s theory of truth as mythological assimilation of objective entities.

### 3.3.1 Modern Interpretation of *Second Analytics*

Rufus probably began the lectures on *Second Analytics* while still in Oxford and he published their commentary under the title *In Aristotelis Analytika posteriora* (ca. 1232–34). The commentary is apparently written in Aristotelian spirit. Rufus regards the soul as a *tabula rasa* with regard to the cognition first given on the level of the senses.

“The intellect is like a blank sheet (*tabula nuda*) without any knowledge; it is given as mere potency with regard to all cognition. But the intellect as potency is twofold, an essential and accidental (*potentia duplex est, essentialis et accidentalis*). The potency in the substantive sense is made by the imposition (*proprie dicitur*), that is, as potency in becoming (*fieri*), which comes into actuality (*cum exit in actum*). The second way of understanding in the accidental sense is taken as supposition (*non proprie dicitur*), because potency is not considered in its essential activity (*fieri tale*), but as an essence taken in itself (*esse tale*). “ [[370]](#footnote-370)

The translation “betrayed” the original a bit, since it tries to show this Latin sophist in the maximum possible Aristotelian way. If we follow the opinion of main Aristotelians of that time (Alvernus, Bacon, Albert), they considered Rufus an Avicennist and Nominalist who creates a deceptive form of philosophy. The ability of cognition is anchored in the permanent disposition of thinking, which is capable of drawing conclusions (*potentia essentialis*). This Avicennist faculty of the intellect as a hypostasis capable of reflection (later *res cogitans* by Descartes) is a new being of the third kind. This kind of receptive intellect “exsists” at the moment when potential cognitive forms (considered as a hypostatic *tertium ens*) appear in the human mind. Such a quasi-substantial potency is pure sophistry. Either we have potency attached to the body as a substance, or we have a receptive intellect as a Neoplatonist or Avicennist “form—substance.” The definition of the dual form of potency is the first known example of a hypostatized *intellectus possibilis* created at the Porretan school in Oxford. The potency of intellect enters the realm of actualization through real cognition, which transforms the permanent individual potency of intellect into a contingent actual cognition (*cum exit in actum*). The possible intellect of second Averroism makes a hypostatic substance that descends into the realm of becoming in order to be reborn as an updated “possible” intellect. This parody of the intellect as *tertium genus* of the CMDA makes total nonsense, since the *intellectus possibilis* became an immaterial hypostatic “form—substance.” It is the first known example that transformed Averroes into an Averroistic simulacrum. Rufus makes a monumental blending of two hypostasized *tertium ens* that have acquired the character of modern substance.

1. There is a simulacrum of the intellect as a quasi-corporeal substance called *potentia substantialis*. Speaking in Aristotelian terms, this is an utter nonsense. This intellect as substantial potentiality simulates *actus essendi* given by *anima intellectiva* in man (*potentia proprie dicitur fieri cum exit in actum*). It is not explicitly stated that the transition of cognition from “*potentia*” to “*actus*” takes place in the human body. This substantial form of intellect represents the modernist simulacrum of intellect as *tertium genus* according to CMDA (*fieri tale*). In fact, it is the hypostasized *intellectus materialis* of Avicenna.
2. Rufus created a further hypostatized version of this simulacrum as *potentia accidentalis*, given in the form of a Porretan essence. This essence replaced the Aristotelian second substance and it acts in human being as a real first substance through objectively defined causality. Rufus′s version of Oxfordian Fallacy created a second hypostasized intellect as an accidental potency that pretends to be an abstracted intellect, that is, a *quartum genus* of CMDA (*esse tale*).

No wonder that Aristotelians in Paris refused to discuss such infinite sophistical reflections of modern substances. Rufus created intellect as two hypostases in man, and neither of them has anything to do with the Aristotelianism presented in the CMDA. Aristotle’s doctrine concerning the soul as *tabula rasa* was connected with Avicenna’s metaphysics, and the course of cognition is divided into two parts. After establishing cognition in the categorical mode *per prius* according to Avicenna’s hypostatized intellect, it follows Aristotelian explanation of cognition. The process of cognition is given according to Porretan interpretation of *De anima*, which had been introduced by the school of *Modernorum* in Oxford (ch. 3.2). The course of cognition begins with the Porretan hypostasis, which is given as intellectual substance of the soul (*potentia substantialis*) and takes direction to contingent and for the time being not realized potency of this atomic substance of the third kind (*potentia accidentalis*). That secondary potency is predicated with respect to the intellectual hypostasis given in the soul in the modus *per posterius*. The actualization of the intellect takes place in a contingent way, because knowledge is an event that is added from the outside to the already existing “intellect—essence.” Knowledge of the external thing secondarily actualizes already existing intellect. It “exsists” in the form of a hypostatic potency (*fieri tale, esse tale*). The real cognition is sensually and thus merely accidentally determined. Such hypostatized intellect exists in man as a *tabula nuda*, which must be actualized either by self-reflection or by external cognition. Rufus’s later commentary on the *Metaphysics* asserts the same argument right in the introduction.[[371]](#footnote-371) The sophism is obvious regarding the soul as *tabula nuda*, because the intellect is hypostatized in the soul in the form of the Porretan substance or as Avicenna’s *intellectus materialis*. This intellect exists habitually in the child, which so far has no intellectual cognition (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The intellectual part of the soul was transformed into an essence. Modern intellect received the newly created sense by an imposition made *ex nihilo*. There is no substance in the form of the intellect in man, since human being is a single substance. Such hypostatized intellect received causal efficacy as an essence in the scheme of Oxfordian Fallacy. That kind of “intellect—essence” was predicated as a second substance according to modern interpretation of *Categories* that emerged at the same time (ch. 3.1.2). The combination of two hypostatic potencies took the causality and its predication into the univocal scheme, in which the difference between the first and the second substance was abolished. The introduction of being of the third kind in the form of *potentia essentialis* changed the scenario of cognition into the modern dualism. The difference between the two potencies (*essentialis, accidentalis*) establishes the postmodern scheme of the two faculties of understanding. Kant put in two levels defined *a priori* and empirically. Rufus’s concept of *potentia essentialis* as “*fieri tale*”, Kant remodeled it through the capacity given *a priori* in the mind that keeps in permance l′entendement raisonnable.[[372]](#footnote-372) Rufus hypostatized *anima intellectiva* in a new way. The intellectual soul was present in Grosseteste’s interpretation of *De anima* only as a superior form, and not at all as a substance (ch. 3.2). In the question of interpretation of the soul, Grosseteste belonged to Blund’s school, which is not the case with Porretan Rufus. The creation of a schizophrenic modern soul is given in two hypostatized potencies of the third kind. The problem of cognition was solved by a mytological copulation of three hypostatic entities (empirical cognition in the body, hypostatic active intellect, hypostatic passive intellect). Modernity, since Pecham, hypostatized the faculties of hylemorphically established soul and then made the soul an independent substance of the third kind (*totalitas virtualis*). Another source of the terminus “*potentia substantialis*” we find in Aristotle’s *Physics*. The natural motion of light bodies goes upward and that of heavy bodies goes downward, which according to Aristotle and Averroes are naturally given in the context of potential determinations of actual substances. Aristotle’s metaphysics clearly establishes with respect to *potentia substantialis* that priority in the order of actuality relates to the real thing. Only the real substance contains the potency of moving (ὄντος κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν), as, for example, the seed possesses the substantial potency to become a tree (*Met*. 1049b20–25). Aristotelian potency is bound to real substances. Rufus, as the first-known author of second Averroism, changed the interpretation of potency into a newly formed Porretan essence. The term “*potentia essentialis*” now refers to the potency given in the *anima intellectiva*, which was transformed into a Porretan hypostasis. The actualization of cognition links to the intellect as a quasi-actual substrate, which is given as a permanent and unchanging disposition of thinking. In this atomic substance, the first principles of cognition are permanently preserved and then actualized by actual cognition.[[373]](#footnote-373) Rufus created the first Cartesian scheme of cognition as hypostatized essence of the soul that takes bodily accidents. The hypostatized potency “exsists” primarily as a hyparchical substance of the third kind, which forms the permanent carrier (*subiectum*) of cognition in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper.*” Emanating from this permanent substance, it takes up the accidental cognition, which is actualized in cognitive judgments. The terminus “*potentia essentialis*” ensures the emergence of a new form of the middle member of the deductive syllogism. The essence made in the form of false metaphysical imposition according to Oxfordian Fallacy univoce represents causally acting first substances. This scheme corresponds to Grosseteste’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy, which changed the interpretation of *Second Analytics* towards Neoplatonism (ch. 3.1.1). Grosseteste, however, refused to apply it to the definition of man. The transition from Aristotelian *potentia substantialis* to Rufus’s newly conceived version of *potentia essentialis* is later documented in the *Summa philosophiae* cited above.[[374]](#footnote-374) In that writing, Rufus’s *potentia essentialis* already functions as a substance of the third kind. This intellect in the form of a modern *tertium ens* has become the new Western subject of cognition as Descartes’s *res cogitans*. Important shift happened in causality of the first substance when the principle “*ex inmediatis*” inserted in the first triad of principles came to the second triad, where conclusions of scientific judgment are given in the mode of logical inference. Albert rejected this change in the introduction of *De homine* as an insufficient scientific way of knowing (*scientur imperfecte*, ch. 2.4.1). Bacon rejected the changed nature of the middle member of deduction (*medium*) as well. He insists on universal character of *medium* according to the causality predicated from the first triad of the principles of cognition (*hoc est universale per causalitatem et non per predicationem formalem*, ch. 3.2). For this fundamental reason Rufus does not belong to the first Averroism, but to the school of *sophistae Latini*, which was criticized around 1240 by Bishop Alvernus and Albert.

Modernism of Rufus was evident when he analyzed the statute of deductive proof judgment and the theory truth. It is not the causality of real things that determines deductive judgment, but theoretical cognition. The intuition of first principles can be found in Grosseteste’s commentary on *Second Analytics* cited above (ch. 3.1.1). Rufus adopted the interpretation of Oxfordian Fallacy introduced by Grosseteste. The second triad of first principles was hypostatized in more radical way. The previous quotation has shown that *intellectus possibilis* acquired a subsistent character, according to Avicenna’s intellect of the “Flying Man.” This led to a permanent intellectual intuition of the first principles in the soul. Rufus hypostatized in the same way the middle member of deductive syllogism in the same way as the previous scheme of the intellect.

“It is necessary to see that with respect to principles of cognition (*respectu cognitionis principiorum*), the intellect is in the accidental potency (*in potentia accidentali*); but with respect to the cognition of deductive conclusions (*respectu cognitionis conclusionem*), it is in the essential potency (*in potentia essentiali*). Therefore, it is true that because of created character of cognition the intellect does not have permanent first principles. In view of this, the intellect is merely in potency, but cognizes it by passing into the actual act of cognition (*tamen exit in actum cognoscendi ea*). This cognition is not cognition in the classical sense, because the demonstration applies to cognition through inference made by the accomplished syllogism.” [[375]](#footnote-375)

Cognition is potentially and contingently given in thought (*in potentia accidentali*) because the hypostatized principles of cognition are actualized *ad hoc* from the real world. Therefore, the intellect is not given in pure potency, although Rufus seemingly asserts this by defending the intellect as *tabula rasa*. The actualization of intellect (*exit in actum*) is made as substantial nature of intellect (*in* *potentia essentiali*). The second Averroism of the Toledo school considered the soul to be the substance, but certainly not the intellect. Grosseteste as *magister regens* at Oxford and later as bishop of Lincoln certainly could not tolerate the theory of substantial intellect separated from real person to be proclaimed at Christian University of those times. In the scheme of Oxfordian Fallacy, the potency of cognition represents the hypostatic fundament (*subiectum*) of accidental knowledge that is already given in habitual and essential form as *potentia substantialis*. Rufus takes up the primacy of the logical triad of principles in demonstrative judgment (ch. 3.1.1) by introducing the hypostasized intellect as a hyparchic bearer of this activity. Being a Porretan essence, the intellect plays the role of the first substance. It replaced the causality of the first real substance in the middle member of the syllogism. Then it is true that the potency to cognize is constant and unchanging in the form of the substratum, even if only potential one. The quotation confirms that the intellect as the essence is permanent, even if it is not always actualized (*non dicitur proprie quod hic cognitio fiat*). Thinking as hypostatized potentiality “acts” with respect to external actualization of internal principles (*in potentia respectu eorum*). It came to its full form in the cognitive act (*exit in actum cognoscendi ea*). The first principles of cognition exist in advance in the above hypostatized mode of essential potency. For this Avicennist, cognition does not exist in the full sense of the word, because the intellect is permanently actualized. Only its potency changes, which is actualized in this or that act of cognition; but the relation to the first principles of cognition from the second triad of *Second Analytics* already exists in a substantial manner. Potency does not mean the reception of cognized things in the intentionally oriented thinking as it is done in the first Averroism. The intellect as substance has already by itself a sufficiently hypostatized being to ensure cognition based on the second triad of cognitive principles given in *Second Analytics*. Modernity does not really need the first real substance for actualizing the cognition. Il needs the first real substance for the actualization of the cognition only accidentally. The sophism concerning the intellect as *tabula rasa* is obvious and all top representatives of the first Averroism saw it clearly around the year 1240. Aristotelian thesis about the exposure of intellect from the front is valid only for accidentally and contingently given act of cognition. Science makes the transition of this hypostatic potency into the state of actual cognition, which additionally requires an actualization of cognition due to real things. The same scheme of intellect regarding the active and the possible intellect in the mode “substance—accident” can be found in the Grosseteste’s school (ch. 3.1.3). Bacon and Albert saw clearly that the second Averroism no longer needed the existence of first substances as effective causality that founds the cognition. Modernists replaced reality with hypostatized essences of Porretans and *Nominales*. Rufus’s insight into the nature of intellect as hypostasis and Husserl’s eidetic intuition are not subject to the transition from potency to actuality as in the case of the classical demonstration that relates to first substances in reality. Modern Avicennists as Rufus changed Grosseteste's Aristotelian philosophy. He still held to the primacy of the first substance for the interpretation of *Physics* and *Metaphysics* and followed the interpretation of *De anima* according to the Blund’s school. The chapters examining the emergence of Oxfordian Fallacy have shown that Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* around 1230 no longer fully accounted for hyparchical effects of first substances. Rufus took a decisive step towards modernity after 1230 by combining Grosseteste’s Oxfordian Fallacy and Avicenna’s hypostatized intellect given in the form of Porretan substance of the third kind. Avicenna’s self-reflexive intellect is actual and therefore placed beyond empirical experience. It joined the scheme of cognition as the middle member of deductive proof (*potentia essentialis*). Newly formed Oxfordian Fallacy became the doctrine of plurality of substances in man based on universal hylemorphism. Therefore, Grosseteste rejected Rufus’s theory that was in contradiction to Aristotle’s *De anima*. Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* shows that the first principles of thought are permanently given as an ever-present substratum. It brought about the first major conflict between Grosseteste and modernists at Oxford sometime in 1235. Grosseteste rejected the dualism of Oxford *Modernorum* because this he held only to the plurality of forms given in the definition of man as the one substance. Grosseteste criticized in principle the new Aristotelians as Adam of Buckfield, Rufus of Cornwall, and Kilwardby, who founded the first school of modernists at Oxford (*contra quosdam modernos*, ch. 3.1.3). The cited authors are the first known modernists who changed the multiplicity of forms in man into the multiplicity of substances. These Latin sophists and first modernists began their studies in Paris under the bishop Alvernus, and their school, called *sophistae Latini*, formed another center of modern sophistry in Paris. They came after the schools of *Nominales* (*sophistae Italici*) that became extinct in the first third of the 13th century. With the help of hypostatized potency as a new being of the third kind, Rufus apparently accepted Aristotle’s receptive intellect as *tabula rasa*. At the same time, however, he held on to the *intellectus agens* as substantial intellectual substance in his scheme of cognition, which he presented sophistically as mere potency (*potentia substantialis*). He then sophistically attributed his fatal error in the interpretation of *De anima* to Averroes himself. Writing *Contra Averroem* (ca. 1236) laid the foundation for the well-known controversy about Averroism. Top Aristotelians such as William of Auvergne, Albert, and Bacon rejected the new form of Aristotelian Avicennism in Paris during the years 1235–40. Franciscan Bacon, as an eminent representative of the first Averroism at Oxford about 1245–50, rejected Rufus’s doctrine in principle. Dominican Albert did the same about 1250–55 in case of sophisms made by Kilwardby. Defending the interpretation of CMDA, the school of the first Averroism could not admit schizophrenic Cartesian cognition and such a false determination of human being. Averroes abolished Neoplatonic and Avicennist dualism and he insisted on pure potential thought as *tabula rasa*. The intellect cannot be substance in any way (*hoc aliquid*), because even the soul is no substance. Actuality given in the way of Rufus’s twofold potency would make impossible a cognition given by *intellectus possibilis* in absolute receptivity (*anima est quodammodo omnia*, *De anima* 431b21). The introduction of two substances in the modern definition of the person was unacceptable due to the ignorance of *De anima* and the CMDA. The inability of a true philosophical interpretation of both mentioned writings of Aristotle and the Commentator forms the main reason why Avicennian modernists at Oxford were resisting to Aristotle interpreted *ad mentem Averrois* in the years 1231–35. This resistance on the part of Rufus’s school turned into active resistance in Paris referring to the school of the first Averroism and to explication of Averroes made in Blund’s school. The tension at the Paris University culminated in the first quarrel between the two schools in 1245 or immediately thereafter. Both main representatives of modernism Rufus and Kilwardby were forced to leave Paris University and returned to Oxford. The victorious modernist offensive led by Kilwardby at Oxford and Bonaventure at Paris will be discussed in the next matrix, which explores the dispute between the two schools in 1270–77.

Let us return to interpretation of *Second Analytics* that established the objective fallacy of modernity. Aristotle conceives scientific *demonstratio* with respect to the solar or lunar eclipse as a kind of deductive proof based on the imposition of efficient causality. It is produced by hyparchical necessity of events that take place in reality. Aristotle and the first Averroism proceeded according to the metaphysical dative from the real causality to the general scheme of that causality. The univocal categorial predication of real necessity is predicated in the mode of agreement by universally given middle member of the syllogism. In this assertion rests the core of truth as correspondence of the intellect and the thing given by Averroes’s *proportio* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). This view of *Second Analytics* was defended in Bacon’s interpretation of that treatise. Scientific statement must respect the hyparchical position of first substances and their causality. The first substance exercises causality in a real way. Real things and their effects cannot be done in other way than they are. It means that the predicated necessity of universal scientific proof given in thinking (ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν οὗ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῶς, *Anal. Post*. 73a21) must follow the real necessity. Both necessities are given in the mode *simpliciter* (ἁπλῶς); but this simplicity has a different statute each time: actual in reality; universal and metaphysical in scientific proof; logical and universal in the speculative sciences as arithmetic and geometry. The necessity as necessary effects of first substances corresponds then in the mode of truth as correspondence between thing and understanding to the different (metaphysical or logical) type of predicative necessity that is used in deductive proofs. The real and the metaphysical necessity meet each other in the middle member of the demonstrative reasoning (*medium*). It entails a specific kind of universal causality that Bacon defended against the modernists as Rufus (*hoc est universale per causalitatem*, ch. 3.2). The physically given causality works both in the reality of first substances and on the level of sensually applied cognition. Only afterwards it is universally predicated in the immaterial form of intellectual cognition, which is realized as a specific faculty of the human soul. This sequence makes the determinacy of intellect from reality in the mode of the metaphysical dative. It is summed up in the terminus “*proportionaliter*” in CMDA and the conception of truth as a correspondence following all above-mentioned kinds of necessity. The fundamental character keeps the determination of substance and causality given *simpliciter* in reality that is afterwards predicated *universaliter* in categorical statements. The necessity of events is given in reality (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, *Anal. Post.* 84a13). Only then, the deductive and demonstrative judgment can be stated, done in the mode of univocal imposition from the direction of hyparchical first substances (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, *Anal. Post*. 84a14). This basic scheme of deductive apodictic judgment of *Second Analytics* was modified by Avicenna. The second Averroism took it over in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The second Averroism was influenced by Neoplatonism of Toledo school. The eclipse of the first substance and true cognition of *Modernorum* was based on the fact that they ignored the fundamental way in which *Second Analytics* created the deductive scheme of the real astronomic eclipse. Thereby, modernists did not distinguish it from the definition of the triangle. Modern sophists assume that reasoning determines the scheme of causality from universally recognized causes. Therefore it is not necessary to know the real eclipse. In Aristotle’s thesis, it is explicitly said that we must first establish the given fact in reality (τὸ ὅτι). The science must know empirically the way in which astronomical bodies such as the Sun and the Moon participate in the given phenomenon by their own action (ἐκλείπει ὁ ἥλιος ἢ οὔ, τὸ ὅτι ζητοῦμεν, *Anal. Post*. 89b27). All people know that there is an eclipse. Scientists start from this general experience (ἔνδοξα) and find its universally valid causes. Rufus turned this scheme around and exposed the sense of being from behind, from the realm of universal forms. However, the writing *Second Analytics* and *De anima* know very well that universality is not given in any form at the beginning of cognition, because the soul is a blank sheet and we recognize the eclipse empirically at first. Therefore, teh science have necessary reality in the action of the first substances and *ex-post* it looks for their general causes (εἰδῶμεν τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι ζητοῦμεν, *Anal. Post.* 89b29). Modernity allowed itself to be seduced by universally valid scheme of deduction. Following Neoplatonic interpretation of *Categories* and substituting the second triad of first principles of cognition for the first triad, modernists placed the universality in the mode *per prius* (ch. 3.1.1). The original source of analytic interpretation of the eclipse, according to *Second Analytics*, is Avicenna as the first Western modernist. He changed the path of illumination of being (*Vor-blickbahn*) with regard to the middle element of the scientific syllogism (*medium*). He thereby founded the original event of thinking, which gives a new epochal meaning of being (*Ereignis*). In contrast to univocal objectivism of contemporary interpreters, hermeneutics conceive the middle member of syllogism made by Avicenna (understanding the cause) in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy.[[376]](#footnote-376) Rufus explains the eclipse in *Second Analytics* in the same sense as Avicenna. Modernism changed the sense of causality, which in *Second Analytics* is conceived in the mode of categorical imposition from the hyparchical first substance. By emphasizing the second triad of first principles of cognition according to Grosseteste’s interpretation, modernists replaced the causality of first substances with logical essences or Porretan hypostases. If Rufus’s scheme respected the separated existence of first substances and the primacy of their causality, then it would be an authentic Aristotelian interpretation. But Rufus interpreted the middle member according to Avicenna and according to Oxfordian Fallacy, which interchanged the first triad of cognition principles with the second. Rufus, like Grosseteste, distinguishes two modes of cognition, which are given in two levels of potential intellect. The univocity of new form of scientific deduction is ensured by the term “*medium sive causa*,” which is understood as being of the third kind (*scibile*). Following quotation shows *Lichtung* of modern positivism based on Oxfordian Fallacy.

“Knowledge is a form of effect and is caused by demonstrative judgment (*scire est quidam effectus et causatur a demonstratione*) and is defined by deductive judgment (*definiri per demonstrationem*). Deduction proceeds in two ways. Either, the proof is grasped in its foundation and it makes the middle member of the syllogism and its cause (*medium sive causa*) in the sense of the assertion that the ‘middle member and the cause are one and the same’ (*medium et causa idem*). In this way, the first definition of demonstrative judgment is given. Or, the proof is conceived in its actual act (*demonstratio consideratur ut in actu*) that makes the second definition.” [[377]](#footnote-377)

The hermeneutics of objectivity take Rufus’s analysis of the middle member in the syllogism (τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ μέσον, *Anal. Post*. 90a6–7), which is given in the terminus “*medium et causa idem*,” as the fundamental point. The middle member universally states the effective causality of the first substance, which exists in reality *per prius*, *simpliciter*, and *per se*. This real causality forms a metaphysical necessity of scientific proof from the point of view of what the thing is as a substance in its real being (ἁπλῶς τὴν οὐσίαν, *Anal. Post.* 90a10). Rufus introduced a new modality *per prius* by using the term “*medium et causa idem*” that was established in virtue of a direct insight into the nature of syllogism. This was utter nonsense. In classical metaphysics, knowledge of real causality follows the activity of first substances established in the mode *absolute*. The real world retains a hyparchical form of necessity as a separate fundament of cognition. Then follows another form of metaphysical necessity given by the imposition of the first meaning from reality to the cognizing intellect. Rufus gave the mode *absolute* to the logical form of necessity created by supposition. He established the nihilistic form of Oxfordian Fallacy in analytical philosophy. He destroyed both kinds of necessity: the real, hyparchically given necessity and the metaphysical necessity given by the imposition. Rufus radicalized the analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* that established both Avicenna and Grosseteste. The first sentence of citation about cognition as a certain effect of demonstrative judgment (*quidam effectus et causatur a demonstratione*) represents a clear sophism from the point of view of Aristotelian metaphysics and logic. It is a typical example of error called “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*” (ch. 3.1.1). The effect as real is produced in real things and not in general statements. The demonstrative proof merely states the already given effect of hyparchical first substances. The proof draws general conclusions from this real state of affairs. The conclusions are generally given in human mind; they cannot by themselves establish an effective cause of events that run on the level of first real substances. This dispute took place already at the time of Abelard with regard to the statute of logical or metaphysical supposition in the deductive syllogism between various logical schools (ch. 1.6). Rufus’s primary definition of deductive syllogism comprehends the medium as a kind of modern essence (*demonstratio consideratur in sua radice*). Hermeneutics put the emphasis on the terminus “*in sua radice*.” In the mode of objective error, the quotation goes radically down to the root of modern scientific cognition. It makes the fondation of formal status of *demonstratio*.The eternal essence precedes and establishes the ephemeral existence. The first substance is not considered primarily in its causality, because there is an intuition of pure essential forms in the mode *per prius*. The conclusion confirms a reversal of Aristotelian cognition. The demonstrative statement presents Porretan and Avicennist interpretation, which is based exclusively on the second triad of cognitive principles.

Hermeneutics follow the historiality of objectivity in the mode of original unconcealment (*alētheia*). Therefore, we must first explore the ontological perspective that directs the preleable understanding of being in the new metaphysics (*Vor-blickbahn*). Rufus sees the world in the mode “*discrete videamus*” established by Porretans (ch. 1.4). Discrete vision does not follow the causality of first substances, but the mythological causality based on Avicennist and Porretan *individuum*. The discrete worldview of modernity leads the deduction (*resolutio*) of the real world to its first mathematical and logical principles, which are no longer provable (ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδείκτων, *Anal. Post*. 71b26–27). These logical principles are at the same time the first causes of thought and of reality. The paranoia of modernity consists in the fact that it has replaced the real necessity of the world with the logical necessity generated by the human subject. Rufus reproved the causality of the first substances that exist in reality and are predicted in the mode of metaphysical abstraction. Instead of them came theoretical causality of logical and mathematical principles, which have necessity and universality only in thinking. Metaphysical abstraction applies the truth to the predication of real causality. Rufus, however, comprehends the truth in the demonstration syllogism only analytically, in the univocal logical universality and necessity. The following quotation shows the emergence of analytical philosophy in Rufus’s analysis in the key part of *Second Analytics*.

“The premises of scientific syllogism being the causes, they must be true. Otherwise, the proof is not a cognition and not a science. This is literally said by the term “true.” The premises of syllogism given in this way are accomplished causes (*praemissae sunt causae completae*), namely within the framework of the respective genus (*in illo genere*). Then it is true that the causes are given directly in the premises (*immediata in eodem*). If they were mediated in any way, they would have yet another middle link of the statement and another cause, and therefore they would not be complete. This is the interpretation of what [Aristotle] means by the term ‘given from the premises of the judgment’.” [[378]](#footnote-378)

According to the first Averroism the first sentence is a complete nonsense. The premises cannot contain the real causality of first substances. They make their scientific predication, in the mode of metaphysical imposition, metaphysical abstraction and true deductive syllogism. The quotation shows the first form of objective “exsistence” that takes up the real and recognized being into one mythological conception. The commentary uses the Aristotelian term “*praemissae sunt causae completae*,” but it means under that notion a formally correct syllogism in the mode of logical abstraction. According to Rufus quoted above, it is only secondarily true (*sic secunda*) that the scientific judgment is related to the real act of recognizing something that is outside of our thinking (*demonstratio consideratur ut in actu*). Once again, it is formally correct; however, the metaphysical correspondence starts from reality and cannot be stated as a simulacrum at the end of reasoning. Rufus makes no difference between the causality given at the level of the first substances in reality and their recognition at the level of the second substances made in mind. Both kinds of very different necessity (metaphysical, logical) acquired a univocal character. Since the medium of judgment has a univocal causality, it does not matter to modern science whether anything really exists or not. The sophism is hidden in the term “true” (*verum igitur*, ἀληθῆ μὲν; *Anal. Post*. 71b25). Rufus does not deal with the basic question that the notion “*in illo genere*” indicates. Aristotle, on the other hand, distinguishes predication in the dual mode of generically different necessity and universality (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12). The exposure of the sense of being proceeds according to Avicenna and comes from the first principles of cognition, which act as effective causes in the world of the first substances. The completion of causality is given in the scientific predication (*causae completae*) due to universal generic determination (*in genere*). Rufus introduced atomic division of Porretans for the last indivisible principle to find the scientific proof. The first principles function as Porretan individuals in the analytical concept of *demonstratio*. The second triad of cognitive principles establishes the modern principle “*inmediate*.” The term “*quod sint immediata*” does not consider the deductive proceeding from the perspective of the first substance, but from the perspective of hypostatized forms. The second sophism is hidden in the term “given in premises of the syllogism” (*ex praemissis autem*, ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδείκτων; *Anal. Post*. 71b26). As a causal second substance, it acts in the new form of the analytical scientific proof based on atomic unity of the first principles that cannot be further proved. The key theorem connects all the sophisms of the second averroism with each other, because it is given in the exposition of causality from the direction of the second triad of formally determined principles of recognition. The essence is now sufficient to determine causality (*praemissae sunt causae complet*ae), because it has the same identity in terms of genus as the first universal statement and thus also the conclusion (*in illo genere dicto*). Then it becomes clear that the conclusion applies according to the principle “*ex inmediatis*” (*sequitur quo sint immediata in eodem*). However, this is the scheme of scientific proof that is valid only for the logical abstraction produced in thinking and not for the scientific judgment that predicts the causality of real substances outside of thinking. The cause of the third kind is connected with the substance of the third kind, and this mixture of the being of the third kind is pronounced *univoce* in the analytical mode of scientific proof. As a result, a new version of Oxfordian Fallacy was created, which establishes the modern speculation of sciences. The modern *illuminati* produce substances of the third kind and then recognize them in the mirror of their enlightened mind. Modernity is based on the eclipse of the first substance and its real causality. This new theory of truth and scientific knowledge established the fundamental *Irrtum* of analytical philosophy.

The first principle of cognition was made by occurrence of events in reality, let us see Albert’s notion *ex inmediatis*, *inmediate* (ch. 2.4.1). It changed into Grossestes formulation “*inmediate*” based on the second triad of cognition principles (ch. 3.1.1). Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* produced yet another confusion. The radicality of new definition of cognition makes the basis of modern science. It contains the false mode of *ipse*, which is conceived in the mode of analytical philosophy. Since the recognized form is the middle link of the judgment from the point of view of the essentiality directly considered (*ipsum medium*), it is also the cause (*sive causa*). The following quotation shows the new theory of science established in the analytical mode of “Unified Science” that can be deduced from the arbitrarily conceived *scibile*.

“For establishing science, the existence of what is recognized is necessary and sufficient element, the cognitive habitual faculty in the subject included (*exigitur et sufficit exsistentia scientis et habitus scibilis*). There is a science if both kinds of being are available (*his enim exsistentibus*). The act of the imagination proceeds from the presence of sensual species, which are given due to imagination (*ex praesentia speciei imaginabiliter*) and does not exist in the real thing given outside the imagination. The intellect similarly establishes cognition from presence of intelligible species (*ex praesentia speciei intellectuali*) that are given in the intellectual faculty.” [[379]](#footnote-379)

The analytical theory of science relates to the second triad of principles. It requires only the existence of the scientist and his habitual ability of making the correct syllogism (*sufficit exsistentia scientis et habitus scibilis*). This view was defended by *Erfurt’s treatise* against Bacon by introducing so-called “formal supposition” (*suppositio formalis*) according to analytical logicians as Sherwood (ch. 3.4.3). The new substance of the third kind “exsists” directly in reality and is then reproduced in the habitual mode of cognition (*habitus scibilis*) linked to existence of modern scientists (*exsistentia scientis*). The habitus of the scientist creates in the soul a hypostatic disposition to draw combinatorial conclusions. This hypostasis is later transformed into a table of postmodern categories, which Kant took for a priori made forms of reasoning. The second source of cognition is the mythological imagination of modernity, which gives rise to deduction made “*ex praesentia speciei intellectuali*,” which is another hypostatic individual in thought. Thus, the basis of modern scientific mythology consists of two kinds of non-existent *tertium ens*. With this common presence of the objective kinds given first in reality (*his enim exsistentibus*) and then in mind (*ex praesentia speciei intellectuali*), modern science arises as assimilation of being of the third kind. Rufus’s sophism forms the original source of the analytic formal supposition. The essence contains all essential determinations of the thing, like the Porretan “substance—*individuum*.” The key is the determination of *scibile* as a new form of atomic substance. This is habitually given in thinking (*habitus scibilis*). That habitus “to be a modern thinker” displaced the causality of real first substances from the scheme of scientific proof. It is evident that classical Aristotelians considered such group of modern *illuminati* as a closed sect of intellectual fools. This habitus of objective brainwashing inherited the scientific community in the period of academic nihilism as well. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls the subject of this unreal group with the title “*Homo academicus.*” [[380]](#footnote-380) Porretan *individuum* does not exist in the reality at all, and moreover, the existence of hyparchical first substance in reality makes only an accidental matter to the new science. Rufus’s *scibile* “exsists” in the objective mode “*semel—semper*” in the realm of eternal forms. That hypostatized essence as *tertium ens* can descend in hylic matter, where it is concretized in the hylemorphic substance (*habet potestatem complendi materiam et faciendi individuum*).[[381]](#footnote-381) The causal-formal scheme of the new form of the substance is given in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The supposition of this logical necessary individual presupposes the occurrence of this substance of the third kind in reality. Aristotle would say in this regard that such univocal exchange of essence with existence for *simpliciter* given middle link of syllogisms applies only to the abstraction of the type of mathematical and geometric proofs, but by no means to scientific cognition of astronomical phenomena given in reality. Metaphysics, as a *scientia prima*, cannot achieve unity of being at the level of mental abstraction. That fact, according to the first Averroism, established the fundamental error of *Modernorum*. Modernity took the identity of the middle link for a Porretan hypostasis given *per prius*. Such hypostasis makes an essentially predicted cause in abstracted univocal modality. The logical identity, however, has a different form of hyparchical being than the metaphysical ipseity. Again it is valid that the metaphysical imposition is not the logical supposition. According to Aristotle and the first Averroism defended by Bacon against Rufus, the middle link of the scientific proof has its own ipseity. The imposition follows the real causality of first substances (*hoc est universale per causalitatem*, ch. 3.2). Aristotle defends the central importance of reality for scientific cognition in the middle link of demonstrative syllogism (*medium*) by establishing the principle *ex inmediatis*. Through the *medium* that predicts causality by the imposition, the universals and the mutual effect of the first substances are in metaphysical correspondence. Then the term “*medium et causa idem*” in the demonstrative statement has two different interpretations according to *Second Analytics*. There are two generically different hyparchical natures of the middle link (*medium*). Since there is a completely different metaphysical ipseity based on twofold hyparchical causality and necessity, there is no identity that could establish unified demonstrative proof. Then the term “*medium et causa idem*” is absolutely false. According to *Second Analytics*, both possibilities exclude each other in the mode of disjunction, and there is no possible conjunction between them. Either the medium is stated according to identity-logic, where the imposition of the meaning comes from the logical necessity of concepts in thinking. Or, the ipseity comes from metaphysics, where the imposition of meaning comes from the action of real first substances. Thus, the two concepts of truth (logical inference and metaphysical deduction) and the two forms of Western science (natural and theoretical) are strictly defined in the framework of *scientia prima*. The abstractly given mathematical identity replaced the causal ipseity of first substances. Rufus is the first modernist to claim that the deductive conclusion of natural sciences can be drawn outside the real causality of existing things. For him, the permanent essence replaced the unique existence and the action of first substances. The imposition of universality and necessity changed from reality into a logical supposition that was considered in the mode *absolute* as Porretan and analytical predication. The truth as correctness and certainty in the second Averroism have an absolute character, which in the case of cognition of reality is pure paranoia.

Founded by Rufus, a philosophical dogmatic and Latin sophist, modernism does not require any real substance to lance the process of cognition in deductive mode according to metaphysical hyparchical necessity. Reflection of *illuminati* requires the first real substance only accidentally to make the demonstration. This kind of deduction comes directly from Avicenna, who described the first moment of cognition as an intuitive grasp of causality expressed by the middle link of deduction (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Rufus knew the classical Aristotelian interpretation of *Analytics* and *Categories*, because his commentary in other places clearly distinguishes the modes of being related to the first and second substance.[[382]](#footnote-382) Sophistic connection of twofold hyparchical universality and twofold necessity was Rufus’s conscious choice. The sophistry is tied to modern mix of the real substance and the logical essence in the analytical concept of science. This metaphysically false connection finds expression in the saying, “*medium et causa idem*.” This sophism created univocal system of being, which was placed outside of classical metaphysics. Bacon condemned that proceeding. The univocal exchange of *cause* and *medium* is excluded from the point of view of *Second Analytics*. The causality runs *simpliciter* in reality and *universaliter* in statements. Metaphysical abstraction must adequately predict these different meanings based on the metaphysical dative. The unique being of the first substance passes into the middle link of the judgment (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν, *Anal. Post*. 84a13). The famous Oxford’s sophist started the process of reducing necessity to its original, more simplistic basis, but at the level of mere logical abstraction. We find the origin of this procedure in Grosseteste and in the terminus “*resolutio*” of Philip the Chancellor, who at the same time lectured the conversion of transcendentals in Paris (ch. 2.3.2). Rufus adopts from Grosseteste the twofold nature of cognition as direct insight of intellect into the pure forms (*intellectus*), in contrast to empirically established conclusions (*scientia*). The direct intuition of hypostatized causes of the third kind (*scibile*) stand outside empirically observed facts. Modernists subjugated the causal reality of hylemorphic substances to speculatively recognized necessity. The necessity of science is determined by the second triad of formal principles of recognition, and not by the predication based on the real interaction of the first substances. For analytical interpretation, reality represents only a coincidence, an *ad hoc* given occurrence of formal essences or hypostases. The science is made in the framework of the analytical deductive syllogism. Rufus considers the action of the given cause directly and in a univocal way, because the universal essence precedes the contingent existence of first substances. The causality became a Porretan hypostasis and a new being of the third kind. The real world presents in modernism and postmodernism a mere accident of demiurgic thinking that directly considers the realm of *tertium ens*. The first Averroism would never allow this, because it saveguarded hyparchical difference between the first substance given *simpliciter* in reality and the second substance given *universaliter* in categorical statements. The second Averroism under Rufus’s leadership radicalized Grossesteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* to create a new version of Porretan Avicennism. Rufus and his school no longer see a significant difference between constructs of thinking and interactions of first substances in reality. Grossesteste inspired by Averroes would never have allowed such mesalliance. Bacon very well noticed fundamental change in the concept of science and the statute of substance in the transition from Grosseteste to the school of *Modernorum*. He declared Rufus the founder of the academic sect called “Modernists” and he announced the year 1250 as the beginning of the epoch-making work of his sophistry at Oxford (ch. 3.2). We show that the change in the perception of reality and new theory of cognition were already given in Rufus’s Aristotelian lectures and commentaries even before the year 1235 at Oxford. Grosseteste could not tolerate such sophistry in his university college. Rufus entered the Franciscan order and was immediately sent to Paris. Historical impact of modernism dated by Bacon proceeds from hidden influence of modernity to open history dated to the year 1250, when Rufus started his official lecturing at Oxford. Since that year, Furies as divine powers of primordial philosophical chaos received the right of residence at the Oxford University and became modern powers of enlightened scholars. Their quasi-divine academic habitus was established as a secular academic habitat by Rufus’s radicalized version of Oxfordian Fallacy. However, they did not become reconciled goddesses according to Aeschylus’s drama *Eumenides*. Hybris of illuminati at his time stood at the very beginning of modern tragedy and citizens of Greek polis had enough political wisdom to collectively stop it. Latin Christianity was not as wise as the Falsafa that stopped the invasion of Avicennist modernity. Analytical predication of universality and necessity established the period of Western intellectual insanity (*Irre*) that started *via Modernorum*. It came to destruction of metaphysics as *scientia prima* done away in the onslaught of modern nihilism. Metaphysical nihilism needs the modern subject, because the classical *scientia prima*, according to Aristotle, rejected mythopoetic fairy tales of Oxfordian Fallacy. Nihilist humanism that defines man as a specific corpse endowed with various hypostases and attributes started a new chapter in the history of effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) produced by modern Western science. Detached from the reality and causality of the first substances, the speculative science created the first object of modern humanities after the year 1300. They were witches and sorcerers investigated and burned alive according to scientific methodology of new humanities guided by objectively educated Furies (OBJ III, ch. 5.5). The choice of univocity concerning the first and the second substance was a collective decision of young Oxford scholars that made the generation of Rufus’s contemporaries (*Moderni*). Albert names this group with the ironic title *doctores Latini*. Alvernus, Bacon, Albert and other thinkers of the first Averroism claimed that modernists created a new form of metaphysics that updated the worst errors of previous schools run by *Nominales* and Porretan logicians. As is well known in the West, modern progress cannot be stopped.

Rufus’s another innovative contribution concerns the role of universal notion in the cognition. According to already interpreted version of *Anal. Post*. 84a11–14, the universal meaning either makes a component of hyparchical being in thinking given *per se.* Or it is about hyparchical being in reality. Metaphysics cannot exchange both forms of hyparchical being with each other in the universal predication, because logic is not metaphysics. It is necessary to respect two generically different kinds of necessity in scientific reasoning. The emergence of analytical philosophy is connected with the interpretation of *Second Analytics* when the concept of universality is newly defined (καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό, *Anal. Post*. 73b26‒27). The quotation defines universal meaning in relation to definition of the triangle. Its general definition integrates into itself all concrete cases of triangles. This essence applies to all real triangles and under all circumstances. Hyparchical being of this general definition exists in thinking, in the mode *simpliciter* and *per se*. The quoted part defines logical abstraction that determines the universal predication of geometry. The hyparchical essence of the triangle as an *univoce* defined geometric figure (ὑπάρχῃ, *inesse*) necessary determines the occurrence of the individual figures in the universal predication. The imposition is given in the mode of logical necessity and universality, because the essential being of triangle exists only in thinking. Deductive thinking and definition are given at the level of logical abstraction, and not at the level of metaphysical unity of being. The imposition of this geometric figure contains in itself hyparchical, universal and definitively given being of the triangle. The individual case of being as triangles merges with the general definition. Let us compare this view with the complete version of apodictic proof, which was analyzed in Grosseteste as the first case of Oxfordian Fallacy (*Anal. Post*. 84a13–14). For the justification of science, Rufus used the mathematical definition of universality, which is pure sophistry. Mathematical abstraction acquired a fundamental character and suppressed the metaphysical cognition. Porretan schools carried it out for the first time (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, ch. 1.5). The central importance of reality for scientific cognition of *Second analytics* is expressed in the middle link of the demonstrative proof that connects the universality and mutual actions of first substances. The imposition of meaning is given directly in the geometer’s thinking due to logical abstraction. Therefore, Rufus can establish the hyparchical function of this definition in the mode of full supposition that includes imposition; both of them are given abstractly in thinking. Since we have the essential definition of triangle in mind, we can predict it in a hyparchical way. However, the real world exists outside of mind; we recognize it scientifically in another way. The imposition of meaning comes from the hyparchical existence of real things. In metaphysics, it is true that the *ousía* in reality is not a *parousía* in thinking. The first substance exists as hyparchical being *simpliciter* in reality. We recognize its universal essence in the mode of parousia that does not contain the original being of the thing, but universally recognized and given essence in the soul (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas*). In such case of the universal essence the proof has not a logical, but a metaphysical status. Let us see previous analysis of the twofold form of universality and necessity (*Anal. Post*. 84a11–14). To make both forms of hyparchical being in one concept of “science” means a pure paranoia. In the case of astronomical eclipses, the predication of necessity and universality proceeds in opposite ways than in the definition of the triangle. The assumption of the middle link of the deduction presupposes a categorical imposition of meaning from the hyparchical causality, from effects of real astronomical bodies. The first substance, in contrast to the triangle, acts in the framework of effective, physically given causality (*passio*). Canonical text *Cat*. 2a14‒16 states that the hyparchical first substance determines the categorical predication *per prius*. Both modes of scientific proof for the eclipse and the triangle, although in terms of necessity per se and *simpliciter* (καθόλου, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει) do not share the same way of necessity and universality. The validity of the essential definition in the field of geometry is permanent and does not depend on contingent events in reality. On the contrary, the predication of first real substance needs the exposure of being from the front, since that ontological approach of pre-understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) characterizes the universally and potentially given scientific cognition. Mythology of modernity wants to establish a universal sense of the world through the *factum* of its sophistry, which was either insane or ridiculous for classical metaphysicians. That is why the modernists had to create for themselves not only their own diacosmos of simulacra, modern faculties of “philosophy,” but also a modern God as the historical guarantor of this paranoid knowledge, as well as a modern subject as the historical carrier of these sophisms. Nietzsche ended the epoch-making reign of this parallel world in the work *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*with the story of crazy man.[[383]](#footnote-383) Modernity became that madman and following the reversed version of well-known biblical proverbs (1 Cor 1:27) these learned madmen were chosen by Catholic Furies to destroy the wise philosophy. They tragically fulfilled the biblical statement. God of *Modernorum* chose foolish sophists of this world not to shame the wise, but to destroy them. Hermeneutics must show how this modern deity came into being and how he died. Let us see previously commented statements about the downfall of the wisdom of the wise in the mode of the Pythian *a/lētheia* (1 Cor 1:19); for true wisdom destroys false wisdom. This passage was quoted by Petrus Venerabilis against Abelard (ch. 1.3) and by Bishop Tempier in the decree of March 1277 against the school of the first Averroism (OBJ III, ch. 4.6). Unfortunately, by doing that unwise deeds and endorsing quite false teachings, they did not know the musical and Pythical sense of these words hidden in the mode of divine *a/lētheia*. Aristotle was not a Neoplatonist *illuminates* manipulated by Furies, but a wise philosopher who walked on the path of wisdom given by real first substances. The real substances (e.g., astronomical bodies) and mathematical abstractions make a different genre of hyparchical being. In the *univoce* done scientific proof, there can be no transition from one genus to another. The imposition of necessity made in mathematics and in physics differs fundamentally in terms of hyparchical values that constitute the predicted substances in the deductive syllogism. On the one hand, the hyparchical value is universal in thinking, and on the other hand, it is in a unique necessary thing in reality. Aristotle even rejected the transition of generic geometry to arithmetic, because this would cancel the scientific proof.[[384]](#footnote-384) Aristotle and Averroes refused to establish metaphysics on the primacy of pure forms; therefore they linked the causal effect of cognition with the real existence of *simpliciter* existing first substances. Due to this simplicity and necessity of the act of being and the effective activity of first substances (ἁπλῶς τὴν οὐσίαν, *Anal. Post*. 90a10), the first substance is separated from the universal act of cognition. It is the reason why the deductive syllogism is created by virtue of categorical predication based on the second substance. Rufus’s commentary on above-quoted passage of *Anal. Post.* 73b26–27 expands the nature of universals and created a new being of the third kind. The commentary in this passage is duplicated at the end of *Second Analytics* (*Anal. Post*. 96b2–4) by a similar assertion. Both passages represent the original *Lichtung* in which the truth and untruth (*a/lētheia*) of Western objectivity are revealed, which unfortunately tragicomically destroyed the wisdom of the sages. The historicity of being underwent a categorical, that is, a hyparchical change. Rufus erased the meaning of the metaphysical predication. Grosseteste would have never gone so far. Let us see his hesitation related to “*aliquantulum obscura*” that concerned his version of Oxfordian Fallacy. The hyparchical essence of a triangle is based on the same nature line and that of the point (τριγώνῳ γραμμὴ καὶ γραμμῇ στιγμή ἡ γὰρ οὐσία αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτων ἐστί, *Anal. Post*. 73a35‒36). That kind of geometrical and logical deduction or reduction (*resolutio*) became the model how to construct the new unified science that is based on the categorical second substance as *tertium ens*. The logically determined essence, as the atomic substance of mathematics devoured the metaphysically shaped second substance. In modern science made by Rufus, the solar eclipse transformed ancient mythological wisdom into a new sophistry as the irrational powers of Chaos engulfed the Sun in a new way. In the case of *via Modernorum*, it is but a tragicomic spectacle of modern *illuminati* led by the chaotic and therefore real Furies. In actual ἐποχή of analytic thinking began to apply universally that real being (οὐσία αὐτῶν) is reduced to the mathematical essence. All substances of the third kind derive from this essence (ἐκ τούτων ἐστί). The modernists swallowed the real Sun and showed an objective *scibile* in its place. The journey along *via Modernorum* was inspired by the Furies who founded objective science. After the eclipse of the Sun in metaphysics, modernism took its intellect-sun as main guide on the road to contemporary nihilism.

Rufus took the geometric definition of universality and, in the mode of categorical predication, related it directly to the first real substance. He does not need the second substance given in the mode of universal categories. The definition, which originally referred to the hyparchical essence of a triangle, is extended in an ambiguous way to the essence and to the real first substances included in the middle link (*medium*) of the deductive syllogism. According to Rufus, the cited thesis originally based on the universally understood predication of geometry (κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ, *Anal. Post*. 73b26‒27) applies to metaphysical character of predication concerning being as being. Aristotle rejected such use, since hyparchical nature of necessity is twofold (ὑπάρχει καθ' αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal. Post.* 84a12). The scientific proof cannot pass from one genus to the second, because the universal and causal relations are stated as the highest univocal genus with regard to the second substance. Universality and necessity do not possess a univocal status, since hyparchical being is given in thought or in reality. Rufus brought together the supposition of logical essences and the imposition of metaphysical causality in a single genre. He subordinated metaphysical predication derived from the causality of real first substances to logical and analytic discourse. Following Simplicius and Avicenna, Rufus made a *translatio studiorum* of ancient Neoplatonism in analytical philosophy. As a result, the nature of scientific proof fundamentally changed. Under professional guidance of analytical Furies, the proceeding of *Second Analytics* passed into the radical mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. Let’s look at the transformation of first three principles dealing with formal and logical universality according to *Anal. Post.* 73b25–27 from the point of view of sophistically conceived causality. The analytical thinkers took causality in the mode of the universal hyparchical meaning that covers all accidents (παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ); they are given in the foundational mode *per se* (καθ’ αὑτὸ) and in the universally given logical identity (ᾗ αὑτὸ). Rufus has no problem with the determination of causality and universality, because he combined the logical abstraction with the metaphysical abstraction to create an objective determination of *tertium ens*. Mathematical abstraction replaced the metaphysical abstraction given with regard to the real effect of astronomical bodies. Following quotation shows the complete eclipse of first substances in analytical interpretation of deductive proof done in the framework of modern Unified Science.

“In proper sense, the universal determination called ‘by itself’ (*per se*) is given when it establishes a full determination in the definition (*completam facit definitione*m) through the relation to itself (*in sua relatione*). Then the determination ‘by itself’ falls to the same kind of being (*aliquid alicui secundum se totum*). It forms a whole by itself (*secundum se totum*) and it is not given by something else, which comes to it from the outside (*non per aliquid sui convenit ei*). If it is not the above-mentioned case, then the first mode of hyparchical predication keeps the correspondence between the necessary identity of the whole (*idem per-se*) and its being given by itself (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*). The full unity of being is given only in this double mode. Other determinations of being given ‘by themselves’ outside this double relationship are included in this definition on account of their diversity.” [[385]](#footnote-385)

Determination of the atomic substance in the mode *per se* is purely formal, because it does not distinguish between the imposition of existence and the supposition of the essence. Every universal meaning and every real thing that exists *per se* has a form of self-reference, which forms its formally given identity. The inspiration of this part of the definition is in Avicenna’s objectively given equine nature (*equinitas tantum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The objective definition of the triangle is given in the mode “*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*”(καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό, *Anal. Post*. 73b27). This mode merged both hyparchical determinations made *simpliciter* and *per se* into one sophistic notion. Once again, the previous interpretation of Oxfordian Fallacy applies, which combined the logical and metaphysical predication into one kind of universality. In the definition of the triangle, this connection is fine, because the supposition and the imposition relate to the same hyparchical being given in thinking. But for the eclipse of the Sun and the Moon as real substances, it is a metaphysical error. There is a generic difference between the first and second substance (*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*). The quotation interchanged both modes of predicated universality (logical and metaphysical) and put them in one predication of the essence given *per se* and in the hyparchical mode *ipsum*. Unfortunately, the real ipseity of the cause that produces the astronomical eclipse is not the same as the mental identity that produces the definition of the triangle. Inspired by the primacy of mathematical abstraction, Rufus removed the real effect of first substances from the definition of *demonstratio*. He leaves only the universally given essence (*definitio completa*) in deductive proof. The definition is determined only in virtue of relationship to the hypostatic essence (*in sua relatione completam facit definitionem*). The universal essence of first substances is totally predicated as the hyparchical essence of the triangle. When analytical *illuminates* defines the essence of things in reality, such definition is given in the contingent mode of being (*secundum quod sunt diversa*). The sophistical nature of middle link of the proof made by combining of logical logical and metaphysical levels of causality and necessity created a modern definition of science. Both components of the universal essence (the eternal and the contingent) formed a univocal unity of the being (*secundo modo sunt idem*). Rufus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy replaced metaphysics by logical abstraction. The ipseity associated with the identity now belongs, in an undifferentiated way, both to the triangle given in thought and to the reality to form one unified demonstation of the eclipse. Rufus combined geometric universality and necessity with the metaphysical universality that relates to first substances. They exist in the mode *per se* and *simpliciter* as well, but the their necessity is of existential kind. The synthesis of both modes of universality is shown in the compound “*per-se et secundum-quod-ipsum-est*.” The conjuction “*et*” is made in completely sophistic way. The univocal mode “*per se*” combines two different levels of universal predication, i.e., the metaphysical and the logical one (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12). The syntactic copula “*et”* reveals epochal meaning of modern philosophy. Rufus established the modern theory of truth as assimilation. His uncritical theory of science absorbed the reality of the world into the realm of logical abstraction. Modern science under the leadership of Furies settled at Oxford and Paris entered the New Age of objective mythology. The unique ipseity of real first substances is given in the original of *Second Analytics* outside of cognitive intellect. Therefore, the universal metaphysical identity must be distinguished from this original ipseity. The logical predication of the universality of triangle, on the other hand, makes its ipseity to merge together with a generically given identity. Both determinations are made in the mode of mental parousia of unified meaning. The logical appearance of the totality of being in the thinking of the first modern *illuminati* connects everything to the essence made according to the example of triangle. The logical supposition of universality in the concept of triangle entails the imposition of any “real” triangle. In Rufus’s reasoning, only this logical identity makes the basis of scientific proof. Since this parousia is complete and evident, it can replace the predication of meaning from hyparchical reality, which shapes science only in a secondary way. Metaphysics received a new mythological foundation in the thinking of Oxford *illuminati* that created their own school. Bacon declared their teaching insane, Albert ridiculous and Alvernus foolish. Fortunately, these lovers of wisdom did not live in present, since they would have never graduated. In the epoch of completed metaphysical nihilism, this “crazy thinking” condemned by the first Averroism has been given a completely global character of sophisticated normality guarded by the departments of Analytical philosophy and Methodology of science.

Let us take the second part of the above-mentioned definition, which repeats the sophistry given in the original version of Oxfordian Fallacy made by Grosseteste. In apparent agreement with *Second Analytics,* Rufus says that in the first mode of metaphysical predication of universality, there is no agreement with the necessary identity of the whole (*non fuit idem per-se*) and the reality taken in itself (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*). This is true, because hyparchical being of the first substance must be universally predicted in relation to that real hyparchical existence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν, *Anal. Post*. 84a13). However, according to analytically thinking Rufus, the predication of metaphysical universality does not make a full form of scientific deduction. In the predication done *modo geometrico*, the contingent state of things is subordinated to permanent *scibile*. The full unity of being is given only in the second logical mode when hyparchical predication makes identical and even univocal unity of both merged modes of supposition and imposition. The scientific definition and the deductive proof are complete only in the case of identity of logical abstraction given by the atomic Porretan essence in the mode “*per se*” and “*idem*.” However, such an identity is hyparchical only in a logical mind of Rufus, Kilwardby, Carnap, Husserl and Wittgenstein. The science based on logical abstraction represents only half of correspondence that establishes the scientific proof according to *Second Analytics*. For Aristotle, metaphysical abstraction and predication are decisive, because they establish the first science of real substances. The correspondence between mind and thing is given in Rufus by the exposure of meaning made from behind, according to the Toledo school. Rufus interprets the *Second Analytics* according to Neoplatonic vision in *Liber de causis*, where superordinate eternal forms cause and determine being of lower forms. Then it is true that the hyparchical first substances are included in the complete scientific definition only by their otherness (*quod sunt diversa veniunt in definitionem*). Once again, according to the predication of real substances done in the second step of the metaphysical proceeding, it is only apparently correct (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, *Anal. Post*. 84a14). Rufus deduces univocity directly from the logic by means of supposition; but metaphysics takes it from the first substances by means of imposition. It is extremely important from which side univocity comes into the deduction, whether from the real world or from the modern subject. Rufus comprehends the metaphysical necessity in the mode of sophistic simulacrum of reality, i.e., according to univocity of higher hyparchical forms given in *Liber de causis*. However, those forms do not really exist. Even if they existed, they would nor have been recognizable to us in their original *actus essendi* as immaterial actualized cosmic substances. The descent of eternal forms into the contingency of Porretan species creates the kind of deductive judgment that is made out according to above-mentioned complete causality of the third kind (*praemissae sunt causae completae*). Rufus fabricated non-existent new modern clothes for naked Porretan emperor. It suits him beautifully, in the mode of modern *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. That metaphysical stupidity is proclaimed in the global village of today by postmodern subject that is subjected to victorious Furies of all kinds. The error given by the substitution of the first triad of recognition principles for the second triad was patent and evident in the times of Rufus. All main representatives of the first Averroism opposed to it. The second part of the cited connection (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*) starts from the Porretan univocity between essence and existence (ch. 1.4). This ipseity of hypostatized “essence—form” as being of the third kind abolished the relation to the real world made of first substances. The analytical scheme of science determines the substance from behind, by universal logical supposition, and not from the front by metaphysical imposition that ties to real causality and is predicted in the middle link of *demonstratio*.

The new cognition of the world is conceived in the Porretan mode of exposing the being from behind, with the help of mathematical definition. It is eternally identical *per se*, whereas the real substance exists in the mode of contingent and empirically recognized hylemorphic reality. The real substances are simply not so beautiful as modern *tertium ens*, because they do not wear the emperor’s new and beautiful clothes. This sophistic absence of the first substance done in the mode of fundamental metaphysical error (*Irrtum*), establishes modern objective determination of being in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The result of analytic interpretation of being is formally the same as in the first Averroism. But similarity of conclusions is deceptive. The suppression of metaphysical thinking that follows the necessity of the metaphysical dative, led to the eclipse of the first substance. The logical “substance—essence” is now determined as the totality of being (*per-se convenit aliquid alicui secundum se totum*). The determination “*secundum se totum*” was disputed as nature of substance between Abelard and Porretans (ch. 1.3). Aristotle primarily defines by this term the essential definition of the triangle (*secundum per se*). Rufus, however, comprehends the essence universally and *univoce* for real first substances that are reduced to Porretan individuals. In his view of analytical metaphysics, this “*totum*” also belongs to metaphysical predication of substances that are in reality. It is true that this can be done for the triangle, but it is not the predication of physical causality, which causes the eclipse of astronomical bodies such as the Sun and the Moon. Such type of science must be created according to the metaphysical necessity “*ex inmediatis*,” because of the categorical imposition that refers to hyparchic being of things in the world. Made in the mode of metaphysical correspondence, that kind of science keeps the authentic character of Aristotle’s *quidditas* as metaphysical determination of what the world is (τό τί ἦν εἶναι). The metaphysical dative entails this original donation of being. Wise knowledge follows the path of the Sun that goes in one direction. As a universal sign (ἕρμαιον), Aristotelian metaphysics uses the metaphysical dative that traces past things already given in reality (*representatio*). Deity Dike as punishing goddess of Justice holds the keys to the Gate of Day and Night (κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς, *Parm*. B 1.37), but not the mortal who follows the path of the Sun in the firmament. Therefore this kind of necessity is the first one and the necessity of logical subject is secondary. The mortal beings have no divine nature and they cannot put both kinds of necessity in one kind of intellectual understanding. Modernity, after the eclipse of the first substance, introduced its own justice under the direction of Furies. Consequently, modernists had to extinguish the true Sun in their objective mythology. They created its own modern God as the full measure of its objective Dike. The scientist looks directly at the essence of the triangle and makes an analytical science as a true and immediate present of this universality (*presentatio*, οὐσία). It should be noted that this presence of meaning is the result of intellectual activity performed by the metaphysical dative. The presence of the triangle is at the same time its full meaning recognized in the intellect (*representatio*, παρουσία). However, the human intellect never makes the presence of real things as first substances (οὐσία). We are not God and cannot create the real world. The presence of hyparchical substances is established by donation of existence made by the metaphysical dative. Human knowledge uniquely makes the parousia of real things in human intellect to make the universal sense. The necessity that exists in reality, it needs therefore the imposition of meaning to create the true correspondence in the intellect. The metaphysical dative of *Second Analytics* creates in a critical and scientific way the human *re-presentatio* of the divine order. We cannot create a direct presentation of external reality, because it is given in relation to our knowledge only in the hyparchical past mode. We do not have the keys to the Gate of Day and Night.

The blindness of modernity and postmodernity is given in the tragic form of the objective Oedipus complex (OBJ III, ch. 7). Modernity has exchanged the hermeneutic representation of the world in the mode of truth as correspondence for its mythological presentation in the mode of truth as analytical evidence. Aristotelian *quidditas* became univocal and universal atomic substance as logical *individuum*. This certain and correct manifestation of objective being (παρουσία) created the mystical science of modern *illuminati* at Oxford. Wise people observe the world at first; then, they know something. Foolish people make the “science” the other way around. Rufus made the order *per prius* that was based on logical abstraction. He did not predict the causality of first substances in reality; he stated a nominalistic determination of absolutely determined essence. This analytical sophist disregarded the argumentation of *Second Analytics*. Rufus deliberately changed the statute of universality in scientific judgment, to which he added *ex post* the effective causality. The hyparchical being of triangle, Aristotle considered it only in the mode of universal mathematical abstraction. Modern sophistry of Rufus combined hyparchical being of triangle with hyparchical being of the first substance. Aristotle’s essentiality is valid but for the hyparchical function of the geometric figure of the triangle; it became a predication of objective and causally valid modern universality given in the mode *per prius*. Through the sophistry of *Second Analytics*, Rufus opened a new age called *via Modernorum*. His exploit did not escape either his critics or his enthusiastic and poorly learned students (*Ricardus Cornubiensis, famosissimus apud stultam multitudinem*, ch. 3.2). The first positivism of analytical philosophy observed the *Tractatus*-world in the mode “*discrete videamus*.” From the canonical theorem of primacy concerning the first substance in categorical predication (*Cat*. 2a14–16), only the second part of the statement became valid. The universal supposition in the mode of the Neoplatonic form according to *Liber de causis* determines *modo geometrico* lower species and individuals (*suppositio formalis*). The mathematical essence given by Aristotle’s “*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*” (καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό) became the basis of being made in the absolutely universal mode given *per se*. The essence replaced categorically predicted first substances and their real causality. This universal form of supposition established categorical essential predication in the mode of mathematical abstraction. The objective causality of this new substance of the third kind is given in the mode of the eidetic parousia of *illuminati*. It formes the middle link of objectively valid scientific proof (*medium et causa idem*). The effect of Oxfordian Fallacy mediated by Western civilization gave that objective causality an epochal historical effectiveness. Through this metaphysical error, the complete figure of analytic philosophy was created in Oxford about the year 1235, which was founded in the incomplete mode by Grosseteste about the year 1230. First Latin modernists gave the universals the status of first substances, which they transformed into a being of the third kind. The above quotation from *Anal. Post.* 73b25–27 referred in the original only to geometric and mathematical proportion. The first substance has its own being, given *per se* outside of human cognition and abstraction. In epochal transformation of reality, this “*secundum se totum*” became a new, unique and univocal being of the third kind. Due to the new concept of “*causae completae*,” there was a complete eclipse of the first substance in the analytical version of science. Rufus claims that real determinations of things and their causality make not a hyparchical subject of deduction (*sub suis partibus subiectivis*); the absolutely true determination of being is formed by essential definition (*subiectum*...*pro partibus constitutivis*).[[386]](#footnote-386) Modern science does not recognize the real world, but it constructs knowledge through axioms and essences. Metaphysical reality of investigated things is no longer hyparchical, but logical, but it acts as if it originated from reality of first substances.

All cited representatives of the first Averroism rejected this sophistry of Oxford made by modernists. Critical thinkers are able to distinguish between logical and metaphysical universality. Rufus’s deduction was inspired by division of universals according to the school of *Nominales*. Done in the mode of Porphyry’s Tree, the deduction goes down to the individual as essence conceived in the mode of hypostatized ipseity (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*). That non-existent individual is contained in the essence in the eternal mode *per prius*, and its objective parousia is made in the illuminated mind. Complete composition of individuals and their hypostatized properties in modern scientific deduction are related to occurrences of universal essences. Rufus puts cognition in the first real substance (*scientia*) in contingent occurrence of essences in the mode *per posterius*. The substitution of existence in the mode “*quo est*” for the modern essence in the mode “*quod est*” gave rise to modern knowledge placed outside causal interactions of first substances. Rufus’s modern science follows Grosseteste’s dualism given by twofold division of cognition (*scientia—intellectus*). The hyparchical being in the cited part of *Second Analytics* determine but the logical aspect of science given by geometric abstraction. This determination acquired a universal meaning. The essence of the triangle, with its abstracted hyparchical being, became an universal being as substance of the third kind. For Aristotle, the real substance in the hyparchical mode *per prius* makes the basis of cognition. Only this entity has a real causality, which determines its accidental and potential predication in thinking. The substantial being of the triangle is not hyparchical in the way of the first substance, because it is given by mere abstraction and exists only in thinking. Although the triangle has a hyparchical existence in the essential definition, mathematical abstraction makes only an equivocation from the point of view of metaphysical abstraction. This substrate is given by itself and for itself (καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό), because it exists only as a potentiality, that is, in the mode of universal concept. The bearer of this concept is the real thinking person due to hyparchical, hylemorphic existence in the body. The definition of the triangle is the result of logical abstraction, which does not require the reality of the first substance. If we enclose any universal by the act of *modus tollens*, then the logical supposition disappears, because it exists only as a universal species. Therefore, the original categorical imposition is checked by the principle called “*destructio primis*” (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). If we erase the cognition of the Sun in mind, then the real Sun still continues to shine in the firmament.

The first Averroism admitted no incursion of theological dogmatic into Aristotelian philosophy, or mathematics into metaphysics, as it was done by Gilbert de La Porrée, Rufus, and, after them, by all modern and postmodern Porretans. Therefore, Thomas Aquinas interpreted the doctrine on abstraction in Boethius’ work *De Trinitate* against Parisian Porretans and Avicennist modernists. This work does not comment at all on these three stages of abstraction in the original. The first Averroism had to show in academic debates after the year 1250 the nature of fundamental error that modernist made. Modern philosophers and theologians could not invoke the classical authorities of Western wisdom to promote their thinking. Rufus absolutized the essence as the basis of science. The existence of the essence precedes the existence of real substances. Let us see the concept of doubled being in Porphyry, in which the pro-hyparchical being precedes Aristotle’s hyparchical substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Grosseteste partly adopted this view and separated empirical cognition (*scientia*) and insight into pure forms (*intellectus*) in the twofold nature of science. In the new constellation, Rufus repeats gigantomachy of substance made by Porphyry that Avicenna updated. He took up the real existence as an accident (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The first substance merely forms the formal and essential supposition of our cognition; it no longer reveals itself in its real causal uniqueness. Grosseteste did not allow such a radical displacement of the first substance and its causality from the scheme of cognition. He defined the unity of the person as a unique, causally acting first substance. We think when we want it, and not when the cosmic *intellectus agens* thinks in us. That is why Bacon and Ockham took Grosseteste as a witness in the dispute with the school of *Modernorum*. The modern Porretans have the basic certainty of cognition, which is given from above and by the exposure of hypostatized eternal essences given in the “*semel—semper*” mode. Then we can take in grace Aristotle’s empirical *scientia* as well. The scientific demonstration finds in the contingent *scientia* an additional confirmation of what *illuminati* already knew in the intuition made by their enlightened intellect. By this interpretation, the objective *illuminates* Rufus justified the above-cited metaphysical proceedings of *resolutio* and *compositio*. The school of Grossesteste took up his arguments in the following decade when they compiled the work *Summa philosophiae* (ch. 3.1.3). Mathematical constitution of being is incomplete and, according to scientifically thinking *illuminati*, it requires a Neoplatonic descent into matter. The higher essence do not need the empirical actualization given in real first substances. The descent from mathematics into reality secures the theory of truth as Avicennian *certitudo*. This mystical descent of modern mind into the matter of the third kind gave rise to the first scientific and logical form of deductive proof for natural sciences. The basis of Grosseteste’s and Rufus’s *scientia* is the mythologic kind of metaphysics (λόγος) converted into an analytical philosophy. Through the descent of forms into universal matter of the third kind and into equally sophisticated body of the third kind gives birth to contingent identity of original cosmic forms. It is predicated with regard to the ipseity of hypostatized essences. This catabasis of forms into the matter was found in late antiquity in the Simplicius’s and Avicenna’s scenario as well as in *Liber de causis*.

Now it becomes clear why Grosseteste and Rufus needed the concept of cosmic *anima mundi* that the Blund’s school had rejected. The cosmic soul forms the mythical reservoir of hyparchical cosmic forms (*locus specierum*) according to Dionysus Areopagite. This reservoir has been replaced in nihilistic version of this metaphysics by digital databases in the mode of cloud computing. The non-existent soul of the world is veiled by objective cloud of planetary digital knowledge guarded by the nihilistic subject. Through this docetic copulation of two subjectively and objectively given being of the third kind, the globally honored *corpus mysticum* of today’s science was created. The value of predicated ipseity lies exactly the other way around in modernity than in the first Averroism. The ipseity is supported by first substances and it is first recognized by the bodily senses. Rufus’s modern version of Oxfordian Fallacy gave the recognition of reality a new ontological comprehension of being (*Vor-blickbahn*). The modern solar myth replaced the orbit of the real Sun in the firmament. The metaphysical necessity disappeared from modern analytical science. Tragicomic *illuminati* hold the keys of Dike in their own pocket; they can go across the totality of beings that are presented to them by modern Furies. This type of modernist worldview was first described by the last authors of Greek tragedy. The main characters, in agreement with Bacon, were presented as madmen who ended tragically their life. The empirical recognition given by hyparchical position of hylemorphic substances has disappeared. The first substance is only presupposed as postmodernists Descartes and Husserl did it. The recognition of the first substance is primarily scientific as the intuition of essential entities, namely through mystical or intuitive reflection (Grosseteste’s *intellectus*). The weak intellect of the first Averroists recognizes the world scientifically adequately according to *Second Analytics*, that is, by effects of first substances in reality. The following quotation from Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* shows the emergence of the new subject of scientific cognition. The subject of analytical statements no longer needs the relation to hyparchical reality.

“The subject is given in two ways, in the general and in its own sense (*commune vel proprium*). The existence of the essential subject (*quid sit*) need not be investigated on the basis of any particular science or by empirical cognition (*in aliqua scientia*). The proof must be considered for the subject in its own sense of being (*de proprio ostenditur*). In the subject thus given, its general being is not shown in the primary mode of existence (*non est subiectum in illa ostensione in qua ostenditur esse*), nor is it manifested from the first principles of cognition (*neque ostenditur esse ex principali*), but only from the conclusions in demonstrative judgment (*sed ex consequenti*). Then the essence of the subject thus given (*ubi est subiectum*) is not manifested by the empirical imposition, but on the basis of the intuitive supposition (*non ostenditur, sed supponitur*).” [[387]](#footnote-387)

The quotation states in an Aristotelian way that it is necessary to investigate the thing existing in reality (*de proprio*) and not only in essence (*de communi*). However, the real thing is not explored in the first relation to its phenomenal reality (*non est subiectum in illa ostensione*), which is given as a direct manifestation of actual being of the thing (*in qua ostenditur esse*). According to *Second Analytics*, this makes but half the truth. Universal metaphysical predication does not imply a hyparchical being of real things, but it expresses that being in an adequate way. Rufus is not interested in causality of first substances, which determines recognition in the original writing of *Second Analytics*. The imposition of the deductive proof is not formed by the first substance recognized due to univocal predication that relates to the second substance. The source of cognition is not the manifestation of real things, but its logical supposition (*ubi est subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur*). This supposition applies to the essentially given meaning and establishes the certain subject of statements. This is given at the level of analytical deduction from pure *exemplars* and essences. Due to such foundational supposition, the Cartesian certainty of the enlightened intellect in its hypostatized actuality became the source of meaning. It is not reality of the first substance that exists outside the cognizing subject. The consequence of scientific deduction with respect to contingent reality is given by the universal hylemorphism, when higher forms descend into the lower matter (*neque ostenditur esse ex principali, sed ex consequenti*). This gave rise to modern scientology of natural sciences. The methodology of such “Unified Science” runs according to Aristotelianism of Toletans as an analytical deduction. Rufus took up the original form of ontologically given, *modo geometrico* created Neoplatonic deduction in the work *Liber de causis*. He inserted that deduction into the interpretation of the scientific proof based on *Second Analytics*. The deities of Chaos became the power of mathematical-analytical mind; they prepared the first Cartesian motifs for the emperor's new clothes, designed by Rufus. The universally recognized “exsistence” of modern *individuum* is based on the higher subsistent form capable of taking cognition out of higher forms to lower ones (*deducere*). The existence of things taken analytically, that is, deductively conceived as *tertium ens*, it follows reasoning of Rufus’s Oxfordian Fallacy. The second triad of the principles guides logical conclusions of statements that determine the predication of the first triad. Once again, the basic error of logical and nominalistic predication is done in the form of predication called “*in artificialibus*” that is placed outside of metaphysical abstraction. Thinking cannot create a real thing, only God can do that. Cognition of real things is scientifically deduced from the totality of accidental or essential properties, which are reflected in Porretan version of the scientific proof. The individual thing occurs in Rufus as *suppositum* of the third kind (*individuum*). Such supposition is based on the existence of the cognizing subject and not on that of the real thing (*suppositio formalis*). The quotation shows a new assumption with regard to the individual being. Its essence is given in a direct insight into hypostatized universal meaning. That kind of individuality is covered by a substantial definition.[[388]](#footnote-388) The supposition of modernity is given by the fact that the subject of cognition directly observes the nominal essence. It forms a principal source of an “exsisting” thing present in the supposition (*principia subiecti et facta ex genere et differentia illius subiecti*). Rufus created a new version of *Ge-Stell* (OBJ I, ch. 1.2), which already carries all nihilist features of later *dativus obiectivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). The subject assigns to itself being of the third kind, which it has created by itself. There is no need for an imposition from changeable reality. Instead of cognizing abstraction, the logical deduction of essences takes place, made in the mode of universal supposition. Oxford *illuminati* founded the first “subject—object” structure of cognition that is purely anthropocentric and it runs on the basis of modern mythology. Man is the foundation (*subiectum*) of the world; he, first of all, recognizes ideal essences and he proves their real existence afterwards. The causality of first substances lost the status of the first subject of scientific cognition that was assured by the middle link of scientific deductive proof. The modernist himself and his habitual ability of cognition become the subject of cognition, see Rufus’s quotations interpreted above. Modern science received historic facticity, because the essence and its consideration are given as correspondence of subjective *factum* and its supposition in illuminated mind. There is an identity of facts in the intellect and their objective reality. That correspondence is ensured by the fact that one and the same *suppositum* exists *univoce* both in thinking and in reality (*subiectum non ostenditur, sed supponitur*). Therefore, Kant needs a priori given categories as pure concepts of understanding and the unity of apperception (*das „Ich denke“*) as two a priori determined subjective foundations of objectivity.[[389]](#footnote-389) As *tertium ens* from the external world, there are the time and the space as pure a priori forms of all possible perception. Following Rufus’s proceeding, Kant established the a priori given level of “subject—object” relations that needs no scientific proof. The autonomous subject includes the recognition of one’s own product of reflection (*factum*) in the metaphysical certainty of the first science that is established by the direct consideration of the first principles. Modern facticity knows no difference between its products and reality. By mixing the metaphysical imposition and the logical supposition in the concept of *scibile* there is no more a difference between human *factum* and the external reality. The analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* based on Oxfordian Fallacy turned the view of reality upside down. Modernity determines the real substance from the hyparchical essence, and not from the position of the first substance. In the key turn of modernity into a mythological *factum*, the existence of real things became a being of the third kind. This fateful *factum* of the modern subject in the mode of *alētheia* becomes an objectively given truth of the West. Rufus’s methodology starts a historical period called *via Modernorum*. He was described by Bacon as an insane thinker (*apud sapientes fuit insanus*, ch. 3.2). What was insane in critical Aristotelianism became modern remake done in the new form of objective mythology. Rufus created the first modern facticity of sciences. He created the sophistic narrative mode according to modernized dialogue *Timaeus*, in which the demiurge created the lower world according to original archaic principles. Platonic beginning of modernity was transferred from Simplicius and Persian Avicenna to the Latin West. It was followed by the new beginning of modernists at Oxford. The founding initiative of Rufus as the first objective sophist is still protected and maintained today by his native alma mater and, after it, by all the chairs of analytical philosophy and methodology of modern sciences. Modern metaphysics completed the eclipse of the first substance and allowed its own simulacra to rule. Modernism and postmodernism in the mode of the historical *passio* given in metaphysical nihilism, proved with deeds and words that the wise people do not always win in life, let alone in modern philosophy.

Following Avicenna, Rufus introduced the modern concept of intentionality. His idea has nothing in common with intentionality based on *diaphanum* as it is in CMDA. The triad “*res—diaphanum—intellectio*” is given in the framework of Aristotelian abstraction as *proportio* of the cognitive form that passes from the senses to the intellect. In the act of intentional reception, the intellect must take on the sensual and the intellectual form abstracted from the existing real thing. Bacon acknowledged that modernists in Oxford no longer needed the reality of first substances to ensure the metaphysical unity of being. The common determination passes (*exsistit*) into the individual being, which then becomes a mental actualization of the universal, *per se* given essence. This model of amphibolic predication is introduced into Western metaphysics by Alfarabi through the notion “modulated terms” (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). Amphibolic determinations of being created *tertium ens* that laid the foundation of objectivity as soon as it entered the system of categorical predication. Let us return to introductory commentary of *Categories*, where the predication is determined by real substances and their causality, which is included in premises of scientific syllogism (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). We have commented on fundamental change in the interpretation of *Categories* in Oxford and Paris above (ch. 3.1.2). The classical definition of univocity and equivocity was established by Aristotle in the mode of categorical predication. This was conveyed by the commentary of Boethius on *Categories* to later Scholasticism. Rufus formally follows Aristotelianism; but its interpretation of categorial predication runs according to Avicenna. The new concept of intentionality is demonstrated in this quotation inspired by Oxfordian Fallacy.

“The modalities of universal predication (*modi praedicandi communiter*) have four basic types. Either the intention is contained in many individual things (*una intentio reperta in pluribus*) and according to their nature; then it is a univocal predication; or, it is neither one intention nor the common nature, and then the mere equivalence applies.” [[390]](#footnote-390)

The unity of meaning is not related to the second substance considered *per prius*, but to the view of the enlightened subject (*intentio*). According to Avicenna’s model, academic *illuminati* contemplate the universals directly in things (*intentio reperta in pluribus*). The first substances are considered as individual things from the point of view of their common nature (*per naturam eandem*). Only the first intention given in the cognizing subject is entitled to univocity. From the point of view of classical Aristotelianism, it is an analogous predication of unity, which is taken from the point of view of the cognizing subject. It is not given by the causality of first substances in reality (κοινὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, *Anal. Post*. 76a38‒39). Rufus absolutizes this logical predication by exchanging it with the metaphysical unity of being. According to Aristotle, metaphysical abstraction cannot be established analogically at the level of mathematical abstraction. The univocity can done only by real causality that makes the imposition of categorical meaning, which is predicted from the direction of the first substances. Analogy, according to Aristotle, is predicated from the supposition of the cognizing subject, which is not sufficient to establish a univocal science. Rufus abolished the metaphysical unity of being and replaced it with mathematical and analogical unity. He illuminates the second substances from behind, according to the subjective certainty of knowing the eternal essences and according to mathematical abstraction. Avicennist sense of intentionality as vision of original simplicity of being (*equinitas tantum*) is now defined in the framework of a new universal predication. The parousia of objectivity means that the modern subject necessarily observes universals and individuals everywhere (*ubi est subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur*). According to the analogical supposition, Rufus can predict the subjective being of the third kind into real things. Such *tertium ens* “exsists” everywhere in the mode of objective supposition. The intentionality given by various forms of diaphanum is useless. For modern cognition, the imposition of meaning from reality is only secondary. The solar intellect illuminates things directly, and *illuminati* recognize the realm of *tertium ens* directly as well. Rufus makes the first known distinction between two types of intentionality that following tradition established by Scotus understands by the terms *intentio prima* and *intentio secunda*. Avicennists observe essences directly in the first reflection (*intentio prima*); in the second step, they find their contingent occurrence in real things (*intentio secunda*). There in no difference between the primary sensual actualized intention as *species sensibilis*, and the secondary inteligibile and purely formal intention as *species intelligibilis*. The new worldview confirms Porretan motto “*discrete videamus*.” It justified the analogical predication of individually conceived universals as last univocal and common units of meaning. The recognition of reality in the second Averroism is not based on Aristotelian abstraction, but on universal Neoplatonic analogy. Aristotelian abstraction takes up the existence of first substances. It creates in the intellect the universal and univocal predication of what exists in reality, in a singular and absolutely simple way. The analytical school turned existence into a mere accident, which is added to essences from the outside. Moreover, such existence is given in the process of random accidental determinations, made in the mode of Porretan collection of hypostases.

Rufus’s commentary on *Metaphysics* (*Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, 1231–35) was written in parallel with the commentary on *Second Analytics*. The commentary does not refer to existence of real things, but to the subsistence of hypostatized individuals (*individuum habet propriam essentiam superadditam essentiae speciei*).[[391]](#footnote-391) Existence provided the permanent categorical “substance—species” with an additionally added accident (*superadditum*). Avicenna provided the archetypal pattern of this cognition of reality; let us see his concept of creation made in the framework of ontotheological comitation (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The archetypal, necessary and universal determination of things in divine thinking exist for eternity. Secondly, it makes the actualization of that possible essence in real time. Rufus continues in an original way in this Neoplatonic ontotheology based on the comitation of subsistent forms. It was rejected by all representatives of the first Averroism. Such kind of intentionality presupposes the external *intellectus agens* that acts upon human soul from above. Grosseteste opposed to it the conception of intellect as an internal form of the soul. It comes (*superveniens*) to the mental acts of the physically given soul to serve as a pattern (*immediate advenit formae non situali*, ch. 3.2). What was originally considered a specific form of the human intellectual soul, that now applies in general to all Porretan hypostatic individuals. The unity of real entities is predicated by hypostatized determination of quantity, which the first Averroism considered a mere accident. The basis of the new worldview is Neoplatonic notion of quantity, which we have analyzed in Simplicius and his followers (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Rufus sees a new unity of the world, in which it is possible to state the unity using generic and specific determinations of the Neoplatonic origin. There is a third definition of deductive syllogism (*medio modo*) put beyond the univocity and the equivalence of categorical predication. It is given in the framework of mathematical abstraction. The philosophical vision of the world made through mathematics has been celebrated by Husserl as a fundamental value of Western thought. Its origin can be found in this quotation. Rufus followed nominalistic definition of univocity a and homonymy done by illumination of being from behind, from the cognizing subject. The most imporatant part concerns the definition of analogy.

“The predication done in an analogical way (*medio modo*) is given in two modalities. Either an intention is given in individual things that differ according to differently given nature. It is the case of determination called ‘quantity,’ because the totality of quantity is given in the intention that represents its measure (*omnis quantitas communicat in hac intentione quæ est mensura*). But this intention of numerically different individual things takes its causality from mathematical unity (*intentio in numero causatur a natura unitatis*); in the geometry, the causality starts from the point; in the temporal proceeding, it starts from the causality based on the present moment.” [[392]](#footnote-392)

Rufus found a new way to the unity of being that will be later called “*analogia entis*”. Analogical predication does not need real first substances to realize the unity of predication. Intentionality of Rufus starts with Porretan essences that are considered as hyparchical substances. The intention of universality occurs in different individual things (*intentio eadem in pluribus*). The quotation created a unity *per prius*, which is not predicted in relation to real substances, but to accidental determinations according to Neoplatonic concept of quantity (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). The accidents given on generically different substances make an analogous unity by the fact that there is a common mathematical equivalent of quantity that can be summed up as quantitatively done measure (*omnis quantitas communicat in hac intentione quæ est mensura*). As far as the unity of metaphysics is concerned, there is even a double error of thinking. First: Aristotelians rejected any categorical unity outside the univocal predication made with regard to the causally predicated imposition that is stated on the level second substance. Second: Rufus abolished the metaphysical univocity and even the classical analogy, that Aristotle defined in relation to real states of affairs in the world. Rufus replaced that Aristotelian analogy with the mathematical analogy. Modern *illuminati* do not observe the unity of the world but a kind of analogical similarity made in their mind by matematics. The quotation establishes a new kind of causality, in which actual cause is replaced by modern intentionality. Illuminated mind sees unifying analogy of individual things due to mathematically made causality that establishes the new unity of being (*intentio in numero causatur a natura unitatis*). Rufus defines this intentional causality of mathematics by the point for extension (*magnitudine autem a natura puncti*) and by the instant for the flow in time (*in tempore autem a natura instantis*). The new unity of the world given in “*medio modo*” has a special univocal character, which is given by mathematical proportion and Neoplatonic participation in the mathematically determined measure. The unity is formed by Neoplatonic relation, which is based on Jamblichus’s principle “Limited—Unlimited” (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). In the context of mathematics (number), geometry (point) and physical time (present moment), the univocal predication defines by its definition the infinite and contingent continuum of matter or motion determined by previous indicators. As a result, a new *resolutio* of modernity was created. Various substances are considered in terms of modern unity and then predicated as such. This unity is given as a hypostatic quantity and measure, which are conceived in an analogical way. The previous interpretation of the work *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi* has shown that on this basis a new philosophical possibility of differential and integral numbers in mathematics has emerged (ch. 1.4). Modern *predicabilia* play the role of second substances that are no longer necessary to ensure the univocal predication. The basis of unity (number, point, time) is given *univoce* in all bodies and that fundament works in the essential, substantial and causal way. These *praedicabilia*, introduced by Rufus, works today in the framework of differential and integral number. There was the last infinite individual of Porretans in the system of division given as modern *resolutio* and *compositio*. In the analytical version of Oxfordian Fallacy, the world was conceived a new, mathematically given unity of being (*intentio in numero causatur a natura unitatis*). The verb “*causatur*” must be understood as sophistic mixture of causal effects and universal meaning that took up the causality of first substances. Modern *illuminati* observe the third world of modern objectivity (*medio modo*) through the principle of universal analogy. General meaning of mathematical essences causally determines the contingent occurrence of things in reality. Rufus’s commentary on *Metaphysics* and *Second Analytics* provoked Bacon to interpret the *Metaphysics* a decade later, in the spirit of the first Averroism (ch. 3.2). The basis of objective mathematics is formed by Rufus’s analytical form of Neoplatonic *methexis*, in which the real existence of things is not determined by Platonic ideas, but by the Neoplatonic essence, relations, properties, etc., which are considered in the framework of causality made by mathematical analogy. Rufus added his original part of sophistry to Oxfordian Fallacy. He did away Grosseteste’s terminus “*aliquantulum obscura*” (ch. 3.1.1) to achieve full eclipse of the first substance. His sophistic worldview made use of crooked Aristotelianism. Albert rejected it after 1240 by in Paris (*De homine*) and Bacon did it at the same time in the commentary on *Metaphysics* (*Metaphysica*, ca. 1240–45). Conceived analytically, the existence of the world and of hyparchic substances have become an accident of modern thought. The school of *Modernorum* abolished definitely the tradition of Aristotelian philosophy made in the first Averroism. The medial form of univocity of the third kind establishes the unity of being on the basis of a mathematical or geometric analogy. In the scenario of modernity, the discrete worldview introduced by Porretans took on a new mathematical form. The introduction of intentional analogical unity (number, point, instant) created a new metaphysics of being that no longer requires hyparchical first substances. Rufus even does not need the second substance, because he built up the unity of hypostatized accidents as extension and quantity. In the mode “*ad unum*,” he combined these accidents into an analogical unity based on mathematical abstraction. The future destiny of the West will be shaped by the unity of being according to a mathematical measure relative to everything quantitatively determined (*omnis quantitas communicat in hac intentione*). The change given in the above-mentioned notion of “*causae completae*” shows that the mathematical measure makes the unity in a effective real way, namely through the essence given as a *medium* of deductive judgment. This form of causality of the third kind became historically effective through the mathematics since the 17th century. Rufus sophistry laid the foundation of postmodern science and technology. The predication made “*medio modo*” becomes the basis of the further matrices of objectivity. Duns Scotus as successor of Rufus at Oxford understood the real potential of this predication for modernity. Scotus objectively repressed the reality of first substances and he put Avicennian essences instead of them (*intentio prima*). The metaphysics of *Modernorum* was born as a result of the fact that Scotus identified the first substance to be an individual object “exsisting” in the actuality of the first intention. He established another form of univocal objective predication (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.1). Aristotle and Averroes would certainly have rejected the primacy of mathematical abstraction and analogy for scientific cognition. The scientific proof must predict the univocal relation of second substances in the middle link of the syllogism in the mode of imposition, that is, by the meaning that retains the causality of first substances.

