**Hermeneutics of Objectivity III.**

**Tragicomedy of Scholastic Modernity**

The final tome interprets the objectivity in full historical review. The hermeneutic triad of historicity, history and history is guided by the visible path of the sun in the sky and by the hidden path of the same sun in the realm of shadows. The journey follows traces of completely hidden archegetic dative and then follows the path of repressed metaphysical dative. The order of donation of being is given by gradual suppression of wisdom. The disappearance of wisdom from philosophy ended in today’s transformation of philosophy in ideologies. The lack of wisdom determines the order of hermeneutic investigation in the mode *per prius* and *per posterius*. Archaic hermeneutics have the divine task of saving the phenomena, because this is the last important oracle given in Delphi before its decline (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). This art belongs to the archaic mission of hermeneutics, which is given by the Delphic oracle about the wise Socrates. That kind of exploration investigates the determinations of Being with the help of fundamental signs (*hérmaion*) on the route of wisdom. By following Parmenides and the goddess of Truth, critical thinking distinguish important semantic signs (σήματ' ἔασι πολλὰ, B 8.2‒3) on the path called “*via Modernorum*.” The most important signs that indicate the birth of objectivity were done at the beginning of the new gigantomachy between the first and second Averroism after 1230. In the case of our study, these signs are given by the defense mechanism “inversion to the opposite” (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*), which has erased hyparchical sense of the first substance from modern thought. Objective analytical philosophy is basically blind to effective causality related to first substances as it is investigated in *Second Analytics*. The objectively determined lunacy of reason is given by various forms of Oxfordian Fallacy. Mythological *modus ponens* of objectivity is based on two fundamental errors. First: modernity lost the attachment to the real being of the first substance. Secondly, modernity does not recognize a real person. The mode of unreal supposition and the plurality of substances in man have created a non-existent human subject. Due to this double eclipse of the first substance, a new bond “subject—object” was established, in which both components are given in a mythical manner. The hermeneutics of objectivity of the previous part followed the tragedy of western Aristotelianism and the first act of victorious tragicomedy of modernity. Roger Bacon followed step by step the emergence of modernity in Rufus’s philosophical school, which he called crazy (*insaniunt contra veritatem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). The paranoid, schizophrenic and demonic features of modernity can be interpreted in the mode of Pythian hermeneutics, because it follows the archaic deeds of Muses and not the objective activism of Furies that became fully subjective.

The creation of objective substance constituted an original event (*Ereignis*) that established the history of modern metaphysics. The arrival of second Averroism changed the sense of being into objectivity, which caused the eclipse of the first substance. Plato’s metaphysical donation was remade in the time of the eclipse of the first substance in a new way. The idea was replaced by being of the third kind. That non-existent entity is manifested as objective parousia that is accomplished in absolute presence of the modern subject. Aristotelian metaphysical dative, on the other hand, is expressed in the past tense of real substance (τό τί ἦν εἶναι) that is present through its recognized being and through adequately made predication. The epoch of objective forgetfulness of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*) took up the logical essence as the basis to make the new donation of sense of being. Made in such a way, a universal parousia of being of the third kind came into being in mind of modern *illuminati*. The event of being as *tertium ens* constituted by Grosseteste and Rufus differs fundamentally from categorical representation of the hyparchical first substance. The first substance is given in the Aristotelian mode *per prius* and is predicated as the second substance in the mode *per posterius*. In Aristotelian metaphysics, this dependence of metaphysical thinking and real being found expression in the fundamental axiom “*ex inmediatis*.” Rufus created an objective donation of being in the new type of parousia that is given as a simulacrum of donation made by Aristotle. In the mind of *illuminati*, all kinds of *tertium ens* reveal themselves directly and immediately in their own nature, since they are given *simpliciter* and *per se*. The modern subject of cognition became the new source of principle “*ex inmediatis*.” The objective simulacrum that pretended to be a kind of hylemorphic substance was announced in some schools in Paris, and especially in Oxford. Rufus created a kind of objective donation of being expressed in the term “*species obiecti exsistentis.*” He founded the objective substance by displacing the priority of Aristotelian first substance. Displacement of the metaphysical dative in favor of the objective dative created the new kind of *Lichtung* that mixed the truth and the untruth. Made in that way, the new place of modern science and nihilistic metaphysics have been established (*ortus scientiarum*). The hermeneutics of objectivity applied Heidegger’s terms (*Ereignis, Irre, Irrtum, Seinsvergessenheit*) to describe new gigantomachy of substance that started in the Latin West at the beginning of the 13th century. New forms of modern metaphysics emerge from the twice-hidden archaic event that offers the original donation of Being. The hitherto little-known conflict between the interpretations of Aristotle done “*ad mentem Averrois*” reveals the quadrangle (*Geviert*) of being that established the place of non/truth (*Lichtung*) that founded the history of modern metaphysics (OBJ II, ch. 3). Hermeneutics followed the mythological cosmogenesis of objectively given atomic substance, making use of multiple perspectives given by Apollonian semantics of truth and untruth. The substance as *tertium ens* appeared for the first time in the second half of the 12th century through Porretan classification that sorted out nominally determined essences. Anselm takes the truth as a hierarchy of essences that are given in real things (*veritas et rectitudo sunt in rerum essentia*; OBJ I, ch. 1.2). Archbishop of Canterbury conceived of existence as an event called into being by the will of the Creator. Anselm created a deontological theory of truth as a God-given rectification of existence (*quod debet esse, recte est*). This deontological concept of truth was transformed into ontotheological scenario of *Nominales*. It caused a fundamental crisis of cognition that deepened after the arrival of Avicenna′s metaphysics via the Toledo school of translators. The illumination of the sense of being comes from behind and it produces the being of the third kind. This *tertium ens* is exemplarily given first in the cosmic active intellect and later objectively in modern God. As a result of this “crazy” conception of *Modernorum* (see Godfrey and Bacon quoted above), the claim and entitlement of every contingently first substance to existence (*rectitudo*) began to be investigated. The annulation of the metaphysical dative gave rise to a paranoid conception of the world turned on the way round. The so-called “strong” thinking of moderns produced “*ens ratum*” and thus determined the “weak” reality given as “*ens debile*.” The Western subject produces the metaphysics out of himself, which was shown by birth of mythological science in the schools of first *Modernorum*. The previous volume showed how the school of second Averroism, under the influence of Oxfordian Fallacy, remade Anselm’s deontology into the new kind of metaphysical being (*scibile*). Mathematics has given things an objectively and obviously given mandate in the “*semel—semper*” mode to ensure modern *scibile* in its “real” existence. The simulacrum of the real world must constantly be made, because hyparchical existence of first substances is given randomly and uncertainly. Modernity has settled the main residence in the objective remake of the Platonic cave. Modern *illuminati* have abandoned the millennia-old wisdom that followed the sun’s real path across the sky; they have stopped caring about real solar eclipses. After the death of modern God, mathematics took over this deontological role in the 19th century. Modernists introduced a combination of Latin Avicennism based on misunderstood metaphysics of Averroes that was interpreted according to the Toledo school. The school of the second Averroism established the history of effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) that contained foundational errors of modernism and postmodernism. The group of modernists gathered around the editors of *Summa Halensis* played a decisive role in the emergence of objectivity. These mendicant academic *illuminati* were non-officially active in Paris until 1255, when both mendicant orders were given their own faculty at the University of Paris.

A new round of controversy between the first and second Averroism begins immediately after the death of Bishop Alvernus in 1250. This battle was led by Guillelmus de Sancto Amore and by his disciples Gérard d’Abbeville and Nicolas de Lisieux in the Faculty of Art in the Rue de Fouarre. Master and rector Guillelmus de Sancto Amore of the school of the first Averroism undertook a campaign against modernists of mendicant orders in 1253–56 before he was expelled from the University of Paris (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). Bacon did not safeguard the first Averroism at Oxford, and eventually Siger’s school in Paris failed as well. The last knight of the first Averroism, William Ockham, had already fought in vain against the Scotist′ s school at Oxford. Modernists assimilated Ockham’s philosophy to their own image in the framework of Aristotelianism given through Oxfordian Fallacy. Nietzsche followed the steps of Roger Bacon by criticizing Neoplatonic postmodernism in the role of *Bacchonus redivivus*. He declared in the work *Zur Genealogie der Moral* that the subterfuge of metaphysically weak and subtly intelligent sophists and academics has been a great historical success.[[1]](#footnote-1) His quotation regarding the resentment of Platonists and his ironic tribute to their technical skill must be placed in Avicenna’s modernity and in power struggle that culminated at the University of Paris in 1255–56. The learned Latins equipped with this type of *ressentiment* and of power prowess were represented by Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventure. The metaphysics of those first Latin *Modernorum* increased the production of mythological entities of all sorts after the foundation of the mendicant chair at the University of Paris (1255). The production of objective simulacra is given through certainty of the modern subject that assimilates the external world in the mode of objective univocity and subjective will to power. The school of *sophistae Latini* in Oxford and nominalist school of *Grammatici* in Paris grasped the “substance—*individuum*” univocally, in the framework of logical abstraction. This *modus ponens* for being of the third kind is given in the mode *absolute*, i.e., outside the univocal categorical link to the hyparchical first substance. The previous matrix showed the emergence of Oxfordian Fallacy in epochal error (*Irrtum*) that the first generation of modernists established in Oxford. Latin sophists of the school of second Averroism combined Neoplatonist status of universals with the matter of the third kind to produce a whole series of objective determinations of substance. Moreover, they endowed universals with hypostatized accidents to create habitus, extension and quantity as a new kind of second substance. They founded the atomic substance of the third kind (*individuum, concretum*) in a new form of “individual” and “concrete” subsistence. All these changes introduced in the school of the second Averroism the production of new forms of being of the third kind. This marvelous accomplishment of Oxford′s *intelligentia spiritualis*, done in conjunction with Parisian academic *illuminati* around Bonaventure, gave rise to modern metaphysics. The schools of Porretans and *Nominales* ceased to exist and passed into the newly established *via Modernorum* in the years 1240─55.

Archaeology of objectivity found in the metaphysics of *Modernorum* the basic model that reveals modern sense of being in the mode of metaphysical *alētheia*. The transitions of datives (archegetic, principal, metaphysical, objective) show Hesiod’s concept of musical historicity that passed from the Golden Age to the present decline. In a similar way, archaic hermeneutics analyze the tragicomedy of modernity. Averroes dies at the end of the 12th century. At this time, Latin defenders of Aristotle in the Blund’s school began a similar battle for the true knowledge of first substance. The dispute over substance has been waged since 1225 by direct appeal to metaphysics of Averroes. Objective modernity displaced classical metaphysics with Freud’s defense mechanism called “*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*” (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). Hermeneutics pursue Apollonian semantics of displaced Aristotelianism that now operates from philosophical Lethe. Aristotle became the scapegoat at Oxford around 1235, taking upon himself all sophistic errors of *Modernorum*. Thanks to the influence of Oxford logical analysts like Rufus, it was Averroes that took up this role after 1250. The controversy over so-called “Averroism” became a visible semantic sign of hidden displacement of the first substance. Averroes, as the best commentator on *Corpus Aristotelicum*, became the new scapegoat of modernity after Aristotle. This tragicomic gigantomachy victoriously fought by moderns is controlled by goddesses of Vengeance and Chaos. Modern metaphysics is built on the paranoid subject and modern logic became demonic due to coming of future Antichrist (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). Necessarily, demonic powers of modern Chaos became completely subjective and logical. The cosmogony of objectivity is nothing but a mythical creation of the world in an academic mode *ex nihilo* that stands under the influence of academically educated Furies. The hermeneutics of the second volume followed in detail the basic way in which metaphysical predication was neglected. Classical metaphysics follows the donation of Being (Heidegger’s *Anwesen, Gabe, Es gibt*) through the sense of being configured in scholastic gigantomachy of substance. Influential schools of *Nominales* began to read *Second Analytics* in the univocal paradigm of logic. Modernity abolished the notion of truth as an accident tied to the operation of the metaphysical dative. Grosseteste’s “obscurity” doubled the obscurity of Avicenna’s metaphysics (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1) and introduced the objective status of hyparchical predication. Rufus and others misread a key part of the scientific proof in *Second Analytics* (ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν, *Anal. Post*. 73b28). The metaphysical dative of hidden being is related to things in the double mode of logical and metaphysical predication (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal. Post.* 84a12). This double determination of scientific proof indicates the original topos of Heidegger’s “*Es gibt*” for the modern metaphysical fallacy (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). The history of philosophy given after 1250 at Oxford sends the original beginning (*Beginn*) of Aristotelian metaphysics into the first form of epochal concealment. The first act of the objective tragicomedy is given in the teaching of Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventure. Roger Bacon accurately observed, dated, and described the tragic intellectual situation of his contemporaries both at Oxford and in Paris. The metaphysical determination of truth has existed since Grosseteste′s and then Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* in two forms: either as Aristotelian *adaequatio* or as modern *coaequatio*. Historical landmarks under examination manifest double hyparchical sense of being in doctrines of the first and second Averorism. Hermeneutics investigate this dichotomy of historically given truth by pointing to its hidden meaning. Tragicomic version of *modus ponens* entails an evident metaphysical fallacy. Logical abstraction cannot replace metaphysical abstraction, which alone provides a deductive scientific proof. It is given in the mode of the metaphysical dative linked to the causality of first substances. This founding event of Aristotelian science establishes true statements concerning the first substances through correctly made middle member of deductive syllogisms (*ex inmediatis*). The causality tied to *quidditas* in the middle member of the scientific proof has been replaced by the essence given in logical abstraction. It means that instead of categorically predicated metaphysical dative, there is a metaphysically false deduction made at the level of logical inference. Analytic logicians and modern *illuminati* are blinded by the light of their intellect—sun bestowed from above; therefore, they stated non-existent *tertium ens* as a kind of first substance. Inspired by Grosseteste, Latin modernists at Oxford abolished the original metaphysical distinction given by the dual nature of universals (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal*. *Post*. 84a12). Logical supposition displaced the metaphysical imposition coming from first substances. Classical schools of logic rejected such erroneous *modus ponens* as a typical example of “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*”(OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). That false reading of Aristotle and the Commentator in logical *modus ponens* was condemned by all eminent representatives of the school of the first Averroism who were active at the University of Paris until 1250. Predication in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy displaced metaphysical essence, since the modernists used an objective simulacrum instead of Aristotelian *quidditas*. Modernity is not governed by a truth based on reality, but by a system of generalized production of subjectively based knowledge (*factum*). The school of *Nominales* has introduced an objective system of knowledge within new *Arbor Porphyriana* given by the production of modern entities of all kinds. The objective multiplication and digital storage of postmodern *scibilia* runs through the movement of a specific differentiation of linguistic, binary and digital oppositions. In Foucault’s genealogy of knowledge, this objective dialectic was transformed into a new kind of science of man based on the principle of production. After the death of modern God, only his diligent and mortal successor remained and he is capable of virtually anything. Essentially given knowledge is given exemplarily and eternally; therefore it determines the contingent and subordinate world through the demiurgic activity of modern God and man. The history of the British Empire shows in a mode *de fine* the hidden beginning (*Beginn*) of objectivity given through Oxfordian Fallacy. The bygone glory of this simulacrum is actualized in the nihilistic epoch of thought by the Anglo-Saxon colonial clone on the other side of the Atlantic. We live in an epoch of metaphysical nihilism that objectively manifests the end of modernity. The nihilistic deconstruction of any fixed meaning, even that one tied to appearance of objective substance, heralds, in the mode of tragicomedy, the end of modern metaphysics.

The revelation of objectivity done in Apollonian *Lichtung* is based on the particular pseudo-substance made in the form of *intellectus possibilis*. The revelation of being relates to mediating role of *intellectus possibilis* as it was identified in Averroes’s magisterial interpretation of *De anima* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The mediating function of the receptive intellect, done in the form of intellectual diaphanum, provides the phenomenological way in which we recognize the world in the mode of Aristotelian correspondence. In the years 1235–40, Rufus created a new definition of *intellectus possibilis* as sophistical simulacrum of that Averroes’s notion. The new form of receptive intellect emerged on the basis of Dinant’s pantheistic interpretation of *De anima* (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3). Hermeneutics used the Commentator’s proceeding to show that Dinant’s form of pantheistic intellect had created an objective double of Neoplatonic and Avicennist *intellectus materialis*. Dinant’s substantial and cosmic version of *intellectus possibilis* was rejected by the founders of first Averroism gathered in the Blund’s school named as *École cathédrale de Paris*. This cathedral school looked after the legacy of Abelard and also that of the Baghdad House of Wisdom. Thanks to the battle won over modernists from the schools of *Nominales* and Dinant’s Pantheism, the representatives of this school became the founders of the University of Paris, which was recognized by papal law in 1215. Rufus adopted Dinant’s simulacrum and transformed it into the modernist doctrine of universal hylemorphism. Finally, he attributed this nonsense to Averroes (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). The objective version of *intellectus possibilis* was presented in Rufus’s work *Contra Averroem*. That modern sophistry pretends to be a revision of Averroes’s teaching by doubling his original version of *intellectus possibilis*. The first representatives of the second Averroism took up the syncretic system of Neoplatonism of the Toledo school to remake it into the first version of analytical philosophy. A key role in this comedy was played by the doctrine of universal hylemorphism. The new intellectual idol of modernity was created with the help of the spiritually given matter according to Avicebron (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Using this mythology, modernists of Oxford connected Avicenna’s metaphysics with Averroes’s “meta-physics.” The univocal doctrine of matter and body defined matter as pure essence and potency in Porretan hypostatized mode (*quod est*). Latin sophists began to predict it in the categorical mode to be a kind of second substance (Rufus’s *concretum*). As a result, the history of “concrete being” was created and the modern epoch of nihilistic objectivity entered on the stage. The universal hylemorphism doubled reality, cognition and truth to merge all that into an analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Albert declared it ridiculous. Philosophy and science acquired a new form in the years 1245–50 due to the activity of aforementioned modern thinkers. According to Bacon, there were insane to create such stupid version of the truth (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). After 1255, the fully positive stage of objectivity (ontic history) was introduced by sophistical modernists in the form of disputes over the so-called Averroism. Duns Scotus brought the metaphysics of *Modernorum* to an objective form. Contemporary medievalism defines his teaching as “second beginning of metaphysics.”

# **4. Objective Ontotheology of Modernity (Matrix IV)**

In the third part of the archaeology of objectivity, hermeneutic explanations take the nihilistic path that characterizes modern donation of being. The interpretation of complete manifestations of objectivity accomplishes the hermeneutic triad of historicity, historiality and history. The metaphysical dative indicates the donation of Being as the emergence of metaphysical being (*ens*). It means that the original event of Being (*Ereignis*) is already completely hidden. Metaphysically determined no longer occurs as an archaic Being of divine Muses (*dativus archegeticus*) or as Being in the first philosophy (*dativus principalis*). The essence of being in Plato’s metaphysics creates a *parousía* of the ideal meaning. It forms the here and now of given presence of being (οὐσία). Neoplatonists and Latin modernists created a substance of the third kind that is given as atomic “substance—*species*” (OBJ II, ch. 1.3.1). Modern sophists contemplate that parousia of atomic substance given in their mind and they state it with the help of Aristotelian categories. The first substance was transformed into a modern *tertium ens*. The realization of this objectively given being proceeds through the act of enlightenment when *tertium ens* is illuminated by the hypostatized intellect. This mythological procedure shows a deep perversion of the original goal and focus of Aristotelian metaphysics. His form of the first philosophy was defended by the school of the first Averroism “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Modernity abolished the original meaning of Aristotle’s metaphysics by performing an eclipse of the first substance and by making the real person disappear as the first substance. Hermeneutic archaeology, in the name of Aristotle and the Commentator, brings the metaphysical accusation (κατηγορία) against modernity and postmodernity. This criticism must be carried out on the basis of the Aristotelian predication. The categorical statements follow meaning of being from the very beginning, from first real substances. Real wisdom follows the path of the sun, like Odysseus, Parmenides and Heraclitus. That is why archaic hermeneutics cannot descend into the chaos of underworld, where two-headed people, mentioned by Parmenides, wander aimlessly. The sun even in the realm of modern shadows of thought runs its underground cycle only in one direction. Therefore, in the epoch of the present irrationality, the movement of musical understanding runs only in one direction: from the archegetic dative and the principal dative to its metaphysical version given in classical metaphysics, and then to its objective version given in modernity. The archaeology of objectivity returns to the original semantics of Delphi and to Socrates’s research of divine truth. The introductory prolegomena explained why the modern and postmodern darkness of thought must be methodically extinguished. Plato’s fairy tales served to illuminate academics, which is certainly nice, but it is not true enough. The foundation of objectivity in the Latin West mentioned above should be interpreted according to the archegetic dative (*dativus archegeticus*), that is, as historial action of objectively non-existent Furies. These demonic powers of Chaos received an academic education and a fully subjective character based on a paranoid form of illumination. Academically educated powers of intellectual Chaos took up their full residence at Oxford in 1230─35, to be there with the objectively non-existent Elijah’s Raven (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). The eclipse of the first substance made possible the full revelation (*alētheia*) of the objective being given by the foundation of modern science through Kilwardby’s work *De ortu scientiarum* (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). The world is observed in a subjectively given mirror (*speculum*) that is created by logical abstraction and by mathematical analogy. Speculative modernity makes the world assimilate to its paranoid image in order to establish the theory of unique truth made in the manner *absolute*. The emergence of modern science in the historial mode of objectivity follows the influence of epochal *Irrtum* in the metaphysics. It can be dated around 1250 at Oxford. The mythological form of modern science was introduced by uncritical use of predication “*in artificialibus*” that generated all kinds of sophisms in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The new metaphysics was based on the one truth as *veritas* and it united the metaphysics and the theology into a new project of objectively conceived ontotheology. Modern meaning of substance emerged as a conscious *epokhê* of Aristotelian first substance done away through the deontological imperative of modernity. Unrealistic thinking displaced reality and sent the being of first substance into the hidden depth of Being (*léthe, Seinsvergessenheit*). Objectivity arose from the eclipse of the first substance in the epochal event (*Ereignis*) that established the metaphysical foundation (*Gründung*) of modernity. Heidegger’s terms suggest that it is an event of Being itself that has doubly changed the original nature and truth. The emergence of Platonism caused the first retreat of archaically seen Being (*Seinsverlassenheit*). This historial beginning (*Anfang*) fully realizes its hidden historical possibilities (*Beginn*) in the course of gigantomachy of substance. The emergence of objective metaphysics definitively closed the question when the first substance was declared as meaningless (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The being of substance has passed into the objective manifestation of substance of the third kind (*scibile, positum*). Science of Latin sophists is a technically given skill in the mode of *Ge-Stell* (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). It means that objective knowledge is served through the power and dogmatic discourse.

Both previous parts have set out the basic *modus operandi* used by academically and analytically trained Furies in order to stage tragicomedy of modern metaphysics and objectivity. Due to erroneous interpretations of Aristotle and the Commentator, it came to eclipse of the first substance, which is the form of the modern *epokhē*. Its new form was manifested in the interpretation of erroneously interpreted deductive proof about solar eclipses according to *Second Analytics*. The dialogue *Sophist* shows the consequences of doubling reality in the mode of *eídolon*. The idolatry of objectivity established the new age of Western civilization by making a fatal misunderstanding of archaic and Aristotelian philosophy. The modern epoch of the eclipse of critical reason started because of the abolition of Aristotelian scientific proof (*demonstratio*). In the mode of truth as *veritas*, modern science investigates what objectively exists. This type of ontic and, moreover, entirely subjective truth cannot follow the ontological understanding of being in the mode of *alētheia* that makes the historicity of philosophy (*Geschichte*). The objectivity established exclusively the truth as modern *veritas,* in the logical mode of the Excluded Third. Due to completely hidden form of archaic truth, the divine comedy of Muses in the mode *a/lētheia* disappeared as well. However, it can lead the understanding of wise mortals. The period of thought instigated by Oxfordian Fallacy is closed by Nietzsche′s metaphysical nihilism and the Neopositivism of all contemporary analytic schools of philosophy, including Husserl’s phenomenology. After the definition of essence as the first substance, the validity of Foucault’s analysis of nihilistic humanism takes full measure. Contemporary humanities are established through *ad hoc* given structure made out of structural differences. Objective difference and chaotic mingling of diverse processes form a new event of knowledge (*le « lieu » de l′événement*) under the guidance of academically capable Furies.[[2]](#footnote-2) Those postmodern types of *scibile* were led out into the epochal revelation of being by productive errors of first modernists. Their followers understood those fallacies as scientific dogma. The new division between truth and non-truth emerged after the year 1230 through a new wave of interpretations of *Second Analytics* and *Metaphysics*. That kind of modern exegesis determined the future development of objectivity in a number of ways. Aristotelians conducted gigantomachy of substance in their own way and modern sophists in their way. Bishop Alvernus in Paris clearly observed struggles of both groups about the year 1240 and analyzed their gigantomachy in his works. The eclipse of the first substance grew to the same extent as grew the lack of understanding that concerned the original interpretation of astronomical solar eclipse done in *Second Analytics*. On the contrary, the definition of the triangle given through mathematical abstraction was more and more compelling. The transformation of metaphysics created a kind of objectively synthesized and fully evident knowledge (*scibile*). This simulacrum of the first substance came to being in the act of self-reflection when the modern intellect illuminated itself. The founding of new metaphysics changed the hiddenness of being that inaugurated Plato′s parable of the cave (*Seinsverlassenheit*). It came to an eclipse of the first substance that was made as a deliberate choice of Latin sophists (*Seinsvergessenheit*). This metaphysical choice of the first science, set against Aristotle and against the Commentator, determined the first wave of modernity that emerged at Oxford and Paris in the years 1235–40. The consequences of this fundamental choice of *Modernorum* shaped the history of postmodernism since the 17th century and the contemporary metaphysical nihilism as well. Rufus’s attempts to create an objective predication and knowledge of the world in the work *Speculum animae* ended with his departure from Paris (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). The next generation of modernists had to create a categorical predication for being of the third kind.

Again, one must reach back to fundamental phenomenological distinction that investigates “how” the objective phenomenon is given when it enters the field of revelation (SZ 27). The triadic structure of historiality, historicity a history is actualized in the triadic structure of understanding. The triadic sense of being revealed by Heidegger is given in the hermeneutics of facticity (GA 60). The objective sense of being (*Gehaltsinn*) depends on the twofold approach to the world characterized by Paul’s admonition in the *First Letter to Corinthians* (*1* *Cor* 7:29–31). Those who enjoy the things of this world should live as if they did not enjoy them. This twofold reference to the world (*Bezugssinn*) in the mode of self-forgetful existence (*Man*) that of alert existence (*Dasein*) is based on eschatological presence of archaic truth. Paul explains to Christians in the mode of the archegetic dative how to live in the times of the approaching end of this epoch (*Vollzugssinn*). The aforementioned triangle of hermeneutic sense of history represents the basic discovery of the new hermeneutics that was established as a new intentional understanding of the world. We find it for the first time in the lectures of the winter semester 1919/20, in the passage devoted to “interpretative understanding” (GA 58, 261). The resulting formulation of triadic understanding is given in full at the beginning of *Sein und Zeit*.[[3]](#footnote-3) From the point of view of musical understanding of historiality, it is true that original being of Being through the mysterious, musical and tragic sense of historiality (*Vollzugsinn, Erfragtes*) is given in the history of thinking in two figures that established the historial manifestation of metaphysics *Bezugsinn, Befragtes*). Objectivity examines only the ontic phenomenon of objectivity, which, moreover, is burdened with all the previous errors and wanderings of modernity (*Gehaltsinn, Gefragtes*). The distinction between the metaphysics of Averroes and Avicenna was laid out in the first part of essay by twofold donation of being done in the mode outlined by Heidegger. In the history of Latin scholasticism, the truth has been given a double manner: in an authentic way in Aristotelianism and in a mythological way in modernity. The exercise of dual historical understanding given with respect to substance gave rise to the school of the first and second Averroism. The representatives of the one and the other school then produced a dual conception of the truth as *veritas* that was established on the basis of twofold interpretation of *Second Analytics*. Either it was done in the mode of Aristotelian truth as *adaequatio* when the second substance is exposed face to face through the imposition of specific meaning. Or it was done by the exposition of meaning established due to the logical supposition made from behind, by using the modern truth as *coaequatio* (Rufus). Given that case, the metaphysics of *tertium ens* arises as a mixture of the first and the second substance (*Gehaltsinn*). The transition of objectivity into the full form of epochal revelation in the false mode of *veritas* was secured by academic *illuminati* as was Rufus and his modernist school that Bonaventure and Pecham established in Paris. The truth of new metaphysics is absolute because logical abstraction is not bound to reality and to causality of first substances. The positively reportable doctrine in the mode of the objective fallacy (*Irrtum*) represents the historical *factum* revealed by hermeneutic investigation of ontological historicity (*Geschichte*) of metaphysics (*Beginn*) that started the ontic history of objectivity (*Historie*). The change of truth in the history of metaphysics gave rise to the historical problem of the so-called double truth, which was fully manifested in controversies in the University of Paris during the years 1270–77. By gradually laying out the threefold form of understanding (*Vollzugsinn, Bezugsinn, Gehaltsinn*) in the hermeneutic triangle of historiality, historicity and history, the threefold structure of hermeneutic understanding is outlined that forms the phenomenon of objectivity. Hermeneutics must investigate the vision of the objective world created by *via Modernorum*. Modernists are illuminated by the solar intellect that shines in mind of academic *illuminati*. They came out of the Platonic cave since the arrival of the Neoplatonism. This objective worldview instigated a new donation of being that established the history of philosophical thought of first *Modernorum* in the historial mode of *alētheia*. This objectively hidden historicity, which is given at the level of ontology, determines the ontic history of modernity. The second volume examined the history of philosophy, which is built on transformation of the truth. Aristotelian theory of the truth, later made as correspondence between reality and reason “*ad mentem Averrois*,” has been transformed into a positively determined *veritas*. The donation of objectively composed essence decisively transformed the metaphysical concept of being. The new position of truth and untruth (*Lichtung*) in modern metaphysics is established by transition from the metaphysical to the objective dative. Modernity carries out the assimilation (*colligatio, collecta*) of all conceivable entities. Truth, as a mythical assimilation, runs within objectively determined correspondence of thinking and the essentially determined being (*Ge-Stell*). The being of the third kind is positioned before the demiurgic subject to be an object created by him. Bacon therefore declared Rufus, the philosophical founder of modernity, a mad thinker. The thinking of metaphysicians like Rufus recognized the new donation of being in the form of essence. These modernists necessarily had to change the system of categorical statements about the second substance, because they abolished the concept of Aristotelian truth as an *adaequatio*. Since Rufus, the predication between different types of essences received a new form of correspondence within the truth as *coaequatio*.

Following the order of newly established being, modernity responded to classical categorization of the Latin dative. It was a grammatical category that Priscianus exactly defined (OBJ II, ch. 1.1). This hermeneutic dative, designated by the term “*dativus obiectivus*,” refers to the presence of being in a new historial form of concealment and non-concealment of metaphysical substance (*alētheia*). Greek and Latin grammar express the act of donation by the dative case (δοτικὴ πτῶσις, *casus dativus*). In the classical work dedicated to the art of true speech, Dionysios Thrax denotes the term “dative” as a sending of the letter to an addressee (δοτικὴ ἐπισταλτική, *Ars Grammatica* 1.31.7). The musical form of the epistolary dative leads the hermeneutic interpretation of objectivity. The original sense of objectivity finds expression through the epistolary dative. It refers to the archaic donation of meaning from the direction of the letter sender that remains forever hidden. This concealment of the original fullness of being is contained in the musical and tragic conception of the truth, and it is expressed semantically. The modern subject became the new addressee of the original form of truth that he rejected and distorted in a tragicomic way. Hermeneutics follow the path of this *translatio studiorum* in Western thought. The new categorization investigates the event of the donation that put in reality the objective being in the mode of *dativus obiectivus*. This donation establishes the modern forms of metaphysics. The absent Being, whose truth and untruth is administered by Muses (*Theog*. 27), changes the hidden historicity into the unconcealed history. It sends a tragic and Pythian letter “towards” (δοτικὴ ἐπισταλτική, *casus dativus*) the wise mortals. Last receivers that understood it well were the writers of Greek tragedies. History of *Modernorum* can be explained as a historical succession that connects various forms of the objective dative. These nihilistic forms of modernity must be interpreted in an archaic way that refers to the founding event of *dativus archegeticus*. The archegetic dative in the musical sense of *casus dativus* is present as a sign in Homer′s work. Hermeneutic archaeology must make the right choice for the construction of the new House of Wisdom in order to collect suitable stones (αἱμασιάς τε λέγων, *Odys*. 18.359). That archaic selection of signs (λέγειν) must be clarified according to Heidegger′s term “*Lese*.” [[4]](#footnote-4) The collection of musical truth and untruth is determined by apophantic categorization. In the epoch of accomplished sophistry, archaic hermeneutics returns to the original grammatical signification and categorization of the dative in its basic casuistry. The grammatical categorization is determined by hyparchical form of being, which has been manifested as an objective “*ens*”since 1250. The hermeneutics of objectivity, by returning to the beginning of meaningful speech in the grammatical mode, provides a new table of categories according to musical form of predication. The structure of Heidegger’s existentials in the work *Sein und Zeit* can help to expose the historical unconcealment of objectivity in its truth as *alētheia*. The new table of categories provides a hermeneutic interpretation of the historial way that indicates a fundamental “how” the metaphysical being can be read (λέγειν) through the predicative structure of the objective dative. The categorization of the objective being follows the classical grammatical meanings of Latin dative case. Hermeneutics according to Heidegger must investigate the phenomenological “How” of phenomena in the mode of *Bezugssinn* and *Vollzugsssinn*. The objective donation concerning the modern essence is determined by the grammatical dative (δοτικὴ πτῶσις, *casus dativus*). Taken into account of linguistic structure, the following categorical phenomena must be saved, with help of following questions.

* How does the metaphysical being become the objective *ens* (*dativus possessivus*)?
* How does the subject bring the objective being into the unconcealment as *veritas* of the first and the second Averroism (*dativus auctoris*)?
* How does the ontotheological structure form objective being in relation to modern God as the Giver of forms (*dativus finalis*)?
* How does the objective being become a universal measure of all things (*dativus mensurae*)?
* How does the objective metaphysics resolve or cancel disputes of previous generations of the first and second Averroism (*dativus incommodi*)?
* How does the objectively define being become an instrument of modern science and technology (*dativus instrumenti*)?
* How does the objective being create the capitalist worldview of modernity (*dativus modi*)?
* How does objectively conceive knowledge destroy the mankind and the Earth in the world wars through blind instrumental rationality, nihilism of technology and vulgar economism of contemporary corporate fascism (*dativus ethicus*)?

The collection of historical truth and untruth (λέγειν, *Lese*) is given in a twofold phenomenological way, as the act of understanding proceeds in the mode of sense of reference (*Bezugssinn*). The new, archaically given categorization is thus completely separated from the objective assimilation (*colligatio*) of non-existent entities of the third kind. The interpretation completely ignores the enumeration of ontic properties that characterize the objective being (“what” is given, *Gehaltsinn*). The more important is the way “how” the essence comes to its being and “how” it must be read (λέγειν) through the table of categories determined by grammatical forms of the objective dative. We must examine the historial manner in which new essence has been built into the cornerstone of modern House of Madness (αἱμασιάς τε λέγων). Its original, wise form was established by Homer through a correct interpretation of divine signs. Hermeneutic archaeology traces *Wirkungsgeschichte* of the metaphysical dative; therefore it has to follow the categorization of the objective dative according to Aristotle’s metaphysics (OBJ I, ch. 1.2). The history of Latin scholasticism proves the fundamental difference between the classical *paideía* of the school of the first Averroism and the modern *apaideusía* of the school of the second Averroism. Modernism introduced a whole series of beings of the third kind, thereby abolishing the validity of Aristotelian principle of the Excluded Third. The new difference is given after the start of *via Modernorum* by the battle between *paideía* of classical Aristotelian philosophy and modern analytical and nihilistic *apaideusía* in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The historicity hidden in categories of the objective dative determines the history of objectivity in the mode of a musical, tragic and Aristotelian accusation (κατηγορία).

The writing *Categories* played a crucial role in relation to Neoplatonism and to schools of *sophistae Latini*. Therefore, the interpretation of objective donation of being (*dativus possessivus*) is of paramount importance. Categorical interpretation must proceed from the primary position of the second substance, which contains the last generic unity of being. The possessive dative of the modern subject replaced the metaphysical dative of Aristotle, which determines *quidditas* of the second substance. In the age of tragicomedy of reason, modernity created a historically effective simulacrum of Aristotelian metaphysical dative in the mode of new *quidditas*. The act of appropriating and transferring the existing being (*ens*) in virtue of Being (Heidegger’s *Er-eignen*) is determined by the above-mentioned grammatical categories. The objectivity thus manifested, it has two forms of metaphysical statements that are given by the dual nature of universals (*Anal. Post*. 84a12). The universals are laid out in the first or second Averroism in two different ways (*Bezugsinn*). The production of thought in two schools of metaphysics gives the resulting form of positive and objective historical truth. It is explored in the understanding given “*de fine*” (*Vor-blickbahn*) given as present nihilism of modern metaphysics (*Gehaltsinn*). The commonly and mythically understood essence of modernity is thus analyzed methodologically correctly, i.e. as the last and definitive phenomenon of the exegesis. The sense given by objective confusion of assimilating modernity (*Gehaltsinn*) is interpreted as the resulting achievement of accomplished historial sense of metaphysical being (*Vollzussinn*). The fourth and fifth matrices will show the way how metaphysical potential of the objective dative was gradually realized. The enumeration of categories made in the mode of musical accusations of modernity shows that Rufus′s metaphysical innovations and the emergence of scientific forms of Oxfordian Fallacy in Kilwardby′s work did not by themselves launch global effectiveness of modernity. Without the coercion of mundane power, there would be no introduction of objectivity as the dominant worldview, which was first spread in church academic circles. Under the influence of modern, Catholic and objectively (καθόλου) educated Furies, the gnostic *illuminati* objectively hold their truth in an absolute manner. Knowledge of the whole world is given in the mode of certainty (*certitudo*) and proof as sovereign correctness (*rectitudo*) in the mode of an onto-theological truth as “*summa veritas*.” Therefore, the modern subject must protect this assimilative form of metaphysical fallacy through the power in the first place. Modern knowledge has become a global power, because it is not metaphysically true as the correspondence of reality and intellect. The protection of truth cannot be exercised by modern *illuminati* in virtue of the power of thinking according to metaphysical wisdom of philosophers as Aristotle and the Commentator. They sought the truth through metaphysical dative. Albert and Bacon spent their lives interpreting Aristotelianism “*ad mentem Averrois*” against modernists. Learned *sophistae* *Latini*, according to Albert, have no scientific conception of truth (*scientiam veritatis nec ostendunt*) and do not state the causality of real things (*nec verbis propriis attingunt*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Academic modernism, and especially postmodernism, is guided by irrational instinct of self-preservation in order to protect the irrationally given objective truths (Spinozas *conatus*, ch. 4.1.1). Modernity must adhere to irrational interpretations of the world and the person given by Oxfordian fallacy. The modern person divides into several schizophrenic substances and perceives reality in a paranoid scheme of cognition. From the point of view of Aristotelian theory of truth, the new way of being was completely absurd, and so was the modern concept of truth. The appropriation of the world by contemporary *dativus possessivus* means the imperative of collecting and manipulating in databases all *tertium ens* available that are produced by the nihilistic subject. The postmodern truth is brought to an end as assimilation, and so is the world. Instead of the real world, its digital simulacrum will prevail. If nihilistic Furies in the sociopathic form of the one per mille really succeed in bringing contemporary nihilism to a victorious end, then no concrete and internally divided *individuum* would even realize that the real world has ceased to exist.

After the fall of the first substance into the epochal Lethe of metaphysics, only the modern subject establishes the truth. It is therefore necessary to discover how the modern subject introduced a new being of the third kind into the objective Averroism (*dativus auctoris*). By virtue of objective Oedipus complex, the modern subject determines all existence and knowledge; therefore he must at all costs adhere to the modern theory of truth as assimilation. Otherwise, his objective vision of the world would perish, which is contained in the original Porretan mode “*discrete videamus*” (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). This paranoid knowledge produces global power of the West according to the postmodern winged and utterly Pythian motto “*scientia potentia est*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.5). Aristotle and his school knew well that potentiality of knowledge is not actualized reality of the world. Hermeneutics recall the replacement of the original Aristotelian potentiality by a new form of global blind power. Because of modern will to power, the subject declared himself to be the first substance par excellence (*Ge-Stell*). Philosophy was transformed by Anselm into a Neoplatonic ontotheology, which was linked to deontological form of dogmatically given Unified Science. This modern knowledge was passed on via the school system of education (*ratio studiorum*). This new type of education is explained by Heidegger’s “*Bildung*” in reference to the Greek term “παιδεία” (OBJ I, ch. 1). Modernity needed power structures to secure the modern truth claim that the first Latin sophists raised against Abelard (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). By exploring *dativus obiectivus* the hermeneutics will show the constitution and course of the second round of the dispute over so-called double truth. Philosophy ceased to be true in the sense of Averroes’s “*proportio*” and became the rightness in the sense of Anselm’s “*rectitudo*.” The question of truth has been changed into a question of power that determines the deontological (and nowadays only ideological) imperative. The imperative metaphysical will in Anselm’s mode “*debet esse*” prevailed over the classical conception of truth as the correspondence of reality and the intellect, which the first Averroism promoted. The universal equality (*coaequatio* of Rufus) is given exclusively in the subject and results from its sovereign right to create the unified sense of being out of its own rightness. The introduction of matter of the third kind (Avicebron) and the creation of intellect as a hylemorphic substance of the third kind made the intervention of power and ideology in philosophy a *conditio sina qua non*. If there are no new clothes for the emperor, then critical thinkers must at least be silenced, for example through an invented argument about Averroism. And silencing of reason must last as long as it takes for the naked emperor of the modernists to get a new suit. Duns Scotus fulfilled this tailoring order of the intellectually naked *Modernorum* by establishing a new metaphysic at the beginning of the 14th century. The power struggle over Averroism was historically unavoidable because it established the epochal effectiveness of objective sophistry. The decisions of ecclesiastical and academic institutions helped to establish a specific form of objective thinking in the mode of epochal error called *via Modernorum*. In this way, the objective history of the Latin West emerged in the mode of epochal error. The hermeneutic predication of categories resulting from full forms of the grammatical dative shows the full sense of the objective dative. The modern will to know and the will to power go hand in hand. The Latin West has bravely borne this paranoid burden of modern science and the power of schizophrenic “White Man’s Burden” for centuries. At first he understood his historical “*conatus*” as the eschatological task of modern scholastic; later as the colonizing task of the white man. Through the power of imperialist reason and demiurgic industrial will, this *illuminatus* tames or destroys the respective demons in the colonies (*half-devil and half-child*; OBJ II, ch. 3.5). Today, under the leadership of neoliberal Furies, a similar system of paranoid thinking makes use of so-called terrorism. The imperial West has contributed to the creation of these ideologically controlled Furies in the former colonies and also manipulates them for its own needs. Hermeneutic archaeology traces the hidden path by which the historically effective form of objective being has emerged. This forms the methodological basis for the construction of the new House of Wisdom. In the end times of mankind (*novissimum*), wisdom should be sought after the model of this no longer existing institution in Baghdad (*Bajt al-Hikma*, OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). We need to replace the modern subject, who is a nihilistic giver of meaning, with a wisdom-based *dativus auctoris*. Building a common House of Wisdom is a very real activity, not the assimilation of virtual stupidities. It must be created according to Homer’s and Dante’s *poiésis* led by Muses, and not as objective modern mythology led by rabid Furies in subjective clothing.

## 4.1 Ontotheological Structure of Objectivity (Bonaventure by Bagnoreggio)

With regard to categorical predication according to the objective dative, the Franciscan Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio (Giovanni di Fidanza, †1274) played a key role in various aspects. This charismatic scholar, Catholic saint and church organizer influenced in a principled way the emergence of modern objectivity. He founded a capitalist worldview given as a new insight into the wholeness of being (*dativus modi*). Hermeneutics must interpret basic principles of objective metaphysics that this main representative of the second Averroism worked out at the University of Paris. His thinking became the objective capital of Western civilization in the mode of *felix culpa*. The eloquent and self-confident organizer of academic and church life took over the universal hylemorphism of the Oxford school and introduced officially the thinking according to Oxfordian Fallacy in the University of Paris. He was inspired by Rufus and Kilwardby. They completed their master’s studies in Paris at the same time when Bonaventure started his studies of philosophy (1236). He entered the Order of the Lesser Brothers in 1243 and became a magister in 1248. Philosophical and theological modernists were gathered in Paris to edit *Summa Halensis* under Bonaventure. That school has some common features, which are described in the contemporary studies devoted to the philosophical schools of that time.[[5]](#footnote-5) Hermeneutics must resolve the question of “how” the thinking of *Modernorum* corresponds to the categories of *dativus obiectivus* mentioned above. Bonaventure plays a major role in the development of objectivity for three fundamental reasons: he outlined a new substance of the third kind; he introduced a new kind of modern subject and he created the complete structure of objective ontotheology. Three points are particularly important for the interpretation of objectivity: Bonaventure’s concept of *species*, his theological hylemorphism of objective matter and form; the overall structure of his innovative metaphysics. Bonaventure incorporated the universal hylemorphism into theological and mystical predication made “*ad unum*”. That new version of Christian Neoplatonism established a new unity of being that was made according to Aristotelianism based on Oxfordian Fallacy. The theoretical basis of his school of the second Averroism is given in Bonaventure’s commentary on Sentences (*Commentaria in quatuor libros Sentantiarum*, 1248–55). *Doctor seraphicus* published a lot of pedagogical and theological writings, the most famous of which is the work *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* (1259). He concluded the polemic with the first Averroism in the series of Parisian sermons professed in February and March of the year 1268 that were summed up in his work *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti*. The deeds and thoughts of Bonaventure as a *regens* of Franciscan studies, a preacher, mystic, general of Franciscan order and Catholic saint founded the entire school of thinkers professing the second Averroism.

The offensive of modernists began in Paris right after the death of bishop Alvernus. The second Averroism abolished in the predication *per prius* classical categorical determinations according to the existing substance, as Aristotle and Averroes handled it. The starting point of the new metaphysics was the determination of the essence and form taken from Avicenna. The new school of second Averroism integrated to Avicenna′s metaphysics original version of Aristotle’s scheme “act—potency” that was based on hylemorphic substance of the third kind. Avicenna changed the concept of “*aliud esse*” made by Alfarabi into a first form of objective *ens* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The creation of new *tertium ens* based on the generic form of being (*hoc esse tantum*) elaborated the first case of objective *dativus possessivus*, which the Latin West took over. In his ontotheological metaphysics, Bonaventure created the first form of effective *dativus possessivus* that was based on Rufus’s term “*species obiecti exsistentis*.” The previous matrix interpreted the first round of the dispute of Modernists and Aristotelians of the first Averroism that took place during the years 1225–45. Modernists lost the first round of gigantomachy in Paris, Rufus with Kilwardby retired to their academic positions at Oxford. Probably in the same year, Rufus published in Paris the unsuccessful defense of modernist theses in the work *Speculum animae*. Kilwardby went back to Oxford after Albert’s intervention against the school of second Averroism, published in the work *De homine*. At the same time, Bonaventure followed the moderate Neoplatonism of Philip the Chancellor and founded the first school of second Averroism in Paris. After the departure of Alexander von Hales (†1245), those modernists established the editorial board in order to finish the edition of *Summa Halensis*. Let’s summarize the approach of the new generation of the school of second Averroism in basic points. So called *sophistae Latini* came after the year 1235 from Oxford to Paris to finish their studies. In the school of Philip the Chancellor they learned the new form of Avicennism. They were above all interested in methodical proceeding of metaphysical *resolutio* that established the predication of highest genres of being. The first and most important element of new metaphysics was the interoperability of highest amphibolia described by Philip (*ens, unum bonum*). The most important was the fact that the simple being of Avicenna was distinguished in the highest genera that cannot be further divided (*individuum*). Amphibolic predication of Philip’s transcendentalia was done in the mode “*in primis*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). The highest class of amphibolic individuals were introduced into the universe of Oxfordian Fallacy by receiving the objective determination made by universal hylemorphism. This kind of predication was transferred to the terminus “*concretum*” elaborated by Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Transcendental determinations of being (Philip the Chancellor) as the objective causality of *res* as modern *concretum* (Rufus) merged into a new figure of being of the third kind (Bonaventure). Hermeneutics must follow a whole series of centuries-old errors (*Irrtum*), which eventually established the modern metaphysics of Bonaventure as a very peculiar kind of mythological narrative (*Irre*). The univocal predication of transcendentals caused these objective modes of being to be transferable to each other within the framework of the last stage of *resolutio* (OBJ II, ch. 2.3). Rufus took over these modern achievements of *Nominales* that were in decline. These schools were explained by using the example of work *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*. Rufus used the numerical unit for the predication “*ad unum*” and took the number as an individual being of the third kind (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Porretans in Oxford combined the exposure of being from behind with the commentary on *Categories* that was done by Johannes Pagus and Nicolas of Paris (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). The predication of essences and species is given in the new system of categories with regard to modern *individuum*. Neoplatonic atomic substance replaced the Aristotelian second substance. Modernists began to state the individual and its hypostatic predicates in the form of appositions, that is, as Avicennist comitation. The modern exegesis of the work *Categories* was well known in Paris and it was connected with the teaching of transcendentals in the school of Philip the Chancellor. The universal concept of a substance of the third kind (*hoc aliquid*) was thus extended to a whole range of completely arbitrary determinations of being. This caused a number of interpretative problems for the group of Latin sophists, and they were labeled to be mad thinkers. The basic philosophical concepts no longer had the same content in both schools, which, among other things, also led to a major crisis of theology (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). After the spread of universal hylemorphism from Oxford to Paris, some of the differences between the two schools could no longer be resolved in any other way than through some external authority. Nietzsche would say that modernity solves philosophy with a real hammer, like a witch′s hammer. Following Rufus, Bonaventure made use of modern *resolutio* that contradicted the classic interpretation of universals made by Aristotle and Averroes that took them only in mind. For the validity of the truth, the new form of deduction does not require an imposition of meaning from the existence of first substances, but only a hypostatized essence, which is given by logical (Rufus) and ontotheological (Bonaventure) supposition. Let us summarize the most important changes in Bonaventure′s school of second Averroism, in relation to three first categories of the objective dative. They created a new architecture of the Avicennist metaphysics of “being as being” (*ens inquantum ens*). The pure being of Avicenna in the form of the transcendental genre was transformed into a new kind of metaphysical being. This pseudo-Aristotelian individual took over the generic beingness of Avicenna to become a kind of objective *ens* (*dativus possessivus*). Then, illuminati of Paris had to create an objective form of *intellectus possibilis* in order to recognize their own objective invention of the third kind. *Suum cuique*. The activity of new *intellectus possibilis* created an individual simulacrum of the first substance, which was placed in the ontotheological framework of a truth as objective *veritas*. Bonaventure then placed this substance of the third kind in a demiurgic, philosophically and theologically given predication “*in artificialibus*.” As a result, the modern Western subject brought the objective world created *ex nihilo* into Christian academic mythology as “*summa veritas*” of the second Averroism (*dativus auctoris*). The last innovation concerns *dativus finalis*. The above-mentioned ontotheological structure of Christian Scientology forms the sphere of objective being, which receives an *ultima ratio* in relation to modern God as the Giver of forms (*Dator formarum*). By accomplishing that project, Bonaventure and his successors founded the Christian diacosmos of Western metaphysics. The new realm of Christian Neoplatonists was divided into two floors, according to the activity of the supernatural creator and his diligent natural demiurge. It has become the first empire of mystical modernists; the second empire was built as imperial colonies in the era of capitalism; the *Drittes Reich* of Nazism was destroyed in the Second World War. The fourth *Reich* of neo-Nazis *illuminati* is being formed right now, in the times of metaphysical nihilism and proxy-wars. The succession of schools solves the question how the objective metaphysics canceled disputes of previous generations of modernists (*dativus incommodi*). Knowledge based on mythological creativity given as a self-preserving *conatus* of modernity, moreover driven by totally subjective Furies, it constitutes an objectively insane power.

The group of modernists *sui generis* that edited the work *Summa Halensis* under Bonaventure’s leadership about the year 1245, had all basic building blocks available in order to found a new metaphysics. The school of the second Averroism opened its work under Philip the Chancellor and created a system of ontotheology, which was based on the Neoplatonic syncretism of the Toledo school. Bishop Alvernus condemned this school in his criticism of so-called “*sequaces Aristotelis.*” The univocal predication of transcendentals by using the Neoplatonic amphibolia was introduced into Western philosophy by Alfarabi (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1) and Avicenna took it over after the Second Master. That kind of “higher” metaphysics presupposes the illumination of intellect made from behind, from the direction of hypostatized forms and *exemplars*. The school of *Nominales* shifted metaphysics into the field of notions as “*mensura*” and “*numerus*” that are determined by mathematical abstraction. The abolition of metaphysical abstraction done by the imposition was a fatal step. Modernists were unable to distinguish between the action of real substances and general determinations of the second substance. The mathematical and geometric qualities (*numerus, quantitas, extensio*) began to play the role of new amphibolic entities according to Avicenna translated into Porretan schools (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). Bonaventure’s role in the establishment of objectivity was indispensable. Academic *illuminati* in his “school” (that is, the editorial group) were the first modernists in the years 1245–50 at the University of Paris. This school of the newly formed *sophistae Latini* held up the flag of the second Averroism as the only one in Paris. After the death of bishop Alvernus, an insurmountable difference arose between the first and the second Averroism in the question of abstraction, species, soul and intellect. Bonaventure’s school of the second Averroism languished in those cruel years at the University of Paris, which was dominated by masters of the school of the first Averroism. The modern *illuminati* were considered philosophical fools. They had before eyes a terrible example of Rufus’s work *Speculum animae*. The founder of modernism was not able to defend his bizarre ideas. He had to leave Paris made “*ad mentem Averrois*” to return to the bastion made “*ad mentem* Oxfordian Fallacy.” The tragicomedy of Western objectivity has been instigated by academic Furies ever since. In the years 1245–50 the group of mendicants around Kilwardby and Bonaventure could have found a new interpretation of metaphysics done “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to the Sicilian school. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The five-year period of academic secrecy of the second Averroism decided the fate of the Latin West. After the death of bishop Alvernus, academic *illuminati* and Latins sophists launched an attack against “heretic Averroes” in Paris. They founded modernism on a biblical basis as a new mythology of *Modernorum*, which later became the objective metaphysics. This version of objectivity forms contemporary itinerary of the Latin West in various secular forms. At the same time, this mythological form of metaphysics was already definitely excluded from Islam, because it led to the death of God in modern thought. The mystic and saint Bonaventure played a key role in the tragicomedy of Muses, as he led modern God to his postmodern execution actualized.

### 4.1.1 Emergence of Ontotheological Metaphysics

Let’s start with Bonaventure’s interpretation of cognition, because it sets out a new way in which objectivity has come to its founding dative (*dativus possessivus*). The new deduction of science is carried out on the basis of enlightened thinking in the framework of the truth as *rectitudo*. The *illuminatus* looks into the creative rule of the Creator, and then applies it in the thinking of the secondary demiurge. The term “*intellectus resolvens*” keeps the insight into the being through the connection of different forms of *resolutio*. The following passage contains the core of Bonaventure’s trinitarian metaphysics that was transmitted in the exegesis of his students (*Dubium I*). The school of Bonaventure found modern *Lichtung* of the being in its objective truth and untruth. Let us comment on *Wirkungsgeschichte* of modernity that started by this quotation.

“Furthermore, it is possible to understand things through something else, namely through the direct intuition of intellect (*intellectu resolvente*). This intellect considers what is essential in the thing (*rei essentialia*) and can also comprehend the subject outside of its real effect (*subiectum sine propria passione*). This can be done in two ways: either by fully contemplating intellect (*intellectu resolvente plene et perfecte*) or by partially contemplating weak intellect (*intellectu deficiente et resolvente semiplene*). Imperfect consideration of the weak intellect conceives the being as a general entity (*aliquid*), but never in its primary form of being (*non intellecto primo ente*). Fully contemplative intellect comprehends each being by starting on the level of the first determination of the being.“ [[6]](#footnote-6)

The metaphysical architecture of being is divided into two basic categories of the intellect. The first type recognizes the world by abstraction of real things (*ad intellectum apprehendentem*); the second type keeps full insight into the essences of things (*ad intellectum resolventem*). The quotation first describes the lower form of the passive intellect (*intellectus apprehendens*) that carries out the first form of cognition. This is the first form of science as Grosseteste′s and Rufus’s empirical *scientia*. It is given by the imposition of the meaning coming from sensually recognized first substances (*resolutio naturalis*). The first kind of abstraction is tied to the recognition of material substances and their effects (*non potest intelligi aliquid sine aliquo*). Taken this empirical nature of species, the essence is not considered directly. The middle link of the syllogism operates in the framework of the second substance. It states univocally external causal effects of first substances in reality (*intelligi effectus*). The first level of abstraction (*primo modo*) situated at the level of *intellectus apprehendens* forms meaning of being in the manner of the already interpreted *Second analytics* and according to the first Averroism made by Albert (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.1) or according to Grossetestes′s version of *scientia* (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). But the quoted *resolutio naturalis* comprehends Aristotle’s *demonstratio* only on the lower level of cognition, in the framework of secondary causality exercised by first substances. Parisian propagators of Rufus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy must take up the second phase of abstraction that abolishes the imposition of meaning from real things. Empirically based cognition is imperfect, since it recognizes abstraction only from real and therefore changeable hylemorphic substances. The natural cognition of contingent beings lacks the direct insight into the primary cause recognized in its eternal essence. The first conception of abstraction corresponds to Aristotle; but the second floor of a worldview made by modern *illuminati* already represents Avicenna’s and Grosseteste′s direct insight into essences (*intellectus resolvens*).

The school of *illuminati* observes the world on the basis of Avicenna′s denudation, i.e. as being separated (*absolute*) from Aristotelian abstraction. Sensual abstraction within the framework of *resolutio naturalis* having been done, it comes to direct intuition of essences that follows in two stages. Bonaventure adopts the Oxford concept of intellect that provides direct insight into Porretan essences (*intellectus considerat ea quae sunt rei essentialia*). Bonaventure created a new type of contemplative intellect (*intellectus resolvens*), in which a new vision of the wholeness of being arises in two stages of metaphysical abstraction (*resolutio semiplena, plena*). The quotation comprehends the first stage of this intellect in accordance with Avicenna at the metaphysical stage of abstraction (*intellectus resolvens semiplene*). Objective determination of the essence begins at this level, since enlightened mystical thinking considers categorical determinations of the second substance, free of empirical effects of the first substance (*subiectum sine propria passione*). Main difference from the first Averroism is the fact that this illumination of being comes from behind since the logical and mystical supposition of essences can alone determine the first stage of essential vision. Bonaventure′s *resolutio* does not need the Aristotelian abstraction and the imposition, therefore is absolutely modern. Bonaventure is not inspecting an Aristotelian second substance, but an Avicennian essence. Bacon from the school of first Averroism saw exactly the fundamental error of *sophistate Latini*. Rufus founded that school at Oxford and Bonaventure took it over to Paris. Their intellect directly reflects fundamental determinations of the essence according to Avicenna, but pretends to elaborate categorical determinations of the second substance according to Aristotle. In the tragicomedy of reason staged by Muses, the objective two-headed thinkers of all times see the same “*aliquid esse*” as a mythological *tertium ens* (*Gehaltssinn*). Archaic hermeneutics must follow the truth as *alētheia*; therefore, it must rescue two fundamentally different phenomena in the mode of reference (*Bezugssinn*). Modern kind of metaphysical *Irrtum* corresponds to the vision of simple categorical forms that can be directly considered in real things in the sense of Avicenna’s *equinitas tantum*. At the next level of *resolutio plena*, mystically enlightened intellect as Avicenna’s *intellectus sanctus* considers those cosmological powers that Dionysius the Areopagite mentioned as last level of *resolutio* that reaches the One. This level of a mystical understanding works with metaphysical cognition that operates on determinations of being in Avicenna’s mode *ens inquantum ens*. Such intellectually formed mystic directly considers the first principles of existence (*intellecto primo ente*). Now the school of Phillips the Chancellor has its say. This view separates the highest genera of being from the preceding stage of only halfway enlightened insight. That weak intellect goes to the recognition of pure forms through the abstraction of essences from real things. The highest level of the contemplative intellect already contemplates the qualities of being at the level of full unity, which excludes the lower forms of abstraction and secondary causal effects (*intellectus resolvens plene et perfecte*). The mystic looks over God’s shoulder towards creation from the highest level of *resolutio*. Seated in this privileged position, the modernist can perform mystical *deductio* by bringing objective entities out of their original unity in God as the Giver of objectively intended forms. Duns Scotus presented the full form of that objective deduction, as in his times the modernist emperor was already half-naked in his new clothes.

Bonaventure’s interpretation of Aristotle shows the exposure of being from behind, through the mystical insight of active intellect (*secundum supremam aciem intellectus agentis*).[[7]](#footnote-7) The contingent cognition of causality at the level of first substances does not have a sufficient measure of universality to see the cause in its hypostatized form of divine exemplars (*non intellecta causa*). Thanks to illumination, the modernist becomes a real metaphysician and mystic, because he recognizes all beings on the basis of unity given at the level of eternal principles and the first forms. It is a typical paradigm of the Toledo school according to Avicenna that carries out a syncretism of Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. The reduction of the principle “*ex inmediatis*” forms the basis of Oxfordian Fallacy that was analyzed in the third matrix (Grosseteste, Rufus, Kilwardby). Bonaventure takes over their interpretation of the middle link of the deductive syllogism. Modern form of scientific proof makes direct insight into the essence operating in the causal mode. Rufus’ analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* comprehends the causality as a universal essence. It is in principle separated from the lower cognition of first substances (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). Bonaventure put at the first stage of cognition only contingent similarity (*similitudo*) with the divine exemplaria as the terminus “*directio naturalis*” indicates. As to reality of hylemorphic substances, modernism need them as a mere “*directio*” of thinking. The first Averroism of Blund′s school based cognition on causal determinations as only mean to ensure full correspondence of reality and intellect. The schema of cognition runs through actualization via *species sensibilis* and corresponding twofold intentionality of cognition. This is given first in the senses and then in the intellect (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.2). Both views of the truth are fundamentally incompatible. The truth as Rufus’s *coaequatio* cannot be realized in virtue of basic form of abstraction at the first stage of *resolutio*, because that level is determined by sensual cognition. Bonaventure defines the twofold concept of abstraction. The first is based on Aristotelian abstraction (*a natura rei*); the second makes the higher level of Avicennian denudation (*ab intellectu nostro*).[[8]](#footnote-8) The quotation states that the thing is defined on the basis of twofold sense of being (*sub duplici ratione*). The subsistence done in the mode “*sub quo*” refers to being of an autonomous “form—essence” that is directly reflected. Architecture of the lower and higher truth is given according to Avicenna′s *denudatio*. The first Averroism rejected this procedure because it does not entail full deduction necessary for scientific knowledge of reality. Denudation goes only to the formal definition of essences as is the case of a triangle. The univocal scientific proof must be based on causality that is active at the level of hyparchical substance. Bonaventure adopts Grosseteste’s theory of weak intellect (*intellectus debilis*) based on empirical cognition of real things and sensual abstraction (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Mystical intellect of *Modernorum* runs direct to essences and needs real things only incidentally.

The double floor of intuition, abstraction and cognition of the world (*resolutio*) shows that cognition expressed by the term “*intellectio*” cannot be the same for the first and the second Averroism. In the second Averroism, this term denotes Neoplatonic denudation. The first Averroism strictly rejected denudation for the definition of truth as correspondence. Modern theory of truth is not determined by the imposition from first substances; it creates but a similarity or analogous unity of cognition. Hermeneutics fully agree with Rohmer’s conclusion concerning the process of abstraction outlined by first Franciscan magisters (Rupella, Bonaventure).[[9]](#footnote-9) Bonaventure prefers direct vision of essences that lies beyond sensual experiences. The twofold nature of being can explain (*Bezugssinn*) why it is not possible to use the term “*species*” univocally for the first and second Averroism (*Gehaltsinn*). Especially after the complete separation of both metaphysics that took place after the year 1250. The ontotheological nature of species reveals the fundamental difference between first and second Averroism. Directly considered “*species innata*” are taken from Augustine, especially from his work *De Trinitate*. This writing separates the direct and innate recognition of Neoplatonic entities from the abstractly recognized genus and species (*juxta speciem vel genus*).[[10]](#footnote-10) The key term from the quoted part of *De Trinitate* became the similarity given by the mystical rule. This rule expresses the Neoplatonic similarity of higher forms in our soul (*per regulam similitudinis*). The mystical and Neoplatonic imperative of similarity connects the trinitary Creator and creation in the mode of mystical agreement (*regula*). The creation establishes the trinitarian structure through the direct eidetic insight of these Neoplatonic species and genera (*specialem vel generalem notitiam*). On the basis of such “regulated” truth as a mystical similarity between Creator and creation, Augustine introduces the ontotheological model of truth as *similitudo*. Anselm took it over, and Bonaventure did it as well. Seraphic teacher asserts that we possess the innate idea in the form of *species innata*, just as later the Cartesian idea of God remains in us. Modern God is the actualized of univocal nature of species. That important mythological *factum* explains how the ontotheological structure of the objective being is categorized in relation to modern God as Giver of forms (*dativus finalis*). He contemplates this species in the clearest form thanks to the light of the divine intellect. The following quotation sets out modern ontotheological structure of metaphysics. Unity of being is exposed from the direction of divine intellect. By direct illumination of human intellect from the divine source of truth, univocity of species is actualized both in thinking and in reality.

“According to the opinion of all doctors of the Church, Christ is inner knowledge and every truth is given only through him, by no means in the spoken language, but through enlightenment from within. Therefore, it is necessary that he keeps the clearest species in himself (*habeat clasrissimas species apud se*), which he cannot accept from anyone else. He himself is the inner essence of every human soul; in virtue of his clearest species, he illuminates the species in human intellect (*suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species intellectus nostri*).“ [[11]](#footnote-11)

The clearest and also the most rational and truest species (*clarissimas species*) come from a transcendental source, which illuminates the soul from within (*interius illustrando*). The recognition of the first substance is not given by abstraction completed in production of *species intelligibilis*, as it was in the first Averroism. By considering modern hypostatized species put in the framework of above-mentioned dual nature of *resolutio*, a twofold conception of truth as Anselm’s *similitudo* and *veritas* arises. Both forms of truth have a different character. The internal truth of the thing is given as similarity (*similitudo rei*), because it follows the realization of the truth coming from the divine source (*impressio veritatis*). This gave rise to the theory of double truth in two registers (*sub duplici ratione*). The first floor consists of Aristotelian correspondence given for *illuminati* only as an empirical *similitudo* of intellect and thing. On the second floor is the real *veritas* given by direct insight from modern God as the ultimate source of truth. The theory of twofold truth was fundamentally unacceptable for the first Averroism, because it completely contradicts the conclusions of CMDA given “*ad mentem Averrois*.” This twofold theory of truth must be taken in twofold perspective of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*). In that case we have to treat the theory of twofold truth as two different forms of *Bezugssinn*, and not some as common objective phenomenon (*Gehaltsinn*) that makes a false kind of *tertium ens*. This twofold conception of truth (taken as *Bezugssinn*) became the real and objectively invisible basis of the famous dispute in 1277.

The following quotation opens the way to Descartes’s concept of intellect and soul, in which the innate species radiates meaning considered immanent and evident. The difference between the first and the second species, which is given in the mode of twofold causal origin, creates the twofold conception of truth in God and in man.