The new worldview was created by the Franciscan group of *intelligentia spiritualis* on the basis of Rufus’s innovative interpretation of scientific proof. Five years was enough for Grosseteste to raise a new generation of metaphysicians in the Franciscan College in Oxford in the years 1230–35. Academic *illuminati* such as Rufus radicalized Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* towards mathematical abstraction. They developed a modern analytical philosophy associated with mathematical nature of the world. Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* completed the development of Oxfordian Fallacy. The predication of the first substance related to the original being of the thing (*actus essendi*) transformed into the intention of the essence given in the mode of the mathematical *individuum*. The existence of the thing became a Porretan hypostasis in the mode of objective *exsistere*. The original and self-confident Franciscan master transformed the doctrine of *Nominales*, which understood the universals as individual essences, into a new form of categorical predication. Since the year 1235, classical concepts of *Nominales* such as *species*, *individuum*, *quantitas* and *numerus* became a new quasi-substance. They received the statute of hyparchical subject (Aristotle’s ὑποκείμενον). Those new forms of *tertium ens* established the categorical predication that created the unity of being in the analogical mode done *per prius*. Necessarily, the existence of real things does not have the same meaning in the second Averroism as in the first Averroism. The first and the second Averroism differ from each other fundamentally in the classical thesis of the “*forma dat esse*” and “*materia dat esse*.” Modern form and matter have the status of a being of the third kind that “exsists” in the mixture of the first and the second substance as a Porretan hypostatic union. Avicennists and Rufus assert that the essence has its own causality that is recognizable as being of the third kind in the process of *demonstratio*. The middle link of the deductive syllogism played a necessary role to ensure the deduction. Its actualization is given *ad hoc* in reality by power of the eternal exemplary essence. If the singularized essence is found and recognized in reality, then the objective “exsistence” of Porretan individuals or Rufus’s *scibile* passes into the predication related to existence of the first substance. Rufus linked the interpretation of *Second Analytics* with the universal predication of Avicenna. The existential statement combined the permanent value of the essence safeguarded through the copula with its ephemeral actualization in reality. Both modes of substance (the eternal species, their contingent existence here and now) are given *simpliciter*. Like this, the univocity of scientific cognition is ensured in the new form of categorical predication. The actualization or exemplification of objective forms makes the middle link of demonstrative proof and therefore it possesses the causality of the third kind. The individual and universal essence extends (*exsistit*) into the existence of real things (*actualiter exsistentia*). The nihilistic phase of metaphysics knows this procedure of deduction through the analytical terms “Principle of instantiation” or “Principle of exemplification.” If the contingent reality does not realize this reception of modern form, then, according to modernists, nothing serious happens. There are essences given in the mode “*semel—semper*” at least in modern God and after his death in some indexed databases. Then, it is certain that the individual always “exsists” as a universal logical predicate. Although this specific universal does not yet possess a modern “exsistence” in reality, it keeps a kind of hypostatized being. It is defined as objective existence (ὑπάρχῃ, *inesse*) of this or that essence or form in divine intellect (*ens ratum, ens diminutum*). At this level, the existence of the thing is given in the mode *obiective*. Every potential “thing” is given as an object of divine intentionality that is considered in the creative mode of *intentio prima*. A new *Lichtung* of untruth was created by the exposure from behind, from the acquired intellect activated by the cosmic *intellectus agens*. This intellect acts as an eternal and evident *locus specierum*. Enlightened intellect of modern *illuminati* reflects this treasury of the objective being and grasps Avicenna’s universal nature of things considered “*ad modum universalis*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). For critical thinkers of the first Averroism, such theory of “science” represented a complete denial of sound mind, not just the annihilation of Aristotelian philosophy. Instead of exploring reality, they began to explore God’s thinking, in which reality is objectively given. Bacon as the greatest connoisseur of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* at that time considered modern sophists as Rufus to be philosophical lunatics. According to him, univocity exists only within the framework of the genus. The science as correspondence between reality and intellect cannot be established by the enlightened science fiction of modern *illuminati*. They reflect their own *scibile* as being of the third kind. The analogy given only in thought is now universally predicated in univocal mode. Such predication “*in artificialibus*” created the metaphysical unity of esences, hypostatic forms, individuals and various kinds of *tertium ens*. Analytical Avicennists in Oxford and Paris acquired a mystical insight into divine thinking. They found Ali Baba’s cave of objective meaning. It concerns non-existent Neoplatonic entities that the Persian Falsafa had prepared for them. Philosophical schools in Baghdad, Córdoba and elsewhere gradually became extinct or completely disappeared in the first third of the 13th century. But their knowledge became a metaphysical *depositum fidei* for Latin modernism. Theology combined with philosophy formed the mythology of one truth. Around the year 1235, the form of universal predication became a kind of deductive knowledge. That kind of knowledge explored according to *Second analytics*, founded the modern conception of science based on Oxfordian Fallacy. Rufus brought it to perfection by creating a modern kind of science fiction. Like this, a new worldview of the West came into being. The further matrices of objectivity show that the vision of reality based on such habitus of enlightened thinking (Bonaventura) and finally on demiurgic habitus of actualized will (Olivi) determined further development of modernism and postmodernism, until the nihilist named Nietzsche brought it to the end. This philosophical terminator of Neoplatonism explains Ali Baba’s cave of objective modernity and postmodernism as a parallel world of crazy mind. Due to such metaphysical cunning rejected by Nietzsche, Platonist intellectual neurasthenics, moral weaklings (and contemporary sociopats of the one percent) started to dominate the world of ordinary people.

New scientific cognition necessarily changed the definition of man. Modern meaning of the term “*homo*” or “*humanitas*” is predicted with regard to modern “exsistence” of the *individuum*. The definition is based on a logical supposition given by the multiplicity of substances in man, not on an imposition given by the unity of a real person. Man started to “exsist” as a gendered or objectively castrated *individuum* (*neutrum*). This collection of mythological and today ideological hypostases is *ad hoc* determined by a set of different *tertium ens*. The emergence of objective determination of man and human sciences can be found in the following quotation.

“The term ‘man’ and any other ultimate species (*species specialissima*) can be predicted by twofold way of division based on individuals (*dupliciter potest dividi per individua*). Either the existence of these individuals is actual or habitually given (*individua actualiter exsistentia, aut habitualiter*). The actual existence cannot always be divided up into individuals; however, we can divide them due to habitual existence (*per individua habitualiter exsistentia*). That being of man is given, for example, in Sortes or Plato.” [[393]](#footnote-393)

Rufus conceives existence as modern invasion (*exsistere*) of *species* or *individuum* as being of the third kind into the existing real substance (*homo in Sorte et homo in Platone*). The difference in modes of “exsistence” of the new substance is due only in the accidental mode that can be done *habitualiter* or *actualiter*. After the eclipse of the first substance, existence became a univocal analytical predicate. The real existence occurs (*accidit*)in the framework of objective form and matter; it comes to an essentialist conception of the thing as its permanent habitus or as *ad hoc* given actualization of essence in this or that individual thing. The universal and real mode of being is complementary *univoce*. Both modes of being determine the predication from the direction of universal essences to randomly made existence of real things. The reality can be reflected either in the mode of *resolutio* or *compositio*. The real existence of Socrates was replaced by habitual existence, which already has the character of universality and can be divided and reassembled according to the Tree of Porphyry. The substance of the third kind arrives through the eternal essence into the habitually conceived and recognized existence of the individual thing (*habitualiter exsistentia*) or expands (*exsistit*) into it. The habitual mode of being represents a permanent hypostasis. According to Nominalists, it is given as a *genus*, then *species*, and finally *species specialissima* and *individuum*. Now it is completely clear Bacon’s and Albert’s criticism with regard to the term “*habitus*” given in the context of Oxfordian Fallacy (ch. 2.4.1). Rufus and *Moderni* similar to him created a parallel universe in their minds. It received the stamp of reality and they began to define it scientifically. Bacon considered it insane and Albert ridiculous. Bonaventura founded officially that school in Paris and Kilwardby in Oxford. Scotus crowned modernity by abolishing the parallel universe in this primitive guise. He introduced the sophisticated model of Aristotelian objectivity. Rufus, following the pattern of nominalist Porretans, defines the individual from the point of view of the form given by the primacy of *species specialissima*. The real hyparchical first substance is reduced to an entity that cannot be further defined (*individuum non habet definitionem*).[[394]](#footnote-394) The hyparchical function of the first substance became extinct and was replaced by modern abstraction that is completely irrational, ergo non-definable. Man became an indivisible individual, which is given in the series of abstract division of *Arbor Pophyriana*. This notion of “humanism” was developed by Foucault in the project of postmodern human sciences, which are given in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism (ch. 3.5). Analytical *illuminati* consider the person as an objective atomic substance generated by the movement of abstract differences. The individual stands indivisibly at the end of the series created by Porretan universals. The following quotation shows *Lichtung* of postmodern division and classification of sciences done in the framework of modern *Arbor Porphyriana*.

“It can be better said what is meant by conceptual definition ‘man is a rational and mortal animal being.’ It is certainly possible to check this definition and explains the term from respective notions. But the ultimate intention of cognition (*ultima intentio*) is to consider the first subject simply given in itself (*primum subiectum simpliciter in se*).” [[395]](#footnote-395)

The classical definition of man (*homo est animal rationale mortale*) takes on a different meaning in the new kind of knowledge that is very different from Aristotle’s approach. The subject (*homo*) and the predicate (*animal rationale mortale*) form a composition of real and ideal determination (*componere hoc de hoc*) that has the character of a substance of the third kind. The basis of new humanism is not the existence of person as the first substance, but the insight into the permanent species as a pure Porretan form or an Avicennist essence (*primum subiectum simpliciter in se*). Once again, the intuition of Avicenna’s pure essence (*equinitas tantum*) is at play. Scotus takes it over in the metaphysical deduction based on Avicenna and Rufus (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*; OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). The last single thing and present universal meaning of “man” (*homo*) became the modern *individuum*. It emerged as the last element of Porretan division of universals. The first substance is not given at the beginning of cognition, but is considered (deduced, constructed, concretized, synthesized, postulated, individualized, etc.) as a result of cognitive processes done due to modern *resolutio* and *compositio*. The unattainable first substance of modernity changes into a modern individual through the act of *compositio*. By invoking classical metaphysics, the commentary on *Metaphysics* accomplishes the first objective collection of what Rufus calls the “real substance.”

“The individual can be defined according to the principles of his individualization; this is not how Porphyry comprehends it. Or it can be defined by the principles that are given externally with regard to synthesizing cognition (*per principia exterius ad cognitionem conferentia*). This is how Porphyry understands Aristotle’s assertion in *De anima I*: ‘Accidents contribute to a large extent to the recognition of what is given’...” [[396]](#footnote-396)

Rufus seems to determine cognition from existing first substances, which act among themselves and are given in reality in their own way of being (*notificare individuum per propria principia individuantia*). Once again, the quote taken from *De anima* is a pure sophism. Aristotle and Averroes understand by accidental cognition the process of abstraction given by intentionality. It synthesizes the resulting concept in *intellectus speculativus* through various sensual and intelligible aspects. Contesting cited authorities, Rufus determines the recognition of the real substance through the collections of formal species.

The first substance comes into being in the framework of mythological *conferentia* organized by modernists, which is an admirable achievement of science. This is still valid today under the leadership of the congress-minded Furies. Rufus’s reference to Porphyry and Aristotle is not appropriate. For them, only the first substances determine the course of cognition in the mode “*per principia exterius*”, although we recognize them first by accidents. But scientific knowledge as *demonstratio* must predict the causality given by direct actions of first substances; otherwise scientific cognition would not be universal and adequate within the framework of the given genus. The univocal categorical predication then refers in the mode of imposition to the second substance, which forms the *subiectum* of the scientific statement. Deductive supposition made by metaphysical imposition ensures that universal meaning “stands for” (*supponit pro*) the properties of the first substance. It is universally predicted in the categorical predication of the second substance and its accidents. Rufus turned the first and second substance into a Porretan individual. According to Rufus, each individual is given in the original simplicity composed of the first and second substance (*simpliciter et ex necessitate*, *In APos* 1.2.S6.ad1). The first inventors of Oxfordian Fallacy turned the relation to reality upside down. They ensured the recognition of the real thing using the essential deduction from eternal *exemplars* and from hypostatic and substantial principles of cognition in the soul. The paranoid thinking of moderns is illuminated by the solar intellect. Such *via Modernorum* is given in the full form of musical *alētheia*, that is, in the mode of epochal metaphysical lunacy. The modern reading of *Organon* conceives the scientific recognition of real world as a necessary consequence of the deductive syllogism, in which the second substance and its formal causality play the role of the middle link. The modernists transformed the existence of the real thing into contingent coincidence of permanent essences and they opened the path of modernity. The first substance comes at the end of cognition, instead of standing at its beginning. Therefore, for the first modernists as Rufus and Kilwardby, above-mentioned texts from *Second Analytics* were important, since they illustrate scientific cognition using examples from geometry and arithmetic. Rufus accomplished the eclipse of the first substance by transforming the conception of the substance into a univocal unity. There is no correspondence between the first substance in reality and the second substance predicted categorically in the recognition process. The exposure of the sense of being from behind created a categorical value in the syncretistic form of Anselm (ch. 1.2). This Neoplatonist combined the conceptually given nominal and equivocal meaning (*significatio*) with the categorical demonstration of scientific statements (*enuntiatio*). The new concept of essence determines the nominal definition (*nomine definitionis*). That battle was fought in the previous matrix between Abelard and Porretans (ch. 1.3). Mathematical abstraction, however, does not provide the final unity of being. Analytical thinkers at Oxford as Kilwardby knew it very well. On the second floor of mathematical abstraction, there is no reality of first substances. Fortunately, Avicenna follows the unity of being in the highest mode of metaphysical abstraction *ens inquantum ens*. The rehabilitation of metaphysical abstraction was the challenge for the next generation of modern Avicennists. They created a new metaphysics that Duns Scotus successfully completed.

The modern concept of individuality and postmodern individualism became the dominant planetary ideology of the West. The existing real person has no place in the modern definition of objectively conceived humanism. Modern *illuminati* as schools of *Grammatici* defined the existing person as residual anything in the division of objective animality (*compositum ex animale et quodam residuo*, ch. 2.3.2). Therefore, mathematics in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*” and “*discrete videamus*” became the new religion of modernity. New vision of reality and of the person, Bacon described it as insane and Albert as ridiculous. The person became a superfluous ballast in both World Wars or in the extermination camps of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century (Lefort 1986a). The new exponents of corporate capitalism and contemporary fascism completed the vision of an objective humanism and successfully replaced the academic fiction of *intelligentia spiritualis* at Oxford. In the epoch of neoliberal capitalism, the ideologically given “exsistence” of man is manipulated in biopolitics reduced to global “human resources.” After the death of modern God, these “human resources” are managed by nihilistic *illuminati* of neoliberal capitalism, which is run by one percent of the planetary oligarchy and one per thousands of top banksters. That group of *illuminati* established the nihilist economy of today. After seven centuries of objective odyssey, the solar intellect changed the address. It moved from academic Oxford to the City of London over and after the two World Wars across the ocean to Wall Street. The speculative thinking of *Modernorum* considers itself in the mirror of its own *scibile*, which is objectively reflected in the New York Stock Exchange. Considered in the metaphysical mode of *certitudo* and *rectitudo*, this view places objective stock market reality of “values” and they are predicated as certain and right in the mode „*discrete videamus.*“ The modern mind of the Latin West has built for itself a global village to be at home in its own paranoid world. The modernists cannot live in the real world. The *illuminati* led by vengeful Furies must necessarily destroy the reality, in order to establish their utopia of New World Order. It is an ontological neurosis of Western *intelligentia neoliberalis*, let us see the last chapter on tragic form of the objective Oedipus complex (OBJ III, ch. 7). Thinking of *Modernorum* admires itself quite adequately in the mirror of its own *scibilia*. This theater became the objective knowledge available in the databases and quoted on the world stock exchanges, as well as in the academic indexes. Hermeneutics must therefore find in Rufus’s teaching the basic *Ereignis* of modernity. He changed ambivalent *alētheia* hidden in Grosseteste’s philosophy of substance to objective *veritas* of new metaphysics.

### 3.3.2 Truth as a Modern Assimilation and Equality

The previuos chapters established the fact that was really frightening for Aristotelians like Albert and Bacon. In the framework of universal hylemorphism, all first substances can be reduced to mythological essences made as *scibile* of Rufus. He extinguished meaning of the real Sun for modern science. In this eclipse of critical, and even common reason, done as transition to the chthonic realm of Chaos, the dogmatic onto-theology of one scientific truth opened the path of *via Modernorum*. Hermeneutic archaeology found the basic event of the eclipse of the first substance, which was justified by epochal error of analytical philosophy in the very hour of its birth. The obscurantism of thinking related to the first sustance in Rufus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy. It established the first form of objectively determined first science in its logically unquestionable form of truth as modern *veritas*. Introductory interpretation of Heidegger’s *paideía* took up a new form of metaphysics. Now, that *paideía* came into being as sophisticated modern non-education (ἀπαιδευσία, *Met*. 1006a6). Its present form is provided by the analysis of current academic ignorance, which is carried out in the mode of instrumental rationality as “*Unbildung*” (Liessmann 2006). The controversy concerning the theory of truth must be set into the framework of treatises and debates that took place before the year 1250 mostly in Paris.

At the same time when Rufus was writing *Speculum animae*, Bacon, in a similar way to Albert, composed a response to sophistic interpretations of Aristotle practiced in the second Averroism. The work *Metaphysics* (ca. 1240–45) was written during Bacon’s studies in Paris probably done in the years 1237–47. The commentary on the second book of *Metaphysics* brilliantly defines the difference between logical correctness and metaphysical truth as *adaequatio* and *rectitudo*.

“The thing is true in the mode of abstraction (*veritas incomplexa*), which refers to a formal being of the thing as an essence (*rei entitas*). The other kind of truth relates to the real composition (*veritas complexa*). The truth related to the real composition is twofold. On the one hand, it can refer to the thing in the sense of the substrate existing in reality (*ad subjectum*). In this way, ‘The truth is the correspondence of the thing’ (*veritas est adequatio rerum*). On the other hand, this truth refers to the knowledge given in the soul (*ad animam cognoscentem*); then it is true that ‘the truth is rightness’ (*veritas est rectitudo*).” [[397]](#footnote-397)

The first level of cognition concerns logical abstraction (*veritas incomplexa*). The logician adheres to the truth through logical abstraction that refers only to the essence (*rei entitas*). It is the predication called “*opinabile*,” without the imposition from reality, let us see Abelard’s writing *Dialectica*: “This corpse is a deceased man” (*hoc cadaver est homo mortuus*, ch. 1.3). This concept of truth does not belong to metaphysics. It does not answer the question concerning the real substance. Metaphysical predication of truth is made with regard to real things (*veritas complexa*). According to Aristotle and Bacon, this truth is given in twofold universality (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12). From the point of view of the key text *Anal. Post.* 84a11–14 interpreted in previous chapters, it is possible to determine the truth in the mode of correspondence (*veritas est adequatio rerum*). Correspondence takes the sens from hyparchical substances that make foundation of scientific proof. If the subject of the true predication is the real thing, then it is an true correspondence made by the imposition based on the real thing (*referri ad res tanquam ad subjectum*). In this case, the first substance makes the direct subject of cognition. The correspondence belongs to the field of *veritas complexa*. The commentary, on the basis of the universally understood and causally given necessity, relates it to the intellect, which recognizes the real existing hylemorphic composition (*complexum*). The truth follows the correspondence due to univocal categorical predication based on hyparchical primacy of existing things in reality. The second case occurs when the real thing is given in the mode of the supposition. Correspondence runs as an essential predication of the second substance, because its concept is created in *anima intellectiva* (*refertur ad animam cognoscentem*). It is not an *opinabile* which is only as a universal concept of essence in the thinking. The mystical enlightenment, recognition through the faith etc. can directly affect the soul as Avicennas “*intellectus sanctus*”. Thought recognizes a real thing not according to a sensual predication of causality taken from reality, but according to essential characteristics given by a universal definition. Then truth is established on the basis of conviction that thinking maintains in virtue of its own rightness (*veritas est rectitudo*). It is not a matter of correspondence to a hyparchical reality, but a comparison of two distinct and categorically predicated meanings of the second substance. From the point of view of metaphysical abstraction, the categorial predication of essences is given outside the deductive proof as *demonstratio*, because the hyparchical reference to sensually perceived reality is missing. Bacon defended the model of the imposition of meaning given in *Categories* and in *Second Analytics* that relates to the first substance. The second case occurs when the real thing is given only nominally as an essence. Correspondence runs as the essential predication of second substance, because the essence is merely a universal in thinking (*refertur ad animam cognoscentem*). Thinking recognizes the real thing not by the predication of unique causality, but by essential nature brought about in universal definition. There is no correspondence with respect to a hyparchical reality, but only a comparison of two universally and categorically predicted meanings of the second substance (*veritas est rectitudo*). From the point of view of metaphysical abstraction, it is true that the categorical predication of essences is given only in the mode of partial truth because the hyparchical attachment to reality is missing. Bacon distinguishes twofold being of substance, either in the hyparchical mode of existence in reality or in the universal mode of existence in thinking. Logical truth arises only in the order of supposition given in the thinking of the knower; then we cannot speak of a correspondence of intellect and reality. The essential and formal correctness made by the subject is not the same as the truth in the project of the first science, which explores the principles of cognition with regard to the first substance (*adequatio rerum*). For this principled reason, Albert refused to recognize the soul on the basis of formal definition made in the Toledo school (*scientur imperfecte*, ch. 2.4.1).

Bacon and Albert in the same decade rejected the false concept of metaphysical truth according to Oxfordian Fallacy. Both brilliant Aristotelians defended against modernists the theory of truth according to the first Averroism. At the same time, Bacon and Albert defended the difference between the two forms of metaphysical truth that shaped two different kinds of scientific cognition in order to make the unity of the first science.[[398]](#footnote-398) The exploration of universal essence in the mode “*ens inquantum ens*” belongs to the realm of Neoplatonist metaphysics according to Avicenna. The metaphysical deduction comes from the essence as a logical principle (*ad principum eorum productivum*), and it makes reduction to abstract concept of being (*reductio entium in quantum entia sunt*). The study of “substance *qua* substance,” on the other hand, belongs to the project of Aristotelian metaphysics according to the Commentator. The first science starts from the physics and explores the real production of being (*resolutio esse actualis et naturalis rerum*). The metaphysical predication of the totality of being runs from the direction of hyparchical being (*secundum methaphysicum est ponere*). It must be based explicitly on the efficient cause (*unam solam causam efficientem*). Once again, the correctly interpreted status of scientific proof according to *Second Analytics* is at play. Modernity transformed it into a sophistical analytical version by obscuring the first substance. The second Averroism constructs cognition as a logical conclusion, which proves the existence of the first substance in the mode of subjective evidence of *rectitudo*. Rufus realized it for the first time in the Latin West. The previous chapter has shown that Rufus abolished the validity of metaphysics as the first science. He built the first philosophy on logical abstraction and he promulgated it in a sophistic way as Aristotle’s metaphysics. The first Averroism firmly rejected this path of the modern thinking, because it defended the truth as a correspondence. Rufus’s analytical way of the merely logical *certitudo* even abolished metaphysics and not only Aristotle’s philosophy. Analytically instructed Furies have made great progress since then. The Vienna Circle of logical positivists made the resurrection of modernism at the beginning of the 20th century; they were acclaimed as philosophical saviors. When Rufus founded *via Modernorum* in the middle of 13th century, he was considered a crazy thinker. However, at the very beginning, when the darkness of modern mind did but the first steps, the disappearance of metaphysics bothered even the first scholastic modernists. It must be noticed that they were considered insane, ridiculous or imbecile thinkers in critical academic schools. Modernity has never promoted a correct theory of truth, but the idea of unstoppable progress. The school of modern *illuminati* in Oxford knew with logical necessity that Antichrist must come (*Ge-Stell*). The existence of logically thinking *illuminati* is the fundamental reason (*ratio sufficiens* of Leibniz) that uphelds the metaphysics of modernity based on eschatology and demonology. Aristotelism considered such thinking a pure paranoia.

The first and second Averroism was splitted because of dispute concerning the atomic substance that was introduced in Porphyry’s commentary on *Categories* (ἄτομος οὐσία, *In Cat*. 90.31). Either the material substance in the mode *per prius* has an atomic character, because it exists in the original uniqueness of actual being. Or the substitute for the first substance “exsists” as hypostatized essence, specimen, species or eidos. Then the truth is transformed from Aristotelian metaphysics into Neoplatonism. Meaning of being is exposed primarily by the cognizing subject, that is, from behind. Modernity does not work with the truth as a correspondence between the intellect and the real thing. Avicennist Kilwardby considers truth in the mode of essential *rectitudo*, and analytical Rufus in the mode of *certitudo* established by logical abstraction. Analytically conceived reality was transformed from the hyparchical first substance into a universal substance of the third kind. Grosseteste and later Rufus shifted the theory of truth as modern certainty and correctness to logical and analytical objectivity. Both representatives of Toletans at Oxford defined the certainty of truth in the framework of Avicenna’s and Aristotle’s theory of cognition. Augustinian Anselm was still the modernist in a Neoplatonist way. Grosseteste rejected the teaching of Porretans, especially in the doctrine of the soul. This, on the other hand, was adopted by Rufus and also by the universal hylemorphism. Rufus’s modern logic became a simulacrum of metaphysics through the inclusion of universal hylemorphism that all representatives of the first Averroism rejected. The second Averroism based on the new interpretation of *Second Analytic* abolished the definition of truth as correspondence of thinking and reality. Rufus replaced this theory with a theory of assimilation, whereby the false intellect as a substance of the third kind assimilates a simulacrum of reality composed of substances of the third kind. According to quoted Aristotelians, that kind of narrative was ridiculous, insane or feeble-minded. Today, this modern *depositum fidei* is managed and safeguarded by all global branches of Oxford’s postmodern and nihilist *illuminati*.

Another reason for the eclipse of the first substance consisted in the fact that the certainty of cognition arises during the process of increasing coincidence of accidents. The first substance, or rather, the collection of necessarily given accidents and *propria*, gradually appears (*exsistit*) as a subject of cognition in the mode of supposition tied to the analytical *demonstratio*. The accidents have their own hypostatized “exsistence” in the contingent matter (*individuum*). It is not a problem to create any individual simulacrum (*concretum*) by a concrete predication based on universal hylemorphism. This confirms once again the absurd way, how the second Averroism recognizes reality. Rufus founded the modern subject of the Latin West. Modernity observes a brave new world, in which it came to an total eclipse of the first substance. The modernist interpretation contested Averroes’s commentaries on *Corpus Aristotelicum*, although it refers verbally to some selected texts taken *ad hoc*. Porphyry and Aristotle do not compose the second substance from Porretan hypostases, but predict its meaning due to the imposition from first real substances. The effects of first substances are real and necessary in themselves; but the recognition of the first substance is an accidental process, which is given *per posterius* with regard to the first substance existing *per prius*. The predicated necessity is not real, but universal. The classical theory of cognition takes cognition with regard to the real substance as an accident, because thinking comes back (*accidit*) to the first substance in the process of cognition given in thinking. Avicenna established metaphysics from the direction of essences considered in eidetic intuition. In authentic Aristotelianism, the parousia of being is given primarily in reality and not in thought, as it is in the case of Avicenna’s essence. The unique parousia of the first substance in reality can enter in the intellect only as universal meaning. The real existence and effects of first substances take but in the past character in the metaphysics. The recognition of the substance in its *quidditas*, in what its existence has been (τό τί ἦν εἶναι), however, it enters the order of universality. The metaphysical dative ensures the unambiguous correspondence of intellect with real things. The intellect is only second in the order of being with regard to reality, but it recognizes it universally. This is a very realistic price, which is paid in authentic Aristotelianism for human cognition. It can be characterized as a formally correct proceeding, although it does not go to the reality of the first substance. The preceding chapter has shown the twofold character of metaphysics in the past character of cognition according to the first science about substance. We followed hermeneutic interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphysical determination of the first substance (τό τί ἦν εἶναι). This donation made by the metaphysical dative founded the theory of truth as correspondence. Therefore, the truth is given according to *Second Analytics* as hyparchical predication of real substances. Gigantomachy of substance against analytical modernists allowed to Bacon and Albert accurately distinguish the metaphysics of Avicenna and Averroes from each other (ch. 2.4.1). The metaphysical status of existing real substances pose a fundamental question about the sense of being, through which the Commentator separated himself from Avicenna. After decline of the hyparchical first substance in the framework of metaphysical universality and necessity, there was impossible to create classical correspondence as Averroes’s *proportio* or *consimilitudo*. That kind of similarity between intellect and reality was based on exposure of being from the front, from the direction of the first substance. The analysis of Avicenna’s theory of truth in the *Liber de philosophia prima* I.8 has shown the first theory of truth, in which the correspondence is given by exposure from behind. Avicenna as a Neoplatonist thinker and Islamic mystics take a reverse direction, from the intellect to the real thing (*significat dispositionem in re exteriore cum est ei aequalis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The intellect perceives the form in direct intuition and then compares it with the occurrence of the same form in real things (*cum est ei aequalis*). Avicenna changed the Aristotelian correspondence theory into a modern assimilation of beings of the third kind. The ontological form of *Ge-Stell* has become quite modern: it starts from mystical (later objective) subject and it goes to reality. After the eclipse of the first substance, modernists changed the nature of truth in the realm of Anselm’s *rectitudo* and Avicenna’s *certitudo*. The pure Islamic mysticism became a speculative thinking of Western *intelligentia spiritualis* doted with strong intellectual hybris and bad metaphysical education (*apaideusía*). Modern God became the last source of correctness and certainty. The first step on *via Modernorum* had to find a new concept of truth in the mode of intellectual demiurgic assimilation of reality. In the epoch of the full eclipse of the first substance, of course, there in nothing to be used for the metaphysical imposition. Modernity had to create some sophistic *Ersatz* for the hyparchical substance, which innovative Rufus accomplished. The permanent essence (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*) given in the mode of metaphysical ipseity characterizes the contingent first substance with the help of a scientific demonstration. Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* analyzed above confirmed that the intellect recognizes the external world through the supposition of intelligible and actualized hypostatic forms. The logical form of abstraction incorporated being of the essence as a numerically differentiated individual into the analytical unity of the being, which was created by mathematical analogy. The assimilation of individualized being proceeds in the spirit of modernists in the manner of “*discrete videamus*” developed by Porretans. The certainty of cognition was originally related to the first real substance. After its departure from metaphysics, it was replaced by modern God as new subject of Latin *illuminati*. That idol necessarily died several centuries later, because such God had never existed in reality.

Let us return to the controversy concerning tritheism in the second half of the 12th century (ch. 1.4). The basic definition of God and man received the nominal character (*opinabile*). Aristotelians in the line of Boethius and Abelard understood very well the concequences of Nominalism. By destroying the imposition and reducing the supposition to certainty of the knowing subject, the destruction of divine Persons and therefore the destruction of man as a person would come about. In the years 1240–45, this dispute was repeated in a much more sophistical way, characterized by interpretation of the cognition and the person according to *De anima*. Rufus transformed *opinabile* of Porretans into scientific *scibile* after Aristotle. He created modern analytical science through this sophistic transformation. In the school of the second Averroism based on Oxfordian Fallacy, the basic prerequisites for the emergence of a new concept of truth were united around the year 1235. The model of the new theory was Anselm’s *Dialogus de Veritate* and his definition of truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo* that are given in God as the highest Truth (ch. 1.2). The first producer of being provides necessary security for the truth given as correctness of things in divine mind. The primary nature of being in God represents the highest security for all created essences (*certum est veritatem rerum esse rectitudinem*, ch. 1.2). Truth as a *rectitudo* is detached from the process of sensual cognition, because it does not arise in the process of Aristotelian abstraction. Situated at the level of the enlightened subject, modern truth assimilates the onto-teological tales concerning the Christian creation in Neoplatonic style. The modernity based on Medieval Church and contemporary “global governance” needed not the real world to create the truth based on the imposition. Instead of it, modernists made use narrative potential of *Liber de causis* and created the mythologic hierarchy of Neoplatonist hypostases. Latin modernists finally found the original cave of Ali Baba full of modern essences created by Avicenna’s Falsafa and then by themselves. The primary nature of being in God represents the highest security for all created essences (*veritas et rectitudo idcirco sunt in rerum essentia*, ch. 1.2). Due to creative activity given by the divine and later human will, the modern subject guarantees the claim of all being to truthfulness (*quod debet esse, recte est*, ch. 1.2). Grosseteste and Rufus, in determining the truth, made use of Neoplatonist Anselm. The preceding chapter has shown that the existence of the subject does not have to manifest itself in a real way, because it is merely predicted (*non ostenditur, sed supponitur*). The supposition does not come primarily from contingent first substances, but from eternal essences actualized in the act of intuition of pure forms. Let us recall the ironic epigram of the work *Fons philosophiae*, which long before Bacon criticized the worldview in schools of *Nominales* as insane (*hoc credidereit solus mentis alienus*, ch. 1.6). Rufus radicalizes the netherworld of Nominalists by combining it with the Avicennian interpretation of *De anima*. Grosseteste could not do this, because he rejected the thesis about multiplicity of substances in man. The introduction to the previous chapter has shown that Rufus is verbally committed to the intellect as *tabula rasa*. However, he denies Aristotle’s interpretation by introducing the subsistent Avicennist intellect taken in the framework of universal hylemorphism (*potentia substantialis*). The actual thing recognized by bodily senses creates but an accidental case (*potentia accidentalis*) of already existing cognition. According to Rufus, the primary characteristic of independent intellect is based on the fact that it reflexively recognizes its own cognition (*intellegit se*). Through the act of self-reflection, Avicennistic intellect of the “Flying Man” is activated and it shares his cognitions with the separated active intellect. This scheme was transformed in the Aristotelian scenario by adopting the Avicennist notion “*intellectus in effectu*”. That kind of hypostatized intellect was updated by exposure from behind, to become *intellectus adeptus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Rufus’s sophistry regarding the interpretation of *De anima* is based on the fact that instead of the doctrine forbidden by Alvernus about the separated, causally acting intellect acting on the soul, he put the *intellectus agens* combined with the *intellectus possibilis* into the soul as a Porretan hypostatized potency. This gave rise to modern simulacrum of the intellect, which is preserved as an important treasure of academic modernity. The modern age is diligently solving the “Mind—Body Problem” that has arisen as a result of major intellectual failure. Modernism and postmodernism dogmatically believe in the inestimable value of this Ali Baba treasure, which was inherited by Avicennistic falsafa and then by Rufus’s two hypostases of modern intellect (*potentia substantialis, accidentalis*). These were joined by all analytical thinkers who were endowed with the modern and postmodern dogmatic belief in the objective value of knowledge founded in such a distorted way. This knowledge makes modern *depositum fidei* that academic *illuminati* created at Oxford. The intellect of *Modernorum* has its own actuality in the mode of *potentia substantialis*. Cartesian intellect of Rufus either work by itself as a subsistent being, which is exposed by cosmic *intellectus agens*, or has an actuality given in the soul as an autonomous Porretan essence. The certainty of cognition in the enlightened subject related to existence of God and to mathematics. Both idols of modernity replaced original Aristotelian cognition related to existence of real things. The previous chapter has shown that Rufus’s commentary on *Second Analytics* used Aristotelian term “*praemissae sunt causae completae*” only for formally correctly created syllogism, to which joins contingent cognition taken from reality. The completion of causality does not primarily proceed from reality through the correctly created and predicted *medium* that forms the demonstrative proof. In the educated circles in the University Paris about the years 1240–45, it was forbidden to proclaim the doctrine of dualistic intellect exposed from behind, from the separated *intellectus agens*. The analytical mathematician Descartes alias *Rufus redivivus* was connected to this alma mater only in the last times of this university before its dissolution during the French Revolution. Due to the hypostatized intellect and existence of universal species in reality, modernity cannot define the truth as a correspondence between thinking and separated first substance that exist in reality.

Emergence of the modern truth is shown in *Commentary on the Metaphysics* (*Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, 1231–35). The commentary does not address Aristotle’s and Averroes’s quest. The classical metaphysics investigates the first principles of real substances. The same proceeding took up Bacon cited above. Rufus considers the first perception of being as Avicenna, and he logically recognizes it through the second triad of axioms according to *Second Analytics*. This sequence was introduced in Grosseteste’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy (ch. 3.1.1). The concept of the first science is based on certainty of essential forms contemplated in the act of direct intuition. Such proceeding is built on the Avicennist abstraction as *denudatio*. In this insight, there is the primary certainty of reflexive cognition. Rufus defines the truth taken in Avicenna’s perspective of metaphysics as evidently given science (*certissima*), which he conceives by direct intuition based on logical and mathematical abstraction.

“It seems that metaphysics is the most certain cognition because its knowledge consists in quite certain causes; the first cause is the cause of all the rest and it is the most certain.” [[399]](#footnote-399)

The science must return to permanent causes (*causis certissimis*), which we do not find on the level of material first substances. Therefore it is necessary to look for the basis of cognition in the world of permanent mathematical forms. Necessity of real first substances was replaced by evidence of the subject, which establishes the certainty of cognition by the act of the first perception of being as such (*ens inquantum ens*). Bacon and Albert refused that proposition as insane and ridiculous. Rufus became an *Avicenna redivivus* that founded the first science by his own teaching (*quasi a se*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The preceding analyses have shown that the necessity is no longer given *per prius* in the realm of first substances. Their contingency lacks the actual evidence and permanence of the form. The analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* binds science in the mode of objective predication to the deductive syllogism given by the causality of essence (*medio modo*, ch. 3.3.1). The higher truth of enlightened intellect shapes the lower truth based on the level of empirical cognition. Grosseteste’s analytic interpretation postulated a lower cognition of weak intellect in the framework of Aristotelian cognition (*scientia*). The science based on empirical abstraction deals but with necessity established by material things and not at all with the necessity of first principles and *exemplars* (*intellectus*). The new definition of truth stands on the worldview of academic *illuminati* that grasp being in the timeless essence predicated in the mode “*semel—semper*.” Grosseteste’s modern and dogmatic logic, built on necessary arrival of Antichrist, enabled the direct vision of Oxford *intelligentia spiritualis* into the intellect of modern God (ch. 3.1.2). The objective “exsistence” of forms in eternal God defined as Avicenna’s form giver complemented scientific cognition in the first ontotheological version of modern metaphysics. Rufus defines the truth as equality (*aequalitas*) of objectively given species rather than the correspondence between intellect and things. His commentary contains a new definition of truth. It is presented in the context of Augustinian illumination according to Grosseteste’s concept of truth (ch. 3.1.2). The modern theory of truth is based on Avicenna’s *denudatio* and Anselm’s *summa veritas*. They are taken up into Augustine’s interiority of the infallible and self-reflective soul.

“Scientific cognition does not only takes into account the presence of cognized species in the act of the faculty of cognition, as is the case of imagination, which visualizes the sensuous species through the act of the apprehension. The intellect recognizes the presence of the species as such (*ipsius speciei*), provided that this species corresponds to what is recognized in thought (*inquantum per aequalitatem respondet scibili*). By this I mean the equality (*aequalitatem*) which is given in the definition ‘truth consists of things and intellect’ (*veritas est rerum et intellectuum*).” [[400]](#footnote-400)

The quotation does not speak of the correspondence between thing and intellect, but of the equality of species that “exsist” in the specific kind of being as *scibile*. Such Porretan forms can be found outside of us and they are identical with those forms considered in the intellect (*praesentiam ipsius speciei apud intellectum*). Such Avicennist “form—essence” appears as being of the third kind in its objective ipseity (*ipsius speciei*). On the one hand, it is specifically given in the thing and, on the other hand, it is specifically given in the thinking, because it is at the same time single thing in reality and also universal as well. The truth arises at the level of pure form (*scibile*), which is given in the faculty of cognition (*virtus scitiva*) and is explicitly separated from the sensuous imagination (*species imaginabilis*). Rufus rejects the classical way of abstraction according to the first Averroism (*non est tantum*), whereby the act of sensuously given intentionality in the imagination abstracts the first species (*praesentiam imaginabilis speciei apud virtutem imaginativam*). The presence of species contemplated by the intellect (*apud virtutem scitivam*) disposes of another, immaterially given kind of representation (*praesentiam speciei scibilis*). The archaeology of objectivity insists on the fundamentally different conception of Rufus’s *species scibilis* and Aristotelian *species intelligibilis* given in Blund’s school. The two kinds of species are separated by the project of metaphysics made by Avicenna or by Averroes. Rufus but seems to work with the model of truth as Aristotelian correspondence. The objective *species scibilis* is a being of the third kind. This Porretan hypostasis “exsists” in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Therefore, Rufus’s *scibile* is given contingently in real things and permanently in eternal essences. The modern identity of things and intellect (and not at all Aristotelian similarity) is defined by the *genitivus objectivus* (*veritas est rerum et intellectuum*). The genitive shows the point of origin of the modern truth, which has become a new being of the third kind in the new mode of predication. Truth is directly bound to the objectively given, specific being of the thing itself (*veritas rerum*) by *genitivus obiectivus*. That “thing” (*res*) is a Porretan individual and not a first real substance. The genitive is therefore simultaneously subjective and objective, because the *scibile* “exsists” as a species of the third kind everywhere in the same mythological way. Its bearer is a modern subject that has been completely fooled by divine powers of academic Vengeance, since there is no such thing in reality. Led by objectively educated Furies, the first modern “subject—object” relation was created, which is built on the mythological form of *Ge-Stell*. The recognized “thing” does not possess Aristotelian character of the first substance, but of permanent Porretan hypostasis. Truth for the first time acquired a fully objective character. The true cognition proceeds in the mode of demiurgic assimilation of non-existent being of the third kind. The univocal species exists in the mode of Porretan “*exsistere*” both in reality and in thinking (*per praesentiam ipsius speciei apud intellectum*). The recognized form is hypostatized both in thought and in reality, but each time in a different mode of presence. The eclipsed first substance no longer influences modern cognition in the mode of *quidditas* (τό τί ἦν εἶναι). The first substance arrived at the tragic form of being done in the mode of forgetfulness of hyparchical substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The act of the original donation of being, which is given in metaphysics by the metaphysical dative (OBJ I, ch. 1.1), has been lost from thinking altogether. The existence of the first substance is replaced by the essence predicated in the mode of logical and mathematical abstraction. The specifically given ipseity of this analytically predicated essence is given *univoce* in the objective demiurgic diacosmos, in the human thinking and in the real things. The cognition is true at the moment when the *species scibilis* comes true in direct intuition (*per praesentiam*) made by illuminated intellect. In the epochal newly given parousia of objectivity, truth holds as mathematical equality (*aequalitas*). The creation of parallel world proceeds in the thinking, where hyparchical being of mathematical and logical essences is fully present. Let us see the quoted passage *Anal. Post*. 84a11–14. This objective and analytical parousia of the cosmic form given in the thinking of *illuminati* corresponds fully to individually recognized intelligible form given in and by itself. The modern concept of truth as universal identity is based on the presentation of Avicennist and Porretan “exsistence” based on objective *scibile* settled in the objective diacosmos. This universal mathematical form or Porretan essence is remade in the mode of presentation of this *scibile* in illuminated mind (*inquantum per aequalitatem respondet scibili*). The truth as assimilation of univocal given and considered being is valid in the mode *absolute*. Such hyparchical being of *species scibilis* is given only in the thought of the modern illuminate, which is separated from the empirical reality (*Anal. Post*. 84a14). Rufus does not need the imposition of truth from reality. The second Averroism has accomplished a full eclipse of the first substance.

Hermeneutics found in Rufus’s texts the epoch-making event of modernity (*Ereignis*), which transformed the original modern *alētheia* established by Grosseteste (*aliquantulum obscura*) into an objective truth as absolutely certain and evident *veritas*. Hyparchical being of Rufus’s *scibilia* as being of the third kind is given only in the modern subject. Hyparchical ipseity of the first substance was replaced by logical identity of Porretan individual as a *tertium ens*. The first substance was metaphysically predicated in the framework of causal necessity as the middle member of scientific proof. Rufus cannot have a universal metaphysical resemblance to the external physical thing done in mode “*ex inmediatis*”, according to the mode *per se* that makes relation to hyparchical first substances (ἂν δι' ἀμέσων, *Anal. Post.* 93a36). The objective species as Porretan being of the third kind replaced the hyparchical existence in the deductive syllogism. Thinking forms a universal equality with itself, which establishes the modern concept of truth as assimilation and sophisticated universal equality of everything with everything. The truth is given both in things and in human intellect. The equality and the identity of forms as *tertium ens* are given in the thinking as *aequalitas* that relates to *univoce* considered things (*veritas est rerum et intellectuum*). The copula “*est*” connecting the truth with things is given in the analytic mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. By identifying the twofold being of species in things and in thought, a conception of truth arose as assimilation of external reality in the mode of logical identity of the intellect with its own *scibilia*. This twofold devaluation of truth from metaphysical abstraction into logical notions and from second substance into a Porretan *individuum*, Bacon considered it to be a complete insanity. After the eclipse of the first substance, modernity can go directly to “things themselves.” Another path to nowhere leads to protocol statements of Vienna Circle about objective reality. Both paths were completed in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism in Husserl’s phenomenology, neopositivism and analytic philosophy. The basis of the absolutized supposition of meaning is not based on the imposition from reality by empirical and intelligible *intentio*. Like this, the first Averroism followed the path of truth by synthesizing of sensible and intelligible species. According to Aristotle and Averroes, the species is given by the abstraction, and thanks to the universal being as meaning in mind. The cognition is separated from singular things in reality. The imposition of meaning is given as intentionality that can establish the truth as correspondence. The external first substance acts on the imagination by the effective causality and then on the intellect by the formal causality. Averroes’s scenario works with the exposure of being from the front, through the diaphanum. It categorically excluded any form of equality between cognized thing and intellect and worked only with the model of correspondence (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The writing *De anima* showed the adequation from the direction of real things on the basis of the causal imposition. It follows the specific way of reception according to mediating the light through the diaphanum in the soul (*intellectus possibilis*). The writing *Categories* and *Second Analytics* follow the same correspondence by interpreting the universal supposition, which is predicated in the scientific deductive syllogism (*demonstratio*). Because of fundamental inequality of intellect and external reality, Aristotelianism postulates a relation between categorical and demonstrative statements. Aristotelian correspondence excludes Neoplatonic concept of sameness or analogy made at the level of Simplicius’s atomic substances and species of the third kind. The Blund’s school that founded the first Averroism in the Latin West, even before the reception of the CMDA proclaimed the truth as a correspondence given by the twofold manner of similarity between *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. Rufus abolished Aristotelian correspondence and replaced it with univocal form of truth as universally given equality. The new form of equality is given in mathematical analogy, the basis of which is arithmetical number as the primary form of *species scibilis*. The science of *illuminati* assimilates those species of the third kind in their enlightened intellect of the third kind. Of course, the correspondence runs in the twofold mode provided *absolute*, since it is separated from reality and reflective thinking takes itself as absolutely logical and certain.

The age of modernity created a total parody on Aristotelian definition of twofold hypostatic truth given in twofold universality (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12). Modernists are diligent creatures because they have to assimilate everything to their true nihilist nature. The more proficient, global and efficient they manage this objective assimilation of God, men and the world, the more evidently they get these “things” confirmed as true in the mode of *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. The modern Western imperialism is based on Oxfordian Fallacy adapted by Rufus. The preceding chapter has shown that the object of cognition given in and for itself and presented in the mode *per se* as an individual (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*) that “exsists” in the mode of hypostatized ipseity. Then it is sufficient to predicate this “exsistence” in the mode of mathematical analogy wherever it appears whether in modern God, in real things or in illuminated thinking. This universal species is adequately grasped in cognition. It contemplates the objective form of being that concerns any observable fact (*inquantum per aequalitatem respondet scibili*). The status of the analytic species has nothing to do with the intentional object given by abstraction, as it was the case with Averroes and after him with the first Averroism. The recognized form plays the role of univocal *tertium ens* that took form of Avicennist being of the third kind (*equinitas tantum, hoc esse tantum*). First this species comes in the mode “*semel—semper*” of eternal forms. They make the true being that modern *illuminati* contemplate through eidetic essences in their illuminated thinking. The same essences exist accidentally and contingently in hylemorphic substances. Rufus does not follow the line of the first Averroism with its intentionality and abstraction. The first modernist created the conception of truth as universal identity of hypostatized essences. Human mind represents the mirror (*speculum*) of hypostatized forms and species. They are in the things and in the intellect in a univocal way and therefore are metaphysically equal. The speculative concept of truth as *aequalitas* makes the identity of twofold representation of the same species. The same theory of truth can be found in the writing *Memoriale*. Rufus refers to Anselm’s already analyzed theory of truth as *rectitudo* and puts it together with his own theory of truth (*coaequatio*).

“To this Anselm replied when he defined the truth as ‘rightness of cognitive mind’ (*rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*). There also exists his other definition ‘truth is common equality of things and their intellectual cognition’ (*veritas est coaequatio rerum et intellectum*).” [[401]](#footnote-401)

The first modernist considers certainty in itself as it is shown by the quotation of Anselm’s definition of truth (*rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*). The reference to Anselm’s conception of truth clearly indicates that identity in mode *per prius* refers to agreement of thinking with hardly any respect to real external things. Bacon rejected this definition of truth in the commentary on *Metaphysics* quoted above as insufficient. Rufus missed the fundamental distinction between reality and intellect. First, there is a lack of distinction between the essential predication given in the mind with respect to the world. A chimera is not a real thing, and the theory of truth should respect this. Second, the adequately cognized being of real things is not causally given by the metaphysical imposition in the mind. Then a corpse is not a person, and a theory of truth should reflect this. The fundamental difference in the truth lies in the possibility of the predication “*in artificialibus*” given in the case of essences. Thinking can shape these essences as it wants by itself.[[402]](#footnote-402) This is understandably not possible in the case of the correspondence following the metaphysical dative, because the necessity is determined by existing first substances. Rufus gave a sophistic Aristotelian garb to Anselm’s ontotheological concept of truth. Such operation, however, cannot fool such connoisseurs of Aristotle as Bacon and Albert. The new nature of truth proceeds from eidetic recognition of the modern hypostatized “thing” (*res*) of Porretans. It is related in the mode of the mystical and intellectual conjunction to actualized intellect (*coaequatio rerum et intellectuum*). The preceding part of the analysis has shown that Rufus’s conception of existence and substance does not correspond to the Aristotelian scientific syllogism. The Oxfordian sophist rejects the correspondence based on primary imposition of meaning from real substances. Oxfordian Fallacy makes no metaphysical difference in the predication of the triangle and the real hylemorphic thing. The introduction of truth as mathematical equality absolutized the use of triangle, geometry and arithmetic in the scientific proof. Analytic mode of Rufus′s predication takes logical abstraction in erroneous way that refers to the real causality of first substances (*medium et causa idem*, ch. 3.3.1). Following Heidegger, we must interpret the fundamental question of “how” being is truthfully given in the mode of this mutual or common identity (*coaequatio*). In the new predicative mode, the copula acquired the logical meaning of abstract univocal synthesis, and not the metaphysical correspondence. The truth as *coaequatio* is expressed as mathematical equality given in the framework of the logical abstraction and analogical predication. The basis of the new unity represents the Neoplatonic statute of extension and the body of the third kind (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Rufus returned to Avicenna’s definition of quantity and circumference (*non est necesse esse in corpore tres dimensiones in effectu*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The mathematical number (*numerus*) became the common denominator of both sciences. The writing *Second Analytics* explicitly forbade the universal use of mathematics, since the scientific proof cannot pass from one genus to another. Mathematics can determine the geometric proof only if it is quantitative with the help of numbers.[[403]](#footnote-403) The new numerically given definition of *individuum* has a universal character for Rufus. Number makes the last univocally given unity of meaning and it is an entity that is not further divisible. He established “metaphysical” unity based on numbers (*in numero causatur a natura unitatis*, ch. 3.3.1). Arithmetic, in contrast to geometry, is the first science in the order of abstraction and universality, because the number already indivisibly (and thus individually) determines the extension of real bodies.[[404]](#footnote-404) Again, it's true that mathematical logic has replaced the teaching of *Metaphysics*. In the case of modern notion of corporeality, even the book of *Physics* has been omitted, which implied the empiric knowledge of physical bodies as the foundation of natural sciences. The mathematics (*numerus*) defined by abstract numbers represented for the nominalist Rufus the last determination of *species specialissima*. This illuminate conceives the mysticism of numbers in the form of being of the third kind, that is, as individualized “form—substance.” Following quotation shows the modern mathematical worldview made in the form of universal *scibile*.

“In the case that arithmetic number is accidentally given, it becomes universal by individualization of the form (*universaliter causatur ex individuatione formae*). The extension is given by individualization of this form in matter. It′s a form that is given in space and through material extension. The arithmetic number acts *a priori* and causally by its essence (*numerus a priori secundum naturam causatur*); therefore it does not make a hylemorphic composition (*in agregando*) and it is given primarily in its essence (*prius est secundum naturam*).” [[405]](#footnote-405)

The real thing is a hylemorphic entity; number is given *per se* and *simpliciter*. Therefore its causality stands higher in the order of reality than the causality of real hylemorphic substances. The first sentence determines the gradually decreasing unity of forms (*ex individuatione formae*). They contain the individualization of the form on the level of the matter only in the mode of accidents, as well as it is the case of real extension in the hylemorphic composition. The original formal definition of quantity consists in numbers, that create the order of Neoplatonist formal causality (*secundum naturam causatur*). Thanks to the a priori settled position of number as pure essence (*numerus a priori*), the predication in the order *per prius* determines the sense of being and it belongs first to arithmetic (*ipsum prius est*). The numerical unity is given in the mode of causality of the third kind, which is given from the essence (*causatur ex individuatione formae*). The individualization based on numerically determined unity is universal and it is given in the hylemorphic individual things (*universaliter causatur*). Mathematical numbers determine in the mode *a priori* the following catabasis of hypostatized Porretan forms into the matter and into physical bodies. The mathematical description of the world (*numerus*) is more universal than the extension of bodies (*magnitudo*) recognized by the senses. The uniqueness of the form is numerically determined on a lower level (*numerus, qui est accidens*) by physically determined bodies. After arithmetic, the descent of forms into matter finds its continuation through geometry. Modernism confirmed anew the Neoplatonist primacy of mathematical abstraction. The arithmetic number entails the form as extension located in matter (*magnitudo ex individuatione formae in materia*). The theory of truth as a modern assimilation of the world is brought to a climax, because it relates to mathematical analogy. Rufus founded the first quantum theory of the world, wherein the mathematically measurable quantum of potency replaced the first material substance.

“The quantity determined as the genus can be a measure, even if it is in potency (*quantum in potentia*) and it is not necessary that the quantity is set in actual things.” [[406]](#footnote-406)

The quantity got the same univocal determination as Aristotle’s second substance in the framework of the genus and thereby has universal validity as potency (*mensura esse quantum in potentia*). This hypostatized quantum of subsistent potency as being of the third kind can be later actualized; however, this is not necessary (*non opportet quod sit quantitas in actu*). Similarly to the second substance, the new determination has subsistent character in the mode *per se* that can be subsequently actualized in real substances. Physical properties of bodies are predicated in the mode of mathematical analogy, and this predication is valid *per prius*. The corporeality got a univocal meaning with respect to time, space and even to relations predicated in the syllogism.[[407]](#footnote-407) Rufus considers the pure forms directly in their accidental being given as the real substance. Therefore, he uses the term “*dimensio*” in the sense of the extension of everything possible. The commentary on *De anima* (ca. 1236–37) conceives the dimensionality as being of the third kind according to the pattern of *Nominales*.[[408]](#footnote-408) Accidental determinations of the second substance got the categorial character. Rufus’s commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* confirms the substantial status of accidents given by Pagus’s commentary on *Categories* (ca. 1230) in Oxford (ch. 3.1.2). The descent of original forms given in the objective mathematical diacosmos is based on modern concept of “exsistence” as a contingent case (*exsistentia*) of cosmic forms. They come from the diacosmos in the contingent part of reality. The hypostatized universals are hyparchical in the mathematical and geometrical causality and then they act out of themselves (*ex-sisto*) in the material world.

The descent of forms presented in *Liber de causis* runs in new type of hypostatized predication. It established a new unity of being based on the new theory of existence and truth. Porretan Rufus transferred the analogical unity to arithmetic numbers as the last, not further divisible individual that has a hypostatic character. The introduction of analogy in the categorical predication is certainly not an Aristotelian solution. Albert’s first Averroism cannot admit a metaphysical definition of truth on the basis that is done beyond the causal relation of first substances. The science would thereby become science fiction given merely in the soul (*si enim scientia sit qualitas in anima*, ch. 2.4.3). Such cognition would end up at the level of a mathematical abstraction that makes an analogical projection of universal concepts as “health” into reality. Rufus knowingly bypassed the entire debate in Averroes’s *Commentary on Metaphysics* regarding the analogy. Averroes makes use of examples as health and medicine only in terms of the externally given goal or factor (*quia est agens aut finis eorum*, ch. 3.1.2). The imposition of meaning is done from reality, and therefore it is possible to predicate the analogical relations in the modus *per prius* and *per posterius* with respect to the first substance. But the originator and the aim of such activities represent only a construct in the thinking of the cognizer. Such unity is given on the level of the second abstraction. According to Aristotle, the analogy makes only a weak form of unity at the level of homonymy and, at best, expresses a unity related to various substances (healthy person, healthy food, healthy lifestyle, etc.). Rufus as Latin sophist simply ignored these “details” that make the definition of analogy, in contrast to the first Averroism. He took from the original definition of mathematical analogy the formal structure of statements related to the substance in the mode *per prius*. According to Aristotle, a weak similarity can be predicted in the mode *per prius* with regard to the original substance, and *per posterius* with regard to meaning in thinking. The innovative Rufus constituted a new conception of the unity of being, which stands on the mathematical analogy given in thinking and not on the metaphysical uniqueness given in reality (*univoce*). The analogical statement refers in the mode *per prius* to the number as hypostatic substance. The number got mythological causality according to divine powers of Chaos and replaced the imposition from reality that founds the scientific syllogism. The abstract relations (*dimensio, magnitudo, numerus*) acquired a transcendental character within the framework of universally conceived analogy. According to *Nicomachean Ethics* (*E.N*. 1131a31‒32), modernity shifted the unity of being into the similarity made by mathematical trinomial. In the new metaphysics, the analogy of hyparchical numbers reached the level of Aristotle’s categorical universal predication. Rufus’s combination of two completely different levels of universal predication founded the postmodern hybrid of universality called “*analogia entis*.” The ontological unity of *metaphysica generalis* starts from the modern term “*univocatio entis*.” This concept was defined after the year 1300 (Duns Scotus, Franciscus de Marchia) to make analogical unity that creates the objective kind of being. Rufus opens *via Modernorum* by establishing modern digitalization of the world as the basis of metaphysics. The number became a new first substance and its hyparchical being, given only in thought; it began to act as efficient cause in the world of the first substances. The epochal advent of mathematics was made possible by devaluation of metaphysical abstraction and by predication associated with the primacy of numbers as the last and no longer divisible basis of reality (*individuum*). The new system of *mathesis universalis* replacing classical metaphysics can be confirmed in the following quotation.

“The mathematical number can be understood in such a way that it has an existence in things. The numerical multiplicity is created by the multiplication of things; done in this way, the number is doubled by the fact that it is multiplied by things (*est binarius per multiplicationem rerum*). The numerical species are differentiated by the multiplicity of individuals.” [[409]](#footnote-409)

On the level of mathematical abstraction (*numerus mathematicus*), the number became a form that is directly contained in things (*habet esse in rebus*). The numerically defined quantity is linked to the universal singular definition of the number as a species. It represents in the univocal order any individual that cannot be further divided (*species numeri et multiplicatur per individua*). By introducing that kind of *species specialissima*, the connection between mathematics and the division of hypostases replaced the imposition of the first Averroism, which determined scientific cognition from the direction of first substances. Rufus’s division is but apparently univocal, because the set of numbers in mathematics is the set of univoken species (*est species numeri*). Rufus created a new version of the dialogue *Timaeus*. There are eternal mathematical species that are causally replicated by models given in matter according to the model of the first numerical Computer Aided Design (CAD). However, the first numerically controlled production of the modern world caused horror at the University of Paris. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, it is practiced on a large scale not only by processing of models within the framework of CAD, but above all by the banksters in Wall Street, who perform this objective numerical and postmodern work of God (ch. 3.1.2). The binary nature of the world as a nihilistic doubling of the real world is made through the production of financial derivatives and global debts. Once again, the theory of truth as a universal equality between things and the intellect is at play (*coaequatio*). The individual and universal arithmetic number (*numerus mathematicus*) became the final guarantee of the modern essence, whereas the real substance plays the second violin. The modern individual, constructed in the mode of arithmetic *unum*, replaced the Aristotelian first substance. The analytical “exsistence” of the mathematized universe arose from the fact that all formal operations presupposed an indivisible individual (*unum*). It stands at the end of the series of species, and their final differentiation takes place at the level of numerically differentiated individuals. Due to the analytical predication of unity and multiplicity (*universum*), mathematics became the universal measure of all things. Logically, the identity of both *tertium ens* (number als *unum, individuum*) is true in the sense of the Latin word “*absolute.*” The mythological correspondence of both terms is done on the level of *opinabile* and they have no imposition from reality. But the emperor’s new clothes are beautiful. The ecclesiastical and academic institutions upheld this pious lie in the mode “*semel—semper*”. Those guardians of modern truth were now replaced by corporate and ideologically administered “science”. The recognition of the world through Aristotelian abstraction and correspondence became completely superfluous in schools of modern *illuminati*. The individualization of real things is given by numerical division, which constituted a new scientific system of classification and division of universal *scibilia*. The individual stands at the end of the Tree of Porphyry. It exists only in one exemplaire and therefore is not divisible. Let us recall that metaphysics considers the numerical comprehension of real substance to be absolutely inadequate, because it is valid only within the framework of equivalence (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The assimilation of reality in the mode of truth as a universal equality of anything with everything (*coaequatio*) is possible in modernity because Rufus abolished the difference between the metaphysical statute of reality and mathematics. The mythological version of Oxfordian Fallacy defined according to Neoplatonic Pythagoras harmonizes the objective diacosmos and the real world with each other. The number became a modern body in Rufus thinking and began to live among us, and we observe its full glory in the age of metaphysical nihilism. The powers of Chaos perform a divine work through the demoniac logic and through the banksters working the world of financial derivatives. As a result, the emergence of a mathematical individual transformed the vision of the first Porretans. The discrete worldview received the scientific value in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. The concept of metaphysical being is formed by the causality of the third kind, which is determined by mathematics and not by causal relations between the first substances. Let us recall the calculations done in the model of the Finite Element Method that establish the mechanics of solid bodies.

Modern *illuminati* consider the truth through the quantitatively determined mathematical relations, which involve the causal relations in reality (*causae completae*). This was demonstrated by the concept of objective causality in the deductive proof, which explained the previous chapter (*medium sive causa*). The process of cognition separated from reality in the mode “*discrete videamus*” received modern certainty from logic and mathematics. The new worldview is based on Oxfordian Fallacy that attributed the same univocal causality to mathematics and to reality. Before, the causal effect of first substances made the only true and necessary causality in *Second Analytics*. Rufus sees only accidental difference between the actual and the calculated astronomical eclipse. The truth as a *coaequatio* corresponds to the worldview based on mythological individuals (*concretum*). Rufus “observes” non existent individuals that are given in the order of mathematical abstraction. The equality of those *scibilia* can be stated either in thinking or in reality. The correspondence between mind and thing became a pure “subject—object” relation. The middle link of demonstrative syllogism that proves such being of the third kind, it exists only in thinking. These specific *scibile* can be found both in hylemorphic substances and as pure forms considered by the intellect. Those Neoplatonist forms are originally given in the diacosmos and they are *modo geometrico* administered according to the deduction described in *Liber de causis*. Rufus took up that scenario and transformed it into mathematical deduction. The arithmetic number receives the causality of former Neoplatonist hypostases and due to universal hylemorphism it received the causality of the first substance as well. Demonstrative syllogism of Rufus is completely paranoiac. Instead of the second substance, there is a number as Porretan individual that plays the role of Neoplatonist cosmic form and pretend to be the second Aristotelian substance made by the imposition from reality. The correspondence of such forms ensures the modern truth as a *coaequatio*. The definition of truth in the mode intellectual assimilation transformed the true relation to reality into the concrete equality of species of the third kind. The analysis of universal meanings (*resolutio*) or the synthesis of hypostatized collections of coincidences (*compositio*) each time creates a final indivisible unity of meaning (*individuum, concretum*). The modern concrete entity is determined not by reality, but by the act of the intellect. Avicenna’s “*res*” became the modern “*concretum*” as composition of nominally given meaning. It is born in the synthesis of accidents and the division of universals according to the Tree of Porphyry. Rufus made determination of being in the “concrete” mode as accidental habitus made at the level of the second substance that the previous chapter described. We find a concrete view of reality in the work *Scriptum in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (1237–38). The predication creates a composition (*concretum*) of form and substance, and this *tertium ens* stands at the level of the first substance: “We state the essential unity of being in the mode of concreteness about every form.“ [[410]](#footnote-410) At the same time, around the year 1240, there was another conception of the moderate Avicennist thinkers such as Hugues de Saint-Cher. His commentary on *De anima* conceives the *concretum* in the Aristotelian sense as the second substance.[[411]](#footnote-411) Rufus’s *concretum* became a universal analytical instrument that acquired a logical and numerical basis. The concrete predication, built on Porretan definitions of *Nominales* and not on the categorical predication of the second substance, represents yet another sophistic innovation, because of which representatives of the first Averroism condemned Rufus. Now it becomes clear why Alvernus’s criticism of philosophers called *Grammatici* included Rufus. Albert harshly criticized the concrete concept of substance in his analysis of “*esse individuatum*” (ch. 2.4.2). The criticism aimed at Rufus as his work *Speculum animae* (about 1245) confirms it. He wrote it in Paris at the time when Albert published the work *De homine* there.

Rufus defines the two modes of formal predication. In the first mode, the predication comes to the hylemorphic form; in the second mode, the form is considered directly dans le mode *simpliciter*.[[412]](#footnote-412) The second mode of predication creates a concrete worldview in the mode of universal hylemorphism, where the intellect of *illuminati* pushes the hypostatized form into the matter of the third kind. As a result, a sophistic simulacrum of reality was created, which was fabricated in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Albert and Bacon considered it to be a complete madness. The concrete meaning of being came through the new definition of the modern thing as “this here” (*hoc aliquid*) that no longer relates to the first substance existing in reality, outside the cognizing subject. The new way of being established a new nature of the thing in the mode of concreteness (*modum concretum*). The original metaphysical determination of substance is transformed by the predication of abstract matter into a being of the third kind.

“In the second way, nature obtains its being and the form in virtue of concretization (*esse et modum concretum*), further in the way given by quality, assignment, inherence and signification, because the concept of the concrete being determines matter (*nomine scilicet suo materiam notantis*). In this way, the form is stated with respect to the matter.” [[413]](#footnote-413)

The set of determinations given as a modern modality is made by the matter (*modum qualitatis et adiacentis et inhaerentis et nominantis*). The concrete individual is a pure product of the intellect, the truth of which is guaranteed within the framework of Avicenna’s truth as *certitudo*, Anselm’s *rectitudo* and Rufus’s *coaequatio*. As a *concretum*, the substance takes a new meaning with the help of Neoplatonic extension. According to the above-quoted Rufus, this abstract voluminosity determines matter in a singular and universal way (*modum qualitatis et adiacentis et inhaerentis et nominantis*). Rufus makes a purely nominalistic deduction as derivation of meaning taken from properties of the essence (*nomine scilicet suo materiam notantis*). The new first substance was created in the school of Oxford′s modernists by the fact that hypostatized essences of Porretans took over Avicebron’s determination of the matter of the third kind (ch. 3.2). The determination of the concrete essence takes place in the order of categorical definitions related to the pseudo-material substance. The result of the synthesis made in virtue of “*modum concretum*” is the objective individual, given as the first substance. This determination of being is contained in full form in Rufus’s treatise *Speculum animae*. Due to the sophistic connection between the first and second substance, a doppelganger of reality arose in the second Averroism. Albert took it for such stupidity that he refused to discuss it seriously. This Aristotelian carried out the defense of real being against the Latin Averroists (*esse reale et ratum in natura*, ch. 2.4.3). The target of Albert’s criticism is certainly Rufus, among others. Porretan determination of the individual and Avicenna’s objective being (*equinitas tantum*) were joined together to determine the real “individual and concrete” thing as *tertium ens*. Then it is true that the classical predication from the direction of the first substance is univoce integrated into the concrete way of predication (*modum concretum accipiunt*).[[414]](#footnote-414) The categorical predication of being of the third kind keep in itself the totality of concretely conceived being. Made it that way, an objective simulacrum of reality was born. The obscurantism of the first substance among modern Porretans was criticized in principle by chancellor Alvernus. He explicitly rejected Rufus’s nominalistic “*modus* *inhaerentis*” in the polemic against Grammarians. Being of the real substance is not the same as its meaning (*esse in subjecto non est inhaerere subjecto*, ch. 2.3.2). Alvernus rejected Rufus’s concrete and inherent nature in substances.

The previous chapter showed that the emergence of the new worldview is associated with the introduction of amphibolic predication and universal hylemorphism. Both phenomena originally belonged to the narrowly defined group of universals separated from categorical predication (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). In the context of Oxfordian Fallacy and universal hylemorphism, the amphibolia received the status of a substance of the third kind. The basis of concrete determination of being includes Rufus’s quoted commentary on *Second analytics*. The univocal concept of the number is created as the last single entity by division within the framework of the Tree of Porphyry. Thus, the concept of number has become formal and at the same time concrete. It means that the universal meaning has merged together with the reality of first substances (*concresco*). The speculative thinking of academic *illuminati* in Oxford and Paris grew firmly together with the concrete and individual simulacrum. Bacon considered it to be insane and Albert as ridiculous. Mathematically given universal species are mutually reflected in the epochal form of modern *Irrtum*. Analytically educated Furies presented the universal untruth to the objective mind of *illuminati* in the tragic, therefore divine manner. The magic mirror of modernity reflects univok the concrete *tertium ens* given *obiective* in reality and in thought. Modernism did not perform Weber’s *Entzauberung der Welt*. On the contrary, the modernists objectively bewitched the real world in an almost demonic way. It was proved by the apocalyptic and demonic nature of modern logic (ch. 3.1.2). The paranoid truth of modernity makes a mythology according to the magic mirror (*speculum*) in the fairy tale of Snow White. Speculative modernists admire in this magic mirror the emperor’s new clothes made by Rufus in “*semel—semper*” mode. Modern speculative science comes into being by illuminating the sense of being from mathematical abstraction, as this quote shows.

“Some causes are determined with regard to their effects to such extent that their actions cannot be stopped. Such kinds of causes exist in mathematics. The form of a triangle cannot be otherwise because of its habitus. But other causes are determined with respect to their effects that can be prevented, which is the case of causality in nature. The olive tree produces olives; but this is not always the case, because this can be prevented by the disobedience of matter (*per inoboedientiam materiae*), as Aristotle says in the first book of *Metaphysics*.” [[415]](#footnote-415)

Rufus defines the connection between cause and effect not on the basis of the effect of real substances, but on the basis of mathematical necessity and causality, which cannot be given otherwise (*impossibile est ipsam prohiberi*). The effective causality of first real substances is subordinated to causal necessity of mathematical abstraction. It is *univoce* taken for cognition and for reality (*tales causae sunt in mathematicis*). Therefore, from the point of view of scientific causality, primacy is given to mathematical and geometric necessity (*formam enim trianguli*) and it is not taken out of necessity that comes from the real state of things in the world. This theory stands in contradiction with Aristotle’s interpretation, where both necessities are distinguished according to the mathematical or metaphysical abstraction. According to Rufus, the mathematically given causality is not disturbed by anything (*impossibile est ipsam prohiberi*), in contrast to the disobedience of matter (*inoboedientiam materiae*). Rufus does not respect basic facts of *Second Analytics* cited above. The abstract logical causality assigned in thinking is fundamentally different from the metaphysical causality that relates to hyparchical first substances acting on each other in reality. Thus, the mathematical truth as *veritas* received the historical impulse for modern assimilation and the conquest of the world. The new imperialist thinking dismissed the metaphysical and “democratic” obligation to accept the world in its real necessity. It opened the road to modern and postmodern pacification of “disobedient matter” of all kinds, including so-called “human resources.“ This nihilistic *scibile* of postmodern humanism precisely marks the concretely defined individual, derived from the specific concept of the human corpse. The interpretation of scientific knowledge in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy reduced the world to mathematical calculus based on analogous unity. That vision established the mythological world of *illuminati* modernes. The new *intelligentia spiritualis* asserts in the name of its founder that the materially given “disobedience” of being must be eliminated and replaced by the “concrete,” also fully actualized power of the demiurgic subject. This quote shows the *Lichtung* of the original place of truth and untruth of future capitalism, which was theologically developed by Bonaventura and economically justified by Olivi.

The modern subject, endowed with the will to make out of the world the mathematical simulacrum and to tame disobedient matter, it must exclude sensual cognition coupled with real substance (*passio materialis*) from the process of deductive cognition (*ipsa demonstratio*). Franciscan mystic and “insane” philosopher Rufus founded the school of *Modernorum* in Oxford, as he took the first important step on the way to British colonial imperialism. The will to power starts from modern scientific cognition, which is placed outside of the real world. The objective double of the real world and its mad carrier (*subiectum*), they existed long before postmodern metaphysics of Descartes and nihilistic humanism of Foucault. The modern division and classification of concrete reality come to the essence as the last indivisible individual, and real causality joins it in the second step. As a result, the analytically conceived *scibile* of modern speculative science became a first sophistic substance in the form of *concretum*. The definition of scientific cognition is based on the exposure of being from behind. It forms a simulacrum of reality as concrete determination of the thing. This gave rise to a paranoid view of reality based on its simulacrum. Alvernus, Bacon and Albert considered it to be the insane way of thinking. The nominally conceived essence according to Oxfordian Fallacy took the role of the middle link of deductive proof. The following quotation defines the scientific proof as coincidence of two parallel phenomena, which are related either to the ideal *definitio* or to the real *passio*. The model of science based on truth as *coaequatio* follows the synchronicity of twofold “concrete” predication.

“The effect in matter has a definition given from the genus and the difference; but the effect thus defined only says something about the essence and its real effects (*essentiam eandem cum passione*), but does not give a definition of the cause. The other definition says something about the effective cause, but nothing about its essence (*dicit causam passionis, et non essentiam*). The first determination of what belongs to the subject as a principle of cognition is given in deductive statement. The second determination of causality concerns not only scientific cognition, but also the real effect of the essence (*non est tantum subiecti, sed et passionis*). In this way, the totality of deductive cognition and the interpretation of the scientific syllogism are given; each part states it from a different perspective of cognition (*positione differens*).” [[416]](#footnote-416)

Rufus defines scientific proceeding as cognition in the mode of universal hylemorphism. The essence as the body of the third kind operates directly in the reality (*essentiam eandem cum passione*). The higher form of analytical cognition of the principles considers the middle link of syllogism in the essentially given definition. As a result, the logically conceived causality (*dicit causam passionis*) is predicted outside the existing first substance. The causality of the third kind represents the apparent metaphysical necessity of the middle link of the proof (*medium*). Rufus transformed the causal necessity into a logical essence and defined it as the formal basis and principle of scientific proof (*subiecti tantum principium est demonstrationis*). The essence acts permanently in the area of causality and replaces the temporary effect of first substances. The modernity has created a new deductive syllogism. The necessity and universality in the modern scientific proof come from a whole legion of modern being of the third kind (*numerus, unum, concretum, individuum*). This mythology determines knowledge of real substances (*sic est tota virtus demonstrationis et sic ipsa demonstratio*). The subject of scientific proof is not the predication of causality coming from first substances. They act in the whole scheme only as an additional accident, which is contingently given in reality (*positione differens*). Empirical cognition, within the framework of truth as *coaequatio*, makes only a supplement to the deduction already given, as shows the conclusion of quotation. The material substance no longer establishes the essence of cognition. The real causality only confirms already given objective causality (*dicit causam passionis, et non essentiam*). Causality in the brave new world keeps independently its essential hypostatic nature. Rufus does not consider the real causal effect as the basis of scientific proof; he replaced it by logical definition of causal effects. Essential causality is ever accomplished, empirical effects are incomplete. The sophistry of *Second Analytics* lies in the fact that the real solar eclipse was exchanged for the “individual” and “concrete” being of the third kind. As a doppelganger of the real Sun, the new “sun” possesses an essentially determined causality (*dicit causam passionis*). After this sophistic exchange of the first substance for a being of the third kind, the definition of scientific proof *ex inmediatis* according to *Second Analytics* applies in a new way. Grosseteste carried out this exchange for the first time (ch. 3.1.1). The individualized cognition of the singular thing secondarily completes the autonomous deduction, which is given primarily at the level of the action of the universal and necessary essences. The accidental relationship to the real causality at the level of first substances makes the cognition complete, which only apparently corresponds to the letter of *Second Analytics*. The previous chapter has shown that Rufus’s predication “*medium et causa idem*” belongs primarily to the essence. According to *Second Analytics*, the essential definition of the middle link of the demonstration is possible only in mathematics and geometry, but by no means in the scientific deduction related to real first substances. We know about the eclipse because astronomical bodies exist, and not because mathematics, or even just the thinking subject exist. Rufus took the mathematical necessity *univoce* with the metaphysical predicted causality of real things and he fabricated a new type of analytical scientific proof. The most important representatives of the school of the first Averroism knew very well that the formal determination of the scientific proof in the school of the Modernorum was self-sufficient and their conception of the *demonstratio* did not require external reality to reach the true conclusion. The substitution of the second triad of first principles for the first in Rufus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy completed the eclipse of the first substance in scientific proof. Rufus’s concept of truth establishes the identity of two Porretan “species—hypostases” (*coaequatio*). Their univocal unity is inspired by the mathematical proportion known from the work *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi* (ch. 1.5). Once again, the different status of the species is at play in the second Averroism, which establishes the analogous unity of being. This is given by the method “*medio modo*” (ch. 3.3.1) that promulgated the modernist school based on Oxfordian Fallacy.

The key question for the truth as correspondence was the statute of species. The first anonymous writing from the school of the first Averroism after 1220 linked the species to Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*. The receptivity of the immaterial intellect assumed the intentional object in the Blund’s school that made coincide the thing and cognition (*potentia media*, ch. 2.3.1). Blund’s school adequately connected the thing and its recognition through the diaphanum and through the activity of *intellectus possibilis*. This form of mediation given by *intellectus in potentia* is fundamentally different from Rufus’s definition “*medio modo*” that makes a speculative unity of the world. The modern concept of mediation has a unique character, which is given by mathematical proportion and Neoplatonist participation in mathematically determined measure. The first Averroism conceived *species intelligibilis* in the context of intentionality. It is Averroes’s ability of the intellect given merely as the potency of the soul. Although Rufus conceives the intellect as an Aristotelian *tabula rasa*, he expressly rejects Averroes’s concept of species bound to *intellectus possibilis*. The second Averroism operates in Neoplatonist metaphysics. It takes the species as a singular and concretely conceived universal, which causally establishes the cognition of the modern individual. Rufus belongs to the school of the second Averroism and his speculative conception of truth starts from Avicenna’s abstraction as *denudatio*. Therefore, his new teaching was positively received by Avicennists around Philip the Chancellor and by representatives of schools *Logica Modernorum* that were already in strong decline. Rufus’s teaching was an excellent fit for the school of the young Franciscans, who, under the leadership of Bonaventura, edited the work *Summa Halensis*. The radical Franciscan coming from Oxford offered to Avicennist’s colleagues in the Paris Convent another version of modernity through the universal hylemorphism and a new type of concrete categorical predication. The modern vision of truth does not require a correspondence between thing and mind, but objectively establishes the correspondence or equality of two univocal species. The intellect of *illuminati* observes these forms directly in things and directly in its own reflection. The definition of truth takes up a speculative equality of *tertium ens* that modern mind itself has fabricated and reflected.

This theory has had a fundamental influence on modernism and postmodernism. The development of truth as Rufus’s “*coaequatio* *rerum et intellectuum*” is accomplished in postmodernism by the absolute logic of Hegel. The work *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* updates Grosseteste and Rufus by the difference between natural logic and speculative logic (§ 170). Hegel, like Rufus, does not take the saying “The rose is red” in relation to the first substance, but to the essence given *absolute*, that is, separately from the first substance.[[417]](#footnote-417) Natural logic is Aristotelian and applies only in the lower conception of syllogistic truth (*Räsonieren*; Hegel 8, 59). From the point of view of the absolute spirit, however, it is true that metaphysics and logic are identical: “*Alle Dinge sind ein Urteil*” (Hegel 8, 318). The original identity of mind with itself is given by the concept that reflects the universal content of mind according to postmodern pattern established by David of Dinant. Then the full speculative equality, which is given by the combination of wholeness and part, applies: “*Das Einzelne ist das Allgemeine*” (Hegel 8, 319). The absolute logic contemplates the existing entities in the mode of logical and metaphysical concreteness that Rufus established about 1235. Marx’s political economy made the same criticism of speculative Hegel as representatives of the first Averroism (Alvernus, Albert, Bacon) made of Oxford’s *illuminati*. Marx’s concept of ideologically given alienation canceled Hegel’s absolute definition of truth as speculative and concrete *coaequatio*. The absolute spirit contemplates own rationality in the world to reach the pre-programmed goal of history. Marx rejected in the work *Die Deutsche Ideologie* (1846) basic principles of speculative and logical mirroring as an ideological fairy tale of German academic idealism. According to Marx, there is no such mirror of the absolute mind as the speculative work *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) pretended. The alienation of postmodern idealistic thinking and the real world of work exists due to false kind of economics generated in the capitalist system. Marx found the basic Oxfordian Fallacy of the capitalist system. Hegel’s absolute consciousness makes the kind of postmodern *tertium ens* that reflects but a false kind of class-based consciousness. The first real substance is made in the capitalism due to ownership of the means of production. Once again, the past character of the real substance (*quidditas*) came into play, given as the primacy of real work and economics over the ideological lunacy of academics. Hegel’s absolute *scibile* reflects the abstract growth of freedom and self-reflection in the thinking of this academic philosopher, and not the real and therefore primary events in the capitalist system of labor and enterprise. Rufus’s modern definition of truth opens up both the development towards Hegel and Marx’s postmodernism and to the development towards abstractly conceived ideas of human rights. In the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, modern universality of human rights stands is a kind of ideological *scibile* based on modern *species* of human nature. The criticism of Aristotelian Hannah Arendt concerns therefore the concept of modern freedom as well as the idea of human rights (OBJ III, ch. 5). Universal species exist *univoce* but in the diacosmos of *Modernorum*. They form potential and substantially given *scibile* in the hylemorphic substances as well as in the cosmic and human intellect. Modern science establishes their identity in thinking with the necessary certainty and correctness. Modernism mystically sees objective species in things and then finds their correspondence with identical objective species given in the mind. The act of cognition logically and obviously necessarily constitutes the full equality of the two kinds of *scibile*. Modern dialectic between the *potentia accidentalis* and the *potentia substantialis* applies undifferentiated both in reality and in thinking, because both species are given *univoce*. The eternal forms are given in contingent reality, and empirically based cognition represents them in thinking. In the act of self-reflection, the theoretical scientist adheres to Cartesian *cogito* as a substantial potential of every knowledge. With the help of the proverb “*semel est verum, semper est verum*” (ch. 1.4), modernists determine how this or that real product of technoscience or ideologically conceived reality looks like. In both cases, the speculative definition of truth is considered to be full equality of things and intellect (*veritas est coaequatio rerum et intellectuum*). Every truth is given in advance, see the metaphysical mode of Avicenna’s and Anselm’s certainty. It is based ontotheologically from the direction of the cosmic active intellect as the form giver. The truth as *aequalitas* comes from mathematically given analogy. It mixes the univocal concept of being, the real thing and its cognition. Blund and the first Averroism clearly distinguished the thing in reality and its sensual and intellectual species in thought from each other. The corpse is not a real person, because it does not impose the sense of person to elaborate the demonstrative proof.

Rufus is the first scientifically designed modern Cartesian who does not need to observe the real world. The certainty of the knowing subject refers to self-reflection at the level of sensual cognition (*percipio me percipere colorem*). The modern cognitive process arises in the mode of modern *informatio*. In the act of self-reflection, the intellect also becomes aware of the consequent fact that it should assimilate another form given as *scibile*. Following quotation indicates *Lichtung* of the informatics age.

“The faculty of seeing, if it is changed by light, perceives not only the color, but also the immutability of light (*suam immutationem*). In a similar way, the intellectual faculty of cognition assumes the immutability of species, which is recognized or formed (*specie alicuius scibilis aut informatur*). The ability of cognition perceives not only the recognized content (*suum scibile*), but also the process of formation of the species (*suam informationem*).” [[418]](#footnote-418)

The parallel runs between two similar processes (*suam immutationem—suam informationem*). Sensorial or intellectual perception is not formed by intentional species. Mind directly considers hypostatized species of the third kind that form the unchangeable cognition. The scheme of exposure from behind suggest the firm basis of perception and cognition (*potentia substantialis*, ch. 3.3.1). That cognitive hypostasis (*immutatio*) is given in comparison with the changeable act of cognition as subjective *informatio*. The insight into the contingent *scibile* is deduced by modern *informatio*. It makes the hypostatic unity of the intellect and the new type of species cast in the mode of individuality and concreteness. The intellect is informed by itself and it comes across accidentally given external reality. The process of information confirms the fact that the mind of *illuminati* is superior to the disobedient first substance. In the order of modern cognition, the reality of the world is valid only *per posterius*, in relation to the unchanging active intellect and in relation to the principles of cognition given permanently and *per prius*. Such proceeding is possible only due to already mentioned mathematical analogy, which is unchangeable by its essence. The process of cognition is determined from behind, from already actualized intuition based on the act of self-reflection in the substantial intellect. This insight repeats the Cartesian *cogito*, which is taken from Neoplatonists as Augustine and Avicenna. The universal and mathematical *coaequatio* between things and the intellect is determined by the analogy and the singular-universal essence of the number (*numerus*). Truth, as a universal equality, does not come from first substances. It represents a form of agreement of the intellect with regard to being of the third kind that is recognized in the framework of Rufus’s mathematical and logical *demonstratio*. Bacon and Albert fundamentally objected to this separation of science from reality because there is no formal and mathematical causality. Both representatives of the first Averroism regarded the Oxford scholars as pure sophists that did not understand Aristotle at all.

The modern worldview was born as a result of the exclusion of unreliable empirically cognizing subject and disobedient material reality. Both sources of Aristotelian truth have been replaced by methodical approach of enlightened cognition based on mathematics and on certainty of the self-reflective subject. Now it becomes clear why classical Aristotelians, like Bacon, or the Averroists of the first wave, like Alvernus, considered their contemporaries to be insane thinkers or sophists. The thinking of those *doctores* *Latini* reflects and assimilates non-existent hypostases that are given by participation in the universal essence given only in thinking (*individuum, species, scibile, concretum*). This simulacrum of reality manifests itself in the act of Avicennian intuition, which is related to the substantially given intellect (*reflexio, informatio, representatio*). The correspondence of thinking is given with regard to the univocal being of the third kind in the cognizing mind and then accidentally overflows into contingent reality. Modern *illuminati* perceive the objective “exsistence” of species in the act of analogical classification (*resolutio*) given at the level of logical abstraction (*denudatio*). The decomposition of the world into prime factors establishes the original certainty of cognition, given by mathematical proportion. Such concept of correspondence works with a different definition of truth than the theory of cognition in CMDA made in the concept of *proportio*.[[419]](#footnote-419) The theory of truth as analogical equality and proportion are determined by the mathematically given equality (*aequatio*). It is made in thinking through formal deduction, which the modern subject projects into the world through the causality of universal essences (*quod est*). Mathematical equality expresses the mutual convertibility and universal equality (*coaequatio*) between the individual unity of the recognized thing (*concretum*) and the representation of this unity in enlightened thinking (*scibile*). Thinking refers to itself, because the *concretum* and the *scibile* fall into the realm of pure abstraction. The basis of the mathematically based theory of truth is the equality between the hypostatic form on the one hand (*scibile*) and the numerically defined individual, impressed in the thinking (*informatio*). Therefore, the truth of modernity is given primarily as the equality of two members in the univocal relationship of assimilation, and by no means as an Aristotelian correspondence of two different orders of being, also the intellect and reality. The specific, i.e., concrete and individual unity of the world finds expression in modern *medium* of demonstrative syllogism, which is understood as causally operating essence. Intentionality fell out of the scheme of the second Averroism. The real intentionality is built on the process of abstraction of the real substance via *species sensibilis* and *species intelligibilis*. The modern intellect speculatively reflects itself in the highest degree at the level of direct insight into the species given in the mode *per prius*. The intentionality coming in virtue of reception from the contingent reality is superfluous. The modern science is self-sufficient, because it is separated from reality by mathematical and logical abstraction. It is only in the mode *per posterius* that modernists look for the correspondence of intellect and things in the mode of empirical *scientia*. At this level, the intentionality given by sensual and intelligible reception of real things keeps some limited value. In the diacosmos of modernists, there is a full mathematical proportion (*equatio*) between the subject of cognition and the universal predication, which is given by the mathematical supposition. The process of mathematical and causally effective *informatio* does not come from the material thing in the mode *per prius*. It directly observes concrete individuals called “things themselves,” as Husserl later named them. The formal essentiality of the thing, i.e. individuality and existence as a *tertium ens* forms the basis of cognitive certainty and gives the ultimate justification to modern being. This new individual of modernity became the subject of cognition (*scibile*) in the process of Rufus’s *informatio*. The new epoch of scientific computer science begins with the emergence of the concrete, completely universal and equivocally conceived modern *individuum*. In the mode *per prius*, the supposition does not require a manifestation of the real thing, nor does it have to predict its causally given imposition from reality. True analytical judgment runs in the framework of truth as a universal mathematical harmony. It is sufficient to keep obviously given certainty of the essence; it may be found in contingent real things as well.

Rufus’s deduction of being of the third kind to the first principles of cognition (*resolutio*) later repeated Descartes to find the first philosophy. The postmodern work *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1641) update Grosseteste’s and Rufus’s displacement of empirical reality by objective evidence of the first principles of cognition. Postmodern recomposition of *tertium ens* into prime factors can be summarized in three basic steps. First: to cast doubt on the external reality. Secondly: finding a firm and unquestionable foundation in the *cogito*. Thirdly: connection with the first principle of cognition, which is actualized in the substantial intellect and is given as the first cause. Fourth: reconstruction of empirical being from the direction of this foundation based on mathematically and reflexively given universal identity. The process starts with Avicenna′s *denudatio* (the mythological disappearance of the real world) and passes through Rufus′s *resolutio* (the metaphysical reduction of knowledge to modern God), which is completed by Porretans's *colligatio* (the logical recollection of the objective, postmodern world). Following Rufus, the postmodern French *illuminatus* directly observes evident facts and he assimilates the world in the mathematical mode “*discrete videamus*.” The decomposition and recomposition of the world in the postmodern realm of logico-philosophical treatises no longer works in the substantial model of the universal hylemorphism of the first *Modernorum*, but through the postmodern consciousness of one’s own self, which acquires the character of a thinking substance (*res cogitans*). The further form of Rufus’s resolution and composition is shown by the postmodern struggle of German idealism for the elimination or confirmation of Kant’s dichotomy of the noumenal and phenomenal world. Rufus’s conception of truth as universal similarity and equality of all *scibilia* opened the road in both directions. On the one hand, the radical subjectivity of Descartes and Husserl emerged. On the other side, the radical objectivity of the Vienna Circle arose, which repeated Rufus’s project in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. At the beginning of the 20th century, logical positivists renewed the past glory of Rufus’s analytic philosophy, because they abolished metaphysical abstraction as superfluous. To the contemporary analytic philosophy, mathematical abstraction and mere nominalism are sufficient for cognition of the world. Rufus’s thesis has a historical effect in all versions of analytical philosophy, which culminates the epoch of Oxfordian Fallacy in the age of metaphysical nihilism. The role of *sophistae Italici* and *Grammatici* criticized by Alvernus was played around 1920 by logical positivists of Viennese school and the analytical philosophy of the early Wittgenstein. The positivists from the Vienna Circle established the nihilistic form of scientific knowledge by replacing metaphysics with modern logic according to their program.[[420]](#footnote-420) This school updates the Oxfordian Fallacy in the form of the objectively victorious philosophy of language. The structure of Wittgenstein’s famous treatise proceeds in the mode of Rufus’s logical truth as a *coaequatio* from the *scibile* given in reality to the formal *scibile*.[[421]](#footnote-421) This postmodern version of Rufus’ original science fiction builds on the dogmatic method of the only logical way made in the framework of unified science, which defends the theory of the one logical truth. Karl Raimund Popper took over the role of Bacon to make criticism of Viennese academics in the year 1930. This high school teacher reminded the Viennese *illuminati* of Aristotle’s principle *ex inmediatis*, although he did not explicitly comment on it in this form. Popper emphasized the fact that the truth of science is determined by the factual state of reality. The knowledge created on the basis of an imposition is always involved in the verification of the deductively given scientific evidence. There are no analytical principles of cognition, which are given as *a priori* principles of inductive proof (*Logik der Induktion*), because this is logical and methodological nonsense.[[422]](#footnote-422) Aristotelian induction cannot be converted into any *a priori* principles, because the metaphysical dative makes the basis of inductive proceeding. Of course, Popper as an objectivist did not mention that part of Aristotelian metaphysics. But he declared the procedure of Oxfordian Fallacy in the remake of the Vienna Circle as methodologically false, because we cannot substitute the first triad of recognition from the reality for the second triad. Again, the status of metaphysical abstraction of *Second Analytics* in the mode of *ex inmediatis* applies (*Anal. Post*. 84a13–14). The two fundaments of universal statements given *per se* in logic and in metaphysics must be carefully distinguished. But in the twentieth century, this doctrine has become quite old-fashioned; it has been objectively displaced from the uncritical methodology of science. According to Popper, the result of aporetic speculative science of Viennese academic *illuminati* is a reflection of the thinking given in itself within the framework of unverifiable, *a priori* given postulates. Also, there is an infinite regress that follows narcissistic mirroring of the speculative subject. Therefore, the deductive conclusions have to be proved only inductively, i.e., by permanent falsification of *ad hoc* given scientific theories. This created another divine comedy, which immediately collapsed again. If there is no deductive procedure at least in the first science, then only relative truths apply.

The main role in the crisis of science was played by analogical unity of the world given in the mode of universal logical-mathematical equality. Its guarantor is not absolute necessity given in reality, but a subjective necessity given in the enlightened mind. All these forms of postmodern Avicennism have in common one fact. Following the example of Oxfordian Fallacy, they exchanged the imposition of hyparchical meaning coming from reality for its logical (Carnap) or eidetic supposition (Husserl). Neither the philosophy of language nor Husserl’s phenomenology is not capable of clarifying the question of reference and truth, which Aristotle and the Commentator had solved a long ago. Husserl separated himself from the “psychologizing“ intentionality of Brentano in search of absolutely subjective basis of cognition (transcendental egology). For the enlightenment of the intellect, Husserl does not need any mediation between the intellect and real things, because in the conception of absolute egology he went “to the things themselves.” Like Rufus, this mathematician and philosopher had to find in himself a universal *scibile*, which should create the last univocal and completely concrete unity of the world. Husserl’s *Cartesianische Meditationen* (1929)presented Rufus’s *coaequatio* as a universal correspondence between the immanent and transcendent components of self-awareness. The truth as a *coaequatio* arises from the fact that at the end of transcendental reduction, evident intuition of transcendence in the act of the absolute ego merges with the current immanence of *cogito*. The mathematician, who, like Rufus, is looking for the undoubted basis of arithmetic numbers, created a new version of the phenomenological *scibile* by interpreting Brentano’s terms “*qualitative Modifikation*” and “*Fundierung*.” In contrast to the Aristotelian Brentano, Husserl shifted intentionality towards the reflexively given *Wesensschau*.[[423]](#footnote-423) Husserl defines Rufus’s pure *scibile*, which is necessary for the truth as assimilation, in the concept of *eidos*. It is given in the mode of radical identity (*radikalen Gemeinsamkeit*) with sensual contemplation and at the same time creates a pure essence (*reines Wesen*) in the intellectual vision.[[424]](#footnote-424) Husserl, for the time being, wrote the last chapter of modern “concrete predication.” He made *revolutio* by repeating the error of Rufus’s predication “*per modum concretum*” in the contemporary philosophy. Modern Neoplatonist Rufus separated himself from the Aristotelian Averroes; the Neoplatonist Husserl rejected the teaching of postmodern Aristotelian named Brentano. In a nutshell, the transition from Rufus’s *scibile* to Husserl’s *eidos* captures the epochal path of modernity according to Heidegger’s *Irre*. The return to the school of the first Averroism was heralded by Heidegger’s separation from Husserl. Heidegger refused the path of Avicennist postmodernity right at the beginning of his phenomenological path of thought. Around the year 1920, new hermeneutics of original meaning of existence discovered a new concept of truth and a new relation to being (*Hermeneutik der Faktizität*). The separation of Heidegger from Husserl repeats the dispute of the first and the second Averroism in yet another gigantomachy about substance. In the following period of philosophical nihilism, the contemporary representatives of Oxfordian Fallacy are fully victorious. Even the humanistic school of modern objectivists lost its cause just as inevitably as the first Averroism lost to the Latin sophists around 1277. The subject of modernity founded by Rufus runs the dialectic “permanency—contingency.” It accomplished a correspondence of being of the third kind with regard to its reflection. Reality represents a special case of the essence, which is conceived informatively and considered directly in the mode of mathematical denudation. This essence then goes (*exsistit*) in the contingent and disobedient matter, which must be assimilated in this new aspect of information and then tamed in a capitalist way. The information epoch of modernity is brought into being by Avicennist cognition as a certainty of the speculative intellect. This gnoseological madness is reflected in the mirror (*speculum*) of pre-existing mathematical univocity of monads as indivisible individuals (Rufus’s *informatio*, Leibniz’s *harmonie préétablie*).

About the year 1235, modernists accomplished the basic program in order to intellectually conquer the world with the help of mathematical abstraction. The concreteness of new science makes use of mathematical abstraction, which is completely indifferent to the existence of first substances, whether living or non-living. The eclipse of hyparchical metaphysics caused the real world to exist only in the thinking of modern *illuminati*. The disobedience of this or that materially given individual must be objectively suppressed. The first Averroism considered this worldview insane or ridiculous. The concrete individual of modernists does not really exist, because the being of the third kind has no way of existence in real world. But the second Averroism created its own form of “exsistence” and truth, which *ex nihilo* constituted an objective diacosmos between reality and human thought. Since the 17th century, the foundation of this formal equality has shifted to postmodern mathematics and technology. Now the equality in the current monetary economy of global corporations with their *scibile* called “virtual finances” is functioning in a complete nihilistic manner. The world of finances became a purely mathematical derivative in which the science fiction of future debts is reflected in a mirror made by the informatic of nihilist Furies. The derivatives are linked to the logically necessary arrival not of the Antichrist, but the economics of banksters and nacessary arrival of planetary debts. The historical task of modernity given by Rufus, to tame the disobedient matter, has been historically accomplished by all colonial empires of postmodern West and today’s banking slavery. These slavers replaced dead modern God and they subsist in the corporate sovereign territory of the City of London or in the Wall Street. The neoliberal ideology given in the present form of vulgar monetarism then compares all values with this nihilistic being of the third kind and forms a new simulacrum of universal equality. Rufus opened *via* *Modernorum*, in which the logical and philosophical state of the world is determined by mathematics and nihilistic logic in the mode *per prius*.

### 3.3.3 Origin of Official Averroism

The dispute over the theory of truth clearly distinguished two schools interpreting Averroes about the year 1235. The controversy gave the signal for a new round of gigantomachy concerning the status of substance. It was quite clear to representatives of Blund’s school in Paris that the new metaphysics, which the students had imported from Oxford, was in fundamental contradiction with Aristotelian theory of truth and cognition according to Averroes’s commentaries on *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The open dispute between mendicants and artists at the University of Paris broke out during the pontificate of bishop Alvernus when he composed his second commentary on *De anima* probably written sometime in the period 1240–45. Let us recall that it was at this time that Rufus’s unsuccessful effort took place, to protect the new version of modern metaphysics. It was achieved in his work *Speculum animae* (circa 1245) that caused his forced departure to Oxford before the year 1250. After the death of bishop Alvernus, academically shaken modernists started the first successful attack against the first Averroism. In the dispute against mendicants, the main protagonist of secular magisters of the University of Paris was already quoted Guillelmus de Sancto Amore. He was magister artium since 1228 and magister theologiae since 1250. He became known for his polemical writings against mendicants (*Tractatus brevis de periculis novissimorum temporum*, 1255). His commentaries on *First* and *Second analytics* are still waiting for a critical edition. John of Parma (Johannis de Parma) as the general of the Order of Friars Minor provisory settled the controversy about 1253. When Rufus left Paris, modernist philosopher Bonaventura took over the entire cause and he led it to a victorious end for modernists. Rufus’s sophistical interpretation of Aristotle shows why and how Averroes became the black sheep of modernity. Rufus’s commentaries created the fundamental dilemma of modernists. In the years 1235–40, they began to form a scholastic thought to take an adventure known as *via Modernorum*. The second Averroism changed scientific cognition, substance, truth and even the concept of being. According to connoisseurs of Aristotle and Averroes at that time, only some philosophically immature individuals could belong to analytical modernism of Rufus, because they were guilty of several fundamental metaphysical errors.

1. The modernists abolished twofold hyparchical sense of being (logical, metaphysical) and used the logical univocity in order to establish modern metaphysics as the first science.
2. They ignore the metaphysical difference between the first and the second substance and therefore produce a being of the third kind.
3. Concrete and individual predication denies Aristotelian categorical distinction between substance as “*subiectum per se*” and accidents as “*esse in alio*.” The accidents became a hypostatic *tertium ens* that replaced the second substance.
4. The so-called “scientific” predication of modernity is therefore not categorical, but analogical. Modern science consists of ontotheological fairy tales and today′s ideological chatter until, like the Titanic, it encounters the principle of reality.
5. The introduction of universal hylemorphism created a parallel universe in the minds of *illuminati*, which they began to represent as an imposition originating from hyparchic first substances.

These five points make basic differences between the first and the second Averroism around the year 1240. They heavily influenced the controversies in the following generation of the first and the second Averroism. The cognition starts from the human subject and it created a universal equality of *tertium ens*. The production of truth in modernity became a matter of the sovereign demiurge on the divine or human level. In the age of perfect nihilism and the death of modern God, the truth degenerated to a purely subjective opinion and to language games in which the thesis “meaning is use” is done in mode *per prius*. The modern “*res*” exists exclusively in a potential manner; the reality of the world represents a contingent ephemeral which is born as the actualization of permanent cosmic forms. Grosseteste accomplished the transformation of existence into an “exsistence” by introducing a new conception of potentiality. The father of Oxfordian Fallacy established the validity of future contingent events and thus founded modern logic on demonology (ch. 3.1.2). The essence given as species passes “from” (*ex*) this permanent, necessary and unchangeable permanence to be transfered (*sistit*) into the contingent actuality. A new scientology emerged through the new interpretation of *Second Analytics* and *Metaphysics*; the modern kind of science does not require a real thing as effective cause of deductive scientific proof. The measure of truthfulness (*rectitudo*) is determined by the evidence (*certitudo*) of correct logical statements (*demonstratio*). Metaphysical speculation based on Porretan version of *Logica Modernorum* made a world of Alice. There is no Cheshire cat as the first substance but its accidental grinning is permantly present in the mode “*semel—semper*.” Doctrine of the second Averroism was adopted mainly by philosophical beginners who studied logic on examples of sophistical puzzles (*Obligationes, Insolubilia, Sophistaria*). They should learn to distinguish between different forms of sophisms. After studying logic and predication in the context of Aristotelian *Organon*, baccalaureates proceeded to questions dealing with the cognition and the first philosophy in the most important writings of the Corpus (*De anima, Physica, De caelo, Metaphysica*). The previous interpretation has shown that the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy fell into the category of “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*” (ch. 3.1.1). Alvernus, Albert and Bacon considered the teaching of modern *Nominales* beyond the philosophical disputation worthy of reasonable men (ch. 3.2). Siger de Brabant and Thomas of Aquin were already obliged to argue with the modernists, as they founded a new school of thought about 1250. It gradually received ecclesiastical blessings and in the year 1255 even its own university chair.

The dispute between two schools necessarily touched the next critical point, namely scholastic interpretation of writing CMDA. The hermeneutics of objectivity must show when and for what reason Latin modernists rejected Averroes’s metaphysics. The corpus of Commentator was to a large extent integrated into Avicennism of the Toledo school, to which Grosseteste had already belonged since the last time of his Parisian period. But the basic problem given by conflicting relationship of both Arabic metaphysicians was not solved by then. The integration of Commentator and Avicenna was impossible because of the incompatibility of their starting points. The preceding analysis of *Second Analytics* has shown that Rufus defended the existence of the single thing as a universal individual. Neoplatonic forms of the third kind (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1) or Grosseteste’s *exemplars* (ch. 3.1.1) act as causes at the level of sublunary world. Rufus defended the singular statute of species by taking the side of Plato and Avicenna. Modernism invoked Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle, which was represented in this period by the interpretation of Avicenna and the Commentator according to the Toledo school. Grosseteste, the author of *De anima et de potenciis eius* (ca. 1225), was active in the Blund’s school. He rejected Neoplatonic interpretation at the time when the Toledo school was publishing the first translations of Averroes’s corpus. As preceptor of Franciscans at the University of Oxford about ten years later, he certainly did not agree with contrary interpretations that young *sequaces Aristotelis* with Rufus at their head put forward. This was the reason why the founder of Oxfordian Fallacy criticized young modernists at Oxford (*contra quosdam modernos*, ch. 3.1.3). This group of radical academic *illuminati* founded the school of second Averroism at Oxford about 1235. Their teaching was at odds with Aristotle’s metaphysics interpreted *ad mentem Averrois*. The introduction of universal hylemorphism was philosophical nonsense even for classical Avicennists from the Toledo school. That is why Grosseteste intervened, so that the unity of the person, absolutely necessary for Christian theology, would not be endangered. This is the next reason why Rufus and other baccalaureate modernists were sent expeditiously from Oxford to Paris for master’s studies about 1235. In the same way as chancellor and bishop Alvernus in the school of the first Averroism, Grosseteste could not tolerate at the Christian University heretical doctrines that promulgated the multiplicity of substances in man and the emanation scenario according to universal hylemorphism that reminded of Aristotelianism made by David of Dinant. In this critical line against modernity, his philosophical successor Roger Bacon continued his lectures at Oxford. Rufus explicitly asserted that Averroes was mistaken on essential points of Aristotle’s teaching. We took two examples from Rufus’s commentaries that present the teaching of *Metaphysics* in contradiction to Aristotle and also to the Commentator.

Averroes’s *Great Commentary on* *Metaphysics* and his writing CMDA link the second substance to material first substances. Averroes defines Aristotle’s concept of individuation exclusively through the real matter and through the singular thing as the first substance. For the first Averroism, the being is numerically different from the other entities thanks to its actual hylemorphic existence. The materially given uniqueness establishes the being of the first substance which is fundamentally different from the potentiality of the concept. The following quotation explains why Grosseteste rejected the school of young contemporaries. They did not understand Aristotle’s teaching and, moreover, made of him a heretic. Rufus belongs to Neoplatonic group of *sequaces Aristotelis* rejected by Alvernus. The quotation from his commentary on *Metaphysics* confirms it.

“Aristotle polemicized against Plato, who presented separated species as causes of existence of single things. In that point the Commentator asserts that the material single thing can be changed only in its matter. Since the species are immaterial and things are material, the species cannot change single things. But this is wrong.” [[425]](#footnote-425)

The quotation correctly sees that the basic dispute between Plato and Aristotle concerns the subsistence of universal ideas as independent substances. According to Plato, the universals work causally in the material reality (*species separatas esse causas singularium*). Such Platonism is absolutely unacceptable for Aristotelians. Averroes insists on the separation of the species given in thought from the physical effect of bodies given materially. Rufus knows very well that fact (*non poterunt singularia transmutari a speciebus*). Rufus rejects Averroes’s position that stands behind authentic Aristotle. That argument fundamentally rejects any concepts of being of the third kind. The first modernist cannot accept in principle Aristotelian division of reality into the actualized being and into a merely potential ideal being (*hoc videtur falsum*). Rufus put numerical difference of substances to the level of mathematical abstraction. The number has causal efficacy and appears as one of the principles of individualization. Arithmetical numbers (*numerus mathematicus*) became a form contained in things. The number became a new being of the third kind, which connects to Porretan individual (*habet esse in rebus*, ch. 3.3.2). Mathematical unity established the identity of existing hylemorphic substances. It is therefore given in the primary mode with respect to the real first substances (*numerus a priori secundum naturam causatur quam in aggregando, et sic ipsum prius est secundum naturam*; *In Apos* 1.3.S4.ad5). Rufus considers numerical individualization a unique phenomenon, established on the same level as the hylemorphic single thing. The primacy of the first substance is rejected, as shows the following part of his interpretation criticizing Averroes’s standpoint.

“The interpretation of the Commentator, however, said the opposite, because the material principle, in spite of all variations and transformations in the matter and in the substance, holds on to the same numerical identity (*the numero prius resoluto*). Then the principle of the thing would not have the same identity as the material thing, which I think is erroneous (*hoc sit falsum, ut credo*).” [[426]](#footnote-426)

Averroes is supposedly not right when he claims that individualization is determined only by the hylemorphic composition given in reality. Rufus does not work with the unity as “*ipse*” given by the subsistence of real substances, but with mathematical unity as “*idem*”. It is given by division of *species specialissima* up to the atomic unit of last indivisible element (*individuum*). The numerical identity (*in idem numero prius resoluto*) is established by Porretan division. Then, an Porretan *individuum* of Rufus received the same metaphysical statute as existing real substances (*in ipso quae sunt substantiales*). The individualization, according to Rufus, is formed by universal and individualized concept of number as the last and not further divisible basis of reality. Existing entities make part of the order based on the logical abstraction. The mathematical number (*numerus*) is one and the same, and therefore identical to itself. Metaphysical abstraction presented in the preceding interpretations clearly distinguishes between the mathematical identity and the metaphysical ipseity of things. Only the ipseity is given in reality *per se* and *simpliciter* as unique and actualized. It is not the case of numerically given potential and universal identity. Metaphysical individuation made in virtue of the matter is no way the same concept as logical individuation made through logical abstraction. Two apples are not the same as the number “two” that entails a non-existent “apple” as abstract *individuum*. The metaphysical imposition is not a logical supposition. The quotation provides the example of modern existence as actualization (*exsistere*) of permanent essences or hypostatic numbers that enter contingent reality. The modern existence entails the fact that the eternal form is a contingent and hylemorphic individual. The univocal conception of matter consider it to be a universal potency that is determined by the objective form in the framework of the numerically given unity. It enables modernists to accomplish the concretization and individualization of everything on the level of universals.

Modern science deals with Porretan “exsistence” that is based on the concrete individual. Rufus contested Aristotle’s and Averroes’s metaphysics as the first science about actualized substances. This was unacceptable for Grosseteste. In that crucial point, he defended Aristotelian metaphysics made “*ad mentem Averrois*”. The real substance can exist for Aristotle and Averroes as a pure form of cosmic intelligences given in the form of first immaterial substances. But the existence of any first substance is separated in principle from the logical abstraction given by the universal concept and from the mathematical abstraction given by the number. Rufus’s writing *Contra Averroem* (ca. 1236) rejected Averroes’s concept bound to the first substance and changed the statute of the first substance into a concrete species.[[427]](#footnote-427) The pseudo-matter was conceived in the framework of pure, *simpliciter* given *materia prima*. It created an atomic first substance in contradiction to Aristotle and Averroes. In addition, the universal hylemorphism of the work *Fons Vitae* changed the matter into a being of the third kind. The individualized matter serves only as accident for the completion of atomic substances of the third kind that are given as an permanent species. The modern process of individualization is determined by “*virtus disponens*,” which passed from demiurgic God into the industrious modern subject.

“And so it is evident that three things are necessary for individualization: the agent, matter, and the associated faculty of individualization (*virtus disponens*). This capacity is given as an intermediary between the substance and accidents, because it is neither a complete substance nor a complete accident. According to this definition, matter is necessary for individualization but is not an actual principle of this individualization.” [[428]](#footnote-428)

The individualization is given outside the reference to the actual substance (*neque est complete substantia neque complete accidens*). The sophistry lies in the fact that the definition pretends to be taken according to Aristotelian metaphysics; in reality it is based on logical division of universals in the framework of Porphyry’s Tree. The preceding analysis of Rufus’s *informatio* has shown that thinking contains in itself the actualized principles of cognition, which are given by the act of self-reflecting intellect. This is a typically Avicennist and Cartesian conception of the intellect as a hypostatized substance. Habitual faculty of modern subject (*virtus disponens*) represents the middle link of scientific deductive syllogism, which performs the division and classification of reality (*ista virtus ponitur medium inter substantiam et accidens*). It is another example of concrete and individual predication done “*medio modo*” (ch. 3.3.1). Then comes the key sentence, which confirms the abstract division of reality according to Porphyry’s Tree. The matter is required for the process of individuation (*materia coexigitur ad individuationem*), but it does not constitute its effective component (*non tamen est principium efficiens individuationis*). Let us recall the position of the essence in Rufus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy. The causality of the third kind ensures scientific proof even without the effect of the real substance (*medium et causa idem*, ch. 3.3.1). Important dispute about hylemorphic determination of substance concerns the uniqueness of the person as well. Modernists used all forms of *tertium ens*, which we have commented so far: substance, matter, quantity, spatiality, *species specialissima* and numerical individualization. Rufus’s determination of atomic substance follows the solution, which is not Aristotelian, but Neoplatonic. In the years 1230–35, the interpretation of *Second Analytics* set up a modern scheme of cognition in Oxfordian Fallacy. It staged the next phase of dispute regarding the interpretation of Aristotelian corpus presented *ad mentem Averrois*. Grosseteste elaborated the first version of Oxfordian Fallacy, but he did not defend the univocity of cognition and reality. He respected the explanation of cognition according to the Blund’s school and according to the Sicilian school. His concept of intellectual soul followed the first Averroism because he rejected the plurality of substantial forms in man. The situation in Oxford changed after the year 1235 when his radical disciples took over academic positions. They proclaimed the plurality of substances in man based on universal hylemorphism (ch. 3.2). Rufus’s sophistical school established academic *genius loci* at Oxford, as it radicalized nihilistic tendencies of metaphysics given in Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Rufus transferred Grosseteste’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy into the Porretan world in the mode of “*discrete videamus*” made by mathematical abstraction. The substance of the third kind and its concrete individualization with the help of the numerical identity annulled the principles of *Metaphysics* that Aristotle established and Averroes interpreted. Oxford modernity does not need any concept of intentionality and receptivity of personal *intellectus possibilis* for the act of cognition. For them, truth is not a correspondence but the universal sameness of univocal *scibilia* that are reflected by the active intellect. The cognition needs the process of *informatio* made by Avicennist *denudatio* and not by Aristotelian *abstractio*. Rufus conceives the species as a substantial being of the third kind, i.e., as an essentially and formally given single thing that is numerically determined. The previous chapter has shown that mathematical unity makes the cognition of the real world from the point of view of universal measure. It is given in the mode *per prius* to replace first substances. Mathematical and atomized individuals replaced hylemorphic substances; those individuals possess at the same time the status of a universal being. Grosseteste thrashed this sophistry of modernists as nonsense (*contra quosdam modernos*). Rufus introduced the exposure of sense made from behind into Aristotelian metaphysics. He created an analogical unity of being based on the new substance of the third kind. The consequence of the transformation of metaphysics into the first form of univocal *metaphysica generalis* was the disintegration of personal unity. This rendered the fundamental theological presuppositions of eternal salvation and damnation invalid, which rejected bishop Alvernus and certainly Grosseteste as *magister scholarium* at Oxford. Both scholars came from the Parisian school of the first Averroism. They defended an authentic Aristotelianism that established the founding event of the Parisian University (ch. 2.1.3). After introducing a heresy connected with destruction of the person, Rufus probably had to choose academic exile in Paris after Grosseteste’s appointment as Bishop of Lincoln (1235). During his master’s studies, Rufus was a co-founder of the modernist school in Paris. He academically built it up and Bonaventure protected it afterwards.

The second example of sophistic interpretation of Averroes concerns the statute of universals. The Commentator is strict on this point and conceives the existence of universals only in human mind (*intellectus est quid agit in eis universalitatem*).[[429]](#footnote-429) The quotation of the CMDA disputes the interpretation of universals called “*in re*”, which the second Averroism had taken over from Grosseteste (ch. 3.1.1). Rufus radicalized the Oxfordian Fallacy and, unlike Grosseteste, he added third kind of causality to the essence in the middle member of the scientific proof. In the school of modernists, Aristotle’s metaphysics presented *ad mentem Averrois* was no longer valid. The writing *Memoriale* recalls the Commentator’s position that universals are only in thinking. Rufus summarizes the teaching of CMDA and then turns its meaning around as nimbly as he had done in the case of Aristotle’s interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Following quotation set forth the controversy concerning hyparchical existence of universals.

“Aristotle not only said that the form has a universal being, but also said that this being is either in the soul or outside it (*habet esse extra animam*). The first kind of existence is assured by the fact that the universals are in the plurality of things (*in multis*); the second kind is given by the fact that the universals are in singular things (*in singulis*). Therefore, universals may be said to exist in the soul and in reality (*universale habere esse in anima et extra animam*).” [[430]](#footnote-430)

The quote pits Aristotle against Averroes. Starigit allegedly claims that universals as forms have their existence both in thought and outside of thought. If we have the universals as a form of the singular thing (*inquantum est in singulis*), then they exist outside the soul. Universal entity creates a hypostatized Porretan species endowed with a numerical unity. If we conceive the universal by the act of abstraction (*inquantum est in multis*) then it is given only in the soul because it creates an intentional species given in the process of Aristotelian abstraction. The first Oxfordian analyst observes the world under the influence of Oxfordian Fallacy. He does not distinguish the fact that the form in the first substance is given *simpliciter* in reality and therefore it has an entirely different kind of existence than the universal form recognized in thought. The reality of the first substance has hardly any impact on cognition of modernists. Modern metaphysics uses a different model of truth that is based on certainty of cognizing subject. The modernity can do without the primary substance for knowledge, as it was set out in Rufus′s writing *Contra Averroem*. It was written at the same time as *Memoriale*. The movement of form establishes an efficient causality whose ultimate product is the individual of Rufus. The logic of division after the Porphyry’s Tree requires that the process of individuation go up to *species specialissima*. It exercises the causality in the division of matter of the third kind until the final indivisible individual. In this style David of Dinant conceived the universal pantheism of matter and intellect (ch. 2.1.3). But Rufus is more careful and he detached God from universal analytic classification of reality. The doubling of the world and the first substance in the parallel diacosmos of modernity is set forth in the following quotation.

“The nature of the last species is knowable by itself (*per se intelligibilis*). What is added to this specific form is the cause of subsequent individualization, and this cause is directly knowable (*scibile*). Otherwise the question of individuation would be insoluble, because we could not find the cause of individuation.” [[431]](#footnote-431)

The ultimate unity of universal meaning is the species cognizable by itself (*natura speciei specialissimae per se est intelligibilis*). The existing thing comes into being through the fact that the last form of difference determines the species, so that a concrete individual comes into being. During the process of cognition of the real substance, the *illuminatus* directly observes the real *species scibilis* through the contingent *scibile*. It is given as conclusion of deductive proof from empirical abstraction. Avicennist Rufus radicalized Grosseteste’s difference between the lower and the higher form of scientific cognition (*scientia, intellectus*) towards mathematical Neoplatonism. Cognition of the atomic substance in form of “*species*—*scibile*” got a causal and mathematical character. The last difference of division forms the single individuum given behind last universal species (*illud additum super formam speciei specialissimae*). This causal and numerical difference establishes the modern individual as a new atomic substance (*scibile*); it is therefore the real cause of individuation (*causa individuationis*). The emergent product of modernity is defined as a singular and individual being of the third kind. It is also the effective substance in reality, according to Rufus. Recognition has an efficient causal character because it forms a substance of the third kind in the form of “*species*—*scibile*” (*causa individuationis… est scibile*, ch. 3.3.2). In such simulacrum of reality, the last difference replaced the real causality of the first substance. The result of this logically predicated causality, given only in the thinking of sophists, is the individual as a being of the third kind. Its material basis is the universal hylemorphism taken over from Avicebron. The new individual of modernity is generically identical with the univocal *materia prima*. It is differentiated by movement of forms following up to the level of no more divisible individual called *scibile*. The primary matter defined in the form of Porretan hypostasis received the categorical statute of the second substance and became a new being of the third kind. Individuation is accomplished by the modern subject that makes sharing and classifications within the framework of *Arbor Porphyriana*. That genesis was completed in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism by Foucault’s post-structural analyses investigating the emergence of nihilist human sciences (*Les mots et les choses*, 1966). Rufus transformed the first matter given in Aristotle as a pure concept of thought into a new form of generic determination of being. Matter is conceived quasi-substantially and became the passive instrument of demiurgic subject, which actively presses the forms into the matter of the third kind. Made in that way, it came into being the modern analogy to the first science of actual substance proposed by Aristotle and Averroes. The truth conveyed by the first substance due to the imposition does not support modern gnosis and postmodern ideologies of all kinds. Modern progress is not based on the truth, but on unlimited production of *scibile*. The quotation shows the beginning of uncontrolled multiplication of objective *tertium ens* when modernists introduced the matter of the third kind.

“I am speaking of matter, from which all common forms, propria and the last common genera are separated, that is, of matter as a form, which has the determination of the most general genus (*forma generis generissimi*). Everything else accepts this first determination of matter, first of all, through above-mentioned general determinations up to the individual thing.” [[432]](#footnote-432)

Modern matter, in the mode of universal hylemorphism, established the generic possibility of individuation. It is given as a pure hypostasis and therefore has no form (*materia circumscripta ab ea omni forma communi*). The hypostatized matter of the third kind, which is placed outside the form, then passively takes over all other forms as the first substrate in the series (*omnium primo recipe*). Modern sophistry has made this mythological matter to be the vehicle of substantial determinations on a categorical level (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*). Modern philosophers make a castle out of sand, which is their preferred *materia prima*. Rufus made another version of Dinant’s scenario of differentiation in Neoplatonic diacosmos that comes in the real world. That fact certainly recognized all connoisseurs of metaphysics in the University of Paris (Alvernus, Albert, Bacon). Neoplatonic hypostatized matter exists as a pure “potency—substance” and it took a hyparchical form in the second step. Such matter as *tertium ens* establishes the first series of individuation. The determination of universal matter by the unique substantial form gave rise to the modern individual (*mediante hac alias per ordinem usque ad individualem*), which can be achieved by nominalist division (*resolutio*). With the help of hypostatized univocal predicates (*collecta*), the individual can be arbitrarily assembled (*compositio*) into the realm of modern simulacra. Such kind of Neoplatonic predication was introduced with Porretan interpretation of *Categories* since 1230.

Rufus adapted the universal hylemorphism to the first form of *metaphysica generalis* presented in the mode of mathematical analogy and logical abstraction. Duns Scotus took up Rufus’s thesis to create the objective form of matter *(Ordinatio II*, dist. 3, pars 1). Scotus made an objective adaptation of *scibile* developed by Rufus. That analogical metaphysics of *Modernorum* was remastered by the first postmodernist Suárez as the founder of modern ontology.[[433]](#footnote-433) Following Rufus and Scotus, the Spanish Jesuit and scholastic founder of postmodernism conceived the matter as being of the third kind (*ipsa habet aliquem actum entitativum*, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* 5.3.5). The form of the primary matter is determined by the Exclusion of the Third, because the individualized “matter” exists by itself and thereby differs from everything else. The logical determination of matter replaced the original metaphysical meaning in Aristotelian hylemorphism. Unlike Rufus, Suárez rejected hypostatic accidents, to which only localized real things belong (let us see the term “*distinctio situalis*”). Aristotelian solution of individuation is only apparent, because the matter of Suárez has the status of Porretan hypostasis and it is the pure essence of Avicenna. Therefore it comes to the already given essence of the modern individual (*superveniens ad rationem individui*). However, the spatiality belongs only to material first substances, by no means to the essence. The quoted passage from Suárez takes distance from modernism of Rufus, because he included the spatiality and the causality in his definition of essence. Suárez rejected the universal hylemorphism and adhered to matter as the principle of real bodies. Leibniz accepted Suárez’s modern individuation and rejected the Scotist thesis given by the concept of matter of the third kind. Leibniz’s earlier work *Disputatio metaphysica de principium individui* (1663) rejects Scotus’s version of individuation by *haecceitas*, because the latter creates a hylemorphic being of the third kind.[[434]](#footnote-434) According to Leibniz, Scotus created a modern Frankenstein from objective matter, which contains all people in a material way (*humanitate concretum constituere, Hominem*). Leibniz rejects the univocal equivalence of reality and its image in thought and agrees with Suárez’s critique of Scotists modernity. Postmodernism is based on the victorious middle current of semi-Averroism, which arose after the year 1280 and was proclaimed by Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius Romanus and some Franciscans such as Aquasparta. They rejected Neoplatonist body of the third kind, because classical metaphysics of Aristotle, interpreted *ad mentem Averrois*, would have ceased to exist. But objectivist movement of modernists adhered to Rufus’s dualism of cognition. The sensual or intelligible species obtained by abstraction from the contingent first substances are unimportant for the scientific syllogism of the second Averroism, because they do not create an original source of universal cognition.

“The species of the recognizable thing is received into the soul as cognition; it is something separate, which is not a sensual image of the recognized thing. Otherwise, these species would never be a principle of cognition of the actual thing.” [[435]](#footnote-435)

Scientific cognition is separated (*est aliquid absolutum*) from sensual cognition (*imago rei scibilis*). Rufus confuses the cause of cognition (the first substance) with its effect in the intellect (species). The nature of “*rei scibilis*” is given in the framework of being of the third kind. It derives from the atomic substance given as a concrete individual analyzed above (ch. 3.3.2). The conclusion is in full harmony with the previous analysis of demonstrative proof in Rufus’s commentary on *Second Analytics*. His analysis is based on modern *scibile* (ch. 3.3.1). Rufus’s two criticisms separate in fundamental points (definition of universals and of the matter) from Aristotle and from the interpretation of Averroes. Modernists created a simulacrum of reality by doubling the first substance in the form of objective being. About the year 1240, Alvernus and Albert took up the dispute concerning the cognition, which was analyzed in the previous matrix. Albert rejected modernist solution in principle. The dualism of *doctores Latini* doubles reality in the universal hylemorphism (*duplici individuitate*, ch. 2.4.2). Alvernus, Bacon and other connoisseurs of Averroes from the first wave of Averroism stated that modern interpreters made a sophistry, which rejects being of the first substance and denies the existence of the unique person. Aristotelians considered the doubling of reality produced by Latin sophists to be absolutely unacceptable. The Oxford modernists refused to take common sense that makes fundamentals of *Metaphysics* and *Second Analytics*.

The univocal identity of species and internal *scibile* are detached from reality recognized by common senses. It means that the receptive intellect of *Modernorum* becomes as problematic as their recognition of reality. Hermeneutic archaeology is therefore looking for the original subject of modern cognition. This subject establishes the original *Lichtung*, which reveals the truth and untruth of modern objectivity. It makes a simulacrum of metaphysics given as sophistry *ad mentem Averrois*. The status of the subject is based on Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*, which cannot have the same character in the first and in the second Averroism. Modernism has no abstraction according to the first Averroism, because the *scibile* is determined as a subsistent form. Twofold interpretation of *intellectus possibilis* constitutes the epochal event (*Ereignis*) when the modern subject is established. It establishes *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of Western worldview in the mode of objective error (*Irrtum*). Rufus changed Averroes into Averroistic simulacrum and provoked a fundamental dispute over Aristotelian or Neoplatonist interpretation of *De anima*. The sophistry lies in already discussed Avicebron’s assertion that possible intellect, like matter, is universal (*intellectus possibilis est communis sicut materiae*, ch. 2.4.3). This assertion contains the basic principle of Dinant’s pantheistic heresy and therefore forms the core of the dispute between the first and the second Averroism. The first Averroism asserts with CMDA that the word “*sicut*” means the similarity between intellect and matter, because the intellect is neither hypostasis nor substance, but similarly to matter, it has the ability of universal receptivity. The second wave of Averroists fundamentally changed the concept of *intellectus possibilis*, which the first Averroism conceived according to CMDA. Instead of abstraction, modernity uses the denudation of objective species to replace the imposition of meaning from the first substance. Rufus requires no intentionality and no possible intellect that makes *conditio sine qua non* for the process of cognition. The modern cognition is not based on the actualization made on the level of *species sensibilis*, but on direct insight of individualized *scibile*. Modern Porretans like Rufus defined the possible intellect as a material substance of the third kind. The possible intellect must be numerically one, separate and universal, so that a similarly created Porretan species can be assumed. The receptivity of cognition forms the substantial essence of man in the manner of Dinant’s universal primary substance (*una materia esse materiae primae, et* νοῦς *erit primae materiae materia*, ch. 2.1.3). This intellectual matter is subsistent and numerically uniform as universal species. At the same time, this *intellectus possibilis* must also be individual and unique as Rufus’s *scibile* that makes the individual act of cognition. The receptive intellect proposed in Avicennist’s interpretation of Averroes according to the Toledo school is a hypostasis in potency according to Rufus’s mode of *potentia substantialis* (ch. 3.3.1). All these qualities must be combined with each other, because according to *De anima* they must keep the receptive character of rational soul.

This task was really a big bite for the first modern sophists around the year 1235. Rufus conceived the *intellectus materialis* following universal hylemorphism of David of Dinant. In order to be able to defend the schizophrenic conception of the person as a modern individual, Rufus had to reject the Commentator’s ingenious interpretation of *De anima*. Averroist’s concept of the intellect and the first open attack of Oxford Modernists on the CMDA is set out in Rufus’s commentary on *De anima* from the years 1236–37 (*In Aristotelis De anima, redactio brevior*). This was probably written at the same time as the work *Contra Averroem*. The hermeneutics presupposes that these two commentaries were still written in Oxford. After their publication, Rufus entered in the Franciscan Order and left for Paris to accomplish master’s studies. As a master of scholastics, Grosseteste could not tolerate a sophistical attack of such a dubious level against the Commentator, which, moreover, contained the key principles of pantheistic heresy of Amalricans. Rufus’s departure from his *alma mater* coincides with the emergence of Averroism. The commentary on *De anima* comprehends rational cognition within the framework of Avicenna’s self-reflection of the soul, which Rufus defines with relation to circular movements of Platonic *anima mundi*.[[436]](#footnote-436) Rufus is one of few commentators about 1250 who supported controversial doctrine of the world soul (Wood 2001, 135–36). This certainly did not help him with the Parisian bishop Alvernus from the Blund’s school. He considered the concept of *anima mundi* to be the heresy of Arabic *sequaces Aristotelis* that had distorted the interpretation of Aristotle (ch. 2.3.1). Moreover, in the previous generation David of Dinant was excommunicated because of his pantheistic interpretation of the cosmic soul. In contrast to this Aristotelian Neoplatonist, Rufus does not require the circular movement of the soul to justify universal intentionality and pantheistic cognition, but for the cosmic and universal movement of self-reflection given by cosmic *intellectus agens*. Avicenna’s active intellect is a cosmic form created by God; therefore Rufus does not cultivate pantheism. He followed Grosseteste in this point. In contrast to the strict rejection of *anima mundi* by Blund and by the first Aristotelianism, Grosseteste accepted the modified doctrine of *anima mundi* in the mode of Anselm’s mystical Augustinian vision. He brought out this vision in his cosmological writing according to Toletan interpretation of Aristotle (ch. 3.1.1). During Grosseteste’s teaching at Oxford, the concept of *anima mundi* probably did not bother any of Porretan masters there, because the bishop of Lincoln adhered to this theory in the modified form that took up Avicennism of the Toledo school. But in Paris it was not possible to proclaim this doctrine at the time of bishop Alvernus. Therefore, after Alvernus’s appointment as bishop, Grosseteste went to Oxford (1228). Rufus’s conversion of the soul to itself (*convertit se supra se ipsam*) is determined by the movement of the mind, which causally acts upon itself. This is a typical Platonic image of the circular movement of the soul adapted to the “Flying Man” of Avicenna. The intellectual part of the soul recognizes itself on the basis of accidental activities of bodily senses. They provide additional stimuli from the outside to hypostatic intellectual part of the soul. The actualization through senses (*excitatio*) proceeds by means of the body through the stimulus of external things (*haec enim excitatio non est nisi mediante corpore*, In DA 2.11.35). The intellect is actualized by the senses, but it is completely marginal. The activity of intellect is based on the self-reflexive *informatio* mentioned in the last chapter.[[437]](#footnote-437) The conversion of the soul to itself does not need to look for a similarity between the external thing and the intellect. There is no change of intellectual cognition by sensual species. Self-reflection is connected with the movement of cosmic intelligible soul, which is the original source of cognition through cosmic *intellectus agens*. See the original pattern of this intentionality in the trinitarian structure of self-reflective divine intellect and its creative act in the teaching of Ibn Adi (OBJ I, ch. 2.2). In the movement of self-reflection, the human soul includes cognition made on the sensual level. The soul has the actuality for demonstrative cognition defined in *Second Analytics* primarily from itself and from the cosmic source of *anima mundi* and not from external contingent things. Rufus needs cognition from the senses only as an accident of cognition for self-sufficient *anima intellectiva*. Therefore, it reduces the status of sensual species only to the sensory organ, for example, to the eyesight.[[438]](#footnote-438) The first part concerning the sensible species (*nullo modo potest immutare animam*) would also be signed by the first Averroism, because it insists on the immaterial exercise of the intellect (*inmixtus*) given through *species intelligibilis*. The soul synthesizes every cognition through its immaterial form, which is why it is not directly influenced by the senses. But the exposure of the intellect, in the understanding of the soul as *tabula rasa*, comes only from the sensually given actuality. That is why the first Averroism follows the causality that enables a true correspondence between the senses and the intellect. Rufus works with the concept of truth as *coaequatio* between the objective species. They keep the causality in themselves. The correspondence theory of truth is replaced by the truth as assimilation, whereby the human or cosmic soul establishes the primary intelligible form in itself by taking a circular motion.

The truth as assimilation of external species into the intellect is confirmed in the third part of Rufus’s commentary on *De anima*, which defines the receptive component of the intellect. The receptive intellect cannot be a pure potency of the soul. Let us see the introductory concept of cognition based on two hypostatized potencies (ch. 3.3.1). The quotation shows the concept of *intellectus possibilis*, which is based on Avicenna’s concept of *intellectus materialis*. This intellect habitually exists even in the child as yet incapable of intellectual knowledge (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Moreover, Rufus has *materia spiritualis* at his disposal, which makes a new definition of Avicenna’s material intellect. The accumulation of various forms of *tertium ens* in the definition of *intellectus possibilis* is quite remarkable.

“What lies merely in potency does not have an independent existence. But the possible intellect precedes any understanding, and even the child disposes of it. Therefore, this intellect exists in actual state (*habet actum exsistendi*). Then it does not entail only the potency; before the act of understanding, there is not only as a pure potency (*antequam intelligat non est solum in potentia*). Therefore, the intellect, through which the soul understands, cannot only be a form, but it is also an individual substance (*hoc–aliquid*). But everything created in this way carries two things in itself: the material unity and the formal part (*unum materiale et reliquum formale*). That is why human intellect has a form and it is not only in potency.” [[439]](#footnote-439)

The receptive intellect already exists in its actual form in children (*habet actum exsistendi*) and must therefore be some kind of individualized substance (*hoc–aliquid*). It is a substance of the third type because it contains a special form of subsistence, which is given at the level of form (*reliquum formale*). The purely receptive component of possible intellect, as the mere potency of the soul, is not sufficient for the act of cognition (*non est solum in potentia*), which is later adopted in Bonaventura’s definition of possible intellect. The definition of the intellect as *tabula rasa* is excluded. The intellect always has its own actuality (*antequam intelligat non est solum in potentia*), and for this reason it is also an individualized substance. The soul is a hypostatic substance and contains a receptive and a formal component (*habet duo in se*). That dualism of separate empiric and intellectual cognition, Rufus tried to solve it by introducing two intellectual substances into the soul (*unum materiale et reliquum formale*). The writing CMDA clearly reasoned that the material sensually given receptivity is actualized, because it links the understanding with the senses given physically in the body as the first substance (*hoc aliquid*). This materially given cognitive faculty of the soul cannot carry out an adequate actualization of the recognized immaterial form or species; therefore, there must be a further act of immaterial intentionality, receptivity, abstraction and synthesis. These are given at the level of the *intellectus possibilis, agens* and *speculativus*. For principled reasons, both treatises *De anima* and CMDA defend the intellect merely as potency of the soul, not as a substance. The first Averroism defines cognition as the formation of intelligible intention in the active intellect. It makes a final receptivity of the receptive intellect that creates a kind of diaphanum between the sensual and the intellectual cognition. Blund separates the passive reception of sensory stimuli from subsequent proceedings of active synthesis that makes part of imagination of animals, and of conceptual cognition in human beings. The passive intellect, given as the faculty of the soul, first intends the sensory stimuli received in the common sense organ of sensuality (*sensus communis*).

Rufus does not need the synthesis of intentional *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*, since he has no diaphanum that makes the mediation between hyparchical reality and human cognition. His concept of *intellectus possibilis* is not based on Averroes’s intentionality as an inner diaphanum, which connects the sensual species with the intellectual cognition of real first substances. Rufus’s commentary on *De anima* does not see a separate act of the receptive intellect, because he does not work with the concept of intentionality according to the first Averroism. The similarity does not go through mediation, from real things to the senses and to the intellect. The atomic substance given as “*species*—*scibile*” represents a common univocal concept for things in reality and for the intentions of the intellect. Rufus gives intentionality according to Avicenna directly into things, which is confirmed in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* (*cum ergo intentions principiorum sint in materia extra*; *In Phys*. P2, ed. RRP). In the process of *denudatio*, the active intellect abstracts the immaterial form from things by putting aside contingent determinations in species done by universal hylemorphism (*et magis adhuc per intellectum agentem per cuius abstractionem removentur illae condiciones*, ibid). Rufus must reject Averroes’s proportionality of personal receptive and synthesizing intellect (*tertium genus*) to the external first substance. His theory of knowledge has no mediation through the diaphanum and through intentionality determined from the senses. Intellectual cognition is separated from the senses, because the intention related to sensory stimuli is given only in the material mode. Cognition arises in such a way that the active intellect denudes the univocal species in the thing or looks at them directly, and then it pushes this *scibile* into the passive intellect. Plato’s metaphor of knowledge as imprinting of form on wax according to mythopoetic activity of Mnemosyne (*Theait*. 191d7–9) is embedded in Themistius’s concept of *intellectus materialis* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The scheme of the actualization of cognition does not follow Aristotelian synthesis of cognition (act—potency), but Platonic imprinting of higher intelligible forms into receptive components in the soul (substance—accident).

“The active intellect abstracts the species by presenting the similarity of their determinations that are given beyond the imagination (*appropriantibus per eius praesentiam super imaginabile*). Just as wax, which in itself undifferentiated, absorbs any form through the seal, the possible intellect is by itself the potency (*de se sit possibilis*) in order to be the similarity of any form. Due to the present similarity of the form in the possible intellect, the similarity of the actual form arises due to presence of the active intellect that manifests universal intentions and their similarities given outside the material purpose.” [[440]](#footnote-440)

The first sentence sets out completely autonomous *intellectus agens*, which carries out the abstraction of intelligible species by organizing the species already given in things and sensual conceptions (*per eius praesentiam super imaginabile*). This cosmic *intellectus agens* is not individualized because we share it in the form of Neoplatonic participation or Avicenna’s *coniunctio*. The enlightened active intellect makes the insight into the first forms and into the first principles of cognition (see the example of Rufus’s *scibile*). It runs in the manner of Platon’s seal by pushing denuded *species intelligibilis* into receptive components of the soul given as *intellectus materialis*. The cited process of imprinting the form into the wax can also be done by separate *intellectus agens*. The numerically distinguished *intellectus possibilis* can passively assume this separate form, which is impressed into the soul by cosmic *intellectus agens*. Next sentence states that *intellectus possibilis* has this ability of reception by itself (*de se*). The receptive intellect is a hypostatized species such as Dinant’s cosmic receptive intellect done in the mode of universal *materia prima*. The quotation emphasizes that only the active intellect (*per praesentiam intellectus agentis*) can establish intended universals (*intentiones universalium*). This actualized and substantial intellect actively creates the universals in the receptive intellect by imprinting the form into the spiritual matter. Descartes’s most important *Regula XII* contains the same scheme of recognition by using the comparison with the wax and the seal to establish evident scientific cognition and methodology.[[441]](#footnote-441) In modernism and postmodernism, the cognition means to reflect univocal species in the active intellect, which denudes hypostatized species of the third kind coming either from real things or from cosmic and mathematical forms. These hypostatized species as a cognitive form are imprinted into the receptive component of the soul that makes the spiritual matter. Rufus is the first modernist to divide the soul into two independent substances. The exposure of being came from behind through *intellectus agens* and the role of *intellectus possibilis* is absolutely minimal. The receptive intellect conceives itself as spiritual matter of the third kind. It absorbs imprints of hypostatized species that the *intellectus agens* reflects or produces. Thus the relation of truth as the correspondence of intellect and things became obsolete (Averroes’s *proportio*, *consimilitudo*). Rufus keeps but mythological correspondence between external and internal *scibile*, which is defined as a substance or species of the third kind (Anselm’s *rectitudo*, Rufus’s *coaequatio*). Avicennist Rufus professes the modern theory of truth; he cannot accept the scenario of the CMDA based on truth as correspondence. But he certainly knew Aristotelian explanation of *De anima*, at least in broad terms, from Grosseteste’s lectures at Oxford. Bacon clearly stated that no plurality of substances in man had existed at the time of his studies at Oxford, which was certainly the merit of Grosseteste (ch. 3.2). Rufus created the intellect as a substance in the mode of David of Dinant’s universal hylemorphism. He started the era of Cartesian dualism.

The definition of intellectual cognition divided the soul into two components, but completely different from what was the case in Aristotelian texts commented *ad mentem Averrois* according to the CMDA and the Sicilian school. Cognition is actualized not from the direction of sensually perceived things, but from the direction of *intellectus agens* and species of the third kind. The exposure of being come from behind. Therefore, the scheme of cognition is given exactly the opposite way in comparison with the first Averroism. The material component stands in potency with respect to intellectual cognition, and the formal component creates the actualized cognition.

“What is material in the created soul is the possible intellect; what is formal in it is the active intellect.” [[442]](#footnote-442)

The material intellect is objectively material in Rufus as well as in theory of Dinant, because it makes a kind of *tertium ens* in the mode of primary cosmic matter. The material intellect is immaterial in its essence. It makes the separated cosmic form that is common to all people. Rufus received as a result the fundamental problem of individualization of such material intellect in cognizing persons. He tried unsuccessfully to solve it in the work *Speculum animae*. Therefore, he had to leave Paris in order not to be accused of pantheistic heresy as David of Dinant that related cognition in the soul to cosmic *intellectus agens* and *possibilis*. Following the example of Dinant as an Avicennist Aristotelian, Rufus had to keep the immaterial receptive intellect outside the individual soul, so that in his scheme of universal species any cognition could take place. The metaphor of imprinting actual form into the wax shows that the second Avicennism has no personalized *intellectus possibilis*. It ressembles to Platonic form in the manner of *hypodokhē* (*Tim*. 48e–53c). The material cosmic intellect recognizes by the fact that the active intellect as *Dator formarum* pushes the forms into it as a seal into the wax. The concept of species as effective universal forms was absolutely unacceptable for Averroes and the first Averroism. If Rufus had read the CMDA as attentively as followers of the first Averroism, he would have known that by misinterpreting the course of cognition, he was doing exactly the same thing that Averroes reproached Themistius, Alexander and Alexandrians of his time (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Modernity lost touch with the first Averroism since it put the intention outside of *intellectus possibilis*. Modernists denied the actualized receptivity that comes from sensually recognized things. Rufus establishes the similarity of universal species on the individuation given by *numerus mathematicus* and on the similarity given by analogical relations to the universal measure (ch. 3.3.1). The intellectual part of the soul does not create cognition in the act of immaterial reception of possible intellect, which intentionally refers to sensual representations in the imagination. Rufus is not interested in the receptive, sensible-oriented component of the intellect. Being a hypostasis, the possible intellect passively takes the forms from the active intellect, and not from the senses. The modern intellect recognizes the species by direct insight, because Avicennist denudation takes cognitive forms directly in things. The basic thesis of Averroes and Aristotle is that universals are given only in thinking. Therefore, the first Averroism looked for similarity made as correspondence of sensual species with respect to intellectual species. The second Averroism did not need this correspondence at all, because its intellect carries cognitive forms in itself. The universals exists universally, that is, even in singular first substances. The receptivity of the soul as a *tabula rasa* plays a key role in the first Averroism with regard to singular and actualized sensual species. The receptive component of intellect takes them in the process of abstraction, and the active intellect then carries out the subsequent synthesis of immaterial and universal intelligible forms. Rufus and David of Dinant transferred the receptivity of the soul to cosmic *intellectus agens*. Their material intellect is not given as an act of the person. The individuation of these cosmic species runs through the spiritual matter. They had to propose a sophisticated conjunction of this simulacrum with the personal intellect. It was not an easy task for the first modernists and it has not been solved in that school to this day. After the conjunction of the active and the passive cosmic form in the human intellect, the modern process of cognition finally starts.

About the year 1235, modern *illuminati* at Oxford compared two kinds of universal species. The first kind of *tertium ens* is directly contained in real things, and the second is considered by enlightened active intellect, which directly perceives cognition in thinking by intuition of pure forms (Grosseteste’s *intellectus*). The active intellect imprints denuded species into the passive part of the soul as *intellectus materialis*, where they are stored in Augustinian kind of memory (*locus specierum*; OBJ III, ch. 4.3.1). The acquired intellect then accomplishes Avicenna’s collection of formal determinations from material things (*iltaqaṭa*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The sensual reception of external things due to intentionality provided by *intellectus possibilis*, it becomes completely secondary in the modern scenario of scientific cognition. Intentionality, according to Rufus and later according to Descartes and Husserl, means the active process of intellect given in man as a substance of the third kind. This actualized hypostatic intellect directly considers universal forms in the act of intellectual intuition. It can receive those forms from real material things; but this is not necessary, because he carries in itself evidence of cognition. Therefore, the mediation made by *intellectus possibilis* fell out of the modern scheme of cognition. It was replaced by Platonic imprint of universal, actualized and hypostatic cosmic form that comes to the receptive part of human soul. Modern cognition represents a mythological collection of universally hypostatized knowledge done in the form of objective *scibilia*. Husserl’s transcendental *cogito* accomplishes Avicenna’s collection of eidetic facts in the act of absolutely given evidence.[[443]](#footnote-443) This kind of cognition is explicitly formulated in the second Averroism about the year 1290 (*per species collectam*; OBJ III, ch. 4.6). The age of computer science founded by Rufus observes in a visionary way the non–existent *scibilia* directly in the world, where they “exsist” in a Porretan manner. They are mathematical entities given in the mode “*semel—semper*.” Today, this Avicennian collection of data in cloud databases represents the cloud of present mystical knowledge given as Buddhist *māyā*, simulacra of sophists or Rufus’s *informatio*. The analysis of Rufus’s commentary on *De anima* has shown that the synthesis of intentional species is carried out only by the active intellect. It receives universal forms directly from singular things or gets them by illumination from separated *intellectus agens*. The recognition of hypostatized cognitive forms in things is given by the fact that thinking of *illuminati* enters the process of denudation. It extracts such forms from contents in thinking that refers to hylemorphic reality at lower levels. The *intellectus agens* imprints these univocal forms into the intellectual and passive medium, which is given as a substance, but in the mode of pure possibility of recognition (*intellectus materialis*). The active human intellect then collects impressed forms as *scibilia* and keeps them in the kind of memory known as Augustinus’s *locus specierum*. The modern *memoria* starts the comparison with permanent *exemplars* given in the active cosmic intellect. The comparison proceeds through the process of enlightenment, which starts directly from modern God through the introduction of exemplars. The truth is the similarity of one and the same species, which is given first in the singular form of the cosmic universal form existing in itself and for itself.[[444]](#footnote-444) From there, it is denuded through objective appropriation called modern “cognition” (*forma universalis cum condicionibus appropriantibus ipsam*). Such kind of demiurgic assimilation compares this form with the same form abstracted from the real world. Fundamental error of modern Alexandrians as Rufus and Husserl is inability to recognize the intentionality founded by Averroes as *proportio* of material things and immaterial intellect. The dualism of two separate types of cognition does not allow a true correspondence between material senses and the immaterial intellect. The subjective style of cognition in the mode of truth as *speculatio* explores and composes only one’s own *scibilia*. This narcissistic style of modernism and postmodernism is set in the paradigm of truth as assimilation and it runs under influence of modern Furies. It does not consider the reality of first substances to be important for cognition. The second Averroism did not work with the correspondence of the intellect and the extra mental thing, like CMDA in the interpretation of the Sicilian school. Rufus denied the immaterial and personalized *intellectus possibilis* as a faculty of the existing soul (*tertium genus*). Instead, he introduced Themistius’s *intellectus materialis* as a separate hypostasis. He then hypostatized the receptive and active intellect given in the CMDA in the mode “*inmixtus*” to create a separate cosmic substance. Rufus could not make any fundamental distinction between the statute of intellect in CMDA as *tertium* and *quartum genus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The possible intellect is a Neoplatonist substance given from the outside, which joins externally the person. Rufus formally works with the same scenario of the receptive cosmic intellect as David of Dinant. Such proceeding could not achieve a great success in Paris in the time of bishop Alvernus.

“Let us remind that the possible intellect is given from the outside and that it is something divine (*intellectus possibilis est ab extra et est quiddam divinum*) and that it connects with man by being infused into his substance (*copulatur com homine per substantiae infusionem*). It is created and infused at the same time; after it has been inserted into man in this way, it is already numerically different and individualized, both from itself and from its essence, which is given in all people. In this way, the possible intellect is present in all men, while it in that way inserted into them.” [[445]](#footnote-445)

The quotation summarizes two basic characteristics of possible intellect, which form the core of dispute concerning Averroism in the next decade. The receptive intellect is an independent substance from the order of cosmic intelligences and comes to man from the outside (*intellectus possibilis est ab extra et est quiddam divinum*). The intellect thus given connects with the human intellect by transferring its own hypostasis to it with the help of academically conceived copulation (*copulatur cum homine per substantiae infusionem*). The individuation of that singular and universal *intellectus possibilis* runs by assuming the external substance of the third kind. It is actualized in the person by the act of accidental actualization of this external and already actualized form. The interaction between the cosmic and the human form is created by the infusion or by the conjuction (*copulatio*) of the cosmic intellect with the similar hypostasis in human *anima intellectiva*. The substantial unity of receptive intellect as a hypostatized cosmic immaterial substance thus gets an accidental exemplification in modern numerically distinct *individuum*. The specific universal potency of the divided and immaterial faculty of the intellect, the Neoplatonist Rufus had to settle outside the personal soul (*ab extra*). The numerical unity of *intellectus possibilis* is given in itself (*individuatus ex se*), because its external form exists outside the existing man. It is a cosmic and divine substance of the third kind (*hoc aliquid*). Through this material and numerical identity, the receptive intellect differs from the active one, which is a pure hypostatic form. The dispute about Averroism that deals with numerically individualized intellectual hypostasis is a total nonsense for the first Averroism as we will discuss in philosophy of Siger (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.3). In the following step made by copulation, this substance also “exsists” in human beings. In the act of mythological copulation and Porretan non-existence, the cosmic intellect expands in both components to make cognition in the human soul. In human beings, the cosmic *intellectus possibilis* is realized as essential and potential hypostasis given in the individual soul. Let us see the scheme of *potentia substantialis* (ch. 3.3.1). This arrival of the separate intellect into a human individual represents the modern concept that defines the “exsistence” of *anima intellectiva*. Emergence of modern *intellectus possibilis* in the form of Averroist’s simulacrum founded the modern subject of cognition. The sophistry of Rufus turned that nonsense into an objective *scibile* that still lives among us in its nihilistic and mythological glory.

Hermeneutic archeology interpreted the emergence of the modern subject in the mode of *alētheia* as epochal *Irrtum* of Latin modernists. About the year 1235 in Oxford, they abandoned Grosseteste’s interpretation of unified being of the person. Bacon clearly documented that the original Oxford definition of the person was based only on a plurality of forms and the person was the one hylemorphic first substance (ch. 3.2). The representatives of the first Averroism in Paris and Grosseteste in Oxford explained in vain to Latin sophists following Dinant that the receptive intellect, defined as a pseudo-substance, was nonsense. Such intellect would never recognize anything because it does not have full receptivity. This was the core of Averroes’s criticism concerning *intellectus possibilis* of Themistius and Alexander. The receptive intellect according to CMDA is a potential cognitive faculty, and not an individual substance. Therefore, cognition takes place in the hylemorphic person through twofold form of receptivity and intentionality (senses, intellect). The modern subject of cognition is based on the hypostatized *intellectus possibilis*. It represents the same simulacrum as its mythological ability of cognition. The first modernists disintegrated the person into three substances: soul, body and hypostatic intellect that occurs in two components: *materialis* and *agens*. The soul is personal and remaining two components come from outside to copulate with us. Such interpretation of *anima intellectiva* composed of two cosmic substances of the third kind has nothing in common with the interpretation of the receptive intellect in the CMDA. Albert considered the concept of the person composed of three substances so stupid that he rejected any academic discussion about it (*dicunt quidam, has tres esse substantias in homine*, ch. 2.4.3). In the years 1235–50, modernists as Rufus, Bonaventura and Kilwardby attributed the hypostatized form of the numerically one *intellectus possibilis* to Averroes. They made him an Averroist. The basic definition of the possible intellect as a separate substance had already been discussed in *Summa Duacensis* (ch. 2.2.2). However, the school of Philip the Chancellor did not dare an academic attack on the Commentator around the year 1230. Sophists at Oxford were much bolder because they were inspired by Aristotelianism made by David of Dinant. Moreover, they presented it in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Modern *intelligentia spiritualis* projected its own errors and sophisms into the Commentator’s teaching in the mode of cosmic nonsense, making a universal intellect common to all people. Under the influence of analytically educated Furies, sophists Latins created a doppelganger of Averroes. They used one of Freudian *Abwehrmechanismen* called inversion to the contrary (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*) for this purpose. They ascribed their own metaphysical errors and philosophical stupidities to mirrored image of their own thinking (*speculatio*) that was called “Averroes.” It was no problem for them to make a simulacrum of the Commentator, because they had doubled the first substance long before. That revered and damned idol of Averroism originated in Rufus’s school of producers of modern simulacra (εἰδωλοποιὸν, *Soph*. 239d4) according to the dialogue *Sophistes* and according to modern powers of intellectual Chaos. Through the modern history of effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*), Averroes became an Averroist and he has been living among us in this sophistic simulacrum ever since. The school of the first Averroism rejected this modern idolatry, at first by bishop and chancellor Alvernus. For this principled reason, Rufus’s school in Paris received the honorary title “*sophistae Latini*.” Averroist’s nature of *intellectus possibilis* can be found in this or that variant in all representatives of the second Averroism and semi-Averroism, including the accusation that Averroes should have established the form of *intellectus possibilis* that is numerically determined. The Commentator allegedly defends the numerically one receptive intellect for all people that joins human cognition from the outside. The modernists and their successors then condemned this dubious *intellectus possibilis* as an Averroism. Averroes rejected the intellect as a hypostasis against Neoplatonists of all kinds by creating a new version of the receptive intellect (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). According to the CMDA and according to Alvernus, the existence of autonomous active intellect falls within the sphere of God, cosmic intelligences and angels (ch. 2.3). The possible intellect cannot be a hypostasis or a substance, because it cannot exist in human being in some hyparchical form. The animals do not have an immaterial receptivity and intentionality on the level of *intellectus possibilis*, because they are not capable of intellectual abstraction. The cosmic intelligences do not need this type of cognition, because their potency is not given at the level of matter thanks to the fully actualized *intellectus agens*. Cosmic intelligible substances are distinguished by this fundamental metaphysical difference from sensual faculty of synthetic cognition. The potentiality of cosmic intellectual beings differs only according to the cosmic spheres and by their difference from the Creator. The arrival of modernists as Rufus forced the bishop and chancellor Alvernus in 1240 to stop the spread of heretical sophistry at the University of Paris by pronouncing the thesis on metaphysical separation of cosmic active intellect. After his death, all inhibitions were abandoned; the sophistry of modernists became an academically recognized science.

Bacon is one of very important witnesses that followed the dispute over Averroist nature of intellect done at Oxford. He examined the emergence of confused interpretation of Averroes in the paradigm of the Toledo school received by Avicennist Rufus. The dispute about the numerical unity in the framework of *intellectus possibilis* became one of the basic elements of subsequent dispute about the misunderstood Averroism. The work *Opus tertium* records in anecdotal brevity one of the disputes between the first and the second Averroism. Franciscan Adam of Marsh (Adam de Marisco) became a lecturer at Oxford in 1238. He defended Alvernus and Grosseteste’s line with regard to separated *intellectus agens*, which resided only in cosmic spheres (ch. 3.2). Franciscan representatives of the second Averroism at the Oxford College asked Marsh to give them an explanation regarding *intellectus agens*.[[446]](#footnote-446) Bacon considers Marsh to be a critically thinking philosopher, in contrast to sophistic group of Franciscans (*aliqui Minores*). They shifted the interpretation of intellect towards Avicennism (ch. 3.1.3). Grosseteste’s posthumous work *Summa philosophiae* later confirmed that change. Marsh as master from the school of the first Averroism replied to young modernists that it reminded of Elias’s ravens (*1 Kings* 17:6). This living first substance came into Elijah’s cave from the outside to feed the well-known prophet. The cognition given *per se* in actualized intellect through the act of denudation and direct insight cannot establish human cognition without the miraculous raven of Elias. The second Averroism lives in the cave of the Neoplatonist dualism and is separated from the sensual experience of the world. They necessarily need some messenger from the external reality as Descartes needs modern God for the true knowledge of the world outside the immanent *cogito*. Husserl created a similar postmodern cave as an immanent and objective vision of being (*Gegebenheit meiner lebendig fortlaufenden objektiven Erfahrung*).[[447]](#footnote-447) The mystic raven certainly comes into solipsistic experience of absolute consciousness. It is presupposed to be there because of absolute egological experience that gives meaning to secondary objective transcendence. The raven keeps its “exsistence” as a kind of self-reflection running in the immanence of Husserl’s pure consciousness; this mode of scientific evidence has no attachment to real things. Husserl’s theory of cognition and evidence is set forth in the following analysis of modern intuition (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). Critical philosophers do not live in the Platon’s cave or in the postmodern cinema of solipsistic egological consciousness. Therefore, they do not need a mediating messenger as miraculous Elias’s raven, Descartes’s innate god, Husserl’s immanent transcendence and the absolute self-existence of phenomenon. In the age of philosophical nihilism, the role of the miraculous raven is taken place by analytical theory of meaning, when the subjective *scibile* of hypostatized language creates a brave new world according to various “language games.” Aristotelianism made according to the CMDA cannot confer the status of hyparchical substance or absolute subjectivity on the active intellect. The first Averroism takes the exposure of being from the front, from real first substances. The primary imposition of meaning is given in this way. The dispute about the separate active intellect, which is given in the mode of Elias’s raven, shows the background of Rufus’s interpretation concerning numerical one or univocal possible intellect for all people that he attributed to Averroes.

Rufus’s work *Contra Averroem* (c. 1236) made the first explicit criticism of the Commentator from the position of *Modernorum* at Oxford. The core of the controversy is the statute of *intellectus possibilis*. The active form of numerically one universal *intellectus agens* corresponds to the numerically one universal form of *intellectus materialis* of Oxford Porretans. The potency cannot be further specified in a lower individual because it forms a numerically identical hypostasis.[[448]](#footnote-448) Rufus formally correctly summarizes Averroes’s initial position on the intellect as potency of the soul (*sit in potentia ad hominem*). But the second Averroism proceeds the individuation of intellectual form at the level of potency with the help of spiritually conceived matter in Avicebron’s dualism (ch. 3.2). Then modern mythology applies, as it is guaranteed by the miraculous raven of Elijas. The individualized cosmic *intellectus possibilis* successfully copulates with our *intellectus materialis*. The medium of this copulation is Avicebron’s matter of the third kind, which forms a separate subject of these two non-existent entities of the third kind. The individuation of the cosmic hypostasis, which is given by Dinant’s *materia prima*, arises in man through copulation with the material component of the intellect. It is given as the act of cognition of the individual and it keeps the same univocal mode as *materia spiritualis*. Both components of intellect are individualized by the mythological matter. Done in such a miraculous way, the act of *conjunctio* proceeds always and in the orderly manner. Human *intellectus materialis* unites with Dinant’s cosmic *intellectus possibilis*. The Commentator makes a modern transvestite hidden behind the figure of heretic David of Dinant. He has been living among us in this sophisticated Aristotelian guise ever since. Now it is clear why the Blund’s school was the only one in Paris that could make philosophical criticism of Dinant’s errors. After the eclipse of the first substance, there was necessarily an eclipse of Averroes’s metaphysics. He was the only philosopher that fundamentally criticized errors of *Modernorum*.

The next generations of modernists adopted the concept of the numerical unitary *intellectus possibilis* created by Rufus. It was indeed an outstanding achievement of the most capable representative of the school *sophistae Latini*. The founders of second Averroism attributed this intellectual debacle to Averroes. The principal authors of this comedy were Rufus and Bonaventura, who headed at those times the mendicant Colleges in Oxford and Paris. By introducing the kind of dualism, which excluded the correspondence theory of truth, sophistic modernists created the well-known dilemma concerning the receptive intellect. Either the intellect is individual, but only hylic in the manner of individualized *materia spiritualis* given in the human body. Therefore, Albert categorically criticized Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s theory of *intellectus materialis* (ch. 2.4.3). They created the hylic intellect in the manner of Themistius and Alexander. Averroes integrated the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* in the scheme of cognition instead of the purely material intellect, which Themistius and Alexander conceive as individual and sensual faculties of the soul (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Rufus merged Themistius’s material intellect with habitual innate principles of cognition (Avicenna) to create a new substance in the soul. Following the example of Neoplatonists and their false reasoning exposed in CMDA, Rufus had to prove the impossible. Modernist of Oxford had to associate with human knowledge a hypostatic form of active and receptive intellect that comes from outside (*opinatus est Themistius quod intellectus qui est in habitu est compositus ex intellectu materiali et agenti*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). This required a mythological copulation that takes place in habitually given hypostatic human intellect (*intellectus qui est in habitu*), which is Avicenna’s *intellectus materialis*. This receptive intellect takes cognitive forms from the cosmic *intellectus agens*. The cognition of habitual intellect is in our power, but it is hypostatized and this substantial intellect receives the sensual cognition. Such Averroist solution presupposes a completely immaterial and receptive *intellectus possibilis*, which is numerically one for all men in the manner of Dinant’s hypostatized cosmic form. Oxford’s *sophistae Latini* had no problem by joining the matter of the third kind to Averroist receptive intellect, because they professed universal hylemorphism in three forms of the matter (hylemorphic, spiritual and primary matter). Following Dinant, modernists synthesized *intellectus possibilis* according to Themistius’s and Alexander’s material individualization given as bodily founded *intellectus materialis*. They put it together with separate cosmic potency as Alexander’s and Themistius’s *intellectus possibilis*. Rufus took Alexander’s separated *intellectus possibilis* and individualized it as a cosmic hypostasis through the fully receptive cosmic *materia prima* according to Dinant. This intellect then copulates in quite a modern Averroist way with Themistius’s habitual *intellectus materialis*, which is given in humans as Avicenna’s *intellectus materialis*. According to Avicenna’s *intellectus materialis*, the habituality of this intellect and thus also hypostatized faculty of thinking is ensured by hypostatized potency of thinking (*potentia substantialis*, ch. 3.3.1). The *a priori* innate principles of thinking were finally adopted by Kant. Divine Furies smuggled Dinant’s pantheism right up to a fully objective version of present times.

Rufus made modern cognition by copulation of two material intellects according to the twofold register of numerical individuation given by the spiritual and primary matter. The first individuation of *intellectus possibilis* proceeds in the cosmos and is quite Averroist; the second individuation proceeds in the Porretan individual and is quite modern. To let such absurd theory of cognition somehow working, schizophrenic and paranoid modernity had to create a simulacrum of Averroes. Modernists then had to attack it permanently, in order to hide its own philosophical stupidity and metaphysical nonsense. The continuous copulation with Averroes’s simulacrum ensures an intellectual fertility of the postmodern “Mind—Body Problem” in contemporary mythology. It should be noted that in Sumerian and Babylonian rituals of the New Year (*Enūma Eliš*) only one mythological copulation in the whole year was enough. *Corruptio optimi pessima.* If objective scientists create a metaphysical paranoia under the leadership of Furies, it looks like a serious enterprise. The production of being of the third kind was no problem at Oxford. The new interpretation of *Categories* and the Porretan worldview in the mathematized mode “*discrete videamus*” were used for this purpose. First, the new myth of modernity must create an underworld. Rufus used Boethius’s *Commentary on Isagoge* to separate the senses from the intellect. He paraphrased basic distinction between sensual and intellectual cognition: “*Universale est cum intelligitur, particulare cum sentitur*.” (*Contra Averroem* I.2, p. 2.24‒25) Rufus takes this distinction to make a complete separation of two components, in contrast to the scheme of cognition in CMDA. According to Avicebron, universal hylemorphism took the matter universally as being of the third kind. Following Themistius in a sophist manner, Rufus created a new mix from the material intellect based on the senses and the separate possible intellect. Modern *intellectus possibilis* makes a cosmic hypostatic potency as Porretan being and it is individualized by *materia prima*. The receptive intellect based on that universal essence is in the mode “*inmixtus*” to be outside the hylemophic material body.

“The first matter is destined to take individual form; the possible intellect is destined to take universal form. The first matter is numerically uniform and is a singular thing (*una numero est et res singularis*). Otherwise, it could not take singular forms. The possible intellect is therefore not an individual intention in the individuals, because otherwise it could not take on universal forms.” [[449]](#footnote-449)

The first matter assumes individual forms (*recipiat formas individuales*) and the receptive intellect makes reception of universal forms. Because of the act of immaterial reception, its *materia prima* is determined as Porretan hypostasis. Its cognition is universal just as Dinant’s concept of cosmic *materia prima*. Then it is evident that Rufus’s *intellectus possibilis* must be numerically one, see the above-mentioned conception of the wax intended for the imprint of the form. The active intellect impress the formes in the receptive and intelligible matter. It makes part of universally material component of the cosmic and human soul. The quotation defines the first matter as a substance of the third kind, and the possible intellect has the same character. Universal hylemorphism considers *intellectus possibilis* immaterial as Porretan hypostasis. In this potency given by numerical identity, he can only assume universal determinations (*intellectus possibilis natus est ut recipiat formas universales*) that are Porretan species as substances of the third kind. According to Rufus’s interpretation of CMDA, the possible intellect as a universal substance is given in the mode of the numerically determined individual (*una numero est et res singularis*). Averroes claims that this intellect is universal; then, according to Rufus, it cannot be individualized at the level of hylemorphic composition of the unique soul and of the unique material body. Its receptivity must be one and general, because that cosmic receptive intellect, in the way of *materia prima*, it takes all immaterial species. From the point of view of the CMDA, Rufus belongs to the category of rejected Neoplatonists, because he divided receptivity into two components. Following Themistius, Rufus arranged *intellectus possibilis* at the sensual level as *intellectus materialis* in the body, comparing it to matter. But then, with Alexander, he took the receptive immateriality of the soul as a separate cosmic hypostasis, which he individualized through Dinant’s primary cosmic matter. According to Avicebron, there are two types of matter to take form, so there are two types of the receptive intellect: one is individualized according to corporeal matter, so it is numerically distict in all people (*intellectus materialis* of Themistius and Avicenna); the other is individualized according to spiritual matter as Dinant's *materia prima*. Then it is given as a single immaterial and separate exemplar (*intellectus possibilis* falsely attributed to Averroes). Rufus summarizes Averroes’s teaching on the receptive intellect in a fatal alternative, which founded Averroist dispute about the numerical unity of *intellectus possibilis*.

“The possible intellect cannot be given for itself by the fact that it is different in different individuals. It is numerically one in all individuals and its universality implies only one individual. (...) Indeed, if it appeared separately in numerically different individuals, it would be a form of those individuals. Then, it would be numerically numerous and individualized according to the matter of these individuals.” [[450]](#footnote-450)

Only the hylic *intellectus materialis* can be individual, because it is given at the level of the hylemorphic individual (*numerata secundum multiplicationem et numerationem plurium materierum*). The sensual phantasm that receives individual things is individual. Therefore, on the sensual level there is the individualization of the intellect, which is given by the material being of persons as first substances. The receptive intellect of *Modernorum* is immaterial and universal; it must give up the claim to uniqueness in the person. It therefore needs the non-existent modern *individuum* and attaches itself to it from the outside as a hypostatized substance. Since this substance is immaterial, it is a species and thus “exsists” as the numerically single cosmic species. Rufus considers Averroes’s status of the immaterial and yet individual *intellectus possibilis* to be contradictory. Averroes cannot combine singularity and universality at the level of hylemorphic matter (*non est ergo intellectus possibilis alius et alius numero in ipsis individuis*). Rufus let out into the world the wrong interpretation of CMDA, which he attributed to Averroes. The conclusion of this sophism has been repeated countless times later, but without true reference to the original source of this false accusation. Rufus defines *intellectus possibilis* as a separate pseudo-material substance in order to ensure the status of universal receptive cognition. According to the canonical declaration “*anima quodammodo est omnia*” the cognition keeps the same universal meaning for all people (*De anima* 431b20‒21). In the same sense, the main clause of *De intepretatione* 16a3–8 applies. Primary signs are common to all people through mental experience and such kind of knowledge makes the imitation of things (ch. 1.1). Instead of Aristotelian correspondence, Rufus chose the metaphor of Platonic imprint of ideas in the soul. The real thing turned into a substance of the third kind (*scibile*). Afterwards, it was necessary to find a corresponding intellectual correspondence at the level of universal receptivity in the mode of *hypodokhē* in the dialogue *Timaeus* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Rufus used the quotations in CMDA that summed up the intellect as a *quartum genus*. Avicennist and Porretan from Oxford rejected the acceptance of these abstracted species in the original context of Aristotelian intentional mediation and abstraction, as it was done in the first Averroism. Rufus needs the mediation of the senses only secondary. Avicenna’s self-reflection of thinking assimilates all species, which are in the second step embedded in Augustinian numerical memory of the third kind (*locus specierum*). The second Averroism knows abstraction merely as an Avicennist’s denudation of already given and hypostatized species as individuals. Therefore, there is a cosmic form of *intellectus possibilis* made of Dinant’s *materia prima*. Averroist interpretation of Averroes in the school of modernists created an objective form of the intellect as being of the third kind, which they sophistically attributed to the Commentator.

“This reason led Averroes’s consideration to assign the one possible and universal intellect to all people (*ponendo intellectum possibilem in nobis omnibus unum et etiam universale*), as has already been said above.” [[451]](#footnote-451)

The school of the second Averroism took the concept of such intellect as the basis of all formal determinations and added universal cognition to it, all done in the framework of an immaterial and separated *intellectus possibilis*. This resulted in an Averroist version of numerically one *intellectus possibilis* thet cannot be materially differentiated. Since this “species—substance” is individualized by cosmic *materia prima*, it belongs to the sphere of cosmic intelligences. The new hypostasis is defined as a numerically one receptive intellect for all people (*unum et etiam universale*). The passage quoted above from the work *Contra Averroem* ends with a sophistical accusation of Averroes, which founded the well-known dispute about Averroism. The philosophical father of *Latin Modernorum* interprets Averroes through Avicenna, instead of reading Avicenna through Averroes as in the first Averroism coming from the Blund’s school. Let us now summarize the contradictory interpretation of *intellectus possibilis*. Rufus presented it to modern world as Averroes’s dilemma.

“It so happened that Averroes, through a rational interpretation, gave the possible intellect to all people to be universal and numerically uniform, as was said above. He proceeded according to above-mentioned reason; it was necessary to postulate numerical possible intellect, which would be given in all people as a universal. Otherwise, it would differ in the individuals with regard to its numerical individuation, which would be in conflict with his unity as a species. Then this intellect would be given in the individual and be different from species...” [[452]](#footnote-452)

Rufus created the false dilemma of cosmic *intellectus possibilis* given numerically in the mode of universal hylemorphism. This modern intellect individualizes itself in us through a mythological, i.e. a completely objective copulation. According to Rufus, only the universal type of numerically uniform intellect in all people (*in nobis omnibus unum et etiam universale*) can recognize immaterial species. According to real Averroes, *intellectus possibilis* is both universal and personal, which is clearly attested in CMDA in the mode of *tertium* and *quartum genus*. Rufus considers both forms of possible intellect incompatible. According to him, the material intellect determined by bodily senses does not have the ability to perceive and synthesize universal concepts. Let us see the separation of both components of cognition cited above with reference to Boethius (*universale es cum intelligitur, particulare cum sentitur*). The second Averroism rejected the definition of the receptive immaterial intellect given in the mode *inmixtus* as a component of the existing person. Writing CMDA takes the definition of *intellectus possibilis* primary as *tertium genus*. Rufus claims that hypostatized intellect as an immaterial species cannot exist in two substantial forms at the same time, because the universal cosmic substance is not the same as the individual human substance. According to the quoted text, the immaterial species would differ from their individual material actualization (*in singulis diversis individuis numero et specie differre*). Then it follows that *intellectus possibilis* cannot simultaneously be like a personal receptive ability of hylemorphic human being and at the same time ensure the universal recognition of immaterial formes at the level of cosmic substance in the mode *inmixtus*. The introduction of individual *intellectus possibilis* would supposedly cause a discord in the human nature. The materially given hylemorphic statute of the individual and the universal recognition of species in mind would differ from each other, which would no longer be universal (*essemus et nos specie differentes*). Rufus rejected the key part of the CMDA, that is, the existential act of *intellectus possibilis* given in the person. Instead of the existence of the person, he puts Averroist “exsistence” of one hypostasis into the scheme of cognition. The intellect as hypostasis is individualized in the concrete individual by universal hylemorphism. The first Averroism objected that there was neither a cosmic *intellectus possibilis*, nor its copulation in the human soul, nor a modern individual given as Rufus’s *concretum*, nor a cognition given as Porretan species of the third kind. To put simply: the world of modernists does not exist, because this is downright cosmic nonsense.

That’s why Bacon declared Rufus an insane thinker. In his curious interpretation, the first modernist turned Averroes into an Averroist. Rufus’s Averroistic translation of Averroes follows dualistic scenario of cognition, in contrast to the letter of CMDA. A similar dispute about the statute of the human intellect in the mode of *separatus* or *separabilis* is carried out by brilliant Siger against semi-Averroist Thomas Aquinas in the school of the first Averroism (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.2). The receptive intellect, given as asubstance of the third kind, remains universally receptive for everyone and for no one; it is at the same time material and immaterial; it operates as numerical and universal; it is a Porretan and an individual entity. Latin sophists created a modern objective form of the intellect by combining all wrong concepts into a substance of the third kind. They gave it a separate character in the substantial mode of the cosmic intellect (*inmixtus*). Averroist scenario of modernism had to react to the reception of the CMDA in the Sicilian school that interpreted the act of cognition after the year 1230. They precisely separated the act of personal understanding (*tertium genus*) from the intellect as an abstracted universal given as a concept in thought (*quartum genus*). Around the year 1235, in response to the Sicilian school, Rufus proposed a connection of both separate hypostases in the form of an accidental connection (*copulatio*). The separate possible intellect as a cosmic form was individualized by Dinant’s cosmic *materia prima*. It joined the subjective faculty of intellectual reception that was individualized according to Avicebron’s *materia spiritualis*. The cognizing subject of modernity was no longer a hylemorphic person. Modern paranoia, in view of the intellectual definition of man, acquired a literally cosmic and therefore wholly tragicomic character. Averroist’s *intellectus possibilis* is given as univocal and universal species. It recognizes through individualized receptivity that is established in the conjunction of cosmic *intellectus possibilis* with equally individual form of *intellectus materialis*. The individualization of cosmic *intellectus possibilis* in man is given by the spiritual matter which was added to Themistius’s and Avicenna’s concept of *intellectus materialis*. After the completed act of mystical conjunction or academic copulation, these two simulacra of possible and material intellect successfully recognize the immaterial subsistent species given as being of the third kind. The first modernist defines the numerical identity of the receptive intellect, which is given by conjunction of three non-existent “substance—species.” In this way, Dinant’s pantheism was recreated to be an Averroist intellect, which was absolutely unacceptable in Paris. Albert declined to comment on this nonsense, and Bacon considered Rufus an academic maniac. Parisian bishop Alvernus had to officially ban the teaching about the separate, cosmic intellect in man at the University.