“The innate species (*species innata*) can be understood in two ways. Either as a mere similarity (*similitudi tantum*), such as the species of the stone, or as a similarity that carries some truthfulness in itself (*veritas in se ipsa*). The first species is given as a sensual image and from it the image is formed in the soul, which is empty from the origin. The second species is the imprint of some higher truth in the soul (*impressio aliqua summae veritatis in anima*) in the form of grace given in the soul, that receives the formative light of cognition and the certain natural direction of cognition.“ [[12]](#footnote-12)

The quotation presents the integration of Aristotelian abstraction into the univocal conception of species of the third kind. The system of twofold truth arose as a result of the difference between the similarity given by the senses in the process of abstraction (*similitudo tantum*) and the similarity given with regard to the higher truth. The higher truth is brought to mind by the species under consideration made *per se* (*veritas in se ipsa*). Abstraction merely forms the similarity between thought and thing in the manner of sensual representation (*prima species est sicut pictura*), but by no means the full truth about the thing given in divine thought. Bonaventure’s species received a twofold form depending on whether it is formed by the twofold kind of resolution (*per similitudinem, per essentiam*). If the species arises through abstraction from the senses in the mode *per similitudinem*, then it determines the soul and the passive intellect as Aristotle’s *tabula rasa* and establishes natural cognition (*directio naturalis*). Unfortunately, this abstraction has no claim to the fullness of truth like Anselm’s *rectitudo*. Only the eidetic insight in the mode *per essentiam* creates a full insight into the truth in the soul. Then it is true that the same species reveals more than just an Aristotelian truth as a correspondence. The truth is given on the second level by exposure from behind, whereby the species symbolizes the higher, God-given truth (*secunda species est impressio aliqua summae species veritatis in anima*). The integration of mystical contemplation and natural cognition gave rise to the first form of the univocal ontotheology of *Modernorum*. The empirical significance of species is given in the mode of contingency and uncertainty, because it arises through the process of Aristotelian abstraction in the framework of mere sensual similarity. The abstracted species shows only the Neoplatonic similarity with the truth, but they are not the truth. Let us recall Oxford interpretation of *Second Analytics* with the bracketed meaning of real substances. This substance was finally excluded by Kilwardby from the six axioms of cognition because of their contingent occurrence. Bonaventure ties in with Rufus’s “disobedience of matter” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). It forms the basic leitmotif of modernity through the elimination of the first substance and through the conquest of the world in the mode of objective assimilation of one’s own *scibilia*. The kind of “substance—essence” is permanently given in God and is considered directly in the mode of “*semel—semper*” given truth according to Porretan school of *Nominales*. That kind of “*species—essentia*” as directly reflected is irradiated from the permanent source of truth, which guides the cognition of the soul. Avicennist denudation separates evident insight into essences from sensually recognized things. They h manifest eternal essences only in a contingent manner, in the disobedient matter. The denudation shifted the object of cognition into the sphere of the objective determination of being.

The same thing has two forms of truth. Just as the intellect and the soul in the second Avicennism have two faces according to Proklos’ teaching, which Avicenna had adopted (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The intellect is confirmed by things to reach the higher truth coming directly from the divine source. Truth as a correspondence has only apparently an Aristotelian character. Bonaventure abolished the donation of meaning according to the metaphysical dative. Therefore, the first Averroism fundamentally rejected the sophistry of Latins. The dialectic between the two kinds of species shows that the thing recognized in truth as *similitudo* is merely an indicator of the higher truth as *essentia*. This gave rise to the theory of twofold truth, which is based on the twofold insight into the species. Bonaventure has a similar definition of truth as *coaequatio* of Rufus, and, like him, he explicitly invokes Anselm’s *rectitudo*.

“Anselm asserts that 'truth is a correctness given only in perceptive thinking' (*rectitudo sola menta perceptibilis*). Nothing can correspond to correctness other than what is correct (*rectitudini non potest aequari nisi rectum*). When our intellect joins the truth, it necessarily becomes right. The conjunction takes place through real conversion of the intellect to the truth. The truth given in such a manner is defined as the 'correspondence of things and intellect' (*adaequatio rei et intellectus*).“ [[13]](#footnote-13)

The exposure of the truth comes from behind and the agreement is given in the act of correctness of thinking with regard to eternal species. The new insight into the meaning of being established a new predication *per prius* and *per posterius* in Neoplatonic mode of the Toledo school, in which truth is given by the exposure of the real being in the mode of correctness. Truth as *coaequatio* presupposes the existence of eternal forms; Aristotelian term applied cannot change anything about this. The key sentence about the fact that nothing can correspond to rightness other than what is right (*rectitudini non potest aequari nisi rectum*) singled out sensual cognition as agreement in the process of establishing the truth. Bacon rejected Anselm’s definition “*rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*” as sophistical (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). In the first Averroism of the Sicilian school, there is a clear distinction between the categorical supposition within the framework of the genus and the act of cognition established by hyparchical imposition from of the first substance to the species. Otherwise, the truth as a correspondence between the first and the second substance could not be done. In the second Averroism, Aristotelian agreement is merely the first stage of cognition (*similitudo tantum*). The illuminati make the act of evident insight that brings to their mind the correspondence between two kinds of *tertium ens* in the intellect. The truth is given as Anselm’s *rectitudo* and as Rufus’s universal equality of species. Bonaventure adheres to the model of the second Averroism, which is given by the illumination of sense of being coming from behind, from the direction of the transcendental source given outside of real things. Bonaventure has neither an abstraction nor a concept of intellect according to *De anima*. The real cognition of the senses does not determine the intellect, but only confirms the already given insight into exemplary species. It is about the same scenario as in the case of the cognition of Rufus’s *scibile*. Therefore, the species in the second Averroism do not have the same meaning as *species intelligibilis* in CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The definition of species is given in the mode of Porretan *tertium ens*, which is considered both in the intellect and in things. Bonaventure’s definition of species is not based on intentional reception, as is the case in Aristotle’s *De anima* (*speciem existentiem in materia praeter materiam*).[[14]](#footnote-14) The quoted formulation shows that the species represents only a contingent occurrence of the univocal species, which descends into hylemorphic matter (*in materia*).

Moreover, Bonaventure thinks that any recognized form given within the framework of spiritual matter is much more stable. This second kind of matter exists outside of the usual matter (*praeter materiam*). The universal hylemorphism complemented Oxfordian Fallacy and provides for the two floors of reality and cognition. The emergence of this specific simulacrum ensures the objective existence of species as a univocal concept consisting of both first substances and the universals. The essential form of species is inserted in the framework of Porphyry′s Tree, following the above-mentioned division of *Nominales* and Porretans. The first nature of species makes their cognitive form through Aristotelian abstraction in the empirically cognizing soul as a *tabula nuda*. The second view considers the same species in its eternally given essence through a direct intuition of permanent and exemplary recognizable forms. The essence of species has the status of a hypostatized Porretan being, which is updated somewhere and somehow in a contingent manner. Taken this case, it can be apprehended by bodily senses as well. Cognition is then true according to the difference between Aristotelian truth given by abstraction (*per similitudinem*) and Avicennist truth given by denudation (*per essentiam*). Sensual species make but the unnecessary condition of autonomous cognition. It does not need the senses when it ascends to higher truth. Therefore, it takes the abstraction given in the first Averroism merely as a secondary instrument. Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s commentary on *Second Analytics* brought the first model of that cognition to Paris. Bonaventure expands their interpretation into modern ontotheological structure given objectively. The predication *per prius* is determined by the primacy of autonomous forms given according to the Neoplatonic *Liber de causis*, and by no means according to real existence of first substances, as Aristotle and Averroes proposed it.[[15]](#footnote-15) The determination of species is not made from the direction of the first substance in reality, but from the innate idea of species (*species innata*) which Descartes exchanged for the innate idea of modern God in us. The act of double insight determines the scenario of modern and postmodern cognition as eidetic evidence considered in *cogito* (Descartes, Husserl). The being of the innate species is stated in the ontotheological mode *per prius*. It is accessible directly in the soul, by exposing the intellect from behind, by taking the direction of divine exemplars.

This interpretation is worth a closer analysis, because it made possible *Wirkungsgeschichte* of modernity. Modern Bonaventure succeeded in finding a new type of predication, whereas Rufus lacked tools to create a concrete predication (*neque secundum concretionem habentur simplicia vocabula*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). Rufus elaborated the equality of species of the third kind (*coaequatio*). Bonaventure settled them in the first floor of similarity according to Aristotle′s abstraction of *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. But this lower form of insight only arrives at a contingent knowledge of pure forms and essences. Bonaventure thus created a categorical predication on two levels, in order to create a sophistic foundation of new metaphysics according to Aristotle′s *Categories*. In such way he formally answered the devastating part of criticism done by the first Averroism, which regarded modernists as philosophical fools. In fact, Bonaventure is working with the scenario of illuminating Rufus′s *scibilia* from behind, through direct intuition of *illuminati*. But then he needs no categorical predication, only the modern and postmodern dialectical division and classification of meaning in *Arbor Porphyriana*. True cognition follows essential intuition of higher forms in order to go to the lower ones through the system of deduction according to *Liber de causis*.

“The intellect is true when it realizes how the thing is given (*sicut est in re*). If it did not realize how the thing is truly given, the cognition would be wrong and in vain. Both the rational philosopher and the metaphysician claim that the differences are extracted from the genus as potency. Therefore, it is necessary (*ergo opportet*) that they are also given in this way in the thing itself (*ita sit in re*), because the less universal forms come into being from the direction of the more universal forms (*exeant in esse a formis magis universalibus*). Otherwise, the considerations of logicians and philosophers would be completely in vain.“ [[16]](#footnote-16)

The first Averroism fundamentally rejects the thesis of modernists that there are universal determinations in real things (*in re*). The quotation established the theory of objective scientific deduction, whereby the existence of lower forms starts from the existence of universal forms (*formae minus universales exeant in esse a formis magis universalibus*). The first sentence confirms the nature of truth as Rufus’s *coaequatio*. In the real thing itself, the universal differences are given directly and in the univocal mode, since the essences are given everywhere in a generic way (*differentias extrahi de potentia generis*). The philosopher as a true illuminated subject (*metaphysicus*) has a pure modern and later Cartesian intellect (*intellectus, si verus est*). He observes these universal species all around him. He confirms their correctness secondarily through an external thing (*intelligit, sicut est in re*). The hylemorphic first substance only illustrates directly considered objective truths. Aristotelian natural philosophers of weaker mind (*rationalis philosophus*), on the other hand, must follow a complicated path of abstraction and categorical predication in order to know anything even remotely true. It is obvious that such a doctrine caused great consternation among the real philosophers, which around 1255 included the secular artists in Paris such as Guillelmus de Sancto Amore and his students. Rufus was the first modernist to put the assumption of the essence from thinking into cognition (*ubi est subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). Bonaventure did the same, for the “*res*” cited has the meaning of a universal hypostasis, and its predication is given in the essential mode of a supposition valid for logical abstraction (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, *Anal. Post*. 84a14). Bonaventure followed the path of Oxfordian Fallacy. He misunderstood the metaphysical sense of the stipulation “ἐν τῷ” in connection with the metaphysical donation “αὐτοῖς” (*Anal. Post*. 84a12) in Grosseteste′s foundational misconception (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). A properly constructed scientific proof should lead from “ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ” (a13) to “ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς” (a14). Bonaventure as a true “*metaphysicus*” does Christian philosophy a generation after the foundation of Oxfordian Fallacy. It is therefore clear that this uncritical philosophical *illuminatus* accepts erroneous Oxford′s doctrines as a philosophical dogma. Then, it is no problem to generate a deduction of metaphysics and cognition in the style “*modo geometrico*.” In true full cognition, the essence emerges from the higher form of Porretan “exsistence” and descends into the contingent first substance (*exeant in esse*). That second occurrence of the essence in transient first substances is no longer so important, because the primary way, the being is given in the mode of modern “*exsistere*.” Bonaventure takes as an example of metaphysical cognition the already known division of *Nominales* according to the Tree of Porphyry. The division of universals runs through the extraction of generic differences (*differentias extrahi de potentia generis*). The objective recognition of what is (*in re*) therefore differs fundamentally, according to the fullness of *veritas*, from the recognition of contingent truth as a mere *similitudo*.

The wording of the above quotation is very important as it reveals the modern form of *dativus obiectivus*. We have examined the way in which the metaphysical being becomes a *tertium ens* as a specific objective entity (*dativus possessivus*). The quotation reveals the way in which the subject brings the objective being into unconcealment as *veritas* of modern dogmatic ontotheology (*dativus auctoris*). Bonaventure has created a new form of the *Ge-Stell*. Enlightened metaphysician does not need the real world in order to build the first ontotheological realm of the modern spirit. He places himself in the place of the modern God as Giver of Avicenna′s objective forms. He therefore appropriates the sense of being from himself in order to understand the being in this holistic and divine way (*Er-eignen*). The sense of being as modern *resolutio* emanates completely from the enlightened subject (*metaphysicus*). The deduction of the truth from permanent forms to transitory reality is led by words “*ergo opportet*” and it is connected to desire in the conjunctive mode (*sit in re*). The pious wish of modern *illuminati* states in a subjective way that what is given “*in re*” is not an act of real subsistence of first substances. In fact, it is the individualization of previously given Porretan hypostases. They are translated from eternal “*exsistere*” of those forms into the same but contingent “*exsistere*” of those forms. Existence of hyparchical substances is sophistically exchanged for logical essence given as subjective supposition. And that transformation, moreover, is given in the mode of ontotheological dogmas. Mythological ontotheology replaced critical metaphysics with the help of pious desire. Divine Furies as punishing forces of Revenge for the loss of common sense have given modernity a really solid chaotic basis through the newly formed *dativus auctoris* and *dativus finalis*. This pious cunning (later known as “*List der Vernuft*” of Hegel) made by academic *illuminati* established the new form of categorical predication and modern worldview in the mode of objective metaphysical fallacy (*Irrtum*). Bonaventure easily accepts the basic premise from *De anima* that the cognition is given by exposing the sense of being from the front, from actual first substances that affects the senses and then the receptive-synthetic intellect. Therefore, he claims that the recognition of innate species begins with the real sensual recognition. This kind of cognition finally leads even the thinking of Aristotelian natural philosophers (*rationalis philosophus*) in the mode *per posterius* to the higher world, to the truth of exemplaria and divine revelation. The perspective of predication *per prius* is given by the fact that we consider these species from the position of God or from the whole of creation. This established a twofold concept of predication *per prius* and *per posterius* according to the canonical text *Cat*. 2a11–16. It acquired an objective meaning in the mode of new ontotheology. In Rufus’s second Averroism, the objective being arises from the fact that form, through *informatio* takes up (*exsistit*) the matter of the third kind (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). As a result of the connection of the universal matter of the third kind and the universal form of the third kind, a universal, fully objective entity is formed. In the quoted passage, Rufus explained with regard to “*species obiecti exsistentis*” that he lacks the necessary category of thinking to establish a metaphysical determination of that new type of being. The role of universal measure of beings is taken by “*species—essentia*” that Rufus invented. Rufus’s *concretum* was included in Kilwardby’s metaphysics of the essence. Bonaventure transferred the “exsistence” of modern thinkers from Oxford to ontotheological narrative. Bonaventure resorted to Alfarabi and integrated Aristotelian abstraction into ontotheological predication of Augustinian Neoplatonism. Aristotelian abstraction determines species in the mode of similarity, because Aristotelians look at the being from the position of creation. The Avicennian “*species—essentia*”is built on the act of denudation one floor higher. Modernists look at creation from the divine perspective and do not need any sensual experience for this. The essence can be given as a Porretan hypostasis independently in the mode *per prius*, when the objective intellect of *illuminati* looks at Aristotelian species through the denudation, in the mode of Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*.” In order to determine the species, critical hermeneutics must know very precisely from which perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) we look at it. Avicenna’s illumination and Aristotle’s abstraction do not possess the same measure of truthfulness. The true cognition of modernity does not begin with the senses. The soul recognized the species of the third kind by itself through denudation in accordance with Avicenna.

Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle changed the whole scheme of cognition of *Modernorum* very little. The second Averroism influenced by the writings *De anima* and CMDA added the process of Aristotelian cognition given by abstraction from the senses to process of Avicennian denudation. This is a typical syncretism of the Toledo school, which was unable to distinguish between the different projects of metaphysics according to Avicenna and Averroes. The twofold insight into the place of the metaphysical being to come (Heidegger’s *Lichtung*) creates the modern collection of two concepts of abstraction. The same view was shared by Augustine and Avicenna. Averroes’s arrival did not have to change hardly anything in the scenario of modern cognition. It was typical Neoplatonic proceeding when the explanation of *Categories* made by *Isagoge* was considered as the first stage of higher philosophy. Aristotle was not deep enough to cope with mysteries of Pythagoras and Jamblichus (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). After Averroes’s arrival in the Latin West nothing fundamental changed in the school of the first Averroism as well, but for a completely different reason (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.1). In the school of second Averroism, modified by Bonaventure, Aristotelian abstraction and Averroes’s truth as a correspondence upgraded Avicenna’s truth as *certitudo* and Anselm’s truth as *rectitudo* and Rufus’s theory of truth as *coaequatio*. Modernity compared one and the same type of species. It is primarily determined by mystical or modern intuition. Then, it is related to its contingent form given by abstraction from the direction of sensually perceived things. The modern *similitudo* of the thing and of the intellect is not given by the determination of the intellect from the real thing, but by the rectification of already known truth, which is ambiguously visualized by the hylemorphic thing in reality as in the mirror (*prima species est sicut pictura*). The sensual images are deceptive, as one knows from Plato and Descartes. Postmodern Descartes treatises this difference between both insights into the outer and the inner species through the transition from the first to the second meditation. Bonaventure’s insight into the being shows the ontotheological metaphysics of the one truth. The univocity of being is made in the framework of Neoplatonic Aristotelianism as it has been handed down by Avicenna and other great thinkers of Falsafa.

The modern concept of certain being exposed the meaning from the direction of the new form of metaphysical resolution. After Kilwardby, Bonaventure was the next modernist who had constituted sophistic concept of *ens ratum*. Albert’s criticism of *ens ratum* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3) is aimed not only against Kilwardby, but against Bonaventure as well, since he abolished the categorical imposition from first substances. The following quotation from the commentary of Bonaventure’s disciples (*Dubium I*) contains for the first time the complete structure of modern “*res*” taken in the mode of objectively conceived reality.

“The determination of being in the context of the thing can be defined in the general mode, in the mode of categorical determination and objectively given determination (*res accipitur communiter et proprie et magis proprie*). The thing is understood in the general determination from the point of view of essential objectivity of the given thing (*dicitur a reor, reris*). Everything is defined in the field of cognition in this way, whether the thing is given in thinking or in reality. The thing predicted in its own mode (*proprie dicitur*) is ensured as being predicted in reality (*dicitur res a ratus, rata, ratum*), which means in the external reality given as a substance (*ens in se*) or as an accident *(in alio*). In this mode, the thing is compatible with the term 'being.' The third way expresses the being in the mode of the objectively given being (*res magis proprie*). The predication of this certain being (*ens ratum*) is given with regard to what is unchangeable in its essential, self-given being (*ratum dicitur illud quod est ens per se et fixum*). Thus, the thing can be stated only with regard to creation (res dicitur solum de creaturis) and to the subsistent substances (*substantiis per se entibus*).“ [[17]](#footnote-17)

The third mode of predication sets forth the complete system of new categorical predication, which was introduced into the system of Avicennist ontotheology. In contrast to the first Averroism, the quotation begins with Avicenna′s determination of the thing in the broadest sense (*communiter*), i.e., from the direction of cognizing intellect (*omne illud, quod cadit in cognitione*). The second determination of “*ens ratum*” goes to the classical Aristotelian conception of the first substance. The third, i.e., objective predication is very important, since the determination of being is understood in the mode “*magis proprie*.” After the abolition of the metaphysical dative, the being of the first and the second substance merged into the nominalistic form of categorical predication. This being of the third kind “exsists” in the new amphibolic predication as a universal and as an individual thing. Bonaventure claims that this *tertium ens* is compatible with the Aristotelian predication made at the level of the second substance (*hoc modo res convertitur cum ente*). This form of objective conversion between the universal concept and the real thing makes a total nonsense in Aristotelianism. The first Averroism has no being of the third kind and it cannot establish any kind of objective predication. The first substance is clearly separated in reality from the recognized being in thinking. Bonaventure begins the determination of being not from reality, but from the intellect enlightened by God. Therefore, for him, the unique being of the first substance (*est in rerum natura*) and its universal cognition in thinking (*est in cognitione*) flow together. This objective determination of the thing is made solely from the direction of essentially given objectivity (*res a ratus, rata, ratum*). The new “thing” became a concrete and convertible universal entity made in the mode of the objective being (*res magis proprie*). This objective property was constituted for the first time by Avicenna for being as being. The meaning of being is given for thinking in the sense of Rufus’s *concretum* and Bonaventure’s *factum*, which establishes a new *tertium ens*. Rufus gave the first direct insight into Avicennist and objective essences. It means that Aristotelian abstraction and Aristotelian categorical predication are no more needed for determining of the third and absolutely certain genre of being. The objectively considered entity can be categorized only with regard to the creation (*res dicitur solum de creaturis*) and to subsistent substances (*substantiis per se entibus*). Bonaventure presents the new type of univocal predication that states hylemorphic substances and cosmic intellectual forms on the same categorical level. As a result, the first complete form of ontotheology was established under the aegis of the single and unified objective truth.

The first Averroism considered such a predication total nonsense. Man is neither God nor angel. Through the emancipation from Aristotle’s metaphysics, the complete figure of modern mythology was created. The objective *factum* is defined as the potency of the demiurgic subject (*dativus auctoris*). It expands (*exsistit*) into the epochal determination of science, technology and capitalism. Bonaventure opened the epoch of modernity by endowing the being with facticity based on objective mythology. The above-mentioned wishful conjunctive connected with this quotation (*ergo opportet, quod ita sit in re*) sets out the new epochal demiurgic way, how the modern subject objectively ratified the ideal sense of being conceived by the modern God (*dativus finalis*). The being is now given in the new categorical mode “*magis proprie*,” whereby the being receives the solidity (*ratum dicitur*) through the objectively given essentially being (*quod est ens per se fixum*). In the new fixation of factually given being, the conversion of the thing and the being in univocal sense is valid. It is ratified by the subject (*Ge-Stell*) and not by the imposition of meaning from first substances. The creation of the objective sense of being must be read according to modernity, in which Porretan hypostatized things keep the primacy. From the point of view of the *dativus obiectivus* (ch. 4), it occurred a fundamental change in the way, in which the metaphysical being receives the objective proprium (*dativus possessivus*). The new definition of being as an objective “*res*” established the objective causality in modern metaphysics. The demiurgic appropriation of the objective being is linked to the category that describes the way in which the modern subject leads the objective being into historical effectiveness (*dativus auctoris*). The facticity of objective being was created by the modern subject in the mode of supposition. It replaced the categorical meaning of the second substance given by the imposition from hyparchical first substances.

For this fundamental reason, the quoted commentary of Bonaventure on Sentences established modernism as an ontotheological system after the year 1252. Rufus was unable to complete that task in the work *Speculum animae*. However, Rufus was there when his acolyte wrote the commentary on Sentences. Rufus supported Bonaventure by his authority at the Franciscan College in Paris. The term “*ens ratum*” and the derived variants (*res a reor reris*) await a great future with Henry von Gent and Duns Scotus. The new concept of minimal being is fundamentally at odds with the conception of the first Averroism. We have quoted Albert’s criticism of Latins with regard to “*esse ratum*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). The critic of Latin Averroism defined it in the mode *per prius* only with regard to first substances. What the first Averroism has as the first, namely the real substance that the second Averroism has as the last one. The objective being definitely separated itself from hyparchical being of first substances. It came to creation of a univocal conceived thing that is categorically predicated in the mode of undifferentiated first and second substances. The new concept of being came into ontotheological scenario of Christian’s metaphysics. Bonaventure is the real author of it, since he created it anew. The universe, according to the Bible, arose from nothing, by the mere, voluntaristic intention of the Creator. Modern sophistry objectively fulfilled the mystical fact of the Gospel of John: “*Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis*” (Jn 1:14). The metaphysical nature of objective reality is taken from the position given as *creatio* *ex nihilo*. It produced *ipso facto* nihilistic metaphysics of the West. The following quotation defines the univocity of being at the level of nominal signification derived from the logical negation of nullity. The impetus of cognition no longer consists in the real existence of the first substance, but in the demiurgic will of modern *illuminati* enlightened by formal logic.

“Everything that the intellect comprehends is the being, for it comprehends everything through the sensual imagination, which is given with regard to real being. Every meaning and truth of speech are more simply signified in terms of being. That’s why we say, 'Peter is,' and that with regard to the being. The proposition related to the past is given with regard to its order given in the present. Similarly, they are given the propositions with regard to the future and likewise the negative propositions. When we say, 'Caesar does not exist,' there also exists another being that is not Caesar (*aliquid enim ens est, quod non est Caesar*). This also applies to other meanings. Similarly, we can say that the chimera is not a unicorn (*chimaera non est hircocervus*).“ [[18]](#footnote-18)

Let us now return to the original part from *De interpretatione* 16a16–19, which is paraphrased in the above quote by Bonaventure.[[19]](#footnote-19) Bobanaventure made a sens by the exposure from behind, from the direction of the “essence—species”. Aristotle works with the imposition coming from hyparchical substances. The metaphysics of chimera is impossible in this system, since logical supposition produces only a homonymous meaning (Abelard's *opinabile*). Bonaventure comprehends the last indivisible being by distinguishing it from the other one by using logical negation. This is a typical position of Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The first perception of cognition goes to the pure being (*omne quod intellectus capit… est ens*). Therefore, even the nominal definition, if it is true (*veritas orationis significantis*), must contain a minimum degree of being (*fundatur simpliciter super ens*). From the point of view of formally determined minimum degree of being, it is then completely indifferent whether the definition covers the non-existent unicorn or a real thing. As a modern individual, the being is formally different from another in the logical mode “this here,” which establishes the minimal, but maximally secure and eternal identity (*aliquid enim ens est, quod non est Caesar*). The temporality has no influence on the nominal being, because with the modern god there always remains a certain minimum degree of definitional determination of being. The key is the final determination of the being named “Caesar” and “chimera.” A one non-existent being (chimera) is different from another non-existent being (unicorn), and their formal difference proves their original identity (*chimaera non est hircocervus*). Both mythical creatures do not exist; but their nominal being is given at least according to the logical principle of the excluded third (A ≠ non A). Thus, the chimera and the unicorn are endowed with the basic measure of being and identity in the mode of objective *ens ratum*. Both beings get the minimum degree of hypostatized being by mere mutual difference (*non est*). Bonaventure invented the first “metaphysics of chimera” by reducing all kind of being to formally minimal portion of being (*ens ratum*). That Avicennist kind of *tertium ens* is given by logical supposition that separates one *individuum* from another. New predication found the basic categorical determination that established the objective being as a universal measure of all things (*dativus mensurae*). The quotation predicts the hypostatized minimal being in two ways. The objective meaning of being arises through abstracted species from the direction of real substances (*per comparationem ad ens*), and also in the mode of direct insight into the whole of being (*in ordine ad ens*). Bonaventure already uses the term “*esse ad*” in a modern way of Simplikios, which founded the objective metaphysics of Olivi and Henry of Ghent. Scotus’s term “*aliquitas*” sent this signification into modern metaphysics (ch. 5.3.2). Being under influence of Oxfordian Fallacy elaborated by Rufus and Kilwardby, Bonaventure merged two modes of univocity given *simpliciter*, which are given differently in the first and in the second triad of cognitive principles according to *Second Analytics*. Modernity does not require an exploration of *actus essendi* of real substances as the basis of unity. Behind contingent unity of substances, there is the mystically considered relationship with the objective One. Objective entities always and certainly exist in modern God, just as Antichrist certainly comes once. Grosseteste changed for the first time the divine plan of salvation into modern logic (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). In Leibniz’s postmodernism, mathematics came instead of the Antichrist and it formally ensured the same uniformity of being. Mystical modernity secured the ontotheological horizon of a certain being that is given outside the real world. Aristotle′s writing *Categories* defines univocity as a generic unity of meaning within the second substance. Modernity has overcome categorical predication by giving, in place of a generic unity determined by metaphysics through imposition, the Neoplatonic unity given as the “*numerus*” of Porretans and Rufus. The mathematical analogy, however, is given by logical supposition. Then it is not necessary to know the world truthfully (the first Averroism), but to model it mathematically precisely (the second Averroism). The first Averroism defended the authentic Aristotle, Boethius and Averroes, who consistently distinguished between the mathematical and the metaphysical abstraction. Philip the Chancellor established a kind of Neoplatonic analogy “*ad unum*” that created a transcendent unity of being. This unity of being is inspired by Platonic highest genera and Porretan hypostases (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). The being became a numerically established One as a new Porretan hypostasis. Bonaventure found the highest a most universal measure of all modern individuals. The simulacrum reality is justified by that modern predication *per prius*. It establishes an objective unity of being given individually and numerically.

“In substance as a genus, there is some unity by which all beings within this genus measure themselves (*quo mensurantur omnia in illo genere*). However, this cannot be an external principle (*non potest esse principium extrinsecum*), because things would then be either larger or smaller by participating in this measure.“ [[20]](#footnote-20)

Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytic* and Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum* introduced the universality of numbers into the definition of individuals. Bonaventure adopts that proceeding in determination of arithmetic unity (*unum*) that provides the basis of generic unity (*in genere substantiae est unum aliquod*). Following Rufus’s pattern, Bonaventure emphasizes that the principle of numerically conceived measure makes the internal principle given at the level of substance (*non potest esse principium extrinsecum*), when the substance is defined as a genus (*in genere substantiae*). The arithmetic number as an internal measure of the being established the immanent and analogous unity, which is given with regard to the highest standard of being (*unum aliquod, quo mensurantur*). The new *actus essendi* is indicated by the word “*quo*,” which links with *dativus possessivus* established by mathematical analogy. Bonaventure accomplished the amphibolic predication of transcendentals elaborated by Philip the Chancellor by mixing it with mathematical *concretum* de Rufus. This process created a new substance of the third kind, which is set in the ontotheological scenario of metaphysics. This “*chimaera—hircocervus*” is now conceived as a second Aristotelian substance that “exsists” on the level of genus. The categorization of objective being in virtue of *dativus mensurae* is now accomplished. The second substance is reduced to a Porretan *individuum*; this *individuum* is reduced by logical operation based on the Excluded Third to a minimal Avicenna′s being as being (*ens ratum*); that minimal being is numerically one and it can establish the modern metaphysics of chimeras. This mythological animal is one (mathematical analogy) and minimally determined being (logical analogy). The modern subject has created the mythological world made according to his own nihilistic image.

The matter of the third kind comes into the analogical construction of being given by Neoplatonic relation to the One. That kind of mythological matter was defined according to the universal hylemorphism. The critical studies analyzing the conception of matter established the fundamental difference between two schools in the first half of the 13th century (Palhoriès 1912). Christian Aristotelianism conceived “*ens creatum*” by the difference between the form and the matter determined in the framework of real substances. Christian Neoplatonism and Avicennism leading the thinking of Franciscan schools that preferred the difference between essence (*quod est*) and existence (*quo est*). From the point of view of hermeneutics, the real substance has been reduced to the modern individual. The unicorn and the chimera form an objectively real substance called “animal” in the same way as a Porretan dead man is objectively walking. Bonaventure adopted Avicebron’s conception of matter and linked it with the univocal conception of the body conceived as a substance of the third kind (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). This development is also confirmed by Palhoriès’s study on the basis of univocal meaning of abstracted body and matter (*matériel et corporel avaient fini par ne plus présenter qu’un seul sens*, p. 183). Once again, it is necessary to return to Avicenna, who initiated this development of abstract extension of bodies in the Latin West. The matter of the third kind in the mode *per prius* is defined not by the relationship to the substance, but in terms of essence and form.

“Because of its essence as an universal potency, matter is devoid of any form. From this formal point of view, the form of matter consists in its own ability or potency (*ipsa formarum capacitas sive possibilitas est sibi pro forma*)… Therefore, it is impossible for matter to exist entirely outside of form.“ [[21]](#footnote-21)

The sophism turns pure potentiality into a hypostatized “substance—essence.” Bonaventure understands the existence of matter univocally with pure potency (*per possibilitatem omnimodam*), which he also refers to the universal possibility of accepting any formal determination (*est sibi pro forma*). The sophistry lies in the fact that the quotation changes the Aristotelian concept of matter into a Porretane essence (*materia secundum sui essentiam*) instead of defining it in relation to a hylemorphic substance. Matter was given an objective definition within the framework of modern defined capacity (*capacitas sive possibilitas formarum*). Then the quotation from Palhoriès is correct because Bonaventure manipulates with two substances of the third kind: one is posited as matter and the second as an individual second substance, that is, as an objective body. The first Averroism decisively rejected any substantially given potency. Rufus took the potency in the substantial form (*potentia substantialis*). Then it is no problem for Bonaventure to understand the matter as a substantial potency. Therefore, the next sentence adds that matter can never exist outside of any form (*impossibile est materiam informem existere*). The sophistry is again evident, since the “form” is a *tertium ens* coined as “*concretum*” made by Rufus. The result of such conjunction of both *tertium ens* makes the simulacrum of hylemorphic substance. The second Averroism followed the path of Porretan logical schools, which defended the primacy of univocal logical abstraction. Bonaventure’s school defined the matter of the third kind with logical negation of nothingness. The following passage presents the already fully objective determination of matter in the mode of unified Porretan hypostasis, which is given as a quasi-substance in the mode of mathematical *unum*.

“Matter is certainly a being in potency and has no actuality and no form from its essence and therefore it cannot be individualized. It has no other distiction (*nullam distinctionem habet*) that the fact to be out of nothingness (*non est nihil*); then it necessarily stands beyond of multiplicity and is numerically uniform (*ita numero una*).“ [[22]](#footnote-22)

Matter is a being given only in potency (*omnino est ens in potentia*). Taken from the point of view of this minimal dose of being, it is “something” only with regard to complete nullity (*non est nihil*). The dialectical bivalence between “*nihil—aliquid*” was transferred by the first modernists to metaphysics. This first form of “*informatio*” made *dativus mensurae* on the basis of modern metaphysics that followed the definition of *individuum* according to *Isagoge*. In the age of accomplished nihilism, this “*informatio*” became a binary informatics. The bit, as the simplest unit in a numeration system, contains just two values (0 and 1) that make up the contemporary form of *dativus mensurae*. This form, actualized only by the logical exclusion of the third, is predicted in modus *per prius* within the framework of the logical abstraction associated with determination of being as “*ens inquantum ens*.” Bonaventure created *ex nihilo* a minimal and absolutely certain being (*scibile* of Rufus), which he determined by mathematical predication. He then took this *scibile* and added to it an equally mythological matter given as the essence (*concretum* ofRufus). The result is a new hylemorphic being of the third kind (*species obiecti existentis* of Rufus), which Bonaventure holds to be an objective, mathematized substance. This individual and concrete numerical “*unum*” as substance thus fits into the objective structure of reality that Rufus created in his work *Speculum animae*. The original source of the connection of “*materia prima*” as a pure, substantially given potency found the second Averroism in Avicennist interpretation of scripture *De substantia orbis*, which was contained in the corpus of the Toledo school.[[23]](#footnote-23) The last difference at the level of pure *materia prima* has a substantial character for modernists. The first matter is a Porretan hypostasis. This individual offers its essence for “material” and therefore potential division („being potential is the essential differentia of prime matter“). Matter has been individualized and it is defined *ex nihilo* in the ontotheological scenario of creation made out by the pure difference to nothing. Bonaventure emphasizes that, in contrast to the genus and the species given within the framework of classical substance, matter is only a pure essential potency (*per sui essentiam nullem habet actum*). The logical separation from nothing makes the final meaning in the framework of Porphyry′s Tree of universals. The primary matter is the last Porretan individual as “*unum*”, defined according to the numerically given atomic substance. This hypostasis is considered in the mode of mathematical abstraction as a unified number (*est una numero*). As a result of the logical separation from the non-being in the framework of propositions based on the Excluded Third, the matter of the third kind acquired a fundamental ontological consistency, which is given in the mode of mathematical abstraction and the final unity. In and of itself, objective matter is an unfinished unity of pure potency and is therefore determined by Bonaventure as a medium between being and non-being.[[24]](#footnote-24) The primary matter is essentially one, which creates both the unity of meaning and the metaphysical determination of the substance. In Bonaventure’s school, matter is defined fully indeterminate with a minimal portion of being separate only from nothing (*medium inter aliquid et nihil*).[[25]](#footnote-25) In Bonaventure’s commentary on Sentences, Augustine’s matter received the essential determination of being of the third kind. This quantum of objectively subsistent essence is concretely and individually determined only by its relation to pure nothingness. Let us remind that such determination of essence were done in the framework of modern physics that was elaborated in Neoplatonist schools (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Bonaventure established the first quantum theory of Western nihilism by creating a logically determined “substance.” This quantum of mythological matter that is unlimited and defined by mathematical analogy was the first “*ens ratum*” of modern physics.

Bonaventure’s students linked the definition of matter as a minimal portion of being not only to Augustine, but also to Aristotle. The nihilism of Western metaphysics begins with Bonaventure. It is shown by *Scholion* that was added to Bonaventure′s text.[[26]](#footnote-26) Nihilistic yet substantial matter became the middle link (*medium*) of scientific proof made in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. Matter, taken as a pure essence, forms an objective medium between the being and the non-being, because it has an absolutely minimal, logically and thus completely unquestionably assured being (*ens ratum*). Bonaventure established postmodern nihilistic metaphysics, in which the determination of being as *ens ratum* is undoubtedly ensured by the movement of pure logical difference given by the difference between “*aliquid*” and “*nihil*.” In a similar, “material” way, the nihilistic metaphysician Derrida defined the contemporary form of cognition. The objective meaning given *ex nihilo* arises from the mere movement of *différance* given in Avicennist intuition of “*hoc esse tantum*.” The new determination of matter and thing by the primary difference from nothing established a mix of pure possibility and a special form of substantive actuality given outside of Aristotle’s first substance. The combination of matter, thing, number and the pure being in this sphere of minimal being is one, formally simple and homogeneous. Above all, it is essentially infinite in itself (*de se est infinita*) and therefore capable of accepting any formal determinations (*ad formas infinitas*).[[27]](#footnote-27) The cited definition of matter of the third kind in the terminus „*de se ist infinita*“ founded the formal-objective concept of infinity, which is indispensable for Western science. The modern idea of infinity arose around 1250 in the second Averroism thanks to the modern conception of matter as a univocally conceived being of the third kind, given within the framework of mathematical abstraction (Grosseteste, Rufus, Bonaventure). Bonaventure’s matter, defined in the form of the essence of the third kind and pure hypostatized potency, is indivisible, eternal in the sense of the absence of arising and extinguishing, homogeneous as well as incompletely uniform (Krause 1888, 7–12). Thanks to this fundamental Franciscan poverty, given outside of any external influence, this “*materia spiritualis*” is waiting for the reception of some form coming from God, man or nature. The essentially conceived matter is given only in the mode of potency. It acquired paradoxical properties that are incompatible with Aristotelian determination. The matter received an objective actualization by becoming a quasi-substance (*aliquid*). Furthermore, as a numerically determined “*concretum*—substance,” this matter received a hypostasized causality.

The emergence of the objective form of the matter is connected with the mathematized world. That result therefore corrects the conclusions of the study that investigated the emergence of modern science through the transition from the closed world to infinite space (Koyré 1957). This study only described the postmodern creation of science by Galileo and Descartes, and not the original creation of modern science in the metaphysics of *Modernorum* given by Oxfordian Fallacy. Science received an epochal new *scibile* through the matter of the third kind. That “materialized” body received in the second Averroism (Rufus, Kilwardby, Bonaventure) the statute of the second substance and corresponding categorical predication. The objective matter received an essential definition (*per sui essentiam*). The cognizing subject fully determines objective matter due to categorical determinations based on *dativus obiectivus*. This simulacrum of matter exists only in the mode of objective *factum*. There is no real substance of the third kind. The objective matter classified by Bonaventure appears in the three stages of hypostatized being: 1) the pure “potency—substance” separated from nothingness by mathematical unity and logical negation (*materia prima*); 2) the real part of the hylemorphic substance (*materia materialis*); 3) the universal hylemorphic matter that establishes the existence of separate forms and it is considered by denudation (*materia spiritualis*). The first form of objectively conceived matter as a pure being is defined by the formal difference from nothingness. Objective matter in threefold type (*scibile, concretum species obiecti existentis*) makes an unlimited continuum that can be predicated as mathematically, physically or otherwise essentially given knowledge. This material continuum is endowed with Franciscan capacity of poverty in the form of the objective *scibile* and goes from the objective *materia prima* to the spiritual matter of the pure hypostatized forms. Modern physics got its theoretical foundation in the modern subject forming the mythological world. The confusion of dogmatic mythology, ontotheology and metaphysics is literally captured by Bonaventure’s concept called “*materia confusa*.”[[28]](#footnote-28) The basis of this specific matter of the third kind is formed by the darkness at the beginning of creation (Gn 1:2). Augustine conceptualized this unclear mythological material that was already known from the Sumerian epic *Enūma Eliš*. He used it against Manichaeans in the term “*terra incomposita*.” Bonaventure introduced this mythological and later also theological term into the Aristotelian scenario of metaphysics. The introduction of mythical form of matter gave rise to a new being of the third kind settled in Christian ontotheology and modern physics. The confused matter complements the equally problematic *materia spiritualis* given in the intellect, and the mix of both creates a new hierarchy of being. Modern matter got the capacity to take the form of any demiurge, which is illustrated by the basic drive of matter to form (*appetitus*). Aristotelian source of volition, in the context of appetite, is based on the combination of the generic and specific determinations given in the definition of animal desire according to *De anima*.[[29]](#footnote-29) The definition of objective matter on the basis of appetite follows Rufus’s transition of matter into the modern form of “exsistence,” which is given by the essential and formal actualization of the form.

“And now for the objection that the [objective] single thing composed of [hypostasized] matter and [hypostasized] form is a real being, which would produce a being of the third kind (*ta venit ad constitutionem tertii*). This is not generally true, but only when matter completes the longing of form and form completes the longing for matter (*materia terminat omnem appetitum formae, et forma omnem appetitum materiae*). This event is not given with regard to something external (*non est appetitus ad aliquid extra*), nor is the mere possibility of the hylemorphic thing (*nec possibilitatis ad compositionem*), because it precedes the will and the inclination given in the real individual things.“ [[30]](#footnote-30)

Bonaventure extended Aristotle’s desire (ὄρεξις), which Stoics associated with entelechy and the movement of living beings (ὁρμή), to the entire creation. Rufus’s term “*informatio*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2) got a new place in the ontotheological structure of metaphysics. The appetite of this modern informally conceived matter for a richer and higher form made possible the modern classification of the world, which all postmodern science has pursued since the 17th century. The greed for form is given as a new transcendental property of the “materially” created being. Spinoza transferred the original greed of modernity into the new metaphysical determination of “*ens inquantum ens*.” In postmodernism, the hypostatized appetite for form gave rise to “*conatus*” of being, which mythically seeks the objective being given by the modern subject. Spinoza’s modern form of the third kind defines every postmodern individual as an univocal “thing” (*res*) that strives to hold on to being (*unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverance conatur*; *Ethica III*, arg. 6). This postmodern determination of the world is founded on the hypostatized appetite as instinct of self-preservation, which Spinoza’s contemporary Hobbes needed for the theory of the modern social contract. The nihilistic form of contemporary thought makes use of this drive to form the global system of consumption, power and manipulation, which forms the actualized *conatus* of planetary power of one percent of contemporary *illuminati* (*dativus ethicus*).

Bonaventure must find a special kind of objective form for the objective definition of matter. Only the combination of matter and form of the third kind establishes a new quasi-substance which shapes the thinking of the subsequent epoch of *Modernorum*. Bonaventure was inspired by Rufus, whose version of Oxfordian Fallacy represents the form in its primary essentiality as a pure *scibile*. Let us return to Porretans that combined the nominally determined first substance (*unitas nominis*) and categorical statements concerning second substances (*unitas enuntiabilis*). See the above-mentioned polemic from the book *Dialectica*, which summarizes Abelard’s dispute with Gilbert. Abelard rejected the Porretan version of specific individuation because individual predication has no place in the system of Aristotelian categories (*substantiales etiam sint speciebus secundum species, non secundum individua*; OBJ II, ch. 1.3). The first Averroism, following Abelard’s example, rejects any categorical determination of absolutely pure potency. Concepts such as *materia prima* cannot be stated in the categorical predication, but only verbally signified, which is not the same in classical logic. The concept of “*individuum*” belongs exclusively to the nominal predication, because it has a universal meaning, without a categorical (i.e. hyparchical) relationship with the first substance that *species* provides for (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Potency is also a universal concept, which is given only in thinking. The categorical determination is predicted in the mode *per prius* and *univoce* with regard to first substances. They exist *simpliciter* outside of cognitive thinking. All universal determinations are given in the mode *per posterius* with regard to second substances, either accidentally or only equivocally. But the concept as *opinabile*, or the concept given only in thinking do not correspond to scientific cognition, which is given in the deductive *demonstratio* determined according to the causality of first substances. According to first Averroism, the substantial predication of mere potency is a clear nonsense, because the corpse would be a human being. The categorical predication of potency was rejected by the first Averroism of the Blund school already around the year 1225 on the basis of the classical determination of Peripatetics as it was mediated by Boethius and Abelard (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.1). The second Averroism proceeds in a different way, which is shown by objective predication of matter and form since 1240 in Oxford. The notion of *tertium ens* introduced a new type of categories and sent modern “*informatio*” into metaphysics. The following quotation presents the emergence of the ontotheological form of objective being.

“The formally conceived essence can be understood in such a way that it is not only latently given in potential matter (*non solum latentes*), but is a being in potency (*sed entes in potentia*). Thus, matter in the primary state contains a primary definition of all forms (*materia habeat in se seminales omnium formarum rationes*). In this, both philosophy and the Holy Scriptures agree that these primary determinations (*rationes*) are brought out into actuality through the activity of some agent (*per actionis agentis educerentur in actum*).“ [[31]](#footnote-31)

The first Averroism would agree with the equivocal conception of the substance hidden in pure possibility (*latent in potentia*). This is Aristotle’s classical definition of *materia prima*, given as a pure concept in thought. Bonaventure, however, endows this potency with a special kind of being, following the example of Avicenna, where matter has been given a subsistence determined through hypostatized potency (*entes in potentia*). The potency became a being used in amphibolic predication, which corresponds to the definition of matter according to Philoponus and Simplicius as a Neoplatonic being of the third kind. This determination of matter is taken over by Avicenna’s formal determination of essentiality defining the thing from the point of view of minimal being (*non esset ita, tunc non esset res*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Bonaventure grafted the potentiality of species on numerically defined substances of the third kind. That gave birth to an essential entity that is understood as pseudo-actualized thing, as the “subsistence of something” (*entes*) in the sense of the minimum portion of being. This minimal dose of being is given in the modern *tertium ens*, which appears as a “matter—essence—potency” and is formed in a Neoplatonic way, by the Stoic and later also by Augustine’s rational forms (*seminales omnium formarum rationes*). The quotation equips the objective matter with a special kind of rational form. This form exists before any hyparchical form (*materia habeat in se rationes*). Real matter receives these forms—*rationes* as the first information (*sibi and primaria conditione inditas*).

According to the first Averroism, no specific determinations can make part of the first substance. It exists *simpliciter*, beyond the universals. The second Averroism put the universals in the things. This fact proves the nature of objective *rationes* that exist immanently even in the pure matter (*habeat in se*). The *ratio*, as a form of the third kind, is given directly into matter from the direction of primordial plane of sense, which forms the basic condition of all that is. The modern *informatio*, i.e., the imprinting of the pseudo-form into the pseudo-substance is carried out by the responsible demiurge. He lives in the objective diacosmos (today in the media matrix) and produces atomic substances of the third kind (*per actionem agentus educeretur in actum*). Above-cited Bacon attacked this sophistic construct in his criticism of modern predication “*in artificialibus*” (*hoc materia artificialis de artificialibus predicatur*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Bonaventure was certainly the one of his opponents. The new being of the third kind is determined in an explicit ontotheological structure (*illud concordat et philosophiae et sacrae Scripturae*). As a result, a new mathematized form of the objective being arises, the primary ontotheological determination and formation of which lies in divine thinking in the form of Grossetestes’s archetypes (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). The Seraphic thinker follows the line of the modern Oxford *Nominales*. He has no problem with the translation of the theological pseudo-form into matter of the third kind. Philoponos and Avicenna had already done this before him, and Rufus and Kilwardby after them. The rationality attached to the concept of substance as a pure potency forms the basis of all possible or actual forms (*omnium formarum*). The *materia prima* being hypostatized in this way, the *rationes seminales* form the first level of being. Bonaventure took over Rufus’s *informatio*. The ontotheological structure of *rationes* that descend from God took up the objectively conceived matter. By the union of form and substance of the third kind, a new pseudo-substance given in the sense of Rufus’s “*exsistere*” is created that establishes the real existence of a contingent first substance. The substance of the third kind is informed by the form of the third kind given as divine exemplar. This modern conjunction of objective matter and form took the form of the Aristotelian categorical predication given *per prius*. The new *tertium ens* came into being because Bonaventure added to the potency of matter the formal essence given in the mind of the divine agent as the eternal species (*ratio exemplaris*). Pseudo matter is endowed with the necessary appetite to take objective forms secondarily at the level of creation (*ratio seminalis*). The demiurge sends the primary forms into the matter of the third kind to establish the objective art of creation. The first objective and therefore mystically conceived informatics work at the level of hylemorphic objective simulacrum. It acquired the necessary appetite for receiving the hypostatized Porretan forms of the third kind. This new simulacrum, according to Rufus, started the computer revolution of the West (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Hermeneutics thus found *Lichtung* of untruth that founded objective computer science.

Bonaventure inserted Rufus’s formal *scibile* in the ontotheological structure and created the Christian version of the Neoplatonic diacosmos. The combination of form and matter of the third kind is predicted within the framework of nominalistic division of genus and species and separated the objective form of universality (*ratio exemplaris, seminalis*) from the Platonic ideas. Dismissal of Neoplatonism can be shown by the position of universals. Bonaventure rejected their reduction to Platonic ideas that are separate subsistent forms. The separation from Platonism enforced the objectivity after the year 1250. Bonaventure has no problem with accepting Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s ideas and even accepts the conception of universals given only in thought. The objective form of being is given in the term “*ratio seminalis*” and is neither one nor the other, see Avicenna’s conception of “*hoc esse tantum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). But because of the assumed matter of the third kind, the seminal species contains a different kind of determination outside of abstracting thinking. Bonaventure created a new determination of being beyond Platonic concept of universals as ideas given *realiter* and beyond the Aristotelian concept of universals given *universaliter* and *potentialiter* in the mind of the knower. The first level of essences contains exemplars given in the divine mind either in pure reflection or in the creative act. These essences are reproduced in the creation on the basis of the objective forms (*rationes seminales*) and are recognizable by direct philosophical insight. There is even the direct recognition of purely divine ideas, which God transmits to man with the help of supernatural illumination. The similarity is not given by the relation to real things, but by the insight into absolute *scibile* separated from contingent first substances. The production of the objective determination of being in the form of *ratio seminalis* once again brings to light the process of individuation initiated by Porretans (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). Bonaventure took up Rufus’s concept of *concretum* and its concrete predication (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Once again, the univocity of Porretan hypostases is at play. They are given *univoce* in thinking and also in reality. The emergence of objective *individuum* is set out by this quotation:

“That is why the universal form does not differ from the form given in the individual thing by the abstraction from matter and the concretization in matter. They are distinguished by the addition of one form to the second in the mode of the more or less accomplished individual. Its sign consists in the fact that this form of species is given in the order of genera and species in a complete way. With regard to the individual thus given, the generically given form represents a being in potency and is guided into objective actuality on the basis of the added difference (*fit magis in actu per differentiam sibi superadditam*).“ [[32]](#footnote-32)

The new predication beyond universals and beyond sensibly perceived things refers to the objective form (*forma singularis*), which is predicated through hypostatized differentiation within the Porphyry′s Tree (*differunt per additionem unius ad alteram*). Bonaventure claims that the new form includes materially given determinations. This distinguishes it from the immaterial universals created by abstraction from matter (*per abstractionem*). Such universals cannot be more or less complete, because they are given only as potential concepts of cognizing thinking. A fundamental difference between the first and the second Averroism is the hypostatized potency stated as the second substance in the objective mode (*per magis completum et minus completum*). That proceeding follows the Neoplatonic interpretation of *Categories*. They created the highest genera of being to make their participation in the One according to the hierarchy of autonomously subsisting forms (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). Porretans took it up and inserted those forms in the predication according to “*magis* *et* *minus*” (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). Bonaventure added spiritual matter to these forms according to the universal hylemorphism, thus creating the first complete form of objective predication. The parallel universe began to produce the objective being in the manner of the demiurge from the dialogue *Timaeus*. The first Averroism clearly refused to add this objective determination of form and matter to universal meaning in mind. The second substance cannot have a more or less universal form, because it exists only in thinking and is given only in possibility. Bonaventure arranged the objective being according to Avicennist gradations of autonomous essences and forms. The parallel universe received a basic structure and order in the mode of categorical predication “before” and “after”. This mode is tied to the predication of objective hypostases.

This ingenious mythology made out according to Bible, mysticism and philosophy produced a new *resolutio* of being of the third kind. Following Kilwardby, Bonaventure founded the objective science of the West by establishing it in an ontotheological structure of categorical predication given “*per prius—per posterius*.” Hierarchically given sense of being could be introduced because the essential predication given *univoce* and *per prius* is initially given on the level of genus (*forma vero generis respectu illius est ens in potentia*). Therefore, Bonaventure rejects the Neoplatonism of the book *Liber de causis*. Neoplatonic form makes a higher first substance that fully determines lower forms. Bonaventure proposed predication in the mode *magis* and *minus* that relates only to the exemplars and *rationes semimales* and by no means to the separated cosmic forms or Platonic ideas. The objectively (and by no means Neoplatonic) determined form is updated by the transcendental determination of pseudo-matter attached to the genus and then to the species (*fit magis in actu*). The model for objectification is the school of *Nominales* and its division of transcendentalia in the framework of *Arbor Porphyriana* (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). The school of *Grammatici* practiced it around the year 1240 in Paris, see the criticism of Alvernus (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). At the end of the division of genus and species, the objectively given individual arises, which receives a pseudo-actuality of the first substance. Rufus produced the first being of this kind (*species obiecti exsistentis*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). Bacon observed the emergence of the second Averroism in Franciscan colleges in Paris and Oxford. He declared the production of the parallel world in the thinking of the *illuminati* to be pure madness (*insaniunt contra veritatem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). Albert criticized those *illuminati* as Averroists for creating a simulacrum of the first substance. He considered this way of knowing the universals with the help of matter of the third kind as pure nonsense. See his polemic concerning *opinio Latinorum* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). But the sophistic modern word became an objective body and began to dwell among us in the guise of a new atomic substance. The mystical theologian and spiritual father of modernity gave metaphysics a new middle link in the deductive syllogism (*medium*) and created a new form of objectivity. The emergence of new metaphysics is evidenced by following quote from his work *Collationes in Hexaëmeron.*

“This is the middle link of the proof that establishes metaphysics (*medium metaphysicum reducens*), and this is our whole metaphysics: coming from emanations, from exemplarity and from the perfection given by irradiation with spiritual light, and it leads to the highest goal. In this way, you will become a real metaphysician.“ [[33]](#footnote-33)

The meaning of being is led to Jesus Christ as the only mediator between God and man. Anyone who recognizes this mystical and philosophical medium becomes a real metaphysician. The Seraphic teacher claims that scientific cognition culminates in revelation, the truths of which are above the mind, but by no means against the mind. The exposure of being made from behind in the twofold form of objectivity (*ratio exemplaris, seminalis*) gives the intellect sufficient certainty of cognition that is expressed by new middle link of demonstrative syllogism (*haec est tota nostra metaphysica*). The ontotheological construction is based on mystical theology and logic and established the objective sense of being. The triple status of the being (real, universal, objective) discussed above requires the univocal species as being of the third kind. Only in this way can the project of modern metaphysics receive the complete predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. This unified predication is transmitted in the framework of the new ontotheology in Bonaventure’s sermons and mystical-theological writings dating to later period of his thought. Just as in the school of *Nominales*, the essentially conceived species in the form of the ontotheological *scibile* represents the fundamental key to the objective recognition of reality. The justification of objectivity is based on the will of modern God and later on the will of modern demiurge.

“Then it is possible to signify goodness in potency, just as the exemplar expresses the being of the thing. Not because the thing exists, but because God can create it. There can be nothing in God that does not recognize with his agreement (*nihil est in Deo, nisi quod cognoscit notitia approbationis*). In this way, he also recognizes all the good that either exists or that he can do (*quod est vel quod potest facere*), since he owns an exemplar of it. But this kind of exemplar is given only in God.“ [[34]](#footnote-34)

The will of the Creator or the demiurge in its formal capacity or potency (*posse*) and the deliberate consent to the intended work (*notitia approbationis*) became, for the first time in the history of the West, a fundamental metaphysical determination of being. The first Averroism recognized that we can investigate God with scientific and critical mind as the first cause, but nothing more. The second Averroism was inspired by the mathematical and geometric universe according to the dialogue of *Timaeus*. Bonaventure determined the metaphysics through the creative will of the demiurge. The objective entity as an exemplary and objective *scibile* (*ratio exemplaris*), is determined by divine intention to create something. This fundament was further developed by Olivi and Scotus and shows the new sphere of the creative sphere in God, which establishes a new conception of being (*exemplar connotat rei entitatem*). The objective nature of non-created being in God corresponds to the doubling of being according to Porphyrios’s interpretation of the dialogue *Parmenides* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Bonaventure created a new version of the hypostatized relation (*esse ad*) that Simplicius conceptualized for the first time (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). Its relative existence depends exclusively on the willing of God. He endows that intended entity with a universal objective being given between a pure being and non-being (*non quia sit, sed quia Deus potest eam facere*). The possibility given only in the demiurge’s thinking became the basis of the rational structure of reality (*illius habet exemplar*). The consent to this willful or intentional intention (*notitia approbationis*) then establishes the being in potency and in actuality. Bonaventure declares that such a kind of exemplary demiurgic will is only possible in God (*tantum est in Deo*). However, postmodernism no longer imposed itself any restrictions after the death of the modern God. The concept of “*notitia approbationis*” is of major importance for the foundation of objective metaphysics since it makes the connection of most important categorical determinations assembled in the framework of *dativus obiectivus*. The metaphysical *ens* becomes an objective *ens* in virtue of demiurgic will (*dativus possessivus*). The source of this volition is in modern subjects that bring the objective being into the unconcealment given as objective *veritas* (*dativus auctoris*). The exemplary established ontotheological structure relates to modern God as the *ultima ratio* of that objectivity (*dativus finalis*). Aristotelian metaphysics received in the learning of the Commentator is useless, since the new predication starts from complete different source than the hyparchical first substance (*dativus incommodi*). Modernity objectively considers as reality what it accepts through its assent in the mythological mode as “*notitia approbationis*.” The magical incantation of demonic approval was created with the tacit participation of Furies that received a kind of Christian mysticism.

The powers of academic Vengeance changed their residence and moved from conquered Oxford to Paris, which had not yet been conquered. Here, they worked in secret during the turning point of 1250–55. The ontotheological construction of modern metaphysics led to the pure nihilism of present times. After the death of the modern god, the demonically manipulated consent passed on to academics, banksters and politicians. Together with the one percent of *illuminati* of all kinds, they create the actualized simulacrum of objectively given reality (*dativus ethicus*). The contemporary West, driven by media manipulation and by post-truths, cannot deny the nihilistic event of its origin (*Ereignis*), given by the eclipse of the first substance. Roger Bacon was the main witness that described the invasion of this objective mythology into philosophy. As an excellent Aristotelian and defender of the first Averroism, he criticized the demiurgic nature of Bonaventure’s ontotheology published after the year 1250. Bacon critically assessed the school of the followers of Alexander Hales and resolutely separated himself from them. Let us see his criticism of the compilers of *Summa Halensis* (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). He followed the emergence of modernism step by step at the Oxford College and then also in Paris, where he became a Franciscan tertiary about 1259. In the quoted commentary on *Metaphysics*, Bacon rejected the statute of the universal as a real thing. He separated the hylemorphic matter of the first substance from the intended universal matter as a mere disposition of thought (*dispositio solum*).[[35]](#footnote-35) This concept does not create a actualized given nature or essence (*natura vel essentia*). Inspired by Oxfordian Fallacy, modernism shaped the concept of causality of the third kind in the middle link of the proof. Modernists therefore rejected scientific deduction based on the causality of first substances, as demanded by *Second Analytic*s. Bacon in vain pointed out to Latin sophists the fact that, according to Aristotle and Averroes, the predication of universal meaning is possible only in the mode *per posterius*, and that the universals are contained in things only potentially. Bacon defines three modes of universals in relation to Rufus and Kilwardby: potentially in things, universal cognition in thinking and as a medium in demonstrative syllogism. They express *univoce* the universal metaphysical causality of recognized effects coming from first substances. Universals have no further determination in terms of metaphysics because every *tertium ens* is philosophical nonsense. The defense of the metaphysical dative explains to modernists meaning of the canonical passage (*Cat*. 2a14–16), which justifies twofold categorical predication. The third type of predication is already universal, but is given by the causally based imposition (*universale per causalitatem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.2), which makes it a special third group. According to Bacon, another determination of universals, which is applied by the second Averroism, is nonsense.

“The universals cannot have a fourth kind of existence, because the existence of something universal would be given at the moment in the real individual things and would not be a mere potency. In the universals, the potency precedes the actualization. But what is considered secondary in terms of universals is actually given as the first case. Therefore, the actualized being is given first, and then the potentiality (posito actu ponitur potentia).“ [[36]](#footnote-36)

According to Bacon, the fourth predication of *Modernorum* belongs only to homonymous meaning that lies outside the scope of the demonstrative proof of *Second Analytics* based on real causality of first substances. Modernity states the universality in the mode of *actus essendi* in several individual substances at the same time (*universale quod esset in pluribus actu*). It is nonsense, because every real thing stands in its own existence and universality would cease to exist. The first substances have actualized being *per se* and not from the human act of cognition. Man does not create the *actualiter* given reality by thinking, but recognizes it truthfully. Bacon defends the past character of cognition given in Aristotelian *quidditas* against objective parousia of *illuminati*. Predication “*in artificialibus*” does not establish the effective causality as it is postulated in *Second Analytics*, but only the exemplary or final causality. According to Bacon and Albert, cognition at the level of metaphor, analogy and mythology cannot establish the deductive science. Let us recall Albert’s criticism of modern Averroists because of completely absurd process of cognition (*quidam Latini naturam animae nescientes hoc confinxerunt*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Bonaventure’s school created an objective Neoplatonism for the philosophical and ecclesiastical people. Bacon stated it openly with regard to Rufus’s effect on poorly educated modernists (*famosissimus apud stultam multitudinem*, OBJ II, ch. 3.2). The ontotheological construction of *tertium ens* renews the parallel world that was previously given as Jamblichos’ “διάκοσμος,” the intermediate world-*barzach* in the Koran and Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The preceding matrix of objectivity has shown that the first Averroism abolished this parallel world of mystical ontotheology. John Blund excluded a being of the third kind in his interpretation of *De anima* (OBJ II, ch. 2.1). Bonaventure creates this parallel world with the help of a new, objectively given ontotheology. Bacon fundamentally rejected the project of sophistic *Modernorum*, since they contaminated theology with philosophical Neoplatonism. Man became a new demiurge by creating being of the third kind. Bacon rejected the thesis that such a version of philosophy should dominate theology (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The fundamental core of the dispute was the above-mentioned statute of species that acquired an objective character in the school of modern thinkers. Bonaventure combined the analytical exegesis of *Second Analytics* with univocal concept of being. This was enforced by the Paris branch of *Nominales* given in the schools of *Grammatici*. Due to that modernist *copulatio*, a new series of categorical determinations of being of the third kind emerged to spin a new ontotheology. Those determinations of being were tied to demiurgic activity of the creative will. The sense of being determined from the position of demiurgic volition is totally problematic from the point of view of philosophy. Bacon and Albert knew it very well. Therefore, both strongly condemned the invasion of modernist philosophy into theology. Sophistic interpretations of Aristotelianism made by newly emerged Averroism of Bonaventure’s school forced Bacon and Albert to interpret the original meaning of the Aristotelian corpus after the year 1250. Duns Scotus clearly understood that Bonaventure′s project of such modern metaphysics had no future. He therefore did not take the will to knowledge, but the Thomistic version of semiaverroism and combined it with Avicenna's metaphysics.

### 4.1.2 Foundation of Objective Averroism

The exposition of Oxfordian Fallacy investigated a new *Lichtung* of the truth and untruth concerning Latin modernity about 1235–45 based on works of Rufus and Kilwardby in Oxford and in Paris. The disclosure (*alētheia*) of objectivity began between the years 1245–55 due to the dispute between the first and the second Averroism. The introduction of new metaphysics forced the next generation of Bonaventure’s students, like Pecham, to defend the ontotheological construction of new metaphysics against classical Aristotelians. Bonaventure composed the second Averroism in explicit opposition to both Averroes and classical Aristotelianism and continued in the sophistry of Oxford’s second Averroism, which Grosseteste condemned at the very beginning (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). We know the negative reception of Aristotle as the “worst” (*pessimus*) metaphysician and natural scientist from some Franciscan masters of the 13th and 14th centuries (Mahoney 1988). Bonaventure attacked the Commentator from the position of reformed Avicennism, thereby starting the official dispute over Averroes as a “heretical” philosopher. The modernists changed Aristotle and Averroes into false Christians in order to condemn them as heretics. The previous matrices have explained that new determination of being must concern the cognition based on central importance of Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*. Controversy about the possible intellect reveals the true nature of dispute between the first and second Averroism. The first Averroism had a strong intellectual support in Paris and a tradition that lasted for half a century, from John Blund to Bishop Alvernus. Bonaventure defended the objective version of philosophy against thinkers as Bacon, Albert and after Alvernus’ death also Siger of Brabant. The quoted Bacon gave the year 1250 as the *terminus post quem* of emergence of disputes regarding the interpretation of Aristotle’s corpus (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). The conflict between the first and the second Averroism over interpretation of Averroes lasted following two decades. The basic concepts of metaphysics (species, matter, form, actuality, essence, existence, truth, etc.) no longer had a same meaning and were divided according to this or that school of thought. The metaphysical dichotomy between the first and the second Averroism contains the core of the dispute about the twofold truth, which was mentioned in the condemnation of 1277. The authorities of the first Averroism refused an academic discussion with the representatives of the school *sophistae* *Latini* at that time. The polemic of the first Averroism is given mainly in the rhetorical style of *oratio obliqua*. Albert and Aquinas designated the philosophical opponents by generic designation *quidam* or *Latini*. Both esteemed Dominicans differ in this from Bacon. This Franciscan tertiary was settled at the center of the second Averroism and was banned from teaching and publishing.[[37]](#footnote-37) He did not mince his words during his second stay in Paris (about 1256‒80), see the cited work *Opus minus* (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The dispute between Bonaventure’s school and Bacon’s and Albert’s first Averroism is not directly proven. The animosity of secular magisters at the University of Paris started in the advent of the new wave of scholars from the mendicant orders. Dominican and Franciscan magisters did not put their quarrels with the first Averroism on public display. Bonaventure as General of the Order emphasized the importance of the Franciscan manners in internal and external disputes over poverty in the Gospels (c. 1253–57). The observance in the form of religious vows means, on the one hand, an avoidance of scandal and, on the other hand, an insight into the truth and thus also into salvation.[[38]](#footnote-38) The quoted keyword “*Regulae tenemur*” gave Cartesian secular modernity its regular salvation. It communicated Bonaventure’s ontotheological objectivity together with the modesty and the moderation of original Franciscan *Regulae*. Albert and Bacon claimed that it was impossible to discuss philosophically with modern sophists. The representatives of the second Averroism necessarily also produced new theoretical concepts, which established objective properties of the being in opposition to the criticism of the first Averroism. New teaching found no support in the previous tradition of thought; therefore, the sophistic *Moderni* carried out a twofold revolution. The modernists gave the old terms a radically new meaning and they constituted completely new terms if it was necessary. The obscurity of new metaphysics ended around 1250. Afterwards, it began the historically effective phase that led to construction of a new metaphysics. The generation of philosophers from the years 1250–70 transferred the meaning of being to the empire of modern demiurgic subject. The history of the second Averroism as the victory march on *via Modernorum* shows that the objectively “strong” intellect of man sees the “weak” reality and has determined “*ens ratum*” in its own way. The integral interpretation of Aristotle’s corpus (Albert, Bacon) in the first round of the dispute became a worthy philosophical response to erroneous opinions of the second Averroism. Bonaventure’s school, together with Kilwardby in Oxford, unleashed a false dispute over Averroism, which gave rise to the epochal figure of the modern forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The true unconcealment of the dispute between two schools is given by the project of authentic humanism and by the emergence of the Western intellectual as were the artists of the rue du Fouarre. The critical search for philosophical truth of these secular priests was the model of intellectual work in the mode of truth as agreement in the following centuries. Siger and his colleagues defended the original philosophical and critical foundation of European education, which was jointly established in the Falsafa by the Second Master and the Commentator (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). This and the following matrix show how the magisters from the rue du Fouarre carried out the process of the actual foundation of science after the *Second Analytics*. Unfortunately, this development was halted by sophistical modernism in March 1277 through the concept of the one dogmatically given truth of ontotheology.

The process of sophistic subjectivization of Western science, according to the Oxfordian Fallacy, is closely related to history of Averroism. The critical and negative interpretation of Averroes can be explained after the failure of Kilwardby in Oxford (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2) date from Bonaventure’s commentary on the second book of Sentences, which radicalizes Rufus’s negative point of view known from the work *Contra Averroem* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). As a result, modernists overcame Neoplatonic synthesis of the Toledo school that was somewhat valid until 1250. The new interpretation rejected the doctrine of the first Averroism, which was presented *ad mentem Averrois* after the Toledo (Grosseteste, Rufus) or the Sicilian school (Alvernus, Bacon, Albert). Modernism and postmodernism made a return to Neoplatonic Avicenna as performed by Porretan schools of *Nominales*, to integrate them into a new project of objective metaphysics. The anonymous writing *Summa philosophiae* takes Avicenna’s metaphysics as the basis of modernity, because it was the only one that contradicted the opinions of the preceding ages (*inter veteres*; OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). This “*revolutio*” of Christian modernity, i.e. the turn of Latin education back to the philosophical fairy tales of dialogue *Timaeus* was not done without hard confrontations. After the death of Bishop Alvernus, the open conflict between mendicants and secular artists began at the University of Paris. The dispute between the first and the second Averroism escalated into the fields of theology and dogmatics due to the sophistic attack on the Commentator. Under Bonaventure’s leadership, Rufus’s philosophical school was constituted as an independent school at the newly established university chair of mendicants orders. The first Faculty of really modern Arts was established by the papal Bull *Quasi lignum vitae* dated to 14. 4. 1255. This bull was issued ten days after the beginning of the pontificate of pope Alexander IV and abolished the previous bull of the pope Innocent IV, which had been issued in favor of the secular magisters (*Etsi animarum*, 21. 10. 1254). They were represented in the dispute by Rector Wilhelm. The commentators certainly noticed the shift in the phraseology of Alexander IV. The new bull took advantage of papal plenary power over the university to enforce authoritarian requirements.[[39]](#footnote-39) The pope supported the philosophical sophists in their dispute with the school of the first Averroism by changing the academic conditions for issuing *licentia docendi*. Both Rufus and Bonaventure were elevated to the ranks of magister due to papal suppression of academic protests coming from secular magisters in the rue du Fouarre. In view of the already interpreted character of the entire dispute, this was an absolutely necessary step for modernity to take its victorious path. In the same year when the mendicant branch of modernists was formed at the University of Paris, the artistic secular masters from the rue du Fouarre ordered the compulsory teaching of *De anima* (1255). The defenders of authentic secularized science had to prevent the misinterpretations of this scripture on the newly established chair of modern *illuminati*. Above all, the authentic Aristotelians defended the unity of the person, which is indispensable for the Christian doctrine of faith. Defense of the unity of the person and its free existence made *raison d′être* of the University founded by Blund’s school. They stood against neoplatonic Aristotelianism of David of Dinant (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3). Aristotelians had to act academically against authoritarian sophists. Modern definition of man disintegrated into the specific corpse composed of several substances. They recognized their own mythological ideas instead of the real world. In the same year, the official dispute between the mendicants and the artists culminates in the rue du Fouarre, which was represented by the Magister Guillelmus de Sancto Amore as the speaker of secular artistic masters and a well-known commentator of *First* and *Second Analysics*. Let us hope that Wilhelm’s commentaries on *Analytica* receive a critical publication that would prove that this magister belonged to the school of the first Averroism.[[40]](#footnote-40) This would complete the missing interpretation of *Second analytics* from this school. Wilhelm’s work *De periculis novissimorum temporum* (1256) casts doubt on teaching authority of mendicant masters at the University of Paris and attacks the principles of evangelical poverty that they defend.[[41]](#footnote-41) After the attack on Averroistic representatives of mendicant orders, this master and rector had to go into academic exile from the artistic faculty in 1256. The anonymous work of sonnets *Il Fiore* (about 1286) describes William together with Siger of Brabant as a victim of mendicant orders (*Il Fiore* 92.9‒14). The campaign of secular philosophers against the modernists in the years 1253–55 ended just as ingloriously as academic career of Siger of Brabant. Wilhelm’s pupils Gérard d’Abbeville and Nicolas de Lisieux continued the criticism of mendicant modernists and had to leave together with the rector of the rue du Fouarre (Baeumker 1898, 62–64). This triple alliance of masters formed the core of the group of the first Averroism. In the next round of quarrels one generation later, they received the name “Sigerists” (*pars Sigeri*) after their top representative Siger of Brabant. Siger was rector of the Parisian secular artists in the critical phase of the dispute after the year 1270 and took the same end as Magister Wilhelm. Siger’s brilliant analysis of *De anima* and his criticism of Aquinas and Albert will be analyzed in the next matrix. The attack of modernists on secular masters in the rue du Fouarre was inevitable, because the logic of the Excluded Third had changed into an authoritarian struggle. The bastion of critical thinking of secular priests and magisters, who interpreted *Corpus* *Aristotelicum* according to the Commentator, had to fall. Only at this price sophistic modernity could conquer the Latin West. After the destruction of secular masters in the rue du Fouarre, a new version of secularization began. It was completed by death of modern God and today’s nihilism.

The year 1255 represents for many reasons a key turn in the development of the dispute between the first and the second Averroism. The influential and charismatic Magister Bonaventure, together with Rufus, who was working in Paris at the time, sent the dispute between the two schools to a new phase. The new wave of the second Averroism, under Bonaventure’s leadership, opened the attack on Averroes. The school of Bonaventure and Rufus created an averroistic image of the Commentator according to their own distorted thinking. Such a diabolic creature was really terrible; also they had to declare their own product to be heretic. The modernists rejected the Averroistic doctrine of the numerically separated intellect, which they had invented themselves. Therefore, they had to make a attack on their own simulacrum in accordance with Freud’s defense mechanism *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*. In contrast to implicitly Christian conception of Neoplatonic Avicenna, Averroes’s Aristotelian metaphysics cannot be harmonized with Augustinism; nor with Neoplatonism; nor with Neoplatonic schools of medieval Falsafa (Avempace); nor with Neoplatonic schools of Jewish wisdom (Avicebron). The same thing had already been stated by Bishop Alvernus long before Bonaventure. Averroes, as the most exalted philosopher, was separated from Neoplatonic “*sequaces Aristotelis*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). The educated chancellor of the University of Paris rejected the attack on the unity of the person as heresy, condemning it in the name of authentic Aristotelianism of the Blund′s school. Christian doctrine of man was defended by the writings of Averroes imported at that time (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). That is why Rufus had no success in Paris with his accusation in the writing *Contra Averroem* (about 1236). His Parisian apology *Speculum animae* (about 1245) failed as well. The change in assessment of the Commentator’s occurred almost instantly after the death of bishop Alvernus. The school of second Averroism at the University of Paris was able to get out of academic illegality that had lasted more than a decade. The attack of modernists on Averroes’ simulacrum indicates the epochal turn of the new metaphysics and, for hermeneutic archaeology, indicates the place and the time when *via Modernorum* came into official existence. Bonaventure’s school sets the scientific revolution in motion on academic actualized by launching the official attack on Averroes as an Averroist, right away after death of Alvernus. The modernists especially criticize Averroes’s rejection of Neoplatonic exemplars, the theory of philosophically possible eternal duration of the world and supposed numerical unity of the intellect for all people. Bonaventure’s lectures set in motion the philosophical dispute between the secular Aristotelians from the rue du Fouarre and the religious modernists. The latter were grouped around the magisters, who were preparing the foundation of an independent chair of mendicant orders in Paris. The school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre basically criticized Rufus and Bonaventure’s distortion of Averroes’s teaching and the introduction of various substances in man. As an eminent student from Blund’s and Alvernus’ school, Albert took up the side of the magisters from the rue du Fouarre and supported their criticism of modernists in a diplomatic and academic way. But because he himself belonged to the Dominican Order, he did not directly name any of these magisters. Fortunately, Roger Bacon, who was persecuted by modernists, did not have these inhibitions. He preserved for us the course and the actors of this gigantomachie about the substance that decided the further fate of the Latin West.

Bonaventure began his lectures in 1245 and he had to observe the decree of bishop Alvernus, which forbade teaching the heretical doctrine of the separated cosmic intellect that directly influenced human cognition. This had to be kept and at the same time the Commentator had be transformed from an eminent “*philosophus nobilissimus*” into a heretic disfigured as “*philosophus pessimus*.” The theory of cognition, given by denudation and illumination, required the hypostased and substantial *intellectus agens*, which acted on the human receptive component of the intellect given in potency. The school of *sophistae Latini* tried desperately and in vain to separate this simulacrum of the divided intellect from the cosmic form of *intellectus agens*. Alvernus described it as heretical doctrine that followed the pantheism of David of Dinant. The modern “*sequaces Aristotelis*” could only hold on to the plurality of forms in man and to universal hylemorphism at the cost of preserving the primacy of Avicenna's metaphysics. However, his epistemic schema was given by the emanation of forms linked to the substantial and divided active intellect (*Dator formarum*). Avicenna’s Neoplatonism, which was supported by the Toledo school, was criticized in principle both by Blund and, after him by the Sicilian school of the first Averroism, which dominated the University of Paris until the year 1250. The attack on Averroes as Averroist could therefore begin after the departure of bishop Alvernus. The second phase of the struggle against Averroes began after Rufus’s second arrival at the Franciscan College in Paris after the year 1253, where Bonaventure was already lecturing as regent of studies. Bonaventure and Rufus created an Averroistic simulacrum of Averroes, which they combined with Avicennian doctrine about the numerically uniform intellect in the mode of universal hylemorphism. The first version of that sophistic criticism is presented in the following part of Bonaventure’s commentary on the Second book of Sentences, written about the year 1252.

“The soul is inviolable. It is not necessary to individualize it, because it can only be given in a single exemplaire that is numerically one (*una numero conservari possit*). That was the position of the Commentator in his commentary on *De anima* (…) Whenever one takes such a view, it is the worst evil and heresy (*pessima est et haeretica*). In fact, it goes against the Christian religion because it takes away the just reward for good and evil. This would not be possible if the soul were numerically uniform for all people. It also goes against common sense. It is clear that the intellectual part of the soul can be intelligible only in the mode of man’s perfection, in that by which he is human.” [[42]](#footnote-42)

The very first sentence shows that Averroes must have been a pantheistic thinker as was condemned David of Dinant. According to Bonaventure, such notion of the soul has all the signs of Platonic idea (*incorruptibilis, non indiget multiplicari, cum una numero conservari possit*). The nonsense about the numerical unity of soul made of Averroes not only an Averroist, but also a modern heretic. The conclusion sophistically states that the intellectual soul as notion is taken in the sense of its actuality (*anima intellectiva, ut intellectiva*) and its perfection in man (*perfectio hominis*) from the point of view of Porretan definition of man (*secundum quod homo*). Bonaventure assigns the Commentator to followers of modern teaching about the numerically uniform intellect in all people. Than, he considers that teaching to be “*pessima, heretica, contra christianam religionem*.” Bonaventure had first turned this Arabic Aristotelian into a Neoplatonist, then into a Porretan in the manner of universal hylemorphism, then into a Christian and finally condemned him as a heretic. This demagogic approach was condemned by Grosseteste when he criticized the criticism of Aristotle practiced at Rufus’s school in Oxford around 1235 (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). Once again, the history of the second Averroism can be seen through Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s effects in Oxford and then in Paris. The criticism of the Philosopher was replaced by the criticism of the Commentator. The argument of the cancellation of personal responsibility for deeds by a just reward for good and evil was first used by Alvernus against the Latin sophists from the school of the second Averroism, who defined the intellect as a substance in the mode of universal hylemorphism and thus made it numerically uniform (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.3). In this, Alvernus relied on the teaching of Averroes as the most exalted philosopher. He created an authentic version of Aristotelianism, which was the only one compatible with Christian doctrine.

Bonaventure took up the same reasoning and demagogically set it against the Commentator. Thus, from the year 1252, the fundamental dispute between the mendicants and the secular magisters was inevitable. The first Averroism stated in the person of Albert that there was no point in studying the doctrine of the numerically uniform intellect in the mode of universal hylemorphism. The sophistry of Latins is completely nonsensical and comes from thinkers who have not understood the writing CMDA (*non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Albert’s work *De unitate intellectus*, which was written around the year 1256, represents the last attempt at a dialogue with the representatives of *doctores* *Latini* on the question of intellect and cognition (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Then this scholar was already breaking his stick over this group of sophists at the University of Paris, not believing in any meaningful dialogue with the second Averroism. This also corresponds to the further course of the already open dispute with the group of modernist *Averroistae* after 1260 that Bacon described in his later writings (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). The new and mixed group of sophistic and learned Latins came into being about 1260. They came from the group of semiaverroists thinkers as were the secular masters (Henry of Ghent). They joined the circle of mendicants and religious academicians that rejected the Avicennistic Neoplatonism and the dualism of substances in man (Aegidius Romanus, Thomas Aquinas). Both of the last-named semiaverroists thinkers made part of the first Averroism. They criticized the modernists, but took up the doctrine of Averroes as an Averroist that Rufus and Bonaventure introduced. Siger of Brabant condemned in the name of the first Averroism erroneous interpretation of CMDA made by Aegidius and Thomas. Hermeneutics gave this brilliant Aristotelian the honorary title of *Doctor Invidiosus* (Dante) and returned to him the title of *Expositor Novus*, which had been awarded to him in the academic dispute against Aquinas (ch. 4.4.3). This title was denied to Siger by modernists after their perfectly executed *damnatio memoriae*. The previous chapter has explained that Bonaventure’s project of metaphysics was conceived as ontotheology connected with biblical theology and with Christological dogmatics. This is another reason why the metaphysics of Aristotle and Averroes belong in dustbin of history, according to this Doctor of the Church. The two critised thinkers designed the secular way of understanding and they separated theology and philosophy. The quoted teaching on the soul is clearly contrary to the unity of the person. It shows that Bonaventure belongs to the group of *sophistae Latini*. Parisian Franciscan professed the tradition of substantial definition of the soul that was advanced about the year 1240 by Adam of Buckfield and Rufus of Cornwall in Oxford (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). According to universal hylemorphism advanced by Bonaventure, the human soul being a substance, it must possess a material fundament, because it is a composition of essence and existence.

“The rational soul, because it is substance (*hoc aliquid*), is born as such to act and to gain experience, to move and to be moved (*per se nata subsistere et agere et pati*). It carries within itself the basis of its existence and the material principle (*habet intra se fundamentum suae existentiae et principium materiale*), from which it takes the act of existence (*a quo habet existere*), and the formal principle (*et formale*), from which it has the existence (*a quo habet esse*). This cannot be said of the animal, since it is corporally established.” [[43]](#footnote-43)

The human soul is defined on the basis of Boethius’s difference between essence and existence (*quo est et quod est*). The real subsistence of this individual first substance (*hoc aliquid*) includes the soul of man in the sense of the autonomous act of existence in the body (*principium materiale, a quo habet existere*). The soul is in and of itself a hylemorphic substance and a form capable of eternal existence (*a quo habet esse*). This being of the soul as an autonomous hypostasized “form—substance” separates it from the animal. Albert rejected this sophistic appeal to Boethius’s definition of substance for the definition of both the soul and the intellect (*dicunt Boetium dicere, quod in omni quod est circa primum, est hoc et hoc*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). By introducing substantial definition of the soul, Bonaventure joined the Oxford school of second Averroism, since he rejected Avicenna’s definition of the soul as a mere form and transformed it into an independent substance in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Now it becomes clear who Albert attacked in the ongoing dispute between the first Averroism and the modernist mendicants. Moreover, Bonaventure considers the determination of the subsistence of the soul according to Buckfield and Rufus to be insufficient. He added to the substantial definition of the soul another determination according to *materia spiritualis*. He is perhaps even the first author of the second Averroism, which went so far in the objectification of the soul and the intellect. The following quotation shows one of the sources of the dispute about Averroism. The soul and the intellect became Rufus’s objective being and a substance of the third kind.

“The principle by which the existence of every creation as such is determined (*fixa existentia creaturae in se*) is given materially. Therefore, it is necessary to allow that the human soul also consists of matter (*animam humanam materiam habere*). But this matter stands above the being of the matter given as extension that is subjected to defectiveness and vulnerability. That is why it is spiritual matter (*dicitur materia spiritualis*).” [[44]](#footnote-44)

The form must take the matter (see Rufus’s notion “*exsistere*”), because this is the only way to ensure the stability of existence (*fixa existentia*). The objectively given existence of the third kind corresponds to “*species obiecti exsistentis*” of Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). Spiritual matter (*materia spiritualis*) ensures the subsistence of human soul as an immaterial substrate, as an “exsisting” substance. The teaching on plurality of substances in man was transferred from Oxford to Paris. The matter given outside of bodily extension (*supra esse extensionis*) objectively fixes existence. That was shown in the dispute between Albert and learned Latins about “*esse ratum*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). As a result, there were three substances in man, the hylemorphic, the soul and the intellect, which Albert considers total nonsense in the cited writings published about the year 1255.

Bonaventure’s hylemorphic theory of the soul includes all basic signs that Albert’s writings against Averroists criticized. The soul is an individual substance; it is defined by Boethius’s difference used in a sophistic way; this hylemorphic pseudo-substance contains spiritual matter on an intellectual level. Therefore, Bonaventure must change not only Aristotle’s, but even Avicenna’s thesis, according to which the human intellectual soul is the immaterial form of the body. The following quotation shows the fundamental error of modernity, which creates an averroistic simulacrum of *intellectus possibilis*. The fundamental properties of the intellect, such as inviolability and separation from matter (*intellectus est impassibilis et impermixtus*), must be changed with regard to the newly introduced *materia spiritualis*.

“To those who object that the intellect is immaterial and separate from the senses, it must be said that the Philosopher takes physical matter out of the intellect in the sense of privation and the possibility of transformation into another being. But he does not take away from the intellect the universal determination of matter (*non removet materiam universaliter*). However, he claims, on the other hand, that the intellect has a nature by which it actively creates and passively accepts (*natura, qua est facere, et qua est fieri*).” [[45]](#footnote-45)

The quotation conceives the immateriality of the intellect in the context of substance, i.e. as the absence of the transformation given on the material substrate (*sub privatione et sub potentia ad transmutationem*). Bonaventure, professing universal hylemorphism, must protect the material character of the soul and intellect as an independent substance. In contradiction to Aristotelianism, the next sentence adds that supposedly the thesis about the universally given matter also applies to Aristotle (*Philosophus ... non removet materiam universaliter*). Bonaventure created dualistic Interpretation of the key passage about the two components of the intellect (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14‒15). He identifies the universally given matter of the third kind with the receptive potency of the soul (*natura ... qua est fieri*). The possible intellect makes the second kind of matter and it is receptive in a similar way (*similiter*). Averroes defines this faculty of the soul as *intellectus possibilis*, which is, of course, immaterial and not a component of sensually determined cognition. The simulacrum of matter solved this dispute sophistically in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Instead of real matter there is its modern counterpart in the objective mode. Let us recall the key quote from CMDA regarding *intellectus materialis*, in which the terms “*consimile*” and “*simile*” reject the nature of soul and intellect as substance.[[46]](#footnote-46) Bonaventure in fact rejected Aristotelianism due to sophistic interpretation of *De anima*, which the masters in the rue du Fouarre certainly knew well. This eminent modernist solved the difference between the passive and the active faculty of the soul by putting the material and the intellectual substance in its place. The writing CMDA defines *intellectus possibilis* as immaterial faculty of *anima intellectiva* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). It is not even a form, but a merely potential capacity of the soul, since the soul is the form of the body. Since the soul has an immaterial character, the classical definition of Aristotelian matter fell under the table. It was replaced by Avicebron’s matter as a *tertium ens* that modernity understands universally and spiritually. From the point of view of Aristotelianism, the matter of the third kind is a clear sophistic fallacy, and this for several reasons. The scripture *Metaphysics* actually gives to *prima materia* the status of universally understood substance. Let us take the example of bronze as one for all objects made out of bronze (*Met*. 1015a9) to be primary and universal (ὅλως πρώτη) material substrate. It shows that Aristotle conceives this substance either material or as a mere concept in thinking. Matter cannot be a being of the third kind, because it has no possibility of existence in such form. The following remark probably shows the only passage from *Metaphysics* from which modernity could indirectly derive the relationship of the first substance to the soul as a substance.[[47]](#footnote-47) The text defines the substantive predicates (“man”, “soul”, “body”) and the accidental attributes (“formed”, “white”) with regard to the second substance as the final substrate of the categorical determination. He separates this predication of matter from its actualization within the framework of material substance (οὐσία ὑλική, *Met*. 1049a36). However, in both cases the first substance is only on the side of the actually existing substances as the primary basis of further determinations (τί ἐστι πρῶτον) and of the first substance as a single thing (τόδε τι). Modernists as Bonaventure and Descartes after them, they adopted from Neoplatonists and Porretans the concept of hypostasized being of the third kind. They assembled and disassembled the person as the first substance like dominoes into individual hypostases. These hypostases possess the character of the first substance. Both quotations from Bonaventure’s commentary on the second book of Sentences show that the attack on Averroes is connected with a new definition of the soul. This view is incompatible with the theory of CMDA and has all the signs of the heresy, which Alvernus rejected in the group of “*sequaces Aristotelis*.” According to the Blund′s school, the soul as a form represents an entelechic principle, which animates the organism as a holistic unit, see Abelard’s term “*totum integrum*” (OBJ II, Kap. 1.3). In the age of critical thinking based on common sense, definition of the person could not consist of a modern collection of hypostases and dubious substances, as is the case today.

By introducing the spiritual matter into the dispute about Averroism, Bonaventure created another objectively determined nonsense that is still discussed to this day. It is numerical unity or numerical multiplicity of the intellect. Peddling that sofistic theory, the objectivists cleverly covered the original point, which was the false or correct interpretation of CMDA. Averroes would have rejected the thesis about a numerical individualization of the intellect by matter as absolute nonsense. The radical form of the second Averroism exported from Oxford defines *anima intellectiva* as a composite of two substances given under the universal hylemorphism. Bonaventure has a hypostasized pseudo-material soul and so does the intellect. Bonaventure defends the approach of the second Averroism in the question of the plurality of the substantial determinations of the soul, which even cancels Avicenna's definition of the soul as the primary form of the body. This thesis would even abolish the Neoplatonic status of the intellect, which is immaterial in nature. The universal and at the same time substantial matter objectively states that, thanks to spiritual nature of matter, the soul has no *extensio* as a material body. This allows a definition of the soul as a Porretan substance and its numerical separation from the other forms, including the extensive hylemorphic body. The first Averroism of Albert and Bacon considered this view ridiculous or insane. Albert even argues against the modernists from the position of Avicenna, for whom the soul was merely a form of the body and not a hylemorphic substance. In the above-quoted critique of universal hylemorphism, Albert emphasized that Latins understand Avicenna’s definition of the soul as a substance (*hoc aliquid*), whereas for Avicenna it represented only a form. For this reason, Grosseteste condemned Rufus’s school at Oxford, which had introduced this modern dualism about the year 1235. Bonaventure defended in Paris precisely this substantial conception of the soul in the mode of universal hylemorphism.[[48]](#footnote-48) His commentary, in sophistic agreement with *De anima*, asserts that objective definition of the soul made in the mode of universal hylemorphism fully satisfies the definition of the intellectual human soul given in the mode “*inmixtus*”. The objectively material soul does not consist of parts that are given in the framework of classical matter.

“The soul is therefore not material with regard to the other forms in the sense of its own parts, since such parts would require further parts to complete them. By such a type of composition the real being of the thing is taken around itself. The soul is therefore material in more simplistic manner (*simplicior est*) because it lacks quantitative determinations of the parts (*ad privationem partium quantitativarum*).” [[49]](#footnote-49)

Thanks to its material simplicity, the soul exists more simply as a hypostased and substantial form, which is individualized in the mode of *materia spiritualis*. The act of subsistence is bound to the soul as a quasi-substance composed of form and substance of the third kind. In the next reply to objections, Bonaventure expressly rejects the criticism of the first Averroism, which defines only the hylemorphic substance and does not recognize any being of the third kind. The new conception formed the soul as being of the third kind, see the preceding objections of Albert and Bacon. The following quote presents the philosophical core of the dispute over Averroism that came to light through the publication of Bonaventure’s first commentary on Sentences in the years 1252–53. Its publication unleashed academic disputes at the University, which subsequently morphed to power struggles in the years 1255–56. Then Modernists won by setting up their own chair and opened the successful path to disintegration of the Paris University that copied the disintegration of the person in the school of *Modernorum*. The modern dualism of body and soul has the following character.

“The soul is composed of matter and form (*anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma*) and it has the aspiration (*appetitum*) to perfect the natural body. Similarly, the physical body as a single thing consists of matter and form, which have the aspiration (*appetite*) to keep the soul.” [[50]](#footnote-50)

Bonaventure knows that in metaphysics only the first substance exists real and actual (*ens completum*), which is universally predicted in the second substance. According to the first Averroism, everything else is categorically excluded under the logical punishment of the Excluded Third (*ita venit ad constitutionem tertii*). In the mode *per se* and *simpliciter*, only real first and categorical second substances exist. Bonaventure only partially agrees with this categorical assertion (*hoc est verum generaliter*). Therefore, following the example of Rufus’s objective being of the third kind, he created the corresponding modern subject of the third kind (*anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma*). The objective Adam of modernity arose *ex nihilo* by taking spiritual matter and mytological form to start its miraculous existence in modern philosophy. Bonaventure retold the Platonic and the much older myth of two halves of man that finally come together through the accomplished desire of one *tertium ens* for the other. The soul puts an end to its hunger for the body (*appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam*), and the body attains perfection in the soul as a form (*appetitum ad suscipiendam animam*). Everything takes place in the Neoplatonic scenario of two hypostasized Porretan substances. Both subsistent entities search each other, since each of them has an appetite for the second one. The same scenario applies to both the soul and the body, because both are hylemorphic compositions. This biblical book *Cantica canticorum* made part of the basic repertoire of the mystical reading of the Scripture. In the perspective of mystical sense of Scripture, the beloved no longer seeks a beloved, but the awakened soul seeks Christ, as it does the entire Church as the bride of Christ. This was the interpretation of *Canticum* created by the founder of the Cistercian order Bernard of Clairvaux in his sermons around the year 1135 (*Sermons in Cantica canticorum*). The literary gifted Bonaventure transformed the biblical *Song of songs* into metaphysics.

The preceding matrices have interpreted the twofold form of unconcealment (*alētheia*) of Averroes’s original metaphysics according to the Toledo and to the Sicilian school. Hermeneutics must examine if Bonaventure’s definition of the receptive and synthesizing intellect falls under Albert’s criticism that was summarized in the rejected doctrine of “*opinio Latinorum*”. After the rejection of Averroes as a heretic, Bonaventure saw no difference between the *tertium* and *quartum genus* according to CMDA. The definition of man has broken down into two separate substances. The soul, defined as a substance of the third kind, has no possibility of existence. Averroes defined the immaterial intellect as a faculty of the soul. It differs fundamentally from Bonaventure’s concept of the intellect as a substance. The Serafinian teacher belonged to the group of *sophistae Latini* rejected by Alvernus and he sophistically accused Averroes of a falsely constituted dualism. Representatives of the first Averroism used for the first time the term “*Averroistae*” to determine the group of Latin sophists around Bonaventure and Rufus. This was at the time of the battle for domination of the Artistic faculty in the rue du Fouarre in the years 1253–55. The fundamental objection of the first Averroism in the line of CMDA concerns the unity of the person that disintegrated into two or three substances. In addition, the connection of the substances to a wholeness of the person has only an accidental and not an essential character. The unity of body and soul is defined at Bonaventure according to the Neoplatonic *colligatio*. The connection between body and soul as two substances is given only at the level of appetite related to the body, which wants to take the soul as a form (*habet appetitum ad suspiciendam animam*). The reason of indirect unity of the person is given by modern Averroism. The material and the immaterial substance have no possibility to connect with each other in a direct way. The theory of appetite has shown that the Bonaventure understands the unity of man as a primary metaphysical disposition, which is inserted into the two separate substances in the form of neoplatonic and mystically Christian symbolism (*praeexigit in componentibus appetitum et inclinationem*). This symbolic unity of the person in the mode “*inclinatio*” follows the dialogue *Symposium*; man and a woman are engaged in the erotic search to find the missing half of each other (ἕκαστος οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον...ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο, *Symp*. 191d1‒5). The unity of the modern subject is given as Platonic *sūmbolon*, which is quite sufficient for the modern humanism of human person as a corpse. Bonaventure’s definition of the person is not Aristotelian, that is, on the level of entelechy of the hylemorphically given individual first substance. Bonaventure divided the substantial form of the person into the plurality of hypostased substances, which were built on the principle of universal hylemorphism. The emergence of the modern dualism of soul and body makes use of one quotation taken from *Categories, Second Analytics* and *De anima* 414b31. This statement uses the comparison of the triangle inscribed in a quadrilateral for the connection of the various properties of the soul and the body. The difference between the interpretation of this passage between Jean de la Rochelle (*Summa de anima*, cap. 26, 6–13) and Rufus (*In De anima* 1.1.7)shows that the unity of modern subject is made in the mode of geometric abstraction both in Paris and in Oxford at that time. Influenced by the reasoning of Oxfordian Fallacy, the generation of Parisian objectivists from the ranks of the second Averroism transformed the mystical connection of soul and body into an analytical and geometric deduction in the mode of “*inclinatio.*” Bonaventure adopted Rufus’s analytical unity of the person and thereby triggered the next wave of polemics about the unity of the person.[[51]](#footnote-51) The quoted passage from Bonaventure’s commentary on Sentences substantiated the discussed argument of the unity of forms in the subsequent dispute over Averroism around 1270. Albert used Bonaventure’s quoted argument from *De anima* 414b31 in the spirit of CMDA, let us see his commentary on *De anima* (*In De Anima* 5, 126a). Albert, however, in the spirit of CMDA, uses only the term “*quidditas*”. He made a statement about the intellect and mental abilities in the mode *quartum genus*, which is given in the past character of the predication originally determined by the existential act of the person (*tertium genus*). Then the comparison applies in the univocal generic mode of logical abstraction. It was a mistake that Siger explained to Albert (ch. 4.4.4). Semiaverroist Aquinas already uses this deduction *univoce*, because he conceives the intellect as a hypostasized form (*Quaestiones disputatae De anima*, q. 8; *De unitate intellectus* 2.49). However, Albert and Aquinas took the definition of the person as a dubious composition of two or three substances to be absolutely unacceptable, because it abolished the substantial unity of the human person. Bonaventure transferred the geometric proof in the mode of false univocity to a completely different genre that entails the existential act of existence. Such a unity of the person was a pure sophistry for the first Averroism, because it denied the argumentation of *Second Analytics*. Due to the teaching and publication of the first two parts of Bonaventure’s commentary on Sentences, a new dispute about the plurality of substances in humans flared up at the University of Paris no later than the year 1253. It was further deepened by the arrival of the modern sophist Rufus from Oxford in Paris in the same year. The masters in the rue du Fouarre defended the philosophical unity of the real existing person. They made the predikation of the real person by the imposition, that is, as *tertium genus*, in the existential mode “*ipse*” according to CMDA. The Paris school of *Averroistae* prepared the creation of the new chair established in 1255. In the same time they formed the official Averroism, which previously Rufus and Kilwardby had proclaimed in Oxford since the year 1250. Then these modern *sophistae Latini* accused Averroes of their own mistakes with the help of the defense mechanism of *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*.

We have cited Albert’s negative standpoint and his criticism with regard to *opinio Latinorum* due to the plurality of substances in man. The receptive component of the intellect is not a substance for two reasons. First, Aristotelian unity of the immaterial intellect and the material body is given in the mode of *proportio*, which establishes the theory of truth as the correspondence of reality and the intellect. This concept of truth–*adaequatio* determines the scientific recognition of the person and excludes the truth–*coequatio* or truth–*rectitudo*. They are given in the univocal framework of hypostasized genera and species. Secondly, according to CMDA, the similarity between intellectual and sensual cognition is ensured by the formal causality given by the diaphanum in the passive intellect (*simile formae, simile materiae*). All types of mystical and mythological analogy that defines the unity of the person only as metaphorical and homonymous similarity. Such “unity” cannot establish categorical predication of Aristotle and Averroes and his school in the rue du Fouarre since there is no scientific demonstration available. Critical Aristotelian philosophy cannot live on Platonic fairy tales for pious academic people. Since the person exists as a hyparchical substance, it is necessary to state it as the *univoce* given second substance. The unity of cognition must have a causal connection with reality; otherwise it is not true as scientific deductive proof. Therefore, *intellectus possibilis* has the immaterial character of the mental potency given in the body and it is not a substance. Bonaventure rejected the teaching of first Averroism since he hold the duality of two or even three substances in man. However, the Serafinian teacher has no problem at all to reject the numerical unity of the intellect in all people, which he mistakenly attributed to Averroes. The immaterial intellect is finally individualized by the spiritual matter. Moreover, its individuality is given as a subsistence in the fundamental distinction between essence and existence à la Boethius. By introducing the individualization of intellect through the objective form of matter, a completely unnecessary and false dispute arose about the numerical unity of intellect. Modern sophists such as Rufus and Bonaventure, due to their fundamental ignorance of Averroes′s philosophy, attributed this simulacrum to the Commentator. Albert had already integrated all of Averroes’s postulates in *De homine* into the figure of the speculative intellect (*intellectus speculativus*), which carries out a synthesis between individual thinking and universal content (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). After the publication of the first part of this work, Albert was appointed as the master at the University of Paris. The work *De homine* was written in Paris at the same time as the first version of the Oxfordian Fallacy that was distributed by Rufus and Kilwardby. At that time, the Averroism of Bonaventure’s school was gradually spreading in the environment of compilers *Summa Halensis*, which entered the academic world after the year 1245. In this year, Bonaventure started his public lectures at the University of Paris. In the same year, it came to an exchange of the Franciscan *magister regens* and defeated Rufus returned to Oxford soon after. For the same reason and in the same year, Kilwardby, who was also defeated, follows him after Albert’s criticism in the Dominican College in Paris. That is why Bacon dates the emergence of modernist teaching in Oxford to the year 1250. It was the period 1245–50 when the modernists moved to Oxford from Paris. Diligent *illuminati* Bonaventure and Rufus successfully introduced the hypostased concept of the soul and intellect in the mode of universal hylemorphism at the University of Paris in 1253–55. Albert was already in Cologne at that time and considered this solution of the second Averroism to be absolutely ridiculous. Therefore, he refused any discussion with the modernists. He could do this quietly in Cologne at the Dominican College, but by no means at the University of Paris. The reason for this has been mentioned above, namely, the introduction of the universal hylemorphism and the plurality of substances in man. They had come to Paris from Oxford and laid the foundation for the school of *Averroistae*. According to the leading representatives of the first Averroism in Paris in the years 1240–50, the learned Latins did not understand the Commentator and thus Aristotle either. Therefore, contradictions of such a nature were presented in philosophy that their errors presented the essence of metaphysics as the first science and endangered the foundations of Christian nature of man, which bishop Alvernus had defended. This was the main reason why not only Bacon and Albert came out against the modernists, but the secular masters from the rue du Fouarre mentioned above. Aristotelians defended against modern Averroists the heritage of Alvernus as bishop and chancellor of the University. The aim of their criticism was above all Bonaventure’s teaching on the unity of the intellect, which is known from his second book of Sentences published in 1255. The Mendicants officially began to teach this point at their own faculty established in 1255. With the emphasis on hylemorphic unity of soul and intellect as “*hoc aliquid*,” the second Averroism cannot understand the difference between the passive and active potency of the one and the same intellect in the mode of “*potentia—actus*.” This difference forms the fundamental part of the reasoning of the first Averroism following the line of CMDA according to the Sicilian school.

Bonaventure starts from generally ascertainable immateriality of the intellect as the form of the body. This is the typical view of the Toledo school. Modernity has no definition of the soul as a form of the body; its definition of the soul as a substance includes an indivisible mix of potency and act. The first Averroism, of course, has a difference between the two acts of cognition, because the soul is not a substance, but a form of the body, which makes plurality of different faculties and performs passive and active activities. The Serafinian teacher, , carried out a key difference between the passive and the active component in the mode of universal hylemorphism, making use of immaterial intellect situated in spiritually conceived matter. The matter of the third kind was identified within the framework of Rufus’s “*potentia substantialis*” and, moreover, it changed into a spiritual matter. Then the modern *intellectus possibilis* acquired the objective and material character of a substance as *tertium ens*. Made in the substantial mode, *intellectus possibilis* became a mix of potency and actualization and it was numerically individualized by the spiritual matter. Bonaventure moved the purely receptive faculty of the intellect one floor lower, i.e. into the materially applied sensuality. With this he transformed Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* into the sensual and materially based *intellectus materialis* (νοῦς ὑλικός) according to Alexander and Themistius. In contrast, he elevated the soul one floor up, adding it to the cosmic intelligences by using a sophistical mention to Averroes. Aristotle’s *Physics* commented by Averroes (*In Phys. III*, q. 9) excludes a pure potency in the astral immaterial substances (*in perpetuis non differt esse et posse*). Bonaventure used this argument in the sophistic meaning with regard to material essence of the soul in the mode of *materia spiritualis*. According to David of Dinant, it is defined by conjunction of human *intellectus materialis* with its cosmic doppelganger given as cosmic potency. This primary cosmic matter forms a cosmic intellect of the third kind, given as a mix of the cosmic *intellectus agens* and the *intellectus possibilis*. According to Aristotle and Averroes, substantive actuality cannot be used to define the human soul. We are the body a we do not possess the metaphysical being of immaterial astral intelligences that are a pure subsistent and fully actualized form. Grosseteste used in Oxford the reference to the oldest Latin attested Averroes′s commentary on *Physics* to create the opposition of the first modern version of Averroism (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). As the author of the work *De anima et de potenciis eius*, he argued in a similar way against the disintegration of the person done by Porretans. The emergence of modern Averroism in sophistic interpretations of Averroes is set out in the following quotation.

“The philosopher asserts that 'actuality does not differ from potency in eternal substances.' Then the act and potency do not differ from each other, especially as the lower and the higher degree of potency. The soul is eternal, as is its intellect. Then, there is no difference between the receptive and the active part of the soul (*non est differentia potentiae possibilis ad agentem*).” [[52]](#footnote-52)

Bonaventure does not dwell on details in Aristotle’s reasoning and emphasizes his own sophistical conclusion, which he needs to defend the soul as a substance of the third kind. Each substance contains a mixture of actuality and potentiality. The intellect and the soul are individual human and cosmic substances *sui generis* and therefore have the potency and also the actuality that is given objectively as a universal one and subjectively as a hylemorphical one. The quotation introduces the matter of the third kind into the soul and intellect in the form of the hypostasized universalium and at the same time is held as individual “substance—potency.” Because of this mix, the difference between the receptive and the synthetic component of the intellect no longer existed (*ergo non est differentia potentiae possibilis ad agentem*). It was exactly that difference that Aristotle and Averroes emphasized. Aquinas took Bonaventure’s argument for the celestial intelligences, since these, as created beings, contain a mix of potency and actuality. Then, citing the Commentator, he created a new simulacrum of cosmic *intellectus possibilis* and attributed it to averroistic Averroes (ch. 4.5.1). Modernism followed the path of Alexandrians that both Averroes and Albert rejected. We have analyzed the corresponding passages from CMDA, in which Averroes rejects the status of *intellectus possibilis*, reduced to the mere *intellectus materialis*, as it was the case with Alexander Aphrodisias (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Averroes argumented against Themistios, Theophrastus and their modern version in the Falsafa (Ibn Bajja, Avicenna) that the passive intellect in man cannot be a substance (*hoc aliquid*). The first Averroism introduced the difference between passivity and activity into the personal immaterial intellect (*intellectus possibilis, agens*). These clearly distinguished acts of the intellect were united in the actualized act of being of the hylemorphic substance (*intellectus speculativus*). Outside of Averroes’s solution, there is no other true vision of the substantial unity of man to this day. Representatives of the first Averroism claimed right from the beginning that fact. For the modern Bonaventure, the person disintegrated into two complementary substances connected by symbolic appetite. The body is hylemorphically and physically given; intellect and soul exist hylemorphically and objectively. The soul, as an immaterial substance of the type “*hoc aliquid*,” cannot in modern times possess a purely passive potency on the type of Aristotle’s intellect as *tabula rasa* or as the pure act of “*fieri*.” According to Aristotle, the cognition of the intellect must be purely receptive in its intellectual component; otherwise the intellect would only recognize itself and not the world. The Serafinian teacher has no theory of the soul as a *tabula rasa* and works with a different concept of intellect than Aristotle’s *De anima* and subsequently the first Averroism. The quotations from *De anima* are taken into the objectivist paradigm of abstraction and into hypostasized cognition according to Avicenna and Oxfordian Porretans led by Rufus. Latin modernism and Cartesian postmodernism, inspired by Neoplatonic Falsafa, divided the person into two or more dissimilar hypostases. Each of these Porretan substances got its own act of subsistence. Being a modern Alexandrian, Bonaventure paved the path for postmodern Descartes.

Modern Averroism, built on the Aristotelianism of David of Dinant, endangered the Christian doctrine of the unity of person. The classically educated artistic masters saw this danger very well and rejected it in principle, following the example of bishop Alvernus. Instead of Aristotle, Neoplatonic Augustine made the main authority of modernists. If two people say the same thing, it is not the same thing. Let us see the classic quote from *De anima* about the primacy of sensual cognition that determines the intellect (*nihil est in intellectutu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*).[[53]](#footnote-53) Bonaventure comprehends Aristotle’s *tabula rasa* according to Augustine. Therefore, he limits the validity of this sentence only to the first floor of cognition, which is given by similarity in the framework of sensual abstraction (*esse in anima per similitudinem abstractam*). The key character is hidden in sophistical elaboration of Aristotle’s thesis, which is delivered immediately in the following sentence. The philosopher is praised for his previous assertion (*valde notabilitier dicit Philosophus, quod in anima nihil scriptum est*); but the following part restricts Aristotle’s teaching in an Avicennistic way by no means to the *tabula rasa* as such (this is the authentic interpretation of the first Averroism), but only to the sensually given contents (*nulla est in ea pictura vel similitudo abstracta*). According to the thesis about Avicenna’s “Flying Man”, Bonaventure presupposes that the hypostased and subsistent soul has its own actuality of thinking, established beyond the process of sensual abstraction. According to Avicenna and Augustine, the first principles of cognition are given in the soul by *illuminatio* and *memoria*. The real thing cannot quite truthfully determine cognition, because it is too contingent for this. The created soul must be illuminated by the divine source of knowledge, which imprints its part of the divine truth on the empty soul (*veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa*). Then the authorities of philosophy and theology agree together (*dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae*). The receptive component of the soul is exposed from the direction of modern sun-like God (*inseruit nobis Deus naturale judicatorium, ubi quid sit lucis*). The interpretation of *De anima* is done according to the second Averroism and according to Augustine. The intellect, with the help of the thing, establishes the similarity of the sensual forms and their eternal ratio (*similitudo abstracta*). This gives a twofold impression of veritative content, which, however, do not have the same value of truthfulness. The determination of cognition from the front, from direction of real things applies only to the first floor of Aristotelian similarity. The model of the exposure of the being from behind shows the hermeneutic way in which the being is given. According to Gilson, the Augustinian Avicennists lacked the fundamental insight into the constitution of Aristotelian understanding that is based on the correspondence of things and the intellect.[[54]](#footnote-54) Modernity rejected the passive principle of intellect given within the framework of its immaterial character. Gilson’s study precisely characterizes the basic dilemma of Bonaventure’s students, even if the author did not use the term “second Averroism” to designate this school. The concept of science as “*scientia certitudinalis*” requires the *illuminatio* outside the first substance, which the first Averroism (that Gilson mistakenly reduced to the Thomism) fundamentally rejected. The core of the dispute established by unclear statute of *intellectus possibilis* was completely repressed in the next decade, due to the epochal error of modernity. Averroes and the first Averroism rejected the obscurity of Avicenna and modern Avicennist contemporaries. But the mythology of the one truth and the one science was stronger than the criticism of Aristotelians. They did not prevent the epochal eclipse of the first substance defended in Porphyrios’ interpretation of the *Categories* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The basis of modern definition of the receptive intellect becomes the potency of the hypostased intellect, which has the ability to represent the already given species on a sensual or intellectual level.

“Either the active intellect understands, or it does not. If not, then you can not call him intellect or intellectual ability. If he understands, then it is true that the intellect can understand nothing but itself, that is, only the species that it carries within itself and compares with each other. Everything that can be understood as a species is a potency in some way. Therefore, the active intellect is also a possible one, to a certain extent (*intellectus agens est aliquo modo possibilis*). Therefore, it cannot be essentially separated from the possible intellect (*non dividitur per essentiam a possibili*).” [[55]](#footnote-55)

Bonaventure abolishes the receptive nature of *intellectus possibilis* and turns it into an actualized property, which is potentially capable of accepting the universal species as such (*omne illud quod est susceptibile speciei*). Instead of individual receptivity of *intellectus possibilis* as a faculty of the soul, receptivity arose as a contingent property (*aliquo modo*) of cognition. The reception of species is much better given in *intellectus agens*. From the point of view of the first Averroism, it is a nonsensical assertion. The concept of *intellectus agens* does not differ essentially from *intellectus possibilis* (*non dividitur per essentiam a possibi*li) even in the first Averroism, since not one of both intellects is a substance. So this is a flawed and nonsensical claim. In the first Averroism, the intellect is given in the soul as the ability of the existing person. The predication of the intellect as a substance would deny the entire argumentation of CMDA. This existential ability is given as an *actus* and it presents an *actus essendi* of the entelechical first substance. The soul is the one actualized and unique form of the person as a living substance, which in its unique being actualizes the various mental abilities given in the body. Bonaventure′s quotation starts from the definition of the soul as an individualized substance and insists on the substantial unity of both intellects (*ergo intellectus agens est aliquo modo possibilis*). The assertion “*aliquo modo*” belongs to the order of perfection of cosmic forms, whereby the human active intellect, in contrast to perfect cosmic forms, also needs the receptive and similarly hypostasized *intellectus possibilis*. The possible intellect then serves as spiritual matter, into which the higher forms are imprinted in a Neoplatonic way. Cognition is not defined by the difference between receptive potency and active synthesis in one and the same *anima intellectiva*, as was the case with the first Averroism. Modernism, following the example of David of Dinant, created two species of intellect as Porretan hypostases and quasi-material substances of the third kind, which it attributed on a cosmic level to averroistic Averroes. The higher intellect in man looks at the species directly through the illumination given by God or by the cosmic intellect. In this sense, the *intellectus possibilis* is only a limited capacity of the *intellectus agens*. In this scenario, the concept of *intellectus possibilis* has no activity of its own and it forms only a component of active intellect as its potency. The lower intellect, which is given as Aristotelian *intellectus materialis*, actualizes this species by abstraction from things. But this is the lower stage of intellectual cognition, which must be completed in the activity of *intellectus agens*. Then, in the mode of universal hylemorphism, it is true that the material *intellectus possibilis* recognizes Porretan species in the formally same mode as the immaterial *intellectus agens*. But because of higher degree of potentiality and changeability, which is given by Aristotelian abstraction, the material *intellectus possibilis* does not recognize in the same perfect way as the active intellect, which forms an independent hypostasis in the soul. Both forms of intellect are interchangeable from the point of view of their function, because they do the same thing, but in a different measure of potentiality.

Therefore, Bonaventure criticizes averroistic Averroes. He allegedly asserts that in the soul as a substance there are two subsistent hypostases, one purely potential and one purely active. The modernists rejected the division of the substantial intellect into two other substances, as did the first Averroism. But the Commentator also does not take the intellect as a form (this is the soul), much less as a substance. By introducing spiritual matter, the modernists changed potency into the active intellectual substance, thus dividing it into two tiers of higher and lower potentiality. By hypostasizing the soul and the intellect as a actualized substance, Bonaventure deprived himself of fundamental possibility to personalize the intellect with the help of metaphysical difference between the receptive and synthetic ability of *anima intellectiva* as a personal form of the body. Avicenna defended the soul as a form as well. Albert and Bacon drew attention of modernists to the fact that their conception of the soul was not even consistent with Avicenna’s definition of the soul as a form of the body according to the Toledo school (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.1). The debate concerns the nature of species discussed in the previous chapter. Aristotelian *species intelligibilis* and nominalist *species* as a universal-individual *scibile* possess a different metaphysical statute. In the epoch of the eclipse of the first substance, modernity requires the receptive component of cognition in the soul only for the sensual imagination. Modernists therefore rejected the most important conclusions of CMDA. The modern intellect individualized (and not personalized) through mytological *materia spiritualis* recognizes existing species given *univoce* both in the soul and in reality (*speciem illius habeat in se et penes se*). Modern intellect is completely schizophrenic; instead of two faculties of understanding (passive, active), it is separated in two nonsensical substances. Universal hylemorphic “immateriality” of intellect, thanks to double materiality, reflects all recognized species on two different levels: on the sensual and the intellectual. Sensually, the soul recognizes species through the process of Aristotelian abstraction; intellectually through Avicennian denudation. The reception differs by degree of potency and contingency, which includes the first and second step. Therefore, the intellectual level of cognition has two different degrees, as they were interpreted in the previous chapter (*intellectus resolvens plene, semiplene*). The active *intellectus agens* reflects permanent forms in the act of direct cognition. The receptive intellect receives these forms through their contingent appearance in species given in hylemorphic substances (universalia „*in re*“). Grosseteste introduced this difference between the direct intelectual intuition and the deductive syllogism in gnoseological dualism “*intellectus—scientia*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). The previous analysis of Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* has set out how the modern intellect reflects external reality through the univocal *scibile*. He first recognizes internal contents, forms and essences that are given in the act of direct insight; subsequently, they are reflected contingently by sensual reality (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). Bonaventure exchanged the individual receptive potency of the soul as a form of the body for the habitual faculty of the intellect. It absorbs the objective species and the *scibilia*. Albert rejected this reflection of objective species in the soul in the writing *De homine* (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.2). It is the scientific way of cognition according to *Second Analytics*. See the cited difference between the species as “*ratio rei*” and as “*accidents animae*”. Bonaventure changed the receptive intellect that Averroes considers ability of the soul, in the essentially conceived passive and active intellect. The first Averroism rejected Bonaventure’s substantial definition of the intellect. The person cannot be a sophistic connection of both components of cognition that present the modern intellect as a pseudo-material substance of the third kind. From the point of view of potency and act, both of intellectual faculties make part of *anima intellectiva*. Moreover, both faculties must be fundamentally separate from each other as far as their activity is concerned. Otherwise, the conception of truth as agreement would be invalid. In the first Averroism, the difference between *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* is based on metaphysical difference between the potency of cognition and the actuality of cognition, both given in the one soul as an immaterial form. The faculty of each soul (including the soul of animals) is the active and passive *operatio*. Both acts of the soul are clearly separated from each other from the point of view of potency or the act. Bonaventure abolished this difference and replaced it with the modern difference between the permanent essence and contingent existence. He attributed both forms of “exsistence” in the mode of universal hylemorphism to the Porretan hypostases and Rufus’s being of the third kind. The world of modernity and postmodernity is full of hypostasized essences, which can be put together and disassembled at will since they present different stages of subsistence (eternal, objective, sensual). The concept of “*exsistere*,” as it is given in the Oxfordian Fallacy, sees the world and the soul differently than the first Averroism. Bonaventure introduced the habitual component of the intellect as hypostasized cognition that exists before any contingent cognition in the mode *per prius*. He became an objective Averroist. Therefore, about the year 1252, he opens the radical attack on Averroes at the University of Paris. He took up Parisian relais of sophistic Rufus, who returned to Oxford, completely defeated. The secular magisters, Albert the Great and Bishop Alvernus as chancellor of the university, expelled Rufus as a sophist from Paris in 1250, because his philosophy was on the verge of the heresy of David of Dinant (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). This hardworking modernist survived in peace in Franciscan and Dominican Oxford, where he raised another generation of modernists. Then he returned to the University of Paris for five years, holding in his hand the papal *licentia ubique docendi*, continuing to proclaim modern sophistry. Rufus was most likely promoted to magister at the Mendicant Faculty around 1255, immediately when it was founded by a papal decree. This was a clear declaration of war to classic philosophy. From now on, it becomes fully understandable the nature of dispute in the years 1255–56 between Aristotelians from the rue du Fouarre and academic mendicants. Aristotelian logic of the Excluded Third was clear: if sophists like Rufus teach in Paris, then critical Aristotelians have no business there.

Bonaventure abolished the personal act of *intellectus possibilis* and replaced it with abstract possibility of cognition defined as a reflection of objectively given species. The contemplation of permanent forms is complemented by abstraction and denudation of the same contingent species given in reality. Their direct vision verifies the recognition already given in the mode of Augustine’s and Anselm’s *rectitudo*. That next step of cognition is made with the philosophical intuition of Avicenna (*hoc esse tantum*). Bonaventure directly observes Porretan species in the first substances. The modern intuition (*discrete* *videamus*) of non-existent *tertium ens* gave rise to the form of the one truth as a modern assimilation of non-existent species of the third kind. This is the *coaequatio* of Rufus and Bonaventure given in the mode of truth as theological-mystical *rectitudo* and Avicenna's *certitudo*. The following quotation establishes the objective value of species. They are considered *univoce* with regard to reality, to the senses and to both faculties of the intellect.

“The active intellect grasps the forms, and the possible intellect grasps the matter, since the possible intellect is intended for reception and the active intellect for abstraction. But the possible intellect is not completely passive, because it has to turn to the species that exists in the imagination. In the act of conversion, which is carried out with the help of the active intellect, he must take up this species and carry out the act of judgment. Meanwhile, the active intellect is fully in the act. He can not understand anything except himself, if he is not supported from the direction of the species. They are abstracted from the phantasms and the active intellect must be connected with them.” [[56]](#footnote-56)

Let us begin with the typical sentence of the first Averroism that mentions the species that are abstracted from phantasms (*adiuvetur a specie, quae abstracta a phantasmate*). The word “*species*” denotes an objective hypostasis and not the sensual and intelligible species of the first Averroism. In the second Averroism, the *intellectus possibilis* is not fully receptive (*nec intellectus possibilis est pure passivus*) because it does not perform an intentional act of reception of *species sensibilis* coming from the senses. This is not necessary, since the species is a being of the third kind and it can be recognized directly in its essence. This is the typical position in the teaching of Alfarabi, who put the exposure of the intellect from the front and from behind as equivalent (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2). But the soul must be passive in a radical way; otherwise it is not capable of universal cognition. See the fundamental objection which bishop Alvernus or Albert, as an important representative of the first Averroism, addressed to Rufus in Paris around the year 1245 (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). Bonaventure denied the pure passivity of the receptive intellect and has no intentionality in the form of mediating diaphanum according to CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Bonaventure has the same problem as Rufus and probably received a similar objection from magister and rector Wilhelm or from other artists in the rue du Fouarre around the year 1252. The quoted *intellectus possibilis* performs the act of cognition with the help of the active intellect, which denies its passivity (*se convertere, et convertendo per auxilium intellectus agentis illam suscipere, et de ea iudicare*). The quotation keeps a major indication for the emergence of modern dualism and the assimilation theory of truth. It denies the transfer of actuality from sensual species to intelligible ones. Univocal species simultaneously enter into the intellect: the one species is objectively-material (and thus contingent), and the second objectively-formal (and thus evident). Likewise, the active intellect is not purely active (*nec intellectus agens est omnino in actu*) because it absorbs the species (*adiuvetur a specie*), which, according to *De anima*, the passive intellect would have to do. The active intellect is only seemingly dependent on the passive component, since in reality both forms do the same thing. The reason for this is the Averroistic concept of the intellect as a potential and actualized substance of the third kind, as we analyzed it above.

The subsequent dispute over the cognition of the world had a principled character. Modernity endangered the Christian unity of the person that disintegrated into two dissimilar modern substances. Bonaventure′s and Rufus’s passive intellect possesses the active ability to go out of itself, and by its own power turns to the species stored in the Augustinian type of imagination and memory (*se convertere ... supra speciem existentiem in phantasmate*). This actualized subsistence of the intellect is the key problem of the second Averroism and of objectivity as a whole, since it presents the major case of *dativus auctoris*. The paranoid and schizophrenic modern subject is from the very beginning an autonomous creator of reality, instead of recognizing reality in the mode of the metaphysical dative, which is tied to fully receptive faculty of *intellectus possibilis*. As a result, purely receptive components of the intellect in the soul became superfluous. Actualization does not come from sensual experience, because the modern *intellectus possibilis* carries it *a priori* in itself, see Rufus’s term “*potentia substantialis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The objectively given species reaches over (*exsistit*) from the objective and universal “exsistence” into the sensual experience (*speciem existentiem in phantasmate*). According to the first Averroism, the species cannot exist either in the imagination or in the intellect, because it is not a porretanian substance of the third kind, but merely a potential and universal form of cognition, which is necessary for active synthesis of the concept. The difference between the *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* is given in Bonaventure by the difference between the two floors of cognition, and not by the difference between the two faculties of the soul. On the highest floor, eidetic cognition is given at the level of permanent hypostatic union with the Porretan species (*intellectus agens*). On the second, lower floor there is only the contingent recognition of this species abstracted from real things by the senses (*intellectus possibilis seu materialis*). Descartes transfers this dualistic version of modern cognition into postmodernism. By abolishing the purely receptive intellect as the faculty of the soul, Bonaventure abolished the only possibility of personal cognition. He cannot keep the theory of truth as a *proportio* between the personal senses and the personal intellect (*tertium genus* of Averroes). Bonaventure’s quotation states that this Latin scholar does not see any significant difference between the active and passive components of the intellect. The division between various kinds of cognition is determined either by the first form of receptive abstraction of the species from reality (*abstractio*), or by the second form of direct intellectual insight into the same species as hypostatic objective essence (*denudatio*). The first Averroism rejected the twofold abstraction on the level of the intellect for understandable reasons, since it presupposes Avicennist exposure of the being from behind, from the active intellect separated in one way or another. The sphere of Rufus’ and Bonaventure’s objectivity represents an Avicennist version of Averroism. This objectivity is sophistically linked to the process of cognition according to *De anima*. Cognition proceeds in the manner of emanations and comitations directly from God as Avicenna’s form giver. Bonaventure rejected the concept of God as a separate active intellect, which emits the flow of hypostasized forms (*Dator formarum*) into creation. He would have admitted the existence of universals outside of things and accept the entire Neoplatonic metaphysics of emanations in *Liber de causis*. Moreover, not even five years had passed since the death of chancellor Alvernus, who had officially condemned the theories about the separated *intellectus agens* in man. To represent a pure Avicennism to artists in the rue du Fouarre would have earned the modernists an official accusation of heresy. Therefore, it was necessary to attack Averroes and to defend the dualistic form of Porretan hypostases in the soul. This also explains the philosophical background of the dispute between the secular artists and the mendicants in the years 1253–56. Modern Averroists, like Rufus in Paris a decade earlier created their own concept of ontotheological metaphysics. Only the objective intellect can recognize objective metaphysics, because it makes out the non-existent species in the mode of Porretan “existence”. The modern intellect requires the real thing only in the mode of the complimentum for the completion of the objective species already recognized. Alternatively, the intellect of *illuminati* receives the objective species from things through *materia spiritualis*, which represents a greater degree of contingency and potentiality. The quotation confirms that the difference between both components of the intellect lies in the twofold perspective of insight into the objective species. Bonaventure dusted off the version of Themistius’s habitual material intellect and contrasts it with Alexander’s hypostasized intellect given as pure actuality.

“The different components of the intellect do exist, but they understand an individual thing. One of the components understands more in the sense of complementing the cognizing soul (*respicit animae complementum*), the other in the sense of the material principle (*materiale principium*). This is so because the one component of the soul possesses the potency for rational cognition, but also adheres to the habitual potency (*potentiae habitualis*). The other component has only the rational potency (*pure rationem potentiae*). Therefore, the first part of the intellect essentially belongs to the soul, whereas the other is given in relation to the body. The first component is always the recognition in actuality (*semper esse in actu*), but the other is not.” [[57]](#footnote-57)

Bonaventure does not work with the division of the intellect into a receptive and an active component, like Aristotle and the first Averroism. The intellect is a substrate and has two different modi of insight into the one recognized hylemorphic substance (*respiciant totum compositum*). The material intellect is defined by the relation to the body (*in comparatione ad corpus*), which is given in the form of the habitual potency (*potentiae habitualis*). However, this means that the *intellectus materialis* is Themistios’s makes an actualized immaterial hypostasis that is separated from the soul as a substance and therefore it has a cosmic character. This was one of the major points that founded the pantheism in the theory of David of Dinant. The only thing missing from pantheistic conception of Dinant is the identification of this intellect with the receptive component of divine thought (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3). Modernity had not yet dared to do this and it was necessary to wait for teaching of postmodern Spinoza. Modern Averroism introduced the Neoplatonic dualism of intellect and body into cognition. It is always present because the cognition makes a habitual faculty of the soul (*potentiae habitualis*) that becomes aware of its own cognition through *intellectus agens*. Hermeneutics emphasizes the modern and postmodern fact that this habitual cognition is already actualized. The intellectual soul of modern Avicennists is not an *anima nuda* and not a blank slate, since it is a hypostased substance (*hoc aliquid*). Then the species is considered by habitual faculties of the material intellect. This is given as a substance of the third kind and considers the abstracted Aristotelian species makes only a supplement to the already given cognition, which was shown by the analysis described above (*animae complimentum*). The soul recognizes actively and through direct insight according to postmodern evidence, which is given by Descartes′s *species innata* and by Husserl’s *eidos*.

Bonaventure conceptualized for the first time the objective intellect of the third kind as a mix of hylemorphic passivity and activity. A similarly modern Frankenstein had to carry this wondrous intellect in himself (*subiectum*). The new subject of the West was created, to which the following generations gradually added the system of objective metaphysics. Serafic doctor divided the substantial unity of the person into two floors in accordance with the natural and supernatural destiny of man. Thanks to its habitual potency related to the body, the active intellect considers the associated species. The soul recognizes itself in the act of conversion to itself in Avicenna’s way of the “Flying Man.” The possibility of self-knowledge is always given as actualized (*semper esse in actu*). This gave rise to the plurality of substantial forms in man, which the first Averroism fundamentally rejected. The unity of cognition in the sense of receptive and active components does not run according to the first Averroism. Unity, and therefore also the truth, is given only on the second level of cognition. It is established objectively, in the framework of ontotheological construction of metaphysics. With the introduction of the universal hylemorphism and the cosmic intellect following Avicenna, the theory of truth as Averroes’s *proportio* between things, the senses and the intellect became obsolete and the modern dualism of soul and body remained. Due to the dubious hylemorphism of *Modernorum* and due to the plurality of Porretan substances and potencies in man, it is not at all clear several quite impotant things. What is the body as a material substance of the third kind? What is the material soul of the third kind? What is the material intellect as another substance of the third kind? None of these “substances” exists in Aristotelianism and in the first Averroism, since they have no possibility of existence. According to Averroes and Albert, this is the fatal path on which all modernists are walking today. Albert and Bacon rejected any discussion of such nonsense, because critical thinking based on the deductive form of scientific proof is neither insane nor ridiculous. They would have been quite surprised that these teachings form the basis of postmodern philosophy today. Descartes’s intellect as a substance (*res cogitans*) makes another version of the intellect as the being of the third kind founded by Bonaventure. The self-reflecting consciousness of modernity as the mirror of the soul (*speculum*) considers everything in itself with the absolute clarity of the mind, *clare et distincte*. The intellect of Descartes, Hegel and Husserl is actualized in the act of “*cogito ergo sum*”. It does not need to receive anything completely passively from the outside, because he finds everything in himself and then checks it in reality. This certainly contributed to Albert’s condemnation of *doctores* *Latini* as pure sophists that are unable to grasp the learning of CMDA. Their triumphal march began after 1255, when Bonaventure’s students, under the aegis of their master, entered the University of Paris through the chair of mendicant orders. Modernism knows well that knowledge is not truth, but power; therefore modernists have won by teaching philosophical nonsense in its own faculty and by gradually liquidating the school of the first Averroism in two purges successives. Bonaventure’s attack on the intellect explained in CMDA exposes the fundamental error (*Irrtum*) that underlies the sophistry of *Modernorum*. The second Averroism of Bonaventure confirmed the objective “exsistence” of man from the direction of the simulacrum of cognition, in contrast to the hyparchical existence of unique person in CMDA. Let us recall that “man” ceased to exist for the first time around the year 1240 in the recognized unity of the person, when the objective substantial multiplicity replaced the original hyparchic unity of the person. The dispute about the twofold truth from the year 1270 forms the inevitable consequence of that metaphysical fallacy.

Bonaventure responded to criticism of the first Averroism by creating a twofold abstraction in the ontotheological scenario of metaphysics. The one and identical species is given univok in the things, the senses and in the intellect, but it is not recognized in an equally certain way. See the previous analyses of *species prima, secunda* and *innata*, which postmodern Descartes, Arnauld and Leibniz took over. The further continuation of the dispute over authentic interpretation of Averroes necessarily had to have the character of a public dispute. In the years 1267–73 Bonaventure presents a series of three sermons (*collationes*) that condemned intellectual errors of those times from the position of the second Averroism. Most of the accusations are later found in the decree of bishop Tempier of December 1270, in which 13 problematic philosophical theses are condemned because they endanger Christian faith. The general of Franciscan order speaks of apocalyptic times, but understands them completely differently than Aristotelians as Alvernus, Bacon, Albert, Giullelmus de Sancto Amore or Siger of Brabant. The accusation of triple heresy, publicly presented at the sermon, includes an official ideological declaration of war on the first Averroism. In the Lenten sermon in 1268, Bonaventure prophetically rejects the “bestial” character traits of the epoch that he helped actively to establish.

“In knowledge, one must beware of three errors that destroy the Holy Scriptures, the Christian faith and all wisdom. One of them goes against the cause of existence, the second against right thinking, and the third against the order of life. The error against the cause of existence is given in the conception of the eternity of the world, whereby the world is presented as eternal. The error against the right way of thinking is given by the introduction of the fatal necessity, as if everything came from the previously given necessity. The third error concerns the unity of the human intellect and says that numerically there is one intellect in all people. These errors are symbolized in Apocalypse by the number that makes the name of the Beast (in Apocalypsi in numero nominis bestiae).” [[58]](#footnote-58)

Let’s summarize the key accusations of the dispute over Averroism that was officially unleashed in the University of Paris. At play is the eternity of the world, which endangers the Christian order of being (*contra causam essendi est ... ponere mundum eternum*). The next defeat of the mind is due to the introduction of fatality into thinking by comprehending all events from the point of view of some immanent or transcendental necessity (*contra rationem intelligendi ... quod omnia eveniunt de necessitate*). The third, according to Bonaventure, the most terrible mistake, which also carries in itself both of the aforementioned errors, is given by the thesis about the numerical unity of the intellect for all people (*quod unus est intellectus in omnibus*). We now want to go through all three basic accusations from the point of view of the present hermeneutics. The previous interpretation has shown that they were presented by a prominent representative of the group called *sophistae Latini* that bishop Alvernus had already criticised.