Rufus founded a dualism of modern *individuum* based on an impossible composition of two simulacra. On the one hand, there are non-existent objective thinking, and on the other, the non-existent modern body. Modern *illuminati* created a new worldview based on the non-existent subject. Its intellect made by Avicennist “Flying Man” reaches the sphere of eternal cosmic intellect. This self-sufficient cosmic intelligence descends into the mythological modernist body through mystical copulation. Modernists live in the chaotic sublunar sphere, that is, almost in the underworld. The copulation of these two mythological entities is not an easy task. Today it employs a lot of Western academic institutions, which, under the leadership of Furies, are successfully participating in the modern version of academic mysteries. These panphilosophical games of modern mind were celebrated for the first time at the University of Oxford and rejected at the Paris University. Under the leadership of corresponding hierophants, small academic mysteries (ὄργια, *conferentia*) are celebrated all over the world today to establish the objective divine comedy. Illuminated Rufus celebrated the conjunction of the chthonic body, the enlightened soul and the objective diacosmos for the first time at this alma mater of modernism. But the quoted interpretation of *De anima* and the writing *Contra Averroem* were probably published in Paris about 1240. Modern Averroists conceived the *intellectus possibilis* as a Porretan substance, which, according to Avicebron, is associated with the hypostatic matter. Rufus, together with Oxford master Adam of Buckfield, introduced the principle of the plurality of substances in man (ch. 3.2). The first Averroism considered this solution to be absolutely erroneous and ridiculous (Alvernus, Albert) or downright insane and heretical (Bacon). Then the universal knowledge of God and the world would disappear in the sense of the receptivity of the soul required by Aristotle (*anima est quodammodo omnia*) and man would cease to exist as a moral authority responsible for his actions towards God. Neither bishop Alvernus in Paris nor Grosseteste as bishop of Lincoln could tolerate such a teaching. After the introduction of modern dualism into the person and after the death of modern God, this problem no longer torments us. The advent of the totalitarian regimes under the leadership of ideological Furies only confirmed that point in the nihilistic phase of metaphysics.[[453]](#footnote-453) The attack on Averroes, which was led by the school of Latin sophists following Oxfordian Fallacy, was an inevitable consequence of the erroneous concept of the receptive intellect. The dispute over Averroist interpretation of Averroes arose after the arrival of Oxford students in Paris around 1240. It is attested by Alvernus, Albert and especially by Bacon. Correctly interpreted writing CMDA eliminated all errors of *Modernorum* and thereby convicted them of grave errors. All representatives of the first Averroism saw those fatal errors about 1235–50; but Thomas Aquinas did not want to see them a decade later (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). Parisian connoisseurs of the first Averroism had to defend Averroes’s authentic teaching on the unity of cognition and person. Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle according to Avicenna directly endangered the foundations of Christianity. Modern Porretans at Oxford conceived the receptive intellect from *De anima* according to the mode “*discrete videamus*.” They considered hypostatic immaterial species that were separated from sensual and bodily cognition. The essentialism of Rufus, influenced by Avicenna and Avicebron, cannot see the actual proceeding of cognition. It has been interpreted in the previous chapters devoted to the first Averroism. The dispute over the objective character of the intellect given as *tertium ens* necessarily unleashed the first round of the dispute over the interpretation of *De anima* in the years 1240–50, which was chaired by brilliant Aristotelian and wise bishop Alvernus.

Rufus created an Averroes through the one-sided commentary full of sophistry and he founded the objective form of *intellectus possibilis*. This Averroistic intellect “exsists” as *tertium ens* in the mode of modern dualism between the senses and the substantial intellect given as hypostatized Porretan substance. A new *scibile* of modernity came in the history of thinking as Platonic simulacrum known from the dialogue *Sophistes*. Averroes became an Averroist, which he never was and never could be. The intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus* metaphysically consists of two completely different phenomena that exists existentially in reality or universally in mind. The sophism of Oxford modernists in the mode “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*” arises from ignorance of real course of cognition according to the CMDA (*secundum quid*). This sophism laid the foundation for the dispute over Averroism by establishing the first objective concept of the cognizing subject in the Latin West. The subject was no longer a real existing person and became a substance of the third kind with hypostatized receptive intellect of the third kind, moreover, exposed from behind. Its being was based on separate *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* as cosmic substances and separated immaterial forms. Rufus accomplished this confused Averroist interpretation of Averroes during his first stay in Paris, which Bacon attested (*reprobatus Parisius propter errores quos invenerat*, ch. 3.2). It is no wonder that the well-known representatives of the first Averroism refused to discuss with these insane *doctores Latini*, who came to Paris from Oxford sometime around the year 1235. Academic credibility of intellectual elite of mendicants was at stake. They created the first European *intelligentia spiritualis* in Oxford in the environment of academic *illuminati*. They celebrated the first objectively made academic mysteries under the leadership of analytically educated Furies. After 1250, these modernists gradually gained control over the academic institutions in Paris through the College of diligent compilers gathered around the editing of *Summa Halensis*. The representatives of the second Averroism could not directly attack the teaching of Aristotle, because the philosophical authority of *Corpus Aristotelicum* could no longer be questioned. Therefore, after the year 1235, instead of the Stagirita, modernists attacked the eminent Arabic Commentator, whom Alvernus rightly called the most honored philosopher (*philosophus nobilissimus*, ch. 2.3). The second Averroism continued the Neoplatonic interpretation of *Corpus* through Augustinian Avicennism. Modernists ascribed to Averroes their confused conception of subsistent, separated and immaterial *intellectus possibilis* made according to David of Dinant and then condemn it as if in a distorted mirror. Averroes became the scapegoat to channel confused thinking of *Modernorum*. He took upon himself all blame coming from sophistic interpretation of Aristotle, which modern sophists and *illuminati* in the Latin West have advocated until today. This crazy way of thinking gave rise to modern Western subject and its paranoid manner of cognition. To this day, modernism, through its criticism of Averroism, is carrying out an objective intellectual exorcism of inappropriate part of the receptive intellect. Modernists are engaged in cosmically indispensable act of mental copulation with the cosmic powers. These impersonal (and therefore demonic) powers are necessarily present in the schizophrenic soul of modern *illuminati*. Now it becomes clear the scientific basis of witch trials that characterize the emergence of modern humanities (OBJ III, ch. 5.5). Thanks to Freud’s reversal to the opposite, this exorcism received a suitable scapegoat, instead of Averroes. The ritual of academic expiation of sins is carried out under the guidance of modern Furies. Powers of intellectual Chaos chase the appropriate goat out of the scientific community into the desert of modern science (Averroes, Siger, Ockham, witches). The act of existential understanding of the person, the Commentator designed it as *tertium genus*. Rufus changed it to an accidental copulation of hypostatic human intellect with the external form of the cosmic intellect. Averroes let universal components of intellect to exist only as an act of cognition in the mode *tertium genus*. It produces self-cognition as a universal *factum*, in the act (*facere*) of self-reflection (*quartum genus*). Averroes presents this purely abstract concept of *intellectus possibilis* as *factum* of thinking, that is, as a concept. Modern mythology transformed this *factum* into a numerical cosmic hypostasis, which subsists in the form of cosmic substance outside of human thinking. This nonsense is then numerically individualized in human individuals by spiritual matter. The possible intellect, numerically individualized by *materia spiritualis*, became a receptacle and a wax for the intelligible recognized form imprinted by the active cosmic intellect. This copulation is already taking place in humans through the individualized *intellectus possibilis*. This mythological proceeding has a truly impressive and dramatic character. Rufus’s confused word about the Averroist intellect turned into an objective body and has been dwelling among us to this day. The modern cognition in man is just as demonic, as modern logic. Instead of the Antichrist, the cosmic nonsense comes in *anima intellectiva* as numerically one *intellectus possibilis*, in order to intellectually copulate with us. That union makes the fundaments of Western objective science. This gnoseological narrative of modernity is tragicomic and totally mythological. The further development of this schizophrenic psychology of the modern subject shows the development of witchcraft in modernity, which objectively rightly saw this copulation as a demonic problem. Critical hermeneutics consider the demonic copulation of modernity as a tragic effect of Furies, because the sleep of reason creates monsters (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Critical Bacon and Albert regarded this copulation as an insane or ridiculous idea of Latin sophists and excluded them from the University of Paris. This concept of *intellectus possibilis* meant a downright cosmic nonsense for all connoisseurs of CMDA. Modern Averroism reminded Aristotelians of Dinant’s heresy. In addition to the fullness of Dinant′s original philosophy, Rufus lacked but divine pantheism. Oxford’s sophist brought the Averroist interpretation to an end during his first stay in Paris and was therefore declared insane by connoisseurs of the first Averroism (*apud sapientes fuit insanus*, ch. 3.2). Times changed and the modern subject won, and with it the simulacrum of dualistic intellect, soul and person. After the victory of modern theory of truth as assimilation in the framework of *coequatio*, the metaphysical paranoia of modernists acquired a global and objective character.

### 3.3.4 Foundation of Objective Being

The collection of *Corpus Aristotelicum* in the Latin West dating from the Falsafa onwards was underpinned by Neoplatonic interpretations that the Toledo school codified *ad mentem Averrois*. Alvernus was the first known representative of Latin Christianity that integrally managed to separate Neoplatonic interpretations from the Commentator’s intentions. Therefore, he condemned both the doctrine of Neoplatonic Falsafa and modern sophists as Rufus (ch. 2.3.1). The writings of Averroes underwent a new interpretation in the second Averroism. The previous chapter investigated the interpretation of Rufus’ writing *Contra Averroem* and his commentaries on *De anima*. The conflict between Rufus and the aristotelicians in Paris was inevitable. The above-interpreted treatises of Alvernus, Albert and Bacon as eminent connoisseurs of the commentator showed that modern interpretation of truth, reality and concept of man were absolutely unacceptable for the first Averroists. However, the new school of thinking was supported by Franciscans such as Rufus and, among other reasons, was built upon the controversy over misconceived Averroism. The large portion of self-confidence in the group of first modernists helped them to replace their poor philosophical knowledge. Moreover, the first modernists at Oxford were good educators, and they influenced many students, at least according to the cited witness of Bacon. The condemnation of Latin sophists in the name of personally conceived *intellectus agens* according to CMDA, started another round of gigantomachy concerning substance. The key dispute over interpretation of *De anima* took place in Paris in the years 1245–50. Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* was written around 1245. It responds to objections of Parisian connaisseurs of Averroes and Aristotle. The writing confirms the nature of polemics between first and second Averroism, which took place after the publication of Rufus′s treatises, namely his commentaries on *De anima* and *Second Analytics*. They were written either before Rufus left Oxford, or more likely during his studies in Paris. After the publication of his commentary on *Metaphysics*, most probably written at the beginning of his stay in Paris, all the main representatives of early Averroism almost immediately attacked Rufus′s commentaries on *Corpus Aristotelicum*. After the publication of *Contra Averroes*, the first modernist had to leave Oxford anyway if he was still there. He defended the doctrine proclaiming the plurality of substances in man, which was contrary to Grosseteste’s teaching given *ad mentem Averrois* on this question. Rufus reduced the problem of the receptivity of cognition to a new cosmic quasi-substance (*intellectus possibilis*) and offered this new being of the third kind as Averroes’s authentic doctrine. Authentic Aristotelians in Paris and in Oxford rejected Rufus’s Averroism, because it resembled the pantheism of David of Dinant. Franciscan Roger Bacon witnessed the dispute. He was Rufus’s contemporary at Oxford and later followed his influence in Paris, after the death of Bishop Alvernus. The connoisseurs of Averroes at the time included students from Blund’s school and bishop Alvernus. They stated that ideas of Rufus and other modernists influenced by Oxfordian Fallacy (*sophistae Latini*) followed the tradition of declining schools of *Nominales* (*sophistae Italici*) and Porretans (*Grammatici*). Both schools were influenced by *Logica Modernorum*. The sophist interpretation of Averroes certainly contributed to negative evaluation of Rufus at the Parisian University. In the treatise *Opus maius* Bacon alluded to a specific dispute involving the group of Latin sophists around Rufus when bishop Alvernus was the Chancellor of the University of Paris.

“It was well known that when I was studying in Paris, it broke out a dispute regarding Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and metaphysics. Those treatises were falsely explained by certain interpreters of Avicenna and Averroes. Because of great ignorance of those people their books were forbidden, but they were nevertheless used for a long time.” [[454]](#footnote-454)

The dispute is placed in the period of Bacon’s study stay in Paris (ca. 1237–47) and concerned sophist interpretations of Aristotle (*fuit contradictum naturali philosophiae et metaphysicae Aristotelis*). A group of interprets dealing with Avicenna and Averroes was responsible for errors (*per Avicennae et Averrois expositores*). Let us recall a similar formulation regarding problematic interpretations of the same category that David of Dinant had produced before (*libri Aristotelis de methafisica et de naturali philosophia*, ch. 2.1.3). The quotation concerns controversy between the Toletan and Sicilian school, which interpreted Aristotle’s writings in different ways after the year 1230. Key representative of the new controversy was Rufus, which Bacon explicitly cites in other works, moreover, with exact dating of the dispute (ch. 3.2). Interpretations of Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes were completely flawed because of profound ignorance (*densam ignorantiam*) of first modernists. Confused works of this school were publicly condemned as a heretic (*fuerunt libri eorum excommunicati*). Until the death of bishop Alvernus, the advent of modernists, who interpreted the Corpus Aristotelicum according to Aristotelianism proposed by David of Dinant, was stopped at the University of Paris. However, their activity continued undisturbed at Oxford. The list of errors cited by Bacon also concerned Avicenna’s misinterpretation, which is correct. Mathematical Rufus even abolished the metaphysical abstraction that makes the basis of Avicenna’s metaphysics (ch. 3.3.1). Rufus’s influence on Parisian students overcame the prohibition of his works in the local circles, already influenced by the second Averroism (*utentes eis per tempora satis longa*). Let us recall the role of critical thinker Adam of Marsh, who defended Grosseteste’s line on the question of intellect and substantial unity of the person. Marsh was a conciliatory lecturer and being the Rector at Oxford about 1238, he allowed dissemination of Rufus’s texts among scholars.[[455]](#footnote-455) Some of them went to Paris for Master’s studies. It was later the case of Duns Scotus that was active in the next generation of thinkers influenced by Oxfordian Fallacy. Bacon’s citation exposes the conflict between the first and second Averroism that started around 1240 in Paris. He reliably identifies the group of *sophistae Latini* that Alvernus mentioned.

It is quite likely that Rufus, in such a controversial situation, did not receive a master’s degree at the University of Paris before the year 1255. He obtained his title later, when mendicant orders got their own chair at Paris in 1255. It is fair to assume that Rufus was one of the first masters of the newly founded Mendicant Faculty, which was tantamount to a challenge to classical philosophy. Therefore, in the same year 1255, a fundamental dispute broke out at the Paris University between academic mendicants and secular magisters. The Popes had to settle it in Rome (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The intellectual center of Oxford modernists influenced by Grosseteste’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy looked upon Rufus’s theories in a far more favorable way. Finally, Bacon himself appeared on the blacklist of Oxfordian authors. The treatise *Opus minus* set forth his critique of the second Averroism (ch. 3.4.3). Rufus’s sophistry that he made by explaining CMDA became a credo of following generations of *Modernorum*. They took Rufus’s concept of numerically unified *intellectus possibilis* as uncritically as his condemnation of Averroes. The massive attack on the Commentator began in Bonaventura’s school after the death of bishop Alvernus in 1252. Now, we still explore Paris's academic activities from 1240 onwards, when the critical thinking of philosophers was still excellently working. Modernists and Latin sophists had hard times at the University of Paris led by Chancellor Alvernus as bishop of Paris. At the same time, Albert the Great, as *magister regens* of the Dominican College, published the first part of the treatise *De homine*, in which he defends Averroes’s concept of *intellectus possibilis* and presents the full unity of the person in virtue of *intellectus speculativus* (ch. 2.4.2). The result of Albert’s exegesis of CMDA according to the Sicilian school was, on the one hand, his appointment as *magister regens* of the University in Paris. On the other hand, it accelerated Kilwardby’s departure to Oxford in the year 1245. Kilwardby received Master’s Degree at the University of Paris, but he certainly could not teach modernist fallacies at the Dominican College in Paris run by Albert. At the same time Bacon wrote a commentary on *Metaphysics* written in the same vein as Albert’s writing. Both authors explicitly condemned the sophistry of their contemporaries regarding Averroes’s metaphysics and their theory of knowledge. Rufus goes back to Oxford after his studies in Paris (ca. 1248). Being a member of the group named *doctores Latini* by Albert, he became the first Franciscan to lecture on the Sentences in Oxford. Thomas of York was elected in 1253 as *magister regens* of the Franciscan College at Oxford because, unlike Rufus, he had full *licentia docendi* for theology as well. Rufus went back to Paris, where he lectured on Sentences in the years 1253–55 as officially nominated successor to Bonaventure. Rufus received his master’s degree probably in 1255, after the foundation of the Mendicant Faculty that brought together the modernists in Paris. In the following year, the father of modernists returned to Oxford as a newly appointed headmaster of studies, because Thomas of York had gone to the newly founded college in Cambridge. The appointment of Rufus as *magister regens* represented the first academic victory of modernists at the University of Paris. Academic representatives in the Rue de Fouarre protested vehemently against it, but in vain. It is therefore quite logical that the first victim of modernistic attack supported by Pope Alexander IV was Guillelmus de Sancto Amore as the Rector of Parisian Artists, and two of his best students: Gérard of Abbeville and Nicolas of Lisieux. Guillelmus was recalled from the University and from the position of the rector in the same year, as the eminent Latin sophist named Rufus obtained a master’s degree at this new faculty (1255). The purge in the University of Paris opened the tragicomedy of the West called *via Modernorum*. Aristotelians considered Rufus a sophist that made out all the heresies of David of Dinant in an elaborate form, pantheism excepted. It is therefore necessary to find and interpret arguments of this important philosophical writing that was certainly affected by the academic ban of which Bacon spoke.

The writing *Speculum animae* presents Rufus’s defense and attack at the same time. The sophistry used in this work establishes the objective path of modernity in the Latin West (*Irre*) and therefore deserves its own chapter. The founder of modernity uses the classical form of dialogue with a fictitious opponent and deals with his objections. According to presented objections and their structure, the addressee is bishop Alvernus, who is honored here with the title “*Vir Dei*”. Another candidate for this title is Albert the Great, who, after obtaining the master’s degree in 1245 at the University of Paris, received the chair at the University on behalf of Dominicans. Appointed by chancellor and bishop Alvernus, Albert had academic and moral duty to defend the school of the first Averroism, which he did during the next ten years by publishing the commentaries on *Corpus Aristotelicum* against modernists. See his key sentence that in judging these questions he rejected in principle the theses of sophistes Latins (*omnino abhorremus Doctorum Latinorum verba*; ch. 2.4.3). His conflict with Rufus and Kilwardby was inevitable, and both modernists lost their cause. Rufus, being a bachelor of arts, left Paris after 1245 and returned to Oxford without the master’s degree. Kilwardby had already been a magister since 1237 and he avoided a problematic explanation of his modernist teachings by accelerated departure to his alma mater in Oxford about 1245. He became the Rector of Oxford and later the archbishop of Canterbury. Kilwardby quite understandably supported Rufus as appointed *sententiarius* in Oxford, since Rufus had been expelled from Paris for the same reason as Kilwardby. Rufus responded to accusations of being a sophist with obligatory self-criticism about the promiscuity of his intellect and by defending controversial points of his university lectures.[[456]](#footnote-456) The key question became the different status of basic metaphysical concepts. They received a different meaning in the school of the second Averroism influenced by Porretans (*quid est quod praedicatur et quid est de quo praedicatur*). Rufus’s theory of truth as universal identity lacks intentional relations to reality. He cannot define truth as agreement. The question of meaning from the point of view of supposition (*quod*) and imposition (*de quo*) became the principal bone of contention. Alvernus made the same criticism of Grammarians (ch. 2.3.2). Philosophical meaning of terms changed, since Rufus and Latin sophists had a different concept of cognition and truth. Taken from the point of view of the first Averroism, their theories belong to the category of metaphysical fallacies such as “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*.” The controversy repeats the dispute of *Logica Vetus* with the modern logic of Nominalists. They did not understand the role of real causality in *Second Analytics*; moreover, they completely botched metaphysical and categorical predication. After the publication of Rufus’s philippic against Averroes, which he certainly defended in Paris, the dispute concerned his modernist interpretation of *De anima*. Rufus transferred the receptive component of intellect to separated *intellectus possibilis*, because he solved the interpretation of CMDA with the help of a new Porretan hypostasis. The new form of intellect became a numerically uniform substance. Equipped with cosmic *materia prima* made by Dinant, this possible intellect was described by Rufus as an invention of the Commentator. The new form of intellect had to be fully one and fully receptive in order to speculatively reflect other species within the framework of modern truth as *coaequatio*. Rufus introduced in Averroes’s name the theory of one receptive substance as species of the third kind that is univocally identical for all men.

The reaction of Parisian magisters to Rufus’s Averroism in modernized and sophisticated remake of Dinant was twofold. Bishop Alvernus, as the Rector of the University of Paris, publicly rejected the doctrine of separate *intellectus agens* in man before assembled members of the University (*universitate Parisiensi convocata*) and proclaimed that cosmic intellect cannot make a component of human intellect (*intellectus agens non potest esse pars animae*; ch. 2.3). Contemporary postmodern medievalists follow epochal *Irre* of Rufus and they proclaimed that Alvernus should have confirmed by this statement the status of separated intellect. In fact, Alvernus canceled Rufus’s theory of Averroistic Averroes, because Alvernus rejected Neoplatonist scenario that used the exposure of being from behind. Being a critical philosopher and theologian following *Second Analytics*, Alvernus respected two generically different spheres of cognition (theology, philosophy). As official protector of Christian faith, he condemned but theological heresies of modernists: multiplicity of substances in man and the direct effect of cosmic intellect on human soul. Alvernus as philosopher let modernists think their fantasies and he merely corrected their Christian errors. Most certainly Rufus’s concept of the cosmic soul and the hypostatized intellect in man belonged to condemned errors. This doctrine was close to Aristotelian pantheism proclaimed by posthumously excommunicated David of Dinant. Prudent attitude of Alvernus was fundamentally different from his follower bishop Tempier in 1277. He completely lacked the ability of critical judgment to solve such complicated questions. The second and positive reaction of magisters from the school of the first Averroism consisted in introducing obligatory lectures of *De anima* at the Artistic Faculty in the Rue du Fouarre that had been attested since 1255 (ch. 3.1.3). The work *Speculum animae* testifies that the main subject of dispute in Paris around 1245 was the status of human intellect. This status had to follow Aristotle’s fundamental assertion: *anima quodammodo est omnia* (*De anima* 431b20–21). Rufus did not consider the truth as correspondence of cognition with sensually perceived things and he did not keep substantial unity of the person. Therefore, the young academic received fundamental questions concerning the cognition on the level of unity of personal intellect operating in the unified person. The representatives of the first Averroism asked him the same question as Averroes had posed to Alexandrians at the beginning of his exploration *De anima*: “In what way do the senses become the sensual cognition and the intellect does provide for the intellectual cognition?” [[457]](#footnote-457) We follow phenomenological meaning of the verb “*fieri*” that is hidden as transitive meaning of the verb “*esse*.” Siger explicitly used it in his criticism of Albert and Thomas (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). The first Averroism does not solve the question of “what” the intellect is as Rufus’ hypostatized *tertium ens*. Exegesis familiar with the Commentator is interested in the hermeneutic question of “how” the intellect operates (phenomenological *Wie*, OBJ I, ch. 1). Later, Aristotelian Heidegger tried to solve the same question against Avicennist Husserl. Rufus as Franciscan scholar has to treat both problems at the University, probably under pressure from Alvernus himself and other representatives of the first Averroism, such as Roger Bacon and Albert the Great. The dispute over the unity of the intellect fundamentally concerns the definition of cognition and the theory of truth.

“Man of God, take the arguments according to the same author and answer my question: How does sensory stimulus become sensory cognition? Your answer according to Aristotle runs like this: ‘The senses are in potency inasmuch as the object of senses is in the actuality.’ This is applied to the bodily senses and to their experience.” [[458]](#footnote-458)

The argument presupposes personal *intellectus possibilis* according to the first Averroism. The actualization of potential senses and afterwards of potential intellect comes from external reality (*est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu*). Rufus must explain the basic scheme of *De anima* about the receptivity of intellect. Let us see the question about the exact proceeding of cognition (*quomodo et ipsum sensibile*). The first Averroism conceives the potency in existential and phenomenological manner, also in the mode of happening (*fieri*) and not in the Porretan classification of *scibilia* (*factum*) that runs in the framework of Porphyry’s Tree. The ipseity of intellect as *tertium genus* is absolutely different from the identity of intellect as *quartum genus*. Previous chapters explained that Rufus does not have the intentionality based on *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* that make an aristotelian kind of conjunction in the soul. Rufus defends Platonic scheme of cognition given by the imprint of the form in the soul. He turned the scheme *De anima* completely upside down by following the exposure of human intellect made from behind. Human cognition is not based on the real thing acting on the potency in the bodily organ of cognition. He defends already given hypostasis (*sensibile*), which is accepted in sensory experience (*quale est ipsum sensibile in actu*). The notion “*sensibile*” of Rufus makes a hypostasis of the third kind. Such a modern phantom was absolutely unacceptable for Aristotelians. Instead of the first substance, modernists recognize Porretan hypostases that Rufus let assimilate into the hypostatic intellect following the mode of identity as *concretum*. Porretan miracle as “*species—scibile—sensibile*” is given outside the senses and exists directly in things. Modernity created a mythological collection of *tertium ens* on the sensible, intelligible and universal level. Their cognition is made in the context of assimilation theory of truth that excludes Aristotle’s and Averroes’s theory of truth as correspondence. Rufus claims that bodily senses have a basic potency to accomplish this collection of immaterial species since the senses are for him the hypostatic potency as such (*sensus est in potentia tale*). Sensual cognition does not bring actuality to modern *intellectus possibilis* because it is separate from the Aristotelian receptive intellect. We have explained the role of Avicenna’s *intellectus materialis* in the modernist schema of cognition. The recognition of species of the third kind is given by the exposure from behind, from the direction of cosmic *intellectus possibilis* (David of Dinant). Rufus does not need Averroes’s scenario that follows the actualization of human intentionality from the senses and then intellect that is based on existing real things. Oxforder *illuminatus* criticizing Averroes had to find a new way of individuation of possible intellect that lies beyond the sensual cognition of first substances.

“If one and the same possible intellect takes in so different and many intelligible species from the substances and accidents, it follows that for them there cannot exist a single individual substantial form which could determine them as a single individual, a substance, and a single person.” [[459]](#footnote-459)

The quotation explains the reception of numerically distinct species in one and the same receptive intellect (*in uno et eodem intellectu possibili*). This kind of intellect makes the reception of species as *scibile* that corresponds to the term “*collectio*” inspired by Avicenna’s denudation. The intellectual collection of mythological universals given in things fundamentally denies the course of knowledge according to *De anima*. The scheme of *Modernorum* omitted the receptive component of intellect that is given in existential cognition of the person (*tertium genus*). Rufus does not have the intellect as activity of a person, and moreover, he completely separated sensual cognition from intellectual cognition. No purely receptive sphere or individual faculty of immaterially given intellectual cognition can exist in the soul. The receptivity is conceived as an external hypostasis. It is Dinant′s cosmic *intellectus possibilis* and Averroes′s *intellectus possibilis* misunderstood as a substance. They are numerically unified to be universally receptive. Both concepts belong to modernist mythology of cognition. See the previous quote regarding Rufus’s active and receptive intellect as immaterial and separate substance (*hoc aliquid*). The universality of cognition is excluded according to the definition of the soul as “*quodammodo omnia*” done at the personal level. Man as a current thinking substance in the body became a current combination of two substantial cosmic intellects: the active and the passive. Albert criticized this view as nonsensical, let us see his criticism of Averroists as Rufus. They have three substances in man, which is insane. Rufus has the intellect as a hypostatized species and, moreover, a pseudo-material copy of reality done in universal hylemophism (ch. 2.4.3). According to Albert and according to the present hermeneutics, this is the path of paranoiac *Modernorum*. All postmodernists take it today as well, because they have not correctly grasped the doctrine of classical Aristotelianism according to CMDA. In their defense it must be said that Averroes and all great authorities of the first Averroism emphasize that the question of personal cognition and the unity of human intellect belongs to the most difficult parts of philosophy. Modernity situated in its metaphysic *apaideusía* took the easier and very broad path of mythological tales. These inconsistencies relate to interpretations in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. We analyzed them in the chapter dedicated to Grosseteste’s disciples that published the work *Summa philosophiae* (ch. 3.1.3).

By hypostatizing *intellectus possibilis* as a substance of the third kind, Rufus fell into his own trap. He cannot include the actual causality of real substances in the middle member of *demonstratio* as his scheme of cognition presupposes that hypostatic *scibile* exercises the causality of its own. Moreover, there is no substantial unity of the person in his system. Therefore, he expels the purely receptive intellect from the soul of the person and he makes it common to all (*species intelligibiles recipiantur in uno et eodem intellectu possibili*). This is the solution of David of Dinant with his pantheistic intellect. The core of the dispute is the old battle of the first Averroism of the Sicilian school according to CMDA that struggled with the second wave of interpreters of Averroes from the Toledo school. The sophist Franciscan does not make criticism of Averroes, but of his simulacrum, which he himself created out of Porretan mythology conceived according to Avicennism and Augustinianism. Albert and Bacon clearly saw it and therefore they rejected any academic discussion with the school of Latin sophists. Being the Rector of the University, Alvernus had to discuss with all kinds of modern sophists gathered at the Paris University for the first time, as it is stated in his commentary on *De anima* (ca. 1240). His commentary rejected erroneous interpretations of Averroism. He followed Blund’s Aristotelian school and brilliantly differentiated between the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic versions of Aristotelianism according to the Sicilian and Toledo school. Rufus’s sophistry could not stand before such a connoisseur of Averroes, seconded by Albert and Bacon. According to Rufus, the unity of cognition arises from the fact that *intellectus agens* directly imprint the species into the immaterial carrier given as *intellectus possibilis*. Through its conjunction or infusion into human cognition, these *scibilia* are preserved in the mode of Augustinian *memoria*. This receptive intellect is immaterial and therefore must have the status of the one numerically identical hypostasis for all people. Such Averroist’s *intellectus possibilis* is one and the same for all human beings in order to be able to ensure identical universal cognitions. Thanks to the passive function and the immaterial essence, there is a common matrix as Platonic receptive wax in the soul. It must be the same for all people within the framework of *potentia substantialis* and then it is actualized accidentally in numerically different individuals. The individualization of cosmic receptive intellect in that modern Frankenstein is made by *materia spiritualis* and by the individualized (and not personal) *intellectus materialis* of Avicenna (and not *tertium genus* of Averroes).

Formally taken, Rufus defends the scenario of the first Averroism, but gives it a different sense. Therefore, he has a different conception of the *possible intellect* than the first Averroism. Rufus helps himself with a sophistic trick, which he has already used in the previous interpretations. He leaves the receptivity as a material accident, which actualizes itself at the already given cosmic substance of Dinant that is cosmic *intellectus possibilis*. It arrives into human cognition by copulation with human material intellect that makes another substantial hypostasis in man. The new apology of previous concepts of *potentia accidentalis* and *substantialis* turns out as follows.

“The external thing, from which the species is abstracted, is called intelligible potency (*potentia intelligibile*). The possible intellect, which takes up this potency, is similar to it. In the act of cognition, it holds what is taken up as recepted (*actu autem habens ipsum receptum*); in the same act, it forms the resemblance (*actu efficitur similis*) between accepted species and the species projected into the world (*speciei infusae et proicienti extrinseco*).” [[460]](#footnote-460)

The first sentence does not entail an Aristotelian abstraction, but an Avicennist denudation. Rufus holds to Porretan species as an autonomous hypostasis of the third kind, which is universally given outside the intellect and in the real world in the potential mode. The correspondence of human intellect with reality based on abstracted *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* has no fundamental character for modern cognition. Modernists make the projection of previously given species into reality (*speciei infusae et proicienti extrinseco*). The reception of universal species is established by the separate active intellect of Dinant, which carries out the actualization of species. On the one hand, modernists store these cognitive forms in Augustinian *memoria*; on the other hand, they compare them with already existing objective forms of the same species that are in external first substances. This model corresponds to Rufus’s previous theory of truth as *coaequatio*. Cognition of external first substances only establishes the contingent occurrence of permanent immaterial forms.

The masters from the school of the first Averroism realized that they were confronted with another pantheistic scenario made after David of Dinant. Instead of God, two cosmic hypostases appear in it, the *intellectus agens* and *possibilis*. Man is composed of three substances. Another problem concerned the definition of the receptive intellect. The modernists apply Avicenna’s coniunctio (*ittiṣāl, ittiḥād*) of two separated intellectual substances to fundamentally different interpretation of cognition according to Averroes. The Comentator would have said at Rufus’s address that human intellect given in the act of cognition cannot be a subsistent form. Rufus should have read thoroughly the corresponding passage in CMDA that deals with the possible intellect as *tertium genus*. Averroes adheres to the act of the intellect exclusively as the faculty of the soul given in the existing person. The intellect, as a universal species in Rufus’s style, represents the concept of the intellect given by abstraction in thinking (*quartum genus*). However, this concept cannot be a hypostasis of the third kind, since it is but potential meaning in human mind. Rufus conceives *intellectus possibilis* on the basis of copulation with the hypostatic component of human intellect and through the assimilation of hypostatized species. They are given in the same univocal manner both in the cosmic *intellectus agens* and in extern hyparchical substances. The first Averroism objects to Rufus’s concept of truth as *coaequatio* that the first substance can actualize the possible intellect at the level of substantially different persons. Therefore, cosmic and hypostatized *intellectus possibilis* as one substance for all people is an absolute nonsense. In human being, and even more so in the subsistent external form, such an *intellectus possibilis* would have to be actualized as Aristotle’s first substance (τόδε τι, *hoc aliquid*). But then the human soul cannot be universal receptacle of all cognition, because the one substance would have a specific causal effect on another substance. Aristotelian canonical sentence “*anima quodammodo est omnia*” would no longer have any sense at all, because the modern intellect is a substance and therefore has no full receptive ability. Modernists cannot recognize a real world, because in the style of Avicenna’s “Flying Man” they recognize but intellectual permanent forms. The human soul is not universally receptive, because one substance (real thing, cosmic form) acts on another substance (hypostatic human intellect). This is not how we experience the act of cognition in ourselves. Human cognition is given in the mode “*fieri*,” that is, in the act of a person that lives here and now (Averroes′s *tertium genus*, Heidegger’s *Dasein*). Rufus constructs modern cognition as hypostatized Averroist dualism of soul and body. That makes merely a modern *factum* that Rufus created and Descartes confirmed afterwards. Modernity and Cartesianism celebrate this mythological mystery of impossible copulation in their academic orgies. Due to this collective *conferentia* and *informatio*, the modern divine tragicomedy was created under leadership of wise and playful Muses. The previous analyses have shown that modernists as Rufus, Descartes and Husserl took the act of cognition as subsistent and dualistic to be distrubuted between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. The error of modernity is based on the introduction of the plurality of substances of the third kind into the definition of man. Such nonsense the CMDA strictly rejected. The separate *intellectus agens* and *possibilis* was introduced into modern thinking by Rufus and his school of Latin sophists at the cost of accusing Averroes to be an Averroist. Simplicius was the first author to convert the first substance into a being of the third kind (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). William Moerbeke completed Latin translation of Simplicius’s *Commentary on Categories* in 1266 (*De praedicamentis*). Simplicius’s hour of glory came about 1280, when the Latin Avicennist Henry of Ghent, on the basis of this commentary, created the first system of predication that entails objective being (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.3). But in the years 1240–45, there were enough competent connoisseurs of Averroes’s philosophy; sophistic modernists made the minority. Classically educated scholars in Paris therefore put Rufus’s substantial dualism on the index, in contrast to modern Oxford. The dilemma of Rufus and all contemporary Cartesians with regard to the sophistry called “Mind—Body Problem” is still the same. The material body dwells in the underworld of *illuminati*; it has no essential connection with the immaterial thinking of *illuminati* that follow modern chaotic paths of their own solar intellect. Understandably, this could not have happened in the original mysteries, and therefore neither in Parmenides’s philosophy. Modernity created the simulacrum of mysteries handed down by academically educated Furies. Today's *illuminati* objectively list the exploits of their intellectual orgies, and banksters as nihilistic deities of today honor them in a divine, that is, a neoliberal manner. This has happened today under the nihilistic influence of the Furies who are creating today's digital chaos. After the eclipse of the real Sun, a fundamental problem arose in modern philosophy, since it generates real academic infertility. There are two different mythological substances that copulate together in a very problematic and quite chaotic way, see the contemporary state of academic orgies. Let us remember that the downfall of the great Greek sanctuaries began in a similar way when they were conquered by the tyrants of the Greek communities in the 6th century BC. According to modernists, sensual multiplicity can never create a universal unity. Now it becomes clear why Rufus lost the first round of introducing the modernism in Paris and why Franciscans had to recall this Latin doctor to Oxford no later than the year 1250. About the year 1245, the University of Paris was simply not sufficiently mature to accept the sophisticated mythology of Oxford scholars.

The controversy concerning diaphanum represents another polemical moment between both schools that were engaged in the polemics over writing *Speculum animae*. See the following quotation with the objection addressed to Rufus, to which he had to respond (*lux praesens in diaphono… est intentio lucidi*). The school of the first Averroism defended Averroes’s interpretation of *diaphanum*, without which the mediation between sensual and intellectual cognition cannot be carried out. Parisian connoisseurs of the first Averroism from the Blund school remind Rufus of basic nature of the possible intellect. It is given in the context of Averroes’s diaphanum that is necessary for the act of seeing (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Twofold kind of diaphanum ensures correspondence at the level of twofold formal causality, as it is postulated for abstraction of sensual and intelligible species. Being the author of the work *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, Alvernus needs the diaphanum to describe two transitions for the correct worldview (ch. 2.2.2). Twofold mediation produces a similarity between thing and intellect by proportionality of intentional objects that are given sensually and intelligibly in physical being of the person. Alvernus’s critique was addressed to Neoplatonic Aristotelians. They refused to accept the exposure of intellect from the senses, since it comes from Neoplatonic solar intellect.[[461]](#footnote-461) Taken into account Rufus’s ignorance of intentionality and diaphanum in CMDA, it becomes clear that criticism of Alvernus and Albert was directed at the group of *Modernorum* around Rufus. The first Averroists of the Blund′s school needed the diaphanum for two reasons. On the one hand, it conveys the actuality of the sunray. On the other hand, it mediates on a sensual level in the act of imagination the act of intentionality, which undergoes another meditation in the receptive intellect. Rufus’s account of cognition follows the scheme of Neoplatonic solar intellect (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). He clearly rejects in his writing the concept of diaphanum and intentionality in Blund’s school and establishes the worldview of modernity that does not need the mediation of cognition from reality. Following Dinant, Rufus introduced the concept of diaphanum as a kind of matter. He presents the first objective and mechanistic picture that makes the transmission of light as a species of the third kind.

“And you answer with the assertion that « the light is given in the intention of what is exposed, because it is present through the diaphanum ». What does this sentence mean other than that the light comes from the original source and it is absorbed from the radiant body in the external matter (*in materia extranea*), also in the air as diaphanum (*in aere diaphono*)? Therefore, I claim that the light is accepted both as species and as their essential similarity (*receptum sit species et similitudo expressa*). And this is by no means an empty idea given in some sensual similarity; this similarity must to some extent be approximated to the original source of this light, as above-mentioned species of the color taken with regard to their original form.” [[462]](#footnote-462)

Rufus has no idea how the diaphanum works according to CMDA. He rejects a synthesis of intentional species in the imagination and therefore in the intellect (*non imaginaria similitudo*). He takes the recognized forms as species of the third kind directly from things (*receptum sit species et similitudo expressa*). Anselm adopted singular and universal “*species expressa*” (ch. 1.2) to establish universal cognition. That contradictory species is contained directly in singular things (*quantum possibile est accedens secundum identitatem*). The defense of expressive species as hypostases of the third kind ensures the identity of cognition and reality. Rufus substantiates nominalistic concept of cognition, which is known as “*universalia in re*.” Separated *intellectus agens* makes the source of such species as Avicenna’s Giver of forms. It sends the stream of objective forms into the world. From the previous interpretation, it becomes clear that such teaching was absolutely unacceptable for the first Averroism. Rufus defended the emanation scenario of *sequaces Aristotelis* and proposed a pantheistic view of cognition similar to David of Dinant. Rufus had to leave Paris because he proclaimed a theory of truth and cognition based on the separate cosmic active intellect. This was contrary to the official statute of the Paris University that Alvernus solemnly proclaimed (ch. 2.3). Rufus cannot reach the reality of the first substance, although he tries to do so through Porretan concept of *species specialissima* to replace the second substance (*Speculum animae* 124.207–212). But the unity of the many and the one in human cognition remains as unattainable for Neoplatonist Rufus as the unity of being for the participants in Plato’s dialogue *Parmenides* or for today’s academics celebrating objective mysteries of Mind—Body Problem.

This is confirmed in the last part of the treatise, when the perplexed author produced a *tertium ens* of all kinds. With regard to previous interpretations of habitus, the term “*forma—habitus*” is interesting. It replaces the causality of missing first substances with Porretan species.[[463]](#footnote-463) In modern scheme of cognition, the actual existence of things and people disappeared, being replaced by Porretan individuals analyzed above. It is given as composition of the first and second substance (*concretum*). The recognition of this objective simulacrum is made in Themistius’s and Avicenna’s *intellectus materialis*, which has a hypostatized and habitual character. The chapter devoted to the exegesis of *Second Analytics* explained Rufus’s mode of concrete predication made on the basis of Porretan collection (*concretive*). In the concrete predication, the difference between the first and the second substance disappeared to be replaced by univocal vision of being (ch. 3.3.2). That pseudo-categorical meaning is predicted as inherent properties of substances at the level of “species—essence.” The universals are predicted to be the first substances with regard to nominally defined individuals. It can be proved in Rufus’s apology (*definitum, praedicatur etiam de ipso aggregato definito et individuo*; *Speculum animae* 128.299–300). Oxford analyst does not distinguish between the inherent nature of categorical and nominal accidents of the substance. For this reason, Porretan Rufus falls into the above-quoted criticism of Alvernus concerning the school of *Grammatici* (ch. 2.3.2). These sophists no longer distinguished between hyparchical inherent nature of the property in the first substance (*esse in subjecto*) and the universal predication of this property in the second substance (*inhaerere subjecto*). The sophist of Oxford strives in vain to find the predication of *actus essendi* of the first substance. The disappearance of the person and its replacement by a sophistic simulacrum certainly did not leave Christian representatives of the University of Paris in stoic calm, since we speak about the year 1245. The nominalist Rufus abolished hyparchical existence of the person in the categorical predication (*idem est dictu*) and defended the definition of the person in the Porretan modus “*humanare*.” [[464]](#footnote-464) The sentence about objective and completely concrete humanization (*hoc verbum 'humanatur', quod concretum est*) has a prophetic character. Rufus transformed man into a non-existent substance of the third kind, which can be manipulated as mathematically quantified abstractum (*intelligatur ipsa forma per modum concretionis et qualificantis*). Thanks to *ad hoc* added provisions, this *concretum* taken in a nihilistic manner is humanized by predication of various hypostases. In the last times of corporate capitalism, Rufus’s concrete definition of man has been replaced by the nihilistic term “human resources.” Against this determination of modern humanism, Dante, in connection with Siger of Brabant and his Averroist interpretation of *intellectus possibilis*, put forward a completely different concept of humanity and unity of *species humana* (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.3). Rufus names this modern vision of man after previous writings with the term “concrete predication” (*concretive praedicatur*, ibid 129.349). The really educated scholars at that time were not convinced. They read the writing CMDA in the spirit of Aristotelianism and knew very well, how the real unity of the person was established. Rufus tried to determine in a completely modern way what man is as an objective nominal hypostasis, and not as he thinks in the existential *actus essendi*. The concrete predication defended in the work *Speculum animae* represents a typical sophism from the point of view of a categorical imposition. It is given by erroneous transition from the abstract logical definition to the first substance (*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*). This error is revealed by postmodern analyses of so-called “instantiation” and “ontology of properties,” to which logically conceived existence is assigned in analytical philosophy.[[465]](#footnote-465) In the epoch of complete nihilism, Rufus would certainly have succeeded at most universities dominated by analytical version of Oxfordian Fallacy, but by no means among real connoisseurs of Aristotelian metaphysics about the year 1245. The logical supposition given in thought is not the same for critical Aristotelian philosophy as the imposition of categorical metaphysical meaning taken from reality. Alvernus criticized in Abelard’s line this predication of the hypostases on a logical substrate that was summed up in the term “*album albet*” (ch. 2.3.2). The second Averroism has neither intentionality, nor a conception of Aristotelian existence, nor a concept of truth as correspondence, and, moreover, it lost the first substance.

Therefore, in the key dispute with the first Averroism, Rufus must define a new being of the third kind, which established the way of thinking known as “*via Modernorum*.” The author from the Oxford school of second Averroism followed Grosseteste when he wrote the 19th chapter of the work *Summa philosophiae*. He proceeded in the same manner as Rufus in order to establish the objective being of the third kind (*re in pura potentia et actu et forma essentiali eiusdem potentiae perfectiva*, ch. 3.1.3). Rufus made this definition of objective being one generation before him. Let us now turn to the key passage in the work *Speculum animae*. The first concept of modern objectivity is created by the term “*species obiecti exsistentis*.” This objectively given species was transformed in the following generation of modernists into a new ontotheology (Bonaventura) and finally into a new metaphysics (Scotus). The following quotation proves the first form of objective existence in the Latin West. We must read it in the mode of archaic *alētheia* to expose original untruth of objectivity.

“Now I come back to the form which is the species of existing object (*species obiecti exsistentis*). In general, it is true that, whether it is a sensual or intelligible form; taking that new matter, it also acquires a new way of being (*de sua materia nova in qua novum esse acquisivit*), and this through the abstraction from the external object given as a material body. This objective form can be predicted concretely in the mode of similarity and proportionality (*consimiliter, comproportionaliter concretive de sua*). It is given with regard to spiritual matter (*materia subtiliori*), that is, similarly to the form mentioned above (*illa forma obiecta*), which exists in the external material bodies.” [[466]](#footnote-466)

The quotation mentions a form given as a kind of objective species (*formam quae est species*). That “form—species” gives some special kind of being to an “exsisting object” (*obiecti exsistentis*) that is composed of objective form and spiritual matter (*materia subtiliori*). The act of establishing the objective being is given by concretization, that is, by entering (*exsistere*) of that objective species into external reality. The case of *genitivus obiectivus* linked to species (*species obiecti*) means that species of Rufus is in a “hyparchical” way related to the new kind of “object” that ist established due the universal hylemorphism. The new “object” received a new matter and a new form in the process of “esistence” (*de sua materia nova in qua novum esse acquisivit*). This deduction represents a typical example of universal hylemorphism, which is superimposed on Porretan species and is predicted in the mode of Avicennist comitation. The sensual or intelligible form acquires a new way of being in the new matter through the objective abstraction from the real substance. But this abstracted being is not given in thought as Aristotelian species. It “*existit*” as Porretan hypostasis, to which Rufus adds the universal matter in the mode of objective correspondence (*praedicatur consimiliter, comproportionaliter concretive de sua, scilicet materia subtiliori*). Rufus replaced the metaphysical donation of being made by *dativus metaphysicus* with a modern kind of donation made by *genitivus subiectivus*. He established an entirely mythological donation of existence that produces an objective *tertium ens*. Such a modern production of being, the first Averroism considers it a clear nonsense. It represents a fatal metaphysical error that Bacon mentioned above (*contradictum naturali philosophiae et metaphysicae Aristotelis per Avicennae et Averrois expositores*). Hermeneutical archaeology follows the hidden transformation of metaphysical *veritas* that became an objective *veritas* due to *genitivus subiectivus* introduced by Rufus. Under the influence of Furies that became the subjective powers of objective thinking, Rufus created a doppelganger of reality. He founded a paranoid metaphysics of modernity. This doubled being, Albert condemned it as a typical product of Averroists (*hoc et hoc esse materiam et formam*, ch. 2.3.3). He considered doubling of reality to be a product of modernist schools, which did not understand Aristotle and brought substantial multiplicity into the soul. Therefore, according to Albert, the opinions of these *doctores Latini* are so ridiculous that there is no point in polemicizing with them. Now it becomes clear who is the aim of this polemic and when that concept came into being. In addition to external things, its objective copy was made in mind. It is produced to be a quasi-hylemorphic being in the mode of Avicebron’s dualism that was common in Oxford as universal hylemorphism (ch. 3.2). In the modern act of objective creation, the external body received a new, much more subtle matter of the third kind (*materia subtiliori*). The objective form of the thing in the mode of assimilation established the new way of objectively given being of the form (*illa forma obiecta*). For the first time in the history of the West, the recognized object acquires the status of a real being, which is understood on the universal level as well (*dico communiter, sive sit sensibilis sive intelligibilis*).

According to Rufus, such a paranoid *creatio ex nihilo* est compatible with the process of abstraction that starts from the real hylemorphic body (*acquisivit per abstractionem*). This is the reason why Bacon declared this modernist to be a philosophical maniac who hides behind Aristotle and creates a paranoid copy of reality in his thinking (*apud sapientes fuit insanus*, ch. 3.2). The quotation shows the typical concept of truth as universal equality of species. They “exsist” in the objective diacosmos and are *consimiliter* recognized in modern hypostatized intellect. The new existence of the object is expressed in the mode of universal hylemorphism by the verb “*exsistere*” that is understood in the mode of Porretan hypostases. They take leave (*exsistit*) from the objective netherworld of modernists to arrive in contingent forms given in real hylemorphic substances. Such contingent manifestation of objective being of the third kind established a new metaphysics that changed the meaning of being. Modern cognition began to duplicate reality in the assimilation mode (*coaequaliter*). However, the quotation presents it as an Aristotelian correspondence of the truth (*consimiliter, comproportionaliter*). The perception of reality received a sophistical doppelganger in modern thinking. Thinking does not recognize the reality of first substances, but its own simulacrum. Modern thinking produces a noematic simulacrum of reality (*scibile*). Through this simulacrum, modernity recognizes the first substance by leading objective reality out of demiurgic thinking in the form of objective deduction (*exsistere*). By reworking the term “*resolutio*” of Philip the Chancellor, Rufus created a new form of amphibolia that imitate the real world. The progress of modernity through the proliferation of simulacra is unstoppable. Philip the Chancellor had four original transcendentals (*ens, unum, verum, bonum*). Rufus made an infinite number of them, because every real being has received its objective copy. The source of objective deduction is Avicenna’s cosmic *intellectus agens* as Giver of forms and not the pantheistic God of Dinant. Rufus establishes the new worldview in the mode of universal hylemorphism. The following quote gives to *via Modernorum* its further direction. The new revelation of being is revealed in direct intuition of first modern *illuminati*. However, Rufus acknowleded that there was not yet an objective categorical predication that could uphold this new worldview.

“Therefore, neither by abstraction nor by concretion we have words by which we designate the species of sensual and intelligible forms (*species formarum sensibilium et intelligibilium*) and the forms of objective things (*rerum obiectarum*). We refer to these things somehow, using an indirect description (*per circumlocutionem quoquomodo adnotamus eas*).” [[467]](#footnote-467)

The preceding quotation created an objective being of the third kind, which has its own matter and its own form. Under the influence of objective Furies, Rufus observes objective America. However, he does not know how to cope with this objective simulacrum of reality, because its meaning cannot be predicted in any way. Aristotelian abstraction and Porretan composition do not grasp the full meaning of new paranormal appearance. Rufus has a fundamental problem with the description of this simulacrum, because there is no corresponding category of thinking for the objectivity that has just emerged. The classical species of both schools are given either within the framework of Aristotelian abstraction or Avicennian denudation, but in both cases they are devoid of the matter. Following Avicebron’s example, Rufus introduced a spiritual matter into the definition of objectively given species. Then he has a problem with the predication of meaning that pertains to the new totality of objectively given things (*rerum obiectarum*). The sophistic subtlety of this concrete object defies the classical categories of predication and even nominalist meaning (*neque secundum concretionem habentur simplicia vocabula*). The predication must objectively (i.e., neither categorical nor universal) convey the meaning of introduced concretization by the matter of the third kind, which classical Aristotelian categories make impossible. Where speaking is insufficient, there is at least a direct insight into objectivity in the mode “*discrete videamus*.” In the objectively given Averroist intellect of the third kind, an objective existence finally reveals itself in the objective sense and corresponding truth. Rufus gave scholastic metaphysics a second beginning by creating a new relationship “subject—object” for the reconsidered whole of being.

Around the year 1235, Rufus laid down the system of second Averroism that created the objective form of *intellectus possibilis*, which sees the world in an epochal new insight. He added to this modern subject as well the modern object about the year 1245. The first modernist performs only an approximate description (*quoquomodo adnotamus*) of this epoch-making operation of thinking, so far done in the mode of sophisticated perlocution (*per circumlocutionem*). Let us recall the hidden effect of Boethius’s definition of speaking in his traduction of the work *De interpretatione* (*notae*, ch. 1.1). Now, it acquired an objectively analytical character. The indicative of verb “*adnotamus*” changed in the following generation into the imperative. It established a new metaphysics, through which *via Modernorum* began to work, from Bonaventura to Henry of Ghent and to Scotus. The last-mentioned modernist was no longer satisfied with the mere description of objectivity. Scotus designed a new metaphysics for Rufus’s term “*species obiecti exsistentis*.” Aristotelian hyparchical existence changed into the act of the modern “*exsistere*,” which primarily concerns not the real thing, but the “*species obiecti*.” The modern subject actively constructs an objective *scibile*. The first Averroism primarily and passively recognized first substances; it abstracted their meaning in intentionally oriented thinking; and then truthfully predicated these species given in the form of synthesized universal concepts, made with regard to causal relationships of first substances. Rufus’s mode *per prius* exposed being from behind, from direction of the subject, instead of from the front, from direction of hyparchical first substances. The new subject constructs a new first substance as an *obiectum* that fully corresponds to active nature of the modern demiurge. The path of ontological understanding brought into play by Heidegger (*Vor-blickbahn*), took up meaning of modern being that goes from the cognizing subject to the real thing. The mythological arrival of objective hypostasis made by Rufus into real contingent world created the first historical manifestation of objectivity. The objective being was given in the original concealment and now it turned into the revealed “exsistence” (*species obiecti exsistentis*). This transition of being from historical concealment (historicity) to epochal unconcealment (history) follows the transformation of being in the metaphysics (Heidegger’s *Ereignis*). The hermeneutic truth of objectivity manifests itself in the field of Averroist intellect, which Aristotelian connoisseurs of that time declared to be sophistic nonsense or madness. In the polemic against these dubious Averroists (*Averroistae*) congregated around Bonaventura and Rufus, Albert defended the unity of cognition in the person according to the CMDA (*hac in determinatione convenit nobiscum Averroes*; ch. 2.4.3). In the glorious hour of his untruth, objective being of Rufus transited (*exsistit*) from historial form of *alētheia* into the history of philosophy (*veritas*). The new configuration of Averroist metaphysics revealed itself in virtue of objective worldview of the first modernist. His metaphysical error (*Irrtum*) founded the history of Western modernism in the mode of objective lunacy (*Irre*). Averroism of modernists made in the mode of logical sophisms was absolutely unacceptable for connoisseurs of Averroes at that time. This error founded the famous tradition of modernity (*via Modernorum*). The work *Speculum animae* manifests objective being as a new beginning of metaphysics (Heidegger’s *Beginn*). Taken from the contemporary nihilistic phase of postmodern metaphysics, Rufus’s objective worldview represents an epochal unconcealment (*alētheia*) of all previously hidden nihilistic possibilities of *Modernorum*. The categorization of these epochal possibilities of modernity is explored as historial categories revealed in the *dativus obiectivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). Oxford scholars Rufus and Kilwardby did not enforce the modern version of nihilistic metaphysics at the University of Paris until the year 1255. The objectivity expelled from academic benches of classical philosophy settled in Rue du Fouarre therefore did not establish a positive history of objectivity (*Historie*), but it opened the path of objective historial effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). This beginning of modernity had already existed for two decades at Oxford, where objective concepts of being, cognition and the person had developed into a historically effective power through Oxfordian Fallacy.

Rufus returned to his native alma mater, where he lectured on Sentences since the year 1250. His Oxford lectures established the epoch of objectivity and Bacon rejected them as insane. Oxford modernists lost the first round in Paris, but by no means the second one. Rufus founded the Parisian period of objectivity in the year 1255. Bonaventura and his modernist school entered the struggle for a new worldview. They supported Rufus during his second stay in Paris when he probably became the regent of the Franciscan College. It now becomes clear why Rufus’s sophistical interpretation of Averroes (*Contra Averroem*, 1236) was replaced by another direct attack that led Bonaventure against Averroes around the year 1252. The Seraphic teacher made Averroes not only a fallible and confused philosopher (Rufus already did this), but also a Christian heretic. Averroès as a pious Muslim became a demonic Christian. Averroès became a demonic Averroist through a ritual of academic necromancy. This modern idol (εἴδωλον ποίησε, Odys. 4.796) was created by the modern Furies and objectively comes from the world of the dead. This now-Christian monster must be expelled from modern philosophy to atone for the errors created by David of Dinant and Rufus. The ritual of necromantic expulsion is the counterpart of the already explained mythological copulation of cosmic and human powers. Every philosophical orgy of the nihilistic enlightened imitates the Babylonian festival of *Enūma Eliš* to make a modern *homunculus* that is the knowing subject of Rufus. Mythological powers given as hypostasized intellect of all kinds descend from Heaven through the chairs of analytic philosophy (ancient ziggurat) to the Earth given to bear intellectual fruit. In the same objective way, an Averroïste Averroës must be summoned from the world of the dead to establish modern philosophy. This demonic creature appears in the philosophy moderne and then must be neutralized by an appropriate academic ritual. The foundation of both procedures is an alleged averroism of Averroes. The mythological copulation of cosmic and human powers in illuminated minds constantly revives objective world knowledge. Likewise, ritualized necromancy is required to make *eídolon* of “Averroism” and then chase it into the desert as atonement for academic sins (*Leviticus* 16:10). Both objective procedures (mythological copulation and mythological necromancy) are necessary in early modernity to establish knowledge of the objective world. Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* concludes his innovative philosophy and mythological creationism of first modernists at Oxford. Rufus carried out an transformation of *tertium ens*. Neoplatonic antiquity handed it over to Avicennian Falsafa, and this, in turn, gave it to modern scholasticism. He made the radical eclipse of the first substance (ἐποχή) in the Aristotelian metaphysics. During the short interval of intellectual darkness (1235–45) he let shine the objective first substance as *tertium ens* in the modern metaphysics. Modernity finally found its sophistic magician who has pulled the magical objective rabbit out of the metaphysical hat.

The new nature of being was inaugurated in the scheme of cognition according to Oxfordian Fallacy founded by Grosseteste. Rufus changed the middle link of the judgment (*medium*) into an objectively given hypostasis, which was endowed with matter and form of the third kind. He predicated this atomic substance with regard to the new object of cognition, which was recognized through the new concept of *intellectus possibilis* as universal Averroistic hypostasis. The intellect turned into a hypostasis (*potentia substantialis*), which was connected with the existing person by this or that contingent act of thinking (*potentia accidentalis*). Rufus’s receptive intellect is the permanent and hypostatic disposition of modern thinking (*habitus*). Therefore, the intellect is able to draw conclusions par itself, even with regard to contingent reality. In doing so, it has its own hypostasis (*esse tale*). This accidental potency of intellect is hypostatized by Averroes’s simulacrum of one numerical possible intellect. Its mythological “causality” is used in the deductive proof to establish the modern scientology. Modern knowledge is given by the fact that the separate cosmic *intellectus possibilis* transforms the potency of the individual material intellect in the non-existent modern subject to an actualized intellect (Avicenna′s *intellectus* *in effectu*). The copulation of two mythological intellects (cosmic and individual) produces a new kind of objective knowledge. The substantial unity of man was disintegrated, since the metaphysical ipseity of the person ceased to exist. The existence of the person turned into a mere logical identity of an individual, to be realised at the moment of this or that act of thinking. Some time later the unknown Averroist from Grosseteste’s school argues in the same way as Rufus when he defined this intellect within the framework of the pure possibility of substance as accidental subsistence (ch. 3.1.3). Alvernus, Albert and Bacon as representatives of the first Averroism refused the key moment of this magic transformation. It was the mode of modern “exsistence.” It concerned a kind of being made out of the universal matter of the third kind that doubled the real world.[[468]](#footnote-468) Modern intellect as an Avicennist hypostasis or Rufus’s simulacrum of Averroes makes a kind of modern emanation (*exsistit*) in order to descend in the ephemeral world. Being there, the cosmic intellect enters the process of denudation to consider objective *scibilia*. They are given in the mode “*semel—semper*” to be found in hylemorphic substances as well.

The dispute between the first and the second Averroism necessarily concerned the principles of cognition according to *Second Analytics*. The quarrel concerned the metaphysical statute of the first principle of cognition that was in the first Averroism determined by the first hyparchical substance (*ex inmediatis*, ch. 2.4.1). Albert’s controversy with Kilwardby refers to this principle, let us see the next chapter. Grosseteste for the first time changed this principle into a Neoplatonic version (*inmediate*), thereby establishing the Oxfordian Fallacy (ch. 3.1.1). The analytical mode “*inmediate*” made possible a conjunction of Averroist *intellectus possibilis* with the (non existing) individual subject and it thus created the concept of objective “exsistence.” The first and most important product of modernity is fabrication of an Averroist idol made out of the real Averroes. It is the first modern demonic being, which opens the epoch of witch trials done in objective scientific manner. The production of this indispensable simulacrum runs in the mode *per prius*. Modern God as Avicenna′s Giver of forms guarantees the coherence of the objective world; the first modernists at the Christian universities had to punish any attack on this idol with academic *damnatio memoriae*. Averroist′s idol of Averroes guarantees modern knowledge of world; it stands as the supreme guardian of modernity at the gates of the underworld of objectivity. Parmenides would wonder a lot who in the period of modernity got the divine keys to the Gates of Day and Night. This gnoseological Kerberos is necessary in order to block the path to a real scientific knowledge of the world in the sense of Aristotle's *Second Analytics* and *De anima* even after the death of the modern God. The original CMDA convicted the first modernists of paranoia, according to cited testimonies of main representatives coming from the first Averroism. It came to the emergence of universally predicted relation “subject—object” that objectively refers to the totality of being. Like this, a complete eclipse of the first substance occurred that inaugurated the epoch of full objectivity. The eclipse of metaphysical and critical thinking based on common sense was accomplished as objectively necessary consequence of that maniac proceeding. The objectively concrete being and its cognition coincide. The truth of *Modernorum* is defined in the mode of assimilation and equality of ever-existing hypostatized forms and species. The schizophrenic subject of the West then recognizes itself through the postmodern archaeology of knowledge (M. Foucault). It has become the very beginning of cognition and truth, over which it has full dominion. Both meaning (beginning and permanent dominion over consequences) make the basic meaning of the same Greek word “ἀρχή.” The modern non-existing subject became the founding event of the brave new world, following a type named Timaeus, who was the first modern demiurge mythologically fabricated by Plato.

The birth of the modern subject followed the Averroist form of *intellectus possibilis*. We find such modern intellect coming into being in the following paragraph of *Speculum animae*. The birth of the modern subject is based on the theory of truth as assimilation and equality made with regard to the objective being. The quotation presents the first form of objective predication, which is related to univocal and universal definition of *intellectus possibilis*. The emergence of the subject of modernity entails the assertion that the predication is made out of the concrete and therefore true determination of possible intellect (*ipso intellectu possibili praedicatur concretive et vere*). The intellect becomes an objective being of the third kind. Rufus predicated the modern intellect as concrete being, made in the mode of Platonic imprinting of the subsistent form into the material substrate. Rufus’s intellectual testament establishes modernity and its humanism of the corpse through the imperative “*accipe*.”

“In the mode of objective proportionality (*comproportionaliter*), therefore, let us accept (*accipe*) the species of the soul, animality, humanity, the species of the stone, etc.—that is, intelligible species, which are abstracted from all determinations made by the place and physical meaning. We can predict concretely and truthfully about such a possible intellect (*de ipso intellectuu possibili praedicatur concretive et vere*). If the receptive intellect wants to understand what a stone is, then it must really become a hypostasis of the stone (*intellectus possibilis, cum intelligit lapidem, vere ut lapideitatur*). If he wants to understand man, he must become a true hypostasis of humanity (*hominem, vere ut humanatur*). It must be said that in the case of true fulfillment, it is not about the actual form of man (*non forma hominis*), but about their objectively similar form (*ut forma hominis*).” [[469]](#footnote-469)

Let us return to the objective view that relates to the new hylemorphic substance cited above. We assimilate forms and species truthfully within the framework of essential potency of the formative intellect (*quod vere perficitur et formatur*), through which the objectively receptive intellect absorbs every *scibile*. The reception of permanent species creates an objective form of cognition in thinking by the fact that an imprinting of this objectively given form is created in the “wax” as *intellectus materialis*. The new creation of reality follows the fact that objective forms come into “exsistence” as hypostases endowed with their own form and matter, because the material intellect becomes active in man as a second substance. This objective *concretum* of the possible intellect is understood in the sense of the conjunction of separated cosmic *intellectus possibilis* with its contingent human form in the Porretan mode. By using the predication of the universal hylemorphic substance of the third kind, modernity does not create real hyparchical forms (*non forma hominis*); it merely state the objectively given similarity of these forms (*ut forma hominis*). In order that Rufus would not go completely insane (Bacon *dixit*), he added at the end of quotation that we are not God, because we do not create the realized form of man, but only recognize it. The *intellectus possibilis* defined by Rufus creates a complete doppelganger of reality in thinking. There is a univocal meaning with regard to reality. According to above quoted Alvernus, modernists merged intentionally given cognition in the subject together with real existence of the first substance. Rufus opened the Pandora box of modernity, as the later editorial edits of *Speculum animae* confirm it. The retraction of Rufus’s too daring view was later inserted in the original treatise. The chapter entitled *Excursus Assisiensis* (*Speculum animae*, pp. 132–133) follows immediately after the exposition of the objective being and intellect. Rufus’s students tried to put his teaching in line with the theories of species and *intellectus possibilis*, which were handed down in the following school led by Bonaventura. The modernists from Rufus’s school emphasized against the criticism of the first and even the second Averroism that it was nothing new. Rufus seemed to follow classical approach in the framework of specific hypostatized predication. They masked his objective hylemorphic reality by introducing universal hypostatic meaning instead of it (*divido esse speciei contra esse naturae*).[[470]](#footnote-470) The hylemorphic objective predication of Rufus backtracked from Aristotelian categories back to a system of division of *Nominales* made according to *Arbor Porhyriana* as Porretans did it before. Rufus’s students had to circumvent the use of spiritual matter for the possible intellect in an ingenious way (*ipsa materia forinseca*). Therefore, they harmonized Rufus’s teaching with the classical Porretan scenario, so that his innovative sophistry could not be seen. However, the modernity founded by Rufus via the false problem of Averroism gave rise to a new concept of objectively founded intellect and being.

Rufus’s apology brings an example of analytical interpretation of reality in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The conjunction of universal species and human individual receptivity runs according to original Latin meaning of “*exsistere*.” Modern humanism defines man as a substance of the third kind. Human being manifest itself objectively by the fact that the permanent subsistence of specific humanity starts from divine exemplary thinking and it is defined concretely as a Porretan individual. Subsequently, this individual receives a contingent actualization in the unique person as a hylemorphic substance. As a result, the concrete individual given in the mode “*homo humanat*” becomes an objective equivalent of the real person in modern cognition. In this modern humanistic scenario of the “man—corpse”. The person as an actualized and unique hylemorphic substance is not important; it is the mythological process that makes the eternal form enter a contingent reality. The non-existent modern subject produces this objective fact in the mythological mode of equivalence “modern subject—modern object.” Then, from the point of view of paranoid modernity, it comes to assimilation of reality and its recognition in the mode “*exsistere*.” Then, it is true that the intellect produces a truthful and utterly subjective and mythological *factum* that is called “*homo humanat*.” Latin terms coming from the school of *Nominales*, such as “humanization,” “petrification” and “animalization,” present the objective conception of “exsistence,” which is given as a contingent occurrence of the univocal species in real external world. Rufus’s univocal nature of species is linked to the production of objective being. Er made fall the boundary between reality and its recognition, since they merged into universal hylemorphism. The modern subject proclaimed itself a new demiurge that started to create a non-existing world.

## 3.4 Development of Academic Averroism (Robert Kilwardby)

In the context of Neoplatonist *intellectus possibilis* made by modern Oxforder and Parisian Alexandrians, the first outline of objective being was born in the Latin West in the years 1240–45. The objective determination of man passes from cosmic intellect into the real person by the principle called *modo geometrico* that was made according to *Liber de causis*. The modern subject added a concrete determination to the first substance, so that it combines universal meaning with the hyparchical external substance (*concresco*). The receptive intellect became a “concrete” entity in a modern sense. Acting in the “concrete” mode, it created its own being *ex nihilo* that received the character of the first substance. Rufus recognized this hypostatized existence of the third kind in the mode “*consimiliter”* and “*concretive*” that makes its own kind of truth. The scenario of learned Latins imitates in sophistic manner (εἰδωλοποιὸν, *Soph*. 239d4) the real process of cognition in the CMDA given as *proportio* and *consimilitudo*. This collection of absurd hypostases assembled into objective unity of the modern person passes through Augustinian *memoria* to create the objective diacosmos of modernity. The modern identity memory of the concrete individual and of the entire Western civilization makes a mythical *locus* *specierum* of Porretan objective *informatio*, which has acquired the causal character of the first substances. This thesaurus of hypostases of the third kind determines the cognition of postmodernism; that is why the present world cannot do without this treasure. Therefore, in the age of nihilistic *informatio*, the present time shifted it into the planetary cloud of information given concretely and individually in the cloud databases. If, in the age of nihilistically accomplished modernity, a person loses this specific memory (both the individual one and the one in cloud form), then he is no longer a person of legal status and she or he becomes an objective nothing. Likewise, after the collapse of the cloud applications and databases, the entire information system of cognition, which is globally collating all *scibilia* of Western civilization, would be annihilated. The basis of all these epochal changes is the modern intellect in the mode of Rufus’s *informatio*. The concept of “*species obiecti exsistentis*” is linked to new kind of receptive intellect and truth. The modernists took the real thing for an objective entity and thereby founded a new worldview. The key factor that contributed to the emergence of objective modernity was the connection of the universal hylemorphism in Avicebron’s dualistic conception with Porretan system of hypostases. That metaphysic mixture was grafted on the system of division and classification of *tertium ens* in the Tree of Porphyry. The decisive impulse for the development of modernity came from the analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* that Grosseteste done at Oxford (ch. 3.1.1) and Rufus developed it later on (ch. 3.3.1). Rufus predicated a new *tertium ens* equipped with the pseudo-matter as an individual *concretum*. His analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* took at the same time being of the third kind as a universal entity in new “*resolutio*” that the father of modernity made after the Avicennian Aristotelianism.

Thereby a new being of the third kind was born. It was connected with the new type of cognition and with the new subject of cognition. The relation “subject—object” deals with quasi-material and hypostatized substances and species. It established the first objective vision of reality, which Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* brought about for the first time. The causality of universal medium in demonstrative proof was ensured by passive and active intellect of Latin Averroists, which became a hypostatized substance. This substance of the third kind created a new subject and an objective concept of being that corresponds to it in the mode of subjective and objective genitive (*species obiecti exsistentis*). Schools of Porretans and *Nominales* definitely expired since they were integrated into analytical philosophy under the aegis of Oxfordian Fallacy. Modernity took up *via Modernorum* opened by Rufus. All connoisseurs of the first Averroism at that time rejected his philosophical sophistry, which plunged the school of the first *Modernorum* into a fundamental crisis. After the lost battle at the Paris University, Rufus and Kilwardby came back to the Oxford University. Its scholars were influenced by twofold version of Oxfordian Fallacy based on Grosseteste’s and also Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics*. By introducing being and causality of the third kind into the definition of cognition according to Oxfordian Fallacy, external reality acquired the character of a sophistical simulacrum. New being of the third kind created by Rufus doubled the reality and the arrival of universal hylemorphism created a new first substance. Paranoid thinking of *Modernorum* accomplished this kind of *creatio ex nihilo*. Furthermore, it received a new “exsistence” as hyparchical quasi-substance and modernism brought the plurality of substances into the definition of man. In order to give this nonsense an academic character, the first *Moderni* at Oxford had to attack Aristotle at first and then the Commentator; he was condemned as heretic. As classic philosopher, Grosseteste rejected strange ideas of sophistic and Averroist *Modernorum* at Oxford. When they came to Paris, Alvernus and after them Albert and Bacon did the same. The quoted passages in preceding chapters commented that quarrels against the second Averroism. In the second round, the school of modern Porretans at Oxford started to interpret *De anima*. The univocal concept of being referred to human cognition within the framework of hypostatized *intellectus possibilis*. Rufus created a new version of *intellectus possibilis* as a fundamental simulacrum of modernity, which he sophistically attributed to Averroes. The carrier of this dubious *intellectus possibilis* became a new subject of the West. All those transformations of modern thinking brought about the eclipse of the first substance. In Paris, the second Averroism lost the battle at first; however, it became a fundamental power at Oxford through firmly established teaching based on Oxfordian Fallacy. Robert Kilwardby played a decisive role in the defense of first modernists at Oxford, since he shared with Rufus the same fate of modernist exile in Paris.

### 3.4.1 Objective Interpretation of *Second Analytics*

The philosophy of *Modernorum* emerged during the years 1235–45, when philosophers as Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventure did their studies in Paris. The nature of being, first substance, truth and existence changed in a dramatic way. A significant representative of the second Averroism became the Dominican Robert Kilwardby (†1279). The previous chapters have explained why he became a regent in the Oxford College already in 1245. The returnee Rufus, shattered by disputes in Paris, certainly found in him a comrade-in-arms. Rufus gained firm academic support at his alma mater under Kilwardby’s leadership. Thanks to his self-confidence and charisma, Rufus was a successful educator and influenced the next generation of local students. After the death of bishop Alvernus, he left for Paris for a second time. After obtaining a master’s degree, together with Bonaventure, he paved a path for modernism that led directly to present objectively given nihilism. Kilwardby’s incomplete commentary on *Second Analytics* basically agrees with Grosseteste’s and Rufus’s views. The work *Notule Libri Posteriorum* was written in 1237–47. Kilwardby, a Dominican friar, obtained a master’s degree probably about 1237 after starting his studies in Paris about 1231. He probably became a magister at the same time when Rufus’s modernist interpretation of science and metaphysics came through. According to *Second Analytics*, the analytic interpretation of the middle member of scientific proof in the mode “*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*” (*Anal. Post*. 73b27) became the basic model for other modernists (ch. 3.3.1). The key quotation from Rufus’s interpretation (*In APos* 1.2.S8.2) connects the first substance and hypostatized essence into a univocal determination. Analytically interpreted middle link of scientific proof completed the eclipse of the first substance. According to Aristotle, mathematical necessity is but in thought, that is, in the necessity generated by logical inferences. Rufus refused to take note of Aristotle’s prohibition of univocal predication of generality and necessity for real events. These produce the causality as real first substances. Rufus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy led from the astronomical eclipse of the Sun to the philosophical eclipse of the first substance in scientific cognition. Kilwardby’s paraphrase, which was written a few years later, presents an interpretation of *Second Analytics* similar to Rufus’s commentary. Writing *Notule* quotes the above-mentioned key part of *Analytics* (καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό, *Anal. Post*. 73b27) as follows.

“To the full recognition of universality belongs a determination given in the formulation ‘according to its own ipseity’ (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*) and the kind of determination that emerges from the necessity given ‘by itself’ (*quid addat supra* ‘*per se*’). Let us recall that in both modes of being necessity is given in two ways (*per se dupliciter est*). Nevertheless, with respect to each other, both necessities mutually relate in such a way that from the necessity in the hypostatized essence produces the necessity of the real given essence (*a quiditate unius egrediatur quiditas alterius*). Therefore, nothing further is added to this relation of two necessities that would function as a cause or effect with respect to one or the other in such a way as to add something additional to one or the other necessity.” [[471]](#footnote-471)

A difference in principle from Rufus is given in the explicit distinction between metaphysical and logical predication (*uterque modorum inherendi per se dupliciter est*) according to the twofold universality (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διτττῶς, *Anal. Post.* 84a12). It was not the case of Rufus. However, the quotation suggests that reduction of the first triad of axioms to the second is accomplished according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The metaphysical necessity given *per se* in the second substance lost the imposition of categorical meaning from the first substance. The determination of necessity and universality in the framework of logical abstraction and essence precedes the determination of metaphysical necessity, both done in the mode *per se*. The metaphysical necessity is taken from the causal effect of things in the world. From Aristotle’s point of view, it came to the disparition of hyparchical determination done in *Second Analytics* in the mode “*ex inmeditatis*” (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, 84a13). The following crucial part of the quotation lays the foundation of analytic deduction within the univocal *inesse*. Such proceeding makes the characteristic of Oxfordian Fallacy. Thanks to *univoce* conceived necessity, Kilwardby arbitrarily exchanged both kinds of necessity: the one given at the level of categorically predicated second substance and the second at the level of the essence conceived in the act of logical abstraction (*a quiditate unius egrediatur quiditas alterius*). The doubling of *quidditas* in an identical supposition is quite characteristic of the analytic school of the second Averroism. As in the case of Rufus, the objectivity arises immediately in mind of *illuminati*, because the past character of the real substance has disappeared (τό τί ἦν εἶναι). The act of the original donation of being, summed up in the metaphysical dative, changed into an objective donation of being (*dativus obiectivus*; OBJ III, ch. 4). Following Grosseteste and Rufus, yet another analytic interpretation of *Second Analytics* came that made it possible to exchange the first triad of principles of cognition for the second. The commentary reduces the relation to real substance to a mere logical inherence and abolishes the first trio of key axioms of cognition as superfluous. By reducing the six axioms of *Second Analytics* to three, a structure of scientific proof is similar to that of Grosseteste and Rufus. The world of Porretans contains a univocal species of reality and of cognition. Thanks to logical definition of essence, the concept of causality has a purely essential meaning on the level of universal concepts (*causa uel ut causatum respectu alterius*). The interchangeability of both kinds of universality defines causality in the mode of univocal necessity. Kilwardby does not need anything else to determine that kind of univocal necessity (*quod alteri aliquid tale superadditur*). The last sentence confirms that the same concept of causality of the third kind is present in writing *Notule* as it was in Rufus’s interpretation. After the doubling of hypostatized essences of the third kind, which are univocal in cognition and in reality, and after their equivalence, it came to fundamental deformation of causality in the scientific proof. The controversy generated a type of causality of the third kind, which is placed outside real effects of first substances due to logically conceived middle member of the syllogism. The analytic cognition of reality reduces the second substance to an essence placed outside the real causality of first substance. Kilwardby accomplished the same proceeding as Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* done in modern *inesse*. Because of this erroneous conception of inherence, Kilwardby belonged to the Parisian school of Grammarians and Latin sophists that Alvernus criticized (ch. 2.3.2).

Kilwardby set scientific cognition deductively at the level of universals that go to contingently given first substances. Causality at the level of first substance (*passio*) is transferred to the level of logical necessity, although Kilwardby verbally acknowledges that there is a twofold form of categorical scientific predication of universality. The univocal reduction of reality to a concept is accomplished in *Notule* by transforming causality in the middle member of the syllogism (*ex necessitate inesse*). It became a permanent essential property given outside the first substance (*semper inest ei cui inest, non tamen posset non inesse*, ibid p. 119.86–88). Reality makes quite a superfluous quality for modern *illuminati*. Accomplishment of pure thought needs the real material world only accidentally, as contingent accident. The modern science is established by reducing the six axioms of *Second Analytics* to three logical principles from the second triad. Kilwardby introduced a full model of analytic philosophy.

“If the real effect of first substances (*passio*) is proved, then the subordinate of syllogisms contains in principle both forms of necessity (*minor resolvitur proprie in duos modos per se*), also the necessity in the first and in the second principle of cognition or the necessity in the third and in the fourth principle of cognition.” [[472]](#footnote-472)

Once again, the analytic concept of the middle member is at play. There was a fatal exchange of the necessity given at the level of causality of the first substances and the necessity given by logical inference. The logical necessity comes from the supposition based on the essence; the middle member of deduction makes it interchangeable with the metaphysical necessity coming from the imposition based on real first substances (*minor resolvitur proprie in duos modos per se*). Mutual interchangeability makes the causality be indistinguishably applied in the mode *per se* to existent things and logical essences. Oxfordian analysts as Rufus and Kilwardby consider the necessity univocally in the realm of metaphysics and that of mathematics and logic. The school of Oxfordian Fallacy transformed categorical necessity into essential logical deduction. There is only a formal difference between Kildwardby and Rufus. Kildwardby knows that the double hyparchical necessity cannot be reduced to a logical-mathematical prediction of universality and necessity. The quotation of logical universality, however, unifies metaphysical and logical sense as hyparchical and *per se* given (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, *Anal. Post*. 84a13). In this his definition differs from a purely logical predication of Rufus made in the mode of universally conceived predication of geometry (κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ, *Anal. Post*. 73b26–27). But this difference is only cosmetic. Due to Oxfordian Fallacy, there is interchangeability of two types of necessity given *per se*. Both modes of predication are mutually convertible, since they make the essential predication done in the framework of analytic *resolutio*. The final level of cognition of categorical necessity is given in the second triad of axioms of cognition (*tertium et quartum*), which can be converted into hyparchical necessity defined by the first triad of axioms (*secundum et primum*). The same view took Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* (ch. 3.3.1). The universal essence is in the case of the definition of the triangle identical with the hyparchical essence of the triangle. Rufus made out of it the erroneous conclusion that it is possible to predicate the universal mathematical essence in the context of physical causality. The doubling of causality copies Porphyry’s Neoplatonic doubling of being (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Oxfordian Fallacy determined the causality by the essence conceived in the mode *per prius* and the knowledge of real substances is taken in the accidentally given mode *per posterius*. The swapping of the first triad of principles for the second produced a new version of Avicenna’s metaphysics that created the objectivity in mind of *illuminati*. Kilwardby’s commentary invented categorial predication in the mode *per se* in terms of the essence (*quod est*) and abolished the primacy of hyparchical necessity given as an act of the real thing (*quo est*).

“The number of modes of necessity is given as follows: In the determination of the nature of the thing there are only these three kinds, namely, essence (*quod est*), objective existence (*quod inest*), and the cause of this objective existence (*causa propter quam inest*).” [[473]](#footnote-473)

Key is the new concept of “*inesse*” that must be conceived in the mode of “exsistence” introduced by Rufus (ch. 3.3.2). The objective existence (*quod inest*) is fundamentally different from classic act of being as *actus essendi* (*quo est*). There is no metaphysic in a sense of Averroes that investigates the unity of being as “substance *qua* substance.” The commentary determines existence of real things through formally defined essences. Conceived in the nominalistic modes “*semel—semper*,” the act of Porretan *exsistere* transfers the eternal essence into contingent actualization in reality. The quotation takes causality univocally in reality and in logical judgment. Bacon rejected it as a cardinal philosophical error of modernism (ch. 3.2). The first Dominican modernist, like Franciscan Rufus, abolished the first three presuppositions of complete scientific *demonstratio*, which concerned the being of the first substance (*ex veris, et primis et inmediatis*). Kilwardby radically changed the interpretation of *Second Analytics* by reducing six basic principles of cognition to a mere three, which some contemporary commentators noted.[[474]](#footnote-474) Albert the Great criticized this fundamental metaphysical error of Oxford analysts as well. At the same time, he finished his studies in Paris and probably lived with Kilwardby in the Dominican College in the monastery of St. James.[[475]](#footnote-475) Following Rufus, modernist Kilwardby in fact carried out a Jacobin revolution in metaphysical thought, which he accomplished during his rectorship at Oxford after the year 1245. He continued to control and guard authoritatively the path of modernism as the Archbishop of Canterbury until his death. After him, the modern Franciscan Pecham did the same, being a twofold dignitary in the same way. The analytic interpretation grasps the meaning of *Second Analytics* for deduction of scientific proof in purely formal terms that are based on modern univocity of being. The conclusions determined by formal triad of principles replaced metaphysical necessity and real causality with the logical necessity (*que insunt ex necessitate*).[[476]](#footnote-476) The determination “*ex necessitate*” has quite an equivalent and ambivalent character in modernity. The objective sophistry abolished important distinctions found in *Second Analytics*. The mentioned term of “*inesse*” is not determined in the mode *per prius* by real existence of first substances. The hyparchical value is given in authentic Aristotelianism as a first principle by imposition from the first substance (*inmediate*). The worldview entrails the univocal character of logical and mathematical necessity, which is dominated by Grosseteste’s analytic principle *inmediate* (ch. 3.1.1). The univocal form of mathematical abstraction combines both logical necessity and action at the level of first real substance. From the point of view of the first Averroism and Abelard’s logical school following Boethius, the case of learned Latins presented a typical example of errors called “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*.” Through this metaphysical fallacy, which had been objectively constituted in the environment of Oxfordian Fallacy, the extinct schools of Porretans and *Nominales* passed into the thinking of analytic modernity. The transition of modern logic to modern metaphysics let passed Porretan interpretations of *Second Analytics* into the framework of Avicennist metaphysics. The comitation of Porretan hypostases such as Philip’s transcendentalia (*bonum, unum, verum, ens*) joined Avicenna’s formalization made as “*ens inquantum ens*.” That new predication was born in schools of *Logica Modernorum* according to the metaphysics of *Nominales*. This change took place first around the year 1235 when Grosseteste’s introduced the formal logic at Oxford (ch. 3.1.2) and then in Paris, when first modern *illuminati* like Rufus lectured there. The cited writings of Bacon and Albert prove that the school of Grammarians criticized by Alvernus moved to the model of analytic philosophy in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy sometime after 1240. The term “*resolutio*” played a key role in the transformation of science from Aristotelian natural science to analytic speculation. Modernists adapted it after the school of Philip the Chancellor (ch. 2.3.2) that created the first conversion of transcendentals. This conversion plays a key role in the transformation of science from Aristotelian natural inquiry to analytic speculation. The reduction of being to the highest genera joined Porretans and analytic deduction of meaning based on the Porphyry’s Tree. The dialectical speculation of Porretans classified the simulacrum of reality according to Platonic “διαίρεσις” taken from the dialogue *Sophistes* and imposed on schools of Porretans and *Nominales*, then in decline. The modern *resolutio* moved from the genus to the individual using the hypostatized predication of *Categories* known since 1230.

Kilwardby presented the division of universals up to the indivisible part of meaning (*individuum*) in his early work on *Categories* making use of hypostatized matter (*materia habet divisionem in possibilem et est dicibile simpliciter*).[[477]](#footnote-477) By introducing the universal hylemorphism, he reduces the first substance to the universal genus and the causal effect to the accident. This procedure is quite in accordance with Avicennist line of interpreting the *Categories* as logical writing. John Pagus already conceives the term “categories” in univocal relation with the term “genus” around 1230. He proceeded in the context of deduction according to Porphyry’s Tree in categorial predication from the highest genus to lower units of universal meaning (ch. 3.1.2). The opposite procedure took the predication of hypostases of all kinds (*collectio*, *collecta*) to build up a new science of Latin sophists that starts from the individual to reach the highest genera of being. The division was replaced by Porretan *collecta* that was predicated in the new concept of *Categories*. Modernists conceived it as logical writing to make Avicennist comitation of hypostases. The predication of the middle member of deduction was done as hypostatized causal essence predicated as a Porretan individual. It displaced hyparchic construction of the scientific proof based on the real causality. See Rufus’s thesis “*homo humanat*” (ch. 3.3.4), which led to his inglorious departure from the University of Paris. There prevailed at that time the last generation of critical and therefore completely antimodern thinkers. From the scientific cognition fell out the primacy of the first actual substance that Aristotle regarded as actualized existence given primarily *per se* and *simpliciter*. There is a difference between Aristotelian interpretation of the principle “*inmediate*” according to Albert and the Avicennist’s “*inmediate*” that Grosseteste introduced. Rufus is the founder of modernity, but by no means its *spiritus movens*. This role was assumed by Dominican Kilwardby at Oxford and by Franciscan Bonaventure in the University of Paris. We have interpreted the introduction of the first Averroism on example of Albert’s polemic with Kilwardby made in the work *De homine*. He begins the first question by rejecting Kilwardby’s analytic sophistry (ch. 2.4.1). The Dominican modernist helds but formal principles concerning premises in the deductive syllogism. The premises are prior to the conclusion, they are better known than the conclusion, and their causes must be recognized. The causality of the first real substance coincides with the essential definition that makes its formal reduplication. According to analytic interpretation of *Second Analytic*,the sequence of six principles looks as follows.

“The succession of principles holds because the first three are conceived separately (*tres primi sumuntur absolute*) and the fourth is given by reduplication of the cause (*reduplicatione causae*). Then the first two principles belong firmly to the deductive syllogism and they fall into the category of universally recognized entities (*cadunt in simpliciter scibilibus*), but not the third. Further, the first principle is more essential than the second (*primus est essentialior quam secundus*), and like this, they are all mutually related.” [[478]](#footnote-478)

The first three principles of cognition mentioned in the text are given separately (*absolute*) from the second pair related to real causality of first substances. The fundamental error consists in the assertion that the principle given by real causality can be duplicated *ex inmediatis* by doubling the cause in the deductive judgment (*reduplicatione causae*). Grosseteste introduced this version of Oxfordian Fallacy and Rufus confirmed it (*medium et causa idem*, ch. 3.3.1). The reality of the first substance was sophistically included in the scientific interpretation. Taken from the point of view of the first Averroism and according to *Second Analytics*, such proceeding confirms fundamental incomprehension of the scientific proof. Causality cannot be doubled, because it is hyparchical real being; therefore, it can be but adequately predicted. The modern science conceived in that way acquired an absolute character and became the new idol of the Latin West in the mode of sophistic simulacrum.

The principle “*inmediate*” refers to existence of first substances in reality. Kilwardby’s fourth principle of cognition is actually superfluous, because it contingently duplicates universal necessity *per se* in the mode of univocity (*quartus cum reduplicatione causae*). The next sentence clearly separates the first two principles from the third (*tertius autem non sic*). We have commented on the reason for separation of the first triad from the second in connection with Grosseteste’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy (ch. 3.1.1). Kilwardby radicalizes Grosseteste’s teaching by taking Rufus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy. He introduced the logical causality into the middle link of the syllogism. The direct insight into the first principles is essentially given through the second triad and determines the first two principles of cognition in the first triad (*cadunt in simpliciter scibilibus*). Kilwardby completely abolished the first triad and replaced it with the second. Rufus did it for the first time. Let us recall the changed value of Rufus’s *scibile* that established the first kind of objective being made by concrete predication (ch. 3.3.4). The scientific proof made by imposition from reality (*ex inmediatis*) postulates the necessity only in the mode *per posterius*, that is, with regard to essential form of the necessity given in the priority mode (*primus est essentialior quam secundus*). The whole architecture of analytic necessity is then completed in the mode of modern *ordinatio* (*sic ordinantur ad invicem*). Let us see the role of *ordinatio* in Scotus’s system of objective metaphysics that bears that notion as the title (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.3). The third principle determines cognition at the level of empirical “*scientia*”. Contingent necessity in the deductive judgment relates to causal effects of real substances. However, such search is carried out only by Grosseteste’s weak intellect (*intellectus debilis*, ch. 3.1.2). The strong intellect of modern *intelligentia spiritualis* becomes the solar intellect that provides by itself for objective parousia of being. Academic *illuminati* as Kilwardby and Bonaventura adopted the two-stage view of science. Albert attacked it in principle by defending actual “*esse ratum*” against universal “*esse debilis*” (ch. 2.4.3). Following Rufus, Kilwardby radicalized the eclipse of real substances; he turned that epochal fallacy into a theoretical system. The introduction of Porretan hypostases into the scheme of scientific cognition completed the exposure of the being from behind and introduced a scientific deduction from the direction of the permanent essence. The reduplication of causality and essence has a key significance in the mode of logical univocity of various types of necessity for the hermeneutics of objectivity. Let’s take a look at the entire structure of scientific cognition according to *Notule*.

“In the premises of the deductive proof, the effects in the recognized subject are established if the definition of this effect is given in the middle link of the syllogism, and if the middle link expresses the real cause of this effect. I argue that the general part of syllogism contains the fourth principle of cognition, because it compares the cause to what is the effect of the cause (*comparat causam ad causatum*); it is interchangeable with the first principle of cognition (*modus primus conversus*). In the second part of syllogism, the causality is given in two ways. The cause of real effects is expressed in the middle link of judgment (*causa enim passionis per medium expressa*) or it relates to the subject (*vel est aliquid subiecti*). If causality is given in the subject, then the general part of syllogism is included in the particular subordinate clause, or the subordinate clause is given as a result of the real effect; then it is done in the second way.” [[479]](#footnote-479)

The middle link of the deductive proof is given in two modes, which, according to the essence given *per prius*, are placed in the new logic of cognition. The cause is generally given, and it is at this level of causality that the first and universal level of deduction is defined. It is Grossesteste’s cognition through intuition of first principles (*intellectus*). This cognition has a hyparchical function in Avicenna’s metaphysics of essence. The new metaphysics replaced the first science of the Commentator that upholds the primacy of first real substances. The key is hidden in the thesis that compares the cause with its effects (*comparat causam ad causatum*). The term “*causatum*” does not express any univocal relationship with the hyparchical first substance and its causality. Generic meaning of essence has replaced the unique causality that is given in reality. In contrast, the original of *Second Analytics* formulates the scientific proof according to actual events. We must follow the order of principles that is established by the metaphysical dative, then from the first triad of principles to the second. In this case, necessity given *per se* becomes unique, as it moves in the correspondant manner from reality to the deductive syllogism (*demonstratio*). It is necessary to follow precisely the metaphysical and univocal imposition (*Anal. Post*. 84a13) at first to arrive at the universal and logically univocal supposition (*Anal. Post*. 84a14) afterwards. Kilwardby turned the scheme of scientific proof upside down. Once again, Godfrey’s epigram about nominalists applies, since they project generic products of their own thinking into the real world (*cum sit tot generibus rerum mundus plenus*, ch. 1.6). The fourth principle of cognition is therefore superfluous in the mode *inmediate* and is included in the first universal part (*in maiori propositione est quartus modus*). The status of the first substance only secondary confirms the universal necessity *per se* that is predicated with regard to Porretan essences. Aristotelian basic principle “*inmediate*” is transformed into Grosseteste’s analytical principle “*inmediate*” and it is determined from behind, from the direction of general logical causality (*comparat causam ad causatum*). The term “*causatum*” is understood as transcendental concept of Neoplatonism in the univocal mode “*esse ad*.” We have discussed it in connection with Simplicius’s terms of relation and habitus. Categorical meaning has shifted to the essence in the mode *simpliciter* (πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). The causality of real astronomic eclipse and abstract mathematics is considered univocal by using the term “*causatum*.” It is the typical scheme of Oxfordian Fallacy that abolished hyparchical value of the first substance and the categorical imposition of causality from real first substances.

Modernity does not need the metaphysical dative, because the meaning of being come from the cognizing subject. Aristotle explicitly mentions that the necessity given in reality is different in comparison with the logical necessity (ἅλλον τρόπον, *Anal. Post*. 73b10). When the animal’s throat is cut, death necessarily occurs, which is subsequently determined by the universal metaphysical statement, that is, through the deductive scientific proof. The scientific explanation exists because the eclipse of the real Sun and the real Moon exists as a physical body. Modern sophistry bypassed this distinction between the unique reality and the universal logical predication. The corpse is specific entity from a Porretan point of view; it is also the same human being as the hyparchical living person. The principle “*inmediate*” presents the truth as correspondence of reality and intellect, as exposure of being from the front. The analytical interpretation says the contrary: the process of eclipsing is determined in the primary mode by theoretical science; its occurrence in reality is only a contingent event and therefore of little interest, being a mere accident of theoretical speculation. Science is not bound in the mode *per prius* to hyparchical substances and to causal and actual effects in reality. But the middle link of the proof, at the lower level of empirical *scientia* includes the causality of real substances. This second type of cognition (*secundus modus*) has a scientific validity, albeit limited to lower intellect that empirically recognizes in the mode of Aristotelian abstraction. Then *demonstratio* applies in the framework of contingent cognition, which corresponds to Grosseteste’s *scientia*. Both modes of cognition are united by analytically conceived necessity. According to the modern *resolutio*, the necessity is taken *univoce* in order to connect the first triad of cognitive principles with the second one. The bearer of cognition is not the real first substance, but the Porretan essence, defined as being of the third kind (*aliquid subiecti*). The scripture *Notule* confirms the analytical interpretation by quoting and interpreting the key part of *Second Analytics* that deals with the astronomical eclipse. The following quotation sets out the complete version of analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* established about the year 1245.

“If the formal definition of the subject (*diffinitio formalis subiecti medium*) lies in the scientific proof, which completes the real causality, and is also contained in the middle link, as some people claimed (*sicut putant quidam*); then, the second mode of scientific predication is given in the second part of syllogism. The real causality is thus stated with regard to the definition of the subject (*predicatur passio de diffinitione subiecti*). Then, the comparison of causality with regard to the real subject and with regard to the definition of the subject is the same (*eadem est comparatio passionis ad subiectum et ad subiecti diffinitionem*).” [[480]](#footnote-480)

The quotation confirms that someone before him (*quidam*) has already reduced the middle link of the scientific judgment to a mere essential definition (*diffinitio formalis subiecti medium*). We have shown that Grosseteste and Rufus had done it before Kilwardby. Rufus established the essence as the basis of the middle link of deduction and radically changed the statute of statements *per se*. Instead of causally acting first substance, the fundament became the causality of “acting” logical essence that received the univocal hyparchical status (*ipsum medium*).[[481]](#footnote-481) The substitution of existence for the essence and the doubling of causality were major reasons to establish the above-mentioned “*opinio Latinorum*” that Albert and Bacon criticized in principle. It was clear to representatives of the first Averroism that sophistic Latins as Rufus and Kilwardby no longer needed real first substances for scientific proof. Modern causality is deduced from universally given properties of essences considered in the mode of analytical logic. Modern *intelligentia spiritualis* at Oxford developed this logic. For those *illuminati*, it is true the first universal maxim of deductive syllogism predicts the necessary imposition for scientific proof. That “imposition” includes in modes *per se* the immanent form of causality in the form of “*causatum*.” Therefore, the imposition from reality is necessary only accidentally. The second part of syllogism confirms in the mode of contingencies the already given analytical insight into pure essences. The empirical science given by imposition therefore belongs to the lower part of scientific rationality (*scientia*) that determines weak (*debilis*) mind of Aristotelians. Now it is obvious why Oxford *illuminati* from the ranks of local Franciscans and Dominicans did not need that “stupid” form of classical “meta-physics” of Aristotle and Averroes to make their analytical form of science. Grosseteste was horrified, since the modernists that he personally educated, understood Aristotle through “remarkable blindness and arrogance” (*mira cecitate et presumcione*), especially the writing *Second Analytics*. Modern sophistry distorted meaning of *Corpus Aristotelicum* taken out of dubious Latin translations. Grosseteste criticized this approach in the quoted quotation (*putantes se limpidius intelligere et verius interpretare Aristotilem ex litera latina corrupta*, ch. 3.1.2). Perhaps one day, the original version of the Latin translation of *Second Analytics* would emerge, out of which Rufus and Kilwardby built up the full version of Oxfordian Fallacy that Grosseteste rejected. The scripture *Notule* comprehends principles of cognition in the mode of equivocal universality. As a result, the writing abolished the basic plan of *Second Analytics*. Aristotle distinguished the science related to reality and the science related to mathematical abstraction. Kilwardby reduces both modes of the universality to the univocal character of necessity. Before him, Rufus had done it in the same way (ch. 3.3.1).

The work *Notule* presents analytical thinking of first Oxford modernists. They related necessity given *per se* equivocally to three different types of necessity (reality, imposition, supposition). Aristotle made a clear distinction between a logical, essential and existential predication (*Anal. Post*. 84a11–14). Modernity simply passed over this fundamental distinction. However, this model forms the basis of truth as correspondence. The modernists merged metaphysical and logical necessity into objective predication. In the second step, they introduced a paranoid model of truth as assimilation that manipulates various kinds of *tertium ens*. Analytical unity of being corresponds to the Neoplatonic nature of Pagus’s commentary on *Categories* (ch. 3.1.2). Empirical cognition given *per posterius* does not have the same value in the Neoplatonism as the effectivity of forms given by illumination in the mode *per prius*.

“All parts and the totality are valid, because the principle ‘by itself’ also applies in the predication ‘about all’ and ‘universal’ and also ‘by itself.’ Moreover, the universal form of predication ‘about everything’ and ‘by itself’ belongs to the general definition, it is determined in the order *per prius*.” [[482]](#footnote-482)

The quotation considers the necessity *univoce* in both directions of proof. Moreover, it directs the exposure of being from behind, from the direction of the diacosmos of subsistent forms. The thinking takes the path of Neoplatonic catabasis, since it combines the necessity given in reality with the higher form of necessity given by the second triad of cognitive principles. They determine the logical conclusion of scientific proof (*« per se » addit supra « de omni » et « universale »*). The universal triad of principles (*in diffinitione universalis*) progresses from the higher necessity to the lower level, because it is given in the mode of predication *per prius*. Made in the mode “*semel—semper*,” the essential definition of necessity primarily and fundamentally determines all other forms of necessity (*prius determinatur*). Grosseteste’s metaphysical ambiguity (*aliquantum obscura*, ch. 3.1.1) considered still the categorical and mathematical necessity to be an uncertain fundament due to the distinction between the first and second triad of the recognition principles. That hesitation disappeared completely in the sophistry of Rufus and Kilwardby. Oxfords *illuminati* removed original ambiguity of the imposition taken from first substances. The light of modern solar intellect established a new theory of truth according to the Toledo school. Toletans worked out a kind of Neoplatonic interpretation of Avicenna and Averroes. Modernists carried out the eclipse of the first substance by replacing hyparchic function given by the principle “*inmediate*” with univocal convertibility between different types of necessity given *per se*. The necessity includes the chaos of undifferentiated meaning:

1. the existing external first substance;
2. the imposition of real causality that is recognized through bodily senses and is predicted in *medium* of scientific proof;
3. the metaphysical predication of hyparchical first substance that is stated through the second categorical substance;
4. the logical and mathematical deduction of meaning based on the essence.

All these types of necessity are given *univoce*, in virtue of intuition dealing with objective necessity settled in modern mind. Bacon criticized this sophistry immediately after its emergence; let us see the quoted commentary on *Metaphysics* (ca. 1245). The formal necessity of logic and mathematics is not the same as the necessity of singular external substances. Bacon in vain explained to modernists that real actions of hyparchical substances make foundation of truth as correspondence between mind and real causality in the world. That correspondence is expressed in the universal statement by the middle member of deductive syllogism (*hoc est universale per causalitatem*, ch. 3.2). The causality primarily operates at the level of the first substances; the logical predication follows it at the level of essential and universal statements. According to Bacon, the real causality must be stated as metaphysical and categorical necessity that establishes the scientific demonstration. Latin sophists and representants of contemporary analytical philosophy do not take note of these differences that establish various kinds of universality and necessity.

Kilwardby and Rufus founded the epoch of modernism and postmodernism by introducing the full analytical version of Oxfordian Fallacy. Due to the eclipse of the astronomical eclipse, the modern destruction of the first substance was completed in an epochal new manner. Hyparchical determination of the astronomical eclipse given in *Second Analytics* has completely disappeared. The imposition of necessity from reality has been replaced by the supposition of necessity given in the mind of *illuminati*. Univocal predication of being introduced the collection of accidents and substances (*collectio*) as replacement of the original unity of being. Modernists started to deduce the original status of the world out of universal principles of cognition (*resolutio*) that entail hypostatized forms of reality (*scibile*). Through this mythological assertion and through the transfer of all principles to a common basis, the foundation of future *metaphysica generalis* was laid out, which determines the contemporary knowledge of the West. Enlightened thinking of modern *illuminati* climbs up and down the mystical Jacob’s ladder of being in the Neoplatonic mode of catabasis and anabasis. A typical example of scientific sophistry based on univocal form of necessity shows following quotation from the *Notule*. It introduces modern analytical version of the proof from immediately given causes (*demonstratio ex inmediatis*). Let us consider the first pattern of modern worldview, which came again in the sentence of Husserl “to things themselves.”

“If we look for how this mode establishes scientific cognition, we must say that it always belongs to the first part of the deductive syllogism; either as the cognition of real causality in the knowing subject or as the definition of the material thing is presented by formal determination. The reason of cognition is the upper clause in the syllogistic proof, since the cause is always separately and directly stated (*semper est subiectum precisa et inmediata causa predicati*). Therefore, I call this procedure ‘proof from the immediately given causes’ (*demonstratio ex inmediatis*). The first and second mode is always included in the conclusion. Where the material subject is entailed in the proof in virtue of the form, therefore, following the first mode, it is included in the conclusion. Where it is deduced according to effects of real substances, therefore it is stated according to the second mode. The individual examples are given only secondarily.” [[483]](#footnote-483)

In the universal part of proposition (*in maiori propositione*), the materiality of substance is included in the formal definition (*diffinitio materialis per formalem*). From the point of view of causality, this subject is completely separated from the real, causally acting substance (*subiectum precisa et inmediata causa predicati*). Kilwardby, in an absolutely precise way, canceled meaning of the metaphysical dative. The effect of the real substance through the middle link of the judgment (*passio de subiecto*) represents only a special case of the general rule (*cadit in conclusione secundus modus*). In the same way, schools of *Nominales* included hypostatized species in the division of universals à la Porphyry under the univocal character of the genus. The effects of real substances are reduced to being examples of the general rule (*exempla ponentur post*). Kilwardby makes use of Avicenna’s comitation of hypostases to put them in the framework of Aristotelian predication that establishes the demonstrative proof of science. The middle link ensures the deduction primarily according to universals (*incidit in conclusione primus modes*) and only secondarily according to the real causality (*modus secundus*). Rufus carried out the same reduction of the first substance to the species and worked out the same version of scientific proof (ch. 3.3.2). In the final, the analytical philosophy of *Modernorum* makes scientific cognition only by an insight into essences conceived *univoce*. They deduce from them the modern “exsistence” of real things and their causal effects. Like Rufus, Kilwardby canceled existence of the external world in the complete form of analytic *epokhē*. Both modernists abandoned the uniqueness of the categorical predication given in terms of real causal effects of first substances. Grosseteste rejected such proceeding a decade earlier, since he was aware of certain ambiguity (*aliquantum obscura*) in such Aristotelian interpretation of *Categories* and *Second* *analytics*. The next wave of representatives of the Second Averroism produced a full version of the Oxford Fallacy. Kilwardby founded academic modernism by modifying Rufus’s doctrine to look like a true metaphysics. Both modernists failed to distinguish between different types of necessity, which was a fatal error. The writing of *Second Analytics* postulates the distinction between the imposition and the supposition as a fundamental premise of scientific knowledge that investigates real events. Descartes and Husserl reiterated the closure of the first substances and produced a postmodern version of the aforementioned philosophy of *Modernorum*.

Let’s summarize the development of the first phase of Oxfordian Fallacy. The first three commentaries on *Second Analytics* in the years 1230–45 (Grosseteste, Rufus, Kilwardby) presented modern interpretations of scientific cognition. All three representatives of modernism created a scientific deduction that did not need the external reality as the fundament of knowledge. The thinking of first *Modernorum* constructs real events in the mode of evident logical certainty through the predication called “*in artificialibus*,” instead of recognizing the world primarily in the mode of truth as correspondence. Moreover, using the universal hylemorphism, the modernists endowed their paranoiac thinking with the objective form of hylemorphic being. They created a doppelganger of reality. It is no wonder that Bacon as critical Aristotelian considered the thinking of his contemporaries at Oxford completely insane. However, modernity knows very well that the truth does not determine the course of contemporary West, but the inexorable progress given as complete appropriation of reality. Therefore, it was necessary to bring this worldview into its present form, called *metaphysica generalis*. The universal paranoia of modernists became the normal thinking, since classical common sense ceased to determine modern speculation. The modern version of truth globally assimilated the entire doctrine of so-called “philosophy “ in the objective “*semel—semper*” mode of truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. Oxfords *illuminati* founded a New Age of the modernity. In the last times, such thinking came to its culmination through absolute knowledge of Hegel, evident phenomenology of Husserl and through nihilistic rule of today’s banksters. Kilwardby inaugurated modern scientific revolution at the same time when Rufus defended his interpretation of *De anima* in Paris (ch. 3.3.4). Bishop Alvernus made criticism of both modernists. Representatives of the first Averroism based on the Sicilian school (Albert, Bacon) ridiculed them at the University of Paris. Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* (1245) represented collective defense of the entire school of Oxford modernists when they were expelled from Paris.

Sophistry of both protagonists of Oxfordian Fallacy (Rufus, Kilwardby) proceeds in two steps. The universals of the type “*homo*” are only in thought, in this point Aristotle and Averroes are right. However, there is a vision of essences according to Avicenna and Grossseteste that keeps the eidetic individuality of essences. Rufus and Kilwardby proclaimed that this insight of universality entails a univocal causal efficacy made in the essential mode (*causatum*). According to Avicenna, the causality of universal essences establishes the scientific proof in *Second Analytics*. Before them, it was reserved only for the causality of first substances that exist in hyparchical mode *per prius*. Since there are real solar and lunar eclipses, we can create a universal deductive proof made *per posterius*. Aristotle, Averroes and the first Averroism knew very well that thinking does not create reality. We can universally keep it and predict the passing substances in scientific and true statements. The school of the second Averroism changed the interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Aristotle fundamentally distinguishes different modes of necessity and universality that make statements of metaphysics and mathematics. The predication related to hyparchical position of first substances does not have the same kind of necessity as essential predication of geometry or mathematics. These modes of predication are separated from the world of the first substances due to formal and logical abstraction. According to Aristotle and the first Averroism, logic must subordinate itself to metaphysics, because the future naval battle cannot be determined truthfully. These axioms have already been partially modified by Grosseteste and, after him, by the analytical school of young Augustinian Avicennists at Oxford. They were inspired by Porretans and by logical schools of *Nominales*. Kilwardby considers three basic principles of cognition that refers to causality of hyparchical first substances (*ex primis et veris et inmediatis*) to be given *univoce* with regard to other three logical principles. The second triad of principles results from logical essences, which entail a necessity given in itself (*per se*). The first triad of axioms recognizing from reality was abolished. It belongs to the realm of empirical *scientia*, and not to the realm of higher science, which analytical *illuminati* built up after the year 1245 at Oxford. This fatal event of thinking (*Ereignis*) related to newly defined metaphysic being. The school of *sophistae Latini* in Oxford became the godfather of the nihilistic metaphysics in the West based on universal hylemorphism. New *Lichtung* of truth and untruth concerning the Western science was created by the fact that *illuminati* have a direct insight into hypostatic first principles. According to the first Averroism, only subjects endowed with a substantial form of *intellectus agens* have such kind of intuition of pure hyparchical formes. These are angels and cosmic intelligences. The modern *illuminati* turned man into a fallen angel, who a few centuries later became a totalitarian animal that followed the order of historial necessity. It was brought into being by this metaphysical error. Bishop Alvernus vigorously opposed such docetic and gnostic deviations of *Modernorum*. Following the *philosophus nobilissimus*, he defended the fundamental unity of the person given as a hylemorphic first substance. Human cognition is therefore determined by hyparchical existence of causally acting first substances. The modern confessors of Neoplatonic solar intellect established the founding myth of modernity and postmodernity that stands until today. The newly conceived intellect is given directly in man as an independent substance; it corresponds directly and in true univocal manner to what is and to what is not. The modern intellect considers the totality of being directly and universally. Modernity divides and assembles everything into the realm of *scibilia* made by special sciences according to this or that form of difference. Such kind of *resolutio* and *collectio* founded nihilistic epoch of metaphysics based on dancing of structural differences that do not distinguish between words and things (Foucault, Derrida). In the epoch of the nihilistic form of eidetic and analytical wolrdview, Aristotle’s definition of truth became superfluous. There is no mediation between things in reality and universal cognition in thinking. This mediation is categorically predicted in the mode of universal correspondence. It states what is hyparchical being that exists as such, and what it is not. The mind of *Modernorum* needs contingent of reality only as secondary confirmation of knowledge known beforehand. Reality provides an accidental confirmation of eternal correctness and credibility (*rectitudo*) of objective truth established by evident objective deduction (*certitudo*). The truth of *illuminati* follows speculative reflection of species assimilated in their universal equality (*coaequatio*). Rufus and Kilwardby established a unified kind of necessity in the mode *per se* given *absolute*, that is, separate from the secondary proceedings of proof that follow empirical reality. Objective modernists as academicians were settled until the year 1250 only in Oxford. It was there that all basic conditions were put together to facilitate the emergence of modern *mathesis universalis*. It produced the metaphysical fallacy (*Irrtum*) that characterizes the contemporary Western science.

### 3.4.2 Creation of Modern Science

Hermeneutic archaeology of objectivity considers the reduction of real existence to evident vision of universal essences in hypostatized intellect as a fundamental sign of modernity and postmodernity. The relation to hyparchical reality (the first triad) was replaced by formally given principles of logic (the second triad). Kilwardby led modern science out of the metaphysical-theological limbo of mind, where it had been waiting patiently for a historical manifestation (ch. 1.6). Bonaventure gives the new objective science a place of honor in biblical ontotheology. Kilwardby suspended the critical thinking to become another Latin sophist of Oxford; his Dominican colleagues noticed it quite well. Albert and Aquinatus defended metaphysical abstraction against the modernists like Kilwardby and Pecham because it would invalidate the unity of first science at the level of first real substance. The inevitable consequence was the death of modern God and the advent of modern humanism that put the living human person and the corpse on the same level of metaphysics. Such perspectives fundamentally trubled Christian thinkers from the school of the first Averroism right at the birth of modernism.

The decisive struggle in the Order of Preachers took place at the University of Paris. When Albert became the regent master at University, Kilwardby had to return to Oxford (1245). During Aquinatus’s second stay in Paris, Kilwardby’s follower Pecham returned to the bastion of analytic modernism as well (1271). The transfer of objectivity to ontotheological structure of metaphysics replaced classical metaphysics with scientific logic. Rufus’s objective sophistry and Kilwardby’s objective metaphysics became moving power of the Latin West. Modern mind directly contemplates essences as *medium* of demonstrative deduction. Hypostatized causality of logical essences makes fundaments of the deductive proof. Rufus put mathematics at the level of acting first substances that establish real causality in the world. Metaphysical error called “*petitio principii*” is based on the fact that Oxford analysts did not see any difference between the inference of conclusions in the framework of logical deduction and the predication of causal actions dealing with first substances. The identity of categorical and logical necessity rendered the middle member of scientific proof (*medium*) obscure. It transformed the univocity made by the imposition into an analogical similarity of everything made as logical supposition. Then the source of knowledge is only the enlightened mind of *illuminati*. They assimilate and compare all known beings of the third kind. To this nonsense came Neoplatonic interpretation of *Categories* according to *Nominales*. They were active in Oxford (John Pagus) and Paris (Nicolas of Paris) in the school of *Logica Modernorum*. The modernists, equipped with the analytic philosophy and the transcendental categorical predication, set out on a broad and comfortable path of metaphysics built on Avicenna’s univocity of being. The categorial propositions acquired a new meaning at the level of second substance. Propositions about hypostatized being and properties became the part of hyparchical reality. Classical Aristotelianism predicated them as accidents (habitus, quantity) or worked with them in generically different category of logical and mathematical operations based on logical necessity and logical abstraction. We analyze differences between both schools in the dispute over twofold truth of substance between Bacon and Kilwardby after 1250 at Oxford (ch. 3.4.3). Rufus and Kilwardby as creators of full-blooded analytic version of Oxfordian Fallacy began to develop new possibilities established by reductionist interpretations of *Second Analytics*. Both learned Latins had to leave Paris after the year 1245 and Kilwardby became the Rector at Oxford. The school of second Averroism gained quite a valuable member, since Kilwardby played an active role in the condemnation of the first Averroism at Oxford in April 1277. The school of the second Averroism was officially established at Oxford during Kilwardby’s activity at the University dating to year 1245. In the same period, modernist Rufus returned to Oxford and began his lectures in the year 1250. Therefore, between 1245–50, the modernist school was officially established at the Oxford University. At the same time, masters in Paris considered it a complete debacle of reason.

Directly apprehended essence does not need any additional recognition made by Aristotelian abstraction from the direction of real things, neither the predication based on the causality coming from real first substances. Therefore, those three cognitive principles explicitly emphasized by Aristotle ceased to be necessary for the demonstrative proof that *Second Analytics* ascribes to first substances. Reality is recognized outside the first substance by the fact that the existence is univocally reduced to the universal essence. Eidetic intuition of modernity makes coincide the existing thing with its primary and immediate evidence. That premise of Descartes and Husserl is necessary to postulate *philosophia prima* as the evidence of pure *cogito*. Postmodernism completed Grosseteste’s intuition of being in enlightened intellect (*intellectus purus potest in his defigere intuitum*, ch. 3.1.1). The vision of pure essences as hypostatic being confirmed the assimilation theory of truth that Rufus established in the mode of objective and subjective genitive. The truth entails the essence of things summed up by the reflection of hypostatic intellect (*veritas rerum et intellectum*, ch. 3.3.2). The full analytic unconcealment (*alētheia*) of objective reality takes place in enlightened conscience of academic *illuminati*. The concept of modern *veritas* is based on Oxfordian Fallacy. After the eclipse of the first substance, a universal equality of all objectively recognized contents of thinking emerged (*scibile*). Analytic cognition following the Oxfordian Fallacy does not explore the real world, but the universal diacosmos of *tertium ens* shaped by mathematical and formal relations. The modernist became a metaphysical homeless individual living in the realm of shadows. This accumulated treasure of truth and knowledge must be kept in the modern version of the informed memory (*locus specierum*). The modern memory is the most valuable instrument; thinking of *Modernorum* does not need reality in order to establish the true knowledge. The objective form of *memoria* replaced the cognition of reality. Specific knowledge stored in the memory of *Modernorum* formed an objective parallel world of *concretum* and of *individuum*. The modern subject needs but itself and its own habitual self-knowledge in the stoic mode “*omnia mea mecum porto*.” Mind operating in the mode “*semel—semper*” knows well that every specific being of the third kind is a very fragile thing. As soon as *tertium ens* disappears from modern memory and databases operating as *locus specierum*, it is irretrievably lost. Such *tertium ens* ceased to “exsist” in its contingent hypostatic union with the subject of modern cognition. Nietzsche put an end to that dubious metaphysics. Modernists took up Porretan mathematics and enabled the division and the classification of modern science in the nominalistic mode “*discrete videamus*” (ch. 1.4). Number linked to analogy within arithmetic began to play the role of the modern individual. Rufus created an insane form of categorical imposition made *a priori* that gave real causality to the mathematically defined individual (*numerus a priori secundum naturam causatur*; ch. 3.3.2). Thereby emerged a new representation “subject—object” in the mode of universal hylemorphism that performed the objective doubling of the world (*species obiecti exsistentis*, ch. 3.3.4). Paranoid thinking of modern *illuminati* placed itself outside the real world; they invented their own solar myth that guides the odyssey of moderns. Spiritual intelligence of the West, hitherto gathered in the one modern academic institution, began to live in the objective diacosmos that they took over from ancient Neoplatonists and from Plato’s philosophical tale called *Timaeus*. Gigantomachy of Plato, Aristotle and later that of Avicenna and Averroes restarted after 1240. Real connoisseurs of Averroes fundamentally attacked the second Averroism. The dispute about modern sciences run in the framework of *Metaphysics* and it concerned above all the philosophical duel between Rufus and Bacon. The dispute between Kilwardby and Albert concerned the interpretation of *Second Analytics* and *De anima*. The translation of mythological metaphysics to modern physics created a new place of sciences (*ortus scientiarum*). That hidden place (*Lichtung*) determines the truth and untruth of contemporary objective knowledge that is given in the mode of metaphysical *Irrtum*.

Kilwardby’s work *De ortu scientiarum* (ca. 1250) laid foundations of modern science. It deals with the statute of substance in the context of metaphysical and mathematical abstraction. Necessarily, further conflicts of both schools concerned the metaphysics as the first science about general determinations of being. The treatise shows the new place of sciences in the system of modern worldview. Hypostatized intellect illuminates the world from behind. Modern *illuminati* consider common principles of cognition and singular and universal forms (*scibile*) through formal intuition. Both kinds of *tertium ens* are given univocally in the intellect and in sciences. Let us take the example of secondary physical determinations. Aristotle and the first Averroism took them only as predication made by the imposition that relates to really existing physical bodies. Kilwardby followed science of Neoplatonists. He considers the quantity to be the same cognitive object of metaphysics and arithmetic: “Metaphysics and mathematics agree that they must deal with the quantity.” [[484]](#footnote-484) The metaphysician considers quantity as being of the third kind (*metaphysicus habet considerare quantitatem ipsa sit aliquod ens*) and conceives it as an inherent property of substance (*et cum sit in substantia*; ibid, p. 90.10–11). The substance of the third kind derived from hypostatized quantity conceived in the mode of mathematical abstraction according to proceedings of Porretan schools (ch. 1.5). However, Kilwardby did not take mathematics completely univocally with metaphysical concept of being, as Rufus did. Kilwardby respected the metaphysical abstraction made after Avicenna. Toletans make definition of being in the mode “*ens inquantum ens*.” This essential predication differs from mathematical abstraction built on abstracted arithmetic numbers (*numerus*). After his arrival in Paris, Kilwardby belonged to the school of Philip the Chancellor. He made use of the same Avicennian determinations concerning the highest genera of being as the school of Philip the Chancellor. However, Kilwardby did not abandon the new worldview that Rufus had created by introducing the mathematical and analytical version of Oxfordian Fallacy. Kilwardby became acquainted with Rufus’s thought at the latest after the year 1235 in Paris. The transition from the analytical logic to the new metaphysics runs in the mode of Porretan and Avicennist vision of being (*ratio entis*). Following quotation opened the path of modern science.

“It is obvious, then, that the metaphysician and the mathematician agree in the fact that they both work with quantity. They differ, however, in the fact that the mathematician conceives of quantity in terms of a certain subject (*quantitatem ponit subiectum ubique*) and determines its properties and accidents in view of such quantity. The metaphysician, however, conceives the quantity in terms of being as such (*in quantum ens est*); he derives general properties of quantity (*proprietates eius communes*) as consequences coming from the determination of being (*quae rationem entitatis eius consequuntur*). Thus, quantity is determined by being as a pure essence (*quantitas ens sit*) and a being determined from quantification as essence (*ens tale*). The metaphysician works with it what falls into the realm of the determination of being as a being (*quod entis est*); the mathematician works with it what entails the determination of being in its individuality (*quod talis entis*).” [[485]](#footnote-485)

The quotation separates mathematics and metaphysics from each other; however, they relate to the nature of being as modern essence. The sophism is hidden in the declaration that ascribes to the quantity the metaphysical status of *tertium ens*. Quantity became a special kind of being (*quantitas ens sit*), and this metaphysically quantified being is taken from two points of view. The mathematician understands the quantity from the lower abstraction related to the formally determined body (*quod talis entis*). The metaphysician takes the body from the point of view of its essence, which is viewed through the objective parousia of pure eidetic beingness (*quod entis est*). By introducing the universal essence of beingness given as a genus, the classical doctrine of *Categories* about the one substance and its accidents was no longer valid. Quantity became a universal hypostasis and it was predicated in the framework of categorical universal predication. Unfortunately, this universality comes from the logical necessity made by the supposition, not the metaphysical necessity made by the imposition. The disappearance of imposition transformed the second Aristotelian substance into a Porretan *individuum*. Quantity ceased to be an accident, as it took on a universal analogical value at the same level as the modern second “substance.” The quantity shifted to the level of objective essences predicated as second substances. The logical supposition comes at the first place, following the second triad of cognitive principles according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The imposition of quantity in classical categorical predication follows as a second step, after the existence and causality of hyparchic first substances have been established. Kilwardby takes it as the first step because the first triad of cognitive principles has ceased to form the basis of modern science. After the introduction of universal hylemorphism, the second substance made by modern Porretans at Oxford acquired not only the character of hypostasis, but also hylemorphic character of the first substance. Kilwardby composes objective substance as Rufus (*species obiecti exsistentis*, ch. 3.3.4) or Grosseteste’s school in the work *Summa philosophiae* (*re in pura potentia et actu et forma essentiali euisdem potentiae perfectiva*, ch. 3.1.3). The quotation accomplishes in a sophistical way the composition of a metaphysical individual that is the same as Rufus’s mathematically determined *individuum*, *concretum* or *scibile*. Following Rufus’s example, Kilwardby introduced Avicebron’s mythological matter directly into mathematics to create yet another form of *tertium ens*.

“In this way, substance abstracts from quantity and thereby causes it. Hence it is called mathematical matter.” [[486]](#footnote-486)

Mathematics creates quantity as a new form of matter. This matter of the third kind exists in the form of mathematically determined quantity that the Neoplatonism introduced for the first time (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Mathematics becomes the basis of new metaphysics because the number is the last Porretan individual in the division of mathematical species. This division is based on the universal hylemorphism that applies to both forms of matter, physical and mathematical: “*Unde materia mathematica involuta est intra physicam*” (ibid, p. 94.5). The new concept of “involutif body” of the third kind replaced the primacy of real (material or immaterial) first substances. They are indispensable in the first Averroism to make foundation of the first science beyond physics. Rufus accomplished the same by the concept of quantum mathematics given as a discrete part of hypostatized potency (*mensura … quantum in potentia*, ch. 3.3.2). The modern *resolutio* follows the primacy of numerical individuation and universal hylemorphism. Such nonsense laid the foundations of new metaphysics and modern science until the year 1250. Kilwardby determines the place (*ortus*) of the objective being as the basis of sciences (*scientiarum*) in the sense of Heidegger’s metaphysical foundation (*Gründung*; OBJ I, ch. 1.2). The concept of “being as being” in the mode of Avicenna’s *resolutio* established the analogical worldview and mathematical mode of Rufus’s *scibile* and *concretum* making use of theoretical sciences developed in the school of Philip the Chancellor. The third form of predication then deals with reality in the mode of Grosseteste’s *scientia*; but this is no longer necessary for fundamental determination of sciences.

Hermeneutic archaeology points out the growing importance of mathematical abstraction in Kilwardby’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy. He created a new version of Avicennist analytics of being by inserting mathematical being of Porretans in the scheme of metaphysical *resolutio*. The second Averroism mixes mathematics, physics and metaphysics together to make a modern metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas in the commentary of Boethius’ philosophy established the *separatio* of mathematics and metaphysics (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). New teaching displaced the original metaphysical unity of being, which was given by the difference between the mathematical *abstractio* and the metaphysical *separatio*. Let us look at the way in which Oxfordian sophists made foundations of modern physics. Kilwardby’s version of mythologic metaphysics transformed Rufus’s qualitative mathematics into a modern kind of speculative physics.

“And so, in the third degree of abstraction, this mathematical matter necessarily takes on specific determinations of corporeality, that is, circularity, rectangularity, and the like. These specific differences it assumes in the mode of active and passive quantities (*qualitates activas et passivas*). These specific bodies of physics (*corpora specialia physica*) are predictable because they fall into the category of essences considered in the framework of physics (*incohatur physica speculatio*).” [[487]](#footnote-487)

Neoplatonic form of mathematized matter takes upon itself determinations that entail abstractly defined particular things of the third kind (*differentias speciales corporum*). The difference founded the “substance—species” of the third kind that needs a new categorial predication (*ista corpora specialia physica dicuntur*). The specific unity of mythological physics follows the line of the dialogue *Timaeus*. Kilwardby proposed a new kind of diacosmos that displaced the former first substance and its causality given in Aristotle’s work *Physics*. The science of *Modernorum* considers the body completely objectively in its pseudo-matter and pseudo-form. Due to the quoted sophism, a new form of theoretical or speculative physics (*speculatio physica*) emerged. From the point of view of Aristotle’s physics, it makes absolute nonsense, let us see the criticism of Bacon, Albert and later Thomas Aquinas. The new speculation based on the abstract conception of the body as *tertium ens*, no longer needs a real thing for the act of cognition, because it has constructed its own substance of the third kind.

The work *De ortu scientiarum* shows how the objective worldview has become a systematic sophistical knowledge. The *illuminati* at Oxford established the first physical and mathematical assimilation of the world based on modern truth as Anselm’s *rectitudo* and Rufus’s *coaequatio*. The truth as assimilation of everything possible became a necessary and unstoppable process in schools of *Modernorum*. Modern version of *Ge-Stell* created an Avicennist idol of “meta-physics” made by Averroes. Therefore, it was even more necessary to expel this philosophical monster into the academic desert as a scapegoat for all errors of modern sophists. Objectively educated Furies founded in Oxford the paranoid untruth of modern physics. It came to complete dismissal of classical Aristotelian physics that the Commentator translated into Western metaphysics. New physics reflect the world in the mode of *certitudo* and it is completely justified in the mode of *rectitudo*. The insight of *illuminati* into the mythological wholeness of being is illuminated from above. However, that kind of living beyond of reality is not possible, because *tertium ens* does not exist. The changed concept of necessity introduced by Grosseteste made possible the emergence of mathematical metaphysics (ch. 3.1.2). The logical variant of necessity replaced through univocal manner the necessity made by causality of real first substances. Grosseteste followed *Second Analytics* to keep at least some difference between the two kinds of necessity, since he conceived them as obscure (*aliquantulum obscura*, ch. 3.1.1). Kilwardby overcame this real ambiguity with logical clarity. The new place of science confirmed the transformation of Rufus’s mathematical objectivity into a new form of Avicennist metaphysics. The subject of cognition done in such a peculiar manner forms the basis of the new science. The theory of truth as the assimilation of essences forms the basis of speculative physics. This “physics” makes the mirror in which modern and contemporary nihilist thought contemplates itself through language games of all kinds.[[488]](#footnote-488) That kind of objective narcistic mind created the next version of Oxfordian Fallacy. The assimilation theory of truth founded modern Western science and technology through the mathematical nature of physics as the first form of speculative natural science. Kilwardby used Rufus’s *scibile* as the basis of modern science that entails the mathematical individual. The objective being of the third kind founded by Rufus entered the new game of classification and division of meaning done as Porretan division of universals in the scheme of Porphyry’s Tree. Mythological philosophy passed from analytical metaphysics to the epistemology of special sciences. The conquest of the world started from the Oxfordian Fallacy to take the course of British colonial empire and global corporate capitalism.

There was a principal obstacle in that glorious path, namely the metaphysics of Averroes as the eminent interpreter of Aristotle. What the assimilation theory of truth cannot grasp according to Latin sophists and *illuminati*, it must be condemned in virtue of a reversal into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*), and then displaced by sophisticated academic forms of *damnatio memoriae*. Kilwardby redirected the attack of Oxford′s modernists not against Aristotle, but against Averroes as an eminent expositor of *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Representatives of the first Averroism called the group founded by Rufus and Kilwardby to be “sophists” because of this reason. The University of Paris followed thinking of Blund’s school; lectures based on such sophisms became practically impossible until the death of bishop Alvernus. Parisian modernists could practice modern sophistry only at the level of teaching logical puzzles and examples of wrong thinking for beginners (*fallacia, insolubilia*). The baccalaureates of artistic subjects kept preference for it and they became convinced modernists in the following decade. The implantation of Latin sophists in the Faculties of Art from 1240 onwards can be attested by disgrace of metaphysicians as Bacon over Rufus’s success with uneducated philosophical beginners (*apud stultam multitudinem*, ch. 3.2). This group of “analytical” students, addicted to Avicennism and to Porretan logic, could no longer properly understand Averroes’s metaphysics and the interpretation of cognition according to CMDA. Unlike Paris, Oxford dominated by academic *illuminati* took up analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*, *Categories*, and logical writing a one generation ago. This bastion of modernism produced the first official attack of *Modernorum* on Averroes’s metaphysics. This attack superseded the preceding philippics of Neoplatonic logicians against Aristotle’s version of *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Grosseteste very probably condemned the first sophistical attack on Averroes when he became the bishop of Lincoln (1236). The substantial unity of man according to CMDA was at stake at those days. Rufus had to leave for Paris to do studies under the auspices of Franciscans. Kilwardby’s work *De ortu scientiarum* started the official criticism of Averroes at Oxford, in connection with the new project of metaphysics that Rufus imported from Paris. He started to lecture his modern version of metaphysics at Oxford in 1250, according to Bacon’s testimony. The polemic with Averroes shows the impact of universal hylemorphism on mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. Modernity began to form the new world *ex nihilo*. Academic *illuminati* summed up created *tertium ens* in the parallel diacosmos they categorized and guarded. Modernists became new guardian dragons in the objective garden of Hesperides (Kildwardby's *ortus scientiarum*). Muses staged this tragicomedy in the mode of archaic *a/lētheia*. The modernists received historially determined mythological task of making and indexing the “science” thus created; and above all, of protecting it from the attacks of common sense. Averroes’s metaphysics explicitly forbids making intellectual simulacra. In the system of classical “meta-physics” established by the science about the “substance *qua* substance,” such entities of the third kind cannot exist. Since there are not in reality, they cannot be in metaphysical thinking, because the CMDA excludes the formation of *tertium ens*. The thing exists in reality or in thinking. Real connoisseurs of Averroes, as Grosseteste, Alvernus, Albert and Bacon, found the sophistry of *Modernorum* unacceptable. They did not consider modern protagonists to be real philosophers, but poorly educated logicians whose skill and knowledge were sufficient enough to teach philosophical beginners. Let us see Thomas Aquinas’s outburst at the end of *De unitate intellectus* (1270) against the school of the second Averroism that was led by Pecham in Paris (OBJ III, ch. 4.6). Let us recall that Pecham had to leave the Paris University in 1271 as ingloriously as Rufus and Kilwardby did before him. Latin sophists created an Averroistic Averroes, which they adapted to their own changing needs given in the order of new scientology. At one time, they invoked him as a Commentator and at another time, they reviled him as a heretic. Such contradictions emerge from the nature of Averroist’s interpretation of the Commentator, which includes the modernized pantheism of David of Dinant (ch. 3.3.3).

False gigantomachy of modernists against Averroes concerned the problem of individuation and the objective concept of matter. By introducing hypostatic nature of quantity, modernists, following Neoplatonism, exposed the meaning of being from behind, according to the Toledo school, instead of doing it from the front, according to the Sicilian school. This led to the interpretation of metaphysics that was given according to the first version of modernism. Such Averroism of Toletans as a continuation of Neoplatonic Aristotle (*sequaces Aristotelis*) was not tolerated in Paris. But Grosseteste in Oxford tolerated it as long as such an interpretation did not threaten the substantial unity of the person. The frontal attack on the Commentator as a bad metaphysician and heretic began at the time, when his metaphysics contradicted the new metaphysics of modernists . It emerged in Rufus’s work *Speculum animae*. By introducing universal hylemorphism into metaphysics, a fundamental conflict concerned objective being made after Rufus’s notion “*species obiecti exsistentis.*” There was no more possible to unify the metaphysics of modernists and Averroes’s commentaries on *Metaphysics* and *Physics* that scholars in Paris interpreted in the paradigm of the Sicilian school. Modernists knew this project of the first science proclaimed by the artists settled in the Rue du Fouarre that was the bastion of the first Averroism. Kilwardby knew as well as Rufus the position of Aristotle and Averroes regarding the question of quantity.[[489]](#footnote-489) Therefore, Kilwardby in Oxford had to redefine the science in the framework of new metaphysics made after Avicenna. The treatise *De ortu scientiarum* offered a positive reception of Aristotle into Avicennian metaphysics and into the system of mathematically given Porretan hypostases. After this transformation of metaphysics, Oxford Averroists started first attacks on Averroes. Kilwardby accomplished the writing at the time of first controversy concerning the status of a new metaphysics. Bacon dated that first quarrel quite rightly in time of Rufus’s lectures in Oxford that took place in the year 1250. The first modernists began officially protecting Aristotle because they interpreted him according to Neoplatonic model of Avicenna and according to Porretans as Rufus. Therefore, about the year 1250 in Oxford, it came to the first official attack of modernists on the Commentator. The repetition of preceding campaign that Oxford *illuminati* led against Aristotle would have exposed them to further academic derision. Grosseteste as Bishop of Lincoln and the supervisor of the University, certainly had to petition the Pope for ecclesiastical sanctions to punish the dubious group of *doctores Latini*. He criticized them for their anti-Aristotelianism at the time when that group was created, somewhere about 1235. Twenty years later on, the attack on Aristotle would have been already superfluous; but the attack on the Commentator decided in the years 1250–55 about being and non-being of modernism in the style of the Excluded Third. If the interpretation of *Corpus* and *Metaphysics* according to the Commentator were true, and especially his glorious exegesis of *De anima* in the writing CMDA, then the sophistry of modernism could not apply. Therefore, the accusation of Averroes being an Averroist kept completely mendacious character in modernists’ schools. They made even harsh denigration of him, which Aegidius Romanus did in the next generation (OBJ III, ch. 4.3.2). Rufus accuses the Commentator of his own aporia and errors and criticizes him for not being able to solve stupid sophisms of modern thinkers.

Let us look at some examples that show the foundation of modern science in the conflict with Averroes’s commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. Modernism professing universal hylemorphism criticizes Averroes for poorly grasping *materia prima*. Following David of Dinant and Rufus, Averroism works with this concept of primary matter on the basis of pantheism and by using Averroist construction of the intellect. The Commentator defines *materia prima* only in the privative mode, which does not permit the creation of numerically distinct individuals as *tertium ens*. Kilwardby offers completely erroneous definition of *materia prima* that established the infamous definition of cosmic *intellectus possibilis* made by Dinant and Rufus.

“The Commentator erred in determining *materia prima* as numerically uniform for all (*materiam primam omnium unam numero*). By this determination he did not mean the positive givenness of the matter, but only the privation, that is, the lack of multiplicity of individual forms and identity of forms.” [[490]](#footnote-490)

According to this quotation, the Commentator would have considered prime matter as a numerically distinct substance. This is an Averroist interpretation developed by Rufus and David of Dinant. The unity is based on the universal hylemorphism, in the form of pure privation (*solum privativum*) does not allow any further differentiation (*carentiam pluralitatis formarum individualium*). It means un double non-sense. The primary matter is taken as modern “substance—essence”; in the second step, it is proclaimed as modern *individuum* that is deprived of all “substantial” determinations. The prime matter is literally un “substance zero” (*solum privativum*). Averroes defined *materia prima* as pure concept in mind and such potentiality has no actualized external form at all. The pure potency cannot be hypostatized according to Aristotelianism and it cannot be determined as numerically distinguished material things in reality. Kilwardby defends both kinds of grave metaphysical errors. The form and the substance make a being of the third kind that “exsists” in some universally and singularly manner in reality as Porretan hypostases. Such definition of *materia prima* cannot be found in Averroes’s cosmology. However, Kilwardby makes the criticism of Averroes for such kind of twofold sophistry. According to Averroes, the first matter cannot determine the first substance existing in reality in mode *simpliciter*, because its statute of pure potentialities does not allow this. We cannot make any hypostatized *potentia substantialis*, as Porretans and Rufus and Kilwardby did. The concept of number, too, exists as a universal only potentially, because it is made by abstraction in the intellect. The matter cannot be individualized through mathematics, as Rufus did for the first time to create the quantum causality in the mathematical model. The first existing substance, being in its actualized state outside of human mind, determines the process of cognition in the hyparchical mode *per prius*. No abstracted forms invented by modernists can do it. Kilwardby and Rufus project their own doctrine according to *Modernorum* into Averroes’s philosophy. Their modern science is truly “speculative”; Averroes as an Averroist makes a false mirroire (*speculum*) in order to establish the source of modern sciences (*ortus scientiarum*). Modernists regard this diabolical creature and they are horrified by their own metaphysical stupidities. Hypostatized *materia prima* makes a potential quasi-substance that is subsequently determined by external autonomous forms; or, it is determined mathematically through hypostatic and causally operating arithmetical calculus made by Rufus. All this can be found in the paragraph in the writing *De ortu scientiarum* devoted to impossibility of the regress that concerns generically conceived quantity (ibid, pp. 71–72). The modern nominalist understands this impossibility in the perspective of division of universals made in the Tree of Porphyry, not at all in relation to real first substances. The false dispute about Averroes concerns in fact the imaginary world of hypostatized Porretan forms that are individualized by a mythological kind of *materia prima*. This is a typical example of universal hylemorphism mady by Rufus and David of Dinant. The section devoted to numerical individuation first defines materially determined substance in reality, whereby the numerical unity is created by classical matter. Then, numerical individuation is only a concomitant of the real unity of the existing thing. The second form of numerical individuation, however, has a completely different character. The following passage sets forth Averroist interpretation of Averroes in terms of *materia prima* that starts the process of mythological individuation.

“But in the first place, only the thing that is in pure potency and not in the act is numerically unified. The form that this numerically unified thing receives (*formam quam in se recipit*) does not represent true individuation. The universal form, which is a thing in potency (*res ens in potentia*), as Averroes says in Book XI of the *Metaphysics*, can therefore only give rise to a numerically unitary essence (*una numero unitate essentiali tantum*) in primary matter; thus the essence remains universal. Our knowledge therefore does not only refer to the inner objects of our own mind (*scientia nostra non est animae figmentum*), as is the case with universals.” [[491]](#footnote-491)

The quotation claims with reference to modernized Averroes that the individual exists as substance of the third kind and it is given in potency (*est* *res ens in potentia*). Through modernist *creatio* *ex nihilo*, a numerically unified essence is created. Primary matter is established as a hypostasis. An equally hypostatic “form—essence” is imprinted in this matter in a Neoplatonic manner. Kilwardby wants to pursue modern metaphysics, not mythology. Unlike Rufus, his scheme does not work with Avicebron′s *materia spiritualis*, since he makes use of Aristotle′s *materia prima*. But his concept of individuation is just as mythological as was the role of mythological matter in the universal hylemorphism. The numerically individualized essence (*una numero unitate essentiali*) behaves like a Porretan substance of the third kind. This impossible copulation of mythological form and mythological establishes a modernist cosmos of individualistic essences as scientifically established worldview (*ita scientia nostra*). The quotation defines this *tertium ens* in terms of the universal form, which is given as an individual thing (*forma universalis quæ est res*). Taken from Averroes’s point of view, that “thing” is merely a potentiality in the intellect. In the intellect there are no “things” (*res ens in potentia*), as modernists claim with reference to the modernistic Aristotle, but only the cognition of things by means of universal concepts. An analysis of the concept “*materia prima*” in Averroes′s cosmology would require a separate chapter. In our context, only one fact is important, namely that there is a modernist interpretation of *Metaphysics* and thus of Aristotle. That highly problematic intepretation establishes a modernist mythological science (*ortus scientiarum*) based on Avicenna's metaphysics of “*ens inquantum ens*.” Against the modernist diakosmos, created *ex nihilo*, stands the interpretation of the same *Metaphysics*, created *ad mentem Averrois*. It incorporates the “meta-physics,” which analyzes the “substance *qua* substance”. The attack on Averroes was therefore unavoidable from 1250 onwards, as the two scientific concepts are completely contradictory.

Kilwardby introduced Avicennian conversion of transcendentals into interpretation of *Metaphysics*. He works with transcendental determinations of being as “*res*” according to Philip the Chancellor (ch. 2.3.3). The Commentator, meanwhile, considers Avicenna’s interpretation of *Metaphysics* in the mode “*ens inquantum ens*” to be a tragic error (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Once again, we can see the effect of Oxfordian Fallacy, which displaced hyparchical and metaphysical predication of *Second Analytics*. The potential thing is individualized through abstractly given first matter (*suscipitur in materia prima una numero*). The potency became a thing to be engaged in the process of modern individualization. Kilwardy got an essence in the kind of Avicenna (*unitate essentiali tantum*). Averroes would have rejected in principle every process of actualization that makes the numerical individuation of things outside of matter determined in the framework of hylemorphism. Taken in the hylemorphic reality, the individuation made in virtue of universal hylemorphism and mathematics represents nonsense based on a fictitious being of the third kind. The cosmic forms do not have the matter and therefore cannot be individualized, because these are real immaterial substances, which exist fully *simpliciter* and *per se*, that is, merely as unique species in one specimen. The cosmic forms are therefore no material and numerically uniform species. All species outside immaterial cosmic forms exist as abstraction in our cognition. To divide cosmic intelligences into individuals according to the Tree of Porphyry would mean that they are considered in the framework of logical abstraction and not due to the metaphysical imposition made by real first substances. Such a sophistical quotation attributes to the Commentator that he has took up the “true” Porretan metaphysics associated with universal hylemorphism and put it in some confused form. Modern science was founded on this paranoid image of metaphysics created on the basis of sophisms done *ad mentem Averrois*.

Made in this way, an Averroistic simulacrum of Averroes became the first kind of objective being in the Latin West. It came into that kind of crazy “exsistence” in the environment of Latin sophists at Oxford about the year 1235. The *genius loci* of Oxford modernism stand and fall with the emergence of that simulacrum. Its *raison d’être* is based on the sophistic replacement of metaphysical abstraction by essential, logical and mathematical abstraction. The preceding quotations have shown that Rufus replaced the hylemorphic first substance and its real causality by some kind of mathematical matter. This replacement made classical Aristotelian metaphysics quite antiquated around the year 1250. In modernity and especially in postmodernity, which had completely fallen into logical abstraction, the metaphysical unity of first substances is gradually replaced by various objective scientific tendencies, which use this term only metaphorically. By introducing a new version of metaphysical Averroism around the year 1250, Kilwardby practically implemented the thesis about the end of metaphysics. The objective being of the third kind comes out (*existit*) of mathematically quantified *materia prima*. By introducing the matter of the third kind, the physical body lost the status of mentally conceived universal object. The objectively conceived thing does not exist only imaginary, like a chimera (*non est animae figmentum cum sit de universali*). The quotation suggests that through the hypostatized form and matter (*suscipitur in materia prima*) arises a particular substance of the third kind. The last sentence of the quotation shows the emergence of a new mathematized reality inserted between the thought and the world in the manner of the former Neoplatonism and the Falsafa (Jamblichus’s διάκοσμος, the third world *barzach* in the Koran, the medieval *purgatorium*). According to Averroes, only the first substances are actualized in reality: hylemorphic bodies, the astral sphere, and immaterial cosmic intelligences, God as separate *causa prima*. Kilwardby works with the actuality given outside of first substances, because he had accepted Rufus’s concept of individuation inserted in the realm of objective being. The modern “*hoc esse tantum*” adopted by Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2) behaves like a first substance (*res*, *scibile*, *concretum*) in virtue of the matter of the third kind. The individual makes a universally hylemorphic substance in the manner of Avicebron, that is, in the univocal manner for physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. This example of sophistical reasoning is shown in *De ortu scientiarum*, ch. 24 (ed. Judy, pp. 65–75). Kilwardby knows exactly the original position of Aristotle and Averroes with respect to the mathematically conceived abstraction and physically given quantification of bodies, and summarizes it correctly (*hoc videtur esse sententia Aristotelis et Averrois*, p. 65.32). Then he attacks the whole argumentation in the name of Oxfordian modernism. The representative of the second Averroism pathetically cries at the fake grave and sophistical criticizes the Averroistic Averroes and not at all his true philosophy.

The second sophism concerns Neoplatonic *resolutio*, which Kilwardby took from Averroes’s commentary on *Metaphysics* and transferred into his own interpretation. The resurrection of Neoplatonism in modern Averroism establishes the univocal and amphibolic unity of being that makes the universal totality of sciences in the mode of the one truth. This sophism destroyed the classical interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Again, it is carried out with explicit reference to Averroes. Kilwardby found a new univocity of being in the conception of the Good, which he took in the mode of Porretan hypostasis. He began to predicate the hypostatized Good transcendentally, according to the school of Philip the Chancellor. Kilwardby deduces the unity of the sciences is according to Avicenna’s definition of the first science based on the truth as *certitudo* according to growing measure of abstraction and truth. We find the same architecture of cognition in Neoplatonic *Liber de causis* and then in the philosophy of Grosseteste and Rufus. The sophistry of modernists connected Averroes with Avicenna by final causality of the Good, instead of real first substances. Kilwardby founded the modern unity of science in the analytical mode of the “Unified Science.”

“Averroes says in Book III of *Metaphysics* [see *In Metaph. III.2, text 3* (Venetii 1574, fol. 41D))*; ad Met.* 996a28] that ‘all that is determined by the Good is the final cause.’ The entire order of knowledge given by this finality then refers to the Good of finite being. In the realm of theoretical sciences, truth is considered all the higher as it is by itself more certain and as it is given about the more certain things. The truth is more certain and deals with a more certain object if it is certain with respect to what is simpler, more primary and more abstract. Therefore, in the order of finite ends, the speculative sciences deal exactly with this order of being, as was said above.” [[492]](#footnote-492)

Avicenna’s finality established as *processio* of Neoplatonic forms out of work *Liber de causis*. Kilwardby presents it to be Averroes’s doctrine. The certainty of truth grows with the degree of universalization (*certa est de simpliciori et priori et abstractiori*). The correspondence does not relate to the world of real substances as in Averroes’s teaching. It makes contemplation of pure forms made in the mode of truth as Avicennist evidence (*veritas… certior est et de certiori*). The quotation confirmed the domination of the modern subject over reality by establishing a new unity of knowledge given in the mode of truth as Rufus’s assimilation (ch. 3.3.2). The modern subject is certain of its truth considered in the mode of modern enlightenment insofar it can manipulate the world after the eclipse of the first substance. Modernity established a possibility for expansion of science and technology that colonizes the entire world through knowledge given as power of the modern subject. Through Kilwardby’s synthesis of both metaphysics of the Falsafa, paranoid mind of Latin sophists established the brave new world of Western science. Against the modern interpretation of *Second Analytics* and *Metaphysics*, Bacon at the same time redacted a realist interpretation of the first science based on the examination of substance interpreted *ad mentem Averrois*. Thomas Aquinas was an Avicennist in a way and he rejected Averroes’s metaphysics; however, he did the same defense of common sense as Bacon a decade later, with reference to Boethius. Bacon refuted the claim of objective unity of science right at the beginning. His commentary on the Fourth Book of *Metaphysics* written about 1245 rejects the univocal concept of being that is based on mathematical quantification.

“About quantity there is no univocal knowledge; however, there is a science concerning the real being. The reason for the difference lies in the fact that the quantity divides itself according to the singular existing; such unity can be reduced neither to an essence nor to a cause. But every being is determined with respect to other beings, although by no means always essential, but nevertheless causal (*si non essentialiter, tamen causaliter*), because it is transferable to accidents with respect to the substance.” [[493]](#footnote-493)

Taken at the level of abstraction established by mathematical quantification, no first science of being can arise (*de quantitate non est una scientia*). We do not have an original unity of being, because the things in reality are determined quantitatively to be single entity (*quia quantitas dividitur per talia*). Realist Bacon holds that in the concept of science given by mathematical abstraction (not to mention the qualities of the third kind) no real causality can exist (*unum ad alterum nec essentialiter nec causaliter reducitur*). Causality is given exclusively on the level of the first substances and their adequate metaphysical predication. This is based either directly on real substances, or at least directly on real causality (*si non essentialiter, tamen causaliter*). The categorial predication creates a univocal unity to determine the causal relation at the level of second substance with respect to accidents (*reducitur ut accidens ad substantiam*). The first Averroism considers absolute nonsense such things as a hypostasis made of accidents, made in the form of extension or numerically determined quantity. Scientific predication exists because *demonstratio* universalizes the action caused by first substances in reality. According to Bacon, modernists cannot have a real science as defined in *Second Analytics*. The reason is, among other things, that they do not have a form of abstraction derived from the correspondence of senses and thinking that refers to reality. Formal determinations of quantity do not correspond to metaphysical abstraction, which arises by the exposure of cognition from the direction of real things. They exercise the causality at the hyparchical level. Modernists make a combination of metaphysics and mathematics to a univocal, and even causally predicated concept of being. It is according to Bacon a total philosophical nonsense. Such a solution contradicts all fundamentals of the first philosophy. It follows metaphysically considered universal unity of being that cannot be of other kind. Avicenna as well as Averroes established this fact (*ut dicunt Averrois et Avicenna, ergo de ente, in quantum commune est, erit una scientia prima*, ibid, p. 89.9–10). In modernist Oxford, Bacon’s critique of the second Averroism was a voice crying in the wilderness that had to be authoritatively silenced. The modern substance given as *concretum* of Rufus gradually supplanted real things. The whole development of modernity confirms it. Let us now quote the key passage from the *Compendium*. In this testament, Bacon condemns for the last time the philosophy of *Modernorum* (ch. 3.2). The criticism of insane thinking represented by Rufus and Kilwardby (*insaniunt contra veritatem*) summarize exactly the essence of the second Averroism with its univocal concept of being and their new theory of truth.

“In this point they prove to be insane (*insaniunt contra veritatem*) with respect to truth when they claim that being as hypostatized quantity signifies the real thing (*ens per quantumlibet significet esse presens*) and the things given in the past. Yet, the nominally given being signifies a being abstracted from the actual being of the thing (*ens nomen significat abstracte ab esse actuali*). With respect to the unity of being, it is only given in the framework of determinate generality (*communitate quadam ad ens*), and not as actual entity (*non ens actu*).” [[494]](#footnote-494)

The first proposition meets the problem of the supposition of *Nominales* in the framework of permanent species (*ens per quantumlibet*). They are valid in the past or in the present without regard to existing real substances (*significet esse presens et esse actuale in preterito*). Moreover, this predication arises *ex nihilo* because it is not tied to the process of Aristotelian abstraction (*ens nomen significat*). Aristotelian abstraction is determined by real existence of the thing (*abstracte ab esse actuale*). Key importance has the last sentence, which determines the difference between the universal predication in the framework of the categories (*communitate quadam ad ens*) and the hyparchical subsistence of the actual single thing (*et non ens actu*). Bacon’s dispute with “insane” representatives of Oxfordian Fallacy was inevitable after the publication of Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum*. The interpretations of Averroes of both schools had been separated since the year 1250 because of the theory of truth as correspondence or assimilation, as well as by different nature of metaphysics. Kilwardby cannot accept the authentic interpretation of Averroes presented in the first Averroism as *proportio* between the real thing and its cognition. The second Averroism defends the univocity of real substances and universals in the framework of the modern *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. Hermeneutic interpretation of the second Averroism has shown that Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s interpretation of the Commentator was sophistical, that is, an Averroist one. Fortunately, Averroes was not an Averroist.

The commentaries on *Metaphysics* written by Rufus and Kilwardby give an insight into already cited dispute of Alvernus with the group called *sophistae Latini*. Bacon held the same position and therefore had the same philosophical opponents. The main target of criticism was understandably Rufus and his sophist writing *Contra Averroem* (ch. 3.3.3). After Bacon’s entry into the Franciscan Order and his deportation to Paris, Bonaventure became Bacon’s opponent, since he enforced the Modernist school at the Paris University. The quotation, citing Averroes, asserts that the active intellect forms part of the human soul (*intellectus agens secundum Commentatorem est pars anime*, ch. 2.3). Bacon knows well that this is Averroes’s original position. Therefore, he places on the other side of the front both Aristotle himself and the Arabic interpreters (*secundum Alpharabium et secundum Aristotelem et Avicennam*). This was precisely the position taken by Alvernus, who set Averroes against the Neoplatonic interpreters of Aristotle (*philosophus nobilissimus*, ch. 2.3). Bacon confirms Albert’s and Alvernus’s interpretation of the unity of intellect in the framework of interpretation according to the CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The other Peripateticists defend the active intellect as an independent separate substance (*est aliquid aliud*). In that way, original disagreement between the first and the second Averroism is confirmed at the University of Paris for the years 1240–45. Both Bacon and Albert attested this disagreement, as well as Alvernus. The dispute continued with the separation of the two schools on behalf of interpretation of *Metaphysics* made by the Commentator. The attack of modernists was triggered by the death of bishop Alvernus (1249) that changed the *status quo* at the University of Paris. After the arrival of Averroist Rufus at Oxford (1250), Kilwardby in Oxford and Bonaventure in Paris opened a frontal attack on Averroes as a heretic. Bonaventura’s commentary on the second book of Sentences (1252) calls Commentator’s philosophy “*pessima, heretica, contra christianam religionem*” (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). Bacon’s position clearly reveals that the first Averroism had to defend the authentic doctrine of Averroes. It gave a fundamentally positive answer to philosophical aporia of the second Averroism associated with Neoplatonism and with Avicenna. The first Averroism saw clearly that only the writing CMDA granted an exhaustive answer to aporia of the writing *De anima* concerning the unity of cognition and the existing person. The correct cognition enabled the establishment of a correct “meta-physics” as the first science about substance *qua* substance. The analysis of the second Averroism has shown that the predication given by hypostases as quantity and number got a new scientific status in Oxfordian Fallacy. Logical schools influenced by Kilwardby confirmed that fact. Oxford school of analytical logicians active at the time of Duns Scotus continues the line of Kilwardby’s work (Guillaume de Walcote, Guillaume de Bonkes). Kilwardby’s disciples merged the second Averroism developed in Paris with the theory of universal hylemorphism according to Oxfordian Fallacy introduced by Rufus. Causally conceived Porretan species and mathematical abstraction dominated the theory of new science. By the union of all these sophisms done after the year 1250, a complete figure of analytic metaphysics emerged that already kept a full Cartesian character.

### 3.4.3 Truth of Objective Substance

Kilwardby made a decisive step in the sophistry of *Modernorum*. He built up a unified science based on the mythological realm of *tertium ens*. Scotus accomplished this task by correcting the worst errors of Oxfordian Fallacy to make the metaphysics of Avicennism look like Aristotelian first science. Let us investigate one important dispute that set out the academic establishment of analytic philosophy at Oxford after the year 1250. The original dispute over “man—corpse” dated back to *Logica Modernorum*. It passed into the schools of modern *Nominales* that Blund’s school and the first Averroism sent into philosophical purgatory. The logical formalism associated with metaphysics of *Modernorum* was known at Oxford since 1250, especially due to thinking of William of Sherwood (Guillelmus de Shyreswood, †1272). Modernism did not need the existence of the first substance to ensure predication in the context of deductive proof; therefore, modernists abolished classical metaphysics as superfluous. Sherwood rejected the theses of classical logic that the statement “*homo est*” and “*homo est animal*” are taken but equivocally. In his view, the copula “*est*” identifies the predicate “*animal ens*” as so-called “*specificatum*.” Sherwood’s logic shows a new vision of reality through the dispute over the predication “*secundum et tertium adicens*” (Sherwood 2008, 440–47). Cited passage presents objective formalization of the copula “*est*” about 1250. Sherwood related meaning of copula to Anselm’s predication that overruled the classical *enuntiatio* given in *Second Analytics*. At the level of final determinacy of *species specialissima*, modern species established univocal “*res*.” The statement “*homo est*” simultaneously means the existence of the first substance (ibid, p. 444). Such kind of consignification received a univocal meaning in the context of the verb “*est*” with respect to the copula. Abelard and Bacon conceived it strictly equivocally, in opposition to the teaching of *Modernorum* (ibid, pp. 441–42). Due to Oxfordian Fallacy, the metaphysical abstraction disappeared from analytic thinking. The logical copula generates the realm of *tertium ens*, following the division of *Nominales* in the framework of Porphyry’s Tree. The essentialist logic of Sherwood takes “*animal*” as a species in its “*esse habituale*” then predicts that hypostatized habitus in the downward direction, to the contingent substance given as “*esse actuale*” (*praedicatio superioris de inferioris*; ibid, p. 444). This is possible on the basis of Rufus’s concept of material intellect as a permanent source of habituality (ch. 3.3.3). The existential meaning of the verb “*est*” related to the first existing substance has become superfluous in the modern logic. The predicates determine the subject in accordance with Avicenist and Porretan verb “*exsistere*” that make pass the higher form into a lower one. The essentialist logic of Sherwood worked already with the newly established analytical science that Rufus and his successors had introduced at Oxford. The supposition of *Nominales* in the mode *simpliciter* runs in the mode of truth “*semel—semper*” (ch. 1.4) that exists independently of real first substances. After the year 1240, this kind of nominal supposition had to arise quite necessarily at Oxford, due to the implementation of Oxfordian Fallacy. The statute of necessity was established *per se* with regard to analytically conceived middle link of the syllogism (*medium*). Sherwood classified the material supposition in contrast to the formal supposition (*suppositio formalis*). That kind of reduction abolished the relation to the first substance made by the metaphysical imposition. The statements relating to unique things and persons (*suppositio personalis*) were subordinated to the new kind of “*suppositio formalis*” (Sherwood 2008, 198). Logicians as Sherwood introduced the Oxfordian Fallacy into the framework of univocal predication by converting Grosseteste’s logical determination of future contingents into a new categorical predication (ch. 3.1.2). Taken as formal supposition, the statement “*Socrates currit*” acquired the determined character, regardless of actual state of reality (*suppositio discreta*). Beginning of modern worldview followed the insertion of that kind of univocal predication. The new classification of events followed the expansion of univocal supposition. After the year 1250, modernists comprehended it quite objectively and in a complete analytical manner (*suppositio simplex*). Its original source was Anselm’s concept of Neoplatonic signification (ch. 1.2) that Abelard firmly rejected. Sherwood’s correspondence of the thing and the intellect reduced hyparchical meaning of the first substance to the logic. He took steps of Grammarians that Alvernus rejected, since they used a false kind of logical inherence. We have investigated the usage of formal “*inesse*” in Kilwardby’s work *Notule*; before him, it was the position of “*medium*” in metaphysically false kind of deductive syllogism invented by Grosseteste and Rufus. The analytical concept of existence established a different sense of being than the existence defended by Bacon in the context of *actus essendi* related to the first substance (ch. 3.2). The stability of modern “exsistence” is ensured with the reference to divine thought as the ultimate source of forms, see Avicenna’s concept of modern ontotheology in the Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). Modernity created fundamental meaning of real substances in an impossible way.

The question of imposition taken from the first substance is set out in the work *Anonymus Erfordensis*. The treatise was written in Kilwardby’s school and shows the gradual loss of representative function of language in relation to external reality.

“The proposition ‘every human being is necessarily an animal’ and ‘man is an animal’ is true, even if no individual human being existed in reality; the reason is given in the fact that the truth of this proposition keeps the material reality even without the actualized existence of both members of the syllogism (*non exigitur existentia extremorum actu*).” [[495]](#footnote-495)

The passage quoted asserts that the statements in question are meaningful and even true without the imposition taken from actual first substances. Modernity created a new kind of ontological equivalence that abolished the correspondence between the first and second substance. It came to disappearance of the imposition that entails the reality of the first substance. In quoted excerpt, the writing *Anonymous of Erfurt* offers an example of drastic reduction concerning “*suppositio materialis*.” Afterwards, the school of *via Modernorum* in the version of Scotus and other logicians became famous for doing this. The writing of pseudo-Kilwardby draws inspiration from univocal necessity and essence made in the mode “*semel—semper*” according to *Nominales* in school of so-called *sophistae Italici* (ch. 2.3.1).[[496]](#footnote-496) The last unity of meaning (*individuum*) was taken in the metaphysics and logic in a univocal way, and it even supplanted hyparchical first substances. This proceeding attests the influence of Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics*. He mingled for the first time in a sophistical way the real causality, metaphysical, essential and logical necessity. In the second Averroism, the abstraction as *denudatio* completely overruled the *intellectus possibilis* and the *species intelligibilis* as the first Averroism defined them. The *Anonymous of Erfurt* confirms that sciences received the new fundament that elaborated Rufus and Kilwardby in the systematic mode. The material supposition received a purely nominal character in the mode *simplex*. The formal supposition cannot separate different kinds of univocity that are established by difference between metaphysical and logical abstraction. Due to formalization of the supposition, hyparchical attachment to the first substance no longer existed in the logic of modern nominalists. The *Anonymous of Erfurt* adopted Kilwardby’s interpretation of the subject as a privileged fundament of cognition. It represents a typical pattern of the second Avicennism influenced by hypostatized essence and existence of Porretans.

The *Treatise of Erfurt* confirmed the dominance of *Modernorum* at Oxford and at the same time, it provides a precious insight into the nature of conflict between Bacon and Kilwardby. The anonymous writer ordered the status of six principles of cognition according to Kilwardby and Rufus (ch. 3.4.1). The dispute concerned the sixth thesis that at Oxford on 18 March 1277 condemned group of errors named: “*Veritas cum necessitate tantum est cum constantia subiecti*” (*Chartularium* I, no. 474). We must precisely analyze the difference hidden in the terms “*existentia subiecti*” (Bacon) and “*constantia subiecti*” (Kilwardby).[[497]](#footnote-497) Kilwardby considers the subject as a modern *scibile* that acquires a different ontotheological consistency (*constantia subiecti*) than in the first Averroism. It determines the statements in virtue of hyparchical first substance (*existentia subiecti*). Taken in the framework of modern “*constantia subiecti*,” the worldview introduces the certainty of modern subject as fundament of metaphysical cognition. The cognition is given primarily in cognizing intellect. The following statement made in Porretan mode “*semel—semper*” defines modern permanence of the subject (*constantia subiecti*) like this.

“The proof that the thesis ‘man is a substance and thus is also a being,’ proceeds like this: the word ‘is’ relates to the respective thing in the actualized mode, and similarly the ‘being’ (*ens*) relates to the same thing in the form of habitus; the existence of the verb ‘is’ is comprehended in every verb. (…) Then the term ‘being’ is also contained in every word predicted in the habitual mode. Therefore, the substance is a name, it is also understood in the real substance as well.” [[498]](#footnote-498)

Analytical meaning of “being” (*intelligitur « est »*) is taken in a homonymous manner in different categories of meaning: as a substance (*homo est substantia*); as an act of its existence in reality (*per modum actus*); as a habitual cognition in intellect (*per modum habitus*); as an appellative expression of meaning in common language (*in quodlibet verbo*). Finally, there is an equivalence between the thing named and its essential act of being (*ergo substantia sit nomen*). The new science took up nominally conceived species and individuals, because they form a new fundament of modern predication. The modern subject is the only producer of such *tertium ens*, because there is no being of the third kind in reality. The term “*constantia*” entails a timeless essence in Porretan mode “*semel—semper*.” It does not have the same meaning as Bacon’s “*existentia*” based on the imposition that relates to hyparchical being of first substances. The difference between Bacon’s “*existentia subiecti*” and Kilwardby’s “*constantia subiecti*” shows the fundamental difference between Porretan “exsistence” and Aristotelian *actus essendi*.[[499]](#footnote-499) The term “existence” had a different metaphysical meaning for Bacon and for the second Averroism. About the year 1250, the being of the first substance had a complete contradictory meaning, following the twofold truth in the school of the first and second Averroism. The quotation manifests the original thinking based on Oxfordian Fallacy that contributed to fundamental errors in the philosophy of language. Language games of analytical sophists follow the logical supposition made as “*suppositio simplex*”that entails completely univocal meaning. Mythological *tertium ens* of Oxford modernists can easily be replaced with contemporary analytical version of “*constantia subiecti*.” Language tolerates everything, even the logical existence of a chimera. However, such a philosophy without the imposition is not able to find an univocal relation to reality, which is clearly demonstrated in contemporary nihilistic phase of the philosophy of language. The suppositional language games in the *simplex* mode lack the imposition related to real first substances. Critical thinkers as Bacon considered the logical-analytical univocity of being made in the mode of pure nominalism to be the suicide of philosophical thinking, and they proclaimed it publicly. In today’s era when the metaphor is the king and simulacra in medias follow the mode of post-truths, this fact no longer bothers anyone. Moreover, modern God is dead as the last guarantor of objectivity; also everything is allowed.

The polemic of *Anonymus Erfordensis* with Bacon and Albert about the statute of imposition and supposition points to postmodern Descartes. The quotation shows that the notion of hypostatized existence became the stumbling block between Bacon and Kilwardby’s school. They defended the new version of Oxfordian Fallacy as historically first academic school of analytical logic established at Oxford about the year 1250. The term “*constantia subiecti*” indicates the emergence of Cartesian subject in its original *alētheia*. The author attacks the school of the first Averroism represented by Bacon in following statement.

“If you say that ‘the question about the essence presupposes the question about the existence of the thing,’ then I say that the question about the essence presupposes (*supponit*) as well the question whether the thing exists and whether there is the intellect (*si est res etiam si est intellectus*). But the question of whether the intellect exists no longer requires the question (*non supponit*) whether the thing exists; but whether the intellect exists (*si est intellectus*). The statement ‘man is an animal’ is valid beyond the existing human being; it entails the question whether the intellect exists, and not whether the real thing exists (*si est intellectus et non si est res*).” [[500]](#footnote-500)

The first step, even in the mode of modern analytical supposition, ensures the connection of cognition with the existence of the real thing, which is linked to the existence of the intellect (*quaestio quid est res supponit quaestionem si est res et etiam si est intellectus*). The key theorem of modernity asserts that the hypostatized intellect as a Cartesian substance of the third kind does not need the existing real thing for the production of cognition (*quid est intellectus non supponit quaestionem si est res*). For the production of knowledge and truth, the intellect needs only its own reality, because it exists as an independent substance. As a result, the metaphysical dative disappeared from modern philosophy. Following the deductive proof in *Second Analytics,* the real movement of the Sun in the firmament categorically determines the intellect. The eclipse of the first substance determined new position of the intellect in the mode of modern *Ge-Stell*. The meaning of being is determined not by the imposition of sense from reality, but by the pseudo-platonic participation of everything in the highest idea of Good. That privileged position took the modern mythological intellect as a non-existent *tertium ens*. The parousia of being reached the same level in the thinking of *illuminati* as the reality of the first substance. The anonymous author of the treatise follows the logical interpretation of *Second Analytics* according to Oxfordian Fallacy, in which the hyparchical predication disappeared (*Anal. Post*. 84a13–14). Then it becomes clear that the term “*res*” no longer cannot have the same meaning as in the school of the first Averroism; now it is presented in the mode of analytical univocal predication. The writing of Erfurt attributes substantial meaning in the framework of the genus (*homo est animal*) that no longer requires a determination from the real thing. The essential meaning such as arithmetic numbers or the definition of the triangle can be determined at the level *per prius* by intellect alone (*est sumpta a quaestione si est intellectus*). According to Albert and Bacon, this is a kind of insane thinking. Such “philosophy” abolished itself as human wisdom that investigates the truth of the world. The quotation proved the Cartesian self-sufficiency of intellect, which absolutizes the supposition made beyond the existence of real things (*non supponit quaestionem si est res*). The existence and the essence converged into a supposition that founded the thinking of *Nominales* as was Gilbert Porretanus (ch. 1.4). Modernists rely on paranoid intellect, which *ex nihilo* produces meaning of “*esse ratum*.” Such “reliable being” replaced the cognition from reality. Let us see the dispute over the status of “*esse ratum*” and “*esse debilis*” between Albert and the school of second Averroism (ch. 2.4.3). If we allow reflexive auto-activation of the intellect of Rufus, Descartes and Husserl in the mode of Avicenna’s *certitudo*, then the reference to the material reality is quite superfluous. The “transcendental” meaning of external reality appears in the necessarily given “immanence” of the intellect. The modern subject considers the objective *scibile* in evident manner (ch. 3.3.3). Bacon and Albert linked the deductive syllogism with real substances. They defended all the time the theory of truth tied to the ontological primacy of hyparchical substances.

Bacon’s position, we can find it in his early logical works, such as *Summulae dialectices* (ca. 1245–50). Bacon distinguishes between the univocal binding of categorical statements to the first substance (*proprietas termini*) and the equivocal meaning given in logical or mathematical abstraction (*suppositio simplex*). According to Aristotle and Averroes, the determination of the middle link of the syllogism is given according to the principle “*inmediate*” with regard to the first substance. We must correctly recognize it and then scientifically predicate with regard to its causality. According to *Second Analytics*, knowledge requires the actual existence of the thing (*an sit*, λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι; *Anal. Post*. 93b29). The question of the essence comes *per posterius*, because the thing must first exist (ὅπερ ἔχοντες ὅτι ἔστι, ζητοῦμεν διὰ τί ἔστιν, *Anal. Post*. 93b32). Following the metaphysical dative, Bacon clearly distinguished the categorical predication related to hyparchical events in the world (*proprietas termini*) and the equivalent meaning made by logical or mathematical abstraction. Bacon’s categorical statements determined the thing with regard to the first substance. It no longer played a determining role in the teaching of moderns. The new form of gigantomachy deals with the old dispute between the two logical schools: “*Omnis homo de necessitate est animal, nullo homine existente*” (ch. 1.6). The contradictory thesis of *Anonymous of Erfurt* was summed up in the above-mentioned quotation: “*Homo est animal, nullo homine existente.*” According to Bacon, that is pure nonsense. The logical meaning and concept of science cannot arise without the first substance and the causality given in it. Such cognition would never reach the univocity in the order of categories. Reality makes necessary condition for stating causal connections between the intellect and the real first substances. Bacon denounced Rufus of Cornwall in *Summulae dialectices* and later in *Compendium studii theologiae* as one of the sources of this erroneous formulation (Pelster 1949, 175–79). Metaphysical predications of categorial terms are determined by hyparchical reality. It determines the main subject of the predication, i.e., the second substance stated in the framework of univocity made by the middle link of the scientific proof. The middle link expresses *univoce* the relation to first real substances. Abelard already defended that kind of categorial predication. In the decade after the year 1250, Aristotelian “Modists” (*Modistae*) at the Artistic Faculty in the Rue de Fouarre renewed it against the mendicant school of the second Averroism. The secular masters were expelled, since they were forced to leave the Artistic Faculty after the dispute with mendicants in 1255. Boethius of Dacia, Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant codified the teaching of *Modistae* in relation to triple order given in *Second Analytics*, *De anima* and *De interpretatione* (*ordo essendi, cognoscendi, significandi*). The second Averroism predicated the supposition and the imposition in Porretan mode “*semel—semper*. ” This created a univocity of both terms in the mode of subsistent essence as Porretan hypostasis. Such objective causality is determined in the modernist principle “*inmediate*” predicated in the framework of logical necessity. By replacing the imposition from the first substance with a universal substitution determined through the modern subject of knowledge, a new gigantomachy of substance started. The structure of classical metaphysics made *ad mentem Averrois* was no longer valid.

The predication of substance received a different metaphysical statute, because the *suppositum* of statements was not the same in the school of the first and of the second Averroism. The anonymous treatise of Erfurt contests the principle “*ex inmediatis*” according to *Second Analytics*. Following Kilwardby’s example, the author introduced a univocal concept of the substance. According to Bacon, the hyparchical attachment to the first substance (*proprietas termini*) disappeared, since modernists replaced it by logical or mathematical abstraction (*suppositio simplex*). The substance lost the same categorical statute in both schools. It came to the separation of metaphysics according to *via Antiquorum* and *via* *Modernorum*. Bacon and Albert considered such kind of unified science madness against the truth. There was no more Aristotelian correspondence between the intellect and the real thing. At that time, the decisive part of academic philosophy was guided by critical thinking presented *ad mentem Averrois*. These thinkers defended the dignity of the first science in its original truth and wisdom. Therefore, they rejected Avicenna’s philosophy of “Flying Man” that was actualized in the contemporary version called “Brain in a Vat.” Such ideas were at first introduced in Oxford by cited authors of first analytical science fictions. The first Averroism was not under the influence of objectively thinking Furies; therefore, it could not abolish the imposition of meaning from reality. Modernity began to create philosophical and scientific meaning of being made *ex nihilo*. The hypostatized intellect as *res cogitans* was quite enough to do it. The previous chapter has explained how this intellect created a mathematical matter in the teaching of Kilwardby and how it established a new construction of sciences through theoretical physics based on predication of *tertium ens*. The line of argumentation shows that analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* gained a decisive influence immediately in the following decade after Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s arrival at Oxford (1245–50). The self-sufficiency of modern intellect became the main topic of controversy between Bacon and the first modernists at Oxford. The univocal concept of being conceived in the mode of mathematical analogy and extended logic became a recognized teaching at Oxford since 1250. Philosophy of Rufus, Kilwardby, Sherwood and other modernists confirmed that fact. On the other hand, a different situation prevailed in Paris after the death of Chancellor and Bishop Alvernus. There was a serious dispute between both schools. We find yet another situation in the school of Dominicans in Cologne, where Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas lectured a decade later.