The thesis about the eternity of the world did not pose a controversial problem at the artistic faculty about 1270. From an ecclesiastical point of view, however, it is a problem, see the Papal Bull Urbans IV of January 9, 1263 (see *Chartularium I*, no. 382, p. 427). It prohibited the teaching of Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics at the University of Paris, as long as they were cleansed of similar errors. Tempier’s first decree of December 1270 followed a similar procedure. The separation of philosophical speculation from theological truths was actually accomplished by the masters of liberal arts. The magisters of that time taught the “pagan” theory about the eternity of the world as a non-binding philosophical doctrine, which was attributed to Aristotle and to Averroes as the Commentator of *Corpus*, and not as a truth of faith. Roland Hissette analyzed the precise attitude of Boethius of Dacia, whose work *Tractatus de aeternitate mundi* (1270) considers eternal duration of the primary primordial substance only in the order of theoretical speculation (*per rationem*). Moreover, in Aristotle’s view, the eternity of the cosmos lies in the permanence of form with regard to its future duration, and the Bible holds to the same eternity by the salvaged form of the world at the end of times. With regard to this future permanence of the form, it can logically be deduced that the world could have been eternal also with regard to the past (*ergo per eandem virtutem potuit fuisse aeternus in praeterito*). The unreal subjunctive clearly shows that Boethius of Dacia considers this truth to be valid only in the sphere of rational consideration (Hissette 1977, 149–56). Moreover, according to the first Averroism, Aristotelian *demonstratio* only confirms the truth “*secundum quid*”, that is, from the effects of the first substance, and not “*secundum simpliciter*”, as the followers of the second Averroism claim. But to do this, modernists need to know the real meaning of *Categories* and *Second Analytics* purged of *Oxfordian Fallacy*. Then it becomes clear that the postulated eternity of the world is merely a speculation given outside the deductive scientific proof. Philosophically speaking, the eternity of the world is a logically valid conclusion; but in the reality of the first substances there is a lack of scientific proof to prove it. By dogmatizing philosophy, modernists made a sophisma of the class “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*”. Moreover, according to the *Second Analytics*, philosophy is different from theology in terms of genre, so that there can be no error at all, that is, not among critically educated philosophers. According to Bacon and others, the confusion occurs only in circles of *doctores Latini* and modern sophists, who were educated after 1255 in their own, quite modern faculty. Due to misunderstanding of metaphysics, they were unable to distinguish between the two sciences. See Bacon’s above-mentioned criticism of Bonaventure’s school in Paris (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Already Grosseteste and, according to him, the quoted Bacon in *Opus tertium* criticized the group of *Modernorum*, who do not know Aristotle’s writings correctly. As a result, they cannot understand rightly his philosophy.

Let us now return to the above quotation and to the thesis of necessity dominating the world (*omnia eveniunt de necessitate*). The second Averroism introduced the thesis about the necessary determination of events by radically changing the statute of future contingent events. The previous matrix of objectivity has shown that Grosseteste attributed the determined logical values to indefinite statements about the future, such as tomorrow’s naval battle (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). He did this against the teaching of *De interpretatione* by linking logic with the doctrine of Avicennist Falsafa. The first Averroism, in the line of Abelard and *Logica Vetus*, defended the classical sense of Aristotelian predication. According to Aristotle and Abélard, there is no real subject to upheld the statements of future events, because the future states are just a pure potentiality.[[59]](#footnote-59) Therefore, there is no real necessity coming existing reality, which establishes the metaphysical and categorical truth of the statement due to correctly made imposition. The logical determination of the new ontotheology was carried out not on the basis of the necessarily given Neoplatonic emanation of forms from the one cosmic intellect, but on the basis of the theologically necessarily given arrival of Antichrist. Bonaventure was also afraid of this unpleasant, albeit logically determined, future contingent event in the quoted exegesis of catastrophic signs of the time, which, according to him, had already started. No jokes were made about the arrival of Antichrist at the time of lost Crusades, and Bonaventure was one of theological stars of the time. His apocalyptic warning about the defeat of reason had to be taken seriously at the Paris University. The question of a possible or actual heresy posed a problem at the University of Paris for the confused ecclesiastical authorities, who seriously lacked an intellectual greatness of bishop Alvernus. He would simply declare that Grosseteste had to leave the University of Paris because of this heresy. After all, he founded this modernist doctrine by misinterpreting *Second Analytics* about 1230. Bonaventure went on in that wrong path called *via Modernorum*.

The third accusation of the sermon concerns the numerical unity of the intellect and it was equally problematic. We have shown that it this erros was created by sophistic interpretation of CMDA made by Bonaventure that radicalizes Rufus’s criticism of Averroes. Modern sophists fatally misunderstood the interpretation of two types of intellect according to CMDA (*tertium, quartum genus*). All the real Aristotelians of that time knew this, in contrast to today’s epoch. The accusation of Bonaventure about the numerically unified intellect was attributed to Averroes, which was a principled fallacy. In reality, the modernists were the Averroists, who projected their error in the defense mechanism into the opposite into the actual connoisseurs of Averroes in the rue du Fouarre. The attack testifies to an intellectual confusion of modernists, who had not understood “*ad mentem Averrois*” the teaching defended at the Paris Faculty of Arts. These artists could not be either sophists or Averroists, because the college at that time was composed of actual connoisseurs of Averroes’s philosophy. However, this changed soon after the forced departure of the brilliant Aristotelian Siger of Brabant around 1275. The attack of the second Averroism was directed, among other things, against the doctrine of the unity of intellect, which was defended by the above Dominican magister from Cologne. After the final editing of *De unitate intellectus* (about 1263), Albert the Great ended the dialogue with the representatives of *Latinorum* on the question of the interpretation of intellect and cognition. Albert refused an academic discussion with Latin sophists and in 1269 definitely an invitation to the University of Paris. In 1270, he published only a small summary of his arguments on the Paris dispute over the unity of the intellect, which he had already tought three decades earlier (*De XV problematibus*). That is why Albert’s best student, Thomas Aquinas, is sent to *alma mater* of the Christian West. The well-known study on the disputes around the year 1270 at the University of Paris aptly characterizes this period with the term “*moment de 1270*” (Wéber 1976, 286). But this chapter has shown that the critical year 1255 already took place before 1270 and the no less important year 1245 had existed before that. Objective medievalists cannot see these milestones because they believed in fundamentally given objective univocity of all the concepts discussed at that time. The year 1255 revealed the emergence of the metaphysics of *Modernorum* in its academic form, given in the school of *Averroistae*. Since that date, the common meaning of basic metaphysical concepts no longer existed at the University of Paris. Historical decline of this Christian university began after that. After Grosseteste′s departure in 1253, the University of Oxford was dominated by the Modernists for at least one generation. This problem could no longer arise in Oxford, because the local modernists preserved Rufus’s simulacrum of metaphysics, and Bacon left Oxford for Paris. The masters of Paris under the rector Guillelmus de Sancto Amore could not simply ignore flat denial of teachig that founded the University of Paris in the times of Blund and Alvernus. These first Western intellectuals and excellent philosophers uncompromisingly defended the truth of critical thinking against the modernists as Bonaventure and Rufus. After Guillelmus’ departure, Siger of Brabant began to give the lectures. His star shone about the year 1265, when he published the brilliant commentary on the third book of *De anima*. The defenders of the first Averroism had to leave the University because of the authoritarian intervention of the papal decree in 1256. In 1270, it began the first round of the official dispute over Averroism, given by Tempier’s first condemnation of 13 disputed articles. The next round was Etienne’s decret of 7. 3. 1277 and Kilwardby’s version at Oxford.

The shift from academic discussions to ideological discourse is absolutely obvious and is given by academic liquidation of both Aristotelian rectors. Guillelmus de Sancto Amore and Siger of Brabant defended the Christian foundation of the Paris University. Its foundation was provided by adequate knowledge of the world, the person and God through *res gestae* of the Blund′s school. The truth of this dispute disappeared and turned into the untruth of modernity, which, under the hundred-year influence of the academic furies, finally brought about the decline of the Paris University. An unattainable connoisseur of musical and Pythian *a/lētheia* was Heraclitus of Ephesus.[[60]](#footnote-60) His well-known statement about infantile Ephesians also refers to repeated moments of the years 1255 and 1270. It came to expulsion of the best Aristotelians and the subsequent disintegration of the Paris University. The declaration of artistic masters of the Paris University dated 1. 4. 1272 clearly met the demands of Parisian bishop issued in the year 1270. Important is the main sentence of the Declaration of 1272, which the masters addressed to themselves and also to the students.[[61]](#footnote-61) The red lines given by the rational Aristotelian discourse that makes the basis of the scientific demonstration should not be crossed (*tanquam sibi determinatos limites transgrediens*). The search for truth is given in one way for philosophy and in the other way for theology, because both sciences differ from each other generically by different causality, which is predicted in the middle link of the scientific proof. The artists from the rue du Fouarre, who were led by the great names of the first Averroism, clearly established two separate lines and separated the genres of research that established the univocity of critical scientific discours. The secular magisters, under the influence of Siger of Brabant and other representatives of the first Averroism, insisted in the Declaration of 1272 on the thesis of the Second Analytic on the impossibility of the transition from one genus to another (*Anal. Post*. 75a38). This thesis of *Second Analytics* was defended in the explanation with the help of a direct allusion to the quoted text (*sicut dicit philosophus non geometram cum geometra sit penitus inconveniens disputare*). This explanation done in the mode of Aristotelian secularization, by no means defended the theory of the two truths, but of the two methods leading to the recognition of the one truth. It can not be otherwise at all, since we recognize the real causality in the world and that of God as *causa* *prima* in the philosophical mode of correspondence. The representatives of universal hylemorphism based on Oxfordian Fallacy, on the other hand, defended the very modern conception of the one truth in the framework of ontotheological and analytical form of unified science known today. The process of modern (but not true) secularization was set in motion by the destruction of the secular masters in the rue du Fouarre. This led to the decline of the Paris University, which was completed under the aegis of the modernists and in the revolutionary postmodernism. The same process, understandably, also led to death of modern God. Hermeneutics is completely right with Gauthier, who rejects the theory that the decree of the artists of 1272 was inspired by the party that was not friendly towards Siger.[[62]](#footnote-62) It’s just the other way around. This decree was issued by the representatives of the first Averroism (*pars Sigeri*). They declared war on modernists at the Mendicant faculty. The hermeneutics of objectivity sees the first round of the dispute of both interpretations of Averroism as a fundamental dispute over the status of scientific cognition between the Aristotelians and the first adherents of modernity. That is why Bacon criticised Bonaventure in the work *Opus minus*. Bacon defended the autonomy of both sciences (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Since the truth of sophistic and dogmatic modernity prevailed, the truth presented in Second Analytics had to forfeit the scientific proof. Rufus’s pioneering work *Speculum animae* gave modernity the basic scheme of reflection taken from the direction of the subject, which would later become the Cartesian *cogito*. The nihilistic phase of metaphysics shows the reflection in relation to the structure given in the play of significant differences (Foucault) or in the context of language games given in the play of metaphors (Derrida, Rorty). The new wave of nihilism comprehends the truth as *rectitudo* through the myth of the new *mathesis universalis* given in the philosophy of language. The philosophy of language was seen by Foucault’s work *Les mots et les choses* as one of three forms of production of the modern epistémé (biology, economics, philology). Rufus founded the first objective simulacrum of reality and made possible the epistemological nihilism of Foucault and Derrida. The deconstructivist critique of postmodern metaphysics starts from the fundamental confusion of *Modernorum*. After the disappearance of the metaphysical dative, the schizophrenic modern subject keeps but paranoid presentation of one’s own *scibilia*, and by no means a representation of reality in the mode of correspondence. As a postmodern being, man is divided into two parts within himself. In the 19th century, in the framework of infinite classifications given in the dialogue *Sophistes*, he received already complete nihilistic simulacrum as his doppelganger. This simulacrum as a factum of postmodernism was thoroughly studied by Foucault.[[63]](#footnote-63) Derrida and the contemporary school of deconstruction belong to the nihilistic phase of Cartesian postmodernism. The postmodern mind contemplates itself in the linguistic universe on the level of mere *significatio*. Postmodern mind got lost in the mirror maze of objective speculation as a metaphorical transmission of arbitrary given *scibilia*. In nihilistic postmodernism, the structurally given meaning based on linguistic “*valeur*” (Saussure 1972, 155–69) even supplanted the metaphysical sense of being given in the framework of objective *scibile*. The new form of *rectitudo* is tied to the movement of structurally constituted difference and realized the dream of modernity about the confinement of reality. Poststructuralism left alive only the metaphorical meaning and the movement of difference. This difference is essential (i.e. *per se*) necessary for the classification of everything that is objective, down to the level of the last individual. The new mirror of mind and nature, as given by Rorty, already criticizes the objectively given correspondence theory of truth (“representational theory of perception”).[[64]](#footnote-64) Objectivity eventually abolished itself in this conception; philosophy degenerated in this form of analytical sophistry into a general theory of culture. Postmodernism thus completed the scientific, technical nihilism of Western metaphysics, which *Nominales* opened up by creating the first objective classification of beings of the third kind. These entities are determined by the movement of difference to establish the Tree of Porphyry. The dispute over Averroism covered the essence of man, replacing it with a sophistic doppelganger. This idolatrous symbol of postmodernism (εἴδωλον) finally completely melted away in the contemporary play of differences and metaphors. It was described for the first time in the dialogue *Sophistes*. Cancellation of the receptive intellect abolished the human person and destroyed the process of true cognition and the theory of science according to *Second Analytics*. Modern *Irrtum* given by global victory of the second Averroism has a fatal character. Bonaventure revealed in musical mode of *a/lētheia* the obscurity of modernity by the biblical number 666, the name of apocalyptic Beast. However, following the defense mechanism of *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*, he attributed it in a sophistical way to the opposite side of the dispute. His pythian statement must be interpreted in the mode of the original tragic wisdom.

### 4.1.3 Odyssey of Modern Subject

The basis of ontotheological metaphysics is the ability of mind to gain insight into the creative intellect, which is the archetypal and divine subject. That mythological intuition keeps sophistic power to unite theology and philosophy into a kind of the first objective science. God is the supreme Being in this system; the multiplicity is given at the level of his demiurgic intentionality, which includes all created potentialities in the objective form of being. The will of the divine Agent then creates the objective determination of the being that comes into existence in the creative act. For the revealed theology and for the ontotheology of modern *illuminati*, this scheme is of fundamental importance. It is given in the mode of one ontotheological truth based on a biblical foundation. Critical Aristotelian philosophy cannot look into the head of the Creator. Mythology of objectivity in the West follows its musical archetype, also Greek goddess Athena (Roman Minerva) as divine power of war, handicraft, and practical reason. She was the daughter of Zeus, conceived without a mother, so that she emerged full-grown from his divine head. Scientific cognition begins and ends with the real causality given at the level of hyparchical first substance. Modern God cannot serve as the basis of classical philosophy, because it is created due to the real world. Objectivity does not need the real world, because it is based on the metaphysic of chimeras. In philosophy, God can be scientifically recognized as a *causa prima*. Hermeneutics must find the original way of revealing the objective being that relates to *dativus obiectivus* as ultimate donation of objective being. It is necessary to interpret the new way in which the being belongs to objective *ens* in the ontotheological objective mode, which constitutes a new version of Western objectivity (*dativus possessivus*, ch. 4). Bonaventure’s commentary on the second book of Sentences and his writings about the year 1255 contain the first complete ontotheological structure of objectivity.

The question of *resolutio* offers the last universal insight into the wholeness of being. That kind of metaphysical framework is reinterpreted in the term called “*signatum*.” Bonaventure and his successors related “*signatum*” to the biblical meaning of the world that is considered from the direction of the Creator. His face brightens above men and above all creation (*signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine*; Psalm 4:7). The light of God objectively “signed” the creation and supplemented Rufus’s concept of metaphysical mathematics (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). According to mystical *illuminati*, the ultimate sense of being is determined by the divine light coming from the face of God. That metaphorical clarity forms the fundamental hermeneutic way in which the being comes to its epochal destiny in modernity (*dativus possessivus*). The sense of the world comes from the face of God. It supplemented Neoplatonic solar intellect that directly illuminates the human intellect. That divine light changed in the age of secularization into the face of a neighbor. Emmanuel Lévinas absolutized that kind of *resolutio* in the ethics explicitly situated outside of postmodern ontology (Lévinas 1951). The Jewish thinker rejected ontologically based postmodern metaphysics and moved ethics back to the ethical theology of the “human” revelation according to the previous model of Bonaventure. As for Lévinas, it should be added that this illumination is seen through the ethical *intellectus resolvens* originally proposed by Bonaventure. Both *illuminati* agree that this type of direct knowledge established through illumination is given outside of any ontology (Lévinas) and outside of any classical metaphysics (Bonaventure). Ethics based on illumination occupy the vacant place of contemporary philosophical nihilism through concepts such as “*épiphanie du Visage*” and mystical predications (“*à-dieu*”). Lévinas took up the *dativus ethicus* of Jesus′s radical ethics to replace by it the *dativus possessivus* of Heidegger′s ontology. Hermeneutics should respect this essay. However, ethics based on religious humanism cannot replace the first philosophy. There are two different genres of science and they do not have a second common substance as a recognized being. Theological illumination of the “second Averroism” of Lévinas is not the natural cognition of the “first Averroism” in the framework of philosophical wisdom. The second objection has a hermeneutic character. The critical interpretation cannot accept any model of irrational illumination. Hermeneutics must follow the path of the Sun through the sky. We must know exactly what form of humanism stands in front of us. The categorical predication of postmodernism and nihilism is based on the donation of being through the objective dative, which stands at the end of the whole series of donations of Being through various forms of the foundational dative. In the era of contemporary nihilism established by *dativus obiectivus*, it is necessary to start from *dativus possessivus* as a second substance. The possessive dative determines the nature of the ethical dative, which is an accident of the second substance thus determined. The categorical predication must follow the path of the Sun running in the firmament. For the two reasons mentioned above, the “neighbor” of Lévinas has the same ambiguous status as Bonaventure’s modern metaphysics. Derrida criticized Lévinas’s dilemma regarding philosophy and theology in his early essay *Violence et métaphysique*. Lévinas is no longer engaged in dialogue with the other person as a subject of language and directed his rabbinic word to the infinite realm of totalitarian meaning beyond himself and only for himself.[[65]](#footnote-65) This humanism closed the path of *Modernorum*, which was given outside of philosophy and finally went beyond rationally justified meaning and categorical predication.

Bonaventure’s metaphysics based on the biblical “*signatum*” transcended Rufus’s metaphysics. Rufus found the modern object of knowledge, but it was unable to define the modern subject of that knowledge. It was as clear to Bonaventure as it was the case of Kilwardby that the mathematical level of abstraction is not able to find the original unity of being, since it must have a metaphysical character. The book *Metaphysics* did not accept the claim of mathematics as the first science and rejected an autonomous existence of the separated mathematical substances (*Met*. 1076b13–16). The being receives the first modern metaphysical determination within the framework of the act of mystical “*signatum.*” The modern subject appropriates the existing being through a demiurgic assignation that takes place according to a predetermined objective rule (*Er-eignen*). The original unity of everything is given by the mystical insight into the divine working and into the divine Being. In the work *Tractatus primus in Ioannem*, Augustine comments on *Book of Wisdom* in the *Old Testament*. The biblical author and, after him, the Neoplatonic Augustin praise the Creator for ordering everything according to measure, number and weight (*omnia in mensura, et numero et pondere disposuisti*, *Liber Sapientiae* 11:21). Bonaventure claims that this harmony of creation exists at first in the divine mind and it is universally signified by the exemplary and seminal forms. The unity of everything is given in the framework of biblically determined numerical unity. Mysticism of measure, number and weight replaces the categorical unity of substances. Meaning of being is given as the whole of creation considered from the direction of mathematically made illumination that comes from the face of God.

“Therefore, it is necessary to contemplate God not only outside and within ourselves, but also beyond us (*supra nos*). Outside of ourselves, we contemplate God through his trace in creation (*vestigium*); inside us through the imagination; above us through the light of God’s face that gives ultimate meaning beyond our thinking (*supra per lumen, quod est signatum supra mentem nostram*). This is the light of the eternal Truth, because ‘our thinking is formed directly (*inmediate*) from the direction of this Truth’…” [[66]](#footnote-66)

The quotation shows the new path of ontological understanding of being (*Vor-blickbahn*; OBJ I, ch. 1). The illumination of the being comes from behind, from the direction of God. His divine truth directly shapes our cognition (*mens nostra inmediate ab ipsa Veritate formetur*). In the present scheme, the mentioned principle “*inmediate*” plays a key role. That kind of direct cognition of essences is made according to the higher type of cognition as “*intellectus*” of Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Bonaventure translated the thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy into the history of effects. He inserted the central principle “*ex* *inmediatis*” postulated in the *Second Analytics* into the Christocentric metaphysics. Made in that way, he established a new “*resolutio*” that entails ontotheological structure of metaphysics. Not only does the Neoplatonic solar intellect mythically irradiate the world, but also the biblical light of the face of God. Then, modern *illuminati* have hardly any reason to search in the mundane darkness for the traces (*vestigium*) given by Aristotelian empirical cognition of first substances received through the senses. The cited work *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* (1259) represents the first modern guide through the totality of being viewed in an objective way. Objectivity became a philosophical gospel of the Christian West, which is even truer in its actualized nihilistic phase after the death of modern God. The preceding chapter has set forth the central importance of Christ as the redeeming mediator between God and man. Bonaventure took the role of Creator and Savior as the basis of a new metaphysics in the role of the universal middle link of deductive syllogism (*haec est tota nostra metaphysica*, ch*.* 4.1.1). The effective demiurge of the second Averroism combined the Bible, Christian theology, Arabic Falsafa, Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism into a single whole.

The new form of Christology gave a complete ontotheological structure to previous versions of Oxfordian Fallacy. It was built on the opposition to the realistic principle “*ex inmediatis*” that Albert and Bacon defended in their interpretations of *Second Analytics*. The truth as *rectitudo* passed into the creative rule of the divine or human subject. This connection created a historically effective version of Rufus’s truth as a universal demiurgic similarity of everything (*coaequatio*). Bonaventure rejected the idea of universal equality that Rufus achieved by mathematical analogy. He placed the hierarchical system of being in two floors of regulated activity instead of it. Bonaventure’s version of the ontotheology established a new *dativus auctoris* as a place of modern knowledge (*ortus* *scientiarum*). Bonaventure found a new historial place (*Lichtung*) that reveals the truth and untruth of objective meaning of being. Bonaventure’s commentary on Sentences added the new subject of *Modernorum* to already created objective being by Grosseteste, Rufus and Kilwardby. A new subject takes up two floors of creative and creative rule and volition. The rules of the Creator form a new *mathesis universalis*, which is given as an example for the totality of creation. The introduction of objective demiurgic predication in the mode “*in artificialibus*” had to change the model of causality. It could not possess an Aristotelian character made according to *Second Analytics*. The following quotation establishes a new version of Oxfordian Fallacy by modifying the basic concept of the causality in *Second Analytics*. The quotation distinguishes between two layers of causality, which are formed by the natural and the supernatural series, just as the physical seed differs from its universal definition (*differt semen et ratio seminalis*).

“The individual cause and its ratio are different (*differunt autem causa et ratio causalis*). The causa refers to the principle of real production. The ratio of causality determines the controlling rule, which determines this principle in its activity (*ratio vero causalis dicit regulam dirigentem illud principium in sua operatione*). In a similar way, the real seed differs from its definition.” [[67]](#footnote-67)

The essential determination of causality is given by God′s rational regulatory imperative (*ratio vero causalis dicit regulam dirigentem*). This principle is given not as a *causa prima* in Aristotelian metaphysics, but as a demiurgic causality of the modern subject (*causa dicit principium productivum*). Such exemplary and objectively established reason is separated from the effective and actual causality given in the real world. The quotation distinguishes between the essentially given causality (*ratio causalis*) and the real causality given in the contingent first substance (*causa*). The first model of such production was outlined by Ibn Adi in the Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.2). The connection of both versions of causality establishes the ontotheological structure of objectivity. The objective world is not formed by the causality of first substances, but by the form of divine rationality. Scotus used the idea of objective rationality to create a new metaphysics. He canceled direct illumination from God and introduced the predication of objectively given divine rationality (ch. 5.3.2). The natural or supernatural rule directs in the predicative mode “*in artificialibus*” the twofold act that produces the sense of being. The first floor of objectivity arises in divine thinking. Through adapted form of Avicennian intentionality, it produces objective Porretan species. Objective causality ties in with universal hylemorphism and forms the second floor of objectivity at the level of creation. Man reflects the exemplary *ratio* in God through the seminal *ratio* in creation. First, the examples are objectively given in creative thinking, and then we recognize them in creation. The first floor has an objective causality in divine intellect; the second floor has a real causality in creation. The rule of the human demiurge runs through the recognition of the seminal forms that are imprinted in matter. The appetite of the demiurge is given by the relationship to the form and it meets the appetite of spiritual and hylic matter (ch. 4.1.1). The pseudo-essentiality of the matter of the third kind (*materia confusa*) is given thanks to the primary approach to form (*appetitus*). Matter, like the human will, shows a fundamental appetite for the forms that provides the demiurge (God, man). That connection of both forms of *appetitus* establishes a new univocity of being that stands beyond of classical theory of categories. Bonaventure defines matter in the mode of biblical ontotheology, thereby creating a new Porretan hypostasis. Driven by the erotic appetite, the matter wants to be united with forms through innate mystical longing that requires the demiurgic form for its completion. Avicebron’s writing *Fons vitae* does not contain an objective character of matter, because Neoplatonism keeps the forms at the exemplary level. With regard to matter, the metaphysical *resolutio* exists in Avicebron only in thinking (*non in actu, sed in opinione*).[[68]](#footnote-68) Albert pointed out this fact in vain (*intendit dicere Avicebron, quod potentia intellectus possibilis communis est sicut et materiae*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Albert clearly distinguished the original interpretation of Avicebron from its modern sophistic variants. Modern Averroists created an objective mythological matter. Matter became an objective object of demiurgic *voluntas*. It determines matter of the third kind as a *factum* of the creative or creative will. The fundamentally poor and not self-sufficient matter of the third kind is driven by erotic longing for the final copulation with the enlightened Latin demiurge. The modern myth of the copulation between the matter of the third kind and the form of the third kind, according to the Falsafa, creates the *mundus imaginalis* of the third kind (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). Platonic demiurge from the dialogue *Timaeus* got a modern doppelganger due to the new type of objectification of form and substance. This gave rise to the modern subject of the West. This objective simulacrum broke out in the following centuries on a global crusade to assert the capitalist insight into the world. The hypostatized *exemplaria* in divine thought separated themselves from the objective *rationes seminales* in creation. The new metaphysics distinguished the modern subject into a divine creator and a human worker. This dual regulation of divine and human demiurge brought a dual rationality into the world.

“The rule for the uncreated agent (*regula autem agentis increati*) is given as an exemplary, i.e., ideal form. The rule for the created agent (*regula vero agentis creati*) is given as a natural form. Then it is true that the ideal and exemplary principles establish rational definition of causality (*rationes causales*), whereas the seminal principles (*rationes seminali*) represent natural forms. The rational and seminal definition of causality relate to each other like the genus to the species.” [[69]](#footnote-69)

The movement of demiurgic differentiation separates two layers of regulated being given in the ontotheological structure “subject—object.” Created reality is under the rule of human producers (*regula agentis creati*) that determine the natural form (*forma naturalis*). In the supernatural mode, it is the divine rationality given by the act of the rational divine will (*regula agentis increati*) that regulates the objective structure of the universe (*forma exemplaris sive idealis*). The architectural principle is based on the analogy of two similar rules of cognition and action that are valide for both floors. Let us sum up the kind of modern “regulatory act” (*Ge-Stell*) that changed the sense of objective being into new form of *dativus finalis*. The new goal of the cosmos that has become modern is the production of objectivity. The creative activity is regulated by the divine intentionality producing an exemplary objectivity (*regula agentis increati*). According to his rule, the human demiurge creates his own world (*regula agentis creati*). It is signed from objective light of God′s face and thus endowed with ontotheological measure, number and weight. The two forms of objective essences correspond to this twofold demiurgic regulation: on the one hand, the natural form of real things (*forma naturalis*) and on the other hand, the supernatural exemplar of this form (*forma exemplaris sive idealis*). The new deductive proof (*demonstratio*) is entirely objectively made: the exemplars form a general premise in divine thought and the objective reality recognized by man represents the necessary conclusion. The “*ratio seminalis*” makes syllogistic union of both rules. Through its objective causality, it forms the syllogistic middle link (*medium*) of scientific proof. Modern ontotheological speculation became a deductive proof. Both rules determine the activity of the human and the divine agent in the mode of objective analogy. Like this, modern man became a modern God, and modern God became a modern man. Both modern simulacra complement each other and both “exsist” in the new type of metaphysical “*resolutio*.” The act of divine and human agent is bound to the corresponding object by action of the seminal form, which is realized by the demiurgic divine and human will. The regulatory model based on activity of both operators is supernatural and natural. The assimilation of objectivity carried out by the modern subject realizes the deontological right of being constituted by God and man, to objective truth as *rectitudo*. This right to exist in an objectively true way is made according to Anselm (*quod debet esse, recte est*; OBJ I, ch. 1.2). This role of the objective exemplar is taken over by mathematics in Descartes and Leibniz, resulting in the contemporary *mathesis universalis*. The mystical and therefore objective connection of both levels establishes a new order of things, from which the global *Novus Ordo Seclorum* of victorious capitalist modernity emerged.

The analogous similarity between the rules and the creation is based on the activity and volition of two subjects. The original determination in the context of *volitio, intentio, intellectio* and thus *creatio* got a fundamentally different character according to the twofold type of the demiurge. Through Porretan substantialization, creative intention and the rule of the demiurge became a being of the third kind. This form of the modern volition entered into categorical prediction as a new form of the second substance (*subiectum*). By producing objectivity, the regulated demiurgic will forms the substantive basis of objective being and to this basis other accidents are added. In the mode of *dativus auctoris*, the unconcealment of demiurgic mode of being explained how the wholeness of being in the new metaphysics can reach its full meaning and truth. As a result, the historical perspective of modernity in the sense of the ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) and the hermeneutic “*Wie*” was found (OBJ I, ch. 1). Bonaventure created the objective structure of metaphysics with the help of the difference between the exemplary potency that determines the essence (*quod est*) and the creative actuality of the divine substance, which forms the subsistent first substance (*quo est*). He translated this difference into Boethius’ difference “quod est — quo est” and reworked it in its own form of metaphysics given by the primacy of the intelligent will endowed with creative or creative actualization. Bonaventure took from Avicenna’s Neoplatonic scenario the difference between the autonomous essence and the contingent essence, which Averroes had criticized as Avicenna’s fundamental error (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The objective being given by the exemplary essential potency (*quod est*) exists independently of the first substance, because it is given in the divine demiurgic intentionality. The model of exemplary potency in the divine or human demiurge is Rufus’s “*potentia essentialis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The first objective form (*exemplar*) is in the divine intellect, and the second form is actualized in the creative will, which produces the actual being (*ratio seminalis*). The coming out of the hypostatized essence of exemplar into the objective “exsistence” of the seminal ratio is tied to the contingent act of permanent demiurgic will of God or man. Both forms of substantial potency are given with regard to created objects. The ontotheological *resolutio* created a new metaphysics by introducing a new form of *tertium ens* into Western scholasticism. The new form of being of the third kind acquired a purely subjective character in the demiurgic predication made “*in artificialibus*.” Classical Aristotelians took such proceeding for total madness (*insaniunt contra veritatem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). Bonaventure joined his academic and religious colleague Rufus. His first concept of objectivity found a new unity of intellect and reality in the term “*exsistere*.” The modern “existence” is now understood as an act of the creative demiurgic will and the intentionality made out in the archetypal mode “*semel—semper*.” The being is exemplarily given in divine thinking, which forms an objectively given intermediate level between the Creator and the creation. In this metaphysical limbo things exist and they do not exist, see the Neoplatonic cosmology of Jamblichus and Simplicius (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1).

Hermeneutics must explain how the demiurgic essence of Rufus comes out in the objective reality (*exsistit*). Before creation, both forms of objective divine intentions exist only potentially and objectively, by no means in some Neoplatonic actuality. The objective essence, given as an exemplary intention in divine thought, was separated from the actualized and contingent act of being of created substances. The exemplars given in the divine intentionality (*rationes exemplares*) are distinguished from “*rationes seminales*” by having their own kind of transcendence. The objective eternal forms are given in real things by the act of creation and modern demiurge can subsequently recognize them. In the new type of objective world, its reality is contemplated by human *intellectus resolvens*. Bonaventure’s modernist school created it due to teaching on the transcendentals made by Philip the Chancellor. The modern form of “exsistence” given by Porretans and Rufus now received a complete ontotheological resolution. Bonaventure introduced the ambivalent statute of universals, although he knew very well that the universals can exist only in thought. The influential Franciscan took a decisive step towards the creation of a new metaphysics of the West by falsifying Aristotle’s metaphysics and rejecting Averroes’s interpretation. The establishment of archetypal objectivity in God as a Christian demiurge gave rise to a new form of *dativus auctoris*, which determined the being of the Western subject (ch. 4). Metaphysics got a new foundation, because the demiurge and his objectively given rule supplanted the causality of the first substance. The second floor of the objectivity given at the human level of regulation acquired a decisive influence. The mental, volitional and factual activity of human demiurge supplanted the being of the real world. From the point of view of Heidegger’s *Ereignis* tied to the fate of metaphysics in the mode of oblivion of being, the era of active Western nihilism began. This stage associated with the global colonization of the planet is characterized in the way in which the totality of being is placed before the subject as its subjectively formed object (*Ge-Stell*, OBJ I, ch. 1.2). Hermeneutics presented this epochal change in the changed nature of *dativus modi* (ch. 4). The existence of the first real substance recognized by the metaphysical dative now came into the manipulative power of the subject through the demiurgic form of mythological parousia in the godlike subject of the third kind.

Aristotelian theologians and philosophers were certainly quite horrified when this sophistic teaching was officially proclaimed at the University of Paris from the year 1255 onwards. The totality of being is determined with regard to the principle creative myth of *Genesis*, to which human initiative is linked. Bonaventure turned Rufus’s being of the third kind (*scibile, concretum*) into an epochal demiurgic *factum*. The *exemplars* have come into historically (i.e. objectively and modern) given sense of being in the form of the *rationes seminales*. They have their ownform of actualiuation. This form is given more *simpliciter*, i.e., through the subsistence of mind and will in divine thinking. Since the objective *factum* is concretely given in the eternal and unchanging divine thought, the “existence” of this eternal, divine and thus also completely objective facticity in worldly reality is only a contingent matter. The existence of objective examplars in divine thought and of seminal definitions of things in reality requires the act of creative reflection and will. The modern divine subject intentionally produces the being in the objective ontotheological mode, he experiences the totality of that being as examplars, and determines it teleologically by its creative will. This act of objective production transfers the being given in thinking into the actual being in reality. Bacon regarded this conception of metaphysics as insane and Albert as ridiculous. But in the meantime, the academic year 1255 is being written, and by no means the years 1245–50, when Rufus and Kilwardby flee from Aristotelian Paris to modernist Oxford. The historical hijra of the first modernists took place in 1250 and established a new epoch. Modernists returned from Oxford to intellectual Mecca of the Latin West in 1255 and conquered the University in 1255–77. The epochal escape of the last Aristotelian Ockham from Avignon in the epoch of the complete victory of modernity already has a completely self-preservation character (ch. 5.4). The introduction of causality of the third kind was given in the ontotheological mode of Oxfordian Fallacy together with the modernized version of the universal hylemorphism according to the Bible. This connection created the first metaphysical structure of objectivity in the Latin West. On the part of the object, a twofold essential subsistence of the being of the third kind is given, whereby this being is given in divine thinking (*forma exemplaris*) or rationally in reality (*ratio seminalis*). On the part of the subject, there is twofold form of the rational “*regulae*” that runs the twofold process of objective determination of being. This gave rise to twofold form of the relationship “subject—object.” Either the demiurge regulates the objective design of the divine exemplars, or the process of their objective understanding as *rationes seminales*. The causal source of the production of the sense of being is hidden either in the intelligent will of the divine Creator (*regula agentis increati*) or in the intelligent will of the human producer (*regula agentis creati*). Neither rule can be in the mode of univocity, but they are given in the mode of objectively conceived analogy. Their basis is formed not by mathematical analogy, as is the case of Rufus, but by anthropological similarity of modern demiurge with modern God (*imago Dei*).

The similarity of two demiurges establishes the ontotheological project of modern metaphysics. The divine Creator considers the form primarily and exemplarily in its intentionality; the human producer recognizes this objectified form secondarily as a seminal in creation and as a real in his demiurgic activity. The rules determine the production of objectivity according to the primacy of the creative or productive will, which has the appropriate essential form in front of it. The simulacrum of the subject created a simulacrum of reality. Albert rejected this duplication of reality as ridiculous and did not consider its authors to be academic thinkers. Bacon regarded this doubling of reality as madness that had brought Platonic fabulations into theology (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The biblical and ontotheological fabulation given in the mode “*in artificialibus*” took the place of classical metaphysics. The artificial world of Latin sophists started by Rufus’s being of the third kind (*species obiecti exsistentis*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4) and Bonaventure gave it a metaphysical consistency. Bonaventure’s objective sophistry founded the first ontotheological model of *analogia entis*, through which the enlightened thinking of climbs up and down the mystical ladder of being. The epochal error of thinking is given by the fact that the real substance no longer forms the foundation of metaphysics. The new version of ontotheological *resolutio* transferred the meaning of being made in Avicennian Augustinism into Aristotelian structure of metaphysics that was sophistically formed according to the Christian worldview. Bonaventure separated the seminal ideas in the real creation from the primordial sphere of rationality in God. That primary sphere of *passiones entis*, exists in the manner of Avicenna’s self-reflecting conception of *intellectus agens* in divine reflexivity; all *rationes entis* are given there as exemplary forms. The exemplars do not even possess matter of the third kind, because they are given in God *absolute* and *simpliciter*. Only the voluntaristic intention of the Creator and the rational plan (*regula*) serve as matter. The ideas exist in thinking of the craftsman, even if they are not yet realized in the finished work, where they can be seen objectively in the form of the seminal ideas. Analogy and necessity combine the exemplars and the *seminal rationes* into a whole. The exemplar belongs to the trinitarian sphere of the internal divine Being, which combines the two remaining sovereign potencies, i.e., the divine Intellect and Will. From the exemplary level, the secondary objective forms are derived, which, within the framework of the modern *existere*, expand from divine rationality through its causal will in the direction of creation. The metaphysical “*resolutio*” builds on the complete eclipse of the first substance and illuminates the wholeness of the being from the direction of the divine “*principium*” and the subsequent human creative “*initium*.” Bonaventure adopts the Neoplatonic scenario of the Falsafa, which he had received through the Avicennism of the Toledo school. This Avicennism acquired in Bonaventure’s school of the modern Augustinians the mystical and ontotheological character of *metaphysica generalis*. Christian metaphysician follows Christ as the first principle of cognition, which is given in the mode of objective and mystical “*inmediate*.” He enjoys direct insight into the essence of the world and God. Regulated objective rationality possesses only one objective truth, which is given in an evident and certain way, and in the mode of absolute correctness. The truth is established in the mode *absolute*, i.e., separated from the real world of the first substance. The bearer of the Aristotelian *actualitas* is no longer the first substance, but the act of the creative and creative will.

The truth and untruth of objectivity left the historical unconcealment (*alētheia*) of being. The new Lichtung is established by the founding event of modernity, that is, due to the eclipse of first substances. This founding event (*Ereignis*) of Latin sophists separated the first Averroism of the Sicilian school from modern metaphysics. Therefore, Averroes had to become an Averroist. The postmodernists as Descartes returned to mystical *epokhē* of enlightened thinking, substantially separated from the body. The difference between the two types of cognition and the worldview corresponding to them is exposed by the difference between Descartes’s first and second mediation on the first philosophy. The shaken and uncertain subject flees from external reality into the evidence of his own self-consciousness, where he rediscovers the source of the modern truth given as Avicenna’s *certitudo* and Anselm’s *rectitudo*. The new definition of objective metaphysics, understandably, has an absolute character, because it is separate from the first substance. Already mentioned term “*excessus mentis*” plays a key role in *fuga mundi* made by a new class of *illuminati*. The term dates back to Neoplatonic theology of the 12th century.[[70]](#footnote-70) The mystical thinking originally given in the scenario of Dionysios Aeropagita transcends the cognition of the material world (*erigendo se supra se ipsum*). The mystical immersion in exalted thinking will later become Descartes’s and Husserl’s intuition of pure forms, which we have already related to Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Models of this mystical cognition given outside of common sense were quite common at those times. Pauline Epistles describe the rapture to the seventh heaven; Avicenna’s *intellectus sanctus* recognizes itself, God and the world through *virtus sancta* and *modus prophetiae* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Using the power of human intellect, modernism tries to realise Avicenna’s quotation about the unification of the soul with the intelligible sphere of the active intellect (*cohaerens principiis intellectibilibus*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). This subjectivist foundation of being is described in Heidegger’s terms *Gründung* and *Ge-Stell* that characterizes the nihilistic phase of metaphysics. Descartes’s *Regula XII* ends the path of modernity that created the difference between two substances, the physical and the intellectual.[[71]](#footnote-71) Postmodern “*informatio*” begins through the act of conversion that makes the Cartesian intellect to itself (*ad primum itaque me convertens*). After the death of the modern God, postmodernism changed the founding myth of *Modernorum* by replacing the role of divine demiurge with human simulacrum.

The conception of a twofold rule and two floors of the world was fundamentally unacceptable for the first Averroism. By introducing the theory of the twofold truth, the paranoid concept of the natural and objective world took place in thinking. The concept of the person divided into several substances was schizophrenic in the same way. The representatives of the first Averroism rejected above all the objective nature of *ratio seminalis*, which forms the medium of new cognition of the world. The first Averroism comprehends all *rationes* in the framework of “*esse intentionale*”. According to Albert, the predication “*in artificialibus*” does not have its own type of knowledge. The creative will is subordinated to cognitive reason that keeps in man always only a universal and potential character.[[72]](#footnote-72) The active component of this predication is given in the individual synthetic ability of the active intellect, which, as matter, takes the universal intentions and concepts from the passive intellect. What is universal in the intellect is potential in view of the unique reality of first substances. None “*ens rationale*” has a univoke or somehow hypostatized actuality in external reality. The concepts of “*rationes*” made by Bonaventure exist as universals only in thinking; therefore, they cannot have the form of a causally acting being of the third kind. Bacon took the same position by criticizing the incorrect use of predication “*in artificialibus*” that was in use among modernists at Oxford (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Bonaventure took up the quarrel with the first Averroism of Albert and Bacon from the year 1245, when he began to teach at the University of Paris. Bacon and Albert around 1255 refused all nonsenses of modern Latins, since they took up the line of defense of Averroes at the University of Paris that had been kept during the life of Alvernus. Aquinas’s position in relation to the modernists is much more complicated, and we will deal with it in the following chapters. Bacon and Albert rejected an academic debate with modernists, because the basic terms of metaphysics no longer had the same meaning. Therefore, around the year 1255, the first modernist crisis started in the academic institutions in Paris.

In the second half of the 16th century, a new system of univocal speculation emerged that took up the second floor of divine reflection. In his work *Surnaturel* (1942), Henry de Lubac presented the postmodern variant of two store metaphysics. The previous interpretations have shown that this two-story worldview was created on the basis of the objective diacosmos of Bonaventure. Let us recall the quotation from the pioneer study, which codified this division for the first time, already ten years before Lubac. According to Gilson, the medial role of the intellect in the mysticism of Augustinian Avicennism allows to take up the first floor of Aristotelian abstraction, but usually it runs according to the scenario of supernatural illumination.[[73]](#footnote-73) Gilson comments with the term “*surnaturel*” Bonaventure’s abstraction that is understood as illumination of thinking due to divine ideas. Bonaventure paves the way to a new world order, because he divided the being of the being into two generically different categories: “*Esse gratuitum est alterius generis quam esse naturale.*” [[74]](#footnote-74) In the later edition of the cited work, Lubac states that this quotation means a “*double passage ontologique*” (Lubac 1965, 113). The being is determined by twofold generic and thus also univoke determination, which is given either from supernatural grace or from a supernatural being. The postmodern Augustinians and Avicennists such as Michael Baius (†1589) and Cornelius Jansen (†1638) took the hypothesis of essentially given “*finalité naturelle*” and erected it against the supernaturally given interventions of divine grace in the existence of man (*praeter naturam, contra naturam*). The twofold ontology of the Augustinian *illuminati* becomes a new philosophy three centuries later. Jacob Lorhard uses for the first time for this now purely philosophical speculation the term “*ontologia*” (*Ogdoas Scholastica*, 1606). Rudolph Goclenius introduces it as a new definition of metaphysics (*Lexicon philosophicum*, 1613). Bonaventure’s rule, which determines the objective state of the world, determined the fate of the postmodern ontology. After the death of modern God, the supernatural floor of *Modernorum* became extinct, but not that kind of schizophrenic philosophy. That error has definitely passed into postmodern ontology. The word “definitiv” must be understood in the mode *alētheia*, also “*de fine Deī Modernorum*.” Therefore, after the eclipse of the first substance, modernists had to take the mystical path of Neoplatonism. This path was opened after the year 1250 by the changed metaphysical status of “*esse ratum*” and “*esse debile*” that Albert rejected by as Averroist nonsense. Duns Scotus as the last modern representative of Oxfordian Fallacy abolished all problematic presuppositions made by mystical ontotheology of Bonaventure. Following Avicenna’s metaphysics, he introduced a new manner of objective Aristotelianism.

Quoted Bacon and Albert resolutely refused the dualistic concept of being and supernatural pseudo-being that the school of the second Averroism introduced in theology and philosophy. The actuality of being exists only in the external substance, because universality is based on potentiality and accidentality of intellect. As a result, the recognition of the first Averroism can never be absolute, i.e., to be separated from first substances. The second Averroism conceived demiurgic path of philosophy called *via Modernorum*. Modern scenario “subject—object” exists in the framework of being of the third kind and it represents an absolute nonsense for Aristotelian metaphysics. The critical Albert and Bacon clearly saw that the univocal structure of modernity created a new pseudo-physics of hylemorphic hypostasis instead of actual physics. There is no metaphysics as the first philosophy related to hyparchical being of first substances (*haec est via quam fere sequuntur omnes moderni Latini*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Aristotelian way of cognition through the first substance now applies to the weak and uncertain mind, which explores the contingent existence of first substances in reality. Modernity exposed the being from behind, from the direction of subjective volition; thereby it created a new metaphysics moving in the direction of nihilism. After the death of postmodern God, man creates himself and thus also *ex nihilo* all philosophical meaning. The humanities are founded in the mode of the postmodern Cartesian *mathesis universalis*, which originated as early as the 17th century. Structuralist thinker Foucault lived in the age of complete nihilism. The proposition about the different rationality of divine production and human cognition is no longer valid in the field of contemporary humanities. Cartesian postmodernism still adhered to this teaching. The contemporary thinking of objective human sciences produces a new *scibile* called “man” through the irrational movement of structural difference that operates in the framework of postmodern *Arbor Porphyriana*. See Foucault’s above-mentioned quotation, which sets out a new place of the humanities (*le « lieu » de l’événement*). Foucault presented this sophistic simulacrum of the second Averroism in the form of demiurgic *factum* and *concretum* in order to accomplish the postmodern *epistémé*. The concrete individuum of Foucalt makes a new doppelganger of the real person. It has been created out of nothing (see the linguistic concept of “*valeur*” de Saussure) and separates the anthropological determination of man in the epoch of nihilism from the previous Cartesian postmodernism. The epoch of metaphysical nihilism gave cognition to the level of pure differentiation of linguistic meaning and to the process of infinite metaphorization of science. Foucault’s work *Les mots et les choses* confirmed basic characteristic of Adam nihiliste in the ninth chapter, which is aptly titled *L’homme et les doubles*. By replacing the simulacrum of Neoplatonic Philon of Alexandria and modern Bonaventure, the nihilistic Adam was created. His objective rationality has completely disappeared; he is formed only by the movement of structural differences. This is a typical product run by nihilistic Furies. Bonaventure created a new work of Christian theurgy on the basis of Jamblichus’s model. The Seraphic doctor settled himself in the new parallel world of mind, which the first Averroism had reserved only for the angelic and cosmic intelligences. The corruption of the best is the worst evil that the nihilistic character of modernism and postmodernism had revealed. Postmodernism turned the objective determination of man into a structural and anthropological construct, which is formed by the difference between one and zero, due to form given fully *ex nihilo*. The theological *dativus auctoris* present in Kilwardby’s work *De ortu scientiarum* and in Bonaventure is no more valid. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, that kind of objective science has been replaced by movement of structural differences and by infinite metaphorical transmissions of meaning. The production of *individuum* called “man” comes from the biological, economic and demiurgic simulacra. The actualized cognition creates the “human being” as an object of knowledge and manipulates it within the framework of the associated biopower (Foucault’s *biopouvoir*), the world, the local wars and the global destruction of the world.

### 4.1.4 Birth of Capitalist Demiurge

Parisian spiritual intelligentsia under Bonaventure’s leadership transferred the modern version of Oxfordian Fallacy to ontotheology. This phase was completed in 1255, as it was officially authorized to teach modernist metaphysics at the newly established faculty of the University. In this mendicant breeding actualized of modernity were formed next generations. They were already fully devoted to objective forms of Oxfordian Fallacy. The objectivity, which has been living in hidden *alētheia* at the analytical school in Oxford since 1240, thus passed to academic history of effects given as objective *veritas*. As a result of the introduction of exemplars adopted by Grosseteste’s interpretation of *Second Analytics*, the first level of objectivity (*rationes exemplares*) was created in divine cognition. These objectively determined essences are given in the form of ontotheological hypostases in divine thought. The first form of objectivity is the potency of the Creator himself as a pure actuality of being that is limited by nothing. The second form of objectivity is given in the conception of universal hylemorphism and the mathematics of measure, number and weight. Thanks to the demiurgic will and the elementary longing of matter for form, the separated world of divine properties given by examplars is reflected in the seminal and rational character of creation. The transfer of exemplary demiurgic rationality into creation by the act of the creative will created a sphere of objectivity in the form of *rationes seminales*. They make a hypostatic unity with metaphysics of first substances. The demiurgic objectivity follows twofold rules and twofold desire, which is linked to the matter and form of the third kind, as well as to the real causality in the world. New philosophical myth of the West established a new form of objective rationality and necessity. Bonaventure retold the first day of creation given in *Genesis* for metaphysics, just as Neoplatonist Philon of Alexandria had done it for the Pentateuch in the first century AD. Bonaventure founded a new philosophical fable for modernists based on the dialogue *Timaeus*. To this day, this mythology forms the metaphysical foundation and the colonizing ethos of Western objectivity. The new type of Jamblichus’s diacosmos was created by creative intention, which is potentially given in the divine Essence. The intention does not exist in a real and substantial way with regard to the real creation, but it is nevertheless at the same time more than a pure Aristotelian potency. In the work *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, the twofold path of the subject corresponds to objectively creative “*operatio*.” The enlightened demiurge transcends the real substance in the act of knowing the twofold rule (*regula agentis creati, increati*) and transcends towards God in Neoplatonic and mystical excess of mind (*excessum mentis*). The path of *Modernorum* initially consisted in ontotheological conjunction of both floors of rules. Modern *illuminati* must conquer the world from the pulpit of the church and from the academic chair. That is why the *illuminati* must always join the tyrants to manipulate the Crusades. They were already lost at that time. However, modern philosophy prepared imperialist wars of the capitalist West.

The intelligent will of the demiurge began to regulate the world according to the divine exemplary rationality and according to human intentions and volition. The modern agent is manifested in divine or human form. He leads the forms from the objective potency of demiurgic intellect and will to actuality. Being active in the world, the intelligent will of the demiurge meets the greed of matter of the third kind (*appetitus*). The seminal ideas enter the will of the demiurge that forms potential greed of matter (*informatio*). The first degree of the formed matter is formed by the aforementioned “*materia confusa*.” The divine demiurge makes use of its hypostatized appetite for the objective form. By the act of the will, the sovereign demiurge imprints into primary being of confused matter the basic actuality (*educerentur in actum*, ch. 4.1.1). The process of Porretan “exsistence” deductively introduces objective “formes—essences” (*rationes seminales*) into the real, hylemorphical matter. The regulated demiurgic appetite is guided by the objective necessity, which directs analogical activities of rational creators and designers. The creative subject has an associated objective form in front of it, which represents a specific *scibile* (*ratio exemplaris, seminalis, causalis*). The *scibile* is determined by an associated rule (divine intellect, human cognition at the level of the objective *vestigium*, empirical *scientia*, and real production). Both forms of conscious and unconscious will (*voluntas, appetitus*) must have their archetypal source outside the contingent reality of the created world. The demiurge is guided by an infinite or finite will and imprints this formative demiurgic will into the matter of the third kind endowed with corresponding appetite (*materia confusa, prima, spiritualis* ...). The Western subject received the first modern rule for the objective form of the crusade, which was later adapted by the military specialist Descartes for mathematical and technological conquest of the world. Created *ex nihilo* in schools of Oxford and Paris, the new subject of the West appropriates the unified meaning of being in the archetypal act of original substantiation. This modern nature of being is situated in the threefold form of objective truth according to Anselm’s truth as *rectitudo*, Avicenna’s truth as *certitudo* and Rufus’s truth as *coaequatio*. After the year 1250, pious modernism had the theory of science given in the mode of the one truth. Modernists therefore transformed the mystical reading of Scripture to establish philosophical determination between the matter and the form (ch. 4.1.2). Matter has an inherent appetite for receiving all forms of the demiurge that strives to imprint these forms into matter by his creative will (*informatio*). Both appetites meet successfully, since they are led there by God given inner necessity. Archaic hermeneutics find another masterpiece of erotically capable Furies. They instigated that objective copulation between the non-existent form and non-existent matter and between separated human body and soul. Those powers of intellectual chaos have been acting through the mystical appetite of objective Western demiurge. Bonaventure stands at the beginning of the modern path to objective completion of matter and form through the universal cosmic longing of form and matter for demiurgic manipulation and mystical copulation. At the time of contemporary nihilism, there is a sexless creature, a complete “*materia confusa*”. It is capable of receiving or rejecting sexual determination in its mind, like any other ideological product of the nihilistic era.

The Industrial Revolution has secularized this appetite of mystical modernity into the scientific and technical conquest of the material world. It was done through the modern version of capitalism founded by Olivi (ch. 5.1.3). Capitalism is driven by a mythological subject whose *appetitus* received a universal cosmic character. The irrational *appetitus* of modern subjects have met the equally irrational *appetitus* of the world in the new version of *Song of Songs* (ch. 4.1.2). Capitalism as an event of objective being guards therefore the character of musical *alētheia*. But its historical untruth as insane wandering of modern metaphysics (*Irre*) has a chaotic character determined by subjectively formed Furies. Bonaventure became the founding father of capitalism since he created its academic foundational mythos. *In illo tempore*, when the two aforementioned irrational powers of greed (*appetitus*) began to copulate, the original mythical event (*Ereignis*) took place that created the original cosmogony of capitalism. The voracity of Western demiurge is given directly in his demonic nature. The nature of the capitalist subject, modeled under the leadership of Furien, is demonic for two reasons arising from “subject—object” relationship. The capitalist individual has become paranoid because the objective underworld given by the biblical ontotheology does not really exist. This objective copulation with the mythological appetite of such a “world” is carried out by a modern subject who is schizophrenic *par excellence*, since it is divided into several incompatible substances. This tragicomedy of Muses defines capitalist *conatus*, which derives from the original demiurgic appropriation of objective being (*dativus obiectivus*). Let us return to the original form of the second substance, which is given by the modern categorization of objective donation, namely, as *dativus possessivus*. The coincidence of two forms of mystical capitalist “*appetitus*” (*Ge-Stell*) established the historically determined spirit of modernity that created the capitalist worldview (*dativus modi*, ch. 4). This interesting and today very problematic accident of the modern Western subject retains the same demonic character as modern logic and metaphysics. After the death of modern God, demonic crusade of modern *illuminati* seeks the imperialist grail in metaphysical nihilism of the last two centuries of World Wars, global capitalism and ecological catastrophes done all over the world. These events make the last geological epoch, rightly called the “Anthropocene.” Bonaventure’s concept of universal rule and demiurgic will sends the objectivity established by Rufus and Kilwardby to the conquest of the world by the modern schizophrenic subject of the West. This figure first appeared in the mode of academic mobilization of all being (*totale Mobilmachung*) in the face of the demonic Beast with the number “666” (ch. 4.1.2). That nihilistic figure of apocalyptic producer is described in the work of Ernst Jünger *Der Arbeiter* (1932). In the last times of ignorance and of “*totaler Mobilmachung*,” punishing Furies changed philosophy into a profitable cultural enterprise with scientific simulacra. The crowds of nihilistic workers called “white collars” produce a huge amount of academic science fiction in the field of so-called humanities. Divine Muses turned modernity into a postmodern cabaret. Its musical production of post-truths is controlled by the capitalist “*dativus modi*” given today as monetary neoliberalism.

Bonaventure created a capitalist version of Rufus’s *informatio* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Each step of information corresponds to corresponding appetite of being that is ready to take the form considered by the demiurge. The longing of demiurge to create meets the longing of matter to accept the form. The analogy concerns basic desire for forming the matter, which the corresponding subject recognizes in the matter of the third kind, given as a hypostatized *scibile*. Modernity follows the parousia of divine demiurgic production that *illuminati* consider in direct objective insight. The first Averroism took the cognition only through the metaphysical dative in order to follow the divine effect as *causa prima* in the past mode in creation. Modernism, illuminated by the solar intellect and by the light of God’s face, looks over the shoulder of modern God and describes the objective process how this sovereign demiurge creates the world. Bonaventure presented a complete structure of ontotheological production of being (*resolutio*). The commentary on Sentences explained the rationality of this production through the threefold way of giving meaning to all kinds of being. The world forms an objectively conceived system of the threefold manifested sense of being. The following quotation established ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) that forms modern technological world design made by the demiurge.

“Things are contained in God in three ways. In God as the principal agent of production (*in principio producente*), things are given in potential rationality (*in ratione potentiae*). God experiences things in their exemplarity (*in exemplari exprimente*) and thus puts them into the rational definition (*in ratione notitiae*). Finally, he keeps things with a view to their goal (*in fine conservante*), which is an act of his rational will.“ [[75]](#footnote-75)

The new ontotheological structure connects Bible and philosophy by creating an interlinked series of three determinations of the objective being (*res tripliciter sunt in Deo*). The divine demiurge became the first capitalist to globally ensure the objective production of the sovereign sense of being (*in principio producente*). The first mythological *dativus possessivus* of capitalism must be divine; it took place *in illo tempore* when modern God produced the first delivery (*Ge-Stell*) of objective being before himself, in his absolute given essence and interiority. This supreme mystical and basic capital of modernity arises from the fact that the process of creative production changes the nature of being in the first technological process of modernity. The divine productivity transforms itself from an exemplary potency in the divine essence via the rational objectivity in the divine Intelligence into the real actuality of creation made by God’s will. The production of the objective being is presented as an absolute event (*Ereignis*). The substantial potency of modern God as the first capitalist demiurge is not limited by anything (*in ratione potentiae*). The technological production of that demiurge must be rational, and made in an exemplary way as conceived intentional objects (*in exemplari exprimente*). God actualizes his abilities thanks to the act of archetypal thinking that experiences the exemplaria as supreme rational essences (*in ratione notitiae*). Finally, God oversees the total production of being in its created finality (*in fine conservante*). This created production of real being is determined by the act of the sovereign divine will (*in ratione voluntatis*). Bonaventure created a complete *resolutio* of objective being within modern capitalist production. Its mythological basis is done as intentionality and comitation created by Avicenna in modern God. This threefold objective level of “*esse ad*” (software) in God (*potentia—exemplar—notitia*) is separated from the real production of the created world (hardware). Through the threefold determination of the being in the divine being and in the creative intellect, a new form of objective predication was born, which in the mode *per prius* was connected with the demiurgic creative activity. In the mode *per posterius*, this predication is given in the direction of creation as an act of the creative will. Both floors of demiurgic activity of God and man correspond to each other in the mode of objectively given mathematical analogy of number, measure and weight. This analogy ties in with the two floors of the absolute creative rule (*in ratione potentiae — in exemplari exprimente*). The totality of the world, given by the act of demiurgic intention and the actualized Divine will, in its real manifestation as a divine *opus*, has an objectively univocal character (*in ratione notitiae*). The world is eternally intended as an objective and rational *tertium ens* in divine thought. Necessarily, being made in the mode of creative mythological analogy, the reality keeps the same objective rational essence.

Bonaventure created the donation of the objective being (*dativus obiectivus*) as an ontotheological understanding of the sense of being (*Vor-blickbahn*) that is conceived in the mode of demiurgic production (*dativus modi*). As a result, it came to fundamentally change how the modernity considers the creation. The new kind of *Ge-Stell* names the demiurgic subject as the source of being. In the mode of mythological comitation, demiurgic intellect and will assure this being to get the objective and then the real existence. The capitalist worldview of modernity arose as a result of the revolutionary exchange of Aristotelian *ousía* for demiurgic *parousía* that was done in Bonaventure’s school of Parisian modernists. The demonology of capitalism (*Irre*) has become effective on a global scale. It consists of the apocalyptic number and name “666” that Bonaventure brought into the world. He has transformed the mathematical objectivity of Rufus into a demiurgic work, which the modern God performs in exemplary fashion, and which modern *illuminati* take up in their own rational way. This worldview enables the unlimited production of sophistical simulacra in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. Bonaventure became the father of modern capitalist subject by transferring Aristotelian categorical predication into the ontotheological predication made “*in artificialibus*.” The being is given in the creative and creative activity of the subject (*per actionem agentis*). The first technological project of being exists originally and initially in the thinking of the producer (*ratio in mente artificis vivit*). The rule of creation given in the mode “*semel—semper*” refers to Augustine’s work *Octoginta trium quaestionem*.[[76]](#footnote-76) The creative idea is given in the thinking of the craftsman regardless of whether he produces the external work or not. The ratio is considered an ideal definition, even if nothing ever arose from it (*ratio est, etiamsi nunquam aliquid per illam fiat*). The objective existence of things in thought and in the will of the demiurge is in no way influenced by the fact whether the thing exists contingently in the external world or it does not exist. This is the typical example of Porretan predication “*in artificialibus*” that Alvernus, Albert and Bacon rejected in the years 1240–50. According to Albert, the analogical similarity given only in thinking cannot establish a metaphysical unity of being, because it lacks the predication of causality from hyparchical first substances (*non retinet ratio causalitatis*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). According to the definition of the causality predicted in *Second Analytics*, it is a clear error of theological *illuminati*. The causa in the designer’s thinking cannot be on the same level as the causality of the first substance acting in reality. However, the mystical Bonaventure believes more in the Bible and the objective metaphysics based on Christian faith than in the rational reasoning in *Metaphysics* based on the critical mind of the “pagans” such as Aristotle and Averroes. After all, the creative idea is ever alive, even if the external work passes. The fundamental determination of being is anchored in the thinking and intention of the divine demiurge. This archetypal illumination forms the fundamental *locus specierum*, in which the being preserves the eternal exemplary objectivity. Modern God is the first and exemplary deified owner of technologically based capital. He keeps in himself virtually all present and future states of all events that are exemplarily and objectively given in his mind. This *locus specierum* forms the first and therefore the most important knowledge and cultural capital of modernity. That “virtual” world is not made according to old nature of “*virtus*” as real state of things, since the virtuality received modern meaning of objective potentialities. Leibniz reworked this thesis for postmodernism by the idea of pre-established harmony. He endowed the real being with the principle of sufficient reason through the postmodern theodicy.

The introduction of demiurgic will into the system of Porretan hypostases is a typical manifestation of modern Franciscan spirituality. The concept of “*rationes exemplares*” as a potential intention of the creative will and a potential object in the divine intellect created a carrier (*subiectum*) for the secondary level of created rationality (*rationes seminales*). In the real world, a modern producer and carrier (*subiectum*) of the modern hypostatic unity of beings of the third kind was born. The modern “*res*” is given as *scibile*, *individuum* and *concretum*. This last individual and *concretum* given by the descent of forms into the diverse potency of hypostatized matter is at the same time the first actual substance and the second universal substance. The first Averroism pointed out in vain to academic *illuminati* that *tertium ens* can in no way really exist in such a sophistic guise. The objective determination of being is based in ontotheology. Rufus of Cornwall created the first version of *dativus obiectivus* by conversion of objective *factum* and reality (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). Bonaventure supplemented Rufus by repeating the creation of *Genesis* in the mode of philosophical Neoplatonism according to the Toledo school. This allegorical reading of the Bible in the mode of Neoplatonism was first constituted by Philo of Alexandria. Bonaventure supplemented the Jewish *factum* of Philon’s first Adam, given from the spiritual form, by creating a Christian *factum* of the objective Adam from spiritual matter (ch. 4.1.2). Modernity completed the Neoplatonic thinking of Philo, to whom the immaterial Adam was available only as a pure form, archetypally existing in the Neoplatonic diacosmos. The connection of Philo’s and Bonaventure’s mythology gave rise to the modern subject of the West and to the objective worldview. Bonaventure created the founding myth of modernity by transforming Porretan hypostasis, defined according to *Nominales*, into an objective *factum* of demiurgic volition. Bonaventure has no model of Neoplatonic emanations of forms, but the system of Avicennian comitation and Porretan predication of hypostatized divine intentions. This system of predication was established on the basis of nominalistic interpretation of *Categories* about the year 1230 (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). The objective exemplars are predicated in the downward direction first by the pure act of divine thought and will, given in the order of the Christological *verbum Dei*, and then also by the human act of thought and will, given in the order *verbum mentis*. This created a new hierarchy of forms coming from modern God (*formae exemplares / seminales / naturales*). The reverse reading of the world from the hylemorphic forms establishes the anabasis of modernity as an objective form of Jacob’s ladder. The ontotheological sphere of being was connected with the creative myth of *Genesis*. Bonaventure connected Neoplatonic and Aristotelian projects of metaphysics with each other. The mystical objectivity produced in the intention and will of the divine and the human demiurge became the place of origin of modern sciences (*ortus scientiarum*). Modern God as the first producer of objectivity represents the first technological capital of modernity. The modern world became a homogeneous whole, which was intended for modern cognition and manipulation. The objective desire of the demiurge, given by his will, corresponds to objective desire of the matter that must accept its rational and voluntaristic rule. Bonaventure’s follower Olivi modified the concept of modern desire into the definition of the will as another being of the third kind. That is why Olivi drafted the first concept of capitalist economy (ch. 5.1.3). After the lost crusades, modern *illuminati* started the objective crusade of the West. Bonaventure indicated it in a mystical way with the sign of the eschatological beast from the *Book of Revelation* (*isti errores significantur in Apocalypsi in numero nominis bestiae*, ch. 4.1.2). Bonaventure’s “bestial” form of metaphysics was founded on the demiurgic will and thus established new *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of the capitalism in its birth-time.

At the modernist faculty in Paris, the objective hypostases of Rufus were combined with the ontotheology of Bonaventure. As a result, the integral system of objective ontotheology was created about the year 1255. It was transformed into *metaphysica generalis* in the postmodernism of the 17th century. The subject of modern demiurgic will includes both reflexive self-knowledge and creativity. According to Bonaventure, the subjective will exists as metaphysical potential, which is determined not only materially and passively. The voluntaristic subject of the Modernorum reshapes the appetite of matter, which is given as a pure essential potency. This potency is tied to the concept of hypostased matter of the third kind and forms the objective opposite pole of the subjective ability of the demiurge (*obiectum*). Objective matter is formed in the mode of Rufus’s *informatio* according to the twofold rule. Bonaventure initiates the modern epoch of dominance through the subjectively determined will.