The dispute between the Aristotelian existentialists in Paris and the modern essentialists in Oxford had a clear theological subtext. It was the same at the time of the controversy between Abelard and the first modernists. Oxford metaphysicians as Kilwardby and nominalist logicians as Sherwood maintain that Bacon’s definition of science concerns only the contingent causality of first substances in reality. From Kilwardby’s point of view, Bacon kept an insufficiently defined middle link of the judgment when he used the terminus “*constantia subiecti*.” The subject in material reality is but contingently given. Modernists claimed that by binding Aristotelian science to the contingent first substance, the eternal theological truths would have lost their validity. Grosseteste, therefore, extended the influence of modern logic to future contingent events as was the coming of Antichrist (ch. 3.1.2). There was a paradoxical situation when generically different truths of Christian dogmas (the coming of Antichrist) began to change the foundations of logic and metaphysics. The introduction of philosophy as a servant of theology gave rise to ontotheological structure of modern metaphysics. That evolution was made as the one truth unified in modern sophistry, as Tempier’s and Kilwardby’s modernist decree of March 1277 defended it. The dispute between two schools prove the already changed worldview. Established group of modernists at Oxford created the concept of modern science, in which reality was replaced by speculative and mystical ontotheology. The complexity of such attitudes can be illustrated in the question concerning the insight into God’s nature (Hoye 1976, 270–71). Bishop Alvernus declared in 1241 as heretical the thesis that God’s existence, taken in and of itself, cannot be seen by angels or by people.[[501]](#footnote-501) By confirming the direct insight into the divine essence, the dispute over the revelation of God was settled. Neoplatonism considered a direct revelation of God according to the separate principle of the One and following the example of the Old Testament to be practically impossible. Neoplatonists therefore postulated a substitute revelation of God to man in the form of theophany (Dionysius the Areopagite, John Chrysostom, John of Damascus, Scotus Eurigena). This theophany of demiurgic hypostases started to expand in the second half of the 12th century with the arrival of Avicenna’s metaphysics and the new categorial predication after the year 1230. It led to modernist remake of *Categories* in schools of Porretans. Modernity in the figure of *sequaces Aristotelis* adapted Neoplatonic emanations and scenario of comitation to explain *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Latin scholastic theology influenced by Aristotelian Falsafa claims that God is directly recognizable in his essence because he can be recognized in the history of salvation through the prophets, through His Son and through various effects of the Divine Trinity. The same applies to the philosophy of God, conceived in a Christian way and made in accordance with *Second Analytics*. God can be recognized as a *causa prima*. However, philosophy cannot directly recognize God’s existence; this belongs to the field of revealed truths of theology. In this dispute, Alvernus defends the point of view of the first Averroism and its interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Since God is by his nature the acting Creator in the order of causality, his recognition entails the order of scientific demonstrations. The middle link of the deductive proof relates the imposition of effects caused by the real divine causality. The Commentator took the same position by asserting it in the form of the recognizable paths to God that are given by the causality of the first substances (*dalā'il*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The dispute between the first and the second Averroism has shown that if two people see the same thing, it is not the same thing. It is even truer for insight into the meanings of such notions as “*essentia divina*.” The second Averroism considers Neoplatonic form in the framework of species as *tertium ens*; therefore, it defends the direct and uncomplicated insight into any essence. Bonaventura’s commentary on Sentences quotes Alvernus’s order and confirms that God is visible “*in gloria sua substantia,*” because the opposite is heretical according to the first article of the University of Paris cited above (*In II Sent*., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ad 7; *Opera omnia* *II*, ed. Quaracchi, p. 547b). However, this is a completely different view of the divine essence than Alvernus had in mind as a representant of the first Averroism. The first Averroism sees the Aristotelian substance in the context of *species intelligibilis*, because it has no denudation, but Aristotelian abstraction. According to Aquinas’s work *De veritate*, we cannot see the divine *esse* in direct insight (*non potest visio Dei per essentiam secundum primum modum*).[[502]](#footnote-502) The quotation shows that the human mode of cognition works through concepts “*ens*” and “*verum*.” It relates to divine truth and being only in the second place through abstraction and predication. We naturally recognize everything by exposure from the front, from the direction of sensual species (*mens enim nostra naturali cognitione phantasmata respicit quasi obiecta*). That cognition can be transformed, due to the intentionality of receptive intellect, into an intelligible species (*a quibus species intelligibiles accipit*). Bonaventura’s well-intentioned words about the direct view of the divine substance (we see it not as the whole, but nevertheless in a direct way) will not have the same meaning in both schools. Duns Scotus accuses Aquinas in Bonaventura’s line of restricting human cognition to a merely empirical fact, which supposedly excludes a direct cognition of the divine essence (Hoye 1976, 283). The dispute over the insight into the divine essence points to the fundamental difference in the framework of this or that “*obiectum*” of theological and philosophical cognition. The first Averroism cannot accept the direct insight into the divine essence in the philosophy, because it exists only in the prophetic and mystical experience. Both schools worked with a different concept of truth, cognition and meaning of being. The representatives of both schools did not see God’s essence in the same way, which created a cardinal problem for the church hierarchy after the year 1270.

The hermeneutics of objectivity shows the emergence of Averroism through the conflicting relations between first and second Averroism until the year 1250. The controversies took place in one way at Oxford and in another way in Paris. Kilwardby and Rufus studied together for some years in Paris, where the first Averroism prevailed until the death of chancellor Alvernus; but both scholastics had to leave this school with great probability during the ministry of bishop Alvernus. The modern sophisms stood in obvious contradiction to the text of *Second Analytics* and *De anima*. All teaching of such kind was fundamentally rejected at the local alma mater until the year 1250. After the death of Alvernus, the situation changed and the finest hour of Bonaventura’s modernist school came. They came from the academic underground into full historical effectiveness. The main obstacle of modernism was the condemnation of *intellectus agens* acting externally on man. Alvernus rejected this teaching at the academic assembly of the Paris University as heresy. That is why Averroes was accused of external influence of cosmic intellect on the human intellect. His simulacrum became an academic scapegoat that took upon himself all sins and errors of *Modernorum* and it carries them to this day. The attack against the Arab commentator as a Christian heretic was unthinkable in Paris until the year 1250. The university was dominated by critical thinking given *ad mentem Averrois* according to the Sicilian school. Averroists as Rufus and Kilwardby had to return from Paris to Oxford, where they victoriously completed their careers in academic and ecclesiastical circles. After them, the same fate arrived to Pecham. Settled in Paris, he did not withstand the criticism of Aquinas and Siger in 1271. Finally, Thomas of Aquin left Paris one year later, since in turn he did not withstand the criticism of Siger’s followers in the Rue du Fouarre and the wrath of mendicant modernists as well. Both groups rejected his semi-Averroism from the position of the first and second Averroism (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.3). We have noticed that conciliatory William of Auvergne by no means took a radical condemnation of modernists, which was a key (and fateful) decision for the nascent school of the second Averroism. As a connoisseur of *Second Analytics*, Alvernus respected twofold path to the one truth given by generic difference between theology and philosophy. Therefore, in his function of Parisian bishop and chancellor, he rejected only those teachings of *Modernorum* that directly endangered Christian concept of God and man. The golden age of modernism begins after the return of both Latin sophists to Oxford, which Bacon described in the case of Rufus (ch. 3.2.). Rufus, according to Bacon’s testimony, began to teach at Oxford in 1250. At the same time, Kilwardby introduced here the new nature of sciences according to modern metaphysics. After the death of Alvernus, the triumphal march of *Modernorum* began in Paris as well. The second Averroism continued the editing of *Summa Halensis* (1240–56) made by Bonaventura’s school in Paris. A decisive fusion between Oxford modernists and Parisian Averroists took place in Paris at the time when Rufus served as regent of Franciscan students and lectured on Sentences. Oxford modernists associated themselves with Bonaventura’s school that Alexander of Hales founded. They emerged from Babylonian captivity of critical philosophy and finally freed themselves from the tutelage of the first Averroism. The second Averroism became an independent school when sophists in Paris led by Bonaventure joined their Oxford′s counterparts. Both of them adopted the analytic philosophy of Rufus a Kilwardby. Parisian attack of Bonaventura on Averroes’s metaphysics followed previous attacks of Rufus and Kilwardby that took place at Oxford. At that time commentaries on Sentences made by Rufus and Bonaventura in Paris were published to finish their master’s studies. Rufus wrote very probaly his masters commentary on Sentences in the same time as Bonaventure (1252–56).

It's easy to understand why the first great conflict was taking place at the same time between the academic mendicants and the secular masters at the University of Paris. The center of nascent modernism was the chair of mendicant orders, which was established at the University of Paris by the Bull *Quasi lignum vitae* issued by the Pope Alexander IV (1255). It was the date when modernism officially emerged in the academic circles of Paris. Master Guillelmus de Sancto Amore was dismissed from the University and from the position of the Rector at the time when the modernist Rufus received the master’s degree at this alma mater. Rufus becomes a master of theology about 1256 and Bonaventure in the year 1257. Both Franciscan modernists receive full *licentia docendi* and both lectured in Paris in newly created bastion of modernism. Now it is evident that the main crisis between the mendicants and the secular magisters broke out just in this period. At the latest in 1255, Aristotelian magisters ordered the compulsory study of *De anima* in the Rue du Fouarre, which made part of the curriculum at the Artistic Faculty. The masters from the Rue du Fouarre responded positively by introducing the interpretation of *De anima* to sophistry of learned Latins from the school of second Averroism. The struggle about true interpretation of *De anima* in the line of bishop Alvernus, probably was the last decision of Guillelmus de Sancto Amore as the rector of the University. Siger of Brabant as the last Aristotelian rector of the University of Paris followed the steps of his predecessors and brilliantly fulfilled the meaning of classical philosophy *ad mentem Averrois*. The students Gérard of Abbeville and Nicolas of Lisieux probably left the University as the rector Wilhelm, eventually. In 1255, the first Averroism lost for the first time power struggle due to the departure of eminent magisters and the rector, who was picked up by mendicant modernists. They received their own chair at the University in the same year. The mendicant modernists regained academic power for the first time. Rufus as the founder of modernism, left the University of Paris and returned to Oxford for the second time. His extremist position was no longer tenable after the concentrated attack of secular masters settled in the Rue du Fouarre that were joined by Albert and Aquinas. Thomas entered the University of Paris as lecturer for the first time. After the year 1255, Oxford modernists in Paris were no longer in danger. Bonaventura as Rufus’s follower supervised the modernist line at the Faculty of Paris. As a newly appointed magister, he took up the new chair of mendicant orders and continued the modernization of metaphysics. Rufus is probably the first master in Paris to achieve this dignity at the newly founded Mendicant Faculty. Then he returns to Oxford, where he dies around the year 1260 in the function of *magister regens* of the Franciscan College. Thus, Oxford definitely became the bastion of modernism in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy, which makes its *raison d’être*.

The struggle of the first and the second Averroism credibly explains the persecution of Roger Bacon. When Bacon’s friend Fulquode was elected Pope Clement IV in 1265, in the following year he requested Bacon’s major work known as *Opus maius*, which was written despite the enmity of Franciscans at Oxford (Bérubé 1969). Neither teaching at Oxford, nor friendship with the Pope saved this representative of the first Averroism from persecution on the part of powerful modernists. His academic conflict with Kilwardby and Bonaventura was inevitable. Bacon considered the thinking of modernists pure madness (*insaniunt contra veritatem*, ch. 3.4.2), and his persecution lasted for a whole decade. Bacon’s persecution corresponds with his second stay in Paris (about 1256–80). It was the time when the second Averroism after the conquest of Oxford opened a triumphal procession to the local alma mater after 1255. Both of the indicated treatise *Opus maius* and *Opus minus* (ca. 1267) explain Aristotelian worldview and classic philosophy to preserve them against modernists. By editing *Opus maius*, Bacon made the same enlightening work as Albert the Great, who completed the integral commentaries on Aristotelian Corpus in the same decade (ch. 2.4.3). The academic persecution culminated with the internment of Bacon as Franciscan tertiary in the Franciscan College of Paris around 1277–79. The ban on teaching and the restricted publication permit were established in 1277, which clearly identifies Bacon as a follower of the first Averroism. The general of the Order Jérôme d’Ascoli (Girolamo Masci), who later became Pope Nicholas IV. immediately ordered after the condemnation of 1277, that distribution of Bacon’s works among the Franciscans was prohibited. This condemnation indirectly confirmed Bacon’s quarrel with the previous superior general of the Franciscans, also with Bonaventure. His work *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* (1273) indirectly criticizes Bacon’s educational project of the teaching of philosophy. Bacon, for his part, in *Opus minus* critically assesses the activity of the unnamed master of the school of Alexander von Hales, who abuses the title of master of theology, and his writings are full of errors.[[503]](#footnote-503) For Bonaventura, the specification “*intravit ordinem Fratrum puerulus*” applies, but not the other specification (*nec unquam legit philosophiam, nec audivit eam in scholis*; ibid, p. 327). However, if we take the criticism of the collective work *Summa Halensis* as harshly and ironically as Bacon, then the aforementioned ignorance of philosophy also applies to Bonaventura.[[504]](#footnote-504) Bonaventura was one of the foremost adherents of the Hales′s school, which Bacon, for the reasons already explained, did not consider as an authentic philosophy, but as a collection of modern sophisms. Bacon calls the group of second Averroists second-rated philosophers and not theologians at all (*vulgus philosophorum quam theologorum*; *Opus minus*, p. 360). Bacon’s criticism is reminiscent of the quoted passage of Albert about the ridiculousness (*ridiculum*) of the works of those pseudo-learned *Latinorum* with whom there is no point in debating (ch. 2.4.3). Bacon harshly refused the group of second Averroists born during the editing of *Summa Halensis*: “This unnamed Franciscan magister allegedly wrote down that large summa, heavy as a horse. Moreover, he did not compose them himself, but others.” (*Opus minus*, p. 326). The preceding matrix has shown that Alvernus made criticism of the same group that he called *sophistae Latini* (ch. 2.3.1). The dispute between the first and second Averroism was no longer a purely philosophical matter after the year 1250. This was yet true about the year 1240, when the concept of science followed the twofold interpretation of *Second Analytics*.

After the introduction of dual metaphysics made according to *Modernorum* and *Antiquorum*, a head-on collision occurred. The question of the subject of the first science is raised in two competing projects: Avicenna’s and Averroes’s metaphysics. The dispute about twofold truth of metaphysics was done in this or that interpretation of Aristotle as a *condition sine qua non* of philosophical discourse. The fundamental characteristic of the second Averroism consisted in eclecticism of all kinds, which resulted in the one truth made in the framework of ontotheology. The philosophical terms acquired a theological meaning and vice versa. It was an important time when the first official attack on Averroes took place in Paris. The second Averroism could enter into open conflict with the first Averroism in Paris only after sophistic criticism of Averroes as a heretic. The heretical and publicly condemned thesis about the separate cosmic intellect had to be collated to Averroes, who became an Averroist. Therefore, after the year 1250, the school of *Modernorum* began a new dispute over Averroes. They did not comment on his imposing figure as the philosophical Commentator, but they condemned him as a religious heretic. The attack on Averroes made by modernists in both mendicant orders represents the basic *terminus* *post quem* that dates the emergence of modernism. This philosophical Bastille did not need to be conquered in Oxford, as Kilwardby had already done it around the year 1250, but in Paris. It was there where the center of university education of that time was located and also the center of the first Averroism. The first attack began in Paris about the year 1252, that is, very soon after the death of bishop Alvernus. Bonaventura published a commentary on the second book of Sentences and followed up on Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s philippic against Averroes (*positio Commentatoris super librum de Anima… pessima est et haeretica*; OBJ III, ch. 4.1.3). Bonaventura, like Kilwardby and Rufus, deliberately misinterpreted Averroes in totally sophistical manner. Therefore, he had to call this Islamic philosopher in the style of Oxford *Modernorum* a Christian heretic in order to transfer the dispute from competent philosophical discussion to a power-related dogmatic discourse. Aegidius Romanus continues that attack in the same spirit a generation later, by writing the work *De erroribus Philosophorum* (c. 1270). His sophistry proved Averroes’s “heresy” by ad hoc collected theological quotations.[[505]](#footnote-505) Ernst Renan took over this sophistry when he wrote an objective thesis on Western averroism in the time of postmodernism.

The core of the dispute between the two schools about in the year 1250 was the status of theology and philosophy. Fundamental generic separation of both sciences was based on *Second Analytics*. The dispute between Bacon and Bonaventura in this question is not easy to be investigated. Bonaventure criticizes the study of philosophical works, since they confused theologians.[[506]](#footnote-506) The similarly negative view of “*curiositas*” concerning the philosophy offers the work *Collationes de donis Spiritus sancti*.[[507]](#footnote-507) Bacon’s *Opus minus* made criticism of the central part of Bonaventura’s teaching as well. Bonaventura demands the independence of the new theology from the classical Aristotelian philosophy presented *ad mentem Averrois*. Bacon rejected the thesis that the wrong philosophy of modernists should dominate theology (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*).[[508]](#footnote-508) Bacon defends the twofold path to truth in the sense of independent dignity of both theology and philosophy (*dignitas philosophia*). Each science has its own field of research and truthfulness; therefore, no kind of knowledge taken from the outside should determine the other kind of science (*nulla facultate extranea debit dominari*). The masters in the Rue du Fouarre, who protected the critical view of science against the modernists of all kinds, unanimously referred to the validity of *Second Analytics* by insisting on the impossibility of transition from one genre to another within the framework of the one *demonstratio*. They defended this point of view in the declaration of the University of Parisdated on April 1, 1272 (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). This was the reason for Aquinas’s departure from Paris at the end of April 1272. Being a theologian, he was not ready to recognize this twofold path of scientific research according to *Second Analytics* presented *ad mentem Averrois*. The previous chapters and the *Anonymous of Erfurt* have shown that the second Averroism abolished the thesis of generic difference concerning sciences. Modernists opted for the new type of univocal predication given within the framework of universal supposition. The attack of the second Averroism on Aristotelian philosophy started from the year 1250 onwards. Modernity defended the position of erroneously made unitary ontotheology. Modern *illuminati* need not to look for the correspondence between thought and reality. They keep the truth in the way taken *absolute*, that is, in the virtue of completely separated *certitudo* made out of their dogmatic teaching and by objectively given *rectitudo* of their opinions. Aristotelians did not become academic dissidents in Paris until about 1270. However, Bacon became a philosophical dissident, right after the year 1245 under Kildwardby’s ministry as rector at Oxford and later in Paris under Bonaventura, until his death. At the Paris University, dominated by Bonaventura’s school and the school of second Averroism, the Dominican and semi-Averroist Thomas Aquinas escaped Bacon’s fate; but not the secular magister Siger of Brabant as a brilliant connoisseur of Averroes and Aristotelian metaphysics. This master and rector of the Artists wasn′t protected by any authority coming from a religious school. He defended true philosophy solely through his own genius and honesty combined with the defense of academic freedoms against the dogmatic, power-hungry modernists who defended their own unique truth. All these fundamental changes determine the approach of hermeneutics in the study of the following matrix of objectivity in the years 1250–77. The dispute between Bonaventura, Kilwardby and Pecham, on the one hand, and Bacon, Siger, Aquinas and Albert on the other, made the clash of two major schools. The conflict between the two schools broke out with full force in Paris after 1250 and sent the dispute of Averroism to the second stage. After this date, the objective worldview left the closed environment of artistic faculties in Paris and Oxford and toop up epoch-making influence throughout the Latin West.

## 3.5 Modernization of Avicennism

Making use of the triad “historiality—historicity—history,” hermeneutic archaeology determined emergence of modern science (*ortus scientiarum*) in their proper nature and place. The imagined existence of the thing made by *Nominales* became a objective body (ch. 1.6). This pseudo-substance (*res*) has come into the world and into modern thinking to be finally at home (*eís ídion*) by making the epoch of its own (*Ereignen*. Since the time of the learned *Latinorum*, this *tertium ens* dwells among all educated people in the form of objective being. Western *illuminati* adopted this *tertium ens* as their own thing of intellect (*idiotés*). Making use of that *genitivus subiectivus* and *obiectivus* of modern historicity, that idiotic *tertium ens* takes its own nature in the cours of Western history (*ereignet sich*). It addresses scholars to deport them (*Ge-Stell*) into the realm of objective science in order to accomplish the tragicomic *a/lētheia* of divine Muses. Since the famous lecture by Max Weber (*Wissenschaft als Beruf*, 1917), science has been an objective vocation (*Beruf*). The birth of modern science dates back to the first round of head-on collision between the classical and modern interpretation of metaphysics in the years 1230–50. As far as the historicity of philosophy (*Geschichte der Philosophie*) is concerned, this conflict represents the decisive event when the objectivity came into being. We should separate the emergence of the modern subject from the beginning of objectivity.[[509]](#footnote-509) Objective concept of the modern subject will be analyzed in the third part of the essay.The quarrel of Porretans with Aristotelians began in Paris as early as the year 1200, which can be approved in Blund’s commentary on *De anima*. Blund’s school took up the dispute between Abelard and the *Nominales*. They resided in the Abbey of St. Victor founded by Neoplatonist Guillaume de Champeaux (ch. 1.6). Classical metaphysics defines true cognition as an accident universally established in the intellect, which adequately accepts real being of first substance. Blund’s difference between the internal species of cognition and the external form of the thing made possible to establish the theory of truth as similarity between the thing, the senses and the intellect. The schools of new Alexandrians in Oxford and Paris formed a historical analogy to Averroes’s contemporaries (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The first modern commentaries on *Second Analytics* (Grosseteste, Rufus, Kilwardby) set out the transformation of cognition in the school of second Averroism. Its first historically effective figure was introduced to philosophy by Grosseteste and it was reinforced by his two most important followers, Franciscan Rufus and Dominican Kilwardby. They shaped the first historically effective form of modernism in the philosophy of the school that was called “*sophistae Latini*”. Franciscan community of Oxford *illuminati* became the original place where objective determination of being appeared, in the years 1230–35. It was alma mater of modernist Rufus of Cornwall that became the leader of new *intelligentia spiritualis*. The analytical „philosophy“ of this school elaborated the new concept of science based on direct intuition of essentially conceived forms. Deduction of meaning starts from the logically conceived second substance, which is mistakenly given as the first substance. Truth as certainty is given in the primary deduction of meaning from the essence given in the “*semel—semper*” mode following the pattern of Oxfordian Fallacy. Fateful disappearance of the first substance was possible due to newly formed middle link of the deductive syllogism. Aristotelian principle “*ex inmediatis*” based on necessity of the metaphysical dative has been modernized into the logical necessity. Then the theory of truth is valid as correlation (*coaequatio*) of two forms of the *tertium ens*: one being of the third kind is a superior eternal form; the other being is given in the contingently given thing as a special form of universals existing outside the human mind. Metaphysical abstraction and deduction that provided the basis for Aristotelian science were replaced by their modern simulacrum, i.e., by logical abstraction and deduction. Afterwards, the univocity of being refers to the self-sufficient and quasi-substantial intellect of *Modernorum*. Such drastic changes in thinking provoked a principal conflict of modernists with the first Averroism.

A new round of gigantomachy between Neoplatonists and Aristotelians was triggered by the reception of Averroes in the Latin West from 1220 onwards. It came to a new event of metaphysics (*Ereignis*) that transcended the horizon of Falsafa. This event founded the second Averroism as well and caused the extinction of nominalists schools. These logical schools operating in the framework of *Logica Modernorum* joined the second Averroism. The key event that unleashed a new metaphysics was Scotus’s interpretation of the Commentator done in the line of the first Averroism coming from the Sicilian school. He lectured at the University of Paris around the year 1230. At this time, Grosseteste left the University of Paris for Oxford. He expanded the Franciscan College in Oxford to be the fundament of university dominated by Porretan logicians and by Avicennists from the school of *Nominales*. The classical school of Aristotle′s interpreters followed the line of Boethius and Abelard. They were at best disposed to appreciate Scotus’s interpretation brought from Sicily at Paris University. Averroes’s *proportio* guaranteed an adequate relationship between the first and the second substance in the first Averroism of Blund’s school. The univocal predication determines true scientific cognition based on the deductive syllogism of *Second Analytics*. The representatives of the first Averroism defended Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* and classical Aristotelian theory of truth as correspondence between intellect and real substances. The philosophical dispute turned very quickly into an ideological dispute related to religious power. Kilwardby defended the second Averroism in an authoritarian manner, which was shown by his quarrel with Bacon and Thomas Aquinas (Destrez 1930). The hermeneutics of objectivity states that this rector of the Oxford College and later Archbishop of Canterbury (since 1272) makes a direct connection of the second Averroism defended at Oxford with all the key issues discussed in the disputes of 1270–77. It is no coincidence at all that the Declaration of the Magisters in the Rue du Fouarre, which defends the autonomy of theology and philosophy, appears in the same year 1272 when this modernist was appointed archbishop of Canterbury and was the Chancellor of the University of Oxford. The representatives of the second Averroism carried out the first purge of Aristotelians at the University of Paris in 1256. The difference between the first and the second Averroism after the year 1250 can be summed up in following points.

* The dispute over the condemnation of “Averroism“ where the first Averroism of Aristotelians and the second Averroism of *Modernorum* opposed to each other in principle.
* The dispute over twofold nature of truth: there was Averroes’s *proportio* in the school of the first Averroism against Neoplatonic *rectitudo* and *certitudo* in the school of the second Averroism.
* The dispute about existential unity of the person and about the numerical unity of the intellect. In contrast to *intellectus possibilis* according to the CMDA, there was a unity of mental abilities based on objective and hylemorphic *intellectus materialis*; it related to the cosmic *intellectus agens* given as separate substance.
* The dispute over the statute of species: Averroes’s *species intelligibilis* were not compatible with modernists *species* given in the mode of eternal essences.
* The dispute over the eternity of the world. On the one hand, there was the hypothetical proposition of Aristotelian philosophy, which neutrally negotiated both the eternity of the world and the creation of the world by the First cause. On the other hand, there was the unified ontotheology of dogmatic modernists; they had intuition into the divine intellect even before the beginning of creation.
* The dispute over intuition of divine essence, since the second Averroism observed the divine species mystically and directly. The first Averroism considered scientific proof of God in the mode “*quoad nos*” according to school of Modists and the CMDA. Mystical insight into the divine essence and philosophical knowledge of God as the First cause are different in terms of genre.

Thinkers of the first Averroism made in the paradigm of the Sicilian school took for granted that Averroes could not be an Averroist under any circumstances. The school of the second Averroism considered the Commentator a heretic and a fallible philosopher. In the following generation, some semi-Averroists and theologians (Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius Romanus) influenced by the Avicennism of the Toledo school accepted the modern simulacrum of Averroes.

Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* has started the eclipse of the first substance since 1230. His exegesis opened the eyes of young Latin scholars studying at Oxford around 1235. They came to Paris for master’s studies afterwards. The reception of Avicenna’s corpus in the version of the Toledo school influenced the interpretation of *Corpus Aristotelicum* at Oxford. It contributed to the emergence of modernity about 1240 in Paris. The sophists of Oxford combined the new interpretation of “science” in the paradigm of Oxfordian Fallacy with the changed statute of *Categories* in logical schools of Porretans, *Grammatici* and *sequaces Aristotelis*. Albert, Bacon and other critical thinkers rejected the Oxford school in the name of the first Averroism. Their interpretation of aristotelian Corpus followed Averroes’s line in the paradigm of the Sicilian school. The sophists of Oxford share the criticism of avicennists that Averroes had made in his day (*hoc contrarium est ei quod contingit Modernis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4). Nobody then nor now is educated and perfect if he is not an Alexandrian modernist (*nullus enim es sciens et perfectus apud eos nisi qui est Alexandreus*). The reception of the Commentator at Oxford simply meant that Neoplatonist Avicenna received an Aristotelian cloak, which he wears to this day. However, the first modernist Grosseteste was still an excellent Aristotelian. He was aware of problems hidden in the conversion of cognitive principles. He saw a certain ambiguity (*aliquantulum obscura*) in the scheme in which the imposition disappeared from the predication of the first substance. In this he differed from Philip the Chancellor at the University of Paris, who at the same time carried out a full conversion of transcendentalia in the concept of *resolutio*. The highest Platonic genres of being united under the idea of Good became the elements of Aristotelian categorical predication (ch. 2.3.2). Grosseteste formally carried out the same Neoplatonist conversion of cognitive principles to a formal basis. The conversion of the first principles of cognition, which was carried out in Oxford around the year 1230, was seamlessly linked to the conversion of transcendentalia, which Philip the Chancellor introduced in Paris at the same time. However, Grosseteste uphold a critical Aristotelism of the Blund’s school and still considered a certain problem in the conversion between the first and second triads of the principles of cognition. Grosseteste became the first Latin modernist, because he was the last representative of classical metaphysics in the emerging modernity, who reflected the effect of *a/lētheia* in the eclipse of the first substance. His term “*aliquantulum obscura*” reflects for the last time the truth and untruth of modern science, which does not need the reality of the first substance to perform a deductive proof. This epochal event (*Ereignis*) started eclipse of reality and inaugurated the objective interpretation of real events as the solar eclipse by means of false interpretation of *Second Analytics*. The double negation (i.e. the real Sun and the metaphysical first substance) results in an affirmation in Latin. Through the condensation of sophistic darkness, the light of the modern mind shone on Oxford *illuminati*, according to the famous metaphysical “obscurity” that Averroes found in Avicenna′s teaching. The young Oxford bachelors, who had come to Paris around the year 1235, they no longer saw any ambiguity. The first modernists came from Oxford and they found their magisterial teachers in the school of Alexander of Hales and Philip the Chancellor. They refused the school of Blund’s successors headed by bishop Alvernus, to which Albert the Great belonged as well. Aristotelian metaphysics practiced *ad mentem Averrois* got two entirely different interpretations according to the Sicilian and to the Toledo school. New interpretation of *Second Analytics* must be considered from the point of view of the triangle of historiality, historicity and history. The truth given by intuitive and mystical insight into being influenced the interpretations of *De anima*. It was the main reason for subsequent controversies over so-called Averroism. Built on metaphysical errors, modernism had to assert itself mainly in an authoritarian way in the first phase that inaugurated its history of effets. The epochal effect of Oxfordian Fallacy imposed the thinking of Latin sophists through the power of the archbishop of Canterbury (Anselm, Kilwardby, Pecham), which protected the realm of sophisms created at Oxford. The same development started in Paris after the year 1277. Preceding matrix analyzed the origin of analytical view hidden in the Porretan term “*discrete videamus*” (ch. 1.4). This event of mythological thought (*Ereignis*) opened up scientific investigation of the non-existent diacosmos created by *Nominales* and constituted the epochal error of modernity (*Irrtum*). Heavenly mysticism and ecclesial power of modern *illuminati* went hand in hand. This sacred bond of modernity has now changed into a fusion of nihilistic ideologies of all kinds. They are promoted by political power in the framework of Deep state and transnational corporations.

Let us return to effects of the metaphysical dative. Albert defended the principle of reality against the school of Oxford modernists that arrived in Paris after the year 1235 (ch. 2.4.1). The event of past donation of being (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas*) determines the true recognition of the first substance. The original metaphysical donation established the here and now given being of the first substance (οὐσία, τόδε τι). That real substance acts *ex inmediatis* in the scientific proof and thereby establishes the secondary recognition of this being in thinking and in the universal mode. The analytical exchange of the first triad of the principles of cognition with the second changed the worldview in direction of the Anthropocene. The parousia of the first real substance in mind, which was previously given as a donation of being, now came under manipulative power of the subject (*Ge-Stell*; OBJ I, ch. 1.2). This conception of being is fundamentally paranoid. The mortal does not create things in thinking, but recognizes them only. The revenge of Muses was delayed for a couple of centuries, but it had a tragic divine character. After the decline of the University of Paris in the accomplished age of Enlightenment, Oxford became the main center of objective modern education. Grosseteste’s hesitation as “*aliquantulum obscura*” disappeared in modernity and it was replaced by tragic paranoia (*Irre*) of victorious objectivity. The analytical determination of “*inesse*” in the middle link of scientific proof was fatally simple, and according to Bacon at Oxford, also fatally flawed. The mixture between two types of universality given *per se* made the first hyparchical substance disappear from modern metaphysics. Real causality and the necessity established by the fact of the world's existence (*actus essendi*) no longer played a decisive role in the scheme of cognition. The generation of modernists came to Paris from analytically minded Oxford for master’s studies. They had absolute clarity in the question of scientific knowledge of reality. Rufus (ch. 3.3.1) and Kilwardby (ch. 3.4.1) conducted the change of worldview during their studies in Paris in the years 1235–40. Mendicant *illuminati* from Oxford excellently complemented the local elite of modernists from schools of *sophistae Latini*. That group began to compile the entirety of the work *Summa Halensis* around the year 1235 under the leadership of Rupella and then Bonaventura. In this school of first modernists, the truth of objectivity in its *a/lētheia* established by Grosseteste, passed into the complete unconcealment of *veritas* that founded epochal metaphysical *Irrtum* of the West. As a result, it came to abolition of schools teaching Porretan logic. They passed into modern interpretation of *Categories* and *Second Analytics* to establish the new stream of analytical modernity. The self-confident and learned sophists in Oxford and Paris produced further versions of Oxfordian Fallacy in the next generations. Let us recall that at the same time in Paris Alvernus as the Chancellor of the University criticized the Neoplatonic Falsafa and especially Avicenna as problematic successors of Aristotle (*sequaces Aristotelis*) and he praised excellent interpretations of Averroes (*philosophus nobilissimus*, ch. 2.3). The deformation of cognition with regard to the essence and its effects confirms the new interpretation of Aristotle’s work, namely *Categories*, *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. The interpretation of these works will become the basis of future disputes in the scholasticism, which once again bring to light the gigantomachy of Falsafa between Avicenna and Averroes. The history of the West has confirmed that speculative *illuminati* of the second Averroism created a mythopoetic science of modernity. Misled by power of sophisticated Muses, they defeated the concept of “weak” intellect in the first Averroism. The cognition in virtue of such “strong” intellect may found the world of mathematics, but by no means the metaphysics that investigates real first substances.

From the year 1250 onwards, the philosophy faced the fundamental dispute regarding the following major points: the statute of human knowledge; the theory of truth; the unity of being; the nature of God in metaphysics. The second Averroism misinterpreted both major sources of classical metaphysics: Aristotle’s teaching and Commentator’s interpretations. The modernists founded a new form of metaphysics, which led to the formation of objective thinking. It came to the new kind of Neoplatonic doubling of reality. Such insane proceeding brought about consternation of Averroists from the first wave. They included Parisian bishop Alvernus, Roger Bacon, Albert the Great and their philosophical successors in the Rue du Fouarre. Bacon met the first school of *Modernorum* directly in Paris, because he obtained his master’s degree there sometime about the year 1240. According to him, the introduction of authentic Aristotle represents an epochal task of type “*horribilis difficultas*” (Wéber 1991, 74). A decade later, Albert argued against the group of modern sophists and he fulfilled the same task. In his writings dedicated to the unity of the intellect after the year 1256, Albert summarized the teaching of this school called “*opinio Latinorum*” (ch. 2.4.3). Bacon, Alvernus Albert and, to some extent, Grosseteste rejected the new worldview that was created in the period 1235–45. The critics of *Modernorum* from the ranks of the first Averroism understood that it came to a radical change in meaning of being. New metaphysics refers to Aristotle and to Averroes only formally, without a real knowledge of their work. Rufus of Cornwall became the founder of objective relation to reality, and also laid out the foundation for the dispute over alleged Averroism of the Commentator. The first generation of modernists studied the collections of hypothetical examples of modern logic (*Sophistaria*); they became in the following decade the masters with the full degree of *licentia docendi*. This change in the second Averroism, dated somewhat from the year 1240, can be traced by transformation of the second Averroism. It came to the transition from Alvernus’s term “sophists Latins” (*sophistae Latini*) to Albert’s ironic designation of this group as “learned Latins” (*doctores Latini*). The new magisters (Kilwardby, Rufus, Bonaventura) began to form the next generation of philosophers and theologians in mendicant schools. After the year 1255, a new type of Western sophist appears at the mendicant chair in Paris in the guise of a university academician. Guillelmus de Sancto Amore of the secular Artistic Faculty in the Rue du Fouarre heavily criticized the group of modern sophists in the new mendicant faculty. Modernity created a new cosmological myth. Under the leadership of modernized Furies, those sophists secured their own intellectual reproduction in the mode of “cultural hegemony” (OBJ III, ch. 4.6). This objective mythology thrives excellently today, even in more crazy formes. The frenetic contemporary production of various being of the third kind also corresponds to this fact. Modernity replaced the quest for the truth by unlimited production of simulacra that attest the power of modern subject (“knowledge is power”). The more simulacra the modern paranoid subject collects in the theory of truth as assimilation, the larger portion of reality it controls.

The dispute between two schools entered a dramatic and confrontational phase after the year 1250. Twofold truth regarding substance fundamentally changed meaning of the thing (*res*) from the point of view of metaphysics. The first Averroism had no theory of twofold truth; it worked with hyparchical first substances and made the imposition of such categorical meaning from reality. God or any first substance exists in reality as such; it exists as actualized being, in and of itself. We must give an exact account how we recognize such real things: whether by reason on the basis of metaphysics, or by divine revelation on the basis of theology. In the first Averroism, the thesis implies two ways of cognition that concern the one truth, or which explore twofold path to the one truth. It is the scenario of *Second Analytics*. The sciences of different genres do not have the same method of research, since their knowledge determines the metaphysical dative related to first real substances. Aristotle and the Commentator define the final level of univocity of philosophy in the framework of generic meaning given by the imposition on the basis of the second substance. This predication is adequately given with regard to reality. It therefore justifies the first science in a univocal manner. The science of classical Aristotelianism is not objective, but true. The first Averroism defended the correspondence of reality and intellect. It was based on the causality of first substances that was rendered in deductive categorical statements. The specific recognition of the second substance is not transferable from one genus to another. Theology and philosophy, for example, recognize the real causality of God as the first substance. But the middle link of the scientific judgment (*medium*) of each of these sciences is determined by a different conception of God and the second substance. The generic unit of meaning given at the categorical level of the second substance (God in theological revelations of the Bible; God as a philosophical *causa prima*) is not transferable from one science to another. But the final goal of diverse cognition of all sciences is this or that existing real substance. According to Aristotelians from the school of the first Averroism, it was clear that modernists understood the being in pure homonymy, because they abolished the imposition of metaphysical meaning from the first substance. Modernity destroyed the basic orientation of Aristotle’s metaphysics as the first science of hyparchical substances that exist beyond us. Modernity replaced the existence of the first substance by the act of formal “*exsistere*” related to the essence. Then, in the logical mode “*semel─semper,*” it is always true that there is a permanent form given in the intellectual insight of parousia and illumination. Afterwards, it undergoes a contingent actualization in reality through the various forms of Avicenna’s comitation. The first substance ceased to be recognized about the year 1240 because of the “disobedience of matter” (*inoboedientiam materiae*, ch. 3.3.2). This art of intellectual docetisme began to determine modern science. The group of *illuminati* at Oxford created about 1235 a new matter of the third kind in the mode of universal hylemorphism. It came to complete mathematical and logical obedience of mythological matter. As a result, a new worldview was formed, in which the classical concepts of metaphysics no longer carried original meaning. Under the pontificate of bishop Alvernus about the year 1240, the University of Paris became the historically first place of fundamental dispute between two types of metaphysics. The metaphysics of *Modernorum* takes as basis is no longer Averroes’s or Aristotle’s first substance, but certainty of the modern subject. Modern God produces as intellectual cause everything in terms of reality: first in divine thought and then in creation. The first Averroism wisely left creation to God and his unfathomable intentions. Therefore, aristotelicians dealt with the recognition of already existing first substances and understood God as *causa prima* in the metaphysical dative that follows the past character of the first substance. The completely separated being of anti-modern God was predicted by scientifically demonstrable causality of the real world. The mystical *illuminati* want to know even more, since they assimilated God to their ontotheological theory of truth. They created modern God as mythological being and started to contemplate his thinking and his creative intentionality in a paranoiac manner. The manipulative power of modernity based on modern God as ontotheological fundament of objective metaphysics became the opium of imperialist Western thinking.

Being the powers of punitive justice, Furies punished modernists for their hubris by production of metaphysical chaos and demonic logic. Such worldview not only changed the theory of truth, but also created a modern logic with a new set of values. The analysis of Grosseteste’s logic showed that the exposure of being from behind created the validity of logical statements as taken from divine perspective (ch. 3.1.3). The logical value of events is determinable in the future; which is impossible in classical Aristotelianism. Modern truth or untruth is determined by eternal divine intentions, instead of existing first substances. To be modern and logical, this means that every actualized or even just potential being is the function of eschatological necessity. It is not the French Revolution that changed the course of modernity to the future; the demonic modern logic based on coming of Antichrist did this. The truth value of every logical statement is given *absolute* in the history of salvation and in eternal divine intentions. The new form of logic separated itself from the cognition of reality, in which necessity is linked to existing first substances through the metaphysical dative. Eschatological *illuminati* at Oxford established a modern logic in the framework of the new ontotheology. The truth value of logical function called “Antichrist” is given in the mode “*semel—semper*” since it situated in immutable divine thinking. The only thing that is changeable is his arrival here and now; the eternally determined basic value of Antichrist as an eschatological substance is given in the modality *absolute*, that is, completely detached from reality. The arrival of Antichrist plays the role of modern mathematical function, to which the corresponding variable is assigned (objectively true Antichrist comes or does not come). Supreme certainty regarding the arrival of Antichrist can be attributed to ontotheological and mystical process of his arrival in the future that is already determined by God. Now let’s replace the variable about the future arrival of Antichrist with the already given present event of his arrival. The formal necessity passes from the possible mode *non sequitur* to the real mode *sequitur*. The originally indefinite (but already bivalent) being of the thing or event changes into a currently given and thus also truthful or untruthful state. The substitution of the first substance for the indefinite “*esse incompletum et indeterminatum*” made it possible to create the formalized logical function of type *f(x)*. Every event (*x*), logically belongs to the original eschatological and ontotheological function (*f*). Their connection represents the corresponding variable in the formal statement *f(x)*. Modern logic was no longer shaped by common Aristotelian sense. Modern branch of logic passed to mythology based on eschatology produced by Oxford Franciscan *illuminati* under the leadership of Grosseteste and mainly Rufus. The mystical reality was determined by *Book of Revelation* and by interpretations made by Joachim of Fiore. Those “events” had a cosmic and necessary character for Oxford Franciscan scholars. This mystical diacosmos of modern mind replaced in a mythopoetic way disobedient and changeable first substances that were perceived only through the bodily senses. Mystical numerology and modern logic invaded metaphysics through Oxfordian Fallacy. In a first step, modernity has created a modern God; in a second step, it has invented an objective Antichrist; and finally, it has constructed a schizophrenic Adam. The modern subject makes chaotic collection of dissimilar substances and hypostases, which the *illuminati* established with regard to themselves as the basis of cognition (*subiectum*). The modern subject creates “his” own science as an objective similitude of being of the third kind, which he regards as univocal within and outside himself. The fundamental task of modern science is knowledge as nihilistic power over the modern God, over the modern man and over the objective world. The first idol has already died; the second is the non-existent *individuum* and *concretum* of concentration and labor camps of the XXth and XXIst centuries. The third idol has just reached the final stage of its nihilistic existence, objectively called “Anthropocene”.

The certainty of the modern subject followed eschatologic worldview of first *illuminati* that founded the age of computer science. Rufus’s mythological version of *informatio* is based on necessary arrival of Antichrist that Grosseteste elaborated. His idea went in the digital epoch. The arrival of Antichrist was digitized by the fact that this being of the third kind received a binary meaning in the eschatological logic made as *modus ponens*. This objectively important, but really non-existent substance founded binary computer science. Computer science is justified by the fact that instead of Antichrist, the emitted electron comes or does not come. The discovery of the transistor effect (1947) founded the structure of bipolar transistors (type NPN or PNP). The emitting or not-emitting of electrical impulses from the emitter (E) goes to the base (B). The base responds to the arrival of an electron by an exponential increase in physically given activity in the collector (C). After the arrival of the electron, the physical subject given at the level of the transistor base (B) creates a higher voltage in the collector. This combination of classical physics with modern logic gave rise to computer science. The frenetic activity of modern subjects (C) awaiting the arrival of the Antichrist (E) reveals the emergence of a new *intelligentia spiritualis* in Oxford after the year 1235 (B). If Antichrist or the electron comes, then the activity of human or physical subject increases accordingly. Physical events took on a new meaning in the order of modern logic. The physical causality given as emission of the electron carries the objectively logical and thus informatics message originally given as Rufus’s *informatio*. The ontotheological production of being of the third kind created a homogeneous world of modern physical abstraction, which is given by measurable inputs and outputs. A mathematically indexable output is important for modern science. This manifests itself as objective *concretum*. It is given by the synthesis of subjective produced facts (*facta*), interconnected by means of mathematical analogy. The modern metaphysics does not need to care about the cognition of the real substance. Any individual unity of meaning represents an objective entry into the hypostatized thinking of *illuminati*. This *subiectum* acts as a universal database for all being of the third kind (*locus specierum*). Introduction of ontotheological production created unlimited sets of *tertium ens*. Like this, a homogeneous world of modern abstraction was created, which is given by measurable entries of all kinds. The power of logical illusion empowered by academic Furies through Grosseteste and his analytical school at Oxford. That power received a global character. The modern God died a long time ago; but the empire of financial derivatives still happy lives ever after, since it is based on so far non-existent arrival of Antichrist. Financial derivatives as simulacrum proliferate like a cancer in the last times of generalized neoliberal stupidity. They metastasize into the financial bubbles, turn millions people into beggars and cause hybrid wars. Modern knowledge is not true but powerful. Since the 19th century, various authors (Francis Bacon, Thomas Jefferson) have used the saying, “Knowledge is power.” Modern knowledge is metaphysically paranoid. Because of its modern untruth, it must conquer the whole real and therefore true world. *Fiat iustitia Modernorum, et pereat mundus Antiquorum*. The new world is ruled by modern Furies as powers of “subject—objective” chaos. Therefore, we have entered the nihilistic epoch quite correctly called the “Anthropocene.” The subject of this epoch is no longer man as a person, but as a modern concrete individual, determined by the status of the “man—corpse.”

Modern philosophy of unique mythological truth came into being in the environment of the second Averroism, due to absolute value of logical supposition. Modernity transferred the cognition of reality in objectively made logical abstraction based on Avicenna’s *denudatio*. The world of first substances changed into a diacosmos of objective essences united in virtue of Neoplatonic analogy. Rufus gave individuality and causality even to arithmetic number (*numerus*), thereby establishing modern mathematics. The smallest abstract unity of meaning (*numerus*) brings about meaning of being that is no longer divisible (*individuum*). Comprehension of this individual becomes mathematically definable in the framework of analogical similarity, since the number defines the individual in the causal mode *per prius*. Rufus defined metaphysics in the mode of Avicenna’s evidence. The certainty of knowing subject is extended to necessarily and universally given *coaequatio* based on mathematical abstraction and numerical analogy. The modern conception of truth as *coaequatio* and *certitudo* relates to mathematically conceived metaphysics as *causa certissima*. Vision of pure forms enabled production of mathematically given meaning. The mathematical nature of the world in the second Averroism was linked to extinct schools of *Nominales*. The nominalistic union of mathematics and metaphysics got a new value by reading Avicebron’s work *Fons vitae*. The arrival of the new matter of the third kind allowed Rufus and Kilwardby to radicalize the concept of science in the first analytical commentaries on *Analytica posteriora* written in the years 1235–40. Rufus gave the academic form to that “analytical” interpretation of reality. The new ontotheology given in the context of Oxfordian Fallacy established an analytically based science in Kilwardby’s work *De ortu scientiarum* written about 1250. Kilwardby, in his authoritarian role as an educator and as the most important ecclesiastical dignitary in England, introduced the metaphysics of *Modernorum* as official academic teaching at Oxford. Bacon represented the school of the first Averroism at Oxford of those days. He declared this doctrine to be a fatal error and insanity with regard to the theory of truth. During Kilwardby’s tenure as rector, the second Averroism already dominated the University of Oxford. Bonaventura’s school could succeed a decade later at the University of Paris, and only partially. In Paris, the school based on Oxfordian Fallacy became fully established during Rufus’s second tenure, when an academically strong school of second Averroism emerged. It was not until the decree of Étienne in 1277 that local modernists achieved full victory when they liquidated the school of first Averroism in Paris. Historical simulacrum of “twofold truth” worked through another simulacrum called “Averroism.” That doubled sophistry successfully supplanted the real philosophical dispute between the two schools. The work of modernist-minded Furies in Oxford and Paris objectively concealed the new round of gigantomachy of substance.

The first Averroism rejected basic metaphysical errors of modernism, which was established academically first in Oxford and then in Paris by founding the faculty of Mendicant orders. Albert and others rejected the double conception of science given due to misinterpreted scheme of Aristotelian knowledge (*duplex scientia ex phantasmate*, ch. 2.4.3). Aristotelian logic follows metaphysical logos based on the metaphysical dative. Therefore, it is true that the real existence establishes intellectual essence, and not vice versa. The future potency or substance of the third kind cannot justify any logical statement, even if it were untrue. Modern science runs in the mystical and logical framework. Modernists refused so-called “contingent events” in reality to be fundaments of their metaphysics. Such an absurd science was built on the manipulation of various kinds of *tertium ens* and on demonic modern logic. It had to create the notion of a “double truth” in the next generation of Oxford and Parisian sophists. Manipulated by divine Furies, modernists duly followed Freud’s theory called “*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*” to impute their own intellectual nonsense to the first Averroism, which they thereby authoritatively destroyed in the year 1277. Forgetting of the first substance caused the lost of reality in the modern metaphysics. This epochally important activity of modernists (*factum*) was projected in doctrine of Averroes by means of inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). Done in that way, the metaphysical wandering of modernity (*Irre*) has been established. It makes justice to divine duty of *a/lētheia* guarded by the Muses. The religious *illuminati* then made out of the Commentator a demonic scapegoat and they chased that simulacrum out into the desert of academic *damnatio memoriae*. Taken in the perspective of logic based on metaphysics, the real figure of Averroes has become the first academic demon of modernity. The sophists always create the double of reality, since the dialogue *Sophistes*. Then it is clear that academicians professionally designed and intellectually initiated witch trials from the 14th century on (OBJ III, ch. 5.5). Averroes as a true philosopher of Falsafa entered the modern tragicomedy. He bears in such a stupid way all punishment for metaphysical insanity of Christian modernity. The same fate was shared by the wisest of all people that was condemned by Athenian sophists. This mechanism of academic violence is repeated in the case of Abelard, Bacon, Guillelmus de Sancto Amore, Siger of Brabant and William Ockham. Modern sophists could object that their academic sacrifices for the modern truth bear names Rufus, Kilwardby and Pecham. Modern truth has a double nature, of course. Around the year 1255, the main act of divine tragicomedy, which officially directs Western rationality, was completed. It is no coincidence at all that in the period 1245–70, all major metaphysical treatises made by Bacon, Albert and by magisters in the Rue du Fouarre were directed against the second Averroism.

Oxford modernists such as Rufus and Kilwardby gained new followers in the campaign against the Artistic Faculty in Paris after the year 1250. New Franciscan magisters, such as Bonaventura had grown up in schools of the second Averroism. They were compilers of *Summa Halensis* and got involved in disputes with Aristotelian magisters in the Rue du Fouarre. Bonaventura led the dispute with the school of the first Averroism at the University of Paris until his death in 1274. His philosophy transposed modernity to the stage of full historical influence. Modernists fundamentally changed the correspondence theory of truth and the hyparchical statute of existence defended in *Categories* and in *Second Analytics*. Latin sophists introduced the essence as the first category of predication in apparent relation to Averroes’s metaphysics. The archaeology of objectivity has shown that questions of quantity, species, genus, *materia prima*, immaterial cosmic bodies, causality etc. are in a fundamental contradiction to the philosophy of the Commentator, because they start from Avicenna’s metaphysics. The second Averroism lost the first substance treated in *Categories*. It reduced the first substance to disparate collection of *ad hoc* created accidents and various kinds of *tertium ens*. Modernity lost the categorical imposition that follows *quidditas* in the middle link of scientific syllogism, in order to truthfully signify the hyparchical first substance. The recognition of the real first substance and its categorical predication makes no longer a starting point of modernity. The intellect of *illuminati* carries out the supposition of the obviously given meaning of things (Avicenna’s *intellectio*, Anselm’s *rectitudo*, Grosseteste’s *intellectus*, Rufus’s *scibile*). Modernists then assert contingent existence of real things with deductive certainty of Grosseteste’s, Rufus’s and Kildwardby’s *demonstratio*. The production of the supposition given in pure intellectual insight became the basis of the modern meaning of being as being (*ens inquantum ens*). Original creators of that objective mythology are academic *illuminati* led by Rufus. Rufus started all these struggles for substance through the analytical conception of existence (*exsistere*), which forms only an attribute of the essence. The original cause that triggers cognition is no longer a first substance in reality, but a formally given certainty of cognition in thinking. Rufus consciously changed Averroes’s definition of truth as *proportio* and *similitudo* of the intellect and the existing real thing. The new correspondence concerns logically defined essences. The truth is given as a modern *coaequatio* that Rufus borrowed from Porretans and from Anselm. Neoplatonic certainty of the insight into the realm of hypostatic forms, Rufus supplemented it by analogical similarity in the framework of Porretan hypostases. Their last basis forms the realm of mathematical numbers. The real non-existent modern individual is divided into non-existent substances in a schizophrenic way. It became the absolute assessor to claiming meaning of being in the objective deontological mode of the truth (*debet esse*). In a positive and veritable manner, in the mode of subjectively assured existence, modern *illuminati* started to determine (*esse ratum*) whether the first real substance has any right to its weak and debile reality. The modernity must determine the place where the right of the first substance to exist actually comes from. Hermeneutics has set out the beginning of the path called *via Modernorum* that newly founded science took in the years 1230–50. They updated the potential of Anselm’s truth as *rectitudo*. The second Averroism took up the slogan “Away from the first substance!” to start the adventure of modernity. In the nihilistic epoch of the eclipse of the first substance, Husserl transforms this slogan into a return to the lost substance of the third kind. Hermeneutic archaeology examines in footsteps of Parmenides and Socrates, how divine historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) manifests itself in the historicity (*Geschichte*) of philosophic thinking. In the last times of irrational thinking (*novissimum*), modernity created a fundamental turn (ἐποχή) characterized by eclipse of the first substance. The original meaning of the term “*epokhē*” symbolized the immersion of the world in the primordial chaos during a full eclipse of the Sun. The new epoch began with the eclipse of the critical mind, which no longer distinguished between the metaphysical and the logical level of abstraction. The study of astronomical eclipse in *Seconds Analytics* gives an excellent example that disclosed erroneous proceedings of modernists. The thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy abolished hyparchical meaning of the first substance, replacing it with the cognizing subject of modernity. The imposition of meaning from first substances ceased to determine thinking, since the supposition of the essence sophistically replaced real being. The logically determined essence plays the role of metaphysical *quidditas* by replacing the first substance with simulacrum. The insertion of essence in the demonstrative proof led to suppression of metaphysical dative. Aristotelian *ousía* in reality turned into an objective *parousía* in glorious thinking of *illuminati*. The causality of first substances passed into objective sense of essences. This modern revelation of reality as a simulacrum is tragic and archaic, since divine powers of philosophical Revenge have directed it. Their subjective incorporation is now quite visible, since vengeful modernists took that divine role against the first Averroism. They took themselves for punishing powers of history to take the metaphysics on the right part of *via Modernorum*. After then, the tragedy of modernity that started in Late Antiquity changed into modern tragicomedy in Christianity. The school of *sophistae Latini* was founded by mortals who developed a truly insane theory of truth (*insaniunt contra veritatem*) as an assimilation of non-existent *tertium ens*. Since then, *illuminati* has been certifying, indexing and digitizing various objective collections of *tertium ens* that they have created themselves. The revelation of being in modernity (*Lichtung*) is given by the metaphor of Avicenna’s active solar intellect. Averroes declared Avicenna’s light of reason to be darkness of thinking. Aristotle’s greatest interpreter of all times replaced the Neoplatonic scheme in his interpretation of *De anima* with personal cognition based on receptive and synthetic faculties. They follow existential necessity of first substances. Subsequent generations of Oxford scholars followed this path of Avicennist untruth, which completely obscured the meaning of the first substance. The metaphysics of the second beginning of scholasticism started in this epochal *Lichtung* that determined the untruth of *via Modernorum*. The obscurity of Avicenna’s metaphysics deepened with introduction of Grosseteste’s “*aliquantulum obscura*” (ch. 3.1.1). He still considered the forgetting of the first substance and the suppression of the principle “*ex inmediatis*” to be a problem. Later modernism and postmodernism have been blind to the reality of the first substance, because they see only the objective simulacrum. The erroneous interpretation of astronomical eclipse in *Second Analytics* led to a complete eclipse of the first substance in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. Metaphysical nihilism realizes cognition based on its own light provided by hypostatized intellect. Rufus’s concrete predication followed the path of Grosseteste’s Oxfordian Fallacy. It points to the place and time where the first objective determination of being in the Latin West was born in the years 1235–45. The original hylemorphic substance (*compositum*) given as the first substance in reality became in modernity an objective composite of the first and the second substance (*concretum*). The introduction of the concept of “concreteness” created a new category of amphibolia (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). The fundament of science became an objectively given *positum* that was based on sophistic form of objective metaphysics. Rufus had outlined it a decade before. Modern science fundamentally changed ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) that grasped the first meaning of being. The epochal eclipse of the first substance determined a new perspective how the world has been observed. Objective individuality replaced real being of the first substance. Modern *illuminati* need the first substance only to obtain additional certainty to assess the objective *scibile* that has been already proved. Kilwardby founded modern science to be accomplishment of an epochal event of nihilistic thinking (*Ereignis*) that started at Oxford. Under leadership of Rufus and Kilwardby, the school of the second Averroism found a new place of science beyond the causality of the first substance. Hermeneutics traced the emergence of modern science (*ortus scientiarum*) as the transition from Rufus’s mathematical objectification to Kilwardby’s speculative metaphysics. At this time, both modernists were lecturing in Paris. They had to leave the University about the years 1245–50 after criticism of bishop Alvernus and other masters of the school of the first Averroism, as Albert and Bacon.

Let us briefly deal with the end of the divine comedy, which Muses staged around the year 1230 for the first time. After decline of metaphysics in the late Scholasticism, the objectivity passed in the last stage of metaphysical nihilism. The modern univocity of being followed essential substance of the third kind. That kind of substantial being took up Averroism in the Renaissance. Alessandro Achillini (†1512) is the first forerunner of postmodernism, because he introduced the concept of Good as an individually given objective essence. This third, quite postmodern reception of another simulacrum of Averroes is a direct precursor of Cartesian postmodernism. The work *De dictintionibus* made reception of Latin *Modernorum* based on Neoplatonist nature of universals. The essence of Good acts as the final cause in the objective mode of univocal necessity given *per se*.[[510]](#footnote-510) The work quotes Averroes’s text *In III Metaphysicae, commento 3* (*Met*. 996a27–28) in the first postmodern meaning of causally given objectivity. Achillini adopted the modern concept of causality based on the essence, which was the case of Rufus and Kilwardby. The definition of universal substances follows the Tree of Porphyry to the no further divisible individual (*per indivisibilitatem*; Matsen 1974, 268). The already extinct second Averroism lives on in Renaissance Averroism by presenting new division of objective reality. Then it is no longer a problem to carry out the postmodern division of sciences, which started the school of Philip the Chancellor; . Foucault completes this nihilistic division of sciences at the end of metaphysics. The first Averroism found its disciples thanks to resurrected authentic first Averroism at the University of Padua. Its best representative was Galileo Galilei. He became the founder of anti-modern, that is, empirical physics based on the first triad of cognitive principles (*ex primis et veris et inmediatis*). The Renaissance school of Averroism took up the dispute between the Toledo and Sicilian school. Galileo solved that struggle by adopting the concept of experimental science according to *Second Analytics*. The enlightened postmodernism repeated once again the whole drama of cognition. Kant works with the nominally given “thing in itself” (*Ding an sich*), which is defined as the so-called *Phanomenon*. The phenomenality of the world in the consciousness of cognizing subject is separated from the *Noumenon*, that is, from the real first substance. Kant has no direct access to the real world given by the imposition. His epistemology works only with *scibile* as the supposition that is synthesized in the consciousness of the cognizing subject. There is no theory of truth as correspondence according to Averroes’s *proportio* in Kant’s philosophy. He is a postmodernist as Descartes and the real world is exposed from behind. The work *Kritik des reinen Verstandes* created two floors of innate principles given at sensual and intelligible level. Kant tried to avoid intelligible hypostases (Leibniz) and empirical hypostases (Locke, Berkeley). Therefore, he conceived a twofold *a priori* objectivity, which he defined purely formally as “*potentia substantialis*”of Rufus. Kant hypostatized cognitive forms according to Rufus by constructing *a priori* given forms of empirically determined intellect. Kant tried to abolish in that futile way Neoplatonic theory of cognition based on Porretan hypostases made by Locke and Berkeley that made use of Leibniz’s causality of mathematical *scibile*. The pure forms of sensual intuition (space and time) created *a priori* established level of first intelligible hypostasis (*reine Anschauungsformen*). Those forms are necessary to make the synthesis of sensual species. However, in contrast to objectivists Locke and Leibniz, Kant, as an objective Aristotelian, let these *a priori* structures be actualized only due to empiric cognition given from the direction of real first substances (*Analogie der Erfahrung*). Being actualized through the sensual reception, Kant made yet another innate principles on the second floor. There are hypostatized intelligible forms as pure concepts of mind (*reine Verstandesbegriffe*). The new categorization of logical relations is again given *a priori*, since it follows the logic of Porretans and replaced Aristotle’s table of categories. The result was the creation of twofold level of innate principles given *a priori*. They directs the synthesis of postmodern objectivity in virtue of indispensable conditions. The first floor of cognitive principles *a priori* (*reine Anschauung*) reminds of hypostatized *intellectus materialis* dating back to Themistius and Avicenna. Since space and time exist in *a priori* established form, pure mathematics is possible. The second floor of intelligible principles and categories has the character of Porretan hypostasis that works asa hypostatic *intellectus agens*. That kind of active intellect forms the basic substrate for the synthesis of concepts. Therefore, the synthesis of concepts starts beyond of empirical matter and experience (*transzendentale Logik*). Cartesian postmodernism radicalized by Kant exchanged the production of exemplars coming from modern God for production of *a priori* given postmodern meaning that produces exclusively the human subject. Postmodernism comes to objectively given things in a similarly radical way through Husserl’s eidetic evidence (*auf die Sachen selbst zurückgehen*). This evidence forms the principle of all other principles (*Ideen I*, § 24). Husserl’s concept of being as “*noema*” of consciousness is nothing more than a supposition produced by the subject in the framework of objective *scibile*. Heidegger saw Husserl’s problematic fundament of being right at the beginning of his path that led him to original historicity of Being. Cartesian concept of existence does not arise primarily from the question of being, but from the secondary question of evidence that entails the self-cognition of the reflecting subject. According to Heidegger, phenomenology must be given as hermeneutics based on the existential analysis that directly and immediately confronts the meaning of Being.[[511]](#footnote-511) Aristotelian Heidegger, after reading *Nicomachean Ethics*, got rid of Husserl′s Avicennism. Moreover, the later interpretation of epochal sense of Being as *Ereignis* done after the famous turn of thought (*Kehre*) completely abolished anthropological and transcendental level of *Dasein* in the new thinking of *Da-sein*. Just as fatally, Husserl separated himself from Aristotelian Brentano at the beginning of his journey to the post-Kartesian first philosophy. Husserl’s *Pariser Vorträge* (1929) supplemented Descartes’s postmodern *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1641). Husserl’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy follows the notion of “*Fundierung*” made by Alexius Meinong (†1920).[[512]](#footnote-512) He founded the nihilistic version of Oxfordian Fallacy by exposing the meaning of being from behind. The foundation of meaning in consciousness (*Fundierung*) ensures the identity of sensual cognition (*Vorstellungen realer Gegenstände*) and eidetic imagination (*Vorstellungen idealer Gegenstände*). The syncretism of sensual and universal experience took up Husserl around the year 1900. It based the existence of the third kind of Rufus’s “*scibile*” (ch. 3.1.3). The nihilistic epoch of metaphysics confirms the primacy of logical and mathematical abstraction in the neopositivism through the new intellectual intuition of reality. Husserl had to overcome Meinong's objective psychologism around 1900, by reworking Meinong's syncretism of sensual and universal experience. Husserl’s lectures from the winter semester 1887/88 make a supplement to Meinong’s notion of *Fundierung* mentioned above.[[513]](#footnote-513) Writing *Logische Untersuchungen* *I* (1900) entails the first phenomenological form of Husserl’s *Fundierung*. Proceeding of pure logic is defined beyond the realm of psychology.[[514]](#footnote-514) After Grosseteste’s eclipse of the first substance, both above-mentioned postmodernists (Meinong, Husserl) completed another *epokhē* from reality to keep eidetic insight into being of the third kind. Due to postmodern psychologization in consciousness of the cognitive subject, twofold eclipse of the first substance took place that characterizes the nihilistic stage of Western thinking. With regard to the real causality of things in the world, the predication *per prius* ceased to shape cognition of the world, of man and God. The dispute between the critical Objectivism of Popper and the Viennese Neopositivism over the statute of deductive proof shows the new constellation of Oxfordian Fallacy in the age of metaphysical nihilism. The contemporary forms of *tertium ens* observed by eidetic intuition deny even the objectivism of original scholastic modernity, since they underwent another round of phenomenological or analytical reduction. Therefore, modern man and then modern God became a specific corpse. The subject of media, politics and banks created the army of intelligent slaves to produce a continuous simulacrum of so-called post-truths. This Potemkin village of contemporary thinking in so d “humanities” conceals the real world. Academic mythological tales serve nihilistic interests of the corporate one percent that make the global class of contemporary *illuminati*. They are related to *species specialissima* of the one per thousand of banksters that produce the mythology of financial derivatives and the realm of global virtual debts. This objective demonology constitutes the last epoch (*novissimum*) of nihilistic objectivity that produces the contemporary corporate fascism.

After the disappearance of the first substance and common sense from modern metaphysics, archaic powers of intellectual Vengeance completed the confusion by establishing new nature of the Western subject. In the sixth part of *Discours de la méthode*(1637), Descartes defined the ultimate guarantor of deontological truth to be a new demiurge (*maîtres et possesseurs de la nature*). The new master of nature founded all being on the subjectively given reason that derives from his mortality. This nihilistic claim of the modern subject to keep all meaning of the world, Leibniz absolutized it in the principle of sufficient reason (*principium reddendae rationes sufficientis*). Heidegger made it clear that the key part of Leibniz’s principle is hidden in the ontological nature of “*reddendae*” that makes a modern form of “*re-presentatio*”.[[515]](#footnote-515) Put into the mode “*debet esse*,” reality must receive an additional evident representation that justifies the contingent existence of real first substances. Objectivity acquires such a strong semblance of truth in postmodernism that those entities that are real, they should apologize for the fact that they exist at all. If reality is fully objective then it is modern and scientifically true. Leibniz completed the postmodern concept of being by establishing nihilistic metaphysics in the primacy of cognizing subject. His path to the deontological truth of postmodernism is formally the same as that of the first Oxford *Modernorum* about the year 1235. The complete procedure of deduction or the derivation of existence according to Rufus’s model can be found in the treatise *Principles de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison* (1714). In that postmodern version of Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum*, Leibniz goes to the foundation of the first, eternal, necessary and metaphysically given principles of reality and derives from them the actualized being of the contingent first substance.[[516]](#footnote-516) Leibniz begins by determining what is separate but from a pure non-existence. Then, in the mode of “*debet esse*,” he adds to it subjectively established principle of existing things (*elles doivent exister ainsi*). In the second step, he introduced the first substance and secured the real world in the mode of primary objectivity made in the new form of Porretan deduction. Every being has a subjective right to objective existence given by the univocal mode *simpliciter* and *per se*. This paranoid “right to real existence” is conceived indiscriminately logically and metaphysically in the mode of Rufus’s *scibile* (*rien est plus simple et plus facile que quelque chose*). It is good to know where all postmodern liberal rights get their metaphysical origin in the form of « *debet esse* » made by Leibniz. Afterwards, the postmodern science made in Kant acquired the transcendental right to compare everything with the image of enlightened demiurge. Kant’s work *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784) proclaims that in contrast to the mindless nature, man has received the epochal task of producing the meaning of being exclusively out of himself (*er sollte vielmehr alles aus sich selbst herausbringen*).[[517]](#footnote-517) The hermeneutics of historicity consider this text to be the basic doctrine of enlightened modernity (Umlauf 2010, 262–65). Kantian imperative (*sollen*) has a historial character because it establishes the truth as *rectitudo* of the enlightened epoch in Anselm’s mode (*quod debet esse, recte est;* ch. 1.2). The will to power has prevailed in modernity through the deontological approach to reality. Things are called into being by the will of the Creator, which, according to Anselm, forms their truth. It has a higher deontological authority that prevails over real existence. The world must be what demiurgic thinking of modern God is. After his death, thinking of man forms deontological basis of postmodern metaphysics. The disobedient reality had to be defined and manipulated in the same way as the human individual that forms a specifically determined corpse. The system based on abstract circulation of knowledge and capital make classifications and sorting out of each individual *scibile* in the mode of economically quantified cognition. The colonial and imperialist assimilation of human resources and raw materials represented an epochal burden of the British and later the American white man.They carried it triumphantly in the assimilation mode of the capitalized truth of the West.The British author Joseph Rudyard Kipling supported the American colonial claim to the Spanish Philippines by poetically celebrating the enslavement of a demonic creature that is “half-devil and half-child”.[[518]](#footnote-518) For the sake of objective recognition and taming concrete savage individuals or Kipling’s demonic being of the third kind, there were established human zoological gardens at the end of the 19th century (OBJ III, ch. 5.5.). The person ceased to exist in the objective human sciences, because it turned into the objective “exsistence” of this or that *scibile*. The following century replaced the human zoological gardens with extermination camps and two World Wars. The concentration camps were humanized into corporate labor camps in the Third World that remind Dante’s first circle of hell made in the era of corporate capitalism.

Aristotle’s universal species became a gnostic body of the third kind and continued to reside among modernists in the form of scientifically recognized *scibile*. The truth as assimilation and equality founded the objective system of knowledge and the objective reality corresponding to it. Porretans started dialectical classification of hypostases by introducing the universal division carried out in the framework of *Arbor Porphyriana*. They conceived the first modern continuum of mythological world made in the mode of universal hylemorphism and mathematically determined quantity. This hypostatized quantity has turned into a purely formal difference that is established by relation to nothing. The last distinction from nothingness as impossibility of further division established in *Isagoge* atomic meaning of the individual (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Bonaventure and Olivi took this indivisibility as a second substance ontologically positive, in the mode of positive nihilism (*non repugnat esse*; OBJ III, ch. 5.1.1). Thereby a purely nihilistic being of the third kind was born in modern metaphysics. This formally determined difference then founded the integral and differential calculus in mathematics from the 17th century on. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, this objective *scibile* of modernists finally became a mere distinction within an arbitrarily given structure that is based on a linguistic model (*valeur*). Modernists consider the world from the point of view of formal representation made at the level of mathematical abstraction, outside of real first substances. The classification of sciences based on postmodern ontology was initiated in Goclenius’s work *Lexicon Philosophicum* (1590). Scientific classification of modern *scibilia* was introduced into biology by Carl Linné (*Systema naturae*, 1735). Its importance for development of human sciences was brought to a climax in the age of nihilism by poststructuralist Foucault. His work *Les mots et les choses* (ch. X) created a new Tree of Porphyry that dated back to postmodernism. Foucault investigated the classifications of reality made on the basis of postmodern productive sciences (biology, economics, and linguistics). The human sciences have abolished themselves in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. Productive *epistémé*, created by Foucault postulates a possible disappearance of *scibile*, metaphorically called “man”.[[519]](#footnote-519) Man is a discovery whose recent origin is set forth in Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge done in the age of accomplished metaphysical nihilism. Foucault’s humanism followed this aforementioned development and changed the definition of man into an irrational game of differences. In the nihilistic age of accomplished the journey of modernity, analytic Furies necessarily brought about death of modern God and the end of objectively conceived humanism. We are now entering the epoch of Anthropocene when the destruction of all life on Earth is imminent. The beginning of modern thinking took as a basis the specification of “man—corpse.” Modern subject established in that manner makes a similar meaning to the whole world, which is fully visible in the epoch of scientific-technical nihilism. Mythological dance of Shiva or Furies gave rise to the postmodern simulacrum of contemporary human sciences in the 13th century that came to end in the 20th century. Knowledge established in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy conquered the disobedient matter by objectively assimilating the world. It was done first in the British Empire and then by corporate fascism of the warlike 20th and 21st centuries. In the time of globally enforced nihilism of international corporations, the fate of the entire planet is already at stake. In the epoch of the Anthropocene, the Earth has become a specific, individual and concrete being of the third kind.

### Abbreviations

**ABMA** William of Ockham: *Dialogus. Latin Text and English Translation. Edited by John Kilcullen, John Scott, George Knysh, Volker Leppin, Jan Ballweg, Karl Ubl, Semih Heinen*. The treatise *Dialogus* is quoted according to the digital edition *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi* (www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/).

**CCSL** *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*. Ed. Brepols, 1953—.

**CMDA** *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima Libros*. F. Stuart Crawford (ed.). Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.

**DK** *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* *I—III*. Herausgegeben von Hermann Diels und Walter Kranz. Curych: Weidmann 1952.

**GA** Heidegger, Martin. *Gesamtausgabe*. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main (1975—).

**Hegel** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969—1971 (Theorie-Werkausgabe).

**KdRV** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The first edition in 1781 (Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1904, Band IV.) is quoted as „A“. The second edition in 1787 (Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1911, Band III) is quoted as „B“.

**KdPV** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Berlin: Akademieausgabe 1913, Band V, 1–163.

**KdU** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Berlin: Akademieausgabe 1913, Band V, 165–485.

**KSA** Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*. Hg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari. München und New York 1980.

**LCDA** Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba. *Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle*. Translated and with introduction and notes by Richard C. Taylor with Therese-Anne Druart, subeditor. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009.

**OBJ** *Hermeneutik der Objektivität I—III*. In the text, the tome and the chapter are quoted.

**PL** *Patrologiae latinae cursus completus*. Ed. Migne, 1844—1864.

**RRP** *The Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project*, University of Stanford (http://rrp.stanford.edu). Richard Rufus of Cornwall.*In Aristoteli Analytica posteriora* (ed. Rega Wood); *Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (eds. Rega Wood & Neil Lewis, 2013); *In Aristotelis De anima. Redactio brevior. Liber 1–3*. (Eds. Christopher J. Martin, Neil Lewis, Rega Wood 2007).

**SZ** Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 171993.

**WA**  *The Works of Aristotle I—XII*, ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford, 1908—52.

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Václav Umlauf

Hermeneutics of Objectivity II.

Tragedy of Scholastic Aristotelianism

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1. “Die Sage »des“Anfangs ist Anfängnis als Sagen. Das Sagen ist Er-eignen in die Wesung der Wahrheit als entbergende Verbergung. Dieses Er-eignen enthält die Wesensfülle dessen, was das Er-eignis zu denken fordert.“ (GA 71, 297) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. “Hier ist ein Heros, der Nichts gethan hat als den Baum geschüttelt, sobald die Früchte reif waren. Dünkt euch diess zu wenig? So seht euch den Baum erst an, den er schüttelte.“ (*Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II*, No. 347; KSA 2, 701) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. “Ergo Bythos et Sige, Nus et Veritas prima quadriga defenditur Valentinianae factionis, matrix et origo cunctorum.“ (Tertullian, *Adversus Valentinianos*, c. 7; ed. Riley, p. 33.13‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. “Definiunt autem eam et hoc modo: differentia est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quale sit praedicatur; rationale enim et mortale de homine praedicatum in eo quod quale quiddam est homo dicitur, sed non in eo quod quid est.” (*In Porph. Isag.* III.10; ed. Libera, p. 13) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. “Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus vel ad similitudinem proportionem materiae specieique constitutionem habentibus (quamadmodum statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura), sic et homo communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter proportionaliter consistit genere, ex forma autem differentia, totum autem hoc animal rationale mortale homo est quemadmodum illic statua.” (*In Porph. Isag.* III.10, ed. Libera, p. 13) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. “He [Avicenna] argues that, if genus signifies all the determinations inherent in a subject, then *body* as genus, in man, must contain animality; whereas *body* as matter, in it, is only a part of the whole animal, i.e. the extended one.” (Di Giovanni 2004, 263) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. “As for corporeality, [being that] which is shared by simple bodies, this is not the form of the natural impetus in so far as dimensions are accidents of these [simple bodies], but rather the dimensions, which are common to [all] simple bodies, are numerically one inasmuch as we say that they exist in matter primarily through the [natural impetus]. They are neither genus nor employed in a definition signifying the general form. This is why the concept of body representing matter is different from the concept of body representing general form (the difference between genus and matter has been explained elsewhere).” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 93.330) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. “Sunt ergo ea quæ sunt in voce earum quæ sunt in anima passionum notae et ea quæ scribuntur eorum quæ sunt in voce, et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem, sic nec voces eaedem, quorum autem haec primorum notae, eaedem omnibus passiones animae et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam eaedem…” (*De int*. 16a3‒8; *Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii commentarii in librum Peri hermeneias*, ed. Meiser, p. 3.5‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. “Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare. Hoc habet etiam apellatio et vocabulum: ergo tria una pars est orationis.” (*Institutiones grammaticae* II.18, ed. Hertz, p. 55) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The debate concerning *enuntiabile* was opened by the study of the relationship between nominalism and theology at the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries (Chenu 1935). On the status of *enuntiabile* in the school of *Nominales*, see the thematic issue of *Vivarium 30* (1992) and contributions cited therein (Iwakuma&Ebbesen 1992) and further Klima 1993, Jacobi et al. 1996. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “Sed per se qualitas, ut album, neque ullius substantiam significat, neque ullam communionem, sicut genus specierum suarum, et indiuiduorum species, ostendit.“ (*In Categ. Aristot*., lib I; PL 64, 195D). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “Notandum etiam aliter accipi denominatiuum ab Aristotile et aliter a Prisciano. Aristotiles enim dicit album denominari ab albedine respiciens ad causas rerum, Priscianus uero albedinem ab albo respiciens quasi ad origines et informaciones uocabulorum.“ (*Notae Dunelmenses*, f. 77ra; cit. nach Kneepkens 1992, 37) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. “Mag. Quidquid vero est quod debet esse, recte est. Disc. Aliter esse non potest. Mag. Igitur omne quod est recte est. Disc. Nihil consequentius. Mag. Si ergo veritas et rectitudo idcirco sunt in rerum essentia, quia hoc sunt quod sunt in summa veritate, certum est veritatem rerum esse rectitudinem.” (*Dialogus de Veritate*, cap. 7; PL 158, 475C) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. “Sed secundum hanc rectitudinem et veritatem, qua significat esse quod est, usu recta et vera dicitur enuntiatio; non secundum illam, qua significat esse etiam quod non est. (…) Alia igitur est rectitudo et veritas enuntiationis, quia significat ad quod significandum facta est; alia vero, quia significat quod accepit significare. Quippe ista immutabilis est ipsi orationi; illa vero, mutabilis: hanc namque semper habet; illam vero non semper: istam enim naturaliter habet; illame vero, accidentaliter et secundum usum.” (*Dialogus de Veritate*, cap. 2; PL 158, 470 C‒D) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. “An itaque non vides quia non ideo est rectitudo in significatione, quia tunc incipit esse, cum significatur esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; sed quia significatio tunc fit secundum rectitudinem, quæ semper est…” (*Dialogus de Veritate*, cap. 13; PL 158, 485B) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. “Dicimus et videmus per aliud, non dicimus et non videmus per suam proprietatem. Hac itaque ratione nihil prohibet et verum esse quod disputatum est hactenus de summa natura, et ipsam tamen nihilominus ineffabilem persistere: si nequaquam illa putetur per essentiae suae proprietatem expressa, sed utcumque per aliud designata.“ (*De divinitatis essentia Monologium*, cap. 65; PL 158, 211D‒212A) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. “Ergo quoniam omnis libertas est potestas; illa libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.“ (*Dialogus de libero arbitrio*; PL 158, 494B) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. “Sed non est anima horum genus, sed totum, partes enim hae animae sunt, sed non ut in quantitate, sed ut in aliqua potestate et virtute. Ex his enim potentiis substantia animae jungitur; unde fit, ut quiddam simile habeat hujusmodi divisio, et generis, et totius divisionis.” (*Liber de divisione*; PL 64, 888 B‒C) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. “Illae enim solae differentiae Socratem constituunt quæ hominem faciunt, veluti rationalitas, mortalitas et caeterae, quæ quidem universales sunt, non singulares; nam fortasse haec rationalitas Socrati substantialis est, non homini. Quod itaque omnes formae quae individuis substantiales sunt, substantiales etiam sint speciebus secundum species, non secundum individua, absque omni calumnia dici potest.” (*Dialectica* I.2; ed. Rijk, p. 90.5‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. “'Totum' autem aliud *secundum substantiam*, aliud *secundum formam*, aliud *secundum utrumque* dicitur. Totum autem secundum substantiam aliud *secundum comprehensionem quantitatis*, quod dicitur *integrum*, aliud *secundum diffusionem communis essentiae*, quod *universale* est; ut cum species suis distribuitur individuis hoc modo: 'homo alius hic, alius ille'.” (*Dialectica* V; ed. Rijk, p. 546.22‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. “Non enim teste Boethio in sola voluntate liberum consistit arbitrium, sed etiam in iudicio mentis. Quotiens enim imaginationes animo concurrunt et voluntatem provocant, eas ratio perpendit, ac diiudicat quod melius sibi videtur.” (*Dialectica* II; ed. Rijk, p. 215.19‒23) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. “Sed est attendendum quare '*significare*' diversis modis accipitur. Modo enim circa ea tantum de quibus intellectum generat, modo vero circa omnia quibus est impositum, solet accipi et secundum quidem primam et propriam significationem…” (*Dialectica* V; ed. Rijk, p. 562.20‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. “Quandoquidem singula quæ dicta sunt, secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, id est non sunt complexae voces, ergo non sunt affirmatio. (…) Omnis affirmatio est vera vel falsa, sed incomplexa neque sunt vera neque falsa, quare affirmatio non sunt.” (*Logica Ingredientibus*I.2; ed. Geyer, p. 137.15;24) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. “Quod etiam ex eo ostenditur quod, quemadmodum secundae substantiae de primis univoce praedicantur, id est nomine et definitione substantiae, ita et differentiae.“ (*Dialectica* II.1; ed. Rijk, p. 51.24‒26) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. The hermeneutics of objectivity is committed to this conclusion regarding the relationship of Abelard to the school of *Nominales*: “On the other hand I know of no text which both *identifies itself* as from the Nominales and calls Abaelard ‘our master’ and no text which attributes views *identified in the text as Abaelard’s* to the Nominales. “ (Normore 1992, 82) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. “Nam '*opinabili*' opponitur '*est*' secundum id quod '*opinabile*' proprie accipitur in designatione tantum non‑existentium. Unde etiam subiunxit: 'opinio enim eius non est quoniam est, sed quoniam non est'. Non itaque solum in compositione oppositio in adiecto servatur, veluti, cum dicitur: '*hoc cadaver est homo mortuus*', inter partes huius compositionis '*homo mortuus*' quaedam oppositio consistit, si per se dictiones accipiantur, atque ideo de eodem singula vere non praedicantur.“ (*Dialectica* II; ed. Rijk, p. 167.30‒36) [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. “Vel si est exemplum non de substantia significata, sed de voce significante substantiam, sic dicemus: est substantia, id est vox significans substantiam, ut homo, equus, istae voces, et tunc homo et equus translata sunt ad significandum nomina rerum, et est quaedam figura facta in translatione vocis de re, cuius proprie nomen est, ad se ipsam significandam.“ (*Logica Ingredientibus* I.2; ed. Geyer, p. 137.9‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. “Veluti '*homo*', cum et speciali naturae, idest animali rationali mortali, primo loco sumptum (imponitur), et tantum ex ipsa individuis ipsius, ut Socrate et ceteris, significationem [in se] ubique speciei in se tenet, non Socratis et ceterorum quæ speciem participant. Ex '*hominis*' enim vocabulo tantum '*animal rationale mortale*' concipimus, non etiam Socratem intelligimus.“ (*Dialectica* V; ed. Rijk, p. 562.28‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. “Cum autem hic secundum significationem intellectus tantum de vocibus intendat, recte eas interpretationes nominat, quia interpretari vocem non est rem assignare, sed intellectum aperire.“ (*Logica Ingredientibus*I.3; ed. Geyer, p. 309.26‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. “Ergo prius assignemus eorum convenientiam ad invicem secundum eorum significationem, de qua intenditur. A causa. Et hoc est: Ea quæ praemissa sunt, scilicet nomen, verbum, oratio, etc., *quæ sunt in voce*, id est quæ sunt voces, *sunt notae*, id est significativae earum *passionum, quæ sunt in anima*, id est intellectuum. Quæ ideo passiones dicuntur esse, quia dum aliquid intelligimus, quandam passionem animus habet, dum se ad rem coarctat et afficitur vel per ipsam rem vel per imaginem eius, ut dictum est.“ (*Logica Ingredientibus*I.3; ed. Geyer, p. 319.7‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. “Nam in eo quod dixit: *'quae hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur*', non tam visus ad vocalem constructionem, ut aiunt, respexisse, quantum ad naturalem rerum relationem. Cum enim ait 'hoc ipsum quod sunt', essentiam demonstravit, non vocabulum. Neque enim ipsa res ipsum est vocabulum; nec vocabulum rei esse dici potest, sed rei essentiae demonstratio.“ (*Dialectica* I.2; ed. Rijk, pp. 92.35‒93.4) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. “Neque enim aequalitas vel similitudo vel caetera ad alias secundum relationem species assignantur, sed ad se ipsas gratia individuorum; aequale enim *aequali aequale* dicitur, et simile *simili simile*.“ (*Dialectica* I.2; ed. Rijk, p. 88.32‒34). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. “Ex his itaque Aristoteles manifeste demonstrat ipsas affirmationes et negationes in proprietate veri ac falsi sequi illos eventus rerum quos enuntiant, gratia quorum tantum verae esse uel falsae dicuntur, in eo scilicet quod quemadmodum quamlibet rem necesse est esse, quando est, vel non esse, quando non est, ita quamlibet propositionem veram necesse est ueram esse, dum vera est, uel non veram non esse veram, dum vera non est.“ (*Dialectica* II; ed. Rijk, p. 221.3‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. “Nam etsi animalitas et rationalitas hominem constituant, potest tamen illud unum nomen aequivoce dari. Quaecumque ergo voces plura ita significant quod ex ipsis non unus intellectus consistat, multiplices dicuntur; quae vero ita quod unus ex eis intellectus proveniat, unae erunt, etsi unius rei substantiam non perficiant res significatae; ut “homo albus” una est in sensu oratio, licet ex albedine et homine nullius rei substantia constituatur.“ (*Dialectica*I.1; ed. Rijk, p. 225.14‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. “Quod autem potentiis ipsis anima iungitur, ad integri naturam pertinet, quod partibus suis constat; et est quidem similitudo in compositione simpliciter, non in modo compositionis; aliter enim ex partibus integrum, aliter ex potentiis anima coniungitur.“ (*Dialectica* V; ed. Rijk, p. 558.9‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. “...ad condiscipulorum quoque tuorum Alberici videlicet Remensis et Lotulfi Lumbardi execrabilem invidiam et infestationem nimiam stilum contulisti.“ (*Epist.* 2; *Historia Calamitatum*, ed. Monfrin, p. 111.19‒20). For historical analysis of letters see, for example, Luscombe 1988. As to history that concerns the implementation of Neoplatonism at cathedral schools during 11th–12th centuries, see per ex. Gersh&Hoenen 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. “Revera zelus hic, quem in Deum habere videmini, multa et magna quacumque intentione sustinet. Sed plurimum refert, utrum haec intentio recta sit an erronea. Nulla quippe est fidei secta, quæ se Deo famulari non credat et ea propter ipsum non operetur, quæ ipsi placere arbitratur.” (*Dialogus inter Philosophum Judaeum et Christianum*; PL 178, 1619 B) [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. “Solet autem in quaestione illud duci, utrum relationes ad se per sumpta tantum nomina referantur, sive etiam per substantiva, utrum scilicet, quemadmodum dicimus 'pater filii pater', ita etiam dicamus: 'paternitas filiationis paternitas'. Sed mihi quidem nihil videtur sonare haec constructio substantivorum.” (*Dialectica* I.2; ed. Rijk, p. 90.13‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. According to Abelard, the chairman of the Council in Soissons in 1121 was the papal envoy, bishop and cardinal Kuno of Praeneste. He did not have sufficient theological qualifications for leading such a dispute. The key players of the council were the Bishop of Chartres (Gottfried de Lèves) and his cathedral teacher Theodoric. From the cathedral school of Reims, there were another two well-known teachers as determined opponents of Abelard: Lotulf of Novara and Alberich. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. “Tu as pris Abélard comme cible de ta flèche pour vomir contre lui le venin de ton aigreur, pour le rayer de la terre des vivants, pour le mettre au rang des morts. Tu étais enflammé contre Abélard non du zèle de la correction, mais du désir de ta propre vengeance.” (Aubé 2003, 413) [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. “Eris tunc verus philosophus Christi, cum in te stultam fecerit ipse sapientiam mundi. Nam si secundum eundem apostolum volueris esse sapiens, stultus esto ut sis sapiens, neque te logicae garrulitatem, phisicae curiositatem, vel aliud quidlibet scire glorieris, nisi Christum Ihesum et hunc crucifixum.” (*Epistola*IX.7; ed. Constable 1967, 15) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. “Die Religion, wenigstens die christliche, ist das Verhalten des Menschen zu sich selbst, oder richtiger: zu seinem Wesen, aber das Verhalten zu seinem Wesen als zu einem andern Wesen. Das göttliche Wesen ist nichts Andres als das menschliche Wesen oder besser: das Wesen des Menschen, abgesondert von den Schranken des individuellen, d. h. wirklichen, leiblichen Menschen, vergegenständlicht, d. h. angeschaut und verehrt als ein andres, von ihm unterschiednes, eignes Wesen — alle Bestimmungen des göttlichen Wesens sind darum Bestimmungen des menschlichen Wesens.” (*Das Wesen des Christenthums*, kap. 2; *Werke* 7, 50). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Let us see, for example, the commentary by Abelard’s contemporary Gerloch von Reichersberg (†1169) on *Psalm 136*: “Quomodo cantabimus canticum Domini in terra aliena? Conventicula haereticorum et Platonicorum, Aristotelicorum sophistarum secundum elementa mundi philosophantium, et non secundum Jesum Christum sunt habenda pro terra aliena, in qua cum interrogatores, reprehensores, adulatores a viro catholico expetunt audire coelestia, magna est illi anxietas et dubietas, loquatur an sileat, cum et in silentio et in loquela timeat periculum.“ (*Commentarium in Psalmos* PL 194, col. 906 D‒907A). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. “Longe in melius disciplinarum studia commutasti, et pro logica aeuangelium, pro phisica apostolum, pro Platone Christum, pro academia claustrum, tota iam et vere philosophica mulier elegisti…“ (*Epistola* 115; ed. Constable I, p. 304) [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. “Quod est, participare aliquo potest; sed ipsum esse, nullo modo aliquo participat; fit enim participatio cum aliquid jam est; est autem aliquid, cum esse susceperit.“ (*Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint*, PL 64, 1311C) [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. “Esse namque subsistentia est, non substantia. Ita cum esse non possit in se habere, quo sit, nec participatione aliud aliquid in se habebit, vere: cum enim aliquid, id est subsistens jam est aliqua subsistentia, tunc fit alterius naturae ad illius subsistentiae potentiam pertinentis, participatio, qua subsistens ipsum quale vel quantum sit.“ (*Gilberti Porretae commentaria in Librum Quomodo*; PL 64, 1319A) [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. “Secundae enim substantiae non hoc aliquid sed quale aliquid (ut dictum est) monstrant, ita tamen quale aliquid monstrant, ut ipsam qualitatem circa substantias determinent. Qualitas enim secundarum substantiarum in indiuiduis est, de ipsis enim naturaliter praedicatur qua, ipsa indiuiduae substantiae sunt.“ (*In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, lib. I; PL 64, 195C) [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. “Illa enim pictura, antequam fiat, in ipsa pictoris arte habetur; et tale quidpiam in arte artificis alicujus nihil est aliud quam pars quaedam intelligentiae ipsius; quia et (sicut sanctus Augustinus ait) cum faber arcam facturus in opere, prius habet, illam in arte: arca, quae fit in opere, non est vita.“ (*Liber Gaunilonis pro insipiente*, cap. 3; PL 158, 244 B) [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. “Paternitas autem in patre est. Similiter etiam est dispositio filii respectu patris. Non est enim hic res una quæ sit in ambobus; unde non est hic nisi paternitas vel filiatio, sed dispositionem appositam paternitati vel filiationi nos nescimus, nec habet nomen.“ (*Liber de philosophia prima* III.10; p. 176.71‒74) [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. “Cum enim dicimus ‘corpus est’ vel ‘homo est’ vel huiusmodi, theologici hoc esse dictum intelligunt quadam extrinseca denominatione ab essentia sui principii. Non enim dicunt corporalitate corpus esse sed esse aliquid: nec humanitate hominem esse, sed esse aliquid. Et similiter unumquodque subsistens essentia sui principii predicant non esse aliquid sed esse: illa vero que in ipso creata est, subsistentia non esse sed esse aliquid.“ (*Expositio in Boetii librum De bonorum hebdomade*; ed. Häring, p. 193.55‒62) [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. “Si Sortes scit se nihil scire, verum est quod nihil scit. Et si hoc, nihil scit. Ergo si Sortes scit se nihil scire, Sortes nihil scit. Sed si Sortes scit se nihil scire, scit hoc. Ergo aliquid. Ergo si Sortes scit se nihil scire, et aliquid scit et nihil scit.“ (Ywakuma 1993, 128) [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. “Es ist noch Nichts, und es soll Etwas werden. Der Anfang ist nicht das reine Nichts, sondern ein Nichts, von dem Etwas ausgehen soll; das Sein ist also auch schon im Anfang enthalten. Der Anfang enthält also Beides, Sein und Nichts; ist die Einheit von Sein und Nichts; – oder ist Nichtsein, das zugleich Sein, und Sein, das zugleich Nichtsein ist.“ (*Wissenschaft der Logik* I.3; Hegel 5,73) [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. “Primo loco et proprie tunc praedicatur, cum simpliciter de aliquo dicitur hoc modo: “*Socrates est*”; tunc non solum habet copulare, sed etiam rem praedicatam ponere; quando autem tertium adiacens est, secundum accidens et non proprie praedicatur, sed gratia praedicati copulandi ponitur. Cui quidem non solum intransitiue, uerum etiam transitiue coniungitur, ut hic: *'chimaera est opinabilis*' uel '*non ens*'; ex quo maxime liquet nullam rem per '*esse*' praedicari, sed tantum, cum tertium ponitur, praedicatum in ipso copulari.“ (*Dialectica* I; ed. Rijk, pp. 163.34‒164.4) [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. “De hiis enim cum magis dicuntur quæ propinquiora sunt ei quæ in ipsa voce est impositioni, cum minus autem de hiis quæ remotiora consistunt, ut album dicitur in quo pura albedo est. Quanto igitur aliquid ad vocis impositionem accedens puriori inficitur albedine, tanto et candidius assignabitur.“ (*Liber sex Principiorum*, cap. VIII; ed. Minio-Paluello&Dod, p. 56, no. 89‒90) [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. “Neque enim quisquam dicit magis esse sanitatem alia sanitate. Sed hoc solum dicere possumus magis habere sanitatem aliquem, id est esse saniorem, et magis sanum, et minus sanum. Dicimus erga quod ipsae quidem qualitates non suscipiunt magis et minus.“ (*In* *Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, cap. 3; PL 64, 257B) [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Dans l'édition remaniée *La logique, ou l'art de penser* (1763), la troisième partie, ch. 10 c'est assez important. La méthode cartésienne est appliquée à la logique moderne *more geometrico*. La définition de la soi-disant ”*proposition contenante*" utilise la division abstraite du sens (voir l'école des *Nominales*) pour trouver le contenu commun final de l'énoncé. Ce contenu commun doit figurer dans toutes les parties de l'arrêt. Par conséquent, la preuve "scientifique" faite par déduction (*demonstratio*) n'a pas besoin de la causalité aristotélicienne des premières substances réelles pour la partie médiane du jugement (*medium*). La modernité n'utilise que l'essence et l'individu logiquement déterminés. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Saussure’s well-known example of structural differences establishes the linguistic value (*valeur*) only thanks to the difference made in the given system of language. The genitive plural (“žen”) of the Czech word “žena” corresponds to the root of the word (“žen”). The linguistic value (*valeur*) is established by the simple fact that it is a unique case of declination, which differs from all other cases thanks to the non-existence of the other suffix (Saussure 1972, 123). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The essay *La différance* (1968) already applies the principle of division in the polemic with Husserl’s concept of pure noematic meaning given outside language (*La voix et le phénomène*, 1967). Finally, Derrida raises the original differentiation of meaning to the ontological principle of reality. See concepts such as “*trace*” and “*dissémination*,” which are conceived within the framework of phenomenology (*Marges ‒ de la philosophie*, 1972). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. “Item. Tertio modo sumitur “*possibile*” secundum quod predicabile est de omni dicto et solum de tali dicto quod potest esse verum, sive sit necessarium sive contingens. Et sic est possibile superius et quasi genus ad hec duo, scilicet *necessarium* et *contingens*. Et in illa acceptione facit propositionem modalem. Item. '*Contingens*' in una significatione convertitur cum '*possibili*'; et tunc non repugnat “*necessario*”, sed est supra ipsum, sicut et “*possibile*”. Et tunc sic exponitur: *contingens est quod potens est tantum esse*.“ (*Logica Modernorum II*, ed. Rijk, p. 481.9‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. “Ille ideas ponit, Platonem aemulatus, et imitans Bernardum Carnotensem, et nihil praeter eas, genus dicit esse vel speciem.“ (*Metalogicon* 2.17; PL 199, 875A) [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. “Sed quia impossibile substantialia non esse, existentibus his quorum sunt substantialia, denuo colligunt, universalia singularibus, quod ad essentiam, unienda. Partiuntur itaque status duce Gautero de Mauritania, et Platonem, in eo quod Plato est, dicunt individuum; in eo quod homo, speciem: in eo quod animal, genus; sed subalternum: in eo quod substantia, generalissimum.“ (*Metalogicon* 2.17; PL 199, 875A) [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. “Considerant enim triplicem nominum significationem: unam in substantia, secundam in qualitate, terciam id quod nominatur, quod in substantiuis et adiectiuis discrete uideamus. Socrates hoc nomen substantiam habet specialem naturam hominis, qualitatem eandem quam superius diximus, nominat uero indiuiduam rem cui positum est.“ (*Tractatus*, MS Vat. Lat. 1486, f. 17ra, cit. nach Kneepkens 1992, 48) [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. “Similiter homo substantiam habet animal ipsum, qualitatem quam prius, nominat uero specialem rem cui et datum est. Ita et alia substantiua substantiam habent materiam rei quam nominant uel quasi materiam, qualitatem id quod redigit materiam in id quod nominatur.“ (*Tractatus*, MS Vat. Lat. 1486, f. 17ra; cit. nach Kneepkens 1992, 48) [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. “At nonne etiam alba, in eo quod sunt, alba esse oportebit ea quae alba sunt, quoniam ex voluntate Dei fluxerunt, ut essent alba? Minime. Aliud est enim esse, et aliud alba esse…“ (*Quomodo substantitae* *bona sunt*, PL 64, 1314A) [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. “Sic mens nostra, qui est oculus animae, nisi veritatis lumine radietur, et ab illo qui illuminat nec illuminatur, mirabiliter illustretur, nec ad sapientiam nec ad iustitiam poterit pervenire.“ (*In Ev. Joh*., tract. 35.8.3; PL 35, 1658D) [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. “In der Logik ist nichts zufällig: Wenn das Ding im Sachverhalt vorkommen *kann*, so muss die Möglichkeit des Sachverhaltes im Ding bereits präjudiziert sein.“ (*Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*, 2.012) [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. “Um einen Gegenstand zu kennen, muss ich zwar nicht seine externen ‒ aber ich muss alle seine internen Eigenschaften kennen.“ (*Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*, 2.01231) [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. See the three phases of Avicenna’s reception in the West thanks to the writing *Philosophia prima*, which was a translation of the part *Ilāhiyyāt* from the work *Shifā*: „For the sake of brevity, these three phases can be labeled, respectively, ‘Philosophia prima without Metaphysics,’ ‘Philosophia prima and Metaphysics,’ ‘Philosophia prima in the exegesis of the Metaphysics.’“ (Bertolacci 2012, 203) [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. “Igitur humanitas, significata hoc nomine “homo” pro qualitate, est species generis, i.e., animalis, quæ ut significatur hoc nomine dividit hoc genus animalis, cum dicitur “animalium aliud homo, aliud non homo”. Sed non eadem humanitas, immo effectus ejus, qui pro qualitate significatur hoc nomine “humanitas”, est species individuorum et praedicatur de eis, cum dicitur “socratitas est humanitas, platonitas est humanitas” et sic de singulis, quæ individua ibi subjiciuntur mediantibus effectibus suis.“ (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, ed. Haring, p. 257) [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. “Mathematicum est quasi abstractiuum quia significat formam quasi a subiecto abstractam ut albedo.“ (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, ed. Haring, p. 254) [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. “Nam haec species specialissima homo praedicatur de suis indiuiduis quæ ideo uniuersaliter subiicitur suo generi ut cum dicitur socrates est homo plato est homo cirero est homo et sic de singulis.“ (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, ed. Haring, pp. 256‒57) [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. “Mathematicae uero abstractionis proprietate non genus sed generis genus de ea quæ non generis sed indiuiduorum tantum species est uere et consequenter praedicari conceditur ut socratitas est humanitas est animalitas est corporalitas.“ (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, ed. Haring, p. 255) [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. “Vnde sicut petrus est homo humanitate sic est uerus homo ueritate humanitatem comitante.” (*Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*, p. 284) [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. “The main features, however, of the Victorine reaction to Abelard’s teaching were not merely impatience or violence. No two Victorine masters are wholly alike, but the group of thinkers who were in the house between the 1120s and 1160s undertook patiently to censor, amend, absorb and surpass Abelard’s theological production.“ (Luscombe 1970, 183) [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. The dispute between Aristotelicians and *Nominales* as gigantomachy about substance prepared its nihilistic present version. This was given with regard to the sense or the nonsense related to the sentence “The present French king is bald” between the formal nominalism (B. Russell) and the critical theory of objectively determined reference (P. F. Strawson). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. “Sciendum quod “*subiectus*” tripliciter dicitur, tum ut significatum per terminum, tum ut fundamentum accidentis, tum ut inferius sue substantie, quod est inferius in ordine predicamentali; “*dici* enim *de subiecto*” est descriptio universalitatis, “*esse in subiecto*” est descriptio accidentis; “*non esse in subiecto*” est descriptio substantie. Cum ergo dicitur: “*individuum dicitur de subiecto*”, falsum est, qui a tunc intelligitur quod esset universale.“ (*Tractatus Anagnini*, ed. Rijk, *Logica Modernorum II*, p. 219‒220) [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. “Res autem, quæ seipsam, prout est, intellectui subiicit, vera est: quæ aliter, vana est falsa. Ergo a modo percipiendi (scilicet quo percipiuntur, aut percipiunt), convincitur veritas aut falsitas tam opinionum, quam rerum: sermonum vero, a modo significandi.“ (*Metalogicon* 4.36; PL 199, 939D) [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. For the Modists’s doctrine of so-called modes of signification (*modi significandi*), see, e.g., Pinborg 1984, 39‒73. The first projects of complex “speculative grammar” (*grammatica speculativa*) date from 1270 (Boethius of Dacia). On the metaphysical difference between being of the thing and its signification in Thomas Aquinas (Rocca 1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. “Addunt hic se socios quidam nominales, / Nomine, non numine, talium sodales; / Alii vicinius assunt quod reales / Ipsa nuncupavit res, quod sunt vere tales. / Nam si pro reatibus variis errorum / Poterat realium nomen dici horum, / Tamen excusabilis error est eorum; / Menti contradicere mos est insanorum. / Namque mens vel cogitet nomen esse genus, / Solus hoc crediderit mentis alienus, / Cum sit tot generibus rerum mundus plenus, / Cuius genus nomen est semper sit egenus.“ (Iwakuma–Ebbesen 1992, p. 179; no. 18.245–56) [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. “Cum ergo sacrificia, sive altaris sive quarumcumque eleemosynarum, pro baptizatis defunctis omnibus offeruntur, pro valde bonis gratiarum actiones sunt; pro non valde bonis propitiationes sunt; pro valde malis etiam si nulla sunt adiumenta mortuorum; qualescumque vivorum consolationes sunt.“ (*Enchiridion ad Laurentium*, cap. 29; CCSL 46, 108.1‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. “Le *De anima et de potenciis eius* comble cette lacune : il nous montre que vers 1225 Averroès, au moins ses grands commentaires sur la *Métaphysique* et surtout sur le livre *De l’âme,* est déjà bien connu à la faculté des arts, et il nous fait assister, dès 1225, à la naissance du premier averroïsme, celui qui découvre dans Averroès une nouvelle forme de l’aristotélisme, différente de l’aristotélisme avicennien: l’Aristote d’Avicenne avait enlevé à l’âme son intellect agent, l’Aristote d’Averroès le lui rend.“ (Gauthier 1982, 25) [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. „Le premier averroïsme, c’est cela: la doctrine qui fait de l’intellect agent une puissance de l’âme.“ (Gauthier 1982, 335) [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. “Lux enim, secundum quod lux, est qualitas que ex essentia sua est perfectio translucentis. Sed illa qualitas que est color solum dicitur esse lux in quantum ipsa ex se generat lumen, et est perfectio translucentis; et dicitur illa qualitas esse color in quantum ipsa colorat suum subiectum. Distinguitur autem in commento inter lucem et lumen et splendorem.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 123; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 32.21‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. “Und auch der aktive Intellekt wird von John Blund aus der Vier-Intellekte-Lehre verabschiedet, dadurch das er ihn zu einer abstrahierenden Seelen*kraft*, einer *vis animae*, erklart, die mit den vorangehenden Intellekten in keinem deutlichen Zusammenhang steht. John Blund hat daher eigentlich keine Theorie der vier Intellekte.“ (Hasse 1999, 46) [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. „Intellectus agens est via animae apprehensiva rerum universalium abstrahendo eas ab accidentibus.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 341, ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 93.22‒23) [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. “(…) Etwas, dessen Wesen die Fähigkeit oder die Bereitschaft besitzt, das Was (Wesen) und die Formen von allem, was vorhanden ist, von den Stoffen derselben zu abstrahiren, sodass es diese Formen allesammt ohne die Stoffe zu einer Form für sich macht.“ (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*, ed. Dieterici; p. 74.23–25) [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. “Intellectus adeptus est passio generata in anima, que est similitudo rei extra; de quo intellectu habetur ab Aristotele in libro *de Anima*, quod res intellecta est perfectio anime et de eius essentia. Appellat autem Aristoteles ibi rem intellectam intellectum adeptum, qui est ymago rei extra.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 339, ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 93.6‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. “Et ille intellectus adeptus dicitur esse intellectus formalis, quoniam est habens se ad similitudinem et proportionem formae; quoniam sicut forma perficit materiam dando ei esse actu, ita et intellectus adeptus perficit intellectum materialem dando ei esse in effectu. Est enim anime secunda perfectio ab intellectu adepto.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 339, ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 93.10‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. “Intellectus angeli et intellectus hominis differunt in modo apprehendendi, non in comprehensibili. Angelus enim non apprehendit res per species abstractas a rebus, sicut homo, cuius intellectus cognoscit per speciem quia coniunctus est. Idem ergo cognoscunt homo et angelus sed differenter.“ (*De anima* II; ed. Baur, pp. 247.40‒248.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. “Dicendum est quod intentio est res accepta ab aestimatione non cadens in sensum ut mediante sensu apprehendatur ab anima, ita quod non exigatur vis alia ad intentionis apprehensionem, nec est eius imago in sensu vel in imaginatione; sed fit in aestimatione imago intentionis [per] apprehensionem, nec est eius imago in sensu vel imaginatione, sed fit in aestimatione imago intentionis non existente aliqua similitudine intentionis in aliquo eorum quæ sunt inter instrumentum aestimationis et subiectum intentionis, sicut superius dictum est de visu, quod imago rei visae sit in visu, non tamen in aere intermedio est consimilis imago.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 257; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 69.23‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Hasse, in the spirit of modern objectivity, interprets Blund’s concept of intentionality by placing the intentional object directly in the external thing, as did Avicenna: “… he [Blund] speaks of the ‘original carrier of the *intentio’* (‘*proprium subiectum intentionis*’), e.g. the wolf, and the likeness or image of the *intentio* (‘*similitudo*/*imago intentionis*’) which comes about in the faculty of estimation. These terms are new. They show us that Blund is radicalizing Avicenna’s theory: *intentiones* are nowhere else than in the object; what is perceived is only representations of them.” (Hasse 2000, 146). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. “Est ergo in ymaginatione duplex vis corporalis: una que est receptiva similitudinis corporis extra, et alia vis que est formate similitudinis retentiva, et utraque istarum virium subservit apprehensioni facte per vim ymaginativam. Qua ratione ergo distinguitur ymaginatio secundum vim receptivam debet ipsa distingui secundum vim retentivam.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 246; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 66.19‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. “Quoniam illud subiectum semper presto est ipsi memorie; se meminisse autem meminit per ymaginationem illius rei cuius rei per illud meminisse fuit recordatio; quoniam per illud meminisse fuit recordatio in effectum… “ (*Tractatus de anima*, 272; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 73.26‒29) [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. “Intellectus materialis est ipsa anima nuda a dispositionibus adquisitis, et dicitur materialia, quoniam habet sе ad simulacrum aptitudinis materie prime ex qua in seipsa non est aliqua forma. Similiter dicitur esse intellectus in potentia, quoniam esse materie est esse in potentia, cum eius esse sit imperfectum, potest autem perfici per forme receptionem.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 338; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 93.1‒5) [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. “Sed propter nil aliud est intellectus abstractivus nisi quia ipse apprehendit formam abstrahendo eam a materia et ab apendiciis materie. Sed simile est de sensu, cum materia non apprehendatur per sensum nisi per accidens. Ergo sensus est abstractivus.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 233; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 62.13‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. “*The quality of John Blund’s discussion is exceptional*. “ (Hasse 2000, 146) Hermeneutics extend this objective and positive evaluation of the new concept of intentionality by the importance of Blund’s philosophy that goes far beyond the objectivity. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. The well-known monograph on scholastic concept of species defends the objective and univocal interpretation of the term “*species intelligibilis*“ for all authors discussed up to the year 1250 (Spruit 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. “Ad hoc dicendum est, ut superius ostensum est, quod anima habet convertere se ad corpus quod ipsa regere habet, et ad eius dispositiones, et ad similitudinem ymaginum inventarum in memoria, et inprimitur in anima intellectus formalis mediante primo datore formarum; vel, ut plures auctores videntur velle, est illa forma impressio ab intelligentia ut ministerio eius, et a primo datore formarum ut auctoritate ipsius.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 350; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 94.9‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. “Consimili modo potest ostendi quod omnes vires anime apprehensive sunt una et eadem vis in essentia. Quod bene concedimus, dicentes quod apprehensive vires ipsius anime humane non sunt diverse in essentia, immo in accidente tantum. Nulla enim est diversitas inter eas nisi in modo apprehendendi. Sensus enim apprehendit rem presentem; ymaginatio rem absentem et prius sensatam; intellectus autem abstrahit rem ab accidentibus, ut patere potest manifestius rationibus supradictis.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 350; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 95.24‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. “Forte dicet aliquis quod theologi est tractare de anima. Contra. Theologus habet inquirere qua via contingat animam mereri et demereri, et quid sit ad salutem, quid ad penam. Quid autem anima sit, et in quo predicamento sit, et qualiter infundatur corpori, non habet ipse inquirere.“ (*Tractatus de anima*, 22; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 7.14‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. “Adde quod a puero studiis electus inhesit / primus Aristotilis satagens perquirere libros / quando recenter eos Arabes misere Latinis / quos numquam fertur legisse celebrius alter aut prius / ut perhibent Oxonia Parisiusque.“ (*Poems of Henry of Avranches*; ed. Heironimus&Russell, no. 130, p. 131.77‒81) [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. “Le premier utilisateur du *De anima et de potenciis eius* fut sans doute le théologien, probablement anglais, qui écrivit vers 1230 le *De potenciis anime et obiectis,* édité en 1952 par le P. Callus.“ (Gauthier 1982, 6) [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. “Quel est exactement le conflict qu’a soulevé dans la concience médiévale la découverte de la philosophie d’Aristote ?“ (Gilson 1921, 51) [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. “Quod autem unum formabile est in plures, materia est, vel ad minus principium materiale: propter quod in nono primae philosophiae dicit Philosophus, quod quaecumque sunt in genere uno, eorum est materia una. Si ergo dicatur una materia esse materiae primae, et νοῦς erit primae materiae materia : et hoc ibit in infinitum. Relinquitur ergo, quod νοῦς et materia prima sunt idem.“ (*Summa Theologiae*, tract. I, pars IV, q. 20; Borgnet 31, 140a) [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. “Et ex hoc videtur relinqui, quod Deus et νοῦς et materia prima idem sunt secundum id quod sunt: quia quaecumque sunt, et nulla differentia differunt, eadem sunt: Deus autem et νοῦς et materia prima sunt, et nulla differentia differunt, ut jam probatum est : ergo eadem sunt, dicente Aristotele in IX *Topicorum*, quod idem est, a quo non differunf diffetentia: et sic videtur, quod Deus sit materia omnium.“ (*Summa Theologiae*, tract. I, pars IV, q. 20; Borgnet 31, 140a-b) [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. “Dyaphanum vero corpus est, in quo alia corpora depingunt proprios colores, ut aer et aqua et multa alia solida. Unde Aristoteles: Color quidem movet dyaphanum, diaphanum vero aerem et ab ilio continuo existente movetur instrumentum visus.“ (*Quaternuli, fragment* 85; cited after Dagron 2003, 433) [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. “Hic omnia regit non ut anima mundi : sed ut universorum dominus. Et propter dominium suum, dominus deus Пαντοκράτωρ dici solet. Nam deus est vox relativa & ad servos refertur : & deitas est dominatio dei, non in corpus proprium, uti sentiunt quibus deus est anima mundi, sed in servos.“ (Newton 1871, 528) [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. “Dico igitur tria esse in anima : scientia et intellectum et voluntatem; horum autem unumquodque est passibile. *Dico passibilem scientiam esse sensum, passibilem vero intellectum ymaginacionem, passibilem vero voluntatem desiderium seu affectum.“ (Quaternuli*, *fragment* 69; cited after Dagron 2003, 422) [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. “Manifestum est etiam, quod passivus intellectus (hoc est imaginacio) non comprehendit esse, nisi assimiletur rei sense, nom hoc supra naturam; per simile vero videtur, quod nec [im]passibilis intellectus possit comprehendere ylen, nisi habeat similitudinem cum ea aut ei sit idem. (...) Ex hiis ergo colligi potest mentem et ylen idem esse.“ (*Quaternuli*, *fragment* 70; cited after Dagron 2003, 423) [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. “Manifestum est igitur unam solam substanciam esse, non tantum omnium corporum, sed etiam animarum omnium et eam nichil aliud esse, quam ipsum Deum. Substantia vero, ex qua sunt omnia <corpora>, dicitur yle; substancia vero, ex qua sunt omnes anime, dicitur racio sive mens. Manifestum est ergo Deum esse racionem omnium animarum et yle omnium corporum.“ (Quaternuli, *fragment* 70; cited after Dagron 2003, 423) [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. “Mens enim, de qua loquimur et quam unam dicimus esse eamque impassibilem, nichil aliud est quam Deus. Si ergo mundus est ipse Deus preter se ipsum perceptibile sensui, ut Plato et Zeno et Socrates et multi alii dixerunt, yle igitur mundi est ipse Deus, forma vero adveniens yle nil aliud quam id, quod facit Deus sensibile se ipsum.“ (*Quaternuli*, *fragment* 70; cited after Dagron 2003, 423) [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. “Dicimus mundum non habere animam.“ (*Tractatus de anima* 360; ed. Callus‒Hunt, p. 98.18) [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. “Inde satis constare potest quia si qua perorem / nullus ad hoc prece vel precio me compulit, immo / insitus humane rationi iura tuendi / naturalis amor compescendique furorem / quo presumit homo divina retexere facta.“ (*Poems of Henry of Avranches*; ed. Heironimus&Russell, no. 130, p. 130.23‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. “Toletanus autem translator utrumque intelligit esse ponendum in diffinitione anime, hoc modo: « Anima est primus actus corporis fisici organici potencia uitam habentis ». Per hoc quod dico « organici », excluduntur corpora naturalia que non sunt organica, ut elementa et elementata : sic excluduntur per hanc differenciam sanguis et sperma. Et quia corpora mortuorum animalium uidentur organica esse, ut excludantur, additur: “potentia vitam habentis”, quod intelligitur ut supra dictum est.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, p. 29.42‒48) [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. “Et quia iste terminus “potencia uitam habentis”, habet se ad plantas et animalia secundum prius et posterius et re et dictione, ideo Aristotiles mutauit eum in hunc terminum: “organici”, quod sic se habet re, non dictione, quia, licet re sit analogum, dictione tamen est uniuocum. Hec est igitur recta diffinitio anime: “Anima est actus primus corporis phisici organici”. Et hoc dictum est secundum expositionem Aueroist.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, pp. 28.36‒29.41) [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. „Sed plus placet nobis sensus Aueneroist. Corpus enim mortuum non est organicum, quia partes eius non sunt organa: oculus mortui non est oculus.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, p. 29.49‒50) [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. „Utque in eo quod est “*homo mortuus*” oppositio est in adiecto, ita et in eo recte diceretur esse quod est “*tempus praeteritum*” et “*tempus futurum*”. Nota autem quod, cum praeteritum et praesens et futurum circa diversa accipiantur, hic ordo est eorum ut antecedat praeteritum, deinde praesens succedat ac postea futurum subsequatur, cum videlicet res ea quæ praeterita est prius exstiterit quam ea quæ praesens est, atque ea quæ praesens est quam ea quæ futura dicitur.“ (*Dialectica* II; ed. Rijk, p. 63.30‒37) [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. “Hec argumentatio potest reduci in explicitam iuxta hoc preceptum: cuiuslibet argumentationis inplicite reductio est in explicitam addita aliqua que cooperatur vel videatur cooperari ad conclusionem, hoc modo: hec propositio “*nullum mortuum est homo*” est universalis negativa et vera et habet simplicem conversam; ergo eius simplex conversa est vera.“ (*Logica Modernorum II*; ed. Rijk, p. 236.10‒14). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. “Si enim non sit actu, a quo vel mediate vel immediate res illa possit venire in complementum, non est possibile rem illam esse. Cum itaque dicitur, quod res est in potentia, forte intelligitur potentia efficientis solum et forte potentia efficientis et amplius.“ (*De potentia et actu*; ed. Baur, p. 127.1‒5) [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. “Primus actus animae est, quod est perfectio corporis organici naturalis, secundus scilicet actus est operari sicut in ense. Primus actus est figura et forma, secundus secare. Et secundus actus non est sine primo. Ergo ad hoc, quod sit operatio animae rationalis oportet, ut sit forma ipsius corporis. Sed hoc non potest esse nisi in corpore sensibili. Ergo ad primum actum oportet, quod sensibile sit medium non tantum ad hoc quod operetur.“ (*De anima,* cap. VIII; ed. Baur, p. 270.25‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. “Perspicuitas est quaedam natura communis aëris et aquae et ignis et quintae essentiae, ut patet II de anima capitulo de lucido et in libro de sensu et sensato expressius dicitur. Hoc ergo, quod non est perspicuum, non est eiusdem naturae cum aliquo istorum. Sed stellae non sunt perspicuae; ergo non sunt eiusdem naturae cum aliquo istorum.“ (*De generatione stellarum*, ed. Baur, p. 34.17‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. “Ad ultimum dicimus, quod duplex est medium; scilicet medium *participans*, ut medius color, et medium *ordinans* unum extremorum ad aliud. Et tali modo componitur anima corpori, non cuilibet, sed aptato.“ (*De anima,* cap. IV; ed. Baur, p. 251.37‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. “Conueniunt etiam in hoc quod quilibet sensus indiget obiecto, medio, organo et spiritu : unde forma abstracta primo est in medio, secundo in organo, tercio in spiritu, quarto in sensibili potencia, quinto in potencia rationali.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, pp. 35.200‒36.203) [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. “Hec potencia media est inter potenciam sensibilem et intellectum separabilem: potencia enim sensibilis est circa fantasmata, intellectus separabilis circa species, hic autem intellectus materialis considerat species in fantasmatibus, ita quod apprehendit species cum accidentibus, distinguens inter speciem et accidencia, non tamen abstrahens; et sic preparat materialiter species intellectui separabili.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, p. 49.425‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. “Forte dices, quod licet anima rationalis sit in homine mediante sensibili, non tamen est alia substantia, sed una, cuius est ratio et sensus; et mediante sensu est ratio in homine. Et ita est potentia media ad potentiam in eadem substantia. Contra: destructo medio et destruitur idem, quod per illud medium est in aliquo. Sed potentia sensitiva non remanet in anima separata a corpore; ergo nec intellectiva, quod falsum est.“ (*De anima*, cap. VIII; ed. Baur, p. 270.12‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. “Primo dicitur intellectus possibili eum ipse sit potencia anime et nichil actu; cuius exemplum est tabula nuda nullam habens picturam nec etiam aptitudinem ad unam magis quam ad aliam, potens autem habere quamcunque.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, p. 52.465‒68) [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. “Est autem talis comparatio agentis ad possibilem qualis est comparatio lucis ad uisum. Sicut enim lux facit resultare speciem coloris de ipso colorato in oculum, ita intellectus agens abstrahit species a fantasmatibus, quas preparauit ei intellectus materialis, et facit eas quodam modo resultare in intellectu possibili. Vnde duo sunt actus intellectus agentis: unus est abstrahere species a fantasmatibus, alius est species abstractas ordinare in intellectu possibili.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, p. 51.446‒52) [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. „Et in hoc errauit Auicena, quia posuit intellectum agentem separatum ab anima, puto intelligenciam siue angelum, sicut sol est separatus a uisu. Set non est dubium hunc intellectum esse potenciam anime, cum in potestate anime sit intelligere quando uult: ex hoc enim sequitur quod et fantasmata sunt semper ei presentia, et intellectus agens qui abstrahit species a fantasmatibus est copulatus anime sicut potencia eius. Quod patet in uisu per contrarium, quia non uidemus album quandocunque uolumus, quia uel lux semper non est presens, uel si lux est aliquando presens, ipsum albu poterit esse absens.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, pp. 51.453‒52.461) [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. “Inseparabilis dicitur rationalitas, a qua homo dicitur rationalis. Et dicitur etiam intellectus materialis, quem uocat Aristotiles passibilem et corruptibilem.“ (*De anima et de potenciis eius*; ed. Gauthier, p. 49.423‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. “Die *Summa Duacensis* ist nach der *Summa de bono* zu datieren. Sie ist von G. von Soissons, dem Kompilator der Sammelhandschrift Douai 434 aus der Summe Philipps zusammengestellt und geht damit wenigstens teilweise auf Philipp zurück. Damit ist die Eigenständigkeit und Originalität Philipps gewährleistet.“ (Wicki 2005, 5) [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. “Similitudo autem dicitur ille intellectus in comparatione ad rem extra cuius est similitudo; formalis autem appellatur in comparatione ad ipsam animam quam format et perficit, et non ad aliud; species autem dicitur idem intellectus secundum quod anima per ipsum tendit in rei cognitionem. Intellectus itaque ille formalis quem distinximus, sive species vel similitudo, deleri potest et annihilari. Sed intellectus ipse agens aut possibilis manet semper in sua substantia incorruptibilis et inmixtus materie.“ (*Summa Duacensis* V; ed. Glorieux, pp. 44‒45) [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. “Tertio autem modo accipitur memoria secundum phisice vel philosophice loquentes hoc modo: memoria est thesaurus in quo recipiuntur ymagines rerum vel species per extrinsecas similitudines accepte. Hoc autem nichil attinet memorie supra dupliciter diffinite; immo differt multipliciter a memoria secundum quod Patris est. Et primum per hoc quod memoria secundum quod est in homine et Patri attributa, inest homini naturaliter et indelibiliter et in opere prior naturaliter.“ (*Summa Duacensis*III*,* q. 4; ed. Glorieux, p. 21) [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. “Respondentes ad illam questionem que fieri solet hic, que scilicet unitas aut quis modus erit unitatis secundum quem unum est ex anima et corpore ipse homo, in hunc modum, triplicem invenimus unitatem: una que scilicet est firmissima, et alia minus firma, et tertia minime.“ (*Summa Duacensis* VII; ed. Glorieux, p. 63) [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. “C’est là simple reprise de la conception avicennienne assurant que la fonction causale d’animation et de régence du corps n’est qu’un effet de ce qu’est l’essence de l’âme. D’où l’inflexion vers un sens de simple efficience qui est imposé à la formule aristotélicienne d’acte premier ou perfection première du corps support, ici, d’une acception augustino-avicennienne. » (Wéber 1991, 86) [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. “Quod autem agens intellectus in predicta operatione sit agens et recipiens, respectu scilicet diuersorum, videtur per simile in luna et sole: Luna enim recipit lumen a sole et illuminat inferiora; ergo similiter agens intellectus recipit ab agente superiori et illuminat fantasmata et intellectum possibilem. Preterca recipit illuminationes a Primo, sicut dictum est, et illuminat alia.“ (*Tractatus de divisione multiplicis potentiarum animae* II.21; ed. Michaud-Quantin p. 92.781‒86) [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. “Intellectus enim agens duas habet operationes, una est abstractio fantasmatum a fantasia etc.; alia autem operatio est receptio illuminatiorum a Primo.“ (*Tractatus de divisione multiplicis potentiarum animae* II.21; ed. Michaud-Quantin, p. 91.754‒56) [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. “Notandum ergo secundum Auicennam, quod operatio intellectus agentis est illuminare siue lumen intelligencie diffundere super formas sensibiles existentes in ymaginacione siue estimacione; et illuminando abstrahere ab omnibus circumstanciis materialibus, et abstractas copulare siue ordinare in intellectu possibili, quemadmodum per operacionem lucis species coloris abstrahitur quodam modo et pupille copulatur.“ (*Summa de anima* 2.1.22; ed. Bougerol, p. 117.1‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. “Passiva vero potentia recipiendi ab altero secundum quod alterum. Oportet autem secundum quod sumitur in naturis, quod sit aliud secundum substantiam vel ab alio secundum substantiam; sed secundum quod proportionaliter sumitur non oportet nisi alterum esse secundum rationem. Nam intellectus ab intelligibili patitur, ipse autem intellectus aliquando intelligibile est.“ (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 147.7‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. “Questio autem est si recipiat diversitatem suam essentialem vel secundum esse vel secundum rationem, ab organo vel instrumento vel obiecto.“ (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 147.15‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. “Dissimiliter tamen dicitur obiectum potentie motive et po­tentie apprehensive. Respectu quidem apprehensive, ut a quo inchoatur actus, respectu autem motive, ut in quod terminatur actus. Unus dicitur motus ad animam, alter motus ab anima.“ (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 148.2‒5) [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. “Dico autem comprehensionem que fit per corpus; de alia vero loquamur in tractatu de anima rationali.“ (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 149.18‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. “Habet autem spiritus virtutem corporis quod deprehenditur ex sua agilitate maxima. Et sic necesse est quod diversificetur apprehensio virtutis rationalis ab apprehensione virtutis sensibilis, sicut et compositio, ita quod abstractionem a phantas­matibus habeat comprehensio forme ab anima rationali.“ (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 150.8‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. It is up to the specialists to show whether the writing *De potenciis animae et obiectis* contains the full reception of the CMDA according to the Sicilian school. The problem is polemical orientation of the writing against Porretans and schools of *Nominales*, which determines bishop Alvernus as the author of the writing. Most of his thinking and focus was not primarily philosophical, but theological and moral in character. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the origin of the writing in terms of the year; very probably it was written after 1230. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. “Primum autem esse est in aere sive in alio medio secundum quod debet reduci forma in esse spirituale; secundum in organo; tertium in spiritu; quartum in anima sensibili; quintum in anima rationali. Esse coloris in aere est quantum ad naturam transparentis, esse vero in oculo est quantum ad naturam transparentis lucidi coadunati, esse vero in spiritu est quantum ad naturam luminis, esse vero in anima sensibili est incorporale, non tamen a corpore separabile, esse vero in anima rationali est incorporale a corpore separabile; et sic manifestum est de gradibus spiritualibus in forma.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 150.13‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. “Hec est autem virtus inseparabilis a corpore, scilicet, intellectus passibilis, qui recipit species abstractas a corpore.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 155.29‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. “Cum autem fuerit intellectus possibilis unitus intellectui formali, qui dicitur similitudo rei vel res ipsa, secundum quod iam dictum est, et fuerint species in intellectu possibili ordinate ab agente, tunc procedunt operationes intellectus possibilis.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, pp. 157.25‒158.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. “Post hanc virtutem est intellectus qui est separabilis a corpore, cuius sunt due differentie: est enim intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis. Et ponitur talis comparatio intellectus agentis ad possibilem, que est comparatio lucis ad visum. Hec tamen differentia est quod lux est separata a substantia visus, intellectus autem agens non est separatus a substantia anime.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 156.1‒5) [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. “Sed quia natura intellectualis est superior rebus corporalibus et supra res incorporales que sunt in ipsa, ideo ad hec comprehendenda non est necessarium illuminatione substantie separate, sed sufficit intellectus agens, qui est lumen interius, cum intellectu possibili.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*, ed. Callus, p. 156.17‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. “Fuerunt tamen quidam philosophorum qui dixerunt intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam a substantia anime, et per irradiationem sui super possibilem fieri intellectum possibilem in effectu. Sed oportet intelligere quod non requiritur talis irradiatio intellectus agentis et separati super intellectum possibilem.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*, ed. Callus, p. 156.5‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. “A stronger and more cogent point, which seems to rule out completely William of Auvergne, is that the doctrine of the intellectus agens and of the illumination of the mind as expounded in this treatise does not tally with his well-known teaching-on-the subject. According to our author the ‘active intellect’ is not a substance ‘separata a substantia anime’, but an immanent faculty of the soul. (…) It is clear that all this, however elementary and imperfect it may seem, is utterly inconsistent with the fundamental theories of William of Auvergne, for whom ‘figmentum igitur est tantum et vanissima positio intellectus agentis’.” (Callus 1952, pp. 139‒140) [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. “Sed oportet intelligere quod non requiritur talis irradiatio intellectus agentis et separati super intellectum possibilem, nisi quantum ad quedam intelligibilia ad que non potest intellectus ex se, sicut sunt ea que de divina essentia intelliguntur divino modo, et quibus humana ratio repugnare videtur.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*, ed. Callus, p. 156.9‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. “Et quod iste sunt differentes quantum ad actus perpenditur ex hoc quod synderesis non dicitur errare, rationis vero inferior pars dicitur errare simpliciter, superior vero per consensum cum inferiori; et hee omnes referuntur proprie ad cognoscitivam boni, et per hoc ad imperantem. Subsequitur autem motiva ad bonum vel a malo, et hec dividitur similiter in superiorem et inferiorem et mediam.” (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*, ed. Callus, p. 159.14‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. “Et etiam jam patefactus est tibi per me error Philosophorum de causis et causalitatibus, quo errore longe plus attribuunt causis quam eis attribuendum sit (…) causalitas effectiva proprie ac vere attribui non potest nisi causae primae, quæ est Creator benedictus et sublimis…” (*Guilielmi De anima* V.2; ed. Le Feron, p. 113) [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. “Post haec autem incipiam destruere errorem eorum qui causas alias efficientes quam creatorem benedictum eidem posuerunt, ex quibus fuit Aristoteles, et sequaces eius videlicet Alpharalius, Algaxel, et Avicenna et plures alii qui post eum et per eum forsitan a via veritatis in ista deviaverunt. Posuerunt enim intelligentiam agentem effectricem animarum humanarum.” (*Guilielmi De anima* V.2; ed. Le Feron, p. 112) [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. “De rudimentis enim philosophiae est proculdubio ratio materiae et formae, et cum ipsa ratio materiae posita sit ab Averroe philosopho nobilissimo, expediret ut intentiones ejus et aliorum, qui tanquam duces philosophiae sequendi et imitandi sunt…” (*De universo* IIa-Iae, cap. 8) (…) “Ipse etiam Averroes omne quod alii vocant compositum ex materia et forma, ipse vocat formam in materia.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* III.9; ed. Le Feron, p. 101) [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. “Nec Aristoteles, quem sequi se credunt in errore isto, hoc unquam posuit, vel cogitavit… intelligentiam agentem separatam… cuius irradiatione scientiae fiunt in intellectu nostro materiali, et eam posuit decimam, infimamque inteligentiarum separatum.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.5; ed. Le Feron, p. 210) [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. “Unde intellectus agens est illud agens particulare quod exigitur ad operationem intellectus speculativi, qui quidem intellectus agens secundum Commentatorem est pars anime, secundum Alpharabium et secundum Aristotelem et Avicennam est aliquid aliud.“ (*Quaestiones supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*, lib. IX; ed. Steele, OHI 10, 298.34‒299.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. “Nam universitate Parisiensi convocata, bis vidi et audivi venerabilem antistitem Gulielmum Parisiensem Episcopum felicis memoriae coram omnibus sententiare quod intellectus agens non potest esse pars animae; et dominus Robertus Episcopus Lincolniensis et frater Adam de Marisco et huiusmodi maiores idem firmaverunt.“ (*Opus tertium*, cap. XXIII; ed. Brewer, OHI 1, 74‒75) [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. “Et praeterea versus finem capituli docet quod intellectus agens est separatus a possibili secundum substantiam et secundum esse, et quod anima scit, et semper est in actu; et hoc non est creatum, sed solus Deus.“ (*Opus tertium*, cap. XXIII; ed. Brewer, OHI 1, 76) [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. “Sic igitur est intellectus agens in anima, scilicet secundum influentiam sui luminis, sed non secundum essentiam, vel quod sint eiusdem essentiae et naturae, scilicet quod sint partes animae.“ (*Opus tertium*, cap. XXIII; ed. Brewer, OHI 1, 79) [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. “Sed scimus hoc esse falsum; et aliae translationes habent aliter. Et Averroes hoc demonstrat, et planum est.“ (*Opus tertium*, cap. XXIII; ed. Brewer, OHI 1, 77) [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. “Ex sermonibus autem Aristotelis evidenter apparet ipsum Aristotelem sensisse virtutem nostram intellectivam et ab inferiori, hoc est, a parte sensibilium per spoliationem, quam exposui, et a parte superiori, hoc est, ab inteligentia agente esse illuminabilem.“ (*De universo* 2.1.15; ed. Le Feron, t. I, p. 822F) [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. See Teske 2006, 53–63 for an overview of all hypotheses, including the claim defended by Teske that these are unnamed quotations from Cicero, Boethius, and Epicuros and Seneca, respectively. An passage from this work already suggests another option: “In one text William refers to ‘sophistae Italici, vel Latini’ who have used the de re and de dicto distinction; there he probably is referring to thinkers of the immediate past.“ (Teske 2006, 60) [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. For the examination of logical texts published by Peter Capuanus, see Iwakuma—Ebbesen 1922, 193–196 (no. 44–45). William of Auvergne’s debate with Porretans concerning the *enuntiabile* and eternal truths, can be found in Lewis 1995. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. “Si dicas, sicut dicunt Nominales, quia quod semel est verum semper erit verum, secundum eos dicendum erit quod Habraham credidit Christum esse natum, et quod Habraham non credidit Christum esse nasciturum, quia Christum esse nasciturum secundum eos semper fuit falsum…“ (Petrus Capuanus, *Summa*; quoted after Courtenay 2008, 55). [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. “For example, the way in which the author deals with the rule *ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet* (which he agrees with) and the scope of the term *necessario*—‘to be necessary’ (*necesse esse*) is subordinate to ‘to be’ (*esse*)—are very similar to the positions held by John le Page and Nicholas of Paris, contrary to those of Peter of Spain and Henry of Ghent.“ (*Matthew of Orleans*: *Sophistaria*; ed. by Spruyt 2001, 4) [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. “Eorem modo res intelligibiles secundem errorem istum non cognoscentur, sive apprehendentur nisi applicatione intellectus nostri materialis ad intelligentiam agentem, sive a converso.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* V.8; ed. Le Feron, p. 123) [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. “Nihil amplius ad inscriptionem suam potens nisi quod charta vel pergamena aut tabula rasa.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.9; ed. Le Feron, p. 216) [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. “Cum sensus illuminetur ad cognitionem sensibilem per solam similitudinem formae sensibilis, quae imprimitur in organo sensus; quanto fortius per solam formam intelligibilem illuminabitur ad cognitionem intelligibilem noster intellectus. Id ergo, quod imprimit intelligentia agens virtuti nostrae intellectivae, non est, nisi forma intelligibilis et similitudo intellecti, hoc est, rei, quæ intelligitur.“ (*De universo* 2.1.16; ed. Le Feron, t. I, p. 825A) [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. “Revertar autem ad hoc, ut prosequar, quod incoepi de opinione Aristotelis circa intelligentiam agentem; dico igitur, quoniam non est ea virtus in sole visibili, ut in speculo vitreo, vel cujuscunque alterius materiae faciat relucere in affectu per se, hoc est sola superfusione lucis suae, aliquam formam sensibilem. Non erit igitur in intelligentia agente ex sola causa hujusmodi, ut faciat relucere in speculo virtutis nostrae intellectivae formam aliquam intelligibilem.“ (*De universo* 2.1.14; ed. Le Feron, t. I, p. 822F) [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. “Yet whoever its author was, he assuredly wrote in the first decades of the thirteenth century and moved in the same intellectual circles as William of Auvergne.“ (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*; ed. Callus, p. 140). [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. “Sed numquid et permittis ut ipse intellectus de se natura exprimat suam propriam ideam in se ipso speculo, est enim ipse intellectus natura vel ens causatum? Unde et obiectum esse potest a quo irradietur idolum, et est ipse idem etiam speculum. Unde et idoli vel ideae susceptivum, et tamen ipse non est receptivus ideae abstractae nisi per naturam suae materiae spiritualis.“ (*Contra Averroem*, cap. I; ed. Wood&Nonne, p. 36.778‒83) [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. “Secunda autem intendo huius, quod est esse, est illud, quod dicitur per hoc verbum “est” de unoquoque, et est praeter uniuscuiusque rationem. In nullius namque ratione accipitur esse; quidquid enim imaginati fuerimus, sive hominem, sive asinum, sive aliud, in ratione eius esse non intelligimus, eo solo excepto, de quo esse essentialiter dicitur; eius namque essentia nisi per ipsum esse intelligi non potest, cum ipsa et eius esse omnimodo sint una res.“ (*De trinitate* 2; ed. Switalski, p. 21.56‒62). [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. “Non est possibile animam intelligere sine phantasmate, et intendo sine signo vel forma intelligibili.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.6; ed. Le Feron, p. 211) [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. “Amplius si vere correlativa sunt intellectus agens, et intellectus patiens sive materialis, et vere contrarii, sicut et nominationes ipsorum ostendunt, necesse est ut quemadmodum intellectus materialis omnes formas intelligibiles naturaliter habet in potentia tantum, sic intellectum agentem necesse est naturaliter habere in se in effectu omnes formas intelligibiles.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.4; ed. Le Feron, p. 207) [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. “Quod si dixerit revera anima humana est, et operatur quantum ad vires, quibus membra deserviunt, sed passibilis est, et passiva tantum, et receptiva quantum ad virtutem intellectualem. Dico quod perversissimus est sermo hujusmodi.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* V.8; ed. Le Feron, p. 123) [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. “Intellectum etiam istum agentem videlicet vocaverunt formalem quasi formantem, seu informatem, seu inscribentem, seu imprimentem formas antedictas intellectui materiali.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.1; ed. Le Feron, p. 205) [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. “Intellectus enim noster hic non apprehendit propie per se particularia, seu singularia, sed universalia tantum, quæ sunt genera, et species, et alia communia, que Plato formas, et species abstractas vocasse videtur. (…) Quare non est intelligere intelligibile nisi per actionem ipsius intellectus passibilis, seu receptibilis hujusmodi passionum, et impressionum, sive similitudinis in eodem. Et hoc ipsum sentire visus est Aristoteles, ubi dixit, quod impossibile est intelligi sine phantasmate.“ (*De universo* 2.1.14; ed. Le Feron, t. I, p. 821B‒C) [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. “Intellectus igitur nostri, hoc est, intellectiones, quibus sumus intelligentes, non sunt in effectu, nisi passiones, seu similitudines intelligibilium impressae ab eidem intelectui nostro. Agere autem vel imprimere, non potest, quod non est; necesse igitur est intelligibilia esse, quæ hujusmodi similitudines, seu passiones imprimunt in intellectu nostro.“ (*De universo* 2.1.14; ed. Le Feron, t. I, p. 821C) [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. “Respondeo autem hujusmodi homini quia vel concedit animam multam esse sive multiplicem viribus et potentiis, et unam essentialiter, aut concedit unam non esse, sed multas, et nullam earum multum esse sive multiplicem viribus et potentiis.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* IV.3; ed. Le Feron, p. 108) [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. “Anima igitur est prout diffinit Aristoteles “perfectio corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis”. (p. 65)… Quoniam autem dicit Aristoteles in libro de anima quonim corpus quidem materia est, anima vero forma… anima quidem non materia est neque compositum, sed forma.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* I.2; ed. Le Feron, p. 66) [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. “...quoniam Aristoteles, et sequaces ejus solum coelum, id est, partem illam, quæ est a luna supra, vel forsitan coelum stellarum fixarum animal esse potuisse videntur, et Avicenna evidenter dicit, quia coelum est animal Deo obediens.“ (*De Universo* 1.3.17; ed. Le Feron, t. I, p. 797C) [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. “Amplius unde somnium istud videlicet ut vis intellectiva duplex sit, sive duas partes habeat, alteram scilicet agentem, quam vocant intellectum agentem, et alteram patientem, et in sensitiva non erit similier duplex, sive duas habens partes alteram scilecet agentem, et alteram patientem?“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.4; ed. Le Feron, p. 207) [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. “Tunc incidit Aristoteles et sequaces eius in sententia Platonis cui contradicebant…, videlicet in hoc quod ipsi ponebant vacuam creatam a scientiis, licet receptibilem earum… “ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.4; ed. Le Feron, p. 208) [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. “Quapropter sicut posuerunt intellectum agentem propter antedictam necessitatem, et indigentiam, multo fortius necesse est ponere virtutem agentem, sive vim agentem hoc est in actum essendi educentem ipsas virtutes. Manifestum est autem tibi quod de virtute hujusmodi nec etiam mentionem fecerunt.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.4; ed. Le Feron, p. 209) [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. The logic students of Paris in the school Saint Geneviève mobilized their armies and sent them into battle against the school of grammarians in Orléans: “She marshalled her forces near Tournai / Under sir Pierre de Courtenai [Pierre de Courtenai] / A very learned logician / There was master John the Rustic [Johannes Pagus] / And Pointlasne, he of Gamaches [John of Paris] / Master Nicholas with the prominent buttocks [Nicolaus Parisiensis].” (Henri d’Andeli, *The Battle of the Seven Arts* 1.1.49‒54; ed. Paetow, pp. 41‒42) [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. „Et exempla horum sunt in hac dictione, albet, et in hac dictione, fit album; et est dicere quia secundum hanc distintionem, albet, significat et ponit quod in eo est, videlicet albedinem quam institutione sua essentialiter significat, et ponit eam in subjecto de quo dicitur: verbum vero quod est, fit, assumit significationem a nomine quod ipsum sequitur.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* III.3; ed. Le Feron, p. 88) [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. „Antiqui Grammatici qui praecesserunt me, et multi qui in tempore meo fuerunt (…). Intentio eorum erat quod quaedam de verbis significabant et praedicabant dispositiones, ponebantque eas in substantiis de quibus dicebatur; quaedam vero non significantes ex semetipsis ponebant in subiectis de quibus dicebantur dispositiones per conjuncta sibi nomina significatas.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* III.3; ed. Le Feron, p. 88) [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. “Amplius secundem hoc album nihil esset, quoniam nec esset homo, nec aliquid aliud juxta hanc viam, vel potius nihil esset album; quoniam res alba non esset res: quare non esset aliqua res, et ita non esset aliquid, nihil igitur esset album, id est res alba, neque res nigra.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* I.6; ed. Le Feron, p. 71) [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. “Si enim verbum inhaerendi significaret inhaerentiam quam utique non est possibile esse nisi accidens, esset ex necessitate inhaerentia hujusmodi in subjecto; et quoniam esse in subjecto non est inhaerere subjecto, inhaereret ex necessitate inhaerentia subjecto proprio, inhaereret vel seipsa, vel alia inhaerentia: si alia, tunc iret res in infinitum…“ (*Guilielmi De anima* III.3, ed. Le Feron, p. 89) [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. “Amplius *si ea quae sunt in voce nota sunt earum qua sunt in anima passionum*, ut dicit Aristoteles; quanto fortius passione quæ in anima sunt notae et signa certissima substantiae subsistentis eas sive portantis ac gubernatis eadem?“ (*Guilielmi De anima* III.12, ed. Le Feron, p. 103) [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. “Si vero dixerit quod animalitas pars humanitatis est, tunc homo inquantum homo non erit animal, sed compositum ex animali et quodam residuo. (…) Quapropter sicut iste homo est animal, ita haec humanitas est haec animalitas.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* IV.3, ed. Le Feron, p. 107) [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. On the differences between Cancellarius and the writing *De anima et de potenciis eius*, see Wicki 2005, 147–160. The author proves against Gauthier that the work *De anima et de potenciis eius* works with a different scheme of cognition than Chancellor Philip used. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. “Primae intentiones simplices dicuntur quia non est ante ipsas in quæ fiat resolutio. Ante prima, non est quod in eorum veniat definitionem.” (*Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis* Summa de Bono, q. IX, ed. Wicki, p. 30.11‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. “Philippe dit que l’unité est la première propriété découlant en tout être de Dieu, sa cause efficiente. Il la définit comme Aristote: l’un, c’est l’être indivis. Cette définition figure sans commentaire dans la *Somme* de Guillaume d’Auxerre. On pouvait lire bien davantage dans les philosophes arabes. Philippe commente la définition: indivis affirme seulement l’être et en nie la division, sans y ajouter rien de positif. Elle ne différencie l’un de l’être que par une négation. Et il poursuit: “C’est ainsi qu’il faut déterminer les notions premières, sur le modèle de l’unité”.“ (Pouillon 1939, 55) [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. “Et ita non diffinietur (bonum) per ens et aliquam positionem superadditam, sicut nec unum cum dicitur unum est ens indivisum; 'indivisum' enim ponit ens et privat ab ente divisionem.“ (*Summa de bono*, Prologue, q. 1, éd. Wicki, p. 7.30-33) [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. “Sunt tres conditiones concomitantes esse: unitas, veritas, bonitas. Unitas autem prima illarum, secunda veritas, tertia bonitas; in idem enim possunt concidere efficiens, formalis et finalis, sed materialis non...“ (*Summa de bono*, prologus, q. 7, ed. Wicki, p. 26.16‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. The key passage in Avicenna is in the work *Kitāb al-Shifā* (*Sufficientia*), ed. Cairo 1960, pp. 348–9, where pure being of the existent is affirmed as the highest genus. Gilson pointed out the importance of Avicenna’s definition of being without subject (*ens non in subiectum*) in connection with the exegesis of Aquinas’s work *De potentia* 9.7 and criticized this view (Gilson 1974, 112–13). [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. “Absque enim ulla dubitatione constantissime asserit apus semetipsa et in se ipsa. Ego sum quæ intelligo, quæ scio, quæ cognosco, quæ volo, quæ appeto, quæ desidero, quæ desideria seu volita inquiro, et cum possiblile est et licet acquiro volita, desiderata et appetita.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* III.10; ed. Le Feron, p. 98) [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. “Potest siquidem alicui videri ex hoc sermone quod unaquaeque species animalis formet sibi corpus juxta convenientiam naturae suae, et hoc aliquando visum fuit sensisse Albumasar: quod si ita esset, tunc species humana formaret sibi corpus secundum ipsum. Hoc autem non videt posse intelligi de ipsa species quæ est universale; universali enim agere vel pati non est opinio vel sermo philosophorum.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* IV.4, ed. Le Feron, p. 109) [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. “Quoniam autem synderesim ponunt semper contradicere malis, et reclamere contra ea, perscrutanda erit mihi hic de hoc praesertim propter sermones erroneorum, et imbecillium.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.13; ed. Le Feron, p. 219) [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. “No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves. Their situation has deteriorated just as stubbornly, until the internment camp ‒ prior to the Second World War the exception rather than the rule for the stateless ‒ has become the routine solution for the problem of domicile of the ‘displaced persons’.“ (Arendt 1962, 279) [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. “Post autem aggrediar declarare tibi ac determinare quid est intellectus qui dicitur theoricus seu speculativus, et quid ille qui dicitur practicus. Sciendum igitur in primis est tibi quod fuerunt erronei, et imbecilles quidam, et adhuc de huiusmodi hominibus aliqui sunt, qui dixerunt intellectum theoreticum sive speculativum vim quandam animae humanae, quæ non intedit nisi rebus divinatoribus ac theologicis.“ (*Guilielmi De anima* VII.12; ed. Le Feron, p. 216) [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Alvernus’s protector was the educated jurist and Pope Gregory IX. (†1241), who excommunicated Frederick II., but had to revoke the interdict after the lost war in Italy in 1228. His next battle with this “heretic” was fought over the university, because Frederick I. had already founded the first European university in Bologna (*Constitutio Habita*, 1158). Alvernus became Gregory’s ally against Frederick II. thanks to the successfully managed the University of Paris. This is proved by papal bull *Parens Scientiarum Universitas* (1231), which created legal order and papal status of Paris University. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. “Aristotle himself had maintained, says William, that the active intelligence is separate and that it shines upon the human intellect like an intelligible sun and thus produces knowledge in it. It can be observed that William attributes to Aristotle what is Avicennian and to the ‘sequaces Aristotelis’ what is Aristotelian. “ (Hasse 2000, 213) [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. “Here William clearly attributes to Aristotle a position which Aristotle himself did not hold, but Avicenna did. “ As evidence Teske cites the opinion of Roland de Vaux, who, however, took up this dispute in a more precise way: ‘C’est donc Avicenne encore que nous allons retrouver derrière les sequaces Aristotelis.” (Teske 2006, 219). [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Albert’s work is cited after a previous edition (*Opera omnia*, ed. Borgnet, 1890–1899) for three reasons. During the editing of this book, not all the treatises now published as part of the *Editio Coloniensis* were available, namely the commentaries on Aristotle’s logical and scientific works and the treatise *De intellectu et intelligibili* (t. II, III, VIII). The Paris edition is freely available in electronic form, which for understandable reasons is not the case of the new edition. Borgnet’s edition, notwithstanding the campaign waged against “Averroism,” presented a very correct version of Averroes’s philosophy in Albert’s work. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. “The premises must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it (αἴτιά τε καὶ γνωριμώτερα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ πρότερα); its causes, since we possess scientific knowledge of a thing only when we know its cause (αἴτια, καὶ προγινωσκόμενα...τῷ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἔστιν). “ (*Anal. Post*. 71b30‒33; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. “They are in fact four: (1) whether the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact, (2) what is the reason of the connexion, (3) whether a thing exists, (4) what is the nature of the thing. “ (*Anal. Post*. 89b24‒25; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. “Et primo quidem modo consideratum principium, est primum, verum, et immediatum. Ex quo enim principiat, principium illud per se est in esse vero: et oportet quod sit determinatum ad hoc quod sit proprium ad principiatum: quia aliter non inferretur illud per se, et non aliud. Dicamus ergo quod principium ex hoc quod est per se, oportet quod primum sit: quia per se est, et non per aliud, sed per ipsum est principium. Verum autem: quia principium est secundum verum, propter quod cognoscitur de ipso quia est.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, Lib. I, Tract. II, cap. 3; ed. Borgnet 2, 25b) [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. “Primum autem dicitur per privationem anterioris: quia scilicet ante ipsum non est aliud: *immediatam* autem, eo quod inter ipsum et subjectum nullum est medium. Primum autem et *prius* in hoc differunt, quia primum per privationem ejus quod est ante dicitur: prius autem dicit comparationem ad posterius. Prius autem et notius in hoc differunt: quia dicitur prius comparatum ad rem: notius autem dicitur per comparationem ad noscentem. Et sic patet intellectus omnium conditionum demonstrationis hic induciarum in diffinitione demonstrationis.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, Lib. I, Tract. II, cap. 3; ed. Borgnet 2, 25a) [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. “Inter tria prima, primum est in secundo, et primum et secundum sunt in tertio. Primum enim est in vero per se: quia per hoc quod est primum, est secundum seipsum verum et causa veritatis in sequentibus…“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, Lib. I, Tract. II, cap. 2; ed. Borgnet 2, 25b) [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. “Et ita quia causa est, non potest esse quin sit prius in ordine essendi, et notius in ordine cognoscendi, et causa in influendo esse causati. Iste videtur esse intellectus Aristotelis.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, Lib. I, Tract. II, cap. 2; ed. Borgnet 2, p. 26a) [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. “Sicut eclipsatur privatur lumine ex objectu umbrae terrae inter solem et lunam: talis enim diffinitio medium est demonstrans passionem de subjecto: dicit enim quid est et propter quid est passionis: illa vero quas concludi potest de subjecto, non dicit nisi quid est: illa vero diffinitio quæ est subjecti, dicitur diffinitio secundum speciem quæ non demonstratur.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, Lib. I, Tract. II, cap. 17, tertia expositio; ed. Borgnet 2, 64b) [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. “Si enim de aliquo non quaereretur nisi ratione substantiae et naturae, non cognosceretur illud secundum esse determinatum partium suarum et natura, sed in universali tantum, in quo non scirentur partes nisi in potentia, et sic scientur imperfecte: et ideo necesse est, quod sciantur partes secundum quod determinatis passionibus subjiciuntur: cum enim sic se habeant in esse et natura, erit iste modus sciendi rem in particulari et in propria natura, sicut habetur ab Aristotele in II Priorum.“ (*De homine*, q. 1, a. 1, solutio, ad 1; ed. Borgnet 35, 4a) [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. “Et hoc necessarium est: quia illud principium demonstrationis quod est medium in demonstratione, est quid est, id est, diffinitio passionis non solum dicens esse passionis, sed etiam causam in esse demonstrationis, id est, quare insit.“ (*De homine*, q. 1, a. 1, solutio, ad 1; ed. Borgnet 35, 4b) [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. “Quaedam est certitudo simpliciter, et alia est certitudo secundum quid. Certitudo simpliciter est, quæ est ex principiis ex quorum certitudine alia cognoscuntur: et sic certior est scientia animae quam corporis: quia anima est causa dans esse specificum corpori et rationem diffinitivam in quantum est animatum corpus et naturale: et ideo certior est, quia ex ipsa cognoscitur esse corporis talis. Certitudo autem secundum quid est, quæ est ad sensum et phantasiam, et haec magis competit corpori. Et hoc intendit Philosophus quando dicit animam esse principium animalium.“ (*De homine*, q. 1, a. 1, solutio, ad 4; ed. Borgnet 35, 5b) [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. “Dicat tamen quilibet quod vult, quod ego non praejudicio alicui, sed dico quod dictum Aristotelis intelligo: dictum autem illorum qui dicunt universale per esse individuum esse in intellectu sicut in subiecto, nullo modo possum intelligere.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, lib. I, tract. I, cap. III, ad 4; ed. Borgnet 2, 10b) [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. “Intellectus species est intelligibilium: et ideo id quod intelligitur, dicitur intellectuale secundum suum esse, et dicitur universale secundum suam potentiam.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, lib. I, tract. I, cap. III, ad 4; ed. Borgnet 2, 10a) [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. “Dicendum, quod anima est actus corporis physici, non simplicis, sed complexionati.“ (*De homine*, q. 4, solutio; Borgnet 35, 43b) [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. “Toutefois au grief trop rapide de syncrétisme, une étude d’Et. Gilson a préféré l’appréciation suivante: bien qu’elle cherche à adopter la thèse hylémorphique d’Aristote, l’anthropologie d’Albert demeure celle, platonicienne, d’Avicenne et reste opposée a celle, aristotélicienne, de Thomas d’Aquin.“ (Wéber 1991, 121) [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. “Resolutio enim est compositi in simplicia, et posterioris in prius, et causati in causam: et incipit ab ultimo secundum naturam quod immediatum sensibile est sensuum, non quidem per se vel commune sensatum, sed per accidens: quia in hoc albo crispo accipitur hic homo, et in hoc homine homo, et sic usque ad primum in quo stat resolutio.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, Lib. I, Tract. II, cap. 3; ed. Borgnet 2, 27a) [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. “Loquendo autem naturaliter et secundum esse, non quaeruntur principia quæ sunt genus et differentia: haec enim sunt principia cognitionis et non esse: nec ipsa hoc modo est species in natura, sed pars speciei.“ (*De homine*, q. 2, a. 1, solutio; ed. Borgnet 3, 12b) [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. “Dicunt tamen aliqui quod demonstrativa scientia dicit scientiam in anima, qui est habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem: sed tunc non erit diffinitio demonstrata de diffinito: et tunc praepositio “ex“ notat causam vel circumstantias causæ efficientis: præmissæ enim tales causa sunt efficiens talis habitus.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, lib. I, tract. II, cap. 3; ed. Borgnet 2, 25a) [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. “Quod concedimus dicentes, quod anima est in duplici consideratione, scilicet rationis, et rei. Rationis secundum quod accipitur ut universale vel particulare: et sic est in consideratione logici. Rei autem duobus modis, scilicet secundum quod habet esse in natura, et sic est in consideratione naturalis Philosophi: et secundum quod est substantia non comparata ad corpus generabile et corruptibile, et sic considerat de ipsa primus Philosophus.“ (*De homine*, q. 2, a. 1, solutio; ed. Borgnet 35, 12a,b) [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. “Secundum Aristotelem et Avicennam, potentiae existentis in actu quatuor sunt gradus. » (*De homine*, q. 54, a. 1, arg. 7; ed. Borgnet 35, 450b) [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. “Averroes vero videtur ponere tres species intellectus, scilicet agentem, et possibilem, et speculativum. » (*De homine*, q. 54, a. 1, ad 1; ed. Borgnet 35, 449a) [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. “Videntur omnes assignatae divisiones esse diminutae. Invenitur enim intellectus simplex et intellectus compositus, qui sunt partes potentiae speculativae animae intellectualis, et tamen non tanguntur in praehabitis divisionibus.“ (*De homine*, q. 55, a. 1, ad 5; ed. Borgnet 35, 450a) [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. “Et hoc pronomen “ipsum” potest referri ad intellectum materialem, sicut diximus; et potest referri ad hominem intelligentem.“ (CMDA III.18; 438.22‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. “Videntur non esse nisi tres species intellectus. In omni enim quod exit de potentia ad actum, non sunt nisi tria, scilicet transmutans, et transmutatum, et illud in quod est transmutatio. Cum ergo anima intellectiva in suis intelligibilibus distinguatur penes ea quæ sunt in transmutatione, non erunt nisi tres intellectus in ipsa, scilicet agens qui transmutans est, et possibilis qui est transmutatus, et speculativus in quem est transmutatio.“ (*De homine*, q. 54, a. 1, arg. 4; ed. Borgnet 35, 450a) [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. “Intellectus species est intelligibilium: et ideo id quod intelligitur, dicitur intellectuale secundum suum esse, et dicitur universale secundum suam potentiam.“ (*Analytica Posteriora*, lib. I, tract. I, cap. III, ad quarta; ed. Borgnet 2, 10a) [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. “Intellectus speculativus habet duo, scilicet subjectum, et speciem. Subjectum autem non est idem apud omnes. Species autem consideratur duobus modis, scilicet ut ratio rei, et ut accidens animae. Et ut ratio rei est apud omnes idem: ut accidens vero animae individuatur in omnibus animalibus.“ (*De homine*, q. 57, a. 3, solutio, ad 1; ed. Borgnet 35, 493b) [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. “Ad aliud dicendum, quod secundum quod universale est accidens animae, non est ratio rei. Quod patet: ratio enim est quidditas rei et substantia: species au­tem intelligibilis est accidens non rei, sed intellectus: et propter hoc cum individuetur a solis intelligibilibus, numerabitur per numerum intelligibilium.“ (*De homine*, q. 57, a. 3, solutio, ad 6; ed. Borgnet 35, 494a) [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. “Sequentes enim Aristotelem et Averroem, dicimus coelum non habere animam praeter intelligentiam, ut supra in quaestione de *coelo* determinatum est. Similiter dicimus intellectum agentem humanum esse conjunctum animae humanae, et esse simplicem, et non habere intelligibilia, sed agere ipsa in intellectu possibili ex phantasmatibus, sicut expresse dicit Averroes in commento libri de *Anima.“* (*De homine*, q. 55, a. 3, solutio; ed. Borgnet 35, 466b) [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. “Dicunt tamen quidam, quod dictum hoc est intelligendum de intelIectu speculativo quoad habitum principiorum: quia quodammodo connaturalis est nobis: et dicitur *immortalis,* hoc est, non corruptibilis, quia non cedit in oblivionem: et dicitur *perpetuus*, eo quod non est in potentia.“ (*De homine*, q. 55, a. 3, solutio, ad 2; ed. Borgnet 35, 466b) [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. “Dicit Averroes in tertio de *Anima* quod intellectus possibilis est incorruptibilis secundum suam substantiam, sed corruptibilis per species quæ sunt in ipso: sicut homo musicus corrumpitur dum desinit habere musicam, et tamen homo non corrumpitur.“ (*De homine*, q. 56, a. 4, sed contra, ad 3; ed. Borgnet 35, 483b) [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. “Intellectus possibilis secundum substantiam et potentiam est incorruptibilis, sed corruptibilis est per accidens, scilicet per actum qui est in ipso: et haec corruptio non est nisi oblivio intelligibilium: et sic intelligitur dictum Philosophi.“ (*De homine*, q. 56, a. 4, solutio; ed. Borgnet 35, 483b) [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. “Dicit Averroes*,* quod in­tellectus corrumpitur corruptione intelligibilium, sed non secundum substantiam: sed universale secundum quod est idem apud omnes, non est in intellectu, sed secundum quod est species quæ est in intellectu sicut in subjecto: cum ergo non sit idem subjectum, non erit eadem species. “ (*De homine*, q. 57, a. 3, sed contra, arg. 2; ed. Borgnet 35, 493b) [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. “Dicit Averroes super tertium de Anima quod una est species intellectus speculativi apud omnes homines.“ (*De homine*, q. 57, a. 3, arg. 1; ed. Borgnet 35, 492b) [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. “Item, Averroes super tertium de Anima: ‘Nos ponimus intellectum materialem esse aeternum et incorruptilibilem, et intellecta speculativa esse et generabilia et corruptibilia.’ Et ponit *aeternum* pro perpetuo et in transmutabili secundum substantiam.“ (*De homine*, q. 61, a. 2, arg. 7; ed. Borgnet 35, 523b) [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. “Avicennæ dicta accipiamus, quo Aristoteli plus concordant, quoniam anima rationalis non est intellectus possibilis, sed intellectus possibilis una ejus pars est: et hoc sensit Aristoteles quando dixit: “De parte autem animæ qua cognoscit et sapit anima”. Et vocavit intellectum partem animæ et non totam animam rationalem.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 12; ed. Borgnet 5, 349b) [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. “Dicunt enim ani­mam rationalem esse individuam duplici individuitate, quoniam dicunt eam in se esse hoc aliquid per materiam incorpoream et spiritualem, quæ est subjectum formae ejus, et ex forma habetur etiam individuans extra naturam ejus quod est corpus cujus ipsa est actus. Concedunt etiam per hoc quod est in ipsa secundum esse est individuata forma.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 11; ed. Borgnet 5, 347b‒348a) [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. “Dicunt enim quod intentiones quæ sunt in intellectu possibili, dupliciter considerantur, scilicet prout sunt abstractae, et prout habent esse in abstrahendo. Et primo quidem modo sunt formae universales liberatae a materia et appendiciis materiae. Secundo autem modo habent esse individuatum in intellectu possibili.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 11; ed. Borgnet 5, 348a) [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. “Unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem qua est triangulus et albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo. Et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium.“ (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.5, ed. Riet, pp. 34.55‒35.58) [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. See the following quotation Grosseteste from his commentary on the *Second Analytics* (*cognitiones enim rerum creandarum que fuerunt in causa prima eternaliter sunt rationes rerum creandarum et cause formales exemplares*, ch. 3.1.1). Leibniz made the postmodern copy of it in the mathematical and philosophical term “*la région des vérités éternelles.*” (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.3). [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. “Ideo volo primo totam Aristotelis scientiam pro nostris viribus explanare, et tunc aliorum Peripateticorum inducere opiniones, et post hoc de Platonis opinionibus videre, et tunc demum nostram ponere opinionem: quoniam in istarum quaestionum determinatione omnino abhorremus Doctorum Latinorum verba: eo quod nobis videtur quod etiam in eorum verbis non modo quiescat anima: propter quod scientiam veritatis nec ostendunt, nec verbis propriis attingunt.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet 5, 330a) [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. “Res sensibiles sunt in anima simpliciter, hoc est, quia formae earum sunt in illa sine suis materiis. similiter formae rerum sunt in intelligentia simplicius et communiori esse. Similiter formae earum sunt in intelligentia simplicius et communiori esse.“ (*Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* III.45, ed. Baeumker, p. 133.15‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. “Sic igitur intendit dicere Avicebron, quod potentia intellectus possibilis communis est sicut et materiae, et ideo separata est a determinatione forma­rum quas potentia et non actu habet. Et quoniam sic universalis est potentia ejus, ideo universale est quod hoc modo est in ipsa.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 9; ed. Borgnet 5, 344b) [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. “Est autem haec disputatio difficilis valde, nес ad eam admittendi sunt, nisi qui nutriti sunt in philosophia; quia quicumque alii sunt, verba quidem audire possunt, sed ad intellectum eorum non sunt idonei. “ (*De unitate intellectus*, сap. III; ed. Borgnet 9, 440b) [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. “Scientia quæ est in anima et aliae virtutes intellectuales, non habent esse reale et ratum in natura, sed in anima tantum: et hoc est esse debile, et potius est entis aliquid quam ens, et talibus entibus rationibus bene subjicitur id quod in se non est individuum sed forma.“ (*Liber III De anima*, cap. 11; ed. Borgnet 5, 348b) [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. “Simpliciter enim dicitur res quod habet esse ratum et firmum in natura; et dicitur res hoc modo, accepto nomine “rei” secundum quod habet quidditatem vel essentiam quamdam; ens vero, secundum, quod habet esse, ut dicit Avicenna, Metaph., tract. I, cap. vi, distinguens entis et rei significationem. Sed quia res per essentiam suam cognoscibilis est, transumptum est nomen “rei” ad omne id quod in cognitione vel intellectu cadere potest, secundum quod res a “reor reris” dicitur; et per hunc modum dicuntur res rationis quæ in natura ratum esse non habent, secundum quem modum etiam negationes et privationes res dici possunt, sicut et entia rationis dicuntur, ut Commentator, in IV Metaph., comm. 2, dicit.“ (*Super libros Sententiarum II*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; ed. Mandonnet, p. 944) [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. “Unde obiter colligo ens in vi nominis sumptum et *rem* idem omnino esse seu significare, solumque differre in etymologia nominum; nam *res* dicitur a quidditate, quatenus est aliquid firmum et ratum, id est, non fictum, qua ratione dicitur quidditas realis; *ens* vero in praedicta significatione dicit id quod habet essentiam realem: eamdem ergo omnino rem seu rationem realem important.“ (*Disputationes Metaphysicae* 2.4.15, editio digitalis Renemann et. al.) [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. “Sed isti absque dubio nunquam bene intentionem Aristotelis intellexerunt: quoniam ex duobus his concessis, quod neque est immixtus, et separatus, sequitur necessario ipsum non esse hoc: et ideo nihil est quod dicunt isti. Adhuc autem animam, sicut dicunt, esse compositam et individuam, nulla omnino probant ratione, nisi quod dicunt Boetium dicere, quod in omni quod est circa primum, est hoc et hoc: et sic in anima concedunt esse hoc et hoc, non continuo inferri potest hoc et hoc esse materiam et formam…“ (*Liber III De anima*, cap. 11; ed. Borgnet 5, 348a) [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. “Adhuc autem haec opinio supponit quod universale sit in anima sicut in subjecto, et forte hoc non est verum.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 11; ed. Borgnet 5, 348b) [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. “Intellectus autem movetur ad ultimam perfectionem a rebus universalibus, et iste sunt in anima. Et dixit: *et iste quasi sunt in anima*, quia post declarabit quod ea que sunt de prima perfectione in intellectu quasi sensibilia de prima perfectione sensus, scilicet in hoc quod ambo movent, sunt intentiones ymaginabiles, et iste sunt universales potentia, licet non actu; et ideo dixit: *et iste quasi sunt in anima*, et non dixit *sunt*, quia intentio universalis est alia ab intentione ymaginata. Deinde dixit: *Et ideo potest homo intelligere*, etc.“ (CMDA II.60; 220.15‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. “Similiter autem scientia ex universalibus est, quæ fiunt ex multis memoriis at experientiis quæ non sunt eadem omnium. Et hoc est quod supra diximus, quod speculativi intellectus sunt unus in eo quod speculativi intellectus sunt, sed sunt multi secundum quod illorum vel illorum sunt, et hac in determinatione convenit nobiscum Averroes, licet in modo abstractionis intellectus parumper differat a nobis.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. II, cap. 13; ed. Borgnet 5, 353b) [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. “Acquirit formas intellectas per hoc quod agens, denudat eas et conjungit eas intellectui possibili: et cum quaelibet illarum formarum intellectualitatis accipit ab agente, oportet quod possibilis in qualibet convertatur ad agentem…“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. III, cap. 9; ed. Borgnet 5, 383b) [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. “Non ergo sic res servatur in anima. Si autem dicatur quod sunt in anima sicut actus in potentia, hoc esse non potest: quia nihil aliud est intelligere et considerare secundum actum, nisi habere intellecta in anima secundum actum…“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. III, cap. 9; ed. Borgnet 5, 384a) [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. “Est autem duplex scientia ex phantasmate: quaedam enim est ex phantasmate, ita quod ipsa forma intellecta est forma habens esse in particulari: quaedam autem sic, quod forma intellecta non est secundum esse in particulari sed in sensibili manifestantur opera ejus: et per opera sicut per effectum venitur in causam per intellectum: et sic cognoscimus separata.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. III, cap. 10; ed. Borgnet 5, pp. 384b‒385a) [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. “Haec est via quam fere sequuntur omnes moderni Latini: sed isti in principiis non conveniunt eum Peripateticis: si enim scientia sit qualitas in anima, tunc scientia non est universale id quod est intellectu, quod est ubique et semper. Peripatetici concorditer dixerunt, quod universale secundum actum non est nisi in anima, et quod universale continuatur in intellectu separato. Et haec est objectio Avicennae, in quam omnes concordaverunt.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. III, cap. 10; ed. Borgnet 5, 385a) [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. “Cum igitur intellectus sic separatur lumine agentis perfectus eodem lumine, et per gradus ascendens conjungitur intellectui separato, et fit intellectus speculativus quasi dispositio media conjunctivus istius: et hoc fere est idem ac si dicatur quod agens habet primo lumen debile, quod non valet nisi speculari, et valet intelligere separata: et postea acquirit lumen forte, per quod intelligit separata: et quod idem est intelligens quidditates quas a materia separatas habet, et quidditates separatorum.“ (*Liber III De anima*, tract. III, cap. 8; ed. Borgnet 5, 382b) [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. “Sicut est quaelibet res in potentia in seipsa et in actu per hoc quod habet a causa potentia, ita etiam est in potentia ad ea quæ movet sub actu ejus quod est a causa prima: et sic intellectus possibilis designans substantiam animae in seipsa, est in duplici potentia, quarum una est ad intellectum agentem secundum quem dependet ad causam primam: et secunda est ad intelligibile quod movet sub actu intellectus agentis.