“Only the will controls its own actions (*sola voluntast est domina sui actus*) and moves itself (*sola est se ipsam movens*). Therefore, the will is the only one capable of making active use of the world *(ipsa sola est, cuius est active uti*). The other abilities are determined materially and passively, so that they indirectly refers to the world, but are not an act of this reference (*habent referri et non referre*).” [[77]](#footnote-77)

The will, highly valued by the Franciscans, represents a human potency that determines itself (*domina sui actu*) and, just like the soul in Plato, is the source of one’s own movement (*sola est se ipsam movens*). The key moment is the determination of the will by the term “*cuius est active uti*.” The act of volition is given in the ontological mode, as a demiurgic appropriation of being (*Er-eignen, dativus possessivus*). From the point of view of Augustine’s difference between “*uti*” and “*frui*,” the demiurgic will relates the world regulated by the will of the human demiurge. That way of proceeding makes in Bonaventure’s Augustinianism an important change in the nature of production that became secularized, therefore capitalistic in its productive nature (*uti*). Had the definition of demiurgic will related to “*frui*,” it should be regulated by divine form of “*regulae* *agentis increati*.” The assertion of the objective truth in the Latin West is connected with the first secularization of the demiurgic carrier of the modern will. That event represents *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of the subsequent capitalist epoch. The power given by demiurgic will of *illuminati* transformed reality into modern concreteness (Rufus’s *concretum*). The truth is no longer determined from the point of view of the metaphysics given by “heretics” such as Aristotle and Averroes. Modernity has exchanged the correspondence theory of truth with the production of truth, given as a sovereign *factum* of divine and human will. Bonaventure established the new ontotheological construction in the mode of capitalist *resolutio* tied to the modern demiurge. Objective knowledge is connected with demiurgically conceived will as supreme creative form. It stands at the divine beginning and at the same time it makes fully secularized end of the whole process of production (*dativus finalis*).

Let us return to the explication of the first three categories of the objective dative (ch. 4). Bonaventure created an itinerary of modernity by combining the first three determinations of the epochal dative (*dativus possessivus, auctoris, finalis*) into a single whole due to the demiurgic character of the production. The following quotation presents the modern vision of “*discrete videamus*” of Porretans that Bonaventure transformed into the demiurgic activity of the subject. The subject sees before him a new world of beings of the third kind. He considers the objective necessity univocally both on things and in the subject from the direction of the objectively eternal and hypostatized divine exemplars. His function was taken over by Leibniz’s mathematics. The following quotation offers the first outline of objective worldview.

“This necessary habitus (*necessariam habitudinem*) can be recognized not only in the existing things, but also in the non-existent ones. If the human being exists, then it is true that when he [real] flees, he [habitually] moves. This deduction applies even if the person is not running in real life. The necessity of statements (*illationis necessitas*) does not come from the existing, materially given thing, since it is given only contingently. This necessity is not given by the existence of the thing in thought; it is not just a concept, because this necessity resides in the thing itself. The necessity of a syllogism comes from the eternal demiurgic activity in its exemplar production (*ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna*). According to this exemplarity, things have a habitual tendency and potential tendency to connect with each other (*res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem*) and they are the realization of that eternal form (*aetarnae artis repraesentationem*).” [[78]](#footnote-78)

The quotation is based on permanently given objective existence of things. This logical existence is established by negating subjunctive (*tunc esset fictio, si non esset in re*). The negative hypothetical subjunctive “*si non esset*,” added to real existence, proves the initial position of modernity. The real existence of the thing is not important, but the construct made of objective essences. The second Averroism exposes the meaning of being from behind. Porretan hypostases are bound by the habitus to the demiurgic subject. Modern Bonaventure, postmodern Descartes and Leibniz assert that the relations of things are firstly given in divine thinking (*venit igitur ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna*). Thanks to divine genius and rules of production, God creates an eternal representation of real causality (*secundum illius aeternae artis representationem*). The deduction based on the ontotheological concept of necessity (*illationis necessitas*) establishes the first objective structure of the world in the Latin West. Simplicius hypostatized the habitus for the first time by a new interpretation of categorical determination made of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (ἐνέργειά τις; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). Bonaventure released this habitual energy by endowing it with objective facticity and with historical effectiveness. The quotation shows that in addition to the necessity tied to the contingent interaction between the first substances, there exists in reality a habitual reality of things, which is objectively determined by the necessity given on the basis of creative production. The exemplary necessity of the creative act is visible by analogy of seminal forms that are present in creation. The world is given objectively and exemplarily in divine thinking. In virtue of ontotheological deduction, the real world is taken out (*deducere*) of the objective diacosmos, where seminal and objective rationality operate. The transfer of higher forms of objectivity into a lower one ensures the similarity that concerns two forms (*ratio exemplaris, seminalis*), two rules and two forms of the efficient will that make part of the unlimited and limited demiurge. Again, an analogy of Jamblichus’s scheme of the “Unlimited—Limited” is used (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The sovereign will, charged with permanent demiurgic energy, takes the baton of objective determination and sends it out into the world. The analogy between the created and the non-created rule ensures that the connection between exemplary and seminal hypostases has the character of an objective *concretum* given in the intellect or the real demiurgic *factum* given in reality. The divine creation is necessarily given as a habitual creation, which goes from the divine thinking into actuality. The deduction constructed on the basis of Oxfordian fallacy does not require the causality of the first real substance (*verum etiam in non entibus*) to reach a true conclusion. Bonaventure creates a new form of cognition with an absolute and dogmatic claim to the truth ontotheologically given by Revelation. Belief in the divine creative genius and in its eternal and universally valid rule replaced the first substance. Descartes repeated it in postmodernism. Bonaventure established modern metaphysics als ontotheological version of Oxfordian Fallacy. The connection of form and matter as *tertium ens* is ensured by the sovereign will of the subject. This mystical and mytological *copulatio* established modern ontotheological objectivity. Duns Scotus reworked this mythology into universal metaphysics. Leibniz replaced the presentation of demiurgic activity in divine thought (*aeternae artis repraesentationem*) with divine capacity of calculus (*la région des vérités éternelles*, ch. 5.2.3). Mathematics completed the march of modernity, opened by Grosseteste and Rufus. The real existence of things is fully interchangeable with the mental image of things. Finally, the Anglican Bishop Berkeley psychologizes Bonaventure’s quoted “*illationis necessitas*” in fully nihilistic version of Oxfordian Fallacy. He reduced the real world to pure experience of the subject (*esse est percipi*). The modern subject received the new habitat not in reality, but in the sovereign will. Its actualization provided the undoubted basis (*subiectum*) for epochal effectiveness of Rufus’s model of the truth as assimilation of beings of the third kind. As a result, the modern subject got a habitus that is defined as an autonomous substance. He was able to set off for the conquest of the world in the mode of objective Christian “*informatio*.” The new form of the world is determined by his will, and disobedient matter has an inner desire to assume this mythological burden of the White Man.

Economic conditions changed fundamentally as early as in the 12th century, when feudal wars of conquest were systematically waged. In addition to the knight bound by his oath of allegiance, the category of mercenaries arose.[[79]](#footnote-79) These mercenaries (*ruptuarii*) and their military escort were paid for military services and received a share of the loot. The marauding bands of mercenaries recruited by the feudal lords represented the first system of wage labor and free labor force exploited in a capitalist manner. This military capitalism turned into the first form of imperialism, which conquered and plundered overseas territories and colonies from the 16th century onwards. The first modern form of a colonial joint-stock company interested in profits from the conquered territories appeared already during the First Crusade (1099).[[80]](#footnote-80) The first global protagonist of modern colonial conquest was Venice during the Fourth Crusade. The Doge Enrico Dandolo (†1205) promised that he would transfer a total of 33,000 crusaders to Egypt and equip the fourth crusade with 50 galleys. As a reward, he demanded 85,000 gold marks and half the share of the conquered territories. Instead of the Holy Land, the manipulated Crusaders captured and plundered the center of Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople (April 1204). This imperialist investment, which was directed in the destruction of Constantinople, was highly advantageous for Venice. In addition to the acquired booty and territorial gains, the main trading competitor of Venetians in the Mediterranean and in the Adriatic Sea was eliminated. The islands of Crete and Corfu made an example of first modern colonies that were exploited in a capitalist manner since the Fourth Crusade at the beginning of the 13th century. At the end of the same century, this view of the world acquires its modern *raison d’être* that changed in *raison d’état* in the 19th century. Karl Marx, however, reminds us that the birth of modern forms of economics must be distinguished from the epoch of capitalism.[[81]](#footnote-81) We need to move from *dativus possesivus* (the economy) to *dativus modi* (the political and social system). The creation of the system must be distinguished from the capitalist economy, since it was already there before. The first capitalist system based on the new form of *dativus possessivus* was born in England of 17th century by redefining of agricultural feudal practice as the new form of *Ge-Stell*. The influx of profit was founded on exchange-value and potential profit created by systematic improvement of agricultural production.[[82]](#footnote-82) In the capitalism of the 19th century, capital becomes a dominant power that shapes society in the mode of *dativus modi* (ch. 5.1.3). The transformation of Bonaventure’s mystical rules into Marx’s economic postulates gave rise to a new objective odyssey of the West. Objective production of being runs according to eternal rules (*aeternae artis repraesentatio*). Bonaventure’s modern rules related to the production of natural agents (*regula agentis creati*) created a new mode of capitalist production of objective being that takes stand before the demiurgic subject (*Ge-Stell*). Bonaventure sent the Western subject on the objective journey of the spirit that took the new odyssey through creation. While Odysseus’s journey is guided by the course of the real Sun, the path of his modern doppelganger is guided by Furies that lead his solar intellect. The modern spirit took as guide through the world the writing *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*. Then, through the mystical Jacob’s Ladder, the whole of being is traversed, which was created on the basis of the analogically conceived and demiurgically regulated being (*ens creatum, increatum*). The itinerary of postmodernism is founded in the same way by Hegel’s work *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807). The spirit, alienated from himself, goes out into the world, where he finds himself fully through the historical self-knowledge of alienated figures of consciousness. The absolute mind, on the journey of self-knowledge, adheres to the creator rule given by the logic of history. The absolute mind forms history through its own movement of thought. The imperative of self-knowledge passes through the concrete concept. It represents its fundamental rule, which the Hegelian mind possesses as its *potentia substantialis*. After the death of modern God, the Jacob’s Ladder of postmodernism is made due to historical development of the absolute concept. The facticity and mathematics given by *illuminatio* of mysticism became the absolute logic of the concept in Hegel’s work. This odyssey forms the habitat of the modern Western subject from Homer to Nietzsche. The nihilistic epoch transformed the theoretical habitus of modernism and postmodernism into fascist instrumental rationality. The consequences of these were first brought to light by the Frankfurt School in the work *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, which was written during the Second World War.[[83]](#footnote-83) In contrast to speculative and idealistic Hegel, the realist Marx created a political and economic itinerary of the mind. Its basis became the fundamental rule given by the objective movement of capital.

Marx’s journey of thought was opened by Rufus’s terms “*speculative*” and “*concretive*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). The critic of Hegel’s philosophy of law understood that the speculative philosophy of history no longer had a concrete basis. According to Marx, the falsely given ideology of his Platonist contemporaries represents a fundamental error of the mind. The illusion given in the framework of so-called “*deutsche Ideologie*” must undergo a critical revision. The introduction of the work *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* (1844) updates in postmodernism the dispute of Averroes with Neoplatonic Alexandrians, who founded the first modernism by eclipsing first substances (*quod contingit Modernis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4). Marx argues that German idealism had supplanted reality by Hegel’s Avicennism. This created the illusion of facticity, which was given as a historical movement of the concept, instead of following the real struggle of social classes for power. According to Marx, the concept exists as a reality only in the thinking of ideological *illuminati*.

“The primitive peoples experienced their prehistoric state in imagination, in mythology. Likewise, we Germans have experienced our late history in thought, in philosophy. We are philosophical contemporaries of the present, without being historical contemporaries.“ [[84]](#footnote-84)

According to Marxism, the itinerary of economically conditioned thinking follows the real causality in the world, as do Aristotle and Averroes. The conflict-laden odyssey of the new *scibile*, given by the circular movement of capital, created the social system of capitalism. At the very beginning of his philosophical path, Marx rejected Hegel’s Avicennist form of work and development of history. They take place entirely in consciousness and then pass into reality. The work generates objectivity; it is not a concept given at first in thinking and then in reality, since it is exactly the other way around.[[85]](#footnote-85) Historically acting people objectifies themselves and for others in the real world through various kinds of labour. This real causality must justify a philosophical interpretation of historicity in the mode of Aristotle’s middle link of scientific proof (*medium*). Marx analyzes the historical transformations of capital. They form the nihilistic itinerary of contemporary capitalism. The simulacrum of the world called “capitalism” is created by the odyssey of the capital given in the circular movement “money—commodity—money” (so-called “*dialektische Darstellung*”).[[86]](#footnote-86) The circular movement of capital creates an apparent univocal whole of objectively alienated forms of labour and thinking. This totality actually exists in the real conflict between the two basic classes in society. It is about the power struggle that controls the bourgeois-democratic state. Marx used the term “capitalism” in a new meaning. He examined the political-economic way of existence in which economic players shape the world by establishing various kinds of rules. The previous economic theories only presupposed an objective analysis of the production, distribution and consumption of the commodity. Classical economics created an idealized Porphyry′s Tree given by the abstraction of various economic units (national, regional) and then divided them into smaller abstract parts, up to the economic individual. Marx proceeded from the real form of the economy given by the historically formed causality of labor.[[87]](#footnote-87) The realistic approach to economic causality showed the primacy of demiurgic production, which shapes the contemporary epoch. The critical work on economics connected the production with the movement of capital. The connection of both forms of “*regulae*” created a foundational rationality (*regula agentis creati*) of the new epoch. The founder of the real, socially given economy interpreted the postmodern sophistry of capitalist alienation by capital. It makes a form being of the third kind, in virtue of which the entire epoch actively alienates itself, by contemplating itself in a distorted mirror (*speculum*).

A nihilistic Porretan hypostasis, called “capital,” became a body and has been living among us in the form of historical *factum* since the 18th century. The postmodern form of capital represents the new being of the third kind, which is given by the specific mode of economic production. On the basis of Marx’s political economy, hermeneutics of objectivity evaluate capital as a new being of the third kind. Marx unmasked the false univocity of capital, which had previously existed in the form of objective *scibile*. The genius of Marx′s analyses of modernist fallacy (*Irre*) called “capitalism” lies in the fact that he analyzed the circular movement of capital in society in the reverse way. This is why Marx founded political economy as a new discipline of humanities. The first and completely invisible rationality emanates from the hidden superstructure (todays “Deep state”, Marx′s *Überbau*) that produces the first level of class imperial interests masked as ideologies (*rationes exemplares*). They are acting back on the economic basis in a visible way, to take the new form of kvazi-rational arguments diffused by media, politicians and propagandists of all sorts (*rationes seminales*). This capitalist combination of ideological and political motivations (*regulae agentis creati*) then determines the demiurgic productive will of all capitalist subjects (*informatio*). The re-presentation of exemplary forms of capital given ideologically, politically and economically takes place through alienated consciousness of capitalist subjects. Let us paraphrase a sentence from Bonaventure quoted above. According to capitalistic exemplarity, ideologies and class interests, all demiurgic elements in the system of production have a habitual tendency to connect with each other (*res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem*). In this alienated form, they make a completely true and tragicomic representation of “Capitalist Fallacy” in the mode of *alētheia* (*aeternae artis repraesentationem*). The modernist form of Oxfordian Fallacy received another simulacrum through Bonaventure as an eminent representative of the school *sophistae Latini*. The schizophrenic thinking of capitalism produces exemplary alienation of labor and capital. Secondary phenomena objectively prove the fundamental alienation of the subject in the mode of subsequent (political, ideological, cultural, religious, ethical) representation. The process of representation of the capitalist subject is characterized by the transformations of capital, which are brought to life in the alienated consciousness of this or that class and the individual. Bonaventure’s twofold rule is replaced by the twofold relation to the means of production, which produce the basic forms of alienation of man. The movement of capital in the capitalist system follows the original ontotheological concept of necessity made by Bonaventure (*illationis necessitas*) that Marx changed into the necessity produced by political economy. The reality assessed by political economy was given a new form by the criticism of German ideology in accordance with the above-mentioned Bonaventure (*secundum artis repraesentationem*). The phenomenological description of these alienated forms of consciousness scientifically categorizes the demiurgic activity and consciousness of the associated subjects who carry capitalism on their shoulders or in their bank accounts.

The founding rule of the new demiurgic epoch is given not only ideologically and economically, but also culturally, which is analyzed by various neo-Marxist schools and directions. The present form of capital comes from the present French “School of Annals.” The history of long-term changes (*longue durée*) analyzed three centuries of structural changes in accumulation of wealth (Piketty 2013). Absolutization of capital arrived as a result of its separation from industrial production. Subsequent nihilistic movement of global debt money created from financial derivatives created a new “exsisting” third world that is runs by one per thousand of contemporary *illuminati*. Rufus’s work *Speculum animae* received a new intellectual life through the postmodern updating of Marx’s work *Das Kapital* (1867) and especially in his philosophical remarks on this work (*Actualized der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, 1858). The original version of mystical facticity of the West was established in works of the visionary Joachim von Fiore and handed over to the society of modern *illuminati*. Oxford branch of this *intelligentia spiritualis* waited for the objectively necessary arrival of Antichrist. Their descendants in the City of London, equipped with Oxford analytical thinking, expect the apocalyptic fall of the dollar and the collapse of the speculative bubbles. That eschatological investment event necessarily occurs and everything will be saved by arrival of the banking Messiah now invoked in the form of the “Central Bank Digital Currency.” Its successful presentation in the stock market will be given as a new form of virtual debt und of real slavery.

The first kind of demonic logic created by Grosseteste elaborated a new logical form due to future coming of Antichrist. This is what the contemporary financial instruments now correspond to. Hermeneutically speaking, contemporary virtual finances are based on the same form of modern *Ge-Stell*, i.e., on a capitalistic supply that organizes demonic essences of the third kind. Instead of Antichrist expected by medieval *illuminati*, the capitalism of contemporary *illuminati* came to complete Bonaventure’s itinerary of Western nihilistic metaphysics. It is signed with the number “666” as the apocalyptic beast of the New Testament. The intuition of the solar intellect (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2) observes the two forms of this mystical or capitalist *scibile* which does not actually exist. Mythical circular movement of new representations of power and knowledge characterizes the demiurge in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. After the wars and the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, the speculative mirror of 19th century capitalism became the face of global Gorgona. The contemporary form of corporate and fascist alienation from the reality of the first substance confirms the degradation of metaphysical form of abstraction to a mathematical rule. The phenomenon of high-frequency trading on the stock market or capital speculations confirm that the core of nihilistic economism in the era of neoliberal speculation is formed solely by mathematical abstraction. There is hardly any real economic value in it. Neoliberal nihilism put in the framework of truth as a universal equality of algorithms, it creates a new simulacrum in the mode of Rufus’s truth (*coaequatio*). It is formed by global information monopoly held by society of corporate digital simulacra. The schizophrenic subject created a paranoid version of money as a virtual debt. Afterwards, he carries out a planetary devaluation of everything that does not have the objective form of the mathematical *scibile* and associated debt value. Global gambling with a non-existent future devalued economic values. The sophistic word of modernists was no longer a virtual body, as it was at the time of Oxfordian Fallacy. It became a mere binary difference between one and zero. The postmodern and nihilistic form of modern thought also received a corresponding *dativus finalis*. The corporate logos of the one demiurgic percent of the planetary elect is fully reflected in the alienated form of consciousness of the remaining 99 percent. This mathematically and economically devalued individuals, called “human resources,” came into being after Porretan division of capital down to zero. This nullity is given by biological reproduction and manipulation of the so-called labor power which is now comprehended entirely globally.

Augustine and, after him, Bonaventure described modernity through the concept of active “*uti*” and contemplative “*frui*.” The itinerary of the contemporary epoch is given as an ontotheological version of Platonic anamnesis. The modern mind, soul, consciousness, capital or postmodern evolution will complete its utilitarian movement within the framework of “*uti.*” Demonic and therefore fully productive modernity will then rest on the eschatological seventh day, after its work is done, in the paradisiacal inactivity of its well-deserved “*frui*.” Finally, on the seventh day, the last generation of modernists receives the eschatological reward and accomplishes in that way nihilist *itinerarium mentis*, which mystical Bonaventure launched by spiritually founding the capitalism. The absolute objectivity finally resolves the movement of modern spirit regulated by Hegel′s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and the movement of alienated work regulated by Marx’s *Das* *Kapital*. Modernity salvaged in a secular manner will look at itself with the necessary certainty and evidence in the objective mirror, which is created by new absolute thinking and economically not alienated work. The new man of the third kind, who has been manufactured by Foucault’s differential humanism, regulates the associated system of classifications that are related to the totality of being determined within the framework of demiurgic production. The mental odyssey of modern subjects first created a new structure of metaphysics and, in the age of metaphysical nihilism, also proclaims its abolition through the digitized matter of the third kind. The natural sciences became the first true speculative knowledge in the completed Oxfordian Fallacy. Furies learned the scientific ABC of cognitive neuroscience and eventually abolished the objectively unreliable philosophy as well.

## 4.2 Objective Structure of Being (John Pecham)

At the end of his life, Bonaventure prophetically saw that philosophical errors and sophisms that he actively helped to create, led modernity to apocalyptic period of history of the West. The academic founder of modernism at the University of Paris became a prominent victim of Freud’s defense mechanism Verkehrung ins Gegenteil. The epochal error (*Irrtum*) of Parisian academic *illuminati* lay in the fact that he attributed the darkness of mind to the thinkers of the first Averroism in a sophistic way. The anti-modernists lost the battle with academic and ecclesiastical power, but not on the level of truthful understanding and truth. Modernism had no academic chance at the University of Paris until the new chair of mendicant orders was established. Then the situation changed radically, following the official attack of modern Alexandrins against Averroes. Critical Aristotelians represented by Guillelmus de Sancto Amore tried to stop this development at the University of Paris. The school of the first Averroism no longer had any success in the second round of the dispute in 1255 (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Classical philosophy and the unity of the person ended up on the sacrificial altar of sophistic modernity. Their artistic successors in the rue du Fouarre, who were known as Siger supporters (*pars Sigeri*) after the leadership role held by Siger of Brabant, they were defeated in the third decisive round of the year 1277. These critical thinkers and professional philosophers lost to the modern sophists only in terms of power, but by no means on the philosophical level. Therefore, in the newly interpreted gigantomachy of substance, they are entitled to full philosophical rehabilitation in the mode of truth as *alētheia*. They are still waiting for full philosophical and church rehabilitation.

The Seraphic teacher designed an objective Christian philosophy of the natural and the objective supernatural in two floors. He established the relationship “subject—object” within the framework of the first ontotheology of demiurgic will. As a church teacher and preacher, Bonaventure publicly formulated a number of controversial statements regarding the Commentator’s philosophy, from which Ernest Renan developed a postmodern simulacrum of so-called Averroism in the 19th century. Herculean work concerning the coming out of objectivity was successfully carried out. The successors of Bonaventure were left with the difficult task of credibly defending this contradictory hybrid of the first modernity. The systematization of new ontotheology around the year 1255 revealed fundamental metaphysical contradictions, which were contained in the new teaching of the *Modernorum*. After 1255 Siger’s group and partly also avicennist Aquin took over the criticisme of Bacon and Albert and secular magisters in rue du Fouarre that were expulsed out of the University. Pecham, Aquasparta, Olivi and others had to eliminate the biggest contradictions in the teaching of *Modernorum*. This second and final round of the dispute between the two schools came to an end with the condemnation of 1277 proclaimed in Paris and Oxford. The primary task of the second generation of modernists was to harmonize ontotheological construction of being with the Aristotelianism of first Averroism. The representatives of the second wave of Latin sophists transformed the philosophical sophistry of the first *Modernorum* into productive knowledge of the West. The disciple of Bonaventure and Kilwardby, Franciscan John Pecham played the main role in the transmutation of the stone of Porretan sages into objective gold. From the year 1269, he was a *magister regens* in Paris and Oxford and then he was named the archbishop of Canterbury (1279–92). The previous analyses have shown that philosophical concepts no longer had the same meaning in the first and in the second Averroism, which, among other things, led to fundamental crisis of Christian theology.

Let’s simplify the systematization of objectivity and its criticism into three blocks. The first part is devoted to the philosophical defense of Bonaventure’s legacy (Pecham, Aquasparta, *Anonymi*). The second chapter clarified the dispute over the interpretation of Aristotle in the first Averroism (Siger, Aquinas). After the condemnation of the first Averroism in 1277, the subsequent matrix clarifies the emergence of the modern capitalist subject (Olivi) and the emergence of a new objective metaphysics (Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus). Scotus established a complete modern metaphysics, and Suárez transformed it into a modern postmodernism. Suárez ended the crisis of double truth condemned by decree 1277 in elaborating the universal project of *metaphysica generalis*.

### 4.2.1 Virtuality of Human Being

The previous chapters have outlined the two stage construction of Bonaventure’s ontotheology in two sets of demiurgic rules. The new metaphysics had rhetorical persuasiveness, but lacked philosophical consistency. Neoplatonism has had a standard solution for such cases since Late Antiquity, namely the permanent multiplication of *tertium ens* and by the continued duplication of reality using sophistic simulacra. The conflict with Aristotelism given “*ad mentem Averrois*” was inevitable. Aristotle’s categories are fixed in relation to the second substance. The genus as the highest unity of the universal meaning is determined only as the second substance. Predication *per prius* can by made only through the imposition of meaning through the species related to the hyparchically determined first substance. In liberated modernity a nd postmodernity, the number and structure of amphiboles are limited only by creative thinking of *illuminati*. Divine Jamblichus, the founder of the modern form of metaphysical theurgy, created the first version of such an objective diacosmos (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The preceding matrices have shown that the production of being of the third kind is in direct proportion to the intensity of the dispute with classical Aristotelianism, which uncompromisingly defends the principle of reality and its cognition. The first substance no longer played the role of *ens ratum* in the second Avicennism since 1240, as it was shown by Albert’s dispute with Rufus and Kilwardby (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). The power of rational argument adored by Albert no longer applied, since basic philosophical concepts no longer had the same meaning. It is no wonder that classically educated Albert refused to go to Paris in 1270 in order to discuss those topics with *Doctores latini* lecturing at the Faculty of mendicants. Taken his lifelong experience, this no longer made sense, since modernists had condemned the teachings of Averroes and they manipulated Aristotle without really knowing the philosophy of both of them. Albert left the thankless task of defeating the Latin sophists and Averroists to his best pupil Aquinas. About 1270, Albert responded to ecclesiastically demanded expertise concerning the dispute of Paris and he wrote a short treatise (*De XV problematibus*, 1270). Aquinas’s arrival at the University of Paris at the end of 1269 opens a new round of disputes between the two schools. Its protagonists are Aquinas and Pecham and the dispute also unfolds with regard to the recognition and the statute of the separated cosmic intelligences and substances. This is evidenced by Aquinas polemical writings *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Dei* (finished in 1268) and *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis* (finished in 1269). Albert’s follower defends the position of the first Averroism regarding unified cognition from the direction of the first substance. Thomas’s conflicts with Pecham and Bonaventure were inevitable after his second arrival in Paris. Pecham started a debate about the unity of the intellect when Albert just finished his work *De unitate intellectus* about 1263. We have already commented on the key arguments of the fourth and fifth chapters of this work, and therefore we will not resume them (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Albert added the following note to the lovers of wisdom at the end of the third chapter.

“The present disputation is addressed only to wise people (*ad sapientes*). We do not intend to pretend anything, because the power of scientific proof leads to the truth of the matter. In the XII Book of *Metaphysics* it is said what kind of knowledge is the matter of that disputation.” [[88]](#footnote-88)

Dominican of Cologne is not interested in creating metaphors (*nihil volumus fingere*), because he only wants to discuss the problem with connoisseurs (*volumus loqui nisi ad sapientes*). The real philosophers are not sophists. The wise thinkers respect the power of arguments that are handled with the help of the demonstrative proof (*virtute demonstrationis*). The whole truth of the matter comes under consideration (*omnia ad veritatem rei*). The fourth chapter of Albert’s treatise *De unitate intellectus* offers 30 arguments regarding the unity of the intellect, which summarize fundamental errors of Averroism of that time. Albert denies these arguments in the associated 30 answers. Bonaventure’s students were the main representatives of Averroism attacked by Albert under the title *Averroistae*. They had to accept the thrown gauntlet and to do the impossible task. Pecham’s fourth chapter of the work *Quaestiones tractantes De anima* (alternative title: *Quaestiones disputatae De anima*) was written in the years 1268–70. It contains 30 arguments that offer the refutation of monopsychism from the position of the second Averroism.[[89]](#footnote-89) All of those 30 arguments of Pecham confirm the direct dependence on Bonaventure in key issues. Contradictions between two concepts of the metaphysics, of the truth and of the abstraction were enumerated by well-known exegetes of scholasticism such as Spettmann, Rohmer, Gilson and others at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.[[90]](#footnote-90) Cited studies of classical medievalists present the contradiction between the first and the second Averroism, in contrast to the contemporary harmonizing interpretations influenced by the objectivist paradigm of Avicennism.

The previous chapters have shown that Bonaventure and his school were unable to clearly distinguish between the active and passive part of intellectual cognition. They introduced the intellect as a Porretan hypostasis and even endowed the *intellectus possibilis* with the spiritual matter. The intellect was defined as a special form of substance (*hoc aliquid*). The connection of soul and body suffers from internal dualism at different levels. Rufus as the founder of modernism had imported that teaching to Paris. Averroes′s *intellectus possibilis* has a material character; the individuation of thinking takes place through *materia spiritualis*; the numerical unity of intellect is connected with the eternal duration of the world according to falsely interpreted Averroes, etc. Direct disputes between Pecham and Aquinas concerned the unity of the person that the second Averroism destroyed by introducing the plurality of substantive forms (Spettmann 1919, 35–40). Emergence of objectivity concerns Pecham’s problematic defense of individual intellect.[[91]](#footnote-91) The intellect as numerically determined “*individuum*” makes bare nonsense from the point of view of the first Averroism. The intellect in classical Aristotelianism makes a specific faculty of the immaterial soul, which is carried out in the mode of *inmixtus* with regard to sensual cognition. Pecham individualized the soul and the intellect as an objective “*individuum*” due to universal hylemorphism. The passive component of intellect is reduced to objective and material *intellectus possibilis*. He differs numerically because of objective matter, and because of his activity, which is indicated as the first way of abstraction determined on the basis of sensible phantasms. However, this sensually given *intellectus materialis* had no direct connection to the immaterial *intellectus agens*. Albert’s solution of the unity of the person through *intellectus speculativus* was rejected as Averroism. The second Averroism understands all differentiation and potentiality only through the pseudo-matter given within the framework of universal hylemorphism. The intellect is immaterial and its individualization is only possible through matter, which must be spiritualized. The basic dilemma of Averroists as Pecham emerges from their erroneous interpretation of the *intellectus possibilis* according to CMDA. It can be summed up in following statement: “The intellect is an immaterial substance. But numerical individuation exists only through matter.” [[92]](#footnote-92) Conjunction of both theses makes sheer nonsense from the point of view of the first Averroism. The first thesis is erroneous in principle and the second makes no sense with regard to the immaterial intellect. The opposition given by the immateriality of the intellect and individuality through the theory of universal hylemorphism established the dualism of modernity. Pecham’s summary of the passive intellect made with reference to Averroes shows that the second Averroism knew the argumentation of CMDA and rejected it in principle. We find the key passages in *Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, items 7–11 (ibid, pp. 40–41). Pecham correctly summarizes the teaching of CMDA concerning *intellectus possibilis*.

“The Commentator, in the definition of the material intellect, asserts that the latter is in potency opposite to all material universal forms. He is not in actuality as a substance, because otherwise he only recognized himself.” [[93]](#footnote-93)

The quotation mentions rightly Averroes′s definition of *intellectus materialis* as a universal potency in relation to sensual forms of cognition. Pecham is mistaken in the fact that the intentional act of cognition of these universal forms is determined by the materially conceived and substantially given intellect. He attributed to Averroes in a sophistic way the Averroistic concept of cosmic *intellectus possibilis* as a material substance. Following text confirms the refusal of classical Aristotelian unity of the person.

“The intellect is an immaterial substance, and there is no other possibility of numerical individuation than through matter. It follows from this that the intellect has no matter. The Commentator proves that the intellect is immaterial and devoid of matter. If he had a form of matter, the intelligible cognitions in potency would be like sensual material things and could not be recognized by abstraction. Therefore, in the third book of *De anima*, the Philosopher says: ‘In material things there is only the potency for intelligible understanding.’ But this is a mistake.” [[94]](#footnote-94)

Averroes is for Pecham as well as for Bonaventure a pure Averroist, who takes the *intellectus possibilis* as a cosmic form that is numerically one for all people. Then, like Aristotle, Averroes cannot individualize the intellect in the soul. According to modernists, both thinkers lack the *materia spiritualis* that is necessary for individuation. This is the classical scheme of exposure of cognition from behind, from the direction of the hypostatized active intellect that illuminates the hypostatized receptive intellect. By abolishing Averroes’s *intellectus materialis* as an immaterial faculty of the soul, the receptive cognition of the universal forms is materially determined. Modernity individualizes the receptive intellect in man through the matter of the third kind. It makes the individualization and receptivity in the individual act of recognizing made by objective *intellectus materialis* in this or that person. The potency of the receptive intellect must be given in some substantial matter; otherwise it is not individual. Pecham therefore, following the example of Avicennists such as Aegidius Romanus, separated the receptive component of the immaterial intellect from sensual abstraction (ch. 4.3.2). Due to the matter of the third kind, there was confusion between the individual determination of *species sensibilis* and the universal determination of *species intelligibilis*. The ninth question in Pecham’s treatise sets out the basic solution of the second Averroism for *intellectus possibilis*. Pecham first correctly states the basic thesis of the Commentator about the full determination of the intellect by the senses (*nihil intelligit sine imaginatione*). Then he proclaims that we recognize the stone by the similarity within the framework of species that is stored in Augustinian form of memory (*memoria*). Their role in creating the similarity between things and the intellect is of absolute importance. In the scheme of cognition, the difference between the *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* is absent, because the modern species has a uniquely objective character.

“The imagination first imprints itself on the senses, then on thinking. So we see the thing as present, but we recognize it as absent. We recognize the present thing through sensory cognition, the absent thing we recognize through the senses and through the movement of cognition given in the intellect or in the imagination. Therefore, the species of the thing is in the soul even when the real thing is not present. There is no stone in the soul, but the sensual species of stone. Something else is the intelligibile species (*species intellectualis*), which is captured by the intellect in the act of cognition (*in acie intelligentiae*) or when it is in the thesaurus of intellectual memory (*in thesauro intellectualis memoriae*).” [[95]](#footnote-95)

The proceeding of cognition runs in the opposite way than in the first Averroism. Since the species is a hypostatized *tertium ens*, it can be found beyond the activity of bodily senses as well. Bonaventure has the same scenario of cognition. Aristotelian abstraction applies exclusively from the direction of the senses, since there is no other way how *species sensibilis* could be actualized. Explication of Pecham is based on the special storage of Porretan species. Their imprinting comes in sensual image and than in intellectual components of the soul (*imaginariam quae imprimitur in sensu, deinde in spiritu*). The key character is the distinction between two kinds of *species intelligibilis*. Pecham allows the *species intelligibilis* to enter Augustinian *memoria*. But those stored *species intellectualis* serve as object of the new insight into the soul given by substantial *intellectus agens*. The new intuition is linked to the divine sphere of objective exemplars and forms (*acie intelligentiae*). At the second stage of *memoria*, thinking is no longer determined by sensorial stimuli. Intellect works with hypostatized species stored in the special type of intellectual memory (*in thesauro intellectualis memoriae*). Augustinian *memoria* replaced the receptive intellect. In the second level of cognition, imagination and intellectual cognition refer to the absent thing, which is represented by its species (*res videtur praesens, et cogitatur absens*). The difference between two modes of presenting the species in memory and in the intellect consists in the permanence of cognition, which is permanent only in its intellectual form (*species ita est in anima*) and not in the real thing (*non res cuius est*). Modern cognition comes from higher intelligible cognitive forms that are given in the soul by illumination. Modernity does not need a real thing to recognize, since it carries within itself the necessary actuality for the act of cognition made *a priori*. Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*, as the receptive faculty of the soul, therefore play no role in the process of synthesizing the intellectual cognition, and the second Averroism thus cannot cope with it. Pecham placed this intellect of Averroes in the material sphere (*ratione sui materialis*; ibid, p. 43.13), where sensual knowledge arises. They are denuded at the second stage of the immanent and *a priori* actualized cognition in the mode “*memoria—intellectus*” because they activated by Augustinian illumination from behind, from the direction of the divine face. The material intellect recognizes the species through abstraction from the senses, and the active intellect ties in with the modern form of memory, where the species are stored. Intellectual memory is derived from Augustine’s triad in *De Trinitate* 10.11.17 (*memoria—intelligentia—voluntas*). This memory gets the actuality directly from God in the theological context of man as *imago Dei*. The active intellect recognizes objective species in the act of specific anamnesis and denudation, which is carried out by intellectual memory of the third kind. Augustinian memory does not exist as a psychic faculty any more than the modern species. They are mythological products as being of the third kind. After the eclipse of the first substance, some instance in man must preserve the simulacrum of the world, because the modernist himself created the world as a collection of beings of the third kind. The identity of the world and of man is given in this specific type of memory of *Modernorum*. This modern database of objective species makes a real treasure of knowledge. It replaced the receptive *intellectus possibilis* of the first Averroism. The beings of the third kind gathered together in memory create an objective imitation of the real world and can always be activated with the power of the will and the active intellect. The possible intellect is not necessary because the memory of the already given and stored species can be illuminated from behind, from the active intellect. Then their potential ability becomes a *scibile* to reveal a piece of knowledge. Pecham sophistically transformed sensual data in the species stored in intellectual memory, where they are mixed together with the eternal species.[[96]](#footnote-96) The memory contains all species known since Bonaventure (*species abstracta, innata, impressa*, ch. 4.1.1) including all other species from the Franciscan school of second Averroism (*species expressa, relicta, collecta*). Introduction of specific memory as a reservoir of beings of the third kind established the modern form of cognition made as Rufus’s universal equality (*coaequatio*). This mode of being of the third kind is subjectively kept in memory as modern *locus specierum*. Modernists made use not only Augustine’s *memoria*, but also Aristotle′s teaching. The intellectual part of soul represents *locus specierum* according to *De anima* 429a27‒28 (τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν). Aristotle treats in this part only the intellect separated from bodily senses and not the definition of the intellect as a *tabula rasa*. Therefore, for the second Averroism, this extract became a canonical text. In the quotation of *De anima*, Pecham separated the sensual species given only in the imagination from Porretan species stored in modern memory. In the newly created diacosmos of modernity, the non-existent species of the third kind had to get a corresponding objective habitat. A new place of knowledge has been created by the fact that the modern subject of these objective contents has the substantive habitus necessary to store and activate the objective species (*in acie intelligentiae*). The *illuminati* have created another important element of a digital homunculus. The modern memory (*in thesauro intellectualis memoriae*) stores third species entities in the manner of a computer’s operational memory (*Random Access Memory,* RAM). Original Neoplatonic diacosmos shifted directly into thinking, since modernists carry their objective shadow world always with them. Modernity is at home in the underworld, since it recognizes the real world only in the mirror and unclear. Pecham created a modern database system that keeps all species of the third species in one place. Led by computer-gifted Furies, postmodernism is working desperately to store all non-existent *tertium ens* as reliably and permanently as possible. John Locke updated the doctrine of the second Averroism for postmodernism. He bound that kind of memory to the act of cognition and even to identity of the postmodern individual (ch. 4.4.3). Postmodern man without his own memory has lost his basic treasure of knowledge because he is unable to know the world objectively. Without this treasure, he does not have his own identity and is therefore not legally responsible. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, computer science put the question of memory at the first place. Without servers connected to each other in the cloud computing system, no identity of objective recognition on a global level would be possible today. Modern memory ensured a basic storage of univocal species. Pecham defended the thesis that the first Averroism rejected in principle, that is, a direct cognition of universals in hylemorphic things (*recipe ergo intellectus species particularium*).[[97]](#footnote-97) The matter of the third kind makes the subject for this individual species that are received by the material intellect and stored in the modern memory. The second Averroism has no instrument to describe the existential act of the receptive intellect in the real person, because it rejected Averroes’s existential act of thinking in the mode of *tertium genus*. Pecham paves the way for contemporary nihilistic reduction of thinking to a non-existent subject that is defined as a kind of pseudo-matter. He sophistically attributed to Averroes that modernist thesis about plurification of the material intellect due to the matter of the third kind. Once again, Alexander′s and Themistios′s solution of the separated intellect were taken into account, which Averroes totally rejected. The second Averroism used by Avicenna and Avicebron read Aristotle in the paradigm of universal hylemorphism. The form and the substance are given as *tertium ens* and they establish an objective atomic substance (*individuum, concretum*). The active intellect considers the univocal and hypostatized species, and then stores them in the receptacle of memory of the third kind. Their reactivation proceeds in the act of cognition by the hypostatized active intellect given as a substance.

The modern person is composed of the immaterial soul, the hypostatized intellect associated with the memory of the third kind, as well as the material body, to which the imagination and the intellectus materialis belong. This collection of hypostases called “human being” is united as a modern kind of *colligatio* according to Bonaventure’s *appetitus*. Pecham connected the soul and through the concept of objective attraction (*inclinatio*).[[98]](#footnote-98) According to the modern dualism, the soul itself would have done much easier cognition of separated immaterial substances than if it were in the body (*limpidius cognoscat separata quam coniuncta corpori anima*). The quotation of Neoplatonic coinage shows that the body makes an obstacle for the soul, although it is necessary for cognition. The first Averroism under Alvernus had already condemned this contempt for the body as non-Christian, because it follows the dualism of Neoplatonic Arabic and Jewish mysticism in the framework of *sequaces Aristotelis*. The second Averroism conceives the soul as a real substance that directs the body from its superordinate position as a formal actualized mover (*anima ut motor*). The contemporary intellectual nihilism abolished this angelic simulacrum of the modernists. Under the guidance of the neurocognitive formed Furies, the separated immaterial intellect was replaced by the brain functions of the purely material intellect as an objectively given neuronal motor. Perhaps the pendulum will swing back to the other side. Hopefully, the next definition of nihilistic intellect will be again absurd in a classical way, which makes a completely angelic and mystical motor. The interpretation of the first matrix of objectivity has shown that Averroes rejected the intellect as a substance both in the school of Alexandrians and in Themistius. Those philosophers separated the active intellect from the individual cognition in man and they outlined the personalization only through the sensual hylic intellect (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Pecham faced a big problem, because the person disintegrated into dissimilar substances. From the position of magister of Oxford and archbishop of Canterbury, he had to systematically defend the work of metaphorical Bonaventure and Kilwardby against the criticism of Albert, Aquinas and Siger. These were top Aristotelians and they defended the unity of intellectual thinking person. It is no wonder that Pecham left the University of Paris in the year 1271 and returned to modernist Oxford. Sophistic Averroism of modern Alexandrians did not understand the receptive intellect in CMDA as difference between *tertium* and *quartum genus*. The modern *intellectus possibilis* became a component of *memoria* that makes a pseudo-material reservoir for the objective species. The soul has become an actual substance, and *intellectus agens* works diligently in it as an actualized mover, which is what today’s CPU processor in a computer represents. This “*intellectus agens ut motor*” then works with objective species stored in the Augustinian *memoria* as the first form of contemporary RAM. Pecham put Rufus’s accidental potency of intellect into Bonaventure’s soul made as a substance. The individual act of subsistence is given by *materia spiritualis*.

“In all created substances, there is the substantial and accidental potency. The accident does not exist other way than through the substance; consequently, it can have no other activity than that of the substance.” [[99]](#footnote-99)

Rufus introduced into the second Averroism (ch. 3.3.1) the above-mentioned concept of substantial and accidental potency (*substantialem potentiam et accidentalem*). Thinking is potentially capable of drawing conclusions from itself, because it has become an objective substance. This substantial being of the soul establishes the unity of all accidental activities of the soul (*accidens non est nisi mediante substantia, ita nec operatur nisi mediante ea*). The substance given in the framework of matter of the third kind creates the original unity of the soul. All activities, including intellectual ones, are derived from it. The faculties of the soul are connected with the cognition of the real hylemorphic substance in the second step. Therefore, the cognitive function of the body became a mere accident, since the knowledge is mediated by the soul as a substance. In the modern dualism of soul and body let disappeared the unity of the person as the actualized first substance. The soul takes the substantial actuality not from the material body, but from its own intelligible immaterial form. The hypostatized potency of the third kind conceptualizes Avicenna’s ability of self-reflection of “Flying Man,” whose thinking does not require a body. The relation of substance and accidents allows the thesis “*operatio sequitur esse*” to be applied. But the “*actus essendi*” of the person as one substance is taken in a hypostatic way as a plurality of objective substances. Those mythological entities “exsist” in every modern homunculus. Then, driven by their erotic appetite, they merge into a centrally operating unit called the “concrete human individual.” It is completely insane as Bacon remarked. The first Averroism decisively rejected this conception for two reasons: the “*operatio*” of intellect is of an immaterial nature; the soul is not a substance, but a form of the body. The second substance (i.e., categorically predicted person) is defined by the imposition of meaning from the real hylemorphic substance. The predication of “*anima intellectiva*” must follow the metaphysical dative that presents the hyparchical being of the first substance. Therefore, the universal meaning exists only in thinking. By associating the intellectual faculty of the soul as a modern substance, modernity abolished Aristotelian concept of the soul as an entelechical form of the body. In this way, Averroes’s definition of cognition was made completely impossible, and then it was manipulated and finally demonized. The intellect of *Modernorum* is not able to convey the original unity between the receptive (personal) and the synthetic (universal) component of cognition.

Modern Alexandrians were victorious and we pay the price for their victory by the dualism of soul and body. Pecham disintegrated the unity of the person, which Boethius established in the famous definition of the person that emphasizes the indivisibility of the one substance (*persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*, PL 64, 1343D). The modern individual came into being at the price that was the division of man into a multiplicity of substances. The classical Aristotelianism of the Sicilian school based on interpretation of CMDA insisted on the four postulates that separated it from the school of modernists.

1. There is only one hylemorphic substance as fully actualized existence of the person.
2. The soul is a form of this subsistent act of being in the context of the person as “*hoc aliquid*,” because the corpse is not a human being.
3. Every act of cognition (sensual and intellectual) has two components and therefore two faculties: the receptive and the synthetic potency.
4. The act of the intellect as an immaterial faculty in the soul as an immaterial form of the body, involves two processes of cognition, the receptive and the synthetic. Both abilities of the intellect (*possibilis, agens*) are brought into actualized state by *species sensibilis*.

These four postulates form the basic unity of the person according to the first Averroism. This corresponds to correspondence theory of cognition and the truth. The receptive potency given by the intentionality of *intellectus possibilis* takes up the sensual potency given in the imagination. The synthetic activity of *intellectus agens* takes this actualized intelligible species from the receptive intellect and, in the act of final synthesis, creates a resulting universal concept in the speculative intellect. All postulates defend the fundamental unity of the person. The person is a unique substance, and the soul is a unique form of this substance. The intellect is the unique faculty of the soul and is given by the two basic immaterial intellectual faculties (*intellectus possibilis, agens*) that form the resulting concept (*intellectus speculativus*). The preceding matrix has shown that the plurality of substances in man arose after the year 1230 in Oxford. Grosseteste rejected the plurality of substances in man. This doctrine arose in connection with Buckfield’s and Rufus’s definition the soul in the paradigm of universal hylemorphism. This hylemorphism was grafted onto the doctrine of Porretans and *Nominales* (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). The second Averroism prevailed with the help of Grosseteste’s philosophy, since he used his version of Oxfordian Fallacy to defend the universal hylemorphism and to introduce it into the definition of the person. With the exception of Bacon as a strict Aristotelian, the large group of masters at Oxford adopted the plurality of substances in man and even considered it as Grosseteste′s authentic teaching. This was stated by the anonymous author of that school. In the next generation, he interpreted Aristotle’s *De anima* in the spirit of the second Averroism (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). Rufus and Bonaventure transformed Boethius’s teaching on the unity of the person as the one substance into the dualism of two substances given by twofold form of the substance, the material and the spiritual. To these two substances they then added corresponding activities, the sensual and the intelligible ones. Modern man has two substances, body and soul. The soul as an intellectual substance has either two (material, active intellect) or even three habitually created hypostases (*memoria*). The modernists of the second wave as was Pecham, they deepened all existing differences: soul versus body; sensual versus intellectual cognition. The first defense of modernism ended in a fiasco, at least according to Bacon’s testimony. The second round of the struggle concerned the definition of the person and it culminated in 1270. Bonaventure’s disciple Pecham had to combine all parts into a single whole, in order to establish the objective unity of the person. Pecham’s explanation ended in a fiasco and he had to leave Paris just as Rufus did it before. Bonaventure again remained alone as the head of modernist mendicant faculty in Paris. But under his leadership, a new generation of modernists emerged, who received their academic titles. The contemporary testimonies show that the question of the plurality of substances in man formed the core of the power-related and ideological dispute of 1277 between the first and the second Averroism.[[100]](#footnote-100) The epochal winner of the whole dispute was the semiaverroism of Aquinas, who proclaimed the pluralism of forms in man (but not of substances) according to the pattern of Grosseteste. On the one hand, there is the real person and his existing soul, on the other hand, there is the eternal *anima intellectiva* created directly by God. According to Aquinatus, that concept ensures the theological postulate of the immortality of the soul. This view was also unacceptable for the masters led by Siger, although it respected the unity of the person as a substance, which was not the case with modernists. The defeated Aquinas lost the battle for the title *Expositor Novus* against Siger and his school and he left Paris in April 1272. Aegidius Romanus, the eminent Latin sophist and founder of Thomism accomplished the victory of Christian schizophrenic personality separated in two forms. After the decline of the first Averroism, Aegidius Romanus as historically first Thomist created the myth of victorious Aristotelian Aquinas at the University of Paris, to whom he himself gave the honorary title *Expositor Novu*s.

In the years 1268–70 Pecham systematized previous sophistry of modernists to establish an objective definition of the Western subject. Objectively made philosophy entered the decisive stage. An integral solution to these problems is offered in the second Averroism by the adverb “*obiective*.” Pecham faced the classic problem of all *Modernorum*: How to defend the internally divided subject and the truthfulness of his cognition that does not primarily refer to reality? In contrast to Bonaventure, his solution was systematic and founded the metaphysics of objectivity. The term “*totum virtuale*” represents the objective *veritas* of the modern subject. The virtual subject can contemplate the virtual world without obstacles. Scotus completed it by creating a new metaphysics. After the year 1250, the modernists had to design a new nature of man that forms a modern unity of the person, the truth and the cognition. Pecham found for *via Modernorum* a third way outside Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. Boethius’s concept of signification led to the emergence of both forms of the being as “*totum universale*” and “*totum integrale*.” It was known in the 12th century from the above-mentioned dispute between Abelard and the school of *Nominales* (OBJ II, ch. 1.2). On the basis of this distinction of Boethius, Abelard defines the concept in thinking (*totum universale*) or the meaning related to the hylemorphic single thing (*totum integrum*). The sentence discussed in Boethius’s writing that contains the unity of the person runs as follows:

“The soul is not given as a genus because of its ability, but it is a *totum*, and the parts belong to the soul not from the point of view of quantity, but from the point of view of a certain potency and actualization (*potestate et virtute*).” [[101]](#footnote-101)

The quotation separates the soul as an independent existential unity (*totum*) both from the abstract genre and from the existentially given abilities of the soul (*partes animae*). In the above quotation, Boethius makes no distinction between the part of the soul (*partes animae*) and the faculty of the soul (*in aliqua potestate et virtute*). He only separates both from the secondary determination of the accident due to the abstraction out of the body (*non ut in quantitate*). According to this Aristotelian, the soul is the immaterial form of the body and therefore cannot contain quantitative determinations. The real ability of cognition belongs to the soul and it has an entelechical effect in the body. The soul does not exist in any other way from the point of view of the categorical predication, since the critical philosophy is based on the causality of first substances. In this case, there is an existing person. All entities were defined either as real first substances (Abelard’s “*totum integrum*”) or as recognized universal meaning (Abelard’s “*totum universale*”). The masters of mendicant orders from the school of Avicennist Augustinism linked Boethius’s definition of the soul as a univocal “*totum*” with the division of universals made in the school of *Nominales* in the framework of Porphyry′s Tree.

Pecham added a third objective determination to these two determinations of being within the framework of being of the third kind (*totum virtuale*).[[102]](#footnote-102) The classical definition of the soul merged with actions of first substances that are exercised in reality. Deductive proof in the first Averroism was based on the causality of the really acting soul in the body. That causality was stated as the middle link of the deductive proof in the form of second substance (*medium*). That kind of *medium* became a univocal component of the universal scientific proof. In that case, the term “*totum virtuale*” as the second substance would state in a univocal manner Abelard’s “*totum integrum*” as the first substance. Pecham shifted meaning of the term “ability” or “effect” (*virtus*) in the direction of modern virtuality. In addition to two well-known concepts of signification, he created a new determination of being called “*totum virtuale*.” The soul became a virtual substance of the third kind. The emergence of the virtual world of modernity is set out in the following quotation.

“The Philosopher asserts that just as the soul relates to the body, the parts of the soul also relate to the parts of the body. But the parts of the soul are given only in potency, and potency is not an accident of the soul, because the accident does not form a part of the substance. Therefore, the soul possesses the character of substance and abilities (*anima habet essentiam et virtutem*). The abilities of the soul do not constitute its accident, because the soul is defined as a virtual wholeness from the direction of its abilities (*a virtute dicatur anima totum virtuale*). Every essence integrates parts, i.e. matter and form. Therefore, the skills also have a corresponding subject.” [[103]](#footnote-103)

The quotation determines the soul with the help of Bonaventure’s *materia spiritualis* as an atomic Neoplatonic substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). It randomly assigns various activities to the being of this substance. These activities are identified with the parts of the soul as atomic substance, that is, with matter and form (*essentia habet partes in se integrantes, scilicet materiam et formam*). The modern subject arises as a *totum virtuale* on the basis of the connection of various faculties of the soul, which take the soul as a carrier (*virtutes correspondentes subiecto*). Because of the universal hylemorphism, the faculties and potentialities must have a hypostatized modern soul as a common carrier and substantial basis. The unity of soul and intellect is given with the help of virtual analogy, which forms a new definition of the soul as a virtual substance (*dicatur anima totum virtuale*). The objective essence and ability are given in the new form of the soul as actualized hypostasis. It makes a kind of substance that produces accidental abilities from itself (*anima habet essentiam et virtutem*).

Pecham created the first objective simulacrum of man as a modern subject. He hypostatized the individual abilities with the help of virtualization and gave them a hylemorphic substrate that “exsists” outside of classical definition of the soul as an entelechical form of the body. For the first time, the subject of cognition acquired a virtual, i.e., an objective character. The modern *anima intellectiva* is neither the real man as the first substance, nor the platonic idea, nor the potential concept as are the universals in thinking. The correspondence of various faculties of the soul to one subject left the path of scientific univocity to take the path of metaphorical unity of being in the framework of *analogia entis*. Pecham realized the transition from Bonaventure’s ontotheology to modern metaphysics, because he found its virtual subject. Bonaventure created *ex nihilo* a new Adam from spiritual matter as a mythological subject (ch. 4.1.2). It was decidedly not sufficient for the assertion of modernist metaphysics, and certainly not in Paris until the year 1270. Bonaventure’s diligent follower managed to combine in the term “*totum virtuale*” the meaning of Bonaventure’s regulations for the creative agent (*regula agentis creati*) Bonaventure developed these rules only in an ontotheological manner. By making the soul in the hypostatic mode “*totum virtuale*,” the first objective simulacrum of the person was created. It established virtual reality, Western humanism and the non-existent modern subject of the third kind. The appeal to Aristotle is a pure sophistry. Aristotle, Boethius and Averroes would have objected that the immaterial soul and the immaterial intellect cannot possess any material parts, only different faculties. They refer to abstracting activities of the living person either on the basis of the senses or the intellect. The conception of the soul as a hylemorphic being of the third kind was rejected both by the quoted Boethius and by the first Averroism, in connection with Aristotle and CMDA. Pecham’s combination of various determinations of the soul and the body in the mode of *inclinatio* establishes the metaphysical confusion of modernity with regard to the identity of the person. Pecham became the founder of virtual reality and the virtual concept of man, which was completed by postmodern media simulacra, Foucault’s humanistic poststructuralism and corporate fascism. The latter simulates and manipulates the global potential of human and planetary “resources” in the world wars of the 20th century and the hybrid wars of the 21st century. Today, the modern subject is literally given as a “*totum virtuale*,” because human beings of the third kind are no longer the persons. It happened after two world wars, after some totalitarian regimes and extermination camps, as well as after the technocratic reduction of the person to “human resources,” which diligently drive the irrational perpetual mobile of instrumental rationality.

### 4.2.2 Cognition as Objective Copulation

From the point of view of the connoisseurs of Aristotle and Averroes, the unity of man, designed in Pecham’s terminus “*totum virtuale*,” represented a clear manifestation of Averroism produced in the environment of Latin sophists. The treatise *Quaestiones tractantes De anima* was published shortly before the critical year 1270. Pecham’s dualistic and controversial solution opposed to Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*. All representatives of first Averroism in Paris rejected it, especially Aquinas in the conclusion of *De unitate intellectus* (1270). The transformation of sensual cognition into an intellectual one in modern kind of memory dismissed the character of truth as Averroes’s *proportio*. Modernity works with an identity and assimilation theory of truth, which is linked to the modern subject and not to the existing person. Pecham’s conception of the soul as a virtual substance formulated anew the problem of cognition in the metaphysics of *Modernorum*. The objective conception of being corresponds to fundamental presuppositions of ontotheology established by Bonaventure. Pecham’s criticism concerns Albert’s thirty points, which summarize the unity of cognition and the person according to CMDA in the terminus “*intellectus speculativus*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Modernity does not possess the unity of cognition according to interpretation of *De anima* done by the Commentator. Albert’s solution “*ad mentem Averrois*” was replaced by objective cognition that modern virtual subject carries in his non-existent *memoria*. Pecham ensures the unity of man and the world in the mode “*obiective*” that took place in ontotheological realm of metaphysics. The quotation predicts the term “*obiective*” in the new metaphysical meaning linked to Rufus’s term “*species obiecti exsistentis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). The following quote provides the objective definition of cognition:

“On the third objection, it must be said in a similar way that the unified vision in learned and educated people is given objectively and not formally (*obiective, non formaliter*). The habitus differs individually, as does the numerically individual understanding of grammar in me or in you. Nevertheless, it is true that the light revealing the principles of all activities is one in all (*lux manifestans principia omnium actuum est una in omnibus*). If thinking of the student is led to this light by the teacher, then it is given within the framework of the one truth and knowledge comes from this one source.” [[104]](#footnote-104)

Unified knowledge is objectively given in the learned and educated (*una scientia est in doctore et discente obiective*). Pecham rejected the correspondence of cognition according to *De anima* 430a20–25, which the writing CMDA investigates in detail in (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Pecham debated with Siger’s school that Boethius of Dacia presented in the writing *Anonymus Giele* (ch. 4.3.1). Therefore, the writing *Anonymus Giele* represents a collective defense of Siger’s group of magisters (*pars Sigeri*) against Pecham and Aquinatus. The answer of Pecham rejected the key part of explanation in the first Averroism, which contains Albert’s conception of Averroes’s *consimilitudo* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Modern truth does not exist as a similarity between mind and reality, but as a universal equality of an intellect and its specific creations, whereby this equality is given as Rufus’s *coaequatio*. The quotation relates this equality to Neoplatonic predication made “*ad unum*.” God is the sun that iluminates the intellect. Bonaventure defined this light as a signature of being by quoting the Bible (*signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine*, ch. 4.1.3). Pecham conceptualizes this light as a principle of cognition, which is common to all people (*est una in omnibus*). By invoking this objective mythological signature of being due to the divine light, Pecham uphold the previous school of *illuminati* made in the line of Grosseteste′s intuition that accepts the cognition in the framework of *intellectus.* That kind of illumination established the original model of modern cognition based on univocal statute of species. In the act of Avicennian and later of Cartesian reflection, we are able to reflect the first principles of cognition (*lux manifestans principia omnium actuum*). The first principles are given in the soul as a hypostasis (see Rufus’s *potentia substantialis*) and they illuminate the soul from behind, according to the example of separated *intellectus agens*. Pecham defends the theory of truth as an objective correspondence of thinking and hypostatized being of the third kind. The intellect is actualized from behind and has its own actuality, which does not need the work of the senses. Rohmer summarizes this unified style of cognition in the study cited above, without putting Pecham directly in that Averroistic actualized. See Rohmer’s commentary on *Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, Q. 5, ad 3 (ed. Spettmann, p. 59.24–27) about the knowledge given within the framework of the universally comprehending intellect (*omnis passio communis habet causam communem*).[[105]](#footnote-105) From the point of view of the first Averroism, this solution is Averroistic. On the one hand, it does not respect the solution in Aristotle’s *De anima* and its interpretation in CMDA; on the other hand, it presupposes hypostatized and actualized principles of cognition. The soul was no longer a blank table; its habitual and virtual actuality abolished the possibility of universal cognition of the world; the function of the receptive intellect disappeared; the theory of truth as a correspondence was invalidated. The new insight into the discrete worldview is thus *a priori* given in the intellect and becomes habitually activated. Man recognizes eternal exemplars through real things and real things through exemplars. The soul possesses this ability directly from God and realizes it in the act of eidetic illumination in objectively manifested being (Bonaventure’s *resolutio plena, semiplena*). Pecham connected together all basic elements of cognition that are valid in modernity to this day. The following quote expose the objective vicious circle of modernity.

“We must note that the truth is predicted as the habitus of things with regard to the eternal exemplar, in virtue of which (*quo*) everything is manifested as a habitually given good with regard to the ultimate goal. The created truth received a reason for existence (*veritati creatae attribuitur ratio manifestandi*), and if it is stated, then it cannot be separated from the species that forms its proprium (*indivisio a propria specie*).” [[106]](#footnote-106)

The truth of creation is exemplarily and objectively given in divine intentionality. The act of “exsistence” makes divine objective truth be manifested before the modern virtual subject (*Ge-Stell*). Anselm’s truth given in God as *rectitudo* and *summa veritas* makes part of an objectively manifested definition in the world (*veritati creatae attribuitur ratio manifestandi*). The quotation defines the key part of Bonaventure’s transition of the rationality from the rules of divine creator into the creation. For the first time, this transition of being from divine thought into the world received an objective definition (*ratio manifestandi*). This sentence, in connection with the previous virtual determination of man, establishes the truth as an accomplished kind of modern objectivity. Following Bonaventure, the objective correspondence of the demiurge and his cognition is divided in two floors. On the upper floor, the soul recognizes the world by enjoying a direct intuition into the first principles of cognition, which are ontotheologically given by eternal exemplars. The notion of truth has been changed from Aristotelian correspondence into modern *habitus*. The subject of the truth is not the real world in its existence, but the schizophrenic and non-existent modern subject. He establishes the truth as permanent quality of things and that hypostatized habitus given “*in re*” makes correspondence to eternal paradigms (*veritas dicit habitudinem rei ad exemplar aeternum*). The modern untruth received its new *Lichtung* since habitus and exemplarity are mythological entities that do not exist really. But this exemplarity is necessary for truth as objective correspondence of the schizophrenic subject to himself. Leibniz replaced exemplars with mathematics and with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The fundament of objectivity (*ratio manifestandi*) can be found directly in created things. Bonaventure put this objective reality as *rationes seminales* in real things. Previously, they were intended as examplars in divine mind. The created things, thanks to that kind of intelligibility, include the definition of truth as *rectitudo*. It makes analogous relationship of *rationes exemplares* in divine intentionality and *rationes seminales* given in creation. Illuminated from the highest truth, the intellect keeps a hypostatized ability (*habitudo*) to see this correspondence on both floors of reality. The correspondence is exposed in creation by faith, by God and by *rationes exemplares* as well as by *rationes seminales*. The higher truth as *rectitudo* applies to exemplars; that objective habitus of being (let us see Bonaventure’s ontotheological *signatum*) can be applied to lower levels of the truth, in the mode of modern assimilation. Lower levels of being contain the rationality of species found in created things (*indivisio a propria specie*). The objective habitus of modern hypostatized intellect (*res cogitans* of Descartes) can observe these species in cognitive reflection illuminated by divine exemplars. Objective *illuminati* abolished cognition as an act of thinking recognizing external things and synthesizing their universal meaning in the act of immaterial cognition. The being of the third kind received the character of an objective atomic substance. Pecham expanded Rufus’s definition of objective being (*individuum, concretum*). Objective rationality flows from divine thinking towards creation in the objective model of Avicenna′s comitation and emanation due to separated cosmic *intellectus agens* known as *Dator formarum*. Scotus exchanged this pious mythology for a new form of metaphysical deduction in order to sell it as real metaphysics. Leibniz exchanged God of *Modernorum* for the eternally valid mathematics. Modern God thus received the death sentence. Although he was appointed the giver of mathematical forms, this honorary title was completely superfluous and he subsequently died as an unemployed demiurge and homeless metaphysical individual. Modern theology then guards the empty tomb, but Kierkegaard already knew that.

Made out in this postmodern edition, Pecham’s scenario of objective cognition has been working until today. Bonaventure and Pecham continue the evolution of *via Modernorum*. Modernity observes a different world that keeps its own being. From the point of view of the first Averroism, this is sheer nonsense. According to Aristotle and Averroes, the universals are given by the process of abstraction only in thinking, and not by direct insight of intellect into real things. As God recognizes something, this is none of our business. In the order of critical thinking, we recognize only the creative causality given from the first cause. Pecham defends the concept of truth and cognition according to Bonaventure. The intellect was joined by the objective faculty of cognition according to innate principles that illuminate the human intellect beyond real world. Descartes and Leibniz transferred the ontotheological form of objective *mathesis universalis* to mathematics. The passive component of intellect ceased to be *tabula rasa* and acquired the character of the Cartesian *cogito*. The path of *Modernorum* definitely became separated from classical metaphysics. Taken in the context of modern historiality, the word “*de fine*” means the birth and the death of modern God. The second Averroism began the paranoid journey of the fully schizophrenic subject, to whom the objectively true meaning of being is revealed in his virtual being. Man became the embodied active intellect and needs reality only as an additional proof of his own hypostatized cognitive abilities. Olivi completed this modern teaching of man by attaching a sovereign will to this intellect. He thus conceived a new capitalist demiurg in the form of the substance of the third kind. The second Averroism does not need hyparchical substances to ensure the truth in the mode *per prius*. The truth proceeds primarily from the subject through Anselm’s *rectitudo*, Avicenna’s *certitudo* and Rufus’s *coaequatio*. The second Averroism had to find an ultimate actualized of objectivity outside the real first substance, because the reality perceived with the senses does not provide a sufficient actualized of true cognition. Pecham secures the new realm of the being by combining body and mind into a virtually given wholeness (*totum virtuale*). The modern subject was born as a new form of atomic substance. This was made in the universal hylemorphism à la Rufus’s “*species obiecti exsistentis*.”

Now, it remained to solve the classic problem of Dinant and other Aristotelian Averroists, namely the connection of this paranoid cognition of the modern virtual subject to the virtual light coming from the divine face. Bonaventure′s solution as “*signatum*” became obsolete in the next decade. The school of first Averroism did not believe in modern fairy tales sold as the first form of modern science in the years 1265–70. Neoplatonism clearly states that the one determines the many, and the work of *Liber de causis* elaborated this doctrine into a hierarchical determination of forms given deductively *modo geometrico*. The second Averroism had to find the objective form of deduction within the framework of exemplary forms. Modern God became the actualized of objective being made out according to biblical factors of measure, number and weight. Pecham well knew that this exemplary deduction must not proceed through Avicenna’s system of emanation of forms from the separated cosmic intellect as *Dator formarum*. It was not acceptable teaching in the University of Paris in those days. Modernists took up Avicenna’s comitation and they reworked into a kind of Aristotelian predication. Pecham designed objectively given *resolutio* of being. Philip the Chancellor elaborated it for the first time as conversion of the transcendentals and in the school of the second Averroism that edited *Summa Halensis* (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). Pecham established a system of new metaphysics that Duns Scotus completed. The principle of abstract deduction makes the fundament of new metaphysics. It is based on Avicennian certainty of intellectual insight. Once again, the theory of truth made by Avicenna, Grosseteste and Rufus enters the stage. It is based on the abstraction from the first and the evident principles of cognition.

“Ninth, the simpler is something, the less it resembles the recognition of compound substances (*in cognitione composita*). But this argument does not apply to recognition of simple essences (*in cognitione simplici*); the cognition made by division (*fieri resolutionem*) comes to the last and the most certain reason of cognition (*ad ultimam et certissimam rationem cognoscendi*).” [[107]](#footnote-107)

The cognition of hylemorphic substance is in the darkness (*in cognitione composita*). It becomes clearer by going to the top thanks to spiritual matter and pure forms of cognition (*in cognitione simplici*). Done in that way, the cognition is truer and safer (*ad ultimam et certissimam rationem cognoscendi*). Modern thinking, enlightened by God and by itself, seeks the subjective evidence and certainty as a new principle of being. This proceeding forms the first objective form of *resolutio* as an ontotheological reduction of cognition to the first principles. The meaning of being is irradiated by objective insight into the light that gives the totality of being. Bonaventure’s teaching on the second floor of abstraction separates the lower truth as “*similitudo rei*” from the higher truth as “*impressio veritatis*” (ch. 4.1.2). The definition of being as “*res*” acquired a metaphysical character in the framework of the objective form of *resolutio*. Pecham systematized his master’s teaching on the natural and supernatural realm into the first form of objective metaphysics. The enlightened intellect observes the whole process of objective revelation of being (*ostensio*).

“On the third point, it must be said that, according to Augustine, the uncreated light shows all beings (*ostendit*), although it does not show itself as an object (*nec tamen se ipsam ostendit obiective*). An example is the species in the visible physical thing that shows the respective kind of species (*cuius est species*); it does not, however, show its essence in the thing (*essentiam suam*), but only the fact that in relation of resemblance to the real thing, the essence of species is something different.” [[108]](#footnote-108)

Augustine’s uncreated light gives the visible manifestation of created being (*lux increata ipsa ostendit omnia*). The divine light is separated from the objective manifestation of being (*nec tamen se ipsam ostendit obiective*). The exemplar makes the first objective ostension, because it in itself (*se ipsam*) represents an *obiectum* securized in divine thinking. God is not an object in itself, because he is a separate, *simpliciter* given being. However, it forms an objective reality according to eternal creative rules, which are manifested in time and in the work of creation. As a special privilege, God was awarded the same metaphysical status, which every first existing substance in Aristotelianism held *simpliciter* and *per se*. For the pious modernists, modern God became a first unattainable substance par excellence. But he manifests himself *obiective*, because he thinks and acts exemplarily (i.e., anthropomorphically). Pecham divides the act of cognition into two separate parts. The first concerns the sphere of divine self-reflection, where reigns light of divine face, inaccessible to us. This light then objectively produces the rest of creation through Bonaventure’s and *rationes exemplares* and afterwards *seminales*. The objective recognition of the thing represents the seeing of eternal exemplary species. In the second step, it comes to their seminal manifestation in the material thing (*ostendit id, cuius est species*). Objective ostension does not concern the real first existing substance, but the objective given species (*exemplum est*). This objective meaning is revealed by means of the first substance (*in specie rei visibilies corporalis*). The first substance merely forms the medium of cognition and is not the only source of cognition, as it is the case in Aristotelianism. The mutual reflection of one and the other form of occurrence of objective species (*est alterius similitudo*) takes place as specific correspondence between mind and things. As a result, the death of modern God began. The real causality of God as an Aristotelian *causa prima* was presented scientifically within the framework of deductive proof according to *Second Analytic*. That causality was exchanged for exemplary rationality, which can be recognized through the mythological objectivity. The new deduction of Pecham describes the descent of hypostatized forms according to the scenario of *Liber de causis*. Modern God became an objective simulacrum created in the image of modern virtual subject. He bravely shared his paranoid cognition and schizophrenic existence with the modern subject until the 19th century. In the epoch of modern nihilism, God of *Modernorum* finally died in silence, as eventually died his creator. An important quotation from CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3) reminded us that mistaken ideas have no connection to natural events because they do not follow the natural course of things and are not connected to the natural order. Thus they are something unintended, such as the sixth finger or monsters in the nature. The metaphysical death of modern God and the modern subject (but not their birth) was an inevitable event predestined by modern logical necessity that keeps a demonic character.

Pecham separated the objective and the real being of things and created an objective theory of the truth as correspondence of various species of the third kind. The manifestation of being primarily concerns not things that exist outside of us, but the being of eternal species that receive the contingent form in the matter. At the level of creation, the objective process of cognition takes place, in which the realm of objective *tertium ens* manifests itself through contingent species, since they are actualized in the corporeal matter (*specie rei visibilis corporalis*). Once again, the Porretan scenario of “*exsistere*” is repeated. The permanent essence acquires a contingent character in the first real substance. But the exemplary essence can “exsist” in reality even without this final actualization, because it was created in the mode “*semel—semper*” as an intentional object of divine intellect. The objective given being in divine thinking has an objective actualization in creation through the *ratio seminalis*. But this mythological descent of divine thought into objective “exsistence”, exclusively illuminated modernists could see it. They passed through Bonaventure’s *epokhē* and they have an eidetic intuition of the objective being (*intellectus resolvens plene*, ch. 4.1.1). The mind of *illuminati* compares both types of species (the permanent one versus the contingent). Therefore, they require a first substance given in reality only as an additional source of previously certain and evident cognition. The principle “*ex inmediatis*” in *Second Analytics* was exchanged for the subjective version given in the term “*inmediate*.” Modernism created a *univoce* established objective psychology for modern man and modern God. Modernity reduced metaphysics to noetics and to psychology and launched a new history of effects made by Oxfordian Fallacy. Pecham shifted the hyparchical determination of the first substance from reality to the virtuality of intellectual intuition.

“The things that are in the intellect essentially, they are in the order of similarity insofar the faculty of cognition directly assimilates this cognition (*potentia cognitiva assimilatur ipsi cognoscibili*). This allows us to look directly at what is present in the intellect through itself (*per se est praesens intellectui*).” [[109]](#footnote-109)

The intellect as *potentia substantialis* of Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1) recognizes the essences in direct insight (*illa quae sunt essentialiter in intellectu*). The intellect acquires Rufus’s universal *scibile* that is given in the same way in things and in the intellect (*per similitudinem*). The similarity does not relate to things, but to the higher truth, which is given by the consideration of what is objectively given as such (*ipsum cognoscibile*). The new definition expanded Rufus’s truth as equality (*coaequatio*) to include the correspondence of two objective species (exemplary vs. seminal). The assimilation of two species concerns the objective being that is present in the intellect thanks to its own objectivity (*per se est praesens intellectui*). In the mode of pseudo-Aristotelian correspondence, the virtual subject recognizes the virtual world of non-existent species of the third kind. Academic Furies that moved from Oxford to Paris enabled Modernists to create a fully virtual underworld. Objective *illuminati* still considers it to be their right home to this day. The objective diacosmos requires external things only as evidence of immanent ability to see the forms as “exsisting” in the mode *per se*. The concept exists in classical Aristotelianism because cognitive thinking exists in the body and recognizes the real thing through the senses. The second Averroism placed the hyparchical actuality of first substances in the realm of hypostatized species. They received a new statute of first substances through the virtual subject. The cognition assimilated in Rufus’s mode of *informatio* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2) the specific being. That objective *scibile* is given in reality and in thinking, in the both cases as a hypostatic entity in the mode *per se*. The new thing of modernity (Pecham′s *cognoscibile*, Rufus′s *scibile*) determines cognition in the mode of *similiter*, which is given as an objective assimilation of species (*ipsa potentia cognitiva assimilatur ipsi cognoscibili*). The virtual subject lives in a diacosmic paradise, where both species are recognized in the world and in thought. They meet together like both beloved persons in *Song of Songs*. Rufus’s *scibile* turned into Pecham’s *cognoscibile* in the objective conjunction of both species. The objective copulation of two mythological entities given in the quoted term “*ipsa potentia cognitiva assimilatur ipsi cognoscibili*” represents the founding myth of modernity, which produces the cosmogony of modern sciences (*ortus scientiarum*). The conjunction of both forms of ipseity in the mode “*ipsa—ipsi*” is given in the grammatical modality as *dativus obiectivus*. It indicates a new donation of being due to a new process of appropriation of being as objectively existing (*dativus possessivus*, ch. 4). In the act of donation (Heidegger’s *Es gibt*), the intellect enters through mythological copulation in the realm of hypostatic intelligible forms that are not abstracted from reality. The truth of *Modernorum* transformed from the correspondence into the universal process of objective assimilation. Modern science is not possible without mythological copulation, because the theory of truth as assimilation cannot be done without the connection of *tertium ens*. Thus, modern science created an objective cosmology in the mode of Cargo cult that rather badly parodies (i.e. on the level of a simulacrum objectif) the classical ritual of the sacred union of a truly existing king with a truly existing priestess, as described in the founding myth of *Enūma Eliš*. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, the objective copulation of scholastic modernism has finally become mere intellectual masturbation performed as a nihilistic *informatio* in a world of *scibilia* created and manipulated by global corporations.

Objective theory of truth as assimilation keeps as its fundament a demiurgic appropriation of the world that Bonaventure founded. The cognition is not a correspondence of intellect with the thing, but approaches the recognized thing through the process of objective insight, which is determined by the concept of truth as a voluntaristic assimilation of being. Modern knowledge is power of demiurgic will and not an Aristotelian science. Petrus Olivi in his commentary on the second book of Sentences proclaimed this modern truth and knowledge at the same time as Pecham (ch. 5.1.3). The syncretism of Aristotelian cognition and the objective cognition is set out in the following quotation.

“The real thing and its intention in the mind are essentially different. It is therefore impossible for the thing and the intention to be the same thing. The intention is formally given to the mind, but the thing moves the intellect objectively (*res quod movet intellectum obiectiv*e). Therefore, the intellect can only recognize things through intentions.” [[110]](#footnote-110)

Pecham knows that the thing in thinking is not given in the same way as the first substance (*res et intentio essentialiter differunt*). The term “*res*” must be given according to Bonaventure as an objective entity beyond the first substance (ch. 4.1.1). The thing as *scibile* does not establish intentionality through sensual cognition as in the first Averroism, but moves the thinking objectively (*res quod movet intellectum obiective*). This mechanical conception of cognition in the mode of the soul as a mover was adopted by Descartes. It differs from the intentional act of reception done by double diaphanum according to the first Averroism of Blund’s school and according to CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Modern intention takes the actualization of cognition from the active intellect, which forms the recognized form (*quod est in intellectuu formaliter, est intentio*). The scheme of cognition is only apparently Aristotelian. The existence of real things as a source of movement is exchanged for their objective simulacrum. The recognition of the objective thing is given by exposure made from behind (*quod movet*), whereas in Aristotelianism it is about an exposure made from the front. The objective thing, as a pseudo-actualized mover, actualizes the intellect in the manner of the first substance. This results in a different recognition of the “thing” (i.e., its objective simulacrum) as an intentional object in the intellect (*quod est*). It is not about a true correspondence of the real thing in the intellect, but about an objective assimilation of two different species. The dualism of “*quod movet—quod est*” indicates a new way of cognition. The first substance no longer determines cognition in the sense of the actualized foundation (*subiectum*). The intellect of modernists is no longer exposed from the front, but from the back, from the reception of objective forms. The modern intellect is the Sun of the objective world; it does not need the real sun. Pecham’s modern subject as “*totum virtuale*” started to virtualize the world. The subject is already split into two substances in a schizophrenic way and no longer recognized the real state of the world. Its relation to first substances necessarily became objective, individual, specific and concrete. From the point of view of classical Aristotelianism, this is absolutely paranoid thinking. The first substance is deduced and hypostatically composed in the framework of *resolutio* as *obiective* given being. But in this case, there is God of *Modernorum* to repair this ominous situation. See the quoted *Psalm* 4:7 that mentioned the light coming from the face of God. Bonaventure transformed it into the intellectual leitmotif of all modernity (ch. 4.1.3). In the following step, the objectivity receives the status of objective totality. The modern subject as “*totum virtuale*” established another kind of “*totum*” directly in modern God. He represents a virtual reality of the third kind. The modern subject could not find full objective reality anywhere else than in modern God. For roughly seven centuries, modern God founded the schizophrenic and nihilistic character of modern existence. This much-needed simulacrum reliably masked the virtual human bearer who created the modern God in his nihilistic image. Nietzsche, Feuerbach and Marx exposed this subterfuge of modern reason.

Pecham transferred divine light in the ontotheological structure of metaphysics. Aristotelian predication that stated the being of first substances turned into an Avicennian comitation of hypostases that objectively join the essential basis (*veritati creatae attribuitur ratio manifestandi*). Truth as assimilation is given in the mode of full manifestation of objectivity by ontotheological nature of metaphysics. Pecham founded the truth as an objective assimilation of being done in the modern intellect. The first substance as “*ens ratum*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3) perished. From the point of view of truth as a non-concealment, the long stage of modernity has thus come to an end. The truth as Avicenna’s *certitudo*, Anselm’s *rectitudo*, Grosseteste’s dualistic conception of the *veritas in/complexa* and Rufus′s *coaequatio* was combined in an objective theory. The formation of objectivity is closed. Let us recall Bonaventure’s thesis that things are *tripliciter* in God (ch. 4.1.3). The objective form of the truth as threefold reality of being (*effective, obiective, completive*) we find in following quotation.

“The truth of created things (*veritas particularis*) is either completed or somehow unfinished (*est complexa, quaedam incomplexa*). The unfinished truth (*veritas incomplexa*) relates the true nature of things that we recognize through the objective species to be the truth about the real thing (*per speciem, sicut res cuius est veritas*). We recognize the truth in the deductive proof through the causality (*effective*); through the eternal light we objectively (*obiective*) recognize the species, which, in the mode of simplicity, establish the meaning of recognized terms in the categorical statement. In the mode of completion (*completive*), we recognize everything through the unchanging Light, about which Augustine said that «we understand everything by it».” [[111]](#footnote-111)

The first part repeats Grosseteste’s twofold nature of the truth, contingently given in composite substances and permanently given in essences. The truth as a correspondence between thinking and the real thing is excluded right in the first sentence (*vera rei entitas, cognoscitur per speciem*). Porretan species fully represents the real thing as its objective simulacrum (*sicut res cuius est veritas*). The transitive determination of truth concerns the real existing single thing (*veritas incomplexa*). Empirically given truth has only a contingent character tied to hylemorphic substances. The following sentence, through the opposition “*effective—obiective*,” sets out the truth as ontotheological assimilation of objective being. The first substance is in reality not an effective cause of cognition, because the effective source of demonstrative proof is an eternal light (*veritas enuntiabilis cognoscitur effective per lucem aeternam*). The signature of the being comes primarily from the light of God’s face as Bonaventure’s “*signatum*” that Descartes and Leibniz replaced with mathematics. The second part is important, as it establishes the objective character of cognition in Pecham′s school. Objectivity follows the mythological signature of existence. It creates a new form of imposition that establishes an effective illumination of existence made from behind, from the face of God. We recognize the world in an obiective way through a new kind of *demonstratio*. Conceived in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy, the terms of the proof do not entail the causality of first substances, but to objectively given forms of species (*obiective per species*). The form of objectivity given by Aristotelian ‘*intellectus debilis*’ takes care of empirical cognition of objective species according to Rufus’s model. But *illuminati* have a strong paranoid intellect, which creates a new form of objective *demonstratio* through direct divine intervention in the act of natural cognition (*effective per lucem aeternam*). Scotus abolished this demonstratively given nonsense, and in postmodernism the Occasionalists discovered him (Berkeley, Maleblanche). The same species effectively exposed by God forms the *medium* of deductive scientific syllogism. Their manifestation in the mode of the completed truth (*veritas complexa*) creates a new terminus (*simplicium terminorum*), which is necessary for the start of fully objective deductive reasoning (*enuntiabile constituentium*).

Pecham created a fully objective version of Oxfordian Fallacy in the mode of Augustinian illumination. To present such nonsense at the University of Paris about the year 1270, it was an academic suicide. In the mode of causally acting entities there was no first substance, but an objective species. The difference in the notion of “*simpliciter*” between the first and the second Averroism established the objective view of modernity (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The signification of logical elements in categorical statements (*enuntiabile*) took up Grosseteste’s direct insight into the essences (*intellectum*), which Rufus transformed into a vision of objective *scibilia*. The act of cognition sees the species directly in things, i.e. it looks at Bonaventure’s *rationes seminales* in a mystical way. The nature of “*ens ratum*” fundamentally change, since the objectively considered being took over the role of the subject of cognition. Pecham introduced ontotheology and objective causality into scholasticism; abolished the Aristotelian cognition of the first substance; confirmed the schizophrenia of man composed of several substances; founded a mythological cognition of the world done by objective being. Through this multiple failure of critical mind, the second Averroism created the objective form of science about the non-existent being. Pecham returned to Oxford in 1272 and at the same time entered into polemics with Kilwardby’s school of Modernists. The issue of Franciscan and Dominican poverty became the point of contention in the dispute between the two schools (*Tractatus contra Robertum Kilwardby*, 1272). Indeed, this controversy, like the one that ensued in the years 1255–56 at the University of Paris, concerned the very different subject, which was the revision of the plurality of substances in man at Oxford. This now obsolete modernist school had to accept the modernized version of semiaverroism that Thomas Aquin founded. The Latin sophist Aegidius Romanus was this modernist light-bearer (*Lucifer*) who brought this new form of illumination to Oxford. The forthcoming analysis of anonymous manuscripts from this period shows this interesting development. The Dominican school had already adopted a modernized version of Thomism and adhered only to the pluralism of forms in man. These modernists probably had no great problems with the adoption of Aegidius′s Thomism. We will examine the third part of *Oxford manuscript* (ch. 4.3.2) and the anonymous of *Summa theologiae* (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3) in more detail. As a result, the little-known modernist dispute arose in Oxford in the years 1270–72, which Kilwardby already had to clarify as archbishop by issuing additional decrees on Paris condemnation dated of 18. 3. 1277. Pecham’s school, together with Rufus and Bonaventure, defended the universal hylemorphism and the plurality of substances in man (ch. 4.2.2). This metaphysics full of virtual heresies began to function as an objective Platonism for people around the year 1270 among philosophy students. These young second-class modernists became totally confused in Paris and they were proclaiming terrible nonsenses (ch. 4.5). Bishop Tempier had to act against the theses that became completely heretical. Bacon decisively rejected the invasion of sophistic philosophy into the theology done for *vulgus philosophorum* (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Modern objectivist theology received a new definition in the framework of the first version of unified science. It led to a fundamental dispute concerning the question of the twofold truth in 1277.

## 4.3 Averroist disputes in the years 1270–75 (Anonymi)

The schools of academic *illuminati* established the objective character of *tertium ens* about the year 1270. Deductive proof as basic knowledge of science and metaphysics is no longer primarily determined by actual first substances. The foundation is given by deduction determined by intuition in the mode of “*resolutio semiplena*” which performs the logical supposition of meaning through hypostatized species. Its producer and recipient, in the sense of Aristotelian *subiectum* of knowledge, is the modern subject. The non-existent modern subject could perform this nonsensical operation under condition that it was split into two hypostatized elements. Both parts copulate mythically with each other in the scheme of Cargo cult that imitates the ancient mythologies. The objectively fruitful union of non-existent substances of body and soul follows the ontotheology based on the biblical writing *Song of Songs*. Founded on the ontotheological structure of metaphysics, this perverse and demonical (i.e., objective) cosmology hidden under a number “666” (Bonaventure *dixit*) is the birthplace of modern sciences (*ortus scientiarum*). Modern type of “deduction” (*deducere*) of meaning starts from the newly determined subject of knowledge. The modern science is completed at the last stage by “*resolutio plena*” that relates to the vision of being taken from the divine intellect. Philosophy has lost its original autonomy of thinking provided by natural critical reason; it has come under the sway of an ontotheological and now ideological scheme of knowledge. The previous chapter has explained that the objective truth is illuminated by the light from a divine source; otherwise the modern cognition is not complete. Bonaventure and Pecham broke through the barrier of classical thought at the University of Paris and they sent academic speculation to *via Modernorum*. The previous chapters devoted to Pecham did not mention his second work, which is devoted to the question of the soul and its cognition. The treatise *Tractatus de anima* was written around the years 1277–79 and represents a textbook example of the argumentation of the second Averroism. Pecham’s second commentary on *De anima*, on the contentious issues, quotes all the important passages of the main authorities of the second Averroism and works in the hermeneutic model of the exposure of being from behind. The light of the intellect and the sensual vision are taken univocally and they are finally given by God. Pecham adopts Bonaventure’s entire teaching and defends it against the first Averroism, repeating in the key points the assertions of his first commentary interpreted above. Pecham’s theses in the *Tractatus de anima* prove that the dispute between the first and the second Averroism had the character of a direct confrontation after the year 1270. Bacon and other Aristotelians clearly saw that the thinking of modern *illuminati* in the predicative mode *per prius* reworks the simulacrum of their own intellect and not reality. They claimed philosophical argumentation; in fact, they reffered to Church discipline. From the point of view of hermeneutics, it is absolutely logical that the next dispute of Pecham and Aquinas concerned the eternal duration of species and the key dispute about the plurality of substances in Christ (Wéber 1991, 159–61). At Oxford, the second Averroism prevailed under Kilwardby and Pecham until the year 1280. Afterwards, this line was modernized by Thomism of Aegidius Romanus and finally by Scotus’s metaphysics. On the contrary, there was still a whole group of educated Aristotelians in Paris with a tradition that ranged from John Blund to Bishop Alvernus to Albert and Aquinatus, Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant. In addition, these magisters belonged to both mendicant orders and to diocesan clergy. They criticized modern Averroists and sophists and it was not easy to silence this group. This was taken care of by Tempier’s decree of March 1277. Three anonymous treatises that were published in one book (Steenberghen 1971) comment on the writing *De anima*. These very important commentaries set out basic lines of the dispute between the first and second Averroism in the years 1265–75.

### 4.3.1 Anonymus Giele

The commentary called *Anonymus Giele* was published by Maurice Giele in 1971 and was dated before 1275. The hermeneutics of objectivity consider the work to be a master defense of the first Averroism. Let’s summarize the basic line of reasoning in order to examine the group that the anonymous author attacks in his treatise. The division of *quidditas* into an individual first substance and a universal meaning within the framework of the second substance denies the doctrine of modern nominalists with reference to the statute of universals in Averroes′s writing (*non sunt universales nisi cum sint in intellectuu secundum Commentatorem*; *Anon. Giele*, pp. 23.16‒17; 35.23–25). The soul recognizes everything only from the phantasms and has no direct insight of species. The fundamental agreement with Aristotle’s nature of the soul as a *tabula rasa* is supplemented by exposure of being from the front, from the direction of first substances. That kind of imposition is considered to be a natural proceeding of cognition. The act of understanding establishes the act of self-reflection in the second step (*intelligit nec nisi ex phantasmatibus, et ideo nec intelligitur nisi ut intelligens*, p. 24.51–52). The immanent actuality of intellect, which the modernists adopted from Avicenna, is rejected. The first and the second substance differ from each other in fundamental ways. Individualization of the universals outside the intellect is rejected as sophistry, because the universals are only general concepts in thinking. Individualization exists only in the material substrate that is quantitatively determined .

“Against the thesis, which denies the existence of universals only in the intellect, I argue that it is sophistical and can be refuted as follows. There are beings that are unified as individual things and thus numerically different from others. They are located in a certain place as a subject and thus differ from each other. Therefore, it is not an accidental difference...” [[112]](#footnote-112)

The universals are in the intellect (*universale esse in intellectu*). The identity of individuals is given *per se* due to material substances that form numerically distictive units (*seipsis distinctionem habent et numerum essentialiter*). Rufus established the numerical unity of universals at the level of first substance (*numerus a priori secundum naturam causatur*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The anonymous treatise says that such nature of universals would destroy their essence (*dissolutio huius talis*). Thinking cannot interchange the specific individuals given universally in thinking and the first substances given in reality. The following series of arguments denies the science made according to analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*. The author refused to use the nominalist middle link of the syllogism made according to Oxfordian Fallacy as the fundament of demonstrative proof. The individuality given by Porphyry’s division of the universals cannot establish a separate identity of individual things, because the universals exist only in the intellectual soul. The science based on substance as a *tertium ens* creates a dubious causality of the third kind. We have analyzed the origin of this causality in the nature of the essence elaborated by Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The anonymous writer considers the science based on objective *tertium ens* to be nonsense.

“If there were any science that taught or proved something in individual things, this science would have the statute of the first substances. However, science recognizes by evidence and assumes what is in the real things; therefore, it has a modal character (*ipsa est modalis*). This is how it differs from individual things. Therefore, it is impossible to have a science that studies or proves what is happening at the level of singular things…” [[113]](#footnote-113)

The argument against the second Averroism has a very specific character. The difference between modal and real cognition indicates the possible author and establishes the fundamental difference between the first and second Averroism. There can be no science on the level of hyparchical first substance. The existence of such “*scientia realis*” would be identical with the cognition of things made by the Creator, who called things into being. The intellect, separated from the senses, recognizes things in their generality, therefore in a different modality than the cognition of senses (*scientia docens modum demonstrandi… ipsa est modalis*). It is fully consistent with the basic thesis of *Second Analytics* that establishes universal predication in the mode of the metaphysical dative. Deductive science must have a universal character, which is given by the corresponding interpretation of intellectual cognition according to *De anima*. There is no science built on the existence of the third kind, as well as on a dubious causality, as it was the case with modern *Nominales*. By rejecting the quasi-substance made by singular nature of the universals, a plurality of substances in the soul is also excluded. In the next part, the writing rejects the main argument of the second Averroism, namely, the plurality of substances in man. According to Aristotle, the author defends the immateriality of the intellect given on the hylemorphic substrate. The intellect is not a form, but merely an act of the soul. The following quotation rejects the second Averroism and summarizes its fundamental contradictions.

“The understanding supposedly proceeds on the basis of the immaterial activity of the intellect and therefore one cannot deduce from this that it constitutes a part of the body. However, this position is controversial. The act of cognition, in fact, forms a component of experience exercized through the matter (*intelligere sit passio in materia*). All cognition is given by the intellect that makes a part of the existing body (*per intellectum qui est actus corporis*). This contradiction entails all assertions that take the act of understanding as some kind of experience given outside the body. For this reason, this claim is nonsensical (*positio haec stare non potest*).” [[114]](#footnote-114)

The treatise clearly rejects basic thesis of Rufus, Kilwardby, Bonaventure and Pecham as nonsensical. The reasoning follows the Commentator’s interpretation of *De anima*. Intellectual understanding is an act of the immaterial soul, given as an act of the body (*intelligimus per intellectum qui est actus corporis*). Any other determination by matter (*passio in materia*) would destroy the immateriality of intellect given by the act of the physical person. The author provides his own version of Averroes’s difference between the *tertium* and *quartum genus* as follows: “The soul requires the body as an object to understand, not as a subject” (*anima indiget in intelligere corpore obiecto, non sicut subiecto*; ibid, 39.67‒68). The soul, thanks to the immaterial act of the intellect, is to some extent separated from individuation made by the body as a material *subiectum*. As we will see further, Siger of Brabant made a similar conception of intellect and body (ch. 4.4.1). But the author immediately reminds that he is not an objectivist as in the second Averroism that separated the intellect as an independent substance. That was quoted Pecham′s conception of objectivity (ch. 4.2.2). The term “*non sicut subiecto*” merely expresses the immateriality of intellect (*inmixtus*), because it does not require any bodily sense organ for its activity. The intellect is not of a material nature and therefore its attachment to the body is very specific, which is clearly expressed in the scripture *De anima* and in CMDA. It is not a “subject—object” relationship of the second Averroism in the context of being taken “*obiective*,” but the relationship of the intellect as an immaterial potency of the soul that is the unique form of the body. Let us recall the corresponding passage from CMDA regarding the *intellectus materialis* as *quartum genus*, where we find a similar thesis.[[115]](#footnote-115) The terms as “*consimile*” and “*simile*” separate Averroes′s conception of *intellectus possibilis* from *intellectus materialis* of modern Alexandrians, who have made a substance out of it. The body stands in the position of the object with regard to this specific act of *anima intellectiva*. The intellectual capacity of the soul is immaterial and differs by this performance from the physical sensory cognition.[[116]](#footnote-116) Thanks to the immateriality of this specific operation, it is true that the soul stands in the position of “*inmixtus*” with regard to the body, because its act is to some extent separated from the body thanks to the immateriality of the intellect (*indiget anima ad explendum hanc operationem corpore sicut obiecto*). The writer holds in this question the brilliant position of Siger’s writing *Quaestiones in tertium De anima*. According to Gauthier, the treatise was written shortly after Siger started his lectures at the University of Paris in 1265–66 (ch. 4.4.1). Writing *Anonymus Giele* uses the term “*sicut obiecto*” against the second Averroism in a similar meaning as Siger, which further limits the range of possible authors. The intellectual part of the soul is attached to the person as a hylemorphic substrate in a very specific way. Once again, the key distinction of CMDA between the two types of cognition is at play, whereby intellectual cognition stands exclusively in the mode “*inmixtus*” for the corporeal person. The unity of the person on the level “*corpore sicut obiecto*” differs fundamentally from the conception of the unity in the modus “*obiective*” given as plurality of substances in man according to Bonaventure and Pecham. The anonymous writer insists on the exposure of the soul from the direction of the first substance (*phantasmata esse necessaria ut obiectum*, p. 39.83). The object of the soul is not the reflexive faculty in the form of some intellectual substance, the innate species or the first principles of cognition, which primarily consider the ideal, God-given exemplar. The intellect is exposed from the front, from the direction of first substances. Universal meaning is abstracted from external things through the work of the senses and the intellect. There is no place in this scheme for species of the second Averroism (*rationes exemplares, seminales*).

The unity of soul and body is given in two steps. The author follows the line of CMDA and rejects the hylic intellect made by modern sophists. The new concept of objectivity from the perspective of the first Averroism defends *intellectus possibilis* as a personal faculty of the soul. The act of intellectual understanding is common to the body and to the soul. The substantiation of material intellect represents a typical position of Alexandrians. In the line of the first Averroism, the author maintains the attachment to *intellectus possibilis* in the body, by insisting on its immateriality. The intellect, therefore, cannot be a subject in the sense of individualized substance, as it is the case in the second Averroism. The solution of modern Alexandrians leads to the substantial material intellect. It is separated from the body and thus separated from the other hypostatized forms of intellect.

“Anyone who thinks that the intellect connects with us like the form with the substance must end up in the position of Alexander and claim that the intellect is bound to the body as a faculty and is therefore perishable (*virtutem generabilem et corruptibilem*).” [[117]](#footnote-117)

The human intellect cannot be a substance. The conception of *intellectus possibilis* as a substance separate from the body (*intellectum nobis copulatum sicut formam secundum substantiam*) would mean that we must conceive it in the same mode of materiality as the body (*intellectum esse virtutem generabilem et corruptibilem*). However, such an intellect corresponds to Alexander’s hylic intellect (νοῦς ὑλικός) and its cognizing cannot establish a universal form of demonstrative syllogism. Once again, the excellent reading of CMDA by Parisian magisters of rue du Fouarre can be seen at work about the year 1270. The rejected material intellect of Alexandrians does not possess the same mode of cognition as Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*. The modernists allowed the receptive intellect to materialize in the manner of a modernist substance in the mode of doubtful *materia spiritualis*. The writing argues that such an Averroistic scenario necessarily presupposes the intellect as a separate form that is responsible for the same immaterial content of cognition in all people. Such kind of cognition in all people is not identical in the correct mode “*idem*” (*quartum genus*), but in the false mythological mode of “*ipse*” (*tertium genus*). The modernity criticized by the author did not understand at all basic arguments of CMDA. The cosmic *intellectus agens*, given as a separate substance, combines with the individual act of cognition given by the hylic intellect. The emphasis on the purely sensual *intellectus materialis* would explain in Themistius’s mode only the connection of individual thinking to the phantasms, but not the unity of the immaterial intellect and the separately given thinking in each person, as we find in Aristotle and Averroes. The resulting solution relates to Albert, namely as an appeal to Averroes and to the synthesis of cognition made by personal *intellectus speculativus* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). In contrast to the second Averroism, the author interprets exactly the key part of CMDA, namely the division of immaterial intellect into a receptive and an active component according to *tertium* and *quartum genus*.

“Averroes asserts in the third book that the active and the possible intellect possess an inviolable character, but the speculative intellect is vulnerable and comes into being by birth. Therefore, neither the active nor the passive intellect is sufficient for each other, but needed the phantasms. The speculative intellect arises [actually] in the phantasms, but from the point of view of the above-mentioned nature, as it is given [essentially] in itself, it is the permanent act of understanding. Similarly, the separated cosmic substances are constantly in motion from the point of view of their rational substance. Therefore, the human intellect needs phantasms. However, this does not mean that the intellect connects with the phantasms in the same way that the eyesight perceives the colors sensually. This answers all objections.” [[118]](#footnote-118)

The commentary clearly distinguishes the hypothetical (*licet*) character of the separated receptive and the active intellect given in the astral spheres (*licet intellectus agens et possibilis sint aeterni*). The argumentation is excellent, since the difference of *tertium* and *quartum genus* is valid even for the cosmic intelligences, since they are movable hypostatic forms (*tertium genus*) that make the same universally shared product of their thinking (*quartum genus*). But in man there is only the intellect as the faculty of the soul given in the body. As a result, the definition of separated receptive intellect can be given only in the mode *quartum genus*, that is, as a universal concept in thinking. The mention of cosmic intelligences provides an important indication for the authorship of the treatise, because it determines the author in relation to disputes concerning the eternity of the world and the species. The intellect, as Averroes’s fourth genus, is the immaterial faculty of the immaterial human soul (*inmixtus*), and thanks to this separation from matter, it completely resembles the cosmic intelligences. But the author knows perfectly well that, in agreement with the Commentator, he is talking only about the abstracted form of intellect in the mode of the *quartum genus*. On the other hand, the quotation presents the human actualization of this immaterial cognition in the personal *intellectus speculativus*, which is vulnerable and actually present in the body (*speculativus tamen corruptibilis et generabilis est*). Therefore, it is not enough to describe both types of intellect abstractly. The description of their activity must be made on the basis of the reception of phantasms (*quia non sibi sufficiunt agens et possibilis, sed et phantasmata necessaria sunt*). The reason is clear, namely, the exposure of human cognition from the direction of the existing material things perceived by the senses. The writing CMDA works this fundamental postulate of the first Averroism in the concept of intellect as the personal act of cognition in the body, that is, as a *tertium genus*. See the previous definition of human intellect as an act of the body. The nature of speculative intellect is the same as Albert did, because it represents the resulting synthesis of cognition as an individual immaterial act (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). The resulting synthesis of individual and universal cognition begins with sensual cognition (*unde intellectus speculativus generatur in phantasmatibus*), and then begins the exact distinction between the cosmic intellect and its human variant. Together they have immateriality and the active ability of thinking (*semper intelligit*). But these properties of the intellect are bound in man to the bodily act of the speculative intellect, which is determined by the sensual and thus also individual cognition. This type of material personalisation establishes the own essence of the human intellect bound to the body and senses (*quantum ex se est*). In the “*semper*” mode, the active human intellect is not bound to the pure form of the active cosmic intellect, but to the specific act of corporeal cognition in man (*iste intellectus naturaliter, quantum ex se est, semper intelligit*). The full mode of this “*semper*” lies according to CMDA merely in the abstraction of the human intellect bound to the existence of humanity as a species, as well as bound to the existence of philosophy (*species humana est aeterna*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). As we know, this line separating *intellectus agens* from its cosmic form is found in Alvernus and also in Grosseteste, but not in their successors, who introduced the second Averroism at Oxford. The human intellect is separate from the senses and thus immaterial. Therefore, the act of recognizing it is not the same as in the case of sensory cognition made due to the act of seeing (*non unitur intellectus phantasmatibus sicut visus coloribus*). This difference was solved in the school of first Averroism by different concepts of diaphanum in the senses and in the receptive intellect according to CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The position of anonymous writer is fully consistent with the solution of the unity of intellect according to CMDA. The last sentence of the quote contains an epochal irony. By a brilliant distinction of the types of intellect, based on the general knowledge of Averroes’s commentaries, the anonymous author claims that he has solved all objections (*per hoc solvuntur omnes rationes*). In reality, he revealed all the contradictions of second Averroism. The modernists had to go on the attack and to come up with new arguments, this time of an ideological and authoritarian nature.

The following polemic with the second Averroism in the second part of the treatise deals with the erroneous understanding of matter and the mode of abstraction. They are corrected with references to Aristotle and Averroes. The author followed the line of Bacon and Albert. He explains the difference between the universal concept of the second substance. It is formed in the act of cognition that differs from the first actual substance in reality. The same, of course, also applies to the twofold statute of matter, which cannot occur in some objective nature of *tertium ens*. The author reminds Latin sophists of basic truths that they should have learned in bachelor’s programs of the artistic faculty when they learned the difference between mathematical and metaphysical abstraction.[[119]](#footnote-119) The text clearly establishes the autonomy of mathematical abstraction as a secondary act that abstracts the real things. The imposition of meaning given by the process of abstraction (*abstractio cuiusdam rei ab alia re*) excludes the objectively given modern univocal supposition. The connoisseur of Aristotle and Averroes at the Faculty of Arts tries in vain to explain to modernists of that time that every abstraction proceeds in the mode *per posterius*, which is bound to first substances that exist in reality (*abstractio eiusdem secundum esse*). When this abstraction comes into being, the mathematics or the geometry, for example, can work with it on the next floor of abstraction. The author creates an abstraction conceived according to *De anima* from the direction of the first substance. In this way, it separates them from the abstraction as *denudatio* of the second Averroism, which considers the homogeneous continuum of universally conceived matter (*materia universale*). According to *Second Analytics* cited above, the author reminds the modernists that this abstracted matter, given in thought, is seen modally as a form of being other than the existence of the thing in reality (*abstractum habeat esse illo a quo abstrahitur*). Once again we are at Boethius’s and Abelard’s division of signification into “*totum integrum*” and “*totum universale*” (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). The rejection of mathematical numerically given extension and the matter of the third kind means that the intellect is not divisible and thus also not individualized in the same way as the continuum given within the framework of the various forms of logical and mathematical abstraction. Pecham radically changed this teaching at the time when this treatise was written (ch. 4.2.2). In the first Averroism, no objective solution is possible by the form of signification of the being of the third kind (*totum virtuale*). The universal hylemorphism linked to Porretan hypostasis is rejected in principle. The author clearly states that he cannot imagine how any quantitative determinations could belong to the essence of the intellect (*nescio de hoc*, p. 54.58). No sphere of objectivity can convey the connection of soul and body in the form of the various forms of *tertium ens*. The intellect, the soul and the hylemorphic unity of the body, they form an indivisible *actus essendi*, which is related to the existence of the first substance (*unde unitas in entitate est ab unitate actus*, p. 57.18‒19). The next part of the treatise states that the act of immaterial intellect is an act of the hylemorphic substance. According to Aristotle and Averroes, all other solutions lead to absurd conclusions regarding the active and possible intellect, which externally connects with man. The intellect of the first Averroism is the faculty of the soul as a form of the body. Therefore, it is not attached to the soul as an independent substance, which is typical for modernism and Cartesian postmodernism. For this reason, the argumentation of the second part of the commentary is important, which rejects the distinction “subject—object” given in the framework of modern objectivity. The substantial attachment of the intellect to the subject does not exist; its subsistence is given as a faculty of the soul, which forms the immaterial form of the body.

“The intellect understands only through the physical phantasms given as an object and not because the intellect would be connected with the body as a subject in the act of understanding.” [[120]](#footnote-120)

The immaterial intellect, as a specific faculty of the soul, takes the sensual phantasms as the object of its activity (*a phantasmate corporis sicut ab obiecto*). Through this immaterial and intentional relationship to the object of his cognition, the intellect becomes an immaterial ability of the person. Therefore, the intellect is not a separate substance with regard to the body, but merely a specific immaterial activity of the soul (*non quia intellectus communicet intelligere corpori sicut subiecto*). This brilliant distinction expanded Siger’s interpretation of the third part of CMDA, rejecting the soul and intellect as a subsistent subject of modernity (*hoc aliquid*). The quotation shows that the intellect works in the framework of Averroes’s distinction of intellect as a separate faculty of the soul given in the act of the body. The rejection of the intellect as an immaterial hypostasis given with regard to the material body has a fundamental character. It shows the model of objectivity given in the first Averroism, which could not end in the Cartesian dualism of soul and body. The author confirms the false position of modernity right in the next part. There is no intermediary between soul and body in the form of some kind of quasi-matter, and also no intellect separated from the body. Therefore, the concept of second Averroism as external connection (*colligatio*) of two substances of different types is an error, for example, the Avicenna′s definition of the soul as the mover of the body (*anima ut motor*). As we will see further, the author makes criticism of Aquinas’s definition of the soul as a hypostatized form (*qua2*, ch. 4.5.2). The author summarizes exactly Siger’s critical position towards Albert’s essential definition of the intellect (ch. 4.4.3).

“If it is claimed that the unity of man arises from the moving intellect and the moved body, it is necessary to investigate whether man is defined only nominally, whether he is defined as a composition of intellect and animated body, or simply as an intellect. Whatever the definition turns out, it is impossible for man to understand anything if he is not the actualized composition of intellect and body, i.e., a unity of matter and form.” [[121]](#footnote-121)

The anonymous writer is clear and precise, he argues with expertise. The combination of two substances in the manner of the active mover and the passively moving substance (*intellectu motore et corpore moto*) cannot create the required hylemorphic unity of the person (*unum ex materia et forma*). The author provides a concise overview of all the basic solutions of the relationship between the soul and the body. Either the solution of the first Averroism holds that the unity of the person lies only in the hylemorphic substance (*aggregati ex intellectu et corpore animato*); or the dualism of modern *Nominales* holds, where the body has only the nominal definition of the individual and the subsistent intellectual substance is placed against it (*utrum homo sit nomen corporis tantum… aut intellectus tantum*). All these and later Cartesian solutions of *Modernorum* lack the full unity of body, soul and intellect. In the first Averroism according to Averroes’s “meta-physics,” the unity of the person is given only within the framework of *actus essendi* of the one substance. As a result, the debate between *Anonymus Giele* and the second Averroism has in principle ended.

The treatise represents a typical commentary of *De anima* elaborated by a classically educated master at the University of Paris around 1270, who is a connoisseur from the school of the first Averroism in the line of Siger von Brabant and who defends his interpretation of CMDA against the fundamental errors of second Averroism. This connoisseur of Averroes expresses himself absolutely concisely and sparingly. He proceeds according to instructions given by Albert in *De homine*. These difficult debates do not belong to the category of philosophical freshmen (*haec disputatio difficilis valde, nec ad eam admittendi sund, nisi qui nutriti sunt in philosophia*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). He criticizes Averroists from Bonaventure’s school, especially Pecham and his solution of the unity of soul and body in the mode of the “*totum virtuale*” (ch. 4.2.2). The author follows the same line of reasoning regarding the unity of intellect as Siger. His argumentation of the unity of the person according to CMDA differs in certain points from the view of Albert and, above all, from the view of Aquinas. Therefore, this treatise is an important witness in the dispute between the followers of Siger and Aquin, which finally led to Aquin’s departure from the University of Paris after Easter 1272. Giele assumes that the author of the book is Boethius of Dacia (Giele 1971, 20). Hermeneutics confirms that this may be a lost commentary on *De anima* written by this magister, or even his commentary on the third book of *De anima*. The treatise works with the modal character of being and of cognition based on Averroes’s metaphysics, as well as on the precise reading of CMDA. This twofold character given in the school of Modists (*Modistae*) coming from the first Averroism, is very characteristic of the author of this manuscript. The remaining two anonymous treatises do not contain it. Boethius of Dacia wrote the work *Modi significandi sive Quaestiones super Priscianum Maiorem*, which confirms the authorship with regard to the modality used in a similar way. Hermeneutics connect Boethius with the schools of *Logica Vetus* in the line of Abelard, like the Anagnines cited above, which clearly distinguished the logical supposition from the metaphysical imposition (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). As a key indication of the authorship of Boethius of Dacia, we can consider the above-cited rejection of the conception of the intellect as a divided form in the manner of Alexandrians and Aquinas (*Anon. Giele* I.6; p. 39.85‒89). Following the example of Siger and CMDA, the writer places the emphasis on the intellect as the active potency of the soul as a form, which is a typical sign of Siger’s phenomenological approach (ch. 4.4.2). Next chapters will analyze the text quoted in Sigers *Quaestiones in tertium De anima* (Q. 4, p. 12.66–70). The scientific proof of human intelellect must find the fundamental kind of causality that establishes the *medium* of deductive syllogism proper the human way of thinking (*scire actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam;* QIIIDA, q. 4; ed. Bazán, p. 12.67‒70). The introductory methodological part in *Anonymus Giele* corresponds to Siger′s text, since the author defines existential abilities of *anima intellectiva* in the same manner. Let us quote this important part from anonymous treatise.

“It is true that the soul can recognize the act of its own thinking for the following reason. Every cognition comes from something other than oneself. The movements of the soul are not in themselves a subsistent being, but they are given in another being. Because of the origin thus given, the activities of the soul cannot be given existence by themselves; therefore they prove [as an effect] the existence of another being [as a cause]. If these movements of the soul did not exist, we would not know anything about the actual soul (*nihil sciremus de ea*). Therefore, we do not recognize the soul as it is of itself (*animam cogniscimus non secundum se*), but according to how it refers to its own movements (*secundum quod refertur ad ista*). That is why it is said that the soul is what it does through its actions such as hearing, seeing, understanding, etc.” [[122]](#footnote-122)

The quotation divides the subsistence of the soul and its abilities (*passiones non sunt aliquod ens per se subsistens, sed sunt ens in alio*). The phenomenological approach comes from the actualized phenomena, i.e., from the observed abilities of the soul (*animam cogniscimus non secundum se, sed secundum quod refertur ad ista*). The argument takes up the defense of *Second Analytics* according to the metaphysical dative connected to the categorial imposition. The real being of the first substance enters the past mode and universal knowledge sets in. This fundamental dependence of thinking on the real being and the causality of the first substance, it finds expression through the metaphysical dative. Only the second step sets the course for theoretical consideration of cognized being of the soul (*anima est quæ facit hoc*). As we will see later, this is the position of the first Averroism, which is defended around 1270 solely by Siger of Brabant and not by Thomas Aquinas or Albert the Great. This reasoning shows that the author is a brilliant connoisseur of the problem of unity and individualization of the intellect according to CMDA. This cannot be unequivocally said about Aquinatus, as his polemic with Siger shows (ch. 4.5.3). The anonymous treatise evaluates Averroes basically positively and for the same reasons as Siger. Another important reason for the authorship of Boethius of Dacia is the similar architecture of building the faculties of the soul from the sensual to the highest faculty of the soul given in contemplation. We find the key passage in *Anon. Giele* I.5, where all the important classical texts of Aristotle on the accomplished life according to intellect are listed.[[123]](#footnote-123) The original use of the terms “*felicitas*” and “*bonum*” from *Nicomachean Ethics* confirms Giele’s assertion about the possible author. The writing of Boethius of Dacia *De summo bono* (c. 1270) elaborates in an essayistic style this fundamental fact of the immaterial intellect, which exists uniquely in every human being through the soul as an personal form of the body.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between Siger and the author, although both integrally defend the position of the first Averroism. Siger and the anonymous author do not work in the same way with the definition of the intellect in *De anima*, even if they understand Aristotle’s teaching on the doctrine very similarly. Each of them directs Aristotle’s remark in *De anima* about the separated intellect in different directions. The philosopher Siger tied the question of intellect that is experienced and separated from the senses by examining the conception of intellect as “*homo ipse intelligit*” (ch. 4.4.4). The anonymous author is a humanist that inserted the primacy of the intellect in the hierarchy of “*actiones animae*” in order to defend the accomplished life according to intellect. In addition, the cited definition of the human intellect sums up in terms of the then-debated question of the eternity of the world and the eternal species, including the cosmic intelligences. The unity of the person is given strictly within the framework of the first Averroism, and at the same time this concept is compared with the separated intellect of the cosmic spheres. This perspective confused contemporary commentators who understood the treatise on the model of Averroism or Semiaverroism. The last reason for authorship of Boethius of Dacia is an *argumentum* *ex silentio*. With regard to the analysis made above, it becomes clear that around the year 1270 there were no other masters of such brilliant thinking who knew and defended the line of the first Averroism according to CMDA so well. There were but Siger and Boethius. At the same time, they differed fundamentally from Aquinas, Albert and Aegidius Romanus. The scripture *De anima* was taught compulsorily in rue du Fouarre since the year 1255. This anonymous master from the school of the first Averroism wrote a commentary of similar quality to Siger’s brilliant work *Quaestiones in tertium De anima*. As the author of this commentary, Boethius of Dacia on all sides meets these high requirements for the knowledge of Aristotle’s *De anima*. The exegesis of intellect was made with in-depth knowledge of CMDA and in accordance with Siger’s position. The writing has nothing to do with semiaverroism and clearly belongs to the school of the first Averroism. The key difference “*subiective—obiective*” is presented in this work by Boethius of Dacia according to Siger QIIIDA against the formal conception of the intellect according to Aquinas and against the first Thomism of Aegidius Romanus inspired by Aquinas (ch. 4.5.3). This treatise was therefore written at the same time as *Anonymus Bazán* (1270–71). Its anonymous author, on the other hand, defends Thomas Aquinas against the position of *Anonymus Giele*. Both writings were therefore published at the same time. Boethius as the author of *Anonymus Giele* was the main representative of the groupe of magisters called *“pars Sigeri*”. They elaborated a collective defense of artistic rector Siger against Aquinas’s conception of *De anima* engaged in the role “*Expositor Novus*.” He was established as a new interpretator of *Corpus Aristotelicum* against the Commentator since the year 1268; and he was acclaimed in that role especially after his arrival in Paris. That is the reason why the interpretation of *De anima* has the precise thinking and formulations on the same excellent level as Siger made in his thinking. Aquinas semiaverroistic position was refuted. The treatise *Anonymus Giele* was written before the year 1272, since it contributed to philosophical defeat of Aquinas as a New Expositor of Aristotle. We will analyze that controversy in detail later. The criticism of modernists as Pecham is a secondary goal, because their sophistry is contradictory in itself. The complementary pole of this polemical and defending writing from Siger’s school is the *Anonymus Bazán*, probably written by Aegidius Romanus (ch. 4.3.3). His semiaverroistic apology was written at the same time as *Anonymus Giele*. However, that second anonymous treatise defends the position of Aquin especially against Pecham’s school.

### 4.3.2 Commentaries on *De anima* of Oxford and Munich

The first conflict of the first and second Averroism came to an end in 1256 with the expulsion of genuine Aristotelians from the rue du Fouarre. The next generation of modernist interpreters of *De anima* entered *via Modernorum* and, understandably, the next generation of their critics started to be active as well. The activities of both schools are documented in the two anonymous treatises, which Fernand Van Steenberghen edited in one book. The manuscripts of Oxford (*Merton College, ms. 275*) and of Munich (*Staatsbibliothek, ms. 9559*) have a similar formal approach to argumentation. Both writings were allegedly written in the years 1273–77 (Steenberghen 1971, 129). The hermeneutics of objectivity do not stand behind Steenberghen’s conclusion that the author of both writings cannot be clearly determined and that, according to the actual state of research, it will remain unknown (ibid, 133). The authorship and circumstances of creation of both treatises can be determined and a new dating of both manuscripts comes to light as well. From the point of view of hermeneutics, both manuscripts defend fundamentally different conceptions of intellect and they do not belong to one school. Munich’s manuscript is written in the spirit of brilliantly conceived first Averroism, and the manuscript of Oxford is written in the spirit of modernized second Averroism. Therefore, we are talking about two completely different solutions of the unity of intellect. In addition, both treatises differ in terms of terminology and style, which Steenberghen duly noticed (ibid, 126). With regard to twofold line of argumentation, Siger as the one author of both treatises can be reliably ruled out. Hermeneutics support Steenberghen’s second thesis that there are not two different *reportatio* concerning the lectures of one master, but two different treatises elaborated by two different authors (ibid, 127). It must be added to this thesis that they were even the representatives of two different schools of thought. The Oxford manuscript paraphrases the Munich treatise and replaces the disputed passages with its own interpretation in the spirit of moderate second Averroism. This fact is evidenced by the key passages of the Munich manuscript, which received a different meaning in the Oxford manuscript. The original manuscript of the brilliant representative of first Averroism is transferred to the thinking of second Averroism, but in a new semiaverroistic version influenced by Thomas of Aquinas. The Oxford manuscript, in contrast to Kilwardby, Bonaventure and Pecham, defends the position of second Averroism from the position of a real connoisseur. He endeavors to reconcile himself with the position of Aristotle, which he takes from the Munich manuscript, while keeping a critical distance from second Averroism in important points. The writing defends these points in a qualified way. The author of the manuscript from Oxford (*Merton College, ms. 275*) must be sought in the environment of much better connoisseurs of Averroes than Bonaventure, Pecham or Kilwardby. There was only one such authority among the second Averroists at that time, namely Aegidius Romanus at the time of publishing *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* (about 1271). This treatise was found in the same convolute (*fol. 101r–107r*) as both anonymous treatises. Hermeneutics confirm Giele’s conclusion regarding the authorship of Aegidius for the Oxford manuscript. His analysis of the date of origin shows that, in addition to Siger of Brabant, the cited writing of Aegidius also had a fundamental influence on the handwriting of Merton College (Giele 1960, 530). Therefore, it is necessary to explain what an influence the thinking of Siger had on this manuscript. Aegidius was a representative of the second Averroism, but attended the lectures of both eminent representatives of the first Averroism in Paris, Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas. He shared their Aristotelian opinions in many points, mainly Aristotelian concept of abstraction and the exposure of the intellect from the direction of real substances. He rejected matter as *tertium ens* and dualistic conception of the soul. He significantly modified the substantial active intellect and analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics*.

The incomplete Munich manuscript with the commentary on *De anima I–II*, on the other hand, philosophically clearly and precisely defends the theses of the first Averroism, citing Aristotle and Averroes. The style of argumentation represents a brilliant example of thinking in the school of first Averroism. The author is modest with his expressions; he does not engage in superfluous polemics, the argumentation is logical, accurate and terminology is very clear. As far as the philosophy is concerned, the writing presents a top synthesis of the first Averroism. In addition to explanation of errors of second Averroism, he provides a total synthesis of CMDA with respect to the unity of the person. He writes in the new situation, given by the advent of second Averroism after the year 1255 at the University of Paris. He offered a brilliant interpretation of CMDA according to the Sicilian school, presented “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Only Siger of Brabant meets these criteria at the time of the writing *Quaestiones in tertium De anima* (about 1265) and before the publication *De anima intellectiva* (about 1273). Hermeneutics therefore agree with Steenbergh’s thesis of Siger’s authorship, because the manuscript of Munich does not contain any contradictory teachings with regard to Siger’s position (ibid, 130). If we separate both manuscripts from each other as independent treatises of different schools, then the probability of Siger’s authorship increases, namely by combining this work with his commentary on the third book of *De anima*. The manuscript of Munich could be some student′s *reportatio* from the Paris University; but the precise style of formulations is in line with the original thinking of magister Siger. This work was transferred to the environment of second Averroism in Oxford, where it was combined with the ideologically different commentary of Aegidius Romanus that modernists of Oxford understandably preferred. The later conflicts concerning Siger and the dispute about Averroism were indirectly reflected in both manuscripts. The manuscript of Munich is less legible and some passages with Aristotelian commentaries are blacked out, and the most important commentary on *De anima*III is missing. It may be that the missing commentary on *DA III* never existed because *Quaestiones* *in tertium De anima* circulated as Siger’s independent work. This makes the difference from the respectable and well-maintained manuscript of Oxford. It was written by a professional scribe who worked in the modernist’s College of Oxford. The Munich manuscript can perhaps be identified with Siger’s lost work *De intellectu*, which was mentioned by Agostino Nifo, an Aristotelian from the Renaissance and the interpreter of Averroes. Nifo refers to Siger in the work *De intellectu* as the greatest authority of the first Averroism (*Suggerius vir gravis secte Averroisticae fautor*; *De intellectu*, f. 33ra; see Hasse 2007, 315). The fact that Nifo ranged Siger into “the sect of Averroists” indicates his poor knowledge of the problem. That is amply confirmed in his commentaries concerning the metaphysics of the Commentator. Nifo quotes Siger’s writing very fleetingly and it is not certain that he does not mean Siger’s already well-known treatises under the general title *De intellectu*.[[124]](#footnote-124) Another probable possibility is the identification with Siger’s lost commentary on *De anima I–II*. It is logical that magister Siger commented on all three books of *De anima*. This writing of Aristotle had been on the list of compulsory reading of the Artistic Faculty since 1255. The structure of the manuscript of Munich corresponds to this treatise, because a commentary on the third book of *De anima* is completely missing and the writing contains only a commentary on books I and II (Steenberghen 1971, 126). For both manuscripts, Steenberghen suggests a date after the year 1270. As we shall see below, the structure of the argument does not correspond to this time. In particular, the last part of the Oxford manuscript (DA III) is very important as to the indication of time. The genesis and the structure of arguments of this section show that it certainly did not originate after the publication of Aquinas′s *De unitate intellectus* (1270), as Steenberghen suggests.

First, we want to take a look at fundamental differences between two manuscripts. They concern the statute of species and universals, the essence of matter and, understandably, the statute of intellect, which determines the two different forms of scientific cognition and the two different concepts of metaphysics. The manuscript of Munich (further only “M”) begins with the definition of science as immaterial universal cognition according to the principle “*ex inmediatis*” from the expressly cited *Second Analytics*. Cognition must go to substantial properties of the first substance (*subiectum*) as the starting point of cognition (*principium*) and the basis of subsequent cognition (*cognitio subiecti principium est cognitionis omnium aliorum*). The investigated reality is the effect of real first substances (*est enim principium cognitionis propriae passionis*), to which the rational definition corresponds on the side of cognition (*quia ponitur in ratione eius*; M 1.1.2; p. 138.22‒25). The manuscript insists on the principle “*inmediate*,” although it does not mention this directly; but in connection with the cited text of *Second Analytics*, this is obvious.[[125]](#footnote-125) The structure of *demonstratio* follows the reasoning of the first Averroism, because it adapts the nature of science to effective actions of real substances (*passiones*). The cognition takes the direction from first substances that determine the subsequent course of abstraction. The Oxford Manuscript (further only “O”) edited this part in such a way that the principle of reality fell out and the definition of *demonstratio* shifted to the middle link of the syllogism edited according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The principle of cognition shifted from the imposition of meaning from reality to the supposition of logic, in accordance with the doctrine of second Averroism. The next part of the argumentation of the manuscript O shows that this is not a coincidence. The exposure does not start from the first substance, as in the case of M, but from the essence and from the autonomous principles of cognition, which are given in the intellect as a self-reflexive actualized hypostasis. Manuscript O in the paraphrase of manuscript M does not mention *Second Analytics* at all, and rightly so, because it changes meaning of manuscript M in the style of the second Averroism. Manuscript M, citing Aristotle, says that, according to the above-mentioned evidence, universal cognition is immaterial (*universale secundum quod huiusmodi non est corruptibile*) and such are knowledge and cognition thus produced (*scientia*). But the process of formation of this knowledge must be given on the material substrate of the body, on which the recognized things act (*illud de quo est scientia oportet quod habeat passiones*). We find the fundamental difference between the M and O manuscripts in the passage, which comprehends the subject of cognition according to the *Modernorum*, that is, by exposure from behind, from hypostatic principles of cognition stored in the intellect according to Avicenna. The quotation from the Oxford manuscript shows an exactly reversed position in comparison to *Anonymus Giele*. The change the Munich manuscript is of a fundamental nature and it follows the reasoning of Oxfordian Fallacy. The author describes the cognition of modern Avicennist subject, which is at odds with the version of M.

“The intelligible cognition of the subject (*cognitio subiecti*) first appears in the intellect according to knowledge and essence. The intelligible cognition of the subject through knowledge is the basis of everything else (*cognitio subiecti in scientia est principium omnium aliorum*), because the principles of cognition are given in the definition of the subject (*principia fundantur in ratione subiecti*). Therefore, the cognition of the subject is the principle of cognition of its own movements (*principium cognitionis propriae passionis*). These movements are contained in him as in the rational subject (*subiectum ponatur in ratione eius*). Therefore, it must be precisely this subject (*subiectum debet esse tale*); for its recognition arises primarily through the knowledge thus given.” [[126]](#footnote-126)

The sophistry of the quotation is based on the unclear definition of the subject of cognition (*cognitio subiecti*). It is undifferentiated and belongs both to the thing recognized in the intellect and to the reflection of the intellect as the carrier of the act of this cognition of the thing (*principia fundantur in ratione subiecti*). This highly sophisticated version of second Averroism omitted to investigate the crucial question of the imposition that makes the fundament of the manuscript M. The principle “*ex inmediatis*” belongs to cognitive subject, because the manuscript O changed metaphysical imposition into logical supposition. Cognition is not illuminated from the front, from the real thing, but from behind, from the knowing subject. The source of cognition is not an external thing, but the essentially given cognition of the self-reflexive subject of the intellect (*cognitio subiecti est principium cognitionis propriae passionis*). Modern mind comes to the external thing ex-post, by self-reflexively activated principles of cognition, which are stored in the actualized form of the intellect, instead of recognizing the causal effects of external things that work on the intellect. This principle of Avicennistic deduction of cognition from the intellect of the “Flying Man” is peculiar to the second Averroism of Rufus and Kilwardby. The previous determinations of the first substance (*passiones et partes subiecti*) were transformed into the investigation of the essence of the thing (*cognitio subiecti primo occurrat intellectui circa naturam illam*). The basis of cognition does not consist in the passions of the researched thing and the person as the first substance. The principles of cognition do not act *per prius* due to first substances, but in the modern scientific proof (*cognitio subiecti in scientia principium omnium aliorum*). Let’s compare this version with the previous quotation of the manuscript M, where the real substance was the source of the first principles of cognition (*cognitio subiecti principium*). When modernists and Aristotelians use the same term “*subiecti principium*,” it does not mean the same thing, because the objective and therefore false *Gehaltsinn* is not the same as hermeneutic *Bezugssinn*. The metaphysical ipseity of scientific cognition (*tertium genus*) must be strictly separated from its logical identity (*quartum genus*). According to the manuscript M, the principles of cognition cannot exist hypostatically in the intellect, because it is defined as a *tabula rasa*. As a result, both manuscripts can be separated according to the rejected or the accepted Oxfordian Fallacy. Either the subject of cognition consists in a real thing within the framework of truth as *adaequatio*; or, the subject transforms in a modern subject with the hypostatic potentiality of Rufus that makes the truth as *rectitudo*. Both manuscripts differ equally in the concept of science that follows either the exposure of the being from the front, or from the back. The changed nature of metaphysics necessarily corresponds to this fact. Manuscript M is clearly written according to the “meta-physics” of Averroes and Aristotle. Therefore, it defines the first science according to Averroes’s interpretation of the Philosopher, i.e., with regard to the twofold determination of the real substance studied from metaphysics and physics (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Moreover, the writing M brilliantly separated the first science according to Avicenna from the metaphysics of Averroes, which quite clearly indicates the author.

“The task of the first philosophy is to examine the being from the point of view of its existence (*de ente secundum quod ens*), which includes the consideration of what constitutes the act of the actually existing being (*quod est actus entis*). In another way, we can state how the substance and the act of being of the sensually experienced body is given, which belongs to research of natural sciences…” [[127]](#footnote-127)

The opening part of definition can include Avicenna’s essential definition of the first science (*de ente secundum quod ens*), but it is not the kind of Aristotelian first science. Therefore immediately after this general part, it follows Averroes’ definition of “meta-physical” cognition of being, which must follow the act of being of the existing real substance (*de eo quod est actus entis*). The integration of both projects of metaphysics in mode “substance *qua* substance” under Averroes’ aegis is important because it presents the synthesis of a twofold project of metaphysics according to Avicenna and Averroes. So explicitly and precisely formulated, it was only available to the first Averroism in the version of Siger (ch. 4.4.1). The Oxford manuscript privileges Avicenna’s definition of the first science in the paraphrase of the given passage of the manuscript M in the spirit of the second Averroism (*primus considerat ens inquantum ens*).[[128]](#footnote-128) The key is the word “*primus*,” which gives a clear primacy to Avicennist version of metaphysics. The hierarchy of both metaphysics is of fundamental importance for determining the authorship of both manuscripts, because it distinguishes the Toletan and Sicilian school from each other. The Toledo’s interpretation in the spirit of the later *metaphysica generalis* integrated Averroes’s project of “meta-physics” (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3) in the metaphysics of Avicenna. The first Averroism of rejected this in principle. The Sicilian school, on the contrary, subordinated Avicenna’s abstract logical metaphysics done in the mode “*ens inquantum ens*” to Averroes’s first science based on the principle “substance *qua* substance.” In the name of primacy of Averroes’s metaphysics, Siger criticized the reverse order of metaphysics made by Albert and Aquinas (ch. 4.4.1). Manuscript O gives Averroes’s definition of the first science in relation to the knowledge of the principles of hyparchical substance only in the second place, but correctly connects it with the definition of physics.[[129]](#footnote-129) This indication clearly shows that the author of the manuscript O did not belong to primitive opponents of the Commentator, like the modernists in the schools of Rufus and Bonaventure. However, the manuscript O lacks Averroes’s exact definition of metaphysics and turned the hierarchy of both projects in Avicenna’s favor. This was the typical lifelong position of Aegidius Romanus. The shift in the definition of metaphysics between the two manuscripts shows the path that has already been taken to create a univocal ontology of *Modernorum* after 1270. The second definition also specifically mentions the corresponding passage in Averroes’s commentary for the definition of the first science according to substance; this definition serves only as an addition to the author’s preferred view of metaphysics according to Avicenna. Modernists consider the definitions of the first science relative to knowledge of physical substance to be secondary (see Grosseteste’s “*scientia*”), as evidenced by development of Oxfordian Fallacy in the thinking of Rufus and Kilwardby. Both manuscripts differ as to the determination of fundamental sense of being, which is necessarily reflected in the following definitions of soul and intellect.

Let’s start with the agreement of both authors in the question of species. The handwriting M brilliantly distinguishes in one sentence between the two sides of the intentionally grasped species (*in specie est considerare naturam subiectam intentioni et intentionem ipsam*; M 1.8, p. 161.76‒77). The second Averroism combined the two completely different components given in the mode of the intended object and the existential act of intentionality (*naturam subiectam intentioni*) into a univocal unity. The univocal intention, which is connected with the species of the third kind, acquires almost the same magical meaning in the view of late Avicennism, which completes Cartesian and Husserlian postmodernism. The author of the manuscript M clearly defines meaning of intentionality by separating it from sensual cognition and from the real thing; therefore, he comprehends it only with regard to the meaning of being in the intellect and, moreover, in the mode *tertium* and *quartum genus* as the Commentator. Handwriting O does not see this nuance and comprehends the process of cognition already in the mode of introduced semiaverroistic objectivity. The Oxford manuscript accomplishes a generally successful paraphrase of the quoted passage and holds intentionality outside of objective species made by second Averroism. This step is again important for determining the authorship of the scripture with regard to Aegidius. The intentionality correctly conceived according to CMDA clearly distinguishes both authors from sophistic teaching of second Averroism proclaimed in Bonaventure’s school. But only manuscript M has the brilliant distinction between the intentional object and the existential act. This was unique character that Siger made by interpreting the writing CMDA according to the Sicilian school. He was elected the rector of artists in the rue du Fouarre because of his exact and brilliant thinking. Dante duly noticed it in *Divine Comedy*. This fact aside, q. 9 of manuscript O follows the general line of manuscript M and it contains the same teaching about the universals. Both authors refer to Themistius and Averroes in agreement. With regard to the ontological primacy of the first substances, the emergence of the universal in thinking represents a secondary operation of the intellect (*quod sequitur ipsa particularia ex operatione intellectu est posterius*; M 1.9, p. 164.25‒26). Citing Aristotle, both authors follow the metaphysical dative and they keep a clear distance with respect to second Averroism. Either the universals are given *per posterius* with regard to first substances, or they do not exist at all (*Aristoteles dicit quod animal universale aut nihil est aut posterius est*; O I.9, p. 165.49‒50). The source of universality is *intellectus agens* which, thanks to its own accidental universality, produce universality with regard to real things. The universals have only an accidental character, because they recognize the essence of the first substance in virtue of immaterial intention added to the first substance (*universale in actu est aliquid aggregatum ex natura rei ei intentione superaddita*).[[130]](#footnote-130) The actual existence of thing is merely thought and therefore cannot be a form of being of the third kind. The author of the manuscript O dismissed the universal hylemorphism in Oxford and Paris, and at the same time this Avicennist did not accept Averroes’s concept of metaphysics, as it is given in manuscript M. This position makes the specific nature of the manuscript O. It determines the authorship, date and circumstances of its coming into existence. At this stage, the numerical unity of the possible and the active intellect has not yet been clarified. Both authors state with an implicit reference to *De anima* that there is a fundamental difference between the two components of the soul. In that question we can see the level of a learned Aristotelian conceiving the semiaverroist manuscript O in contrast to the Averroist school of Bonaventure. The latter had a plurality of substances directly in the intellect (ch. 4.1.2). Such a level of educated Aristotelianism shows that the author of the semiaverroist manuscript O stands in opposition to the Averroist school of Bonaventure. This separation of the cultivated semiaverroism preserved in the manuscript O from the primitive Averroism of the early modernists suggests the birth of Thomism in the milieu of the second wave of Oxfordian Fallacy about 1270. It means that the Thomism and the Scotism have the same modernist origin, which we will discuss later on.