“ (*De unitate intellectus*, ad 25; ed. Borgnet 9, 471b) [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. “Dicunt autem constare, quod intelligentia sive intellectus est, quæ dat formas, cum primus fons formarum sit intellectus. (…) Et rationem adhibent dicti sui: quia quod est causa formarum in esse formali, est etiam causa earum in esse minus formali: quia causa formae in quantum est forma, non potest esse nisi una, quando reducuntur causae in suas causas passivas.“ (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. II; ed. Borgnet 9, 439b) [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. Basic interpretations of the term “form” that were used at the time of Albert’s arrival in Paris about 1240, they can be found in the overview of Albert’s noetics and metaphysics (Libera 2005, 246–47). [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. “Universale nomine extenso et communi, est universale quod est in artificialibus, et tale solum retinet rationem et proprietatem predicationis, et non causalitatis.“ (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*; ed. Steele, OHI 11, 154.18‒20). [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. “Duplex est materia; quedam est materia que est materia tantum; alia est materia et subjectum; alia subjectum, et de ista potest aliquid predicari, et etiam ista de aliquibus potest predicari, et hec subicitur in artificialibus. Et propter hoc materia artificialis de artificialibus predicatur, quia ipsa est tota veritas rei artificialis; forma enim artificialis non est nova natura vel essentia, set est dispositio solum, ut extentio, circulatio, vel aliquid hujusmodi, unde convenienter dicitur *anulus est aurum*.“ (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis, supra II. Met.*; ed. Steele, OHI 11, 75.13‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. “Sed omne agens ad formam solam materialem oportet quod sit agens per motum: cum enim formae materiales non sint per se subsistentes, sed earum esse sit inesse materiae, non possunt produci in esse nisi vel per creationem totius compositi, vel per transmutationem materiae ad talem vel talem formam. Impossibile est igitur quod prima inductio formarum in materia sit ab aliquo creante formam tantum: sed ab eo qui est creator totius compositi.“ (*Summa contra Gentiles* II, cap. 43, n. 5; ed. Leonina 13, 367.31‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. “Quidquid ex se non diffinit aliquid nec determinat, remanet universale et idem et unum ubique: intellectus autem separatus ex se non diffinit nec determinat aliquid: igitur videtur quod remaneat universalis idem ubique. Si enim aliquid diffiniret et determinaret intellectus ex se, illius esset sicut materiæ propriae: nullius autem est sicut materiæ propriae: ergo nihil ex se diffinit vel determinat. (...) Et illi rationi multum innititur Averroes, sed aliis verbis format eam.“ (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. 4, arg. 4; ed. Borgnet 9, 443a) [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. “Dicunt enim quod species accepta sine materia est una natura indivisa, et non dividitur nisi per materiam. Et hoc accidit ei in quantum est in materia, et non secundum se: haec autem multo magis convenit ei quod est species specierum. Est autem intellectus species specierum. Igitur non dividitur nisi participatione materiae. Sed participare materiam est contra naturam intellectus et contra diffinitionem ipsius.“ (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. IV, arg. 7; ed. Borgnet 9, 444a) [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. “Sequeretur etiam, quod receptio intellectus possibilis esset sicut receptio materiae: quia quidquid recipit forma secundum esse singulis, est materia vel virtus materialis, et non operans nisi in materia. Et hoc est contra naturam substantiae separatae qualem probat Philosophus esse intellectum possibilem.“ (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. IV, arg. 27; ed. Borgnet 9, 450b) [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. “Intellectus autem possibilis qui potentia est omnia scibilia, non est in nobis secundum eos.“ (*De* *unitate intellectus,* cap. IV, arg. 30; ed. Borgnet 9, 461a) [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. “Quomodo autem ipsa sui ipsius speciem, et a se ipsa abstractam, intelligat et recipiat quaere alias, scilicet in quaestionibus illis praedictis, et exemplum huius rei conveniens [habes] in speculo corporali – qualiter scilicet eiusdem speculi corporalis simulacrum in ipso eodem speculo corporali representari potest, et non tantum semel sed multotiens et iterato.“ (*Speculum animae*, q. 5; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 139.629‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. “Non enim consentimus cum Avicebron, quod anima rationalis composita sit ex materia et forma, sed potius dicimus eam componi ex potentia et actu.“ (*De unitate intellectus*, cap. 5, ad arg. 23; ed. Borgnet 9, 470b) [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. “Cum autem speculativus intellectus qui est factus et generatus multipliciter secundum ea in quibus sit, necesse est quod subjectum ipsius quod est patiens, multiplicetur secundum eadem: quia speculativus non numeratur nisi numero subjecti. Igitur possibilis intellectus multiplicatur secundum numerum speculantium: ergo multiplicatur etiam secundum numerum aliorum. Igitur multi sunt possibiles intellectus relicti ex multis hominibus.“ (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. 5, ad arg. 8; ed. Borgnet 9, 454a) [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. “Peripatetici autem dicebant quod id quod non est esse rei, non potest esse principium cognitionis rei: quia omnis rei cognitio scitur ex his causis, principiis, et elementis, ex quibus est, et quod nihil horum habet esse separatum ab esse rei, nisi secundum quod est intentio per intellectum denudata ab illa.“ (*De unitate intellectus*, cap. V, ad arg. 7; ed. Borgnet 9, 453b) [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. “Quod autem dicunt quidam, has tres esse substantias in homine, non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum: et non dixerunt hoc aliqui Peripateticorum, sed quidam Latini naturam animae nescientes hoc confinxerunt, et a nobis est in multis locis improbatum.“ (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. V, ad arg. 12; ed. Borgnet 9, 455b) [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. „Unde diffinitur a Philosopho: “anima est actus corporis etc.”. Dicit etiam alibi Philosophus quod plante non habent animam, set partem partis anime. Et secundum hoc in homine sola racionalis dicitur anima, tamen tres substancie.“ (Adam de Buckfield*, Sentencia super librum de Anima*, Ms. Merton College 272, f. 8rb; ed. Callus, p. 441.100‒104) [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. “Sed quidam non mediocris auctoritatis viri inter Latinos quibus ista sententia non placuit, asserunt universale secundum aliquid esse in rebus. Si enim in re non esset, de re vere non praedicaretur, praecipue cum haec sit natura universalis, quod in quolibet suorum particularium est totum.“ (*De intellectu et intelligibili Liber Primus*, tract. II, cap. 2; ed. Borgnet 9, 493a) [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. This part methodologically proceeds from the synthesis of historial transformations of Heidegger’s *Geviert.* Four poles determine philosophical and epochal destiny of the West in the form of new hermeneutics of history (Umlauf 2010, 482–96). [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. “Im Retten der Erde, im Empfangen des Himmels, im Erwarten der Göttlichen, im Geleiten der Sterblichen ereignet sich das Wohnen als das vierfältige Schonen des Gevierts.“ (GA 7, 153) [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. “Das Alles aber kann auch nicht einander ungleich, kann nicht mit sich im Widerspruch sein… Damit haben sie ihren stupenden Begriff „Gott“… Das Letzte, Dünnste, Leerste wird als Erstes gesetzt, als Ursache an sich, als ens realissimum… Dass die Menschheit die Gehirnleiden kranker Spinneweber hat ernst nehmen müssen! — Und sie hat theuer dafür gezahlt!“ (*Götzen-Dämmerung: Die „Vernunft“ in der Philosophie*, § 4; KSA 6, 76) [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. “Moreover, in addition to theological and legal teaching, which had continuously been at Oxford from the 12th century, we witness in the first decade of the 13th century the introduction of the ‘New Aristotle.’ Edmund of Abingdon was lecturing on the *Sophistici Elenchi*, a Master Hugh on the *Posterior Analytics*, John of London (the teacher of John of Garland in his youth) on Avicennian theories, while John Blund was the first to read on the *libri naturales*. “ (Callus 1945, 43) [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. The University of Paris was already in a state of decay due to the expulsion of Jesuits and other orders from France in 1763. The subsequent steps leading to destruction of the university in the years 1792–93 show the victorious progress of postmodernist *raison d’état*, which in a mirror effect copies the destructive model given in 1277 as modernist *raison de l’église*. The autonomy of theological faculties was abolished by the “*Rapport Gaudin*” (1792). The lecturer had to take an oath of allegiance to the revolutionary regime. Then, by a decision of the Revolutionary Parliament (*Convention nationale*, 15. 9. 1793), all 26 colleges of the University of Paris were abolished, and subsequently all university colleges throughout France. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. “Super hos duos polos ut diximus, circumvolvitur coelum cum omnibus stellis et planetis, qui sunt in eo motu aequali et uniformi per diem et noctem semel, cuius motus causa efficiens est anima mundi.” (*De sphaera*; ed. Baur, p. 13.32‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. “Cognitio autem primorum principiorum, que est intellectus, est melior dispositio quam sit scientia; principia autem non simpliciter prima cognoscuntur non intellectu, sed scientia, que est peior dispositio quam intellectus.” (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.2; ed. Rossi, p. 103.91‒94) [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. The submitted translation of *Anal. Post.* 84a11—14 follows the excellent translation made by Tricot (*Les Seconds analytiques*, Vrin 2000, p. 117). The Oxford translation of this passage is based on the essence and it follows Oxfordian Fallacy: “Demonstration proves the inherence of essential attributes in things (ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι τῶν ὅσα ὑπάρχει καθ' αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν). Now attributes may be essential for two reasons (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς): either because they are elements in the essential nature of their subjects (ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), or because their subjects are elements in their essential nature (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς).” (*Anal. Post*. 84a11‒14; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. “Demonstrativa scientia est ex veris, et primis et inmediatis et prioribus et notioribus et causis conclusionis. Si autem demonstrativa scientia et demonstratio sint idem et “ex” sumatur communiter ad “ex” dictum materialiter et dictum originaliter, dico quod in hac propositione probatur diffinitio materialis de suo diffinito per diffinitionem formalem supra positam.“ (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.2; ed. Rossi, pp. 100.41‒101.46) [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. “They are in fact four: whether the connection of an attribute with a thing is a fact (τὸ ὅτι); what is the reason of the connection (τὸ διότι); whether a thing exists (εἰ ἔστι); what is the nature of the thing (τί ἐστιν).“ (*Anal. Post*. 89b24‒25; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. “Eclipsis enim simpliciter semper est in rationibus suis causalibus, nulla tamen particularis eclipsis semper est in sua ratione causali. Aut enim sic dicendum est aut quod Aristoteles non intendebat dicere quod eclipsis semper est, sed intendebat dicere quod conclusio in qua demonstratur eclipsis est propositio habens veritatem in omni hora sive eclipsis sit sive non sit.“ (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.7; ed. Rossi, p. 144.200‒205) [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. “It follows that we cannot in demonstrating pass from one genus to another (oὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι). “ (*Anal. Post*. 75a38; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. “Hec sequitur inmediate ex proxima, quia si necesse est magis scire premissa inpossibile est magis scire conclusionem. Ad expositionem autem littere in hoc loco quia est aliquantulum obscura dico quod principia conclusionum quandoque sunt prima quandoque non prima, sed probata per prima; ea que prima sunt non contingunt, id est, non sequuntur ex alio.“ (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.2, ed. Rossi,p. 102.80‒83) [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. “Ad hoc dicendum quod universalia sunt principia cognoscendi et apud intellectum purum et separatum a phantasmatibus, possibilem contemplari lucem primam, que est causa prima, sunt principia cognoscendi rationes rerum increate ab eterno existentes in causa prima. Cognitiones enim rerum creandarum que fuerunt in causa prima eternaliter sunt rationes rerum creandarum et causae formales exemplares, et ipse sunt etiam creatrices. Et he sunt quas vocavit Plato ydeas et mundum archetypum, et he sunt secundum ipsum genera et species et principia tam essendi quam cognoscendi, quia, cum intellectus purus potest in his defigere intuitum, in istis verissime et manifestissime cognoscit res creatas, et non solum res creatas, sed ipsam lucem primam in qua cognoscit cetera.“ (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.7; ed. Rossi, pp. 139.99‒140.111) [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. “Forma vero substantialis absolute dicta adhuc dicitur multipliciter. Dicitur enim uno modo exemplar separatum a re et non quo res est; et alio modo quo res est, ita quod sit coniunctum rei et non exemplar; tertio modo dicitur simul exemplar et quo res est. Exemplar dicitur solum forma, quæ est in mente artificis, non forma illa, quæ est illud, quo res est et non exemplar.“ (*De statu causarum*; ed. Bauer, p. 124.22‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. “Quapropter sequitur, cum necesse sit scire quia est ad hoc ut sciatur quid est, quod scire quia est prius est quam scire quid est. Sed contra hoc opponit Aristoteles hoc modo: de quolibet scimus quia ipsum est per demonstrationem nisi res de qua inquirimus esse sit substantia; sed si demonstratur quia est scitur per causam, ergo scitur per diffinitionem, quia idem est causa et diffinitio, ergo prius accepta est diffinitio que dicit quid est res quam sciatur quia est res, et ita habetur diffinitio et scitur quid est res et nondum scitur si est res, quod est inpossibile.“ (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* II.2; ed. Rossi, p. 325.452‒60) [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. Avicenna’s commentary on *Anal. Post.* 76b11–22 (S. Bertolacci 2002, pp. 46–47, text 5.2) enumerates three principles of the scientific statement: genus (γένος), the first principles as axioms of cognition (τὰ πρῶτα), the determination of the genus (τὰ πάθη). Avicenna deduces the scientific deduction from Neoplatonic concept of genus as the first substance, which acts in downward direction through the causal *passio*. The interpretation of the *Second Analytics* shifted beyond the determination of the real substance to the hypostatic essence. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. “*Theologia sive scientia divina est duplex… metaphysica dicitur*… *in sacra Scriptura traditur*.” (*Super De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4, co. 4; ed. Leonina 50, 154) [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. “Manifestum est igitur quod neque actu habemus principia ab initio neque penitus ignoramus ea, sed sunt in nobis ab initio potentia et extrahuntur in nobis de potentia ad actum. Habitus itaque eorum in nobis primo est potentialis et materialis passivus et non activus, quia si esset activus, tunc esset honorabilior et melior et certior quam habitus actualis principiorum, eo quod activum est nobilius eo in quod agit et nobilius effectu.” (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros*, II.6; ed. Rossi, pp. 406.17‒407.23) [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. “Demonstratur tamen in metaphysica per effectum de causa prima quia ipsa est, similiter forte de hoc genere substantia non scitur per causam quod sit, licet habeat causam efficientem causam primam, sed esse cuiuslibet substantie specialis et esse accidentis potest demonstrari per causam et diffinitionem.” (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* II.2; ed. Rossi, p. 325.464‒69) [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. “Je mehr es in der Weltnacht bis zur Mitternacht geht, desto ausschließlicher herrscht das Dürftige dergestalt, daß es sein Wesen entzieht. Nicht nur das Heilige geht als die Spur zur Gottheit verloren, sondern sogar die Spuren zu dieser verlorenen Spur sind beinahe ausgelöscht. Je mehr die Spuren verlöschen, um so weniger vermag noch ein einzelner Sterblicher, der in den Abgrund reicht, dort auf Wink und Weisung zu langt, wenn er nur so weit geht, als er auf dem Weg, der ihm beschieden ist, kommen kann.” (*Wozu Dichter?*, GA 5, 272‒73) [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. “Si autem intelligimus universalia per modum Aristotelis formas repertas in quidditate particularium, a quibus sunt res particulares id quod sunt, tunc universale esse ubique nichil aliud est quam universale esse in quolibet suorum singularium.” (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.18; ed. Rossi, p. 266.143‒45) [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. “Item, Philosophus I Posteriorum: 'Demonstrationes sunt de perpetuis et incorruptibilibus'. Et Lincolniensis dicit ibidem quod manifestum est quod demonstratio fit de universalibus repertis in singularibus; igitur universalia sunt vere extra animam. Item, Philosophus, cap. 18: 'Universale semper et ubique est'. Et Lincolniensis dicit ibidem…” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 2, q. 7; OTh 2, 232.8‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. “Aut sit quidem, resume: accipere a superiori extra singulare quam singularia, sed illud superius sit indenominatum in rebus differentibus specie, utpote intentio una ambigua in rebus differentibus specie est aliquo modo diversificata et non potest habere nomen unius intentionis penitus de differentibus specie dictum, aut contingat esse illud in quo monstratur, id est illud de quo proprie debet fieri demonstratio, sicut totum in parte, id est sicut genus indistinctum et non diversificatum apud intellectum a sua specie propter occultationem differende qua habundat species a genere.” (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.5, ed. Rossi, p. 124.161‒69) [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. “Praeterea, dicit Philosophus quod ens est prima impressio intelligentiae; sed quo ordine se habet ens in communitate, eo ordine se habet primum ens in causalitate; ergo et primum ens in ordine causalitatis est prima impressio; se ipso ergo cognoscitur secundum substantiam ab intelligentia.” (*Summa theologica* II, n. 2, in contrarium, 3; ed. Quaracchi, t. II, p. 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. “Intellectus autem debilis, qui non potest ascendere ad cognitionem horum verorum generum et specierum, cognoscit res in accidentibus solum consequentibus essentias veras rerum, et apud illum sunt accidentia consequentia genera et species, et sunt principia solum cognoscendi et non essendi. Quomodo secundum hos duos modos ultimos sunt genera et species rerum corruptibilium incorruptibilia dubitabile est.” (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.7, ed. Rossi, p. 141.141‒47) [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. “The *Categories* deal with what, from the point of view of the logician, are the minimal units of discourse, namely, simple expressions such as ‘man’ and ‘whiteness,’ which, ultimately, are studied as possible constituents (integral parts) of syllogisms.” (Hansen 2012, 63\*). For an overview of commentaries on writing *Categories* around 1250, see Newton 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. “Et propter hoc dico quod dicibile incomplexum ordinabile est commune analogum ad omnia decem quod est per prius dicitur de substantia, per posterius autem de omnibus aliiis praedicamentis eo quod induunt modum substantiae.” (*Rationes super Praedicamenta* I, q. 1; Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl., f. 42va‒vb; cit. nach Hansen 2012, 74\*) [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. “Praedicamenta enim attribuuntur substantiae, non quia est agens aut finis eorum, sed quia constituunt per illam, et subiectum est eorum.” (*In Librum IV Metaphysicorum*, comm. 2; ed. Iuntii 1562, vol. 8, fol. 65-i) [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. “And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances (ἔχειν φανταστικὴν τέχνην), he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter-attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker (εἰδωλοποιὸν).” (*Soph*. 239c9‒d4) [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. “Ubique enim esse est esse in quolibet suorum locorum, loca autem universalium sunt ipsa singularia in quibus sunt universalia, nisi forte dicamus quod universale ubique est quia intellectus est locus universalium, et universale ubique esse est ipsum in intellectu esse, qui intellectus quodammodo ubique est (…) Si autem universalia sunt ydee in mente divina, tunc universalia ubique sunt per modum quo causa prima ubique est.” (*Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros* I.18, ed. Rossi, p. 266.145‒54) [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. “Igitur veritas rerum est earum esse prout debent esse, et earum rectitudo et conformitas Verbo, quo aeternaliter dicuntur. Et cum haec rectitudo sit sola mente perceptibilis et in hoc distinguatur a rectitudine corporali visibili, patet, quod convenienter definitur ab Anselmo veritas cum dicit, eam esse rectitudinem sola mente perceptibilem. Et complectitur haec definitio etiam summam veritatem, quæ est rectitudo rectificans simul cum veritatibus rerum, quæ sunt rectitudines rectificatae.” (*De veritate*, ed. Baur, p. 135.4‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. “Consuevimus autem usitatius dicere veritatem orationis enuntiativae. Et haec veritas, sicut dicit philosophus, non est aliud, quam ita esse in re signata, sicut dicit sermo. Et hoc est, quod aliqui dicunt veritatem esse “adaequationem sermonis et rei” et “adaequationem rei ad intellectum”. — Sed cum verior sit sermo, qui intus silet, quam qui foris sonat, intellectus videlicet conceptus per sermonem vocalem, magis erit veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei, quam exterioris; quod si ipse sermo interior esset adaequatio sui ad rem, non solum esset sermo verus, sed ipsa veritas.” (*De veritate*, ed. Baur, p. 134.17‒26) [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. “So when I seek how the word would come to you and accommodates in your heart, which is already in my heart (*in corde tuo insideat verbum quod iam est in corde meo*), I take the voice to help me and speak aloud to you. The sound of the voice brings to you the sense of the word (*ad te duxit sonus vocis intellectum verbi*); the sound itself passes away, but the word, which the sound brought to you, is already in your heart (*verbum iam est in corde tuo*), without having moved away from my heart (*nec recessit a meo*).” (*Sermo* 293; PL 38, 1328D‒1329A) [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. “Quod autem non sit alia veritas a veritate summa, videtur secundum Anselmum, qui in libro suo de veritate concludit ad ultimum, quod unica est omnium verorum veritas, et quod illa est summa veritas, sicut unum est tempus omnium illorum, quæ sunt simul in uno tempore.” (*De veritate*, ed. Baur, p. 132.12‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. “Quam ergo verae atque incommutabiles sunt regulae numerorum .... tam sunt verae atque incommutabiles regulae sapientiae.” (*De libero arbitrio* *voluntatis* 2.10.29) [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. “(...) *Hanc ergo incorruptibilem numeri veritatem dixi mihi et cuilibet ratiocinanti esse communem*. » [*De libero arbitrio* *voluntatis* 8.21] Aeterna est igitur talium veritas ac per hoc summa veritas. Similiter sine initio fuit verum „aliquid fuisse futurum“; sed non fuit verum, nisi veritate sua. Sua igitur veritas aeterna est et summa; similiter omnium conditionalium veritas ut: „si est homo, est animal.“ Per hypothesim igitur omnis enuntiabilis veritas est summa veritas.“ (*De veritate*, ed. Baur, p. 132.26‒32) [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. See quote from Avicenna’s *Al-Ḥikmat*, which regulates the necessity only with regard to the fundamentally impossible: “ … and ‘the possible’ is said to be whatever is not impossible and which exists and [then] in non-existent, and [in general] whatever does not exist at some time or other.” (Wisnovsky 2003, 200, cit. L 58) [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. “In the *Iqtisād*, it is stated that any future event in itself is possible. However, in accordance with God’s foreknowledge, what the eternal will determines is only what is necessary, so that different alternatives simply do not occur. Consequently, a future contingent event which is not contained within God’s foreknowledge will never take place. This event is considered to be ‘possible with regard to itself’ (*mumkin bi-’itibār dhātihi*), and ‘impossible with regard to something else’ (*muḥāl bi-’itibār ghayrihi*), that is with regard to both God’s *irāda* and *’ilm*.” (De Cillis 2013, 124) [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. “*“Necessarium”* dicitur duobus modis, scilicet respective et absolute. Respective, ut *‘te sedere dum tu sedes est necessarium*’. Absolute hoc duplex, scilicet per se et per accidens: per se quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse falsum, ut '*Deus est*'; per accidens quod non potest nec poterit esse falsum, potuit tamen fuisse falsum, ut *Socratem fuisse antequam fuit*.” (*Logica modernorum II*, ed. Rijk; *Logica „Cum sit nostra*, p. 429.1‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. “Omnis substantia [simplex est] stans per seipsam scilicet per essentiam suam. [Nam ipsa] est creata sine tempore et est in substantialitate sua superior substantiis temporalibus.” (*Liber de causis* XXXVIII; editio digitalis Pattin‒Zimmermann, § 199‒200) [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. “Quoniam liberum arbitrium de praesenti esse non potest, tametsi ipsum in praesenti est; sed spectat semper ad futuros eventus, et solum qui in contingenti consistunt.” (*De sacramentis*, pars II, cap. XXII; PL 176, 256C) [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. “Licet igitur vere dicatur veritas huius propositionis “antichristus est”, tamen non sequitur, quod statim erit necessarium eum fuisse, quia huius veritas est esse incompletum et indeterminatum. Idem enim est ponere necessitatem super hanc veritatem et ponere necessitatem super assertionem de futuro, quod erit, et super existentiam rei futurae. Quaelibet igitur talium propositionum “antichristus erit”, “antichristus est futurus” est vera non necessaria, sed contingens, quia possibile est, quamlibet talem esse falsam.” (*De veritate propositionis*, ed. Baur, p. 144.19‒32) [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. “Ad illud autem, quod oppositum fuit, hoc scilicet, “antichristum esse futurum potest esse falsum, tamen modo sit verum”, dicendum, quod hoc verum est eadem potentia, qua verum est, Deum posse scire et nescire aliquid, scilicet de potentia aeterna. Et scias, quod veritas talium enuntiabilium non est veritas temporalis, sed aeterna.” (*De libero arbitrio*, ed. Baur, p. 182.19‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. See the title of the conversation with Lloyd Blankfein, who at the time of mortgage robbery was in the leading position of the bank Goldman Sachs (*I’m doing “God’s work”. Meet Mr Goldman Sachs*. In: *The Sunday Times*, November 8, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. “Totum igitur quod in his generat caliginem est, quod contingentia rerum in ipsis videtur repugnare necessitati illi, quæ est immutabilitas praesentialis in mente et scientia divina; similiter necessitati illi, quæ est immutabilitas praesentialis veritatis in his de praeterito et de futuro; et quod non distinguitur, quomodo in eadem propositione ex parte aliqua est necessitas propter hoc, quod non finibilis est eius veritas, et ex parte alia contingentia quia quæ est vera potuit sine initio non fuisse vera, ex qua potentia sequitur rerum contingentia.” (*De libero arbitrio*, c. 6, ed. Baur, pp. 171.31‒172.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. “Hec adduximus contra quosdam modernos, qui nituntur contra ipsum Aristotilem et suos expositores et sacros simul expositores de Aristotile heretico facere catholicum, mira cecitate et presumcione putantes se limpidius intelligere et verius interpretare Aristotilem ex litera latina corrupta quam philosophos, tam gentiles quam catholicos, qui eius literam incorruptam orginalem grecam plenissime noverunt. Non igitur se desipiant et frustra desudent ut Aristotilem faciant catholicum, ne inutiliter tempus suum et vires ingenii consumant, et Aristotilem catholicum constituendo, se ipsos hereticos faciant.” (*Hexaëmeron* 1.8.2‒4; cit. after Dales 1987, 183‒84) [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. “Unde intellectus agens est illud agens particulare quod exigitur ad operationem intellectus speculativi, qui quidem intellectus agens secundum Commentatorem est pars anime, secundum Alpharabium et secundum Aristotelem et Avicennam est aliquid aliud.” (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*, lib. IX; ed. Steele, OHI 10, 298.34‒299.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. „...librum de anima, si cum naturalibus legatur, in festo Ascensionis, si autem cum logicalibus, in festo Annunciationis beate Virginis...“ (*Chartularium* I, no. 246, p. 278). [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. “Verumtamen cum intellectum possibilem dicimus, duo dicimus, id est intellectum, qui non est aliud quam substantia vel spiritus intelligibilis, cum sit quaedam potentia eius ‒, et possibilitatem, quæ est rerum accidens quoddam consequens quoddam esse animae vel spiritus. Ideoque verius intellectus possibilis quatenus intellectus est, substantia non est, sed subsistentiae, et quatenus possibilis neque substantia neque subsistentiae nisi per accidens.” (*Summa philosophiae* 19.4; ed. Baur, pp. 305.39‒306.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. “Ideoque enormiter erraverunt Theophrastus ac Themistius posteriusque Averroes, qui eundem unicum intellectum possibilem in omnibus individuis hominum etiam secundum numerum esse posuerunt, et maxime Aristoteles qui intellectum agentem ab intellectu possibili differre secundum substantiam arbitratur. Quibus inter veteres solus manifestius Avicenna contradicit.” (*Summa philosophiae* 29; ed. Baur, p. 472.18‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. “Omne autem recipiens iuxta Averroem denudatum est a natura recepti, cuius anitas sola sui relatione ad formam naturaliter ipsius perfectivam, sub qua actualiter esse potest, perpenditur. Quod enim vere non est nisi in potentia sola vere cognosci non potest nisi ex relatione potentiae ad actum.” (*Summa philosophiae* 19; ed. Baur, p. 305.25‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. “Res namque materiata substantialiter ex duobus consistit, scilicet re in pura potentia et actu et forma essentiali eiusdem potentiae perfectiva, quod et per viam considerationis, resolutio manifestat, cum omnis potentia passiva ad potentiam simpliciter reducatur et omnis actus et forma ad formari simpliciter, sicut actualiter ex duobus componitur, scilicet ente potentia quadam scilicet respectiva et hac forma vel ista penitus signata et individuali.” (*Summa philosophiae* XIX.4; ed. Baur, p. 306.11‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. “Et manifestum est, quod adaequatio actualis vel etiam habitualis respectus est intellectus ad scibile intellectui obiectum vel intelligibile omnino relati. Scientia enim de genere est relativorum. ‒ Adaequatio vero intellectus et rei in sola potentia tantum vel potest considerari a parte intellectus tantum, aut a parte rei tantum, aut a parte utriusque.” (*Summa philosophiae* 19, ed. Baur, p. 293.1‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. “Scias quod, sicut prima forma quando coniungitur altiori materiae, constituit speciem intelligentiae et eam ducit ad esse, similiter forma quantitatis cum coniungitur materiae inferiori, constituit speciem corporis et eam ducit ad esse. Ergo forma quantitatis erit conferibilis formae intelligentiae.” (*Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* II.8, ed. Baeumker, p. 38.9‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. “Si inferius defluxum est ab altiori, tunc totum quod est in inferiori debet ut sit in altiori.” (*Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* IV.1, ed. Baeumker, p. 211.12‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. “Haec sunt substantiae spirituales, continentes substantiam sustinentem nouem praedicamenta, quæ sunt natura et res animae et inteligentia.” (*Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* II.24, ed. Baeumker, p. 69.16‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. “Forma intelligentiae est una simplex, forma uero quantitatis est multae unae compositae. Et sicut forma intelligentiae est propinquior materiae altiori inter omnes formas, similiter forma quantitatis est propinquior materiae inferiori inter omnes formas.” (*Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* II.8, ed. Bäumker, p. 38.13‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. “Illud enim quod prius est inter animas est in potencia respectu posterioris et aliquo modo perfectibile ab ipso. Et quod virtus sensitiva sit in potencia respectu intellective patet per hoc quod ymacinacio, que est ultima virtus sensitiva, perfeccior est et magis determinata in homine quam in aliis animalibus; quod non esset nisi esset in potencia respectu forme nobilioris et aliquo modo perfectibilis ab ipsa.” (*Sentencia super librum de Anima*, Ms. Merton College 272, f. 7rb; ed. Callus, p. 438.134‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. “Ad ultimum potest dici quod non similiter se habet virtus intellectiva ad alias sicut differencia completiva se habet ad genus. Differencia enim nichil dicit adveniens ab extrinseco, set solum actualitatem et perfeccionem eiusdem quod prius fuit imperfectum.” (*Sentencia super librum de Anima*, Ms. Merton College 272, f. 7rb; ed. Callus, p. 438.149‒53) [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. “Relinquitur igitur quod vult animam intellectivam secundum suam substanciam separari a corpore, substanciam autem sensitive et vegetative non; per quod patet quod non est eadem substancia, set alia et alia.” (*Sentencia super librum de Anima*, Ms. Merton College 272, f. 8rb; ed. Callus, p. 438.9‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. “Quod si dixerit quis, quia intellectus omnino non est forma nec habens formam, et ideo impossibile est ipsum agere: respondemus, quia intellectus in se ipso, in esse suo et in specie sua, forma est.” (*De immortalitate animae*; ed. Bülow, p. 31.11‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. Regarding the matter taken *simpliciter* in atomic substance of the third kind, the remark on the origin of the word *helyatin* is important (Albert uses the term *hyleachim*). It expresses the Arabic word for the whole and is related to the substance by the Latin translation of *Liber de causis* (§ 8) made by Gerhard von Cremona (Baeumker 1898, 124). This origin of the term *hylē* is also documented by other authors independently of Baeumker (Pessin 2013, 174). [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. “On the other hand, if matter, despite being one in number, were not potentially many, then it would never have been denuded of that form of which it happened to be the recipient and that form would have been in the very essence of that underlying matter, should be completely denuded of its form or that it should lose this form and obtain another.” (*De substantia orbis* I; ed. Hyman, pp. 60.95‒61.101) [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. “Tercii sunt qui volunt concordare philosophos cum theologis, et dicunt in homine esse sensitivam et vegetativam dupliciter; sunt enim hee due sicut dicunt theologi potencie tantum et eadem substancia numero cum intellectiva, unde et veniunt ab extrinseco.” (*Sentencia super librum de Anima*, Ms. Merton College 272, f. 7rb; ed. Callus, p. 443.157‒62) [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. “Ad ultimum dicimus, quod duplex est medium; scilicet medium *participans*, ut medius color et medium *ordinans* unum extremorum ad aliud. Et tali modo componitur anima corpori, non cuilibet, sed aptato. Quid autem dicitur medium? Dicimus, quod vegetativum et sensitivum; sed alterum remotius alterum propinquius.” (*De anima*, cap. IV, solutio; ed. Baur, p. 251.37‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. “Quidam concedunt, quod anima composita est ex spirituali materia et spirituali forma et angelus similiter. Sed contra hoc Augustinus in libro “de definitione animae”, ubi dicit expresse, quod anima non est ex materia, immo ex nihilo, ut praeostensum est.” (*De anima*, cap. I, solutio; ed. Baur, p. 243.28‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. “Et etiam intendit, quod motus eorum est causa exitus eius, quod est in potentia in illis formis abstractis ad actum scil. ad formas materiales. Istae enim formae videntur habere duplex esse, scilicet esse in actu, quod intelligo materiale, et esse in potentia, quod habent in abstractione.” (*De motu supercaelestium*; ed. Baur, p. 95.32‒96.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. “Nulla enim pars plantae est planta, nec animalis animal, sed unaquaeque pars plantae vegetatur et unaquaeque pars animalis sentit. Alio modo est anima intellectiva forma superveniens his, de quibus iam dictum est; quae quia immediate advenit formae non situali, necesse fuit, ut non educeretur in esse immediate a forma substantiali, sed immediate a forma non situale, scilicet prima...” (*De statu causarum;* ed. Baur, p. 125.4‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. “Et propterea simul cum formis situalibus perimitur; et a tali forma non dicitur pars eiusdem speciei cum toto, sed eiusdem operationis.” (*De statu causarum*, ed. Baur, p. 125.2‒4). [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. “Anima vero rationalis non solum unitur corpori humano sicut motor, sed etiam sicut intelligens mediante virtute corporea. Intelligit enim non sine phantasmate, quod est actus virtutis sensitivae.” (*De statu causarum*, ed. Baur, p. 125.20‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. “Forma vero, quæ simul est exemplar et quo res est, non est coniuncta rei, sed abstracta, simplex et separata. Haec est forma prima, quæ qualiter sit forma prima, difficile est explanare.” (*De statu causarum*, ed. Baur, p. 125.23‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. “Anima igitur duplicem habet totalitatem perfectionis et potentialitem. Unde dicitur totum dupliciter, scilicet totum perfectum et totum potentiale sive virtuale. — Totalitas perfectionis inest animae ex parte essentiae eius. Totalitas virtualis ex parte potentiae. Et ita patet, quod non sequitur: anima habet totalitatem ergo quantitatem.” (*Tractatus beati Roberti Grostesto Lincolnienis episcopi de anima* II, solutio; ed. Baur, p. 250.5‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. For the dating of work *Distinccio tercia de anima* up to the year 1268, see Hackett 1997, 190. For understandable reasons, this study does not share his conclusion that Bacon’s criticism is aimed at Parisian Averroists of the years 1270–77. [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. “Omnes enim ante viginti annos posuerunt quod sola anima intellectiva detur, et quod vegetativa et sensitiva in homine producantur de potencia materie per viam nature. Et adhuc theologi de Anglia et omnes philosophantes hoc celebrant.” (*Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* III, dist. III de anima, cap. 1m; ed. Steele, pp.281.34‒282.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. “Tota igitur philosophia clamat quod solus intellectus creatur, et omnes theologi alicujus valoris et philosophantes ante viginti annos, et adhuc omnes Anglicani qui satis inter alios homines sunt et fuerunt studiosi. Et arguunt ad hoc non solum per auctoritates Aristotelis et aliorum philosophorum, set per raciones.” (*Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* III, ibid, p.283.8‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. “Quoniam vero nullam habent racionem ad hanc insaniam que sit digna solucione, et magis asserunt quam racionentur. Nec video aliquid quod posset racionabiliter adduci pro hac fantasia, ideo transeo ad aliud quod est majus inconveniens, et error pejor, et heresis nequior, immo nequissima. Temporibus autem meis non fiebat mencio de istis erroribus, quia cuilibet fuit manifestum quod heretica fuerunt, sicut quodlibet aliud contra fidem et philosophiam, nec dignati sumus movere questionem de hiis propter stulticie magnitudinem.” (*Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* III, dist. III de anima, cap. 2m, ed. Steele, p.286.14‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. “Unde dominus Robertus quondam episcopus Lincolniensis sanctae memoriae neglexit omnes libros Aristotelis et vias eorum, et per experientiam propriam et auctores alios et per alias scientias negotiatus est in sapientialibus Aristotelis…” (*Compendium studii philosophiae*, cap. VIII; ed. Brewer, OHI 1, 469) [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. “Et Avicenna et Averrois et omnes philosophi dicunt illud idem, et hoc concordat cum fide, ut sola ymago Dei creetur, set hec est anima intellectiva. Nec est aliquid contra hoc nisi quedam auctoritates duorum librorum qui non sunt autentici, scilicet, De Spiritu et Anima, et De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus. Non enim sunt Augustini, ut periti theologi sciunt, licet aliqui estimare solebant quod essent Augustini.” (*Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* III, dist. III de anima, cap. 1m; ed. Steele, p. 282.8‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. “Ab annis decem igitur inolevit opinio per hominem erroneum et famosum quod ante animam racionalem presupponitur differencia substancialis specifica educta de potencia materie que ponit hominem sub specie animalis, ita quod intellectiva non faciat hoc, set anima sensitiva specialis addita ad naturam sensitivam animalis communem, sicut anima sensitiva specialis asini additur super animalitatem ut fiat asinus species animalis. Set istud porro est contra totam philosophiam Aristotelis et omnium auctorum.” (*Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* III, ibid; ed. Steele, p. 283.1‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. “Adhuc videtur quod anima intellectiva in homine sit perficiens ipsam animam sensitivam, et sensitiva vegetativam, sicut forma que est differencia perficit et complet formam generis. Cum igitur eadem sit substancia generis et differencie, non differens nisi sicut completum et incompletum, videtur quod eadem sit substancia anime intellective, sensitive et vegetative solum differens secundum complecionem et incomplecionem.” (*Sentencia super librum de Anima*, Ms. Merton College 272, f. 7rb; ed. Callus, p. 435.59‒436.66) [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. “Quia si animal est genus ad hominem, et sensus facit animal, racionale vero hominem; tunc videtur quod sensus vel sensitivum genus sit ad racionalem seu intellectivam partem anime. (…) Nam nunquam invenitur quod genus veniat ab intrinseco et differencia ab extrinseco, nec e converso, sed semper per unam viam procedunt ad esse.” (*In II Sent*., dist. 17; Ms. Oxford 62, f. 145ra‒5vb; ed. Callus, p. 441.86‒96) [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. “Ex ignorancia istorum duorum problematum tenet multitudo quod Cesar mortuus sit homo, et quod homo mortuus sit animal, et quod Christus in triduo fuit homo, et alia infinita falsissima et stultissima circa restrictiones et amplitudines in proposicionibus et circa necessitates et contingencias, et alia…” (*Compendium studii theologiae*, pars II, cap. IV; ed. Rashdall, p. 52) [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. “Et optime noui pessimum et stultissimum istorum errorum autorem, qui vocatus est Ricardus Cornubiensis, famosissimus apud stultam multitudinem; set apud sapientes fuit insanus, et reprobatus Parisius propter errores quos invenerat, [et] promulgauerat quando solemniter legebat sentencias ibidem postquam legerat sententias Oxonie ab anno Domini 1250.” (*Compendium studii theologiae*, pars II, cap. IV; ed. Rashdall, p. 52–53) [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. In the edition of Bacon’s *Summulae dialectices I—II*, Libera notes that this work was edited in Oxford around the year 1250, but that it related to debates in Paris from the previous decades (Libera 1986, 152). This corroborates the thesis about the key epoch around 1240, when Rufus studied and taught under bishop Alvernus in Paris and when all young bachelors of the later dispute between the first and the second Averroism were gathered there. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. “Tertio modo dicitur quod nec actu nec potentia habet esse in pluribus formaliter, set solum causaliter, et hoc est universale per causalitatem et non per predicationem formalem, et tale universale est non‑predicabile.” (*Quaestiones altere supra Metaphysicae IV*, ad 14; ed. Steele OHI 11, 153.17‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. The complete Latin translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Translatio hispanica*) was finished in June 1240. Hermannus Teutonicus from Toledo used Averroes’s *Middle Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics* for the Arabic and Latin translation. In Paris, this revised edition of the *Ethica Vetus* appeared with the last part of the Book III already around 1240 (*Versio longuior*). Another compilation of *Ethics*, which was again influenced by the Toledo interpretation of Averroes, is documented around 1243–44 (*Translatio alexandrina*). [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. “Sicut anima secundum partem speculatiuam habet duplicem naturam, unam secundum quam comparatur ad superiora et hec uocatur intellectus agens, aliam habet secundum quam comparatur ad inferiora et hec uocatur intellectus possibilis et secundum intellectum agentem semper est in anima ueritas, secundum possibilem non…” (cit. in Zavattero 2012, 10) [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. “Avempace autem post hos veniens, addidit quod homo secundum intellectum habet duas vires: unam humanam quam habet in quantum colligatur phantasmatibus, alteram autem divinam quam habet secundum quod est vestigium intelligentiae separatae. Per humanam intelligit concepta cum materia, per divinam autem separata.” (*Liber III De anima*, tract. III, cap. 8; ed. Borgnet 5, 381b) [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. Rufus’s writings *In Aristoteli Analytica posteriora* (Ed. Rega Wood) and *Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (Eds. Rega Wood & Neil Lewis, 2013) and his first commentary on *De anima* (*In Aristotelis De anima. Redactio brevior. Liber 1–3.* EdsChristopher J. Martin, Neil Lewis, Rega Wood, 2007) we cite according to the on-line publication these writings at the University of Stanford as part of the *Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project* (http://rrp.stanford.edu). These writings are cited under the abbreviation, “RRP.” [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. “Probably it was the intention of the university to seek privileges from the legate Cardinal Otto de Monteferrato when he visited Oxford in April 1238. But any such plans were thwarted by the murderous brawl that broke out at Oseney Abbey between members of the university and the legate’s household. Oxford was placed under interdict and the schools were suspended for the summer. So instead of asking for privileges the regent masters had to placate the cardinal with a public act of penance.” (Aston 1984, 103) [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. “Intellectus sit sicut tabula nuda, et omni careat cognitione, est simplex respectu cuiuscumque cognitionis in potentia. Sed intelligendum quod potentia duplex est, essentialis et accidentalis. Intelligendum ergo quod illud quod primo modo est in potentia proprie dicitur fieri cum exit in actum. Quod autem secundo modo est in potentia non proprie dicitur fieri tale, sed esse tale...*”* (*In APos* I.1; ed. RRP, 1.S1.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. “Forte impossibile est hominem in statu isto uti intellectu simpliciter et sine phantasia…*”* (*Memoriale*, Prooem.; ed. RRP, Prooem. 7) [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. The work *Critique of Pure Reason* creates hypostatized potency of cognizing intellect with the help of the term *Kategorien des reinen Verstandes*. This postmodern form of Porretan categories forms the formal and synthetic principle of all empirical experiences (*ein formales und synthetisches Prinzipium aller Erfahrungen*; KdRV, A 119). They are given only as a pure formal possibility, made in the permanent manner on the level of *a priori* established intellect. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. “Sciendum quod in respectu acceptionis subiecti et praedicati est in potentia essentiali et indiget agente.” (*In APos* I.1; ed. RRP, 1.S1.1.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. “Causa vero, quare videntur haec moveri a se, est latentia motoris propter mixtionem potentiae essentialis ad motum cum potentia, quam habet accidentaliter teste Averroe, id est potentia essentialis in materia, ex qua mobile generatur atque naturalis.” (*Summa philosophiae* XXIX; ed. Baur, p. 611.28‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. “Sciendum igitur quod intellectus respectu cognitionis principiorum est in potentia accidentali; sed respectu cognitionis conclusionum est in potentia essentiali. Et sic licet ex sua creatione careat omni cognitione principiorum, et sit in potentia respectu eorum, tamen exit in actum cognoscendi ea. Non dicitur proprie quod hic cognitio fiat, sed solum est hoc dictum de cognitione conclusionis.” (*In APos* I.1; ed. RRP, 1.1.S1.1.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. “In this example, the middle term is ‘having the sun as the cause of light’, the secondary intelligible is the proposition ‘the moon shines only on the side facing the sun’ ‒ which is not an observation but knowledge resting upon understanding the cause.” (Hasse 2000, 181) [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. “Dicendum quod scire est quidam effectus et causatur a demonstratione; et propterea habet definiri per demonstrationem. Sed hoc dupliciter: Aut secundum quod demonstratio consideratur ut in sua radice, et sic nihil aliud est quam ipsum medium sive causa, secundum quod dicitur quod “medium et causa idem”; et sic datur definitio prima. Aut secundum quod demonstratio consideratur ut in actu, et sic secunda.” (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S1.ad1) [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. “Ad aliud dicendum quod ex hoc quod scire est cognoscere praemissae quæ sunt causa, oportet praemissa esse vera. Aliter enim non cognoscerentur vel scirentur. Et hoc tangit in littera cum dicit 'verum igitur' etc. Ex hoc autem quod praemissae sunt causae completae -- in illo genere dico -- sequitur quod sint immediata in eodem, quia si essent mediata, haberent medium et causam, et sic non essent completa causa. Et hoc est quod dicit “ex praemissis autem” etc.” (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S2.ad2) [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. “Item, videtur quod ad salvationem scientiae exigitur et sufficit exsistentia scientis et habitus scibilis. His enim exsistentibus, universaliter manebit scientia, sicut est actu imaginatio ex praesentia speciei imaginabiliter apud imaginationem, etiam non exsistente re imaginata extra; et similiter intellectus ex praesentia speciei intellectuali apud virtutem intellectivam.” (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S1.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. “Il suffit en effet de mettre à l’œuvre cette technique pour voir qu’elle *reproduit* la logique même du jeu qu’elle est censée arbitrer : les différents “juges” — et le même “juge” — a différents moments — mettent en œuvre des critères différents, voire incompatibles reproduisant ainsi, mais seulement de manière imparfaite, parce qu’*en situation artificielle*, la logique des jugements classificatoires que les agents produisent dans l’existence ordinaire.“  (Bourdieu 1984, 27) [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. “Secundum naturam habet potestatem complendi materiam et faciendi individuum; et tunc est individuum habitualiter…” (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S5.ad2). [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. “Ad primum dicendum quod modi per se quidam sunt praedicandi, quidam essendi.” (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S7.ad1) [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. “Wohin ist Gott? rief er, ich will es euch sagen! Wir haben ihn getötet ‒ ihr und ich!    
     Wir sind seine Mörder! Aber wie haben wir das gemacht?” (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Drittes Buch, Aphorismus 125; KSA 3, 480) [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. “We cannot, for instance, prove geometrical truths by arithmetic (οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῆι).” (*Anal. Post*. 75a38–39; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. “Proprie autem dicitur per se secundum quod in sua relatione completam facit definitionem, et sic per-se convenit aliquid alicui secundum se totum, et non per aliquid sui convenit ei. Primo modo non fuit idem per-se et secundum-quod-ipsum-est; secundo modo sunt idem; secundum ergo quod sunt diversa veniunt in definitionem.“ (*In APos*I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S8.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. “Et hoc tangitur per hoc quod dicit “per se et secundum quod ipsum est.” Et in hoc tangitur illa universalitas, scilicet ut praedicatum non recipit solum subiectum sub suis partibus subiectivis sed pro partibus constitutivis. Si namque insit secundum-quod-ipsum-est et primo, tunc totum praedicatum ab universo subiecto egreditur.“ (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S8.ad1) [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. “Ad primum dicendum quod duplex est subiectum ‒ scilicet commune vel proprium. De communi non quaeritur neque ostenditur in aliqua scientia quid sit; de proprio ostenditur. Sed tamen intelligendum quod ipsum non est subiectum in illa ostensione in qua ostenditur esse, neque ostenditur esse ex principali, sed ex consequenti. Unde ubi est subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur.“ (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S7.ad1) [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. “Ad aliud dicendum secundum quosdam quod definitio illa quæ est forma vel substantia, dicens principia subiecti et facta ex genere et differentia illius subiecti, haec eadem est passioni materialis.“ (*In APos* III.5; ed. RRP, 3.S5.ad4) [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. “Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes aber, nur vermittelst der Kategorien und gerade durch diese Art und Zahl derselben Einheit der Apperzeption a priori zu Stande zu bringen, lässt sich eben so wenig ferner ein Grund angeben, als warum wir gerade diese und keine andere Funktion zu Urteilen haben, oder warum Zeit und Raum die einzigen Formen unserer möglichen Anschauung sind.“ (KdRV, B 145) [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. “Ad aliud dicendum quod quattuor sunt modi praedicandi communiter: Aut enim cum fuerit una intentio reperta in pluribus, et per naturam eandem; et tunc omnino univoce. Aut non una intentio, nec natura eadem, et tunc pure aequivoce.“ (*In APos* II.10; ed. RRP, 2.S10.8.ad 3) [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. „Dicendum quod individuum habet propriam essentiam superadditam essentiae speciei, sed illa essentia superaddita non est natura praedicabilis, et propterea individuum non habet naturam praedicabilem nisi per naturam speciei.“ (*Memoriale* VII, ed. RRP, 7.12.5.b) [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. „Aut medio modo, et hoc dupliciter: aut scilicet cum intentio eadem in pluribus sed per naturam diversam, ut in hoc nomine “quantitas”, quia omnis quantitas communicat in hac intentione quæ est mensura. Sed haec intentio in numero causatur a natura unitatis: in magnitudine autem a natura puncti; in tempore autem a natura instantis.“ (*In APos* II.10; ed. RRP, 2.S10.8.ad 3) [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. “Dico 'homo', et quaelibet species specialissima, dupliciter potest dividi per individua: aut scilicet per individua actualiter exsistentia, aut habitualiter. Licet ergo non semper dividatur per individua actualiter exsistentia, dividitur tamen per individua habitualiter exsistentia ‒ ut homo in Sorte et homo in Platone.“ (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S6.ad3) [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. “Individuum non est huiusmodi (non enim habet formam praedicabilem aliam a forma speciei), et omnis talis est definitio quod habet formam praedicabilem per se et completam, cuiusmodi est species specialissima et nihil aliud, propterea sciendum quod individuum non habet definitionem.“ (*Memoriale* VII; ed. RRP, 7.14) [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. “Sed potest melius dici quod nomine definitionis intelligit huiusmodi orationes 'homo est animal rationale mortale'. Et licet huiusmodi oratio intendat probare et componere hoc de hoc, tamen ultima intentio est ut cognoscatur primum subiectum simpliciter in se.“ (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S4.ad4) [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. “Ad aliud dicendum quod est notificare individuum per propria principia individuantia, et sic non intellexit Porphyrius; aut per principia exterius ad cognitionem conferentia, et sic intellexit Porphyrius, secundum quod habetur ab Aristotele in I De anima: «accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est»…“ (*Memoriale* VII; ed. RRP, 7.10.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. “Quedam est veritas incomplexa, de qua dicitur quod veritas est rei entitas; alia est complexa. Et hec dupliciter refertur; potest enim referri ad res tanquam ad subjectum, et hoc modo dicitur “veritas est adequatio rerum”; vel refertur ad animam cognoscentem, et sic dicitur “veritas est rectitudo”.“ (*Quaestiones altere supra Met. II*, q. 2, ad 2, solutio; ed. Steele, OHI 11, 34.11‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. “Set quia methaphysicus considerat primum exitum, propter hoc unam solam causam efficientem secundum methaphysicum est ponere, scilicet primam causam. Ad primam rationem contra hoc dicendum, quod quedam sunt principia ad que stat resolutio esse actualis et naturalis rerum, et sic stat ad materiam et formam ; alia est reductio entium in quantum entia sunt ad principium eorum productivum et non componens, et sic omnia ad principium reducuntur vel resolvuntur.“ (*Quaestiones altere supra Met. II*, q. 2, ad 10, solutio; ed. Steele, OHI 11, 51.27‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. “Videtur enim esse certissima, cum sit de causis certissimis; est enim de causa omnium prima quæ certissima est.“ (*Memoriale*, Prooem; ed. RRP, Prooem. 4) [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. “Scientia non est tantum per praesentiam speciei scibilis apud virtutem scitivam, sicut est imaginatio per praesentiam imaginabilis speciei apud virtutem imaginativam, sed est per praesentiam ipsius speciei apud intellectum inquantum per aequalitatem respondet scibili, quam aequalitatem tango cum dico “veritas est rerum et intellectuum”.” (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S1.ad3) [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. “Ad primum respondit Anselmus, dicens quod veritas est “rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis”, et est alia eius definitio quæ est “veritas est coaequatio rerum et intellectuum”.” (*Memoriale*, lib. I; ed. RRP, 1.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. “Ad secundam dicendum, quod duplex est rectitudo ; quedam est que est regula operationis ordinate ad aliquem finem, et talis rectitudo est operationis ; alia est que est recta rerum apprehensio, et talis est veritas. Ad rationem ostendentem quod veritas non sit sola mente perceptibilis dicendum, quod rei veritatem apprehendere, hoc est dupliciter…” (*Quaestiones altere supra Met. II*, q. 2, ad 2, solutio; ed. Steele, OHI 11, 34.30‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. “But in the case of two different genera such as arithmetic and geometry you cannot apply arithmetical demonstration to the properties of magnitudes unless the magnitudes in question are numbers (εἰ μὴ τὰ μεγέθη ἀριθμοί εἰσι).” (*Anal. Post*. 75b3–6; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. “Dicendum ergo quod magnitudo naturam numeri aliquo modo participat, et scientia quæ secundum hoc est de magnitudine arithmeticae subalternatur, ut patebit.“ (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S4.ad4) [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. „Numerus, qui est accidens, universaliter causatur ex individuatione formae; magnitudo autem ex individuatione formae in materia, non quacumque, sed situali et extensibili. Et sic numerus a priori secundum naturam causatur quam in aggregando, et sic ipsum prius est secundum naturam.“ (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S4.ad5) [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. “In genere igitur quantitatis potest mensura esse quantum in potentia et non oportet quod sit quantitas in actu.“ (*Memoriale*, lib. X; ed. RRP, 10.5) [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. “Est enim propositio quaedam dimensio inter subiectum et praedicatum, ut alias patet.“ (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S3.ad4) [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. “Ergo essentia magnitudinis naturaliter praecedit omnes condiciones materiales a privatione causatas.“ (*In DAn* 3.2.3; cit.nach Wood 2001, 142) [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. “Dicendum quod numerus mathematicus potest considerari prout habet esse in rebus; et hoc modo multiplicabilis est binarius per multiplicationem rerum et est species numeri et multiplicatur per individua.“ (*Memoriale* III; ed. RRP, 3.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. “Unde unitas essentialis concretive dicitur de omni forma.“ (*Scriptum in Met. Arist.*, ms. Q290.31vb–32ra, ed. Wood, cit. nach RRP) [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. “Item est compositio accidentium ad subiectum que proprie dicitur concretio; et est compositio potentie ad actum; et est compositio cause ad effectum secundum omne genus cause ut uere dicatur compositum quod ab alio est, uel quod sub alio est, uel quod in alio est, uel quod ad aliud est.“ (ms. Douai 434, f. 108vb‒109ra; ed. Lottin, p. 470.13‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. “Primo modo [forma] in se simpliciter et in abstractione, ut ens et hoc-aliquid et natura et substantia, ex qua cum alia, scilicet materia, fit compositum. Secundum istum modum nullo modo praedicatur de composito vel materia, sicut verbi gratia non possum dicere quod homo vel caro sit anima.“ (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 128.305‒8) [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. “Secundo modo recipit ipsa natura formae esse et modum concretum, modum qualitatis et adiacentis et inhaerentis et nominantis, nomine scilicet suo materiam notantis; et isto modo praedicatur de sua materia.“ (*Speculum animae*, q. 2; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 128.309‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. “Proprium vero nomen, ut “Socrates”, quia substantiam designat solum per modum subsistentis et fundamenti, et ita ens secundum quod ens et non esse designat, de nullo per se praedicatur nisi de se ipso, et hoc solum per accidens. Bene vides quod “esse” et “est’ concretiva sunt; “ens”, vero abstractum, et tamen si in praedicato ponatur “ens” et “homo”, modum concretum accipiunt.“ (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 127.288‒93) [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. “Propterea dicendum quod aliqua causa est ita ordinata in suum effectum quod impossibile est ipsam prohiberi. Tales causae sunt in mathematicis; formam enim trianguli respectu habitus triangulorum impossibile est prohibere. Sed aliqua est causa quæ cum in aliquem effectum sit ordinata, tamen potest prohiberi, et tales sunt naturales. Verbi gratia: determinata est oliva ut generet olivam, nec tamen semper ita est, sed potest per inoboedientiam materiae prohiberi, ut dicit Aristoteles in Philosophia prima.“ (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S5.ad1) [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. “Passio autem a materia habet definitionem factam ex genere et differentia, et haec eadem dicit essentiam eandem cum passione, sed non causam. Alia autem dicit causam passionis, et non essentiam. Prima ergo secundum quod est subiecti tantum principium est demonstrationis; secunda quod non est tantum subiecti, sed et passionis, sic est tota virtus demonstrationis et sic ipsa demonstratio, sed positione differens.“ (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S5.ad4) [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. “Weiter besteht dann die Unwahrheit des unmittelbaren Urteils darin, daß dessen Form und Inhalt einander nicht entsprechen. Wenn wir sagen: ‘diese Rose ist rot’, so liegt in der Kopula ‘ist’, daß Subjekt und Prädikat miteinander übereinstimmen. Nun ist aber die Rose als ein Konkretes nicht bloß rot, sondern sie duftet auch, hat eine bestimmte Form und vielerlei andere Bestimmungen, die in dem Prädikat 'rot' nicht enthalten sind.“ (Hegel 8, 323‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. “Virtus enim visiva, cum immutetur a colore, non solum percipit colorem, sed et suam immutationem. A simili, virtus scitiva ex hoc quod immutatur a specie alicuius scibilis aut informatur, non solum percipit suum scibile, sed et suam informationem.“ (*In APos* I.3; ed. RRP, 1.3.S6.4) [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. “Sed in hoc quod dico “proportionale” tangitur eadem natura semper et eadem intentio secundum substantiam, diversificata tamen secundum propinquius et remotius ad illam naturam. Praedicat enim ubique certitudinem habitudinis, habitam per naturam numeri, et est hoc quod dico “certitudo” intentio numeri. Et cum dicitur “numerus”, tangitur illud per cuius naturam tangitur et reperitur hoc in omnibus. » (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S10.ad3) [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. Carnap’s basic thesis of his critique of metaphysics is as follows: “Auf dem Gebiet der Metaphysik (einschließlich aller Wertphilosophie und Normwissenschaft) führt die logische Analyse zu dem negativen Ergebnis, daß die vorgeblichen Sätze dieses Gebietes gänzlich sinnlos sind*.* Damit ist eine radikale Überwindung der Metaphysik erreicht, die von den früheren antimetaphysischen Standpunkten aus noch nicht möglich war.” (Carnap 1931, 220) [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. “*1.* Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist. *1.1* Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.” (*Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* 1.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. “Induktionsprinzip wäre mit jedem wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt von neuem falsifiziert. Man müβte deshalb ein Induktionsprinzip einführen, das nicht falsifizierbar ist. So kommt man zu dem Unbegriff eines synthetischen Urteils ‘a priori’, d. h. einer unwiderleglichen Aussage über die Wirklichkeit. Versucht man, aus dem metaphysischen Glauben an die Gesetzmäβigkeit der Welt, an die Verifizierbarkeit der Theorien, eine Theorie der Erkenntnis zu machen, eine Logik der Induktion, so hat man nur die Wahl zwischen dem unendlichen Regreβ und dem Apriorismus.” (Popper 1935, 188). [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. “Unter den allgemeinsten Wesenseigentümlichkeiten der reinen Erlebnissphere behandeln wir an erster Stelle die *Reflexion*. Wir tun es um ihrer *universellen* methodologischen Funktion willen: die phänomenologische Methode bewegt sich durchaus in Akten der Reflexion.” (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* I, Husserliana III/1, § 77; ed. Schuhmann, p. 162.1‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. “Das Wesen (*Eidos*) ist ein neuartiger Gegenstand. So wie das Gegebene der individuellen oder erfahrenden Anschauung ein individueller Gegenstand ist, so das Gegebene der Wesensanschauung ein reines Wesen. Hier liegt nicht eine bloß äußerliche Analogie vor, sondern radikale Gemeinsamkeit. Auch Wesenserschauung ist eben Anschauung, wie eidetischer Gegenstand eben Gegenstand ist.” (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* I, Husserliana III/1, § 3; ed. Schuhmann, p. 14.20‒26) For the similarity between Rufus’s and Husserl’s eidetic insight into the active intellect, see corresponding remarks in the chapter 3.3.3. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. “Quaeritur de redargutione Aristotelis quam ponit contra Platonem ponentem species separatas esse causas singularium, quia super hoc dicit Commentator quod nullum materiale transmutatur nisi a materiali, et propterea cum species sint immateriales et singularia materialia, non poterunt singularia transmutari a speciebus. Sed hoc videtur falsum…” (*Memoriale* II; ed. RRP, 2.7) [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. “Expositio autem Commentatoris fuit dicentis contrarium, quod materiale principium non cedit in idem numero prius resoluto propter multas transmutationes et variationes factas in ipso quæ sunt substantiales, et ita non videtur principium manere idem numero — cum tamen hoc sit falsum, ut credo. ” (*Memoriale* IV; ed. RRP, 4.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. “Ratio huius sermonis forte esse potest quod omnis substantia, si vere et perfecte sciatur, inquantum est substantia erit scita, et prima omnium substantia, quia illa prima vera est species et vera forma omnis naturae concreatae.” (*Contra Averroem* 1.4.2; ed. Wood&Nonne, p. 8.170‒73) [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. “Et sic patens est quod ad individuationem requiruntur tria: [agens], materia et virtus disponens. Et ista virtus ponitur medium inter substantiam et accidens, quia neque est complete substantia neque complete accidens. Et secundum hanc positionem dicendum quod materia coexigitur ad individuationem, non tamen est principium efficiens individuationis.” (*Memoriale* VII; ed. RRP, 7.11.5.c) [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. “Deinde dixit: *Vivum autem universale*, etc. Demonstratur per hoc quod ipse non opinatur quod diffinitiones generum et specierum sunt diffinitiones rerum universalium existentium extra animam; sed sunt diffinitiones rerum particularium extra intellectum, sed intellectus est qui agit in eis universalitatem.” (CMDA I.8; 12.21‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. “Quia tamen Aristoteles non solum dicit formam esse universale prout habet esse in anima sed prout habet esse extra animam, et hoc sive ipsa consideretur inquantum est in multis et non in singulis, sive consideretur inquantum est in singulis, ideo potest dici universale habere esse in anima et extra animam.” (*Memoriale* VII, ed. RRP, 7.8) [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. “Item, natura speciei specialissimae per se est intelligibilis, et illud additum super formam speciei specialissimae quod est causa individuationis (quicquid illud fuerit) est scibile; alioquin enim esset quaestio insolubilis, quaerens causam individuationis.” (*Contra Averroem* 1.4.3, ed. Wood&Nonne, p. 8.176‒79) [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. “Loquor enim de materia circumscripta ab ea omni forma communi et propria et communissima — scilicet, forma generis generissimi; hanc enim omnium primo recipit, et mediante hac alias per ordinem usque ad individualem.” (*Contra Averroem* 1.4.1, ed. Wood&Nonne, p. 9.9‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. “Prima autem ratio solum procedebat de individuatione quoad distinctionem unius ab alio, de qua iam praedicti auctores fatentur non oriri a materia. Adverto tamen argumenta facta non convincere de omni distinctione, nam, ut infra dicam, materia suo modo habet unde distinguat unum ab alio, quatenus ipsa habet aliquem actum entitativum; probant tamen non esse cur prima ratio totius distinctionis numericae illi potius quam alicui formae attribuatur.” (*Disputationes metaphysicae* 5.3.5, editio digitalis Renemann et. al.) [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. “Hanc eludendae Aristotelis authoritati appellabat Materiam Totius. Nam, inquiebat, est forma totius, v.g., humanitas tanquam abstractum hominis, cui opponitur materia totius, nempe Haecceitas; et forma partis, anima rationalis, cui corpus ut materia partis opponitur. Sed id nihil est, nam Haecceitas, si est materia totius, debet cum humanitate concretum constituere, Hominem.” (*Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, § 18; ed. Lipsiae 1663, p. 9) [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. “Species enim rei scibilis recepta in anima sive scientia, prout est aliquid absolutum et non prout est imago rei scibilis, nunquam esset principium cognoscendi ipsam rem.” (*In DA* I.2; ed. RRP, I.2.5.ad aliud 2) [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. “Quid autem voluerit Plato intendere secundum veritatem per hoc quod ponit animam secundum quod cognoscit esse sicut lineam rectam, in movendo autem circulum sit distinctum secundum octo circulos, sic poterit imaginari, et primo de anima mundi.” (*In DA* I.7; ed. RRP, I.7.4.Q.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. “Anima ergo sic alterata a coloris specie convertit se supra se ipsam ut est eius similitudo, nihil eius recipiendo sed solam eius similitudinem actualem. (...) Similiter nihil ipsius sensibilis transfertur usque in animam, sed solum fit quod anima quae prius in potentia fuit eius similitudo fiat actu eius similitudo, quando convertit se supra ipsam.” (*In DA* II.9, ed. RRP, 2.9.34) [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. “Nota quod species sensibilis nullo modo potest immutare animam immediate nec agere in ipsam, sed solum in corpus agit immediate. Unde ultima actio ipsius sensibilis immediate est in organum.” (*In DA* II.9; ed. RRP, 2.9.34) [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. “Quod solum est in potentia non habet actum exsistendi; sed intellectus possibilis ante omne intelligere, ut in puero, habet actum exsistendi; ergo non est solum in potentia, igitur antequam intelligat non est solum in potentia. Item, intellectus quo intelligit homo sive anima intellectiva non est solum forma sed hoc–aliquid. Sed omne tale causatum habet duo in se — scilicet unum materiale et reliquum formale. Ergo intellectus noster habet formam, ergo non est solum in potentia.” (*In DA* III.4; ed. RRP, 3.4.9) [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. “Intellectus autem agens abstrahit hanc speciem sive similitudinem ab his condicionibus appropriantibus per eius praesentiam super imaginabile. Et sicut cera, cum sit susceptiva cuiuscumque figurae indifferenter de se, per praesentiam sigilli supra ipsam recipit figuram sigilli, similiter cum intellectus possibilis de se sit possibilis ut sit similitudo cuiuscumque formae, per praesentiam similitudinis alicuius formae super ipsam fit similitudo illius formae in actu, per praesentiam tamen intellectus agentis manifestantis intentiones universalium et eorum similitudines, praetermissis condicionibus materialibus appropriantibus.” (*In DA* III.4; ed. RRP, 3.4.12) [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. “Sensus omnes externos, in quantum sunt partes corporis, etiamsi illos applicemus ad objecta per actionem, nempe per motum localem, proprie tamen sentire per passionem tantum, eadem ratione qua cera recipit figuram a sigillo.” (*Regulae* XII.5; ed. Tannery 10, 412.14‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. “Igitur illud quod est materiale in ipsa anima creata est intellectus possibilis; illud autem quod est formale in ipsa est intellectus agens.” (*In DA* III.4; ed. RRP, 3.4.10) [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. “Wir merken hierdurch, daß wir innerhalb des vollen Noema (in der Tat, wie wir es im voraus angekündigt hatten) wesentlich verschiedene Schichten sondern müssen, die sich urn einen zentralen 'Kern', um den puren 'gegenständlichen Sinn' gruppieren ‒ um das, was in unseren Beispielen überall ein mit lauter identischen objektiven Ausdrücken Beschreibbares.” (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* I, § 91; Husserliana III.1, p. 210.33‒38) [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. “Et sicut in forma singulari est forma universalis cum condicionibus appropriantibus ipsam, similiter in similitudine formae singularis est similitudo formae universalis sive intentio cum condicionibus appropriantibus et facientibus illud, ut hic et nunc.” (*In DA* III.4; ed. RRP, 3.4.12) [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. “Nota quod intellectus possibilis est ab extra et est quiddam divinum et copulatur cum homine per substantiae infusionem. Simul enim creatur et infunditur, et ipse infusus est enumeratus et individuatus ex se et ex sua essentia in hominibus in quibus infunditur.” (*In DA* III.4; ed. RRP, 3.4.12) [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. “Unde quando per tentationem et derisionem aliqui Minores praesumptuosi quaesiverunt a fratre Adam, “Quid est intellectus agens?” respondit, “Corvus Eliae”; volens per hoc dicere quod fuit Deus vel angelus. Sed noluit exprimere, quia tentando et non propter sapientiam quaesiverunt.” (*Opus tertium*, cap. XXIII; ed. Bridges, OHI 1, 75) [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. “Die objektive Welt ist für mich immerfort schon fertig da, Gegebenheit meiner lebendig fortlaufenden objektiven Erfahrung, und auch nach dem Nicht-mehr-Erfahren in habitueller Fortgeltung. Es handelt sich darum, diese Erfahrung selbst zu befragen und die Weise ihrer Sinngebung intentional zu enthüllen...” (*Cartesianische Mediationen und Pariser Vorträge*; Husserliana I, ed. Strasser, p. 136.22‒32) [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. “Secundum Commentatorem si sit in potentia ad hominem, hoc erit ad alterum hominem, et non ad eundem numero...” (*Memoriale* IV; ed. RPP, 4.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. “Materia prima nata est ut recipiat formas individuales; intellectus possibilis natus est ut recipiat formas universales. Et materia prima una numero est et res singularis; alioquin non reciperet formas singulares. Intellectus possibilis erit intentio non individualis aut non recipiet formas universales.” (*Contra Averroem* 1.2.3; ed. Wood&Nonne, p. 5.95‒99) [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. “Non est ergo intellectus possibilis alius et alius numero in ipsis individuis. Erit ergo (ut videtur) unus numero in omnibus individuis, aut etiam unus numero et universale sub quo non est invenire plusquam unum individuum. (…) Quia si invenirentur plura individua, esset forma illorum individuorum multiplex numerata secundum multiplicationem et numerationem plurium materierum.” (*Contra Averroem* 1.2.4; ed. Wood&Nonne, pp. 5.105‒6.114) [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. “Ergo hoc videtur movisse ipsum Averroem et rationabiliter in ponendo intellectum possibilem in nobis omnibus unum et etiam universale, sicut prius dictum est.” (*Contra Averroem* 1.2.4; ed. Wood&Nonne, p. 6.117‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. “Ergo hoc videtur movisse ipsum Averroem et rationabiliter in ponendo intellectum possibilem in nobis omnibus unum et etiam universale, sicut prius dictum est. Hoc, inquam, secundum rationem dictam videtur, quod sit necesse intellectum possibilem vel unum numero, et tamen sic universale in multis individuis esse; aut in singulis diversis individuis numero et specie differre...” (*Contra Averroem* 1.2.4; ed. Wood&Nonne, p. 6.117‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. “Totalitarian rulers rely on the compulsion with which we can compel ourselves, for the limited mobilization of people which even they still need; this inner compulsion is the tyranny of logicality against which nothing stands but the great capacity of men to start something new. The tyranny of logicality begins with the mind’s submission to logic as a never-ending process, on which man relies in order to engender his thoughts. By this submission, he surrenders his inner freedom as he surrenders his freedom of movement when he bows down to an outward tyranny.” (Arendt 1962, 473) [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. “Scimus enim quod temporibus nostris Parisiis diu fuit contradictum naturali philosophiae et metaphysicae Aristotelis per Avicennae et Averrois expositores, et ob densam ignorantiam fuerunt libri eorum excommunicati, et utentes eis per tempora satis longa.” (*The Opus Maius of Roger Bacon* I.9; ed. Bridges, p. 20) [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. “Adam Marsh, considered him an exemplary friar (Epistle 205) and noticed that younger friars were glad to work with him because he let them use his books (Epistle 192). Finally, we know one of Rufus’s dreams, or rather his nightmare: intellectual pride. Rufus once dreamed that St. Francis himself appeared to him. In this dream Francis told Rufus that the Franciscan Order’s most celebrated priestly lecturers had less merit than a humble lay contemplative brother.” (*De adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam* 11; *Life of Richard Rufus*, ed. RRP) [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. “Vir Dei, garrulus sum et loquax et expedire nescio. Diu te tenui in istis, sed de cetero procedam. Et quaero a te: quid est quod praedicatur et quid est de quo praedicatur?” (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 127.272–74) [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. “Quomodo est sensus ipsa sensibilia et intellectus ipsa intelligibilia?” (*Speculum animae*, q. 1; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 118.27) [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. “Vir Dei, dices mihi, colligendo ex ipso eodem auctore, et respondebis mihi cum quaero: sensus quomodo est ipsum sensibile? Respondebis cum Philosopho, quia hoc modo, scilicet quod “sensus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu”, et illud pertractabis ad singulos sensus et sensibilia.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 1; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 118.40–45) [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. “Et iterum, cum tam variae et multiplices substantiarum et accidentium species intelligibiles recipiantur in uno et eodem intellectu possibili, consequitur quod nulla earum sit forma substantialis ex qua cum ipso intellectu fiat vere unum individuum, una substantia, una persona.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 2; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 123.173–77) [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. “Ipsa autem natura forinseca, a qua ista species abstrahitur, dicitur potentia intelligibile. Et dictus intellectus possibilis recipere potentia est similis, actu autem habens ipsum receptum actu efficitur similis et speciei infusae et proicienti extrinseco.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 133.449–52) [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. “Non erit igitur in intelligentia agente ex sola causa hujusmodi, ut faciat relucere in speculo virtutis nostrae intellectivae formam aliquam intelligibilem.” (*De universo* 2.1.14; ed. Le Feron, t. I, p. 822F) [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. “Et tu, convertens, dices sic: “lux est intentio lucidi, praesens in diaphono”. Et quid hoc est dictu, nisi quod ipsum lumen genitum ab origine, corpore luminoso, receptum in materia extranea, scilicet in aere diaphono? Hic, inquam, receptum sit species et similitudo expressa, non vana, non imaginaria similitudo, sed quantum possibile est accedens secundum identitatem et appropinquans ad formam lucidi fontanei, sicut supra audisti ex specie coloris ad ipsum colorem.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 2; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 126.248–56) [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. “Iuxta praedicta forte dices quod gratia in anima iusta sit forma non sub-stantialis, ex qua cum materia fit hoc-aliquid, sed nec forma accidentalis, sed est ibi forma-habitus, et fit unum ex ipsa et anima sicut ex subiecto et forma-habitu.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 2; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 126.265‒68) [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. “Ex praedictis accipe quod “Socrates est homo”, “homo est homo”, idem est dictu acsi dicerem “Socrates vel materia Socratis humanatur”, “homo vel materia hominis humanatur”. Et proprie videtur dictum “humanatur”, ut per hoc verbum “humanatur”, quod concretum est, intelligatur ipsa forma per modum concretionis et qualificantis.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 128.327–31) [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. Let us quote a typical sentence of modern nominalism that hypostatized the existence of the first substance after Rufus’s *scibile*: “Realists attribute existence to properties; anti‑realists deny it.” (Poli—Seibt 2010, 139) [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. “Nunc redeo ad formam quæ est species obiecti exsistentis. Et dico communiter, sive sit sensibilis sive intelligibilis, quod ipsa etiam de sua materia nova in qua novum esse acquisivit per abstractionem, scilicet ab obiecto forinseco, grosso corporali. Praedicatur consimiliter, comproportionaliter concretive de sua, scilicet materia subtiliori, sicut et illa forma obiecta, extrinsecus exsistens in materia grossiori.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 130.368–72) [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. “Et hoc dico, neque secundum abstractionem neque secundum concretionem habentur simplicia vocabula quibus designentur species formarum sensibilium et intelligibilium rerum obiectarum, sed per circumlocutionem quoquomodo adnotamus eas.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 130.374‒77) [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. Let us notice that the MANIAC (*Mathematical Analyzer Numerical Integrator and Automatic Computer Model*) was the name of the first computer in the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The first variant (ENIAC, 1945) and the second (MANIAC, 1953) was used among other tasks to calculate on the basis of „Monte Carlo method“ if uncontrollable neutron diffusion during the thermonuclear fission („criticality accident“) would not lead to uncontrollable chain reaction that would have destroyed the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. “Comproportionaliter ergo accipe quod species animae, sive animalitatis sive humanitatis sive lapideitatis et sic de aliis — species, inquam, intelligibilis, abstracta scilicet ab omni situ et corporeitate — de ipso intellectu possibili praedicatur concretive et vere; ut possis scilicet dicere quod intellectus possibilis, cum intelligit lapidem, vere ut lapideitatur; cum hominem, vere ut humanatur. Hoc est dicere quod vere perficitur et formatur, non forma hominis, sed ut forma hominis.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 132.408‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. “Adeo enim apta et cognata eis speciebus, scilicet intelligibilibus sic abstractis, est materia istius intellectus possibilis qui est non situalis, aptus natus tamen tangibiles species et formas suscipere; adeo, inquam, cognatae et comproportionales istis speciebus, sic et qualis est ipsa materia forinseca ipsis formis-naturis et esse naturae habentibus in ipsa. Et tu scis quod ego divido esse speciei contra esse naturae.” (*Speculum animae*, q. 3; ed. Etchemendy&Wood, p. 132.425‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. “Ad plenam cognitionem uniuersalis habendam et quid dicat hec particula “secundum quod ipsum est” et quid addat supra “per se”, notandum quod uterque modorum inherendi per se dupliciter est, quia, cum duo sic se habent, quod a quiditate unius egrediatur quiditas alterius, aut ita est quod neutri aliquid superadditur quod sit ut causa uel ut causatum respectu alterius, aut quod alteri aliquid tale superadditur.” (*Notule Libri Posteriorum;* ed. Cannone, p. 134.470‒75) [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. “Et sic quando demonstratur passio, minor resoluitur proprie in duos modos per se, scilicet in secundum et primum, uel in tertium et quartum.” (*Notule* *Libri Posteriorum;* ed. Cannone, p. 127.274‒78) [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. “Numerus autem modorum 'per se' sic sumitur: in natura rerum non sunt nisi tria, scilicet quod est et quod inest et causa propter quam inest.” (*Notule Libri Posteriorum;* ed. Cannone,p. 130.367‒68) [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. As to Kilwardby’s reduction concerning the basic principles of *Second Analytics*, see Corbini 2013, 174–77. We quote the key point of his conclusion: “First and foremost, Kilwardby takes for granted that a principle must be true: because as is known in Aristotle, the true simply coincides with that which is, and also because the truth of principles obviously constitutes a necessary condition for the possibility of the demonstrative conclusion being true as well. In any case, it is impossible to have false demonstra­tive knowledge. What is more, Kilwardby claims, that, as far as the principles are concerned, to be primitive and to be immediate in fact coincide.” (Corbini 2013, 175) [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. The monastery called “*Couvent des Jacobins*” was built in 1218 in the street of St. James (Rue Saint-Jacques) and was the first seat of Dominicans in France. Therefore, the French Dominicans got the nickname “Jacobins” after the place of their enclosure. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. “Huius rationis primo ponit conclusionem, et hoc est: *que* *insunt ex necessitate*.” (*Notule Libri Posteriorum*; ed. Cannone, p. 129.341‒342). [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. “Dico ergo quod tota intentio logici stat supra syllogismum universaliter: unde secundum descensum istius et divisionem, descendit in suas partes. Partes autem syllogismi sunt dupliciter, scilicet priores ipso et posteriores: priores, materia et forma; et materia habet divisionem in possibilem et est dicibile simpliciter…” (*Notulae super librum praedicamentorum*, proemium; ed. Conti, p. 5.15‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. “Ordo patet, quia tres primi sumuntur absolute, quartus cum reduplicatione causae. Item, primi duo principaliter pertinent ad demonstrationem et cadunt in simpliciter scibilibus, tertius autem non sic. Item, primus est essentialior quam secundus, et ideo sic ordinantur ad inuicem.” (*Notule Libri Posteriorum*; ed. Cannone, p. 130.381‒85) [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. “In premissis autem illius demonstrationis que concludit passionem de subiecto, si diffinitio passionis sit medium, cum illa exprimat causam passionis, dico quod in maiori propositione est quartus modus, quia illa comparat causam ad causatum, uel modus primus conuersus; in minori autem dupliciter contingere potest: causa enim passionis per medium expressa, uel est aliquid subiecti, et tunc in minori est primus modus, uel aliquid consequens ad ipsum, et sic est secundus modus.” *(Notule Libri Posteriorum*; ed. Cannone, p. 131.402‒408) [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. “Si autem in demonstratione, que concludit passionem, sit diffinitio formalis subiecti medium, sicut putant quidam, tunc in maiori propositione est secundus modus, quia predicatur passio de diffinitione subiecti, et eadem est comparatio passionis ad subiectum et ad subiecti diffinitionem.” (*Notule Libri Posteriorum*; ed. Cannone, p. 131.411‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. “Aut secundum quod demonstratio consideratur ut in sua radice, et sic nihil aliud est quam ipsum medium.” (*In APos* I.2; ed. RRP, 1.2.S1.ad1) [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. “Partes patent et ordo similiter patet, quia “per se” addit supra “de omni” et “uniuersale” supra “per se”. Et iterum, tam “de omni” quam “per se” cadit in diffinitione uniuersalis, et ideo prius determinantur.” (*Notule Libri Posteriorum*, ed. Cannone, p. 117.47‒49) [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. “Si autem queratur quomodo iste modus se habet ad demonstrationem, dicendum est quod semper cadit in maiori propositione demonstrationis; et hoc siue debeat demonstrari passio de subiecto, siue diffinitio materialis per formalem; et hoc est, quia in maiori semper est subiectum precisa et inmediata causa predicati; et hoc dico, cum sit demonstratio ex inmediatis. Primus autem et secundus incidunt in conclusione semper, quia, ubi demonstratur diffinitio materialis de subiecto per formalem, incidit in conclusione primus modus, et, ubi demonstratur passio de subiecto, cadit in conclusione secundus modus. Exempla ponentur post.” (*Notule Libri Posteriorum,* ed. Cannone, p. 126.259‒64) [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. “Metaphysica et mathematica conveniunt in hoc, quod utraque habet considerare quantitatem.” (*De ortu scientiarum*, cap. 29; ed. Judy, p. 89.30‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. “Patet igitur quod conveniunt metaphysicus et mathematicus in hoc, quod uterque quantitatem considerat. Sed differunt in hoc, quod mathematicus quantitatem ponit subiectum ubique et de ea demonstrat et perquirit proprietates et propria accidentia. Metaphysicus autem eam considerat in quantum ens est et proprietates eius communes quæ rationem entitatis eius consequuntur. Cum enim quantitas ens sit et ens tale, quod entis est capit metaphysicus, quod talis entis, mathematicus.” (*De ortu scientiarum* 29.239; ed. Judy, p. 90.20‒27) [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. “Et ideo huiusmodi substantia deferens quantitatem et causans eam dicitur materia mathematica.” (*De ortu scientiarum*, cap. 29, ed. Judy, p. 93.6‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. “Consequenter autem tertio gradu recipit dicta materia differentias speciales corporum, scilicet circulare et rectum et huiusmodi, cum quibus differentiis etiam recipit quasdam qualitates activas et passivas. Et ista corpora specialia physica dicuntur quia in his incohatur physica speculatio.” (*De ortu scientiarum*, cap. 29; ed. Judy, p. 93.8‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. “To make the distinction between internal questions (where the answers are given within the culture, the theory, the story, the game) and external ones (answered by whether it is a culture we are members of, a theory we accept, a story we believe, a game we play), we can get along with the notion of ‘reference’ and skip that of ‘meaning.’ ‘Meaning’ only seemed important because it provided a way to pick out an object in the world, which we could then determine to be the same or not the same as some object countenanced by our own culture, theory, story, or game.” (Rorty 1979, 274) [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. “Haec videtur esse sententia Aristotelis et Averrois. Dicit enim Aristoteles in II Metaphysicae versus finem [*Met*. I.9, 992b12‒15]; quod non invenitur una definitio communis eis quae sunt cum numeris et lineis, et Commentator ibidem sic dicit, quod impossibile est ut numerus et superficies et linea habeant unum genus commune nisi aequivoce, verbi gratia quantitatem. Manifestum est enim quod hoc nomen quantitas dicitur de eis aequivoce, et ideo artes doctrinales consider antes de eis non sunt unum sed plures.“ (*De ortu scientiarum* 24.168; ed. Judy, pp. 65.32‒66.5) [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. “Erravit Commentator ponens materiam primam omnium unam numero, vel quod non intendit aliquid positivum per hoc quod dicit unum numero, sed solum privativum, scilicet carentiam pluralitatis formarum individualium et indistinctionem formalem.“ (*De ortu scientiarum*, cap. 30; ed. Judy, p. 106.14‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. “Quod autem est unum numero primo modo est res in potentia tantum et non in actu, et ideo formam quam in se recipit secundum quod huiusmodi non individuat. Et ideo forma universalis quæ est res ens in potentia, ut dicit Averroes super XI Metaphysicae, suscipitur in materia prima una numero unitate essentiali tantum, manens universalis, et ita scientia nostra non est animae figmentum cum sit de universali.“ (*De ortu scientiarum* 31.303; ed. Judy, p. 110.6‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. “Quia autem, ut dicit Averroes super III Metaphysicae *illud quod disponitur per bonum est causa finalis*, ideo ordo scientiarum penes fines attendendus est penes bonitatem finium. In ipsis autem speculativis tanto melior est veritas quæ intenditur quanto ipsa certior est et de certiori; certior autem est veritas et de certiori quæ cum sit certa est de simpliciori et priori et abstractiori, et ideo speculativae in ordine finium servant ordinem subiectorum, de quo supra dictum est.“ (*De ortu scientiarum*, cap. 63; ed. Judy, p. 217.14‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. “Ad tertiam dicendum, quod de quantitate non est una scientia, tamen de ente est una scientia, et hujus ratio est quia quantitas dividitur per talia quorum unum ad alterum nec essentialiter nec causaliter reducitur; sed ens dividitur per ea quorum unum ad alterum, et si non essentialiter, tamen causaliter, reducitur ut accidens ad substantiam.“ (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis IV*; ed. Steele, OHI 11, 90.13‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. “Item ad hoc insaniunt contra veritatem dicentes quod ens per quantumlibet significet esse presens et esse actuale in preterito, tamen ens nomen significat abstracte ab esse actuali et cum communitate quadam ad ens et non ens actu.“ (*Compendium studii theologiae*, pars II, cap. IV; ed. Rashdall, p. 56) [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. “Hec est vera “omnis homo de necessitate est animal” et illa “homo est animal” nullo homine existente, sicut ostendebat quaedam ratio, quoniam ad veritatem propositionis in naturali materia non exigitur existentia extremorum actu.“ (*Anonymus Erfordensis*, fol. 9rb, ed. Libera, p. 234) [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. “Haec propositio “omnis homo est animal” est vera, et semper erit vera, et semper fuit vera, semper enim fuit verum dicere “omnis homo est animal,” et semper erit verum dicere; ergo est necessaria, et videtur ibi esse locus ab expositione huius vocabulum “necessarium”.“ (*Anonymus Erfordensis*, fol. 7vb; ed. Libera 2002, 219) [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. “Roger Bacon, *Summulae dialectices*, 3.1.4., §. 222‒24 : « ad hoc dico quod *necessitas* propositionis *non extenditur ultra existentiam subiecti* » ; *contra*, Robert Kilwardby, Syllabus [18 mars 1277, Oxford]. *Errores in logicalibus* n° 6 [*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I, no.474)]: « Quod veritas cum necessitate tantum est cum constantia subiecti ».“ (Libera 2002, 234). [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. “Et quod sequatur “homo est substantia, ergo homo est ens” probatio: quoniam sicut se habet hoc verbum “est” ad res significatas per modum actus, ita se habet “ens” ad res significatas per modum habitus, et in quolibet verbo intelligitur “est.” (…) Ergo in quolibet nomine, cum significet per modum habitus, intelligetur ‘ens.’ Cum ergo substantia sit nomen, in substantia intelligetur.” (*Anonymus Erfordensis*, fol. 8va; ed. Libera 2002, 224) [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. Libera’s study devoted to the analysis of *Anonymus Erfordensis* followed the critical edition of this commentary. The following statement of his analysis is highly controversial: “*L’équation constantia = existentia ne pose pas de problème majeur.*” (Libera 2002, 204) Hermeneutics, on the other hand, considers this univocity to be a fundamental problem. The first and the second Averroism had categorically different conceptions of substance and existence from the very beginning. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. “Quando ergo tu dicis “quaestio quid est praesupponit quaestionem si est,” ego dico quod quaestio quid est res supponit quaestionem si est res et etiam si est intellectus. Sed quaestio quid est intellectus non supponit quaestionem si est res, sed si est intellectus. Sed ista “homo est animal” nullo homine existente est sumpta a quaestione si est intellectus et non si est res.” (*Anonymus Erfordensis*, fol. 10rb; ed. Libera, pp. 236‒237) [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. “Primus error quod divina essentia in se nec ab homine nec ab angelo videbitur.” (*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis I*, no. 128, p. 170) [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. “Menti igitur nostrae in statu viae convenire non potest visio Dei per essentiam secundum primum modum. Mens enim nostra naturali cognitione phantasmata respicit quasi obiecta, a quibus species intelligibiles accipit, ut dicitur in III de anima; unde omne quod intelligit secundum statum viae, intelligit per huiusmodi species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Nulla autem huiusmodi species sufficiens est ad repraesentandam divinam essentiam, vel etiam cuiuscumque alterius essentiae separatae…” (*De veritate*, q. 10, a. 11, resp.; ed. Leonina 22/2, 336.157‒67) [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. “Et maxime ille qui vivit habet nomen doctoris Parisius; et allegatur in studio sicut auctor, quod non postest fieri sine confusione et destructione sapientiae, quia ejus scripta plena sunt falsitatibus et vinatatibus infinitis. Numquam talis abusio fuit in hoc mundo.” (*Opus minus*; ed. Brewer, p. 327‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. The postulation of Albert and Bacon as representants of the first Averroism refutes the thesis that Albert is the target of Bacon’s criticism (Eaton 1971, 210–31). Another candidate of Bacon’s criticism could be Rufus during his activity as regent in Paris or master Gilbert of Tournai (†1284). He took the function of regent after the appointment of Bonaventura as the General at the Franciscan College in Paris (1257–61). Gilbert was above all a writer and educator and devoted himself to the political and social education of the rulers (*Eruditio regum et principum*, 1259). This genre in the form of “mirror of rulers“ (*principum specula*) existed from Seneca’s work *De clementia* until the Renaissance, see Machiavelli’s work *The Prince* (*Il Principe*, 1513). [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. “Preter tamen errores philosophi, arguendus est quia uituperauit omnem legem, ut patet ex II. et XI. [Metaphysica], vbi uituperat legem cristianorum, scilicet legem catholicam nostram, et etiam legem sarracenorum, quia ponunt creationem rerum et aliquid posse fieri ex nichilo.” (*De erroribus Philosophorum* cap. IV.30, ed. Mandonnet, p. 9.23‒26) [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. “Maius autem periculum est descendere ad Summas magistrorum, quia aliquando est in eis error; et credunt se intelligere originalia [sc. sanctorum] et non intelligunt, immo eis contradicunt. Unde sicut fatuus esset qui vellet semper immorari circa tractatus et nunquam ascendere ad textum; sic est de Summis magistrorum.” (*Collationes in Hexaëmeron* 19.11; *Opera omnia* 5, 422a) [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. “...philosophica scientia est ad alias scientias; sed qui vult stare cadit in tenebras…“ (*Opera omnia* 5, 476a); “...sunt qui scire volunt tantum, ut sciant, et turpis curiositas est…” (ibid, 478b) [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. “Sunt vero septem peccata studii principalis quod est theologiae; unum est quod philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam. Sed in nulla facultate extranea debet dominari; et maxime hic ubi domina scientiarum reperitur; immo etiam cujus dignitatis philosophia non habet usum; nam scientia Dei est, et ad vitam perducit aeternam.“ (*Opus minus*, ed. Brewer, p. 322) [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. The modern subject is involved in much older development, which is initiated, among other things, by introduction of personal confession through the renewed ecclesiastical code *Decretum Gratiani* (1140). From the 12th century, a new dimension of the interiority was created, which is linked to personal confessions in the local languages (Rusconi 1981). The institutional space of subjectivity created in that manner was linked to the emergence of the purgatory mentality that appeared in Porretan theology (ch. 1.6). [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. “Illud quod disponitur per bonum est causa finalis; bonum enim est desiderabile, et causa finalis est desiderabilis… si hoc concedatur, quod omne quod est bonum secundum se et propter suam naturam, est finis.” (*De dictinctionibus,* Venetiis 1510*,* fol. 164; cit. podle Matsen 1974, pp. 282‒83) [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. “Die Analytik stellt die ontologische Frage nach dem Sein des *sum*. Ist dieses bestimmt, dann wird die Seinsart der *cogitationes* erst faßbar.” (SZ 46) [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. “Fundierung leistet insofern für Vorstellungen idealer Gegenstände dasselbe, wie Wahrnehmung für Vorstellungen realer Gegenstände; und das alte erkenntnistheoretisch-psychologische Prinzip von Intellectus und Sensus leidet am fundamentalen Mangel, mit der Fundierung sozusagen die eine Hälfte der Tatsachen zu vernachlässigen.” (*Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung*, §7; Meinong 1899, 203) [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. “Das Streben nach einer wissenschaftlichen Fundierung der philosophischen Disziplinen führte zur logischen Betrachtung der Mathematik als der einzig sicheren und exakten Wissenschaft. Im Hinblick auf sie sucht die Philosophie sich zu orientieren, sichere Haltung und wissenschaftliche Methode zu gewinnen.” (*Geschichtlicher Überblick über die Philosophie der Mathematik*; Husserliana 21, 227.26‒29) [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. “Die Möglichkeit bleibt offen, daß eine andere Wissenschaft und vielleicht in ungleich bedeutsamerer Weise zu ihrer Fundirung beitrüge.” (*Logische Untersuchungen* I, § 20, p. 59) [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. “Das principium rationis ist für Leibniz, streng gedacht, das principium reddendae rationis. Rationem reddere heißt: den Grund zurückgeben. Weshalb zurück und wohin zurück? Weil es sich in den Beweisgängen, allgemein gesprochen im Erkennen um das *Vor*stellen der *Gegen*stände handelt, kommt dieses” zu-rück “ins Spiel. Die lateinische Sprache der Philosophie sagt es deutlicher: das Vorstellen ist re-praesentatio. Das Begegnende wird auf das vorstellende Ich zu, auf es zurück und ihm entge-gen praesentiert, in eine Gegenwart gestellt.“ (*Der Satz vom Grund*, GA 10, 34) [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. „Jusqu’ici nous n’avons parlé qu’en simples physiciens: maintenant *il faut s’élever à la métaphysique, en nous servant du grand principe, peu employé communément*, qui porte que rien ne se fait sans raison suffisante, c’est-à-dire que rien n’arrive sans qu’il soit possible à celui qui connaîtrait assez les choses de rendre une raison qui suffise pour déterminer pourquoi il en est ainsi, et non pas autrement. Ce principe posé, la première question qu’on a droit de faire sera : *pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien*? Car le rien est plus simple et plus facile que quelque chose. De plus, supposé que des choses doivent exister, il faut qu’on puisse rendre raison pourquoi elles *doivent exister ainsi*, et non autrement. (*Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raiso*n (1714), kap. 7; *Oeuvres* I, ed. Janet, p. 727) The italics are of my own origin. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. “Die Natur thut nämlich nichts überflüssig und ist im Gebrauche der Mittel zu ihren Zwecken nicht verschwenderisch. Da sie dem Menschen Vernunft und darauf sich gründende Freiheit des Willens gab, so war das schon eine klare Anzeige ihrer Absicht in Ansehung seiner Ausstattung. Er sollte nämlich nun nicht durch Instinct geleitet, oder durch anerschaffene Kenntniß versorgt und unterrichtet sein; er sollte vielmehr alles aus sich selbst herausbringen.” (AK 8, 19) [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. “Take up the White Man’s burden, Send forth the best ye breed / Go bind your sons to exile, to serve your captives’ need; / To wait in heavy harness, On fluttered folk and wild / Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child.” (*The White Man’s Burden*, R. Kipling 1899) [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. “Une chose en tout cas est certaine : c’est que l’homme n’est pas le plus vieux problème ni le plus constant qui se soit posé au savoir humain. En prenant une chronologie relativement courte, et un découpage géographique restreint — la culture européenne depuis la fin du XVIe siècle — on peut être sûr que l’homme est une invention récente. (…) C’était l’effet d’un changement dans les dispositions fondamentales du savoir. L’homme est une invention dont l’archéologie de notre pensée montre aisément la date récente. Et peut-être la fin prochaine.” (Foucault 1966, 398) [↑](#footnote-ref-519)