Both Aristotelians know that human cognition has the character of a movement from the possibility to realization, and its actuality is initially given by bodily senses. First, the *intellectus possibilis* must be given as a receptive part of the soul, which is updated by the *intellectus agens*. If the active intellect imprinted actuality into the possible intellect from itself, and not from the intentional reception of the external thing, then our cognition would be actual and permanent. It contradicts the real course of contingent cognition. On the question of species and universals, both authors clearly and convincingly defend the line of the first Averroism given by the interpretation of Averroes.[[131]](#footnote-131) The falsity of the objectivity of the second Averroism, given in the mode of universal hylemorphism and by the plurality of substances in man, is clearly and in principle rejected by both authors. They know well the writing *De anima* and the argumentation of CMDA. The author of Oxford manuscript has no problem with the first part of the quotation in manuscript M.[[132]](#footnote-132) The author of the version M states that *intellectus agens* stands above potential intellect (*agens sit nobilior patiente*) in the order of knowledge, because receptive intellect is defined only in relation to the potentiality of intellectual knowledge. Cogniton that the *intellectus possibilis* has only in potentiality, the *intellectus agens* operates as a ready-made immaterial concept. The fundamental difference between the two manuscripts lies in the question of whether the term “*nobilior*” signifies the ontological superiority of Avicennist active intellect (modernism); or, the term merely indicates the order of cognition in which the actuality given by intentionality passes from the receptive to the active intellect (Aristotle′s *De anima*). The author of manuscript O is an educated Latin sophist in the style of Grosseteste’s “*aliquantulum obscura*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Therefore, the main difference between the two commentaries should be noted with a remark in manuscript O that distances itself from the doctrine advocated in manuscript M: “*Sed quomodo est istud, magis dubium est*.” (O 1.10, p. 168.47) According to the author of the version O, what is doubtful in principle and why? The manuscript O faithfully reproduces and in the end doubts the key sentence from manuscript M, which concerns the essence of the connection of both intellects. The receptive and the active components of the intellect are immaterial, but differ from each other due to the difference between potentiality and actuality. The intellect is to be determined somehow (*quomodo*) by sensual recognition of the real thing. This difference in both manuscripts is of a principled nature. This position separates the dualism of the sensual and the intelligible cognition of the semiaverroist Aegidius from Siger’s brilliantly elaborated definition of cognition within the framework of the one person. Handwriting M performs in this part a summary of the central part of the unity of the thinking person according to CMDA. The author of version M fundamentally rejects the thesis of the subordination of the receptive intellect to the active, because otherwise *intellectus agens* would become an independent substance in the soul. Then he continues with an attack against Averroists from Bonaventure’s school, who hold on to the exposure of meaning of being made from behind. Handwriting M accurately determined the position of modernists and rejected it. Modernity defines the production of cognition on the basis of the fact that the hypostatized and detached intellect acts by itself on *species sensibilis* in the imagination. It transforms the intelligible potency of sensual species into an actualized notion.

“How this subordination would be given is shown by somebody that placed the phantasms in the same relation to the possible intellect as the sensory impressions to the senses. In the phantasms there is supposedly no universal determination in actuality, but only in potency. The active [moderne] intellect supposedly proceeds from the intention or the rational determination given in the potency (*ab huius modi intentione vel ratione universali in potentia*) and replaces the principles of sensual individualization (*circumscribens principia individuantia*). As a result, the [moderne] intellect makes the universals given in potency to become the actually given universals (*intellectus universale est actuale*). Thus the active intellect creates the universals by itself (*intellectus agens per se agit universale*). That actualized universal meaning then moves the possible intellect. That is why somebody claims that the universals in things pre-exist before the activity of the intellect.” [[133]](#footnote-133)

The first sentence says that there are defenders of a thesis (*secundum Quosdam*) according to which the universals cannot actually be in the sensual phantasms, but are there only in the potency (*in phantasmatibus … non est ratio universalis in actu, sed in potentia*). Therefore, their immaterial definition (*ratio universalis*) directly affects the immaterial receptive intellect. Modernism, enlightened by that solar intellect, does not need *intellectus possibilis*. The school of the first Averroism needs it in principle, because otherwise it would not have the truth as *proportio* of the real thing and the intellect. Let us recall the abolition of abstraction in the modernity of Falsafa that chose the *denudatio* of Avicenna instead of *abstractio* of Aristotle (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The defenders help themselves with the analogous and, according to handwriting M, totally erroneous comparison that the phantasms have by themselves the same relation to the possible intellect (*in phantasmatibus, quæ se habent ad intellectum possibilem*) as the senses have the perceptible properties of things with regard to the physical senses (*sicut sensibilia ad sensum*). The quotation mentions a standard expression of second Averroism, with which the modernists tried to bridge the fundamental difference between sensual and intellectual cognition in a metaphorical and sophistic manner. According to the author of M, this analogy is impossible; see the previous explanations about the statute of universals, which cannot be given in the first substances, because they are supposed to be only in the intellect. Accomplished version of Oxfordian Fallacy bypasses the principle of individuation (*circumscribens*) that is given at the level of the first substance. Being settled at the level of pure abstraction, the intellect begins to reign without restrictions. This determines the universality that is already potentially given in the phantasm and then received by the possible intellect (*from huiusmodi intentione vel ratione universali in potentia*). The actualized *intellectus agens* (Rufus’s verb “*exsistit*”) draws the universal given in potentia through its own actuality into the hypostatic existence in thinking (*intellectus agens… facit quod illud quod erat potentia universale est actu universale*). Then it becomes clear that this predestined soul and intellect is not Aristotle’s *tabula rasa*, but Avicenna’s “Flying man.” Porretan hypostatized active intellect by itself developes actual cognition. Therefore, it forms a substance separate from the body, in a Cartesian way. The quotation clearly rejects Bonaventure’s and Pecham’s teaching that the first substances contain some hypostatic objective entities (*rationes exemplares, ratio seminalis*). The author works with the scheme of knowledge within the framework “potentiality—actuality” that is fully Aristotelian. But potentiality in real things retains the hypostatic, therefore objective character. Aquinas kept the same position of formally given univocal causality of sensual and intelligible intentionality. Siger therefore repeatedly criticized him in his second work *De anima intellectiva*. Anonymous writer does not have the complete CMDA scheme of cognition that the main proponents of the first Averroism (Boethius, Siger) have. The scripture claims that phantasms already have the universals in the form of *species intelligibilis*, which are supposed to be only potentially given. Thus these species are said to be already intelligibile due to the fact that they are immaterially given. And in this form they are then taken up by the immaterial *intellectus possibilis*. As we will see later, this is the position of Aegidius Romanus, who, as the author of the manuscript O, must reject the position of Siger. Handwriting M, citing Averroes, categorically asserts that there are no universals in things, because there is no way how they could exist in *simpliciter* existing first substances. Therefore, things are universally recognized in thinking, where their meaning arises as a result of an existential act of the person.

The following key phrase shows the essence of the disagreement of both authors. The author of M asserts that the introduction of universals into things leads to a circumscribing of reality (*circumscribens principia individuantia*). The first substance no longer determines the process of cognition and is replaced by the modern products of the active intellect (*Ge-Stell*). The author of the manuscript M, as one of the few thinkers of his time, has a clear idea what makes the epochal error of modernity (*Irrtum*). Namely, that it carries out a complete eclipse of the first substance. Siger, as the only author of his time, identified a fundamental change in the concept of *dativus possessivus*. The bearer of knowledge (*subiectum*) is not reality, but the modern subject. As a result, modernist Furies severely punished him for this right standpoint. By the displacement of the first substance, the principle “*ex inmediatis*” was abolished, which was defended by Aristotelian manuscript M, in contrast to Avicennian manuscript O. The author of the manuscript M clearly sees the fatal error of modernity and rejected an objectivist definition of cognition. The reality of the external thing shapes only the material process of emergence of sensual species, but by no means the immaterial process of abstraction at the level of the intellect. The author of M recalls that in this case we are dealing with a dubious (i.e., objective) meaning of the being, which is given by exposure from behind, because abstraction does not need the actualized first substances. In this masked Neoplatonism, the active intellect thinks out of itself and not from the direction of real substances (*intellectus agens per se agit universale*). The universality made in that wrong way determines the work of the possible intellect, instead of the activity of sensual species (*universale autem factum in actu movet intellectum possibilem*). Then it becomes clear that these quidams, in conflict with Aristotle and Averroes, must assert that the universals pre-exist in things outside the activity of the intellect (*dixerunt universale praeexistere in rebus operationi intellectus*). The author of the Munich manuscript rejects this thesis of modernists as false. Depending on the exposure of the being from the front or from the back, such clear-cut difference between the first and the second Averroism exists only in the philosophy of Siger, as we will see later. He was the only Aristotelian of that time who precisely understood how Avicennists carried out the eclipse of the first substance. The author of the manuscript O indirectly rejects this passage right in the introduction, but has no means to polemicize against this precise formulation. The author does not know how to solve the problem of the unity of cognition (*sed quomodo est istud magis dubium est*, O 1.10, p. 168.47). He has the solution of the manuscript M right in front of his nose, but refuses to accept its knowledge, because he adheres to the dualism of sensual and intellectual cognition. Thus, the author unmasked himself as a sophist from the environment of semiaverroism that stood between the first and second Averroism. Aegidius, in contrast to confused sophists from Bonaventure’s school, knows and understands the solution of the manuscript M exactly. He knows what kind of problem it is about, but refuses to take note of the offered solution according to CMDA and according to the manuscript M. The result of Aegidius’s philosophical despair and perplexity was his violent attack on Averroes as a pagan philosopher, heretic and destroyer of religion in the work *De erroribus Philosophorum* (1270). The author of Munich manuscript has no aporia of cognition, because he follows Averroes′s *proportio* between the senses and the intellect in CMDA. By rejecting the universal hylemorphism of modernity, the manuscript of Munich brilliantly sums up the whole problem of universals and their cognition.

“But we object to the fact that everything that comes into being by itself is a composition of matter and form. The resulting composition cannot consist only of some form, because otherwise it would not be a hylemorphic composition. It can also not consist only of some matter, because the composition would then need some other kind of matter. The universal is therefore not a single hylemorphic thing that exists *per se*. Therefore, it cannot arise out of itself either. It follows from this that the active intellect cannot produce the universals only out of itself.” [[134]](#footnote-134)

The process of cognition is a certain form of *generatio*, but a very specific one. The horse does not beget a horse by thinking. The birth is the example of “*generatio per se*,” which is given in reality by the action of first substances (*aggregatum ex materia et forma*). The universal thing is not a first substance, because it does not produce an existing individual (*per se non generatur*). It can be in no way a being of the third kind that combines both determinations into an objective kind of being. The author rejects the objectivity of the second Averroism, because he possesses a sound mind. There is no matter of the third kind (*nec materiam*) which could produce an objective hylemorphic composition defined as the first substance (*universale non est aliquod aggregatum per se*). Such was the case with Rufus and Bonaventure in the conception of being as a *concretum* of singularity and universality. According to the treatise M, the human intellect does not take actuality from itself, but from first substances. The last sentence of the quotation clearly rejects the statute of the active intellect as the sun that illuminates both the phantasms and the passive intellect and produces the universal meaning out of itself (*intellectus ergo agens non agit universale per se*). The active intellect has no possibility of individualizing cognition, because it is a psychic faculty, which merely carries out a universal synthesis of already individualized immaterial cognitions. Therefore, the intellect cannot somehow “materially” generate recognized forms in man in the mode of universal hylemorphism and as modern *tertium ens*. The author of the version M rejected the erroneous solution of some representatives of the second Averroism (*secundum Quosdam*). It is not the position of the manuscript O. Once again, it is an allusion to the cited dispute regarding the twofold mediation between the intelligible and the sensual phantasma (*phantasma se habet ad intellectum possibilem sicut color ad visum*). The handwriting O requires the solar intellect to recognize, because the irradiation of the phantasms comes from behind. Then the full equivalence of the exposure must apply, which is not the case in the first Averroism. Manuscript M, with explicit reference to Averroes, asserts that both intellects act “*secundum se*” as autonomous and even immaterial abilities of the soul. Therefore, the intellect is separated from the senses (*inmixtus*). However, he has no actuality of cognition given outside the first substance, because both intellects are not capable of any separate act in the form of a actualized hypostasis and substance (*generatio per se*; M 1.10, p. 169.64‒77). From the point of view of hermeneutics, it is important that handwriting M, by brilliantly defending both the autonomy of the intellect and the dependence of the intellect on the senses. Moreover the author rejects the idea of the intellect as a form of the soul. As we will see later, this dubious thesis of the unity of the person was defended by Aquinas (modality *qua2*). Siger criticized it in principle (ch. 4.4.3). Therefore, Siger of Brabant is the only possible author of this treatise for many reasons. As the only known Aristotelian, he critically analyzed all ambiguous solutions of unity of the person in the environment of the first Averroism (Albert, Aquinas), in the environment of semiaverroism (Aegidius Romanus) and, understandably, in the school of sophistic Averroism based on the doctrine of universal hylemorphism (Rufus, Bonaventure, Kilwardby, Pecham). Therefore, it becomes clear where Siger’s numerous enemies came from. He received for that reason the honorary title *Doctor invidiosus* that Dante rightly accorded him.

Let us now quote the key part of the manuscript M, which follows the line of the lost writing *De intellectu*, which is mentioned by Agostino Nifo. Siger allegedly sent this writing to Aquinas in response to *De unitate intellectus* (1270). Let us try to find, in addition to the proofs already provided, the text corresponding to later criticism of Siger in the second treatise on the soul from 1272 (*anima est qua intelligimus*).[[135]](#footnote-135) Aquinas combines the immaterial essence of the intellect and the specific act of thinking in the immaterial mode into the one hypostasis (*intelligere fit secundum ipsum intellectum*). Aquinas considers the intellect became an independent form next to the soul, which Siger resolutely rejected. If the manuscript M is indeed Siger’s work, then he must uncompromisingly defend the thesis “*anima est qua intelligimus*” and it must reject Aquinas’s semiaverroistic thesis given in the mode on the hypostatized nature of the intellect (*ipsum intellectum*, ch. 4.5.2). Writing M distinguishes two types and ways of cognition of intellect: from the act of thinking and from the substance of the soul. In doing so, he clearly states that the phenomenological approach to cognition through manifestations of intellectual abilities of the soul has the primacy over direct cognition by the soul as a substance. This becomes clear from the twofold way of scientific cognition according to *Second Analytics* (*Anal. Post*. 84a12). Essential definition does not have the same status as the predication from the direction of hyparchical causality, which is necessary for the scientific proof concerning real substances. We recognize the world, while we exist as a hylemorphic first substance, since we are not an immaterial cosmic intelligence as modernists and Cartesians presupposes. Therefore, Bacon rejected Anselm’s definition of the truth as “*rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Likewise Albert criticized the modern definitions of the soul, which were given on the basis of the formal definition of the Toledean school (*scientur imperfecte*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). As we will see later, Siger accused Albert of neglecting this difference, making a mistake in his later teaching on the intellect. The manuscript M, like Siger, defends the phenomenological principle of cognition in the key passage in *Quaestiones in tertium De anima*, which we will analyze in more detail (*scire actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam*, ch. 4.4.2). But manuscript M analyzes this basic principle in a different way than Siger in the quoted part of *Quaestiones in tertium De anima* (further under the abbreviation QIIIDA). Hermeneutics see in Siger a shift in thinking from more conciliate attitude in manuscript M to the fundamental criticism of Aquinas in the work QIIIDA. The difference in argumentation is based on the specificity of the second and the third part of *De anima*. In DA I–II, a conciliatory point of view was possible. In DA III it was no longer possible, since that part explores the essence of human cognition and intellect. Hermeneutics emphasize that Siger’s handing over of the olive branch to Aquinas was in no case given by a change in Siger’s attitude in the years 1265–70. Siger regarded Aquinas as an Avicennist from the Toledo school since the days of Aquinas′s studies in Paris. Aquinas defended Averroistic interpretation of the Commentator, holding the intellect in the soul as an independent hypostasis. That is why he defended the plurality of forms (but not substances) in man. This was unacceptable in principle for Siger as a high representative of the first Averroism of the Blund′s school in the rue du Fouarre. For this reason, the Paris dispute over the title of *Expositor Novus* began between Siger and Aquin after the year 1270 (ch. 4.4.4). We now want to quote the introductory intellectual position of Siger in manuscript M, where he comments only on the first and second parts of *De anima*. This is important to know, because this position was no longer possible in the commentary to the third book of *De anima* that followed the interpretation of the third book of CMDA. Therefore, Siger rejected the essential recognition of the soul in the commentary of QIIIDA as insufficiently scientific. Siger rejected the direct recognition of the soul given *per se* in the QIIIDA as an inadequate form of demonstration because of the lack of causality in the middle link of deduction. Since we recognize the actually given external thing, we also actualize the cognitive principles and our own mental abilities in this actual cognition. The direct insight into the essence is replaced in the QIIIDA by the model of *tabula rasa*, which is given by the determination of cognition only from the direction of the first substance, that is, from direct experience of thinking in the first person. The writing *Anonymus M* has fundamental doubts about the direct recognition of the intellect by form or substance, but accepts it as a possible way of true cognition of intellect (*potest esse*).

“It is necessary to become aware that the difficulty in recognizing the soul can be due both to the essential character of the soul (*potest esse ex parte substaniae animae*) and from the point of view of our cognitive activity (*ex parte nostra*). The cognition is not a problem from the point of view of the essential essence of the soul. What has the essence of being out of itself must be recognizable to the highest degree. The soul is like that and is therefore certainly recognizable in and of itself. Then there is no problem with the cognition of the soul from the point of view of its existence (*non est ex parte substantiae animae difficultas*), but with the cognition given by our activity (*ex parte nostra*). We are not able to recognize the principles of action other than by experiencing and performing the actions in our own self (*ex cognitione passionum et operationum*)…” [[136]](#footnote-136)

The introductory sentence comments on both approaches to the recognition of the intellect (*ex parte substantiae animae vel ex parte nostra*). The term “*difficultas aliqua*” alludes to the term “*valde difficile*” in CMDA. The Commentator rightly considers the study of the soul and intellect as one of the most arduous tasks of philosophy. The next argument admits the argument of Avicennism about the direct recognition of the soul as an essence, which Siger rejects in writing QIIIDA. The manuscript M recognizes that access to the soul as an abstract essence can establish true cognition (*non est ex parte substantiae animae difficultas in cognitione eius*). However, Siger would thus allow Avicennist possibility of soul’s direct insight into its essence in the mode of the modern *cogito*, which was not his position. The last sentence categorically asserts that we are not able to recognize the principles of action other than by experiencing and performing the action ourselves (*ex cognitione passionum et operationum*). Interesting is the conclusion about the possibility of true cognition also by direct insight of the substance (*ideo ipsa multum est cognoscibilis*). The author’s twofold position shows that he was familiar with the debate regarding the cognition of the essence of intellect. Let us see following chapters dealing with disputes between Siger, Albert and Aquinas in the treatise QIIIDA. The third part of interpretation *De anima* definitely closed the debate by separating Aristotle’s interpretation of the intellect in *De anima* and Averroes’s ingenious solution in CMDA. Aristotelians as Albert and Aquinas were not able to grasp this nuance. Siger criticized both philosophers, as in the book QIIIDA, as well as, in particular, the semiaverroistic position of Aquinas, which is refused in the analysis of *De anima intellectiva*. Munich commentary on *De anima* I–II admits to a certain extent the position of formally conceived Aristotelianism of Albert and Aquinas as valid. However, Siger did not consider their definition of *anima intellectiva* to be correct, taken into account the position of CMDA. This is the key indication of the correctness of Nifo’s remarks that Siger sent this writing to Aquinas in response to his teaching about the intellect. It is not important whether Thomas received this writing personally or not. The key is the fact that manuscript M contains this point of view and that it was published before 1270.

Siger tried to find a way to reconciliation by partially negating the principles that he had considered absolutely correct on the university floor for the factual and publicly stated reasons, although these did not have such great weight with regard to the dispute with the modernists. As we will see later, this conciliatory position concerned only the interpretation of *De anima* I–II, because that kind of reasoning with regard to the interpretation of the third book was no longer possible. Siger could have sent the manuscript M to Aquin in Italy. He knew Aquin’s arguments well, and Thomas′s attitude did not change fundamentally after his second arrival in Paris. The overall orientation of Siger’s interpretation is shown in the subsequent analysis of QIIIDA, where Siger rejects the study of the intellect as a hypostasis on the basis of a precisely created scientific syllogism according to *Second Analytics*. Siger’s complete philosophical interpretation of *De anima* from the years 1265–68 (manuscript M and QIIIDA) was not accepted at mendicant faculties because he rejected their theological attitudes, which were projected into modernist exegesis of *De anima*. The connection between the Munich manuscript and the QIIIDA forms Siger’s complete commentary on *De anima* (M I–II, QIIIDA). It was the writing that Aquinas probably received before his arrival in Paris at the end of 1269. Both manuscripts taken together make the writing *De intellectu* that Agostino Nifo mentioned. Aquinas’s answer consisted in the work *De unitate intellectus* written in Paris about 1270. After his second return to Paris, Aquinas intensified his rejection of Averroes, which Aegidius Romanus joined from the position of Averroism. Then Siger’s party could no longer back down and had to defend the full philosophical unity of the person, which was connected with the primacy of metaphysics according to Averroes and was thus separated from the dogmatic theology of Avicennists of all kinds. Siger’s party rejected both solutions of mendicant theologians, because they annulled the unity of the person. Siger’s commentary on *De anima* I–III did not know the final debate between Siger and Aquinas regarding the pluralism of forms in man; it is available in Siger’s second work *De anima intellectiva*. The final result of the debates was the decree of Artists of 1272. The declaration separated the philosophical exploration of the soul from the theological postulates of modern Averroists in the mode of the biblical ontotheology of Bonaventure. At the same time, the decree separated the first Averroism from the dualistic Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*, which had been presented by the Semiaverroists as Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus. The Munich manuscript basically defends the phenomenological principle of knowing the soul through the existential act of understanding (ch. 4.4.2). As phenomenological principle for the manuscript M we find in the quoted sentence: “We are not able to recognize the principles of action other than by experiencing and performing those actions by ourselves” (*non possumus … nisi*). As we will see later, the term “*non possumus*” is of a fundamental nature and forms a difference between Siger and Aquinas. The important part of Munich manuscript in Modus “*non possumus*”is included in the Oxford manuscript, but it is brought to the fore only for ancient authors (*aliqui antiqui secundum diversa apparentia de anima dicunt ipsam esse diversa*; O 1.7, p. 156.39‒40). This is understandable, since Aegidius turned Averroes into an Averroist. On the contrary, manuscript M leaves the universal validity of the phenomenological thesis untouched and does not limit it to the old disputes (*propter quod alii aliter et aliter dicebant de anima secundum quod de anima apparebant eis diversa*; M 1.7, p. 156.35‒36). In contrast to the trivialization in manuscript O, manuscript M is well aware of the fundamental significance of this thesis for the scientific recognition of the soul. In addition, it extends it by the cautious criticism of the impossibility of the direct recognition of the soul as a substance, although it allows this possibility from the point of view of the commentary on DA I–II. We find the recognition of the intellect by the essence as a kind of form in the writings of Albert and especially in Aquinas works written in Italy. The quotation shows that this part of the manuscript M in connection with the QIIIDA provides a complete answer of Siger to Aquinas, as described by Agostino Nifo. In addition, the Averroistic handwriting O added his own conception of the actualized intellect to the explanation of magister M, which is Avicennian and understandably it is missing in the handwriting M. The manuscript of Munich strictly follows the line of Aristotle presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to the Sicilian school. The manuscript M was edited on the basis of Siger’s lectures, when he commented on the complete book *De anima* and before the second commentary known as *De anima intellectiva*. It is unlikely that this is a *reportatio* written by his students. The formulations are very precise and always address the core of the problem with the utmost brevity and accuracy. The connection *De anima* I–II of Munich and Siger’s QIIIDA describes the entirety of Siger’s polemic with Aquinas and Albert up to the year 1270. Aquinas certainly knew this whole commentary of Siger on *De anima* before his second arrival in Paris, because he reacted to it in the work *De unitate intellectus*. The Munich manuscript must be kept separate, since it is dated before 1270. Its modernist Oxford version may have emerged later, as it is a semiaverroist commentary on manuscript M. In any case, the state of debate on the unity of person and intellect corresponds to the situation at the University of Paris before the year 1270.

It is understandable that Siger’s line could not be accepted by the modernist anonymous writer of Oxford. The author of the Oxford manuscript has so far veered between the first and the second Averroism. Since handwriting O accepted the line of exposure of the being from behind, it necessarily ends in the second Averroism and in its specific conception of truth as *rectitudo*. Manuscript O changed the conception of the truth and the meaning of being from the first Averroism, as given in manuscript M, to the second Averroism. The author is not an objective Averroist. He does not share the direct insight into the forms given *obiective,* from the direction of divine thought, as was the case with Bonaventure, Pecham and Kilwardby. The following section summarizes the semiaverroistic conception of the meaning of being, as given by Oxfordian Fallacy and later Cartesianism. The difference in metaphysical vision of the world fundamentally separates the two manuscripts. The key element is the way in which semiaverroism understands the sentence “*intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus*.” The author of the manuscript O rejects the universals in things. However, he works with Avicennian and Cartesian conception of intellect as an active subject in the form of Porretan hypostasis, which keeps the first *per se* given principles of cognition. The dualism between the sensual and the intellectual cognition is inevitable (*universale in potentia existit in phantasmate, quod non potest movere intellectum*, O 1.10, p. 170.83‒84). For Siger, as the author of the book M, makes this assertion double nonsense. The universals are neither in things nor in potency, and cognition quite naturally connects the senses and the intellect with each other; otherwise, the person would break up into two different hypostases, as we find it in sophistic modernity. The author of the manuscript O cannot connect both levels of cognition in any way; see his acknowledgement of this above-mentioned inability. Therefore, the hypostatized intellect of the handwriting O produces an actualized *scibile* out of itself and outside the first substance, which is a typical sign of modernity.

“One must become aware that [understanding] sometimes acts through an intermediary as through an instrument. Thus, the active intellect acts through the possible intellect and this through the instrument of the first principles of cognition (*agit enim intellectus agens in possibilem per principia prima*). Therefore, he brings about conclusions in the possible intellect through the first principles, and the first principles in him act without intermediaries (*prima principia agit in ipsum sine medio*). The intellect is oriented towards the thing and the essence of the thing, which are multiplied in the individual things. However, the individual things relate to the intellect only in the accidental mode, because the nature of things is grasped by what is given in the intellect. Therefore, it is true that the intellect causes universals in things (*intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus*), and literally (*verbi gratia*). Knowledge indicates that it is recognizable (*scientia refertur ad scibile*). If something produces cognition from the point of view of the definition of knowledge (*scientiam sub ratione scientiae*), then it also produces as actualized knowledge (*scibile in actu*).” [[137]](#footnote-137)

The process of cognition proceeds through the mediation of abstracted forms, which the hypostatized active intellect uses as an instrument (*by medium ut per instrumentum*). It means that the modern intellect in the manuscript O can be actualised by itself und not by cognitive forms coming from *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. It uses them as an instrument and not as the source of cognition. The actuality of the active intellect is given *per se*, because the generation of knowledge is ensured by first innate principles (*agit enim intellectus agens in possibilem per principia prima*). These principles ensure the cognition directly, through the actuality of the intellect itself (*prima principia agit in ipsum sine medio*). The intellect of modernity produces universality in things thanks to its own actuality (*verum est dicere quod intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus*). The quotation expounds Avicennist nature of innate first principles that are permanently actualized in the soul and the intellect.[[138]](#footnote-138) As a result, the exposure of the sense of being is turned from the thing to the intellect. It begins a typically nominalistic definition of modern cognition. The author of the manuscript O forgot the previous thesis about the non-existence of universals in individual things and already sees them directly in things (*intellectus refertur ad rem et naturam rei*). The intellect inserts the essentiality into things and deduces (*exsistit*) the universals in a Porretan way, with the help of modern existence in objective mode of being (*quae sunt multiplicata in particularibus*). The author sophistically asserts that this cognition is authentically Aristotelian, because it is constantly taking place in the accidental mode (*particularia autem referuntur ad intellectum per accidens*); however, no longer with respect to the first substance, but with respect to the permanent essences that are given as contingent in the individual things. The intellect recognizes itself and the rest of the world only through itself (*natura illorum est intellecta per aliquid quod est in intellectu*). The author fell into the trap rejected in manuscript M. This manuscript fundamentally rejects any circumvention of first substances existing in reality. See the quoted statement regarding the quidams, which bypass the principles of cognition given only in the first substance (*circumscribens principia individuantia*). As soon as the parallel between the mind and reality is academically launched, it is not a problem for the modern and postmodern sophists to see in reality even that which does not exist. The truth defended in the manuscript O is not a correspondence between the real thing and its cognition, but a coincidence of the permanent essence and its contingent occurrence in reality. The definition of cognition in the version O compares the species in things and in the intellect in the Porretan modus “*exsistere*” (Rufus’s *coaequatio*), bypassing the primary correspondence between intellect and thing. This line is also confirmed in the second part of Manuscript O, which places the potential intelligibilia and universals directly into things and lets them be led out of them by the active intellect through the receptive intellect (*exsistit*).[[139]](#footnote-139) The anonymous writer of the manuscript O does not generate recognition by any means from the middle member according to *Second Analytics* that follows the principle “*ex inmediatis*.” He uses the essential definition instead. The introduction of Oxfordian Fallacy changes the definition of scientific deduktion by the essentialist character of the middle member of the proof (Kilwardby’s *inmediate*). Therefore, this manuscript was used in Oxford, where it was stored.

The scientific cognition of the modernist author is based outside the contingent reality. Then any form of formalistic deduction can be carried out and it can be considered as a science. The author pursues a modern form of creating objectivity. He has at his disposal the hypostatized *intellectus agens* that establishes the actuality of any cognition (*generaret scibile in actu*). Handwriting O definitely separated itself from the vision of reality, cognition and truth advanced in handwriting M. That is why it belongs to the school of the second Averroism and cannot have come from the pen of the same author as manuscript M. Despite the sophistic concept of intellect, the author adhered to the basic idea of Aristotelianism and rejected universal hylemorphism. Both Manuscript O and Aegidius clearly rejected the thesis about the matter of the third kind, as well as the plurality of substances in humans bound to it (see O 1.16). Aegidius Romanus took up this unique position, sophistically swinging between the first and second Averroism about 1270. That part of the commentary on *De anima* can only be found in manuscript O, which confirms the previous conclusions. In the spirit of modern analysis made by Rufus and Kilwardby, the author abolished the first three principles of *Second Analytics* that ensure the scientific investigation of reality. Then a very curious ontological value of substance emerges, because he founds the statements *per prius* on the primacy of the objectively given form (*forma prius est substantia secundum esse et naturam*).[[140]](#footnote-140) The reference to Averroes is pure sophistry in the quoted part of the manuscript O, because the Commentator’s view is exactly opposite. Let’s look at an important example of an objectivist error, how the handwriting O substantiates the modern concept of “Unified Science.” The objectively given form, as in the second Averroism, forms a univocal conception of being according to *analogia entis*. The whole dispute concerns the univoke or plurivoke nature of diaphanum, which permeates both the supralunar and the sublunar spheres. Manuscript O created a new definition of objective *perspicuum* and thus replaced Averroes’s diaphanum with a Neoplatonic form. This was necessary in order for the full equivalence of sensual and intellectual perception of the world to come into its own (*phantasma se habet ad intellectum possibilem sicut color ad visum*). The author introduces the diaphanum in the form of objective *tertium ens*. Done in that way, the author thoroughly changed the original scenario in CMDA, given only by illumination made by the real sun (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4).

“(…) but the diaphanum in the cosmic intelligences is invulnerable, but vulnerable in the hylemorphic world. From the point of view of the definition, it is not about two different views, because both forms of the diaphanum take the light as their act (*perspicuum utrobique recipit lumen ut suum actum*). Also, the light is not different in both cases, because we see it in the same way in their actuality. But in the lower world we grasp the diaphanum only from the point of view of the proportional part related to its occurrence in the higher world (*reperitur perspicuum in inferioribus secundum proportionem quamdam in superioribus*). Therefore, we predict the diaphanum in the mode *per prius* with regard to the higher cognition and *per posterius* with regard to the lower cognition.” [[141]](#footnote-141)

The new scenario of the diaphanum presented in the mode of objective analogy (*secundum proportionem quamdam*) works univok in two floors of mediation. Neoplatonism of the Toledo school received a sophisticated Aristotelian coating. In the first case, the diaphanum, like a substance of the third type, is imperishable, in the second, it is perishable (*perspicuum in superioribus est incorruptibile, in inferioribus corruptibile*). The diaphanum has become the same substance as the light, and the two substances acquired a common existence of the third kind (*lumen non est alterius rationis*). Therefore, modern thinking approaches them from the same univocally given position (*eodem sensu judicamus utrumque*). The difference between the two spheres of the cosmos in their fundamental aspect of the world is not in the substantial difference of two forms of diaphanum, but only in their proportion (*secundum proportionem*). The difference is based only in the mode of predication, which takes the supralunar light in the primary mode *per prius*, whereas in the sublunar sphere we predict its essence only in the mode *per posterius*. This curious concept ensures that the solar intellect exposes the meaning of being equally in both parts, in the material cosmos and in the light of the immaterial cosmic intelligences and forms. The model is the analogous relationship between higher and lower forms in the work *Liber de causis*. This solution is reminiscent of Bonaventure’s two floors construction of the world (ch. 4.1.2). But this time in a much more thoroughly elaborated form of the purely philosophically given univocity and with knowledge of CMDA. The author did not understand at all the formal function of the diaphanum in CMDA; therefore, he cannot understand the role of *intellectus possibilis* in CMDA. Aegidius made out of the diaphanum a substance of the third kind in the manuscript O. He did the same with the possible intellect in the work *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus*, in which he turned the possible intellect into an Averroist hypostasis. Manuscript M considers a similar solution impossible, because it is about two different substantial forms (*corruptibile et incorruptibile non sunt unius rationis*).[[142]](#footnote-142) Handwriting M clearly sees the les *modi recipiendi* differents, with which the diaphanum absorb the light both from the sun and the forms of immaterial intelligences. Therefore, the diaphanum do not have the same definition in both worlds and a univocity of the term is impossible. The procedure clearly shows that the author of the writing M follows the Sicilian school and he understood the relationship between light and diaphanum according to CMDA. On the contrary, the Oxford manuscript, inspired by the Toledo school, is content with the metaphor of light as the sun, because it dogmatically relies on the univocal nature of diaphanum. In the work *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus*, Aegidius criticized Averroes as an Averroist precisely from this position. With sophistic reference to Aristotle, he attributed to him the modernist theory of the eye as a *locus specierum*. He then had this species received by the soul, from which he made a separated substance (*in essentia animae fundatur ut in subiecto*). Finally, he triumphantly proclaims that by this twofold nonsense he has refuted Averroes’s arguments about the unity of the intellect. The writing *De plurificatione* turned the soul into a subsistent entity instead of the Aristotelian form and designed the soul as an immaterial substrate for the possible intellect. We also find this view in the second part of Oxford Anonymus (*sicut motor eius, anima dat esse substantiale et movet corpus*; O 2.5, p. 203.14‒15). Handwriting M swept a similar solution off the table, because it does not have the Porretan worldview that characterizes the modernism. Siger distinguished exactly the threefold conception of mediation by the diaphanum (physical, sensual, intelligible), which Aegidius confused and, moreover, comprehended it in a substantial way.

The independent chapter consists of the third part of the commentary on *De anima*, which is only available in the Oxford manuscript. At this point, the approximate agreement between the two manuscripts ends. The author of the manuscript O did not agree in principle with Siger’s commentary on the third book of *De anima* contained in QIIIDA. Therefore, he replaced it with his own version of DA III. It is based on Aquinas lectures that were already delivered in Italy before the year 1268. With regard to the preceding parts, the third part has some new characteristics, which differ from the preceding argumentation of the manuscript O. The exposition of the third part of *De anima* in the Oxford manuscript has a similar line of reasoning and works with the reading of CMDA II.5–6 in the same spirit as Aegidius’ work *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus*. The aforementioned study of Giele analyzed it in detail. The shift is clearly given by radical criticism of Avicenna, which is missing in the preceding parts of the manuscript. The third part is influenced by the debate between Siger and Aquinas up to the year 1270. Made in the mode of Toledo concordance, Avicenna’s metaphysics has the fundamental primacy over the Commentator’s metaphysics. Aegidius had the school of Siger, so he knew well that it was impossible to begin knowledge from the problematic definition of existence according to Avicenna. Siger distinguished Averroes’s “meta-physics” from the erroneous conception of Avicenna, which began with the essential definition of being instead of the first real substance. Another shift from Avicenna was given in the wake of the criticism of Aquinas. The third part of Manuscript O completely excludes the material nature of *intellectus possibilis*. The conception of the unity of intellect is in harmony with the conception of Aquinas’s treatise *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas* (1270). The individualization of the intellect runs through the activity of the soul, which is the actual form of the body. The previous hesitation of the author of the manuscript O was over. He dealt with the soul as Avicenna′s substance of the Toledo school (*anima ut motor*). The soul was actualized through the actual and immaterial *intellectus agens* that illuminated the soul from behind. For the first Averroism, this was total nonsense, because the bodily human person is the actual substance for *anima intellectiva* as the form of the body. Aegidius Romanus originally had a hypostatized concept of the soul as the engine of the body. After this concept, we no longer find a trace in the third part of the O manuscript. This section represents Aegidius′s commentary on DA III from 1268–70. He completely sided with Aquinas’s position while rejecting Siger’s interpretation of the third book *De anima* given in QIIIDA. Aegidius attributed Averroes’s solution to the unity of the intellect to Aristotle and rejected Averroes’s interpretation as Averroistic. The same Aristotelian position was also represented by Aquinas, from whom Aegidius had adopted this argumentation. But the connection of the soul and the body presented the modernists with an insurmountable problem, which is still true today.

The author of the manuscript O dealing with DA I–II elaborated the theory of a subsistent intellect, therefore he had to reject the connection of the senses and intellect as Averroes′s *proportio* in CMDA. The clueless semiaverroist Aegidius in parts I–II necessarily rejected the option of Siger and fell into the desperate position of Averroists in Pecham′s school. This was the defeat of common sense, and, moreover, Aegidius risked expulsion from the University of Paris, like all the quoted modernists before him. The last part of the manuscript O III had to reject Siger′s solution of the unity of the person, so as not to fall into the trap of modernists like Pecham. Therefore, Aegidius in the third part chose the position of Aquinas, who was a much better semiaverroist. Moreover, he completely broke with the modernists in the point of personal unity. The hesitation about the unity of the person given the first two parts of the manuscript O completely changed in the third part. Aegidius rejected as Aquinas any substantial nature of the intellect and the soul. The whole concept of the unity of intellect and cognition has been thoroughly revised, criticizing Avicenna from the position of Aristotle presented in the Thomist paradigm. The similarly designed introduction of *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* shows that Aegidius followed Aquinas’s works *Summa contra Gentiles* and *De unitate intellectus* (Olszewski 2012, 24–76). Aegidius rejected the Avicennism of autonomous forms given externally that exercise the causality on the soul and the intellect. The third part of the manuscript O adopted the reasoning of the unity of the intellect according to CMDA to a large extent. However, led by his personal Furies, Aegidius adhered to the former blanket criticism of Averroes. The treatise is therefore considerably chaotic and was created in the spirit of school *sophistae Latini*. Aegidius accepted Aquinas’s thesis that the unity of the intellect must come from the acceptance of sensory phantasms. The third part of the work O explicitly rejects the idea that the actualization of *intellectus agens* originates from its own first principles of cognition. This makes a clear difference from the first and second part. The break in thinking in the third part of the manuscript O is important for its dating. At the time of the creation of O III, the author knew Aquinas’s writing from Italy and perhaps also the writing *De unitate intellectus* dated to 1270. He develops argumentation against Avicennists and presents the unity of intellect as an Aristotelian theory that in principle do not contradict Averroes’s position. The conception of intellectual cognition in O III corresponds to Thomas’s position in the writings dated to the period of his stay in Rome. The anonymus continues in his work with Thomas’s Averroistic interpretation of Averroes. The author rejects his conception of the supposedly numerical unity of the intellect for all people.[[143]](#footnote-143) The second part considers Averroes’s teaching of the unity of *intellectus possibilis* as internally contradictory, and even from the point of view of Averroes himself.[[144]](#footnote-144) The Commentator supposedly saw the problem of cognition in terms of numerical unity, but did not find a solution to the pluralization of the possible intellect. The author’s inability to describe the unified act of cognition leads to schizophrenia regarding the unity of the person. The manuscript O mistakenly accuses Averroes because of it. In this sense, the author repeats the quoted perplexity from the first part of the treatise regarding the exposure of the intellect (*sed quomodo est istud, magis dubium est*). He does not know how to solve the problem of the unity of the intellect without involving argumentation according to CMDA. Now he repeats the perplexity as a dilemma with regard to numerical unity of the possible intellect, which Rufus imputed to Averroes for the first time (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). Aquinas did the same (ch. 4.5.1). The author is well aware that Siger, in the work QIIIDA, rejected as nonsense all debates about numerical diversity of the intellect in individuals and also the numerical unity of the possible intellect. But the anonymous author rejected this argument of Siger, which he clearly proved in the two preceding parts that deal with corrections and amendments in Siger’s treatise. Then Aegidius as perplexed author of the treatise has no choice but to sophistically assert that Averroes did not know what he was actually writing, because he allegedly made an argument against himself (*per rationes quas ponit Commentator contra seipsum*). As we will see later, this attitude paraphrases Aquinas Averroistic argumentation in the work *De spiritualibus creaturis* (ch. 4.5.3). Instead of blaming Averroes for the lack of thinking, the author should have read the writing CMDA as carefully as Siger did in the interpretation of the third part of *De anima*. The same mistake was made by Aquin. He did not read CMDA as thoroughly as Albert the Great, which Siger duly noticed.

Let us now turn to the key passage from Manuscript O, which solves the statute of the speculative intellect. That solution should be compared with Albert’s already known interpretation in his first work *De homine* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). The anonymous writing conceives *intellectus speculativus* in the spirit of CMDA as an actualized cognition of intellect, in which the twofold kind of species is connected. These are given both in the actuality of the personal act of recognition and in the potentiality of the universal content common to all people. The Oxford manuscript now recognizes the species according to exposure from the front, from the direction of real things. However, the author still refuses to acknowledge that this solution comes from the writing CMDA.

“The species exist individually in our imagination. They are intelligible in the act of understanding and must therefore be abstracted from the sensual phantasms. If this is so, then the intellect cannot connect with us through the form or through the intelligible species, which the Commentator calls the speculative intellect.” [[145]](#footnote-145)

The first species is given individually by sensual abstraction and cognition (*species existentes in phantasmatibus nostris existunt sub conditionibus individuantibus*). The theory of cognition corresponds to Thomas’ analysis in *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* (c. 1265–66), which was presented in the papal curia in Rome (ch. 4.5.2). The author, like Aquinas, criticizes Averroistic act of understanding the immaterial intellect in the mode of *copulatio*, which is supposedly given by Averroes in the terminus “*intellectus speculativus*.” Albert’s interpretation in *De homine* sheds light on the capacity of the soul through *intellectus speculativus* in the unity of the person according to CMDA. This act of intellect produces both personal cognition and universal content (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). However, with a false appeal to Averroes, the author characterizes this type of intellect according to Themistius. Let us recall that Averroes criticizes Themistius in principle because of his dualistic conception of intellect (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). According to this ancient philosopher, the separated active intellect (*intellectus agens*) acts on the detached passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) in the style of the demiurge. The craftsman has an innate idea and he presses it into the sensual material (*intellectus materialis*) in order to maintain the permanence of accomplished cognition (*intellectus speculativus*). The author turned Averroes into an Averroist by dividing both sides that make the synthesis of species in CMDA and he turned them against each other. Aegidius follows Themistius to a dead end, which Albert avoided by thoroughly reading CMDA.[[146]](#footnote-146) Let us recall the key source of this error in the case of Rufus. He introduced into the teaching of intellect the dilemma of Boethius’s above-mentioned commentary on *Isagoge* on the impossibility of mediation between the sensual and the intellectual cognition (*universale est cum intelligitur, particulare cum sentitur*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). It is only logical that the manuscript O, citing Averroes, works with the exact opposite view of the speculative intellect as the first Averroism after the year 1240. The position of modern Alexandrians shows how easy it was to turn Averroes into an Averroist. It is enough to combine the third and fourth genres of the intellect, either sophistically or out of ignorance. According to CMDA, they are metaphysically different. However, according to Averroes, neither of the two intellects is a substance and therefore cannot appear in the Averroistic scenario of modernity. The author of manuscript O takes the position of second Averroism. He projects his own dualism, of which he accused Averroes in a sophistic way, into the interpretation of CMDA. This proceeding founded the first version of Thomism that appeared for the first time in the manuscript O III. Averroes allegedly individualized cognition only from the outside, through the conjunction of separated intellect. It is originally the point of view of Aquinas (ch. 4.5.1). The thesis of separated possible intellect was absolutely unacceptable for Averroes, because the intellect, as the potency of the soul, would otherwise have become a separated substance (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). As we know, Averroes categorically refused to give the intellect the status of a thing or a substance. But he took Themistius’s basic premise about the immateriality and separateness of the passive intellect, which in this key property coincides with the active intellect. If there were no identity of both intellects as *inmixtus*, then the man would not be the one rational substance and the truth as correspondence would disappear. Averroes did not accomplish the doubling of the person and the abolition of truth as a correspondence; it was done by the second Averroism. The following definition of Averroes as an Averroist includes the position of Aegidius and Aquinas. The anonymous writer takes their side.

“We do not adhere to the position of the Commentator, who determined the possible intellect as an actualized and separated substance. Therefore, he did not define understanding from the point of view of its actualization, since he defined human understanding through the relationship with this separated intellect.” [[147]](#footnote-147)

Averroes’s possible intellect is supposedly separate from individual human cognition because it forms an independent separated substance (*intellectum possibilem esse substantiam separatam secundum esse*). The author of the manuscript O adopts sophistic reasoning attributed to Averroes by Rufus and Bonaventure around 1235. Aquinas updated it to a new form during his first stay in Paris. The author insists on the immateriality and universality of the possible intellect, separated from the singular and sensual cognition. The manuscript of Oxford and Aegidius see in this point the fundamental problem of Averroist Averroes. He was accused of being unable to link the act of cognition to the individual *intellectus possibilis* that is separated from the senses. A later example of this sophistry we find in the scripture *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* (p. 115.196–204). In the cited work, Aegidius divides cognition into *intellectus materialis* given by the reception of sensual forms and the immaterial *intellectus possibilis*, which he declares to be a product of Averroes in the framework of erroneous numerical unity. Then he announces that Averroes combined sensual and intellectual cognition into a whole as a kind of an individualized intellect. Albert and Bacon and after them Siger found the connection of sensual and intellectual cognition in Averroes′s work because they had interpreted correctly the writing CMDA. For this fundamental reason, they had no problem with the individual character of *intellectus possibilis*, although they acknowledged that this question emerged from the category of very difficult problems. They were not biased, sophistic and dogmatic *Moderni*, but critical readers and seekers of truth. Therefore, they sought the unity of the person through the thoughtful solution of aporia that the third part of CMDA gradually examined. In the *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* (ca. 1265–66), Aquinas proceeded in the same way as CMDA (ch. 4.5.2). However, he claimed that this whole interpretation of *intellectus possibilis* and intentionality was purely Aristotelian, because Averroes was an Averroist. His semiaverroism therefore involves a more complicated line of reasoning than the *Anonymus of Oxford* and Aegidius Romanus. But the third part of manuscript O was written under the influence of Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* dating to the Roman period. Aegidius appointed Aquinas as the new interpreter of Aristotle (*Expositor Novu*s), in order to replace the Commentator. Let us recall the fundamental change in Thomistic interpretation of O III with regard to the preceding parts I–II, which concerns the rejection of the Avicennian first principles of cognition given in the soul. The author broke away from the conception of Oxfordian Fallacy in Kilwardby’s Oxford and from the reasoning of Bonaventure’s school in Paris. The third part of the manuscript O is strictly committed to the understanding of the intellect as Averroes’s *tabula rasa*. The author canceled the actuality of first cognitive principles that was defended in the first and second parts of the same manuscript. The intellect cannot be a substantial component of the soul, because then the Avicennist principle of innate ideas would apply. We find the main part of the criticism of Avicenna in the third part that represents the core of the author’s new position. Just for the sake of order, we recall that already Bishop Alvernus around 1240 clearly saw Avicenna as the Neoplatonic successor of Aristotle (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). The anonymous author claims that the Avicennist school does not have any continuity of intellect in the real person and that their act of individual thinking follows Platonic concept of ideas. This is also the reason why the third part rejects any actualization of *intellectus agens* before sensual cognition.[[148]](#footnote-148) The intellect as an autonomous form (separated *intellectus agens, possibilis*) or even in the form of a complete hylemorphic being of the third (*hoc aliquid* of the second Averroism) would have the actuality before the personal act of thinking. Therefore, he could never be an individual ability of the human soul. The third part of the Oxford manuscript accepted the main thesis of CMDA against Neoplatonism that the intellect cannot be a substance. This part of the commentary changed the entire line of reasoning under the influence of Siger’s and Aquin’s criticism of Avicennists.

The author accepted the reasoning of Aquinas in Italy that was finished in the work *De unitate intellectus* and adapted his own interpretation to it. This is also the reason why this part of the interpretation of *De anima III* appears in the Oxford manuscript instead of Siger’s interpretation of the third part of *De anima*. The treatise QIIIDA criticizes Aquinas’s position. The Oxford school and semiaverroists as Aegidius put together their own reading of the manuscripts documenting the dispute over Averroism in the modernist paradigm to suit their needs. We find the key argument in the passage describing the connection between the sensual and the intelligible species, which withholds Averroes’s previous interpretation. In the third part, the manuscript rejected the species as a Porretan being of the third kind. With this, the author committed himself to the truth as a correspondence, as it is given in *De anima* and in CMDA. In the last part, the author completely turned over his position given in the two previous chapters made according to Oxfordian Fallacy. That is why the following quotation plays a major role in the constitution of Thomism as a modernized second Averroism. Next chapters will examine it in more detail. Aegidius linked the two species together, referring to Aristotle and Averroes.

“The species appears as an instrumental factor with regard to the possible intellect, because everything is moved in principle by an external factor. But the species lies in the cognizing intellect in no other way than according to the similarity. The species is not the main object of understanding, but the one through which understanding comes to what is (*illud quo intelligitur quod quid est*). Thus, the species becomes the similarity of the recognized thing (*quid est, cuius est species seu similitudo*). Then it is true that it is out of similarity that understanding is possible in the framework of deductive proof, as the Commentator says.” [[149]](#footnote-149)

In contrast to the previous position, the author clearly sees that it is necessary, following the example of CMDA, to establish that *proportio* or *similitudo* between sense and intellect. As we will see later, this “*similitudo ex consequenti*” takes Aquinas as the formal principle of deduction (ch. 4.5.2). But the correctly defined *species intelligibilis* means in this first Thomistic scheme of cognition that the species in no case plays the role of being of the third kind, as in modernity. Once again, we are talking about Aquinas’s correctly understood and well-interpreted scheme of cognition in *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, which is set against modernists. The most important is the part about the instrumental influence of sensual species on the intellect (*species se habet ad intellectum possibilem sic videlicet sicut movens instrumentale*). It becomes clear that this influence cannot be given according to efficient causality, because the sensual species is material and individual, whereas the intelligible species is immaterial and universal in nature. This brings us to the key debates between Siger and Aquinas before the year 1270 that the author knew very well. See both following chapters dedicated to Siger and Aquinas. The next sentence represents the synthesis of the objective stream of the first Averroism before the year 1270, which principally separated itself from modernists in the school of the second Averroism. The intellect does not recognize any essence (*quod*) in sensible species. This was argued in the previous Averroist sections of the treatise with reference to univocal porretan species understood as Rufus’s objective *scibile*. The author now clearly sees that the intellect uses this sensual species to actualize its own act of cognition given on another level (*sed est illud quo intelligitur quod quid est*). Through this new act of actualization of intellect thanks to the senses (*quo est*), the essence of the given thing remains that was first recognized by the senses (*quod est quid est*). Therefore, the species is not a result of actualization of knowledge (*quo est*). The result is the universal concept in the modality “*quod est*.” The new definition of the species made in the mode “*quo est*” represents the instrument that carries out the actuality of the individual act of the person upheld by intentional species. According to Aristotle, we can also talk about the truth as the correspondence of the thing and the intellect. This view is contained in Aquinas’s treatise *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* presented in Rome (ch. 4.5.2). Different components of the actualization (*quo est / quod est / quid est*) create an actual imitation of reality, because the species of intellect becomes a new universal form of sensual species (*cuius est species seu similitudo*). The indication of changed position and the contemporary criticism of Averroes will be introduced later (*mihi ad presens non videtur hoc*, O 3.10; p. 322.19‒49). These passages reproduce Aquinas’s position before the year 1270 and they differ from Siger’s position. The *species intelligibilis* became a mere mental construct (*ens rationale, ens intentionale*). Under Aquinas’s influence, the author of the third part of treatise finally understood something essential about Averroes delivered by Siger, in contrast to dogmatic modernity. Therefore, Aegidius improved his previous position, which was shared with Latin sophists as were Bonaventure and Kilwardby. He elaborated an analogy with Averroes’s difference between the *tertium* and *quartum genus* in CMDA. Albert processed this position in the terminus “*intellectus speculativus*.” As we will see again later, Siger proceeds in different ways than Aquinas. He had made Averroes an Averroist when writing the early work *De ente et essentia* and did not change his position, thus recalling the author of the treatise O. That is why the thinking of Aegidius Romanus resembles to Avicennistic Aquinas, but not to real Averroist Siger.

We find the defense of the new position with regard to the intellect in the section that presents an exact summary of first Averroism with regard to the possible intellect. It established the semiaverroistic form of objectivity that was the winner of the dispute after the year 1277. The author changed the direction of exposing the meaning of being and became a Thomistic semiaverroist from the school of the first Averroism. Therefore, he rejects all theories of Avicennists and objectivists regarding the pre-existing actualized forms of intellect in the soul.

“Some argue that the active intellect is a habitual component of the possible intellect and they do not agree on this issue. Some say that it is an assumed habitus, others say that it is an innate habitus. But not one of them is right. No innate principles of cognition can exist in man, because the possible intellect would then not be a blank slate (*tabula nuda*). The active intellect cannot also be an assumed habitus, because everything that we absorb with our intellect lies only in the possibility of cognition (*tantum est potentia intelligibile*). If the possible intellect lies in the mere possibility, then it cannot by itself complete the act of cognition (*non vadit ad actum intelligendi de se*).” [[150]](#footnote-150)

The quotation distinguishes exactly between the two connections of the active intellect with the receptive one by the different mode *habitus innatus* and *habitus acquisitus*. Rufus′s and Pecham’s concept of intellect as a habitual cognitive potency considered the actualization of intellect by a contingent sensory species only as a secondary phenomenon (ch. 4.1.1). The Bonaventure elaborated a kind of Neoplatonism that confirmed the actuality of intellect. It is actualized from above, by the relation to eternal truth (*habitus innatus*). The second school, which defends the habitus of the possible intellect in the hypostatized mode *habitus acquisitus*, is represented by the school of Aquasparta. This Franciscan monk understood that the intellect of *Modernorum* is not capable of grasping the real thing as the basis of cognition. At most, it is through the real thing that there is an accidental confirmation of the already given truth. Aquasparta had to combine Aristotle’s scheme of cognition in *De anima* with the theory of illumination given in Augustinian intellect (ch. 5.1.3). The *Anonymus of Oxford* claims that both schools are wrong because they have misunderstood the basic function of the receptive intellect. The intellect actualized by innate cognition cannot have the soul as *tabula rasa* (*intellectus possibilis non esset sicut tabula nuda*). The *intellectus materialis* would play this false habitual role at the moment when it had its own source of actualization from actualized first principles, as in the case of Themistius and Avicenna. This was the position of the author in the previous two parts of the manuscript O. However, this first modern Thomist already knows that the hypostatized intellect of modern Porretans became a substance of the third kind (*hoc aliquid*). Aristotelian theory of truth as the correspondence of thing and intellect (*consimilitudo*) is impossible in that case. The author, in contrast to both previous Avicennian parts, adopted the theory of exposing meaning of being from the real world. He updates the habitus of cognition only through the intellect as a *tabula rasa*, which is determined by the receptive intellect determined from sensual cognition. The already updated recognition of reality at the level of the senses enables the intellect to draw similar conclusions for further cases and scientific proof. The previous position of the author in the Oxford commentary on *De anima* I–II defended the exposure of the being from behind. Therefore, he left the possibility of hypostatized cognition in the mode *habitus innatus* or *habitus acquisitus*. There are no previously actualized principles of cognition, which the intellect carries on as a subsistent hypostasis. Both types of hypostatized habitus require the intellect as a substance of the third kind. Therefore, it requires Avicennist, modernist and postmodernist enlightenment of intellect from the direction of innate ideas, cosmic forms, a priori principles of recognition, cultural memes given in DNA, etc. The first Averroism, on the other hand, asserts that cognition must first be actualized from the direction of the senses. It becomes the subsequent habitual property of the intellect as a faculty of the soul, after the empty *intellectus possibilis* has recognized things entirely by exposure of being from the front, that is, by actualization from the direction of sensual species. The habitus is then caused by real things in the process of cognition (*habitus acquisitus*) and is not previously bound to any hypostasis of the somehow actualized soul or intellect in the form of substances. Another form of habitual formation of intellect is excluded. Any previously given actuality of intellect fundamentally contradicts the conception of *intellectus possibilis* in its purely receptive and fully passive role (*tantum est potentia intelligibile*). The author of the third part clearly states that *intellectus possibilis* is a purely potential component of the soul (*intellectus possibilis sit tantum in potentia*) and therefore cannot pass into actualization by its own making (*non vadit ad actum intelligendi de se*). As we already know from the previous matrices, this fundamental thesis of Averroes was directed against all modern Alexandrians (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2) and the school of the first Averroism repeated it. The whole debate concerning habitus is concluded by the last defender of the first Averroism, William Ockham, in the polemic against Scotus and his modern school (ch. 5.4).

The author of the Oxford manuscript, who converted to Thomism, already knows very well in the third part of the treatise that the intellect cannot have its own actualized being as the modernity claims. The break in this position occurred in 1266–68 with the publication of Siger’s QIIIDA and Aquinas’s commentaries on *De anima* made in Italy. Therefore, the third part of the manuscript O was written before the year 1270. Avicennists as Bonaventure are unable to establish the fundamental difference between the two components of intellect (*ergo non est differentia potentiae possibilis ad agentem*, ch. 4.1.2). Unfortunately, the anonymous writer is not thorough and perhaps not principled enough to look for all these facts in Averroes’s work CMDA. He does not want to accept all the consequences of the first Averroism in the Sicilian school settled in the rue du Fouarre. The sophistic attitude is based on the fact that he still insists on the incompatibility of the separation between sensual and intellectual cognition, which does not have a common receptive platform. See his position concerning the nature of *perspicuum* quoted above. This schizophrenic and sophistic position characterizes Aegidius Romanus, who distanced himself from the school of the first and second Averroism. After writing *De erroribus Philosophorum* (1270), Aegidius could no longer back down on the question of Averroes’s Averroism. The fifth chapter of the cited writing made a sharp attack on Averroes as a contender of the monotheistic religions.[[151]](#footnote-151) Unlike the critical bishop Alvernus, Aegidius placed the Commentator in the group of outlawed pagan authors (Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel, Al-Kindī, Maimonides). The shift in thinking is evident in the later writings. Aristotle and also Avicenna are depicted in *De erroribus Philosophorum* as adherents of the plurality of substantial forms. For Avicenna and Averroes, this accusation remains; with regard to Aristotle, Aegidius changes it as it had been already done in the third part of the manuscript O, written under the influence of Aquinas’s interpretation. The whole argument about Averroism in the treatise is completely unnecessary if we seriously consider the following quotation of the manuscript O III. It defines the unity of the receptive and synthetic intellect rightly according to Averroes (*secundum Commentatorem, duas operationes animae experimur in nobis*).[[152]](#footnote-152) However, the meaning of “*experimur*” is meant in an Averroist manner. The author insists that the Commentator in CMDA took into account only the conjunction of both intellects. The key difference from the previous rejection of Averroes in DA I–II is obvious. In the previous both parts, the soul became the plurality of substances, and *intellectus possibilis* was numerically uniform for all people. In the third part, this intellect is individualized by the actualized subsistence of soul and body, and even with referrence to Averroes. The author further imputes Avicenna’s position of actualized first principles in the soul to Averroes. However, he must admit that Averroes’s Aristotelian interpretation of *Second Analytics* defends a different version than the first principle of cognition given by Avicenna *simpliciter* and *actualiter*.[[153]](#footnote-153) Once again, we see the separation from the position of Averroism according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The anonymus must partially accept Averroes’s reasoning proposed by Siger, although he does not agree with it.

We now want to summarize the new, already fully Thomistic position of the author. It finds explicit expression in the following section, where there is a complete exposure of intellect from the front (O 3.17, p. 334.43‒55). In the soul there are two faculties of cognition given with regard to two orders of reality (*respectu sensibilium, intelligibilium*). From the point of view of intellectual cognition, both intellects are fundamentally different as potencies of the soul (*agens activus est respectu sensibilium et possibilis passivus respectu intelligibilium*; p. 334.51‒52). The active intellect is responsible for the active synthesis of cognition, which is taken from the sensual sphere. But he could not do this if he did not build on the pure potentiality of the immaterial passive intellect, which absorbs all intelligible contents in their universal potentiality and in the immaterial mode *inmixtus*.[[154]](#footnote-154) The entire cognition is exposed from the front thanks to the basic orientation of the active intellect to the real, sensually recognized things (*agens activus est respectu sensibilium*). The unity of all components produces universal cognition of intellect. It is determined by the senses and by recognized individual things. Both modes are fundamentally separated from each other in terms of particularity and universality. The synthesis of cognition goes from the direction of things and it is determined by the active component given in our soul (*intellectus agens*). Let us recall that even Averroes does not have the universals in things and cannot have them available for absolutely principled reasons: the exposure proceeds from the front in the direction of first substances; the intellectual capacity of the soul is therefore *tabula rasa*; the intellect is not supposed to be an actual or separated substance, because it could not recognize anything else except itself. All universals are given only in thinking and are the result of abstraction. Something completely different are cosmic immaterial forms and intelligences, because they are actualized first substances. Aegidius as the first Thomist could not defend Averroes because, like Aquinas, this semiaverroist belonged to the school of *sophistae Latini* as far as the unity of the intellect was concerned. Aegidius cursed Averroes as a heretic, which in no way prevented this Latin sophist from adopting all the key arguments from him, especially those in the most important third part of CMDA. The whole dispute about the unity of the intellect in both parts is to a certain extent placed outside the well-known line of the dispute between the first and the second Averroism. From the point of view of hermeneutics, it becomes clear that he concerns only two well-known authors: Aegidius Romanus (manuscript O) and Siger of Brabant (manuscript M). The author’s evolution from moderate Avicennism (O I–II) to the explicit rejection of Avicennist theory of cognition and intellect (O III) elaborated historically first version of Thomism. This break came when Aegidius accepted Aquinas’s treatises written in the years 1267–69 during his stay in Italy. The author is a semiaverroist because he rejects the solution of Averroes and Siger. With the help of Aquinas, he creates a new version of the dispute over Averroism, conveniently accusing Averroes of his own inability to create the unity of cognition and the person. We find the same attitude when Aegidius abound the year 1270 wrote the treatise *De plurificatione*. Aegidius defined the intellect in the mode *quartum genus* and was unable to interpret CMDA in the mode *tertium genus*.[[155]](#footnote-155) Aegidius and Aquinas saw the Neoplatonic Averroes through the glasses of the Toledo school and made the criticism accordingly. Both thinkers did not at all consider the fact that the interpretation of the unity of the intellect in both modes, i.e., in the mode of the existential act of cognition and the mode of the abstract view of the intellect according to the Sicilian school, had been put forward by Alvernus and Albert about the year 1240. The full unity of cognition and person was defended all the time in the interpretation of *De anima* by magisters in the rue du Fouarre. Aegidius projected the basic sophisms of the second Averroism into the Averroistic figure of Averroes (*ista est sententia Commentatoris*) and subsequently condemned him. Hermeneutics characterize this version of Averroism as an exposure of meaning made from behind, because the active intellect directs the actualization of species given “*in potentia*” directly in individual things. Then it is no problem turning Averroes into an Averroist, see Aegidius’ writing *De erroribus Philosophorum* (1270). The sophistic explanation states that *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* in each person must be numerically distinct as a separated substance, because both forms of the immaterial intellect (passive, active) are responsible for uniform universal contents given equally in all people. The cognition of Averroistic Averroes is supposedly individual only in a contingent way and in the form of *coniunctio*, whereby that *coniunctio* is separated from the cosmic intellect and from our cognitive faculties. This is Avicennian position of the Toledo school, which Aquinas took over, as we will see later. The possible and also the active intellect are by themselves subsistent forms, which subsequently form the individual process of cognition. But then man does not think as a personal substance, which is the result of Aegidius’ interpretation and the attitude in the Oxford manuscript. We find the same point of view with Aegidius in the scripture *De plurificatione*, where he uses arguments similar to the handwriting O. The dualism of cognition and the theory of separated intellect are sophistically attributed to Averroist Averroes. That fact makes the position of Oxford′s manuscript, Aegidius and Aquinas (ch. 4.4.3). The intellect became another hypostasis in the soul and acts as a subject with its own actuality. This already impersonal act of the intellect has the effect that thinking is not an act of the personally conceived soul, but of the impersonally given intellect, which connects with us in the mode of copulation. Averroes’s early and middle commentaries on *De anima* could probably have said the same, but by no means the last synthesis in CMDA. The scholastics of that time knew the writing CMDA as Averroes’s only commentary on *De anima*. This semiaverroistic interpretation of CMDA works in modernity to this day. The postmodernist thinking influenced by Cartesianism and objectivism takes this *copulatio* or *coniunctio* of intellect as an external substance as Averroes’s definition of human intellect and the process of cognition. According to CMDA, this is pure nonsense, because the hypostatized intellect with its own actuality would necessarily be an independent substance (*hoc aliquid*). The key error of semiaverroistic interpretation of CMDA lies in the fact that the Oxford manuscript and Aegidius separated the sphere of the senses and the intellect from each other.[[156]](#footnote-156) The writing CMDA rejects this in principle, because otherwise *proportio* between the senses and the intellect, which form the core of Aristotelian metaphysics, would become impossible. The correspondence between thing and cognition is given from the direction of real first substances and not from the direction of any substantial intellect. Averroes and the first Averroism, according to Aristotle, assert that man, as the first substance, exists simpliciter and as an indivisible *actus essendi*. From the point of view of the first Averroism defended in the rue du Fouarre, any plurality of substances, forms or hypostases in man is sheer nonsense. The rejection of the second Averroism was finally accomplished by the third part of the Oxford manuscript, which was influenced by Thomistic interpretation of *De anima*.

The key passage of the manuscript with regard to dating and authorship begins with the words: “*Thomas de Aquino resistit rationi Commentatoris super secundum Metaphysicae*“ (O 3.21, p. 341.68‒75). Steenberghen’s remark considers the argument concerning Aquinas to be an incorrectly summarized Thomas’s work *In Metaph.* II, lect. 1, 286 (ibid, p. 341). It has not been summed up exactly. The arguments of the anonymous writer correspond exactly to Aquinas’s attitude in *ST I*, q. 88, including the quotation of the second book of *Metaphysics* according to the Commentator.[[157]](#footnote-157) Aquinas and Aegidius defend Averroistic model of the cosmic *intellectus possibilis*, the existence of which they justified with the sophistic appeal to Averroes’s quoted interpretation of *Metaphysics* (ch. 4.5.1). The answer to Question 88 rejects the doctrine of Averroistic Averroes, which supposedly defines cognition in Neoplatonic mode “*per continuationem*” of the human intellect with the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*.[[158]](#footnote-158) This is the typical Averroistic interpretation of CMDA III made in the mode of “*coniunctio*.” It was created in the Toledo school by making the concordance of Averroes with Neoplatonic Avicenna. Aquinas defended it as well. While studying in Paris, Thomas rejected Alvernus’s and Albert’s interpretation of the Commentator, since he considered Averroes to be an Averroist. The Toledo school interpreted CMDA III in the mode of Avicenna’s “*conjunctio*.” Aquinas considers the interpretation of Toletans as Averroes’s own work and rejected it on the basis of the new Aristotelian reading of *De anima*. The beginning of the editing of the first part of *Summa theologica* is believed to be in the years 1267–68. Aquin rejected Averroes’s interpretation of the third book of *De anima* in CMDA. He already understood CMDA as an Averroistic treatise during his first stay in Paris. Therefore, around the year 1268, Aquinas became the *Expositor Novus* of Aristotelian corpus for semiaverroists and Latin sophists as was Aegidius Romanus. This student of Siger rejected his exegesis of CMDA and DA III presented in 1266–67 according to the Sicilian School, but he did not want to end up in the shadow world of the *Modernorum*. He explicitly accepted Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* in Italy directed against Averroes. Aegidius, a brilliant Latin sophist, became the first Thomist around 1268. It means that the year 1268 is the most probable date, when the part O III was written.

Let us analyze the dating of the three parts of the Oxford manuscript according to the disputes between Siger and Aquinas, which are described in the following chapters. Aegidius′s attitude towards Avicenna in the first and second parts of the manuscript (O I–II) was given by Siger's comments DA I–II, which may have circulated as *reportatio* made by students. But the author of manuscript O was responding mainly to Siger′s writing QIIIDA, which he simply censored and replaced entirely with his own interpretation. This theory is consistent with the alleged writing *De intellectu* mentioned by Nifo, since it resumes Siger′s first commentaries on *De anima* made during his university lectures before 1270. Aegidius rewrote Siger’s commentary in the form of Avicennism, which had already acquired a semiaverroistic character and thus differed fundamentally from the second Averroism. According to Gauthier, Siger’s writing QIIIDA was written soon after Siger’s first lecturing at the University of Paris in the years 1265–66 (Gauthier 1983, 201). At that time, Aegidius was studying with Siger and he knew well his doctrine of the unity of the person according to phenomenological reading of CMDA (ch. 4.4.2). Aegidius, however, commented on Siger’s commentary on *De anima* I–II in the Munich manuscript in a semiaverroistic spirit according to Averroism of *Modernorum*. Therefore, the first two parts of the Oxford manuscript were written soon after the edition of Siger’s writing QIIIDA. Sigers *reportatio* could have circulated with the commentary on DA I–II even earlier, because they are two different manuscripts with separate histories of composition and reception. The manuscript of Munich is something else. It very probably represents the original of DA I–II, which Siger himself wrote. Formulations and style of argumentation are very similar to the treatise QIIIDA. Aegidius was familiar with the exegesis of *De anima*, which according to Aquinas was written in the years 1267–68, and finally adopted it instead of the second Averroism and instead of Siger’s interpretation of *De anima*, which he had rejected from the beginning. The conversion in the third part of the Oxford manuscript is carried out under the influence of Aquinas’s writing *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* (1265–66). Aegidius then expressly refers to Thomas’s definitive Averroistic interpretation of Averroes, which was published in ST I, q. 88. This break is clearly stated in the third part of the manuscript O, which rejected the illumination scenario of Avicennism and also rejects its consequence, that is, the existence of *tertium ens*. Thomistic part containing the commentary on the third book of *De anima* was written about the year 1268. Aegidius took up Aquinas’s key argument of exegesis *De anima*III, which criticizes the central part of CMDA’s interpretation. Aquinas then presented an Averroistic definition of *intellectus possibilis*, which he attributed to the Commentator. By doing this, Aegidius definitely separated himself from the school in the rue du Fouarre and founded Thomism on the basis of Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima*. Sometime around the year 1268, Thomas became the *Expositor Novus*, which was built against the Commentator and against the Siger’s school. Boethius of Dacia responded to this situation by analyzing erroneous interpretations of intellect done by Aquinas and Aegidius. His work is known as *Anonymus Giele* and it was published before the year 1270. The most probable period for the redaction of *Anonymus Giele* is the time of 1268–70. Aegidius and Aquinas were the most prominent semiaverroists that opposed the teaching of Sicilian school exposed in rue du Fouarre. The quality of arguments used in the writing *Anonymus Giele* clearly shows that it was not directed against the primitive modernists in the school of second Averroism. In this difficult situation that dates back to 1268, Siger sends Aquinas his complete commentary on *De anima* (manuscript M and QIIIDA) to Italy. Siger wanted to stop the disputes about the unity of the person and the intellect, which in his view were completely unnecessary. Even the excellent thinkers like Aegidius and Aquinas had misunderstood the interpretation of CMDA. The complete sophistic confusion concerning the interpretation of *De anima* prevailed at the modernist mendicant Faculty under Pecham. They proclaimed Averroism in the mode of universal hylemorphism. However, all teachers of the school of the first Averroism rejected this, including Albert and Aquinas. Thomas’s interpretation rejected the interpretation of the third book *De anima* according to the modernist interpretation of CMDA, which defended the plurality of substances in man. Therefore, the reasoning of the third part of the Oxford manuscript must be interpreted with respect to Aquinas′s position. He finished the first part of *Summa Theologiae* in 1268, where we find the first version of his accomplished Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*. Manuscript O expressly refers to this work because it summarizes the interpretation of Thomas’s concerning *De anima*. The school of Thomism came into being in Aegidius’s commentary on the above-mentioned ST I, Q. 88 and further from the commentary of Thomas’s above-mentioned Roman writings dated before 1269. The interpretation of Aegidius made out of Thomas a Thomist, just as Averroes had been made an Averroist. In the case of Thomas, however, it was about Aegidius’s successful interpretation of Aquinas. He has become the best Semiaverroist of all times. In the second case, Aquinatus’s reading of the Commentator was pure sophistry. The Oxford manuscript is critically oriented towards Averroes and starts from Aquinas’s semiaverroistic conception of the intellect, which will be discussed in the next chapters. The anonymous writing criticizes with references to the above-mentioned position in ST I, q. 88 an Averroism of Averroes, which Aquinas continued to condemn permanently. When the third part of the Oxford manuscript was written (*terminus ad quem* is the year 1270), the semiaverroists as Aegidius gave to Aquinas the honorary title “*Expositor Novus*”as the new interpreter of Aristotle that stood against the Commentator. These scholars finally took part in the crusade of modernists in the Bonaventure’s school against secular magisters in the rue du Fouarre (*pars Sigeri*). The title *Expositor Novus* was given to Aquinas not during his stay in Paris dated to the year 1270, but some time before, namely when he published the *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* in Italy (ch. 4.5.2). The dispute over the new interpretation of *De anima* began in Paris in 1270. Pecham, the representative of the modernists, lost immediately and had to leave Paris. The real opponents were only Siger and Aquinas. The following year Aquinas lost to Siger and left Paris about the same time as Pecham (1272). Afterwards, the beaten Modernists had to do something more substantial than using philosophical arguments.

If Siger’s authorship of the Munich manuscript is confirmed, then the creation of the first and second parts of the Oxford manuscript must be postponed to the same time at least, so that the break in the argumentation in the third part dated to 1268 can be explained. The double dating of the Oxford manuscript explains the transition from Aegidius’ Avicennism according to erroneous understanding of Siger made in the Toletan paradigm (O I–II) to Thomas’s interpretation of *De anima* (O III). The contradictory reception of the Commentator speaks for the later date of the third part of the Oxford manuscript. Under the influence of Aquinas’s exegesis of *De anima,* Avicennist Aegidius became the first Thomist. The interpretation of the Oxford manuscript shows Aegidius’s perplexed sophistry regarding Averroes′s thinking, especially in the first and second section. But the third part adopted the Thomistic interpretation of *De anima*, however, enriched with a considerable dose of sophistry. Aegidius took all key arguments for the unity of knowledge and person from Siger’s interpretation of CMDA, but gave them out as Aristotle’s teaching that Aquinas commented. Through this sophistry, Aegidius created another confused figure of Averroist Averroes. Aegidius could not find another theory of cognition, which adhered to the unity of the person, since he rejected the dualism of the second Averroism. Before the publication of Siger′s QIIIDA (ca. 1266) it was not possible (and it is still not possible) in classical metaphysics to interpret the full unity of the person without the exegesis of CMDA presented according to the Sicilian school. Magisters in the rue du Fouarre fully defended this school. Aegidius rejected the teaching of the school of Siger, which he had previously defended sophistically, and switched to the school of Thomistic Avicennism that was extremely hostile to Averroes. This school of semiaverrorist modernists joined with the classical modernists of the school of the second Averroism. Together they destroyed the school of the first Averroism in 1277.

Aquinas’s writings made in Italy and finally *De unitate intellectus* published in 1270, presented a new interpretation of the unity of the intellect, given “*ad mentem Aristotelis.*” That interpretation was explicitly directed against Averroes. By this act Aquinas became the *Expositor Novus*. But Siger’s school rejected his solution of the unity of the intellect as inadequate, unscientific and implicitly Averroist as early as 1266. Aquinas adhered to the plurality of hypostatized forms in man for theological reasons. The solution was already classic one, since it dated to Grosseteste and it was in line in with the interpretation of *De anima* made strictly according to Aristotle. The present dating and authorship of Siger’s commentary on *De anima* I–II in the Munich manuscript also integrates Agostino Nifo’s remark that this writing had been sent in connection with QIIIDA to Aquinas in response to his interpretation of *De anima*. This is possible because Aquinas was still in Italy until the autumn of 1269. The publication of the manuscript of Munich can be dated at the same time as the QIIIDA, that is, to the year 1266. This is in line with the assumed early dating of the Munich manuscript to the period of the creation QIIIDA. Siger certainly lectured on the complete interpretation of *De anima* in the rue du Fouarre. The manuscript M confirms that Siger did not agree with the theory of essential predication by hypostatized form of the intellect as Aquinas proposed it. Nevertheless, according to the conciliatory commentary on DA I–II, he recognized this way of the true cognition of the intellect as possible (*potest esse*, M 1.7). However, in the interpretation of DA III, he rejected the view of Aegidius and Thomas Aristotelianism because it contradicted the deductive scientific proof of *anima intellectiva* according to *Second Analytics* (ch. 4.4.3). The new round of the dispute between Siger and Aquinas flared up in Paris after the year 1270, when Siger rejected Thomas’s semiaverroism presented in *De unitate intellectu* by publishing the work *De anima intellectiva*. Siger and his group entered into a direct confrontation with Aquinas and Albert after the year 1270, among other things, by clarifying the points of contention of Avicenna’s metaphysics in relation to Averroes’s project of the first science. This point of view of the magisters gathered on the side of Siger is expressed by Boethius of Dacia in *Anonymus Giele* written before 1272. Aquinas certainly had to react publicly to Boethius’s and Siger’s criticism of the plurality of forms in the soul, which in Thomism shattered the unity of the person. The confirmation of Thomas’s criticism brought in the second round of the dispute after the publication of *De unitate intellectus* and Siger’s writing *De anima intellectiva*. After the year 1270, Aquin was confronted with a new criticism from Siger’s group, which culminated in the declaration of the Artistic Faculty of the year 1272 (ch. 4.1.2). The masters from the rue du Fouarre, citing *Second Analytics*, forbade a mixture of theology and philosophy into an argumentative whole. It certainly concerned Aquinas’s version of unity of intellect presented in *De unitate intellectus*. Therefore, it is very likely that Siger’s work *De anima intellectiva* was written before the publication of the decree, which ended the entire debate between the followers of Siger and the Thomists. The decree of the artists came out on 1. 4. 1272 and the beaten Aquinas left the Paris University right after Easter (24. 4. 1272). Thomas could not teach at the faculty of Parisian modernists, because he considered their philosophy to be a fundamental error, and these modernists considered Aquin as an Averroist (ch. 4.5.1). Chancellor Alvernus had already condemned the thinking of Porretan grammarians (*falsi nominis scientia*; OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). In Albert’s line, Aquin defended his legacy linked to Blund’s school of the first Averroism. He had already done it during his first stay in Paris. Pecham was appointed to the chair of the Franciscan theology after Eustachius of Arras in 1270 and was dismissed after one year. By the year 1272, Pecham had already returned to Oxford. His students in Paris have certainly not forgotten who had turned their master into a second-rate philosopher at the end of writing *De unitate intellectus*.

The first two parts of the Oxford manuscript provide a commentary on Siger’s DA I–II present in the manuscript of Munich. They had certainly been written before the main dispute in 1270, because they reflect the Avicennist attitude to cognition, which is given by exposure from behind, and are influenced by the school of the second Averroism. The change came by the transition from the moderate second Averroism (O I–II, ca. 1266–67) to the first Averroism according to Aquinas (O III, ca. 1268–69). It explains the complicated semiaverroism in thinking of Aegidius Romanus. This Latin scholar elaborated very interesting and sophistic reception of Averroes. It far exceeded the primitive mode of the Latin sophists criticized by Albert from Bonaventure’s school in Paris and from Kilwardby’s school in Oxford. The influence of Aquinas’s criticism of Averroes and especially his position towards Averroes as a bad interpreter of Aristotle from *De unitate intellectus* (1270) led Aegidius’s evolution to Thomism after the completion of the third part of the commentary of manuscript O. This development is shown in the writing *Anonymus Bazán* in the next chapter, which reflects Aegidius’s position in the years 1270–71. At this time, Aegidius, together with Aquinas, directly attacked Averroes in Paris and, like Bonaventure’s school, turned him into a heretic. In the publication of *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* dated to the years 1272–75, Aegidius adheres to modern dualistic position of cognition, which is not fully consistent with Aquinas’s interpretation in *De unitate*. But around the year 1270 Aegidius still shared semiaverroistic position of Aquinas against Averroistic Averroes conceived according to the Toledo school. Therefore, in the dispute over the unity of the intellect, Aegidius necessarily stood against the magisters in the rue du Fouarre. They kept Alvernus’s line and defended the Commentator as the most exalted philosopher according to the Sicilian school. Siger of Brabant rejected both semiaverroists in the years 1265–73 in an absolutely qualified way as a magister in the rue du Fouarre and pointed out the errors in Albert’s later interpretation of *De anima*. From April 1272 both semiaverroists Aquinas and Aegidius, after issuing the decree of the Artists, joined forces with the modernists around Bonaventure in order to attack Siger’s school. Kilwardby and Pecham fully supported their attack from Oxford. Pecham had to leave the Paris University around 1271 and settled in Oxford. Albert considered the arguments of the modernists ridiculous and refused any discussion with them. As a connoisseur of CMDA according to the Sicilian school, he could not defend position of Aquinas and Aegidius because it was obviously flawed. Now it becomes clear why this interpreter of *De anima*, as well as the whole *Corpus Aristotelicum*, refused a trip to Paris in 1270. He certainly didn’t want to publicly correct his best student. The defeated Aquinas left Paris at the end of April 1272 and went to Naples. Magisters in the rue du Fouarre no longer withstood the second round of the attack of Latin sophists and in 1277 their condemnation followed. The third part of the Oxford manuscript was created in the first round of culminating disputes before the arrival of Aquinas in Paris. The described peripeties of complicated disputes in the years 1266–70 are indirectly presented in both manuscripts, due to the changes in argumentation done within the school of the first Averroism.

### 4.3.3 Anonymus Bazán

The anonymous work *Quaestiones super Aristotelis librum De anima* (further only *Quaestiones*) was edited by Bernard Bazán. The author of the work cannot be determined exactly. The publication of the treatise is dated to the years 1272–77 (Bazán 1971, 377). The editor of the manuscript states on the basis of the concise style and the unfinished sentences that it was a student *reportatio* from the lectures of a master of artistic sciences, who was a good connoisseur of Aristotle and faithfully transmits Aristotle′s teaching (ibid, 364–65). Bazán reflects on the fact that the treatise does not follow the line of *De anima*, but has its own argumentation structure. Among other things, the work comments on some authorities of classical metaphysics. Maybe the author was a young artist who just started his lectures, probably at the University of Paris (Bazán, p. 365). The editor clearly prefers the literary genre of *quaestiones* inserted in the title of the work. This allowed the master to have enough possibility of improvisation. Hermeneutics appreciate the distinction of style and form between the preferred genre of *quaestio* and the rejected genre of *lectio* (Bazán, p. 363). In the quoted part, the editor points out that the treatise can have its own logic of interpretation albeit the one that is unknown to the editor.

The interpretation of objectivity accepts Bazán’s invitation and presents an integrale argumentation of the treatise in the context of disputes between the first and second Averroism that provides the approximative date of publishing. The question is whether the thought and style of the treatise form a consistent whole and how the wholeness of the scripture is conceived. We must analyze the applied logic of argumentation and its form in the often used dialectical mode of disputation (*probas/dico; dicis/concedo; dicis/nego; dicis/dico quod falsum est*). It is therefore necessary to determine the meaning of the dispute by establishing the identity of two opponents and by defining the subject of their debate. The framework of the quodlibetal disputation, in connection with the student *reportatio*, explains some shortcomings, which, according to the editor, testify to the original oral version (Bazán, p. 363). One must find factual reasons that led the author to that style of interpretation, or rather parallels of this form of discourse from the given time.[[159]](#footnote-159) Furthermore, the interpretation must determine whether this writing belongs to the school of the first or the second Averroism; or to the semiaverroistic position represented in the Oxford manuscript discussed above. It is also necessary to determine at what level of professional argumentation *Anonymus Bazán* represents the given school. With regard to the specific topics covered in the treatise, it can be said that its author worked at the University of Paris on the date of the creation of the treatise, indicated by the editor, i.e., after the year 1270. By integrating the treatise into debates between the first and the second Averroism, we can decide whether it is a product of a young artist or belongs to the personal style and expressions of a mature master. The reasoning of the treatise is clearly directed against the second Averroism; but the author has some interesting deviations from the line of the first Averroism and Semiaverroism, which are represented in three anonymous scriptures (Anonymus Giele, the Oxford and the Munich manuscript). The interpretation of *De anima* is fundamentally inspired by Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas. The relationship between the intellectual soul and the body is solved with the knowledge of Siger’s procedure given in the term “*subiective—obiective*”.[[160]](#footnote-160) This procedure is applied with the knowledge of Siger’s phenomenological approach to the act of recognition. Siger presented this terminology in the Munich manuscript and in the QIIIDA and Boethius of Dacia used it in *Anonymus Giele* as well. In the spirit of Siger’s school combined with Aquinas’ Aristotelianism, the treatise distinguishes between the act of the intellect, explicitly defined as potency, and its intelligible *obiectum* (Bazán, pp. 398.45‒49). This key phrase about the relationship between the intellect and the body at the level of the object is found in the same meaning in Aegidius Romanus in the writing *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus*.[[161]](#footnote-161) He took it over from Siger and changed it into the modernist form. The process of cognition in the treatise is made in the mode *per posterius* and follows Siger’s phenomenological approach in QIIIDA (ch. 4.4.1). The performance of the act of cognition (*operatio*) is based on experience, which is given by the causality of the act of cognition in the body. That is the only basis that allows the reflection on the nature of the soul.[[162]](#footnote-162) Anonymous author emphasizes that this procedure is easily feasible, and notes to the address of his opponents that it is absolutely in line with Aristotle’s thinking. However, the anonymous Semiaverroist does not have the same view as Siger. The cognition is defined in the Aristotelian scenario similar to Thomism. The author took up the Thomistic and Aristotelian position; he clearly defends the first Averroism and the exposure of the intellect coming from the senses (*omnis cognitio nostra est ex sensatis et imaginatis*; *Quaestiones* 1.5, p. 397.40). The anonymous writing adheres to Aristotle’s and Averroes’s position regarding the substantial unity of the person and reminds modernists that the main theme of *De anima* consists in the unity of the whole person. This perspective of reading *De anima* according to the first Averroism is highlighted several times in the text.[[163]](#footnote-163) The author rejects the modernist thesis inherited from David of Dinant, according to which the receptive potency of the soul would be a *materia prima* according to Averroes’s writing *De substantia orbis* (*Quaestiones* 2.3, p. 407.50‒54). The main character of the writing is the distinction between the essence of the soul and its potencies, which make it possible to clarify the unity of soul and body in the line of the first Averroism. The author is inspired by Siger’s above-mentioned commentary QIIIDA, which rejects the intellect and the soul as a numerically determined substance. In the case of emanation, the thesis rejects the movement of intellect as *transmutatio*, which would presuppose a substantial nature of soul and intellect. Therefore, he also clearly confirmed the scenario of exposing cognition from the front, from direction of sensual experiences that shape various faculties of the soul.[[164]](#footnote-164) The author confirmed the classical scheme of the first Averroism: the person is given as a hylemorphic first substance; the soul is given as a form of the body. The intellect, as the immaterial potency of the soul, proceeds from the senses, but it does not undergo any substantial changes. The difference between the *operatio* of any potency of the soul and its product (*obiectum*) was discussed in works of Siger and Thomas. It allowed the author to clarify the problem of the unity of the vegetative, animalistic and intellectual components of the soul in the framework of difference “*materialiter—formaliter*” (Quaestiones 2.8, p. 415.43‒50). The food consumed or the thought produced is an object of the various faculties of the soul and body. The objects of the various activities include the potency of the soul in the framework of the one hylemorphic substance and thus also of the one *actus essendi*. The soul includes various abilities, similar to how the quadrilateral contains the triangle. By this well-known example from Aristotelian corpus, the cognitive faculties were rejected as substances and they were incorporated into the one act of existence.

The fundamental rejection of the second Averroism is given in the chapters that are critical of universal hylemorphism. Citing Avicenna, the author confirms the unity of the essence; in accordance with the first Averroism, he claims that the first substance is given by the composition of form and substance.[[165]](#footnote-165) The inclination to Avicenna joins his Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*, from which Averroes is excluded. It was exactly the position of Aquinas. The anonymous writer follows Aristotle’s teaching about the first substance given *actualiter* and *simpliciter*. In the essential sense, one can only talk about matter in the context of *incompletum*, making abstraction from real existence of first substances (*duplex est esse, scilicet esse actuale et esse essentiale*; Q. 2.10, p. 419.43‒44). Matter is excluded from the intellect (*dicis quod anima est materia, nego*; Q. 2.13, p. 424.33). The receptive component of the soul is not a *materia spiritualis*, but merely an immaterial faculty of the receptive intellect. The distinction between the intellect as potency and its object excludes the matter of the third kind in the soul and in the intellect. Thus, all forms of matter as *tertium ens* are excluded from the soul and intellect. The author contests all typical signs of the second Averroism influenced by Avicebron. In the question of the conception of the soul and cognition, the author does not belong to the school of the second Averroism. There is no objective matter as *tertium ens* that enables human cognition. The receptive faculty of the soul forms one of the intellectual faculties of the soul that relate to the existing person as a substance (*totius coniuncti principialiter*, Q. 2.13, p. 424.45). The key issue is the debate on “*accidentia completa et incompleta*” (Q. 2.14, p. 425). The author rejected Bonaventure’s thesis of the mixture between active and passive ability within the framework of the soul as “*hoc aliquid*” (ch. 4.1.3). The soul would include in itself in a undifferentiated manner the active and passive components of *intellectus agens* and *intellectus possibilis*. A cocktail of the real properties of the first substance and the intentionally given accidents would lead to the dualism of two substances, of soul and body, which would cancel the unity of the person. The first Averroism ensures unity of the person by distinguishing different potentialities (active, passive; material, immaterial), which are given in the framework of the one subsistent act of the first substance.

Within the framework of the first Averroism, the author adopts Averroes’s definition of diaphanum, although he does not mention this philosopher as the original source. The scripture rejects the principle of the second Averroism and Neoplatonism that entails the direct exposure of color from the sun.[[166]](#footnote-166) The intellect does not relate to phantasms as light does to colors, because it is only a matter of similarity, by no means a coincidence. The intellect is immaterial; colors and light are material, i.e., the similarity of both phenomena lags on both legs (*claudicat in uno*; Q. 2.14, p. 433.39). The receptive component of the soul represents a medium similar to a diaphanum, which absorbs the sensual species in its immaterial way. The beam is only intentionally contained in the diaphanum, which is stated with explicit reference to Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* (*Expositor Novus*) and not to Averroes (*lumen intentionaliter est in aere*; Q. 2.21, p. 436.19‒20). Therefore, the resulting conception of color is not defined according to CMDA, but according to Aquinas’s scheme in the second book of Sentences (ch. 4.5.1). The author only turned light into an intentional being in thinking, and color into a real being (*lumen est ens intentionale, color est ens reale*; Q. 2.22, p. 437.24‒27). The function of the diaphanum is misunderstood from the point of view of the first Averroism and stands in conflict with the scenario of formal causality and intentionality according to CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). We find a similarly confused conception of diaphanum in the previous Oxford manuscript attributed to Aegidius. But now, the intentional function of diaphanum is already put in the scheme of cognition according to Aquinas.[[167]](#footnote-167) By an erroneous definition of the diaphanum, the anonymous writer deprived himself of the fundamental possibility of defining Averroes’s *proportio* of cognition given with regard to the senses and to the intellect. The disputation therefore separates the sensual and the intellectual cognition from each other, because it is not able to connect them with each other. The mediation between the intellect and the senses is established according to Avicenna, that is, in the dualism of the two separate components of cognition. The intellect is strictly immaterial and cannot receive from the senses, because it does not have the same model of experience as the senses. Therefore, the treatise separates the sensual reception from the intellectual reception (*intelligere non est passio passione proprie dicta*; Q. 3.1, p. 466.28). The use of the term “*proprie*” for the receptive component of intellect is important, because the author refers to Aristotle. This position is not given according to CMDA, but in the spirit of Aquinas, who turned the intellect into another form in the soul. With emphasis on the completely separate function of the intellect in the mode of *inmixtus*, the anonymous writer separated the sensual and the intellectual cognition from each other. The rejection of full receptivity of intellect, intentionally given from the sensual species, clearly shows that the author did not include the basic line of Averroes’s reasoning of *De anima* and Siger’s interpretation. Previously, he had claimed that cognition comes from the senses; but due to the incorrectly defined diaphanum, he has no way to make this correspondence. This passage is important for determining the identity of the author. In the book *De plurificatione*, Aegidius Romanus adhered to the dualistic theory excluding *proportio* between the senses and the intellect, on the basis of which he accused Averroes of the Averroistic thesis of the numerical unity of the intellect (ch. 4.3.2). The third part of the Oxford manuscript defends the connection between the sensual and the intellectual species in the mode of *continuatio*, citing Aristotle’s *De anima* and the Thomistic interpretation of Averroes. In the same line, the author of the third part of the Oxford manuscript considers Averroes to be an Averroist. The anonymous writer regards Averroes as an Averroist who adheres to numerical unity of the separated intellect. Aegidius, as well as *Anonymus Bazán*, is not able to distinguish between the position of CMDA and Themistius, falsely claiming that both authors see the intellect only in the mode of the immaterial separated substance.[[168]](#footnote-168) The writing has the same selective and sophistical conception of CMDA as we find in Aegidius when he redacted the third part of the Oxford manuscript. He considered the possible intellect given in CMDA as an abstracted species in the mode *quartum genus* taken from the Averroistic theory made by Toletan modernists. They define the intellect as an objective hypostasis.[[169]](#footnote-169) The preferential treatment of Avicenna is supplemented by Aristotelianism according to Aquinas. This mental inconsistency and this sophistry balancing between the first and the second Averroism is typical of Aegidius Romanus around the year 1270 and they are also attested in the anonymous treatise. Aegidius took up arguments of Aquinas, who rejects Averroes. He was unable to interpret the key parts of *De anima* and CMDA about the unity of the person and intellect in the Aristotelian line as well as Aquinas. The treatise complements the preceding commentary on DA III, which can be found in the Oxford Manuscript (O III). This position precedes Aegidius’s modernist conception in the work *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* (1271), where there is the full dualism of two separate ways of cognition. This time, however, the debate is directed against the representatives of the school of second Averroism. Aegidius chose the Aristotelian position on the question of cognition after the year 1268, left the wavering between Avicennism and Aristotelianism behind and commented on *De anima* in the spirit of the first Averroism.[[170]](#footnote-170) This magister finally accepted the reasoning of CMDA on the question of the unity of the person, but, following the example of Aquinas, condemned Averroes as an Averroist. Aegidius rejected Avicennism and adopted the line of semiaverroism according to Aquinas. The interpretation of *Expositor Novus* opposed to Siger’s interpretation of CMDA presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to the Sicilian school.

Another typical expression of the second Averroism according to the Toledo school concerns the definition of *materia prima*. The author is clearly an Avicennist in the matter of primary matter. His theory of *materia prima* is influenced by the school of Rufus and Kilwardby. The author defends the thesis that from the point of view of potency, the *materia prima* forms a being of the third kind (*potentia materiae primae sit quoddam essentiale*). In the Avicennist mode of “*concomitatur*,” this essentially defined matter contains the potency as its own substance.[[171]](#footnote-171) The potency of the first substance is neither a substance nor a predicate, but a sophistic determination of *tertium ens* that is inserted between the two kinds of enuntiation (*essentiale est medium quoddam inter substantiam et accidens*). The author accepted Kilwardby’s thesis of Porretan division of *materia prima*. By referring to the work *De substantia orbis*, he created a being of the third kind from the first matter. However, since Aegidius was a Thomist in the question of cognition and the substantial unity of the person, he excluded the modernist conception of *materia prima* from the intellect and rejected its numerical individuation with the help of Dinant’s primary cosmic matter. The universal hylemorphism was unacceptable for Aegidius and Thomas, because no being of the third kind can exist in man. Pecham’s definition of man as “*totum virtuale*” (ch. 4.2.2), which is given by the new definition of objective matter, was absolutely unacceptable for the first Averroism. The first Averroism rejected the comitational theory, which was based on the conception of the active intellect in the form of Avicenna’s *Dator formarum*. This is the difference from the second Averroism of Bonaventure’s school, which made Avicenna’s comitation the objective ontotheological scheme of the *rationes exemplares* and *seminales*. Therefore, the author rejected the matter of the third kind in the framework of universal hylemorphism. Such an extremist position of *Modernorum* denies the principles of Aristotelian metaphysics. The author therefore disagrees with the second Averroism on the question of hypostatized qualities as extension (*magnitudo*). It relates to his above defense of the first substance given as hylemorphic unity. The first part of the commentary shows that the interpretation *De anima* of the author belongs to the school of the first Averroism. The question of the unity of soul and intellect is clearly directed against the school of the second Averroism. The most important position against the second Averroism is given by the exposure of the intellect from the direction of phantasms.[[172]](#footnote-172) However, he adheres to the conception of the hypostatized essence and being of the third kind according to the modified version of the second Averroism. In this way he corrects the fatal errors of Bonaventure’s school, which destroyed the classical metaphysics of Aristotelian *Peripateticorum* by introducing the theory of universal hylemorphism. The treatise conducts a clear and uncompromising polemic with the representatives of the second Averroism on all basic issues. Aquinas adhered to the same line since 1268 and had the same opponents from the ranks of the second Averroism on issues of cognition and unity of the person. We find this characteristic in Aegidius Romanus around the year 1270. The writing *Anonymus Bazán* fully corresponds to that movement of Thomist semiaverroism.

Which of representatives of the second Averroism is the main ideological opponent of this polemical treatise? The first clue can be found in the debate about whether the *sensus communis* has the heart or the brain as the main organ.[[173]](#footnote-173) The author is an Aristotelian, and therefore considers the heart to be the center of sensual synthesis against Avicennists. They accept Avicenna’s thesis according to which the brain is this center, which the postmodern Avicennist Descartes also adheres to. The corresponding passage with references to John Damascene and Avicenna can be found in Pechams *Quaestiones tractantes De anima*.[[174]](#footnote-174) The key passage of the contradiction between the first and the second Averroism concerns the role of matter. The second Averroism adheres to Avicebron’s thesis of universal hylemorphism. We find important references to Pecham’s opinion in the third part of the anonymous commentary on *De anima*. The writer repeats his initial position, which rejects the substantial intellect in the soul, and concretizes intellectual cognition with regard to the sensual apprehension. The view “*subiective—obiective*” corresponds to Siger’s view from the Munich manuscript and that of Anonymus Giele. Anonymus Bazán defends in his own way the position of the first Averroism from the rue du Fouarre.

“You claim that the intellectual soul carries out its activities without a sense organ, which I deny. As proof, I will add that the intellectual soul performs its two activities without a sense organ in the sense of the carrier of this activity (*subiective*); however, it refers to the intentional object to be recognized (*obiective*), since the intellect must consider the sensual phantasms.” [[175]](#footnote-175)

Subjectively, the intellectual component of the soul (*anima intellectiva*) is autonomous in relation to the senses. The act of the immaterial intellect is separated from sensual cognition (*exercet suam operationem sine organo corporali subiective*). For the immaterial intellect (*inmixtus*) this means that the sense organs cannot function as a substrate of the intellect. The intellect is given in the living body of man as the highest faculty of his immaterial soul, which has no specific organ. Objectively speaking, however, the intellect is bound to the body in so far as it obtains actuality from the sensual phantasms. The relation “*subiective—obiective*” does not include Siger’s existential meaning in the mode “*ipse homo intelligit*,” but it includes the Thomist mode “*homo intelligit*.” The model is again the scheme of recognition discussed above in Aquinas’s writing *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* (1265–66). Cognition produces the individual (but not existential) act of the intellect in the body. The intellect is the subject of the immaterial soul as a form, which forms its substrate for the immaterial subsistence of the intellect as potency. The intellect operates through the existence of the soul as a form of the body. Objectively, however, the intellect depends on the senses, because it can only create intelligible content through *species sensibilis*. Thanks to the work of *intellectus agens*, a universal *species intelligibilis* is formed in the act of abstraction from sensible species accepted in the immaterial environment of *intellectus possibilis*. As a result, there is a difference between the subjective act of the intellect in the soul (*tertium genus*) and the produced universal meaning that is the same for all people (*quartum genus*). With regard to the previous rejection of any substance in the intellect, the author insists on the pure potency of the intellect, so that it is receptive in the universal manner to accept every kind of cognition. The key part of the rejection of the first matter for the intellect identifies the opponent from the school of the second Averroism.

“I reject the second assertion: if the intellect were a pure potency, it would differ from the first matter. You are trying to prove that the intellect is equal in potency to everything intelligible, like the first matter in potency for the reception of all forms. I say that it is not the same, because the first matter in potency is only for the reception of all natural forms and individual things. On the contrary, the intellect is for the reception of all forms: the intelligible, the spiritual and the intentional, because it functions as the primary matter for the reception of these forms. Therefore, both views differ fundamentally from each other.” [[176]](#footnote-176)

The receptive component of the intellect cannot be *materia prima*, because both forms of reception are diametrically different from each other from the point of view of metaphysics (*maxime differunt*). The first matter relates to hylemorphic substances (*materia prima est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes formas naturales et particulares*). The intellect exists one floor higher and plays the role of the first matter only in a transferred meaning (*intellectus est materia prima ad hoc*). Its reception concerns immaterial forms obtained through the abstraction process (*intellectus est potentia ad recipiendum omnes formas intelligibilis et spirituales et intentionales*). This theory of the primary matter given in the intellect, on the other hand, is defended by Pecham as an objective successor of David Dinant.[[177]](#footnote-177) The modernists of Bonaventure’s school require for the process of intellectual cognition some kind of receptive subject, given as an objective being, i.e., in the form of a hypostatized *materia prima*. It carries the fundamental *simplicitas*, which is subsequently determined by objective species. Pecham comes from the school of second Averroism and he must reject the existential act of the intellect according to CMDA. This eminent follower of the second Averroism was inspired by the division of quasi-material continuum of *Nominales* given in the framework of differentiation according to *Arbor Porphyriana*. The school of modernists does not know how the universal species could be received in the personal act of cognition. Their species is a Porretan hypostasis, and this being of the third kind has to express itself in a Platonist way in some intelligible matter of the human soul. Pecham’s following reasoning sets out why the school of the second Averroism had to adhere to the material intellect in the mode of universal hylemorphism, that is, as a substance.[[178]](#footnote-178) The species of the third kind must be taken individually, because every individual recognizes on its own. Pecham’s conception of the unity of the modern person is given as “*totum virtuale*” (ch. 4.2.2). There must be some individual receptive and hypostatized *intellectus possibilis*. Since it is individualized due to *materia spiritualis*, it is numerically different in all people. According to the second Averroism, the individuation of the intellect must pass through the individual or through the cosmic *materia prima* because of the universality of univocal species. This gives rise to the dualism of the two forms of the receptive intellect (the human and the cosmic one). The cognition is given by copulation of both substances of *intellectus possibilis*. Pecham interprets Averroes’s teaching in such a way that the Commentator supposedly postulates for universal species only an immaterial receptive intellect as a substance in order to ensure the immaterial cognition of objectively given species. The anonymous writer fundamentally opposes to such a solution. He points out to the opponent the error in the case of the reception of universal species. The opponent does not distinguish between the act of the individual synthesis of the intellect (*subiective*) and the resulting product of intellect (*obiective*).

Anonymous’s distinction “*subiective—obiective*” misunderstands the basic argument of CMDA. Aegidius as the author of this writing was clearly instructed on this issue by Boethius of Dacia (Anonymus Giele). The explanation of individual cognition is mixed with its universal product (*species est similitudo plurium, sic es universalis*).[[179]](#footnote-179) Such definition is either intentionally sophistical or it superficially includes the conclusion of Siger’s precise explanation. If it is a question of some *reportatio* of students, then this inadequate summary of the difference between *tertium* and *quartum genus* according to CMDA can be forgiven. However, hermeneutics claim that it is Aegidius’s work created at the moment when he constituted the first Thomistic presentation of Aquinas made on *De anima*. Then it is true that Aegidius deliberately misinterprets Averroes’s and Siger’s position, because he knows their interpretation of CMDA very well (see the argument “*subiective—obiective*”). He uses against Pecham the main arguments coming from Siger′s commentary. The commentary uses this meaning not as existential meaning of Siger, but only as purely formal meaning of Aquinas. Aegidius argues in the style of the first Averroism. The individual act of cognition in the mode “*subiective*—*obiective*” was enough to refute the position Pecham. In the case of universal meaning as immaterial cognition in the mode of *inmixtus*, the mode of intellectual reception (*intellectus possibilis*) is the same as the mode of intellectual production (*intellectus agens*). Cognition takes place in the immaterial mode, but in the two modes of reception: in the passive and in the active. The reception from the senses proceeds at the level of the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* and the synthesis of cognition at the level of *intellectus agens*. Both components are the individual potency of the soul, and therefore the universal hylemorphism is an unnecessary and nonsensical solution. From the previous rejection of the objective matter as *tertium ens*, it becomes clear that the author must reject the conception of *magnitudo* as an essential quantity (*magnitudinis esse*). This definition of objective matter cannot be univocally combined with Aristotelian definition of the hylemorphically determined substance (*magnitudo*).[[180]](#footnote-180) We also find a similar analysis rejecting the existence of the third kind in the next question (*Quaestiones* 3.8, p. 481). Pecham, on the other hand, follows the model of Rufus and Kilwardby. He refers to univocal concept of *magnitudo* related to the matter Neoplatonic being of the third kind.[[181]](#footnote-181) On the same page, however, the inconsistent anonymous writer of *Quaestiones* differs from the first Averroism. He is inspired by Avicennism by asserting that the intellect is able to recognize the individual things directly by becoming aware of the difference between the two modes of cognition (*intellectus ponit differentiam inter singulare et universale; ergo intellectus intelligit singulare*, p. 479.24‒26). This Avicennist position of the self-sufficient intellect in the form of the “Flying Man” is not compatible with its own principles of cognition with the teaching of the first Averroism, but, on the contrary, with the conception of *Modernorum*. The following chapters will show that the nature of intellect as a hypostatized form is also held by Aquinas in the school of the first Averroism around 1270, and he criticizes as well the position of Pecham. He could not stop multiple attacks of the first Averroism (Aegidius, Aquinas, Siger) and, like Rufus before him, had to flee to Oxford sometime after 1271.

We find the key rejection of the second Averroism in the polemic about univocal statute of species. Once again, distinction is made between the act of the intellect and its universal product. The author reminds the defensors of the exposure of meaning of being from behind that this is a fundamentally bad view. The second Averroism creates the species by stating their actuality in the act of direct intuition taken from the direction of separated intelligible forms. Bonaventure defined this form as exemplar, which is given in God as his intentional object, that is, in the manner “*obiective*.” The first Averroism denies the autonomous existence of hypostatized species, because every recognized universal entity is given only in thinking. The intelligible species arises through the act of abstraction related to real things and they are only in thinking. The anonymous writer clearly says that the cognition of real things runs as Aristotelian *adaequatio*. The knowledge of reality depends on mediation through the process of Aristotelian abstraction (*mediante specie*).[[182]](#footnote-182) This act of recognition produces an intelligible form. Quotation shows that the intellect recognizes the essence of the thing in the process of Aristotelian abstraction given by synthesis of intelligible species (*quidditatem rei mediante specie*). Then it is true that the essence given in the thing and in thought is not one and the same (*species rei et intellectus non sunt idem*). The opponent based the primacy of hypostatized species on abstraction in the form of *denudatio*. After the introduction of Oxfordian Fallacy, the modern intellect perceives those objective forms in direct intuition. The author emphasizes that in this erroneous conception the act of the intellect and its object make the same entity. However, the writing cannot accept this, since it defends the position of the first Averroism (*non est ita*). The intellect as *tabula rasa* excludes any separate actuality of the intellect in the form of any substance of the third kind. The first act of intentionality comes to the essence of the thing, which is grasped by the abstracted species given in thought only as intentional content (*intellectus intelligit primo et principaliter quidditatem rei mediante specie*). Only in the second step can the intentional species become its own object of reflection, as well as any other immaterial, intentionally given content (*ex quadam relucentia intellectus*). In this case, the intellect reflexively refers to the already synthesized species of the thing (*intellectus intelligit speciem rei*). As a result, the statute of the hypostatized species as an objective being of the third kind is canceled. The intentional objects have their being only in the process of abstraction given by real things. Thanks to *species intelligibilis*, made like that we can create a universal meaning given only in thought. This difference between the act of intentionality and its object according to the pattern of Blund′s school elaborated Aquinas and Siger after 1265; but magister of Brabant established it according to CMDA. The writing *Anonymus Bazán* defends Thomist′s position of the first Averroism that differs from Siger’s argumentation. The position of moderns is exactly opposite and established the first eidetic insight of modern Cartesians. Pecham adheres to Bonaventure’s difference between *species prima, secunda* and *innata* (ch. 4.1.2). As we already know from the previous analyses, the theory of the univocal species represents thesis of Rufus, Descartes and Husserl that proclaim the actuality of quasi-substantial intellect as an independent hypostasis. The process of cognition compares individual species as to their universal form given in creation or by modern God.[[183]](#footnote-183) The conclusion repeats the position, which coincides with the procedure of the third part of the Oxford manuscript. Averroes’s position is associated with monopsychism and the interpretation of CMDA is considered as Averroist. The author sophistically identifies Averroes’s position with Themistius and with Alexander. All texts of CMDA that point to the process of individualization of intellect are attributed to Aristotle; Aquinas is glorified as the New Expositor of Aristotle. Averroes is seen as an Averroist who professes the theory of separated intellect.[[184]](#footnote-184) Aegidius Romanus took up the same position in the writing *De plurificatione* and he formulated it for the first time by editing the third part of the Oxford manuscript. See the conclusion of the previous chapter regarding the authorship and the circumstances concerning the publication of Munich and Oxford manuscripts. Aegidius summed up fundamentals of Aristotelianism and he comments on *De anima* from the position of the real connoisseur situated in the complicated debate between the first and second Averroism. Certain nuances with regard to the third part of the Oxford manuscript can help to date that manuscript after the creation of writing O III dated to 1268. Anonymus Bazán has a higher level of reasoning of first Averroism than the third part of the Oxford manuscript. Aegidius wrote *Anonymus Bazán* in 1270–71, parallel to the publication of Thomas′s *De unitate intellectus* (1270). The aim of polemic is to condemn Pecham’s school of second Averroism at the University of Paris. Aegidius defends Aquinas as the New Expositor of Aristotle’s corpus. Pecham was beaten twice and he returned to Oxford. The decree of Magisters of rue du Fouarre of April 1272 then followed, which condemns the univocal view of ontotheology. The modernists and Aquinas with Aegidius were criticized together, because they did not respect the nature of scientific proof concerning different generic research, in accordance with the scientific *demonstatio* of *Second Analytics*. Modernists then joined forces with Semiaverroists as Aquinas and Aegidius to form a hostile front against Siger’s school. The authoritarian attack on the position of the first Averroism (*pars Sigeri*) defended by Siger’s defenders ended with the condemnation of this school in 1277. Albert followed the slogan “*si tacuisses Philosophem mansisses*” and tried hard not to get involved in the dispute, although Siger criticized him for the essentialist interpretation of the intellect.

Let us now summarize the view of the treatise, which Bazán had described as the work of a philosophical beginner. It was certainly not written by any artistic bachelor, quite the contrary. The author is distinguished by a high level of knowledge of all major issues concerning the unity of the intellect and takes clear argumentative positions. The philosophical trivialities and the repetitions of the well-known doctrine in *Quaestiones disputatae* must be explained by low philosophical level of opponents. They have not understood Aristotle, either sophistically or out of ignorance. The second part of the confusion concerns the style of the student’s *reportatio* or a polemic, which allegedly summarizes the teaching of the unknown master. This, too, may well be explained by the personal animosity of Aegidius and Pecham. Pecham was almost a textbook example of the sophistry of *Modernorum*.[[185]](#footnote-185) After his arrival to Paris in 1269, Dominican Thomas Aquin as a mendiant monk certainly could not, or did not want to lecture on the mendicant Faculty of modernists under Pechams regency. Therefore, Aegidius rushed to the aid of Aquinas as the New Expositor of Aristotle against the Commentator. It was not the position of Siger that defended Averroes. Aegidius did not understand or did not want to understand Siger’s brilliant exegesis of CMDA. In that point, he repeated his position taken in the Oxford manuscript. Aegidius adopted in polemical *Quaestiones* *disputatae* the key arguments against modernists from Siger’s teaching that he adjusted in the spirit of Thomism founded by him. The use of terms “*obiective*” and “*obiectum*” for the relation between soul and body in the context of cognition *anima intellectiva* is made according to Siger’s first Averroism. In reality, it is very close to the dualism of second Averroism. That ambiguous position of the new school of *sophistae Latini* is very important, since it indicates original *Lichtung* of the truth and non-truth of the Thomism. Aegidius as a follower of Aquinas cannot accept the phenomenological principle of Siger, which is linked to the unity of cognition in the existing person (ch. 4.4.2). When writing *Questiones*, he converted himself to the first version of Thomism; therefore he defended the position of Aquinas, which Siger rejected. See Aquinas’s definition of intellect as a hypostatized form in the terminus *qua2* (ch. 4.5.2). The author takes *quidditas* as an essence of Avicenna. At the same time, according to the recognition scheme of the first Averroism, he rejects the status of *quidditas* as a being of the third kind. See, for example, the polemic concerning the theory of truth (Q. 3.17, p. 502.46‒54). On the other hand, however, he defends the Avicennian theory of comitation in the objective version of second Averroism. Unclear position between the first and the second Averroism shows that the anonymous writing still adheres to the doctrine of the second Averroism in certain points. Hermeneutics is particularly reminiscent of the above-mentioned similarity with the Oxford manuscript with regard to the existence of universals in things (*universalia secundum quod sunt in rerum natura*). The objective “exsistence” of the species as being of the third kind is combined with the exposure of the first substance from the front according to the first Averroism.[[186]](#footnote-186) This is Aegidius′s standpoint about the year 1270. He converted himself into a modern dualist afterwards. The acceptation of Oxfordian fallacy explains the direct recognition of the individual thing in the intellect. However, the author rejected Avicenna’s principle of the immanent actuality of the intellect and he insists on Aristotelian recognition as a *tabula rasa* in the purely receptive soul.

The Oxford Commentary written around 1268 by Aegidius and his criticism of Pecham dated from 1270 explain the complex train of thought of Semiaverroists. These thinkers opposed the party of Siger in the rue du Fouarre and took the banner of Aquinas as the *Expositor Novus*. The first Thomists fundamentally rejected modern hylemorphism and the plurality of substances in man that were lectured in the Bonaventure′s school and in Oxford. Aegidius knew reasoning of Siger given in his brilliant commentary of QIIIDA. But he rejected Siger’s masterful interpretation of CMDA and contented himself with Aquinas’s polemic against the second Averroism in *De unitate* *intellectus* (1270). As the author of both anonymous writings, Aegidius defends the basic theses of the first Averroism, but does not entirely agree with the conclusions of this school. He is familiar with the most important points of CMDA’s argumentation. However, he refuses in principle to recognize the existential acts of the intellect in the mode *tertium genus*. His interpretation is influenced by Averroist Averroes of the Toledo school. After 1268, Aegidius replaced this argument with Aquinas’s Aristotelianism, thus establishing the Thomism as an objective version of the second Averroism. The secular magisters under the leadership of Siger (*pars Sigeri*), on the other hand, adopted and deepened the interpretation of the Commentator done after Michael Scotus that had circulated in Paris since 1230. Bishop Alvernus already knew very well that the scripture *De anima* can be interpreted both in the problematic way of *sequaces Aristotelis* and in the way of the most honored philosopher Averroes. Aegidius tries to maintain the unity of the person against modernists as were Pecham and Bonaventure. Therefore, Aegidius as an excellent representant of modernist school *sophistate Latini* took basic conclusions of CMDA and attributed them to Aristotle according to the proceeding made by Aquin as *Expositor Novus*. In the previous Oxford manuscript (O I–II), Aegidius still needed the explication of Averroes in the Avicenna′s paradigm of the Toledo school. This primitive sophistry disappeared in 1266–68 under the influence of Aristotelian exegesis made by the New expositor. The transformation is set out in the third part of the Oxford manuscript (O III) and in the writing *Anonymus Bazán*. Gilles de Rome founded the school of Thomism in the writings *O III* and *Quaestiones disputatae* (1968–71) through his excellent level of sophistry that perverted teaching of the school named “*pars Sigeri*.” It's clear that Aegidius, driven by mechanism “*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*,” became one of the greatest enemies of that school. His role remains to be clarified as far as the condemnation of 1277 is concerned. Connoisseurs of CMDA certainly considered the semiaverroism of Aquinas and Aegidius to be an interesting Aristotelian sophistry, which fundamentally differed from the primitive interpretation of modernists. For this reason, the writing *Anonymus Giele* was written around 1270. Boethius of Dacia explained to Thomists the precise reasoning of first Averroism in the Sicilian school, which the group called “*pars Sigeri*.” defended in the rue du Fouarre. The terse formulations of *Anonymus Giele* that confuse contemporary interpreters of this writing are quite understandable. In contrast to modernists, these learned Aristotelians of both actualized (Thomism, first Averroism) were well acquainted with the basic arguments of *De anima* and CMDA. Aegidius, on the other hand, had to resort to direct polemics and simplistic argumentation against the school of Pecham in *Anonymus Bazán*. After the publication of Siger’s commentaries on *De anima* I–III, the educated secular magisters in the rue du Fouarre were well aware that Aristotle gave only an incomplete solution to the unity of the person in the original text *De anima*. Averroes in the third part of CMDA created the full unity of the person.

Unfortunately, many students in Paris did not accept Siger’s reasoning, which was certainly known in 1266 after the publication of QIIIDA, and persistently accused Averroes of Averroism. This was especially true of students in religious schools, such as Aegidius and Aquinas. Many of mendicant friars were hostile to secular magisters in rue du Fouarre since 1255 onwards. Bonaventure officially made the accusation of Averroism as early as 1252–53. The main representatives of this semiaverroistic group in the years 1268–70 were Aegidius and Aquinas. That fact is explicitly documented in the work *De unitate intellectus* after Thomas’s arrival in Paris. Therefore, he was permanently criticized by Siger for incomplete clarification of the unity of the person. Siger was und stil is the greatest connoisseur of Averroes of all times (ch. 4.5.3). The writing *Anonymus Bazán* insists that Averroes is an Averroist and Aquinas claimed the same. The main opponent of Aegidius in *Anonymus Bazán* is the Franciscan Pecham, as he was for Aquinas when he wrote *De unitate intellectus* in 1270. The modernist Pecham was severely criticized by secular Aristotelians around Siger. Aegidius launched his first attack against Pecham in the manuscript O III written about 1268. Since 1270, *Anonymus Bazán* continued the criticism. It joined at the same time Aquinas’s attack on the Pecham school that came shortly after Aquinas’s arrival in Paris, in the spring of 1270. Therefore, Pecham, like Rufus and Kilwardby, lost his cause in Paris and had to return to modernist Oxford. The treatise *Questiones disputatae* was written during these disputes and he defended Aquin’s position, not Siger. All conclusions of CMDA related to personalized intellect are attributed to Aristotle. Aquinas interpreted those conclusions as *Expositur Novus* instead of the Commentator. This position characterizes both the Oxford manuscript in the interpretation of the third part *De anima* and *Anonymus Bazán*. This view corresponds to sophistic position of Aegidius Romanus around the year 1270. This first and therefore most important Thomist from the school *sophistae Latini* performed an academic slalom between the first and the second Averroism. The treatise *Questiones disputatae* is written at the same time as Aquinas’s work *De unitate intellectus*. Aegidius took up the same argumentation and he had the same opponents from the school of the second Averroism. The aim of Aegidius’s critique is the school of second Averroism represented by Pecham. In his argumentation, Aegidius sophistically uses the position of Siger’s followers and therefore does not criticize them in this treatise. The group “*pars Sigeri*” was on his side in this dispute against the second Averroism. Aegidius wanted to help Aquinas with his criticism of the school of second Averroism by starting a direct polemic with Pecham, probably right after Aquinas’s arrival in Paris. It was no problem for him, because he knew Aquinas’s argumentation made in Italy. Moreover, Thomas’s interpretation of Aristotle remained unchanged in Paris. Aegidius did not accept the theory of truth as correspondence according to CMDA, because he had made Averroes an Averroist. However, he refused to establish the metaphysics on Avicenna’s concept of being as *tertium ens*. He refused Neoplatonic nature of cognition that exposed the sense of being from behind, from the world of autonomous forms. That is why *Anonymous Bazán* takes the same metaphysical position as the third part of the Oxford manuscript, which was probably written about the year 1268. The difference in both treatises is based on different standpoints. In the case of the Oxford Commentary, it was a neutral university treatise, in the second case it was a disputation against opponents from the school of second Averroism. In the first phase, Aegidius vacillated between Aristotelian abstraction according to the first Averroism as *abstractio* and Avicennian *denudatio* according to the second Averroism. Founding the Thomism on the abstraction as *denudatio* was impossible; therefore the exposition of being comes from the sensual cognition. However, after rejecting Averroes’s conception of truth as *proportio*, Aegidius inevitably took up on the opposite side with regard to the first Averroism. The manuscript *Anonymus Bazán* prepared this change by defending Oxfordian Fallacy, which was incompatible with the nature of cognition according to the first Averroism in the Sicilian school. After the condemnation of 1277, it was no longer a problem to reject the entire theory of the first Averroism and to take the objective concept of being. After writing both commentaries on *De anima* (ms. Oxford, ms. Bazán), Aegidius finally takes the objectivist position as we find it in the works written by Henry of Ghent. The objectivists of the school of the second Averroism formally adopted the definition of cognition and of the person according to Aquinas’s version of the first Averroism; but their view of metaphysics remained Augustinian and Avicennist. After the condemnation of 1277, Semiaverroists and Thomists such as Aegidius Romanus rejected the school of *augustinisme avicennisant* and they preached an objective Aristotelianism that was critical of Averroes. Aegidius and Aquinas represent the founders of the objective version of Aristotelianism given in the school of the first Averroism. After the destruction of the school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre, this semiaverroist group of Thomists like Aegidius defected to the modernists as was Henry of Ghent. Together they formed the school of objective Aristotelianism in Paris after 1280. Aegidius’s writing *Quodlibet II* is dated to Easter 1287. It contains a complete compilation of objective concept of being in the mode of Avicennian denudation that is based on the self-reflection of Cartesian intellect.[[187]](#footnote-187) The quotation confirms the exposure of being from behind, which forms the basis of twofold abstraction of *Modernorum*. The first intention of cognition goes only to the essence actualized in the external thing, which forms the first aspect of universality. The second intention, given by exposure from behind, from the direction of autonomous active intellect, grasps the same essence in its actual universality placed outside real things. But Aegidius’ two previous commentaries on *De anima* (ms. Oxford, ms. Bazán) still remained in the middle semiaverroistic position, because they were written in the years 1268–71. It was at this time when culminated the dispute between the interpretations of CMDA made by the Sicilian and the Toledo school. Aristotelian Aquinas joined that controversy as *Expositor Novus* in the years 1266–68.

The interpretation of objectivity investigates two different disputes. The first dispute is about the unity of the person made on the basis of the acceptance or rejection of the plurality of forms in man. It takes place only within the school of first Averroism (Aquinas and Aegidius versus Siger’s school). The second dispute involves the complete rejection of modernist arguments. It concerns the question of cognition and the plurality of substances in man. In this dispute, the entire school of first Averroism is united against the school of second Averroism. If this scheme is valid, then there is no other candidate for the authorship of both commentaries (*Manuscript of Oxford, Anonymus Bazán*) than Aegidius Romanus. Both commentaries were written in the years 1268–71 and represent his unique position in this twofold dispute. In this context, the early writings of Henry of Ghent still need to be researched. The present analysis takes up only his treatises written after 1280. But Gandavus’s Avicennism, which is linked to Augustinianism, put this scholar in the school of second Averroism. Neither of these two anonymous commentaries corresponds to the line of the first Averroism cultivated in the Sicilian school. It was lectured in the rue du Fouarre by the group of Modists (*Modistae*). This school rejected the theologization of philosophy. The supremacy of theology over philosophy in the Toledo school was promoted by both Aquinas and Aegidius. They joined in that point Bonaventure’s modernist school that interpreted the position of man in the spirit of the biblical ontotheology. The magisters from the rue du Fouarre, on the other hand, rejected this sophistry in their decree of 1272 because it abolished Aristotelian project of critical science. Aquinas and Aegidius hold the commentary on *De anima* outside the modern pluralism of substances in man and, with Aristotle, adhered to the interpretation given by the plurality of forms. Especially, they took up the immaterial intellect as an eternal form that ensures the eternity and immortality of the human soul. The condemnation of 1277 was written by academics from all schools of *sophistae Latini*, since Thomists and modernists were fully united in that point. Their intention was to destroy the schools of the first Averroism at any cost. The unity of the person defended by the Siger′s school lost the cause so that the modern sophists of all kinds could win. The condemnation of 1277 attributed the confusion of modernists regarding the unity of the intellect to the school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre, in the mode of *Verkehung ins Gegenteil* described above. Both semiaverroists, Aquinas and Aegidius, as well as the modernist school of Bonaventure fully agreed on this sophistical and demagogic position. A further point of agreement between the two schools that came together against Siger’s artists in the rue du Fouarre, was the rejection of the Commentator as an Averroist heretic. Of course, the school of the first Averroism could not do this, as it postulated the generic difference between the scientific study of theology and philosophy according to *Second Analytics*. The concept of one truth placed sacred science above intellectual speculation. Semiaverroists as Aquinas and Aegidius considered the philosophy only servant of theology. However, the unitarian theologians and Aristotelians as Aegidius and Aquinas rejected primitive Aristotelianism of *Modernorum* in their interpretation of *De anima*. This writing had already been commented in rue du Fouarre for a whole generation (since the year 1255) according to the interpretation of CMDA elaborated in the Sicilian school. Therefore, the new expositors of Aristotle adopted the model of the unity of the intellect according to interpretation of CMDA given in the rue du Fouarre; however, they rejected the defense of Averroes and the separation of theology and philosophy. The result was a new figure of Averroist Averroes, given in the mode of Aquinas and Aegidius’s Thomistic semiaverroism. Writing *Anonymus Bazán* and the third part of the *Oxford manuscript* present all these contradictory characteristics of incipient Thomism in the mode of original *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of this school. Apart from Thomas Aquinas, only Aegidius Romanus was such a capable and sophisticated author from the school of the first Averroism at that time. This monk of the order of Augustinians (*Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*) was a good expert on Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas. At that time, Aegidius stood outside of Bonaventure’s school and also outside of Aristotelian artists in the rue du Fouarre. It was only after their expulsion in 1277 that Thomists and Modernists were able to occupy the Faculty of Arts. That group of *sophistae Latini* led by academical Furies victoriously entered *via Modernorum*. This semiaverroistic middle position, which sophistically balanced between the schools of the first and second Averroism, is clearly documented in both anonymous writings. The first manuscript attempts a sophistical separation from Siger’s interpretation of *De anima*. In the first and second parts of manuscript O, Aegidius remained an Averroist in Porretan model of the Toledo school. The break in his position is dated in the third part of the Manuscript O, whereby he became a Semiaverroist at the latest in 1268, after Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle. He defended his position against Pecham around 1269–70 after Aquinas’s arrival in Paris. That situation confirms the anonymous manuscript edited by Bazán. The explanation established connection of both treatises in the context of disputes about 1270 and it also explained the transitional phase between the two manuscripts (O I–II and III). Aegidius defended the resulting modernist dualism at the end of his academic career, after the definitive defeat of the school of first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre. Aegidius Romanus, an excellent Latin sophist and the first Thomist, is the only possible author of anonymous treatises produced in 1266–68 (O I–II) and then in 1268–70 (O III and *Anonymus Bazán*).

## 4.4 Synthesis of the First Averroism (Siger of Brabant)

Magister Siger of Brabant was not in the comfortable position of Dominican Albert the Great, who became a bishop of Regensburg and was presiding *studium generale* he had founded in Cologne. Nor was he in the position of Thomas Aquinas, who came to the University of Paris from papal Rome at the end of 1269 and was protected by papal authority and by the Dominican order. The brilliant philosopher, logician, metaphysician and secular priest had to debate with Latin sophists for a long time as a Master of Arts because they were active in Parisian schools founded by mendicant orders. He lectured at the most important philosophical faculty in the Latin West, where he became the rector of Parisian artists. The modernists obtained the chair at the University of Paris in 1255 and by the time of Siger they had already gained considerable influence. After the edition of *De intellectu et intelligibili* (ca. 1257) and during the publication of commentaries on Aristotelian corpus, Albert refused to enter into a discussion with followers of the second Averroism. He considered their arguments ridiculous. He did not want to travel to Paris around 1270 to attempt to settle the dispute between the representatives of the first and second Averroism. This thankless role fell to his best student, Thomas Aquinas. But the philosophical history of the West was being written in Paris at the time, not in Cologne. This fact proved to be fatal for Siger personally and for Western philosophy in general. In philosophy, however, many things had already changed with regard to Siger’s reputation.[[188]](#footnote-188) The study of Gauthier cited above made the most important contribution because it rehabilitated Siger’s academic position at the Faculty of Arts (Gauthier 1983, 1984). This critical connoisseur of the Middle Ages took the first step towards the rehabilitation of philosophers of the first Averroism, which was initiated by Étienne Gilson. He investigated whether the accused “Averroists” such as Siger really defended the theory of twofold truth (Gilson 1921, 51–69). Siger’s interpretation of *De anima* opposed both to objective ontotheology (Bonaventure, Pecham) and to the problematic solution of some followers of the first Averroism (Albert, Aquinas, Aegidius).

Siger’s role in the rejection of Latin sophists and modernists corresponds to the classification of the Brabant magister in the work *Divine Comedy*. Dante placed him in the group of the main representatives of the first Averroism. The path of the fourth solar sphere follows the logic given by the primacy of Siger’s philosophy. The timeline pays tribute to famous theologians of the Church (Gratian, Petrus Lombardus, Boethius, Bede the Venerable and Richard of St. Victor). In poetic vision of his time, Dante clearly separated the theologians Albert and Aquinas (*Paradiso* 10.64–99) from Siger as the only philosopher. He closed the whole section as the best of all (vv. 136–38). Dante was a true poet in the mode of divine *alētheia* guided by divine Muses, and not by objectively educated Furies. The exploration of Siger’s philosophy must fully justify Dante’s appraisal. The structure of the verses and their content clearly prove that the title *Expositor Novus* was not given to Aquinas, but to Siger. First of all, we must find, in which points Siger differs as a philosopher from vaunted theologians such as Aquinas and Albert. Therefore, it is necessary to give factual reasons why this poet, guided by artistic form of truth, regarded Siger in *Divine Comedy* as the greatest philosopher of his time and why he did not give this title to Aquinas. Dante characterized Siger’s immortal merits precisely, in the spirit of the modest and inconspicuous magister, i.e., in a laconic, concise and absolutely clear manner.[[189]](#footnote-189) The quoted verse emphasizes the fundamental trait of Siger’s thinking; he was capable of presenting enviable truths in a clear and demonstrative manner (*silogizzò invidïosi veri*). The verb “*silogizzò*” applied only to Siger is extremely important when one considers the declaration of magisters in rue du Fouarre in 1272 (ch. 4.3.3). This is not praise of the “logicians” Siger, as is usually assumed, but praise of the “*pars Sigeri*” as the best interpreters of *Second Analytics*. The group of the first Averroism led by Siger was the only one that separated theology from generically different philosophy. For this reason, Siger is the only philosopher who differs from theologians such as Albert and Aquinas. They did not correctly make the separation of sciences within the deductive syllogism that produces the scientific proof (*demonstratio*). Dante knew exactly what was the real reason for the controversy around 1270 and the condemnation in 1277. These “unpleasant” (*invidïosi*) philosophical truths, however, aroused the displeasure of criticized representatives of Semiaverroism (Aegidius, Aquinas, Albert) and, above all, intrigues and anger of rejected representatives of the second Averroism (Bonaventure, Pecham, Kilwardby). This is the second meaning of the term “*invidïosi*,” which Dante did not forget to emphasize since it contributed to Siger’s academic funeral. Dante created the form of poetic and philosophical *Lichtung* in which the musical truth of controversies in the years 1270–77 has been revealed. Siger may have lost the power struggle to modernists and Latin sophists (Dante knew this well), but he certainly did not lose the battle concerning the philosophical truth. The musical hermeneutics of objectivity clearly confirm Dante’s praise, which is hidden in the Pythian term “*invidiosus*.” The exegesis follows the characteristics of Dante and confers on Siger the scholastic honorary title of “*Doctor Invidiosus*” with all artistic connotations that belong to this title. Siger has been a philosopher called “*invidiosus*”, to be admired and envied since he was and stil is the greatest connoisseur of Averroes of all times. He was the only philosoher of late Scholasticism that profoudly separated the “meta-physics” of the Commentator from the metaphysics of Avicenna. The animosity of academic Furies (*invidïosi*) was joined by modernist *damnatio memoriae* coupled with the repression of Siger’s metaphysics in the sophistic mode of inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). Archaic hermeneutics follows the influence of Muses, who created a new form of divine comedy in the epoch of academic fabulations culminating around the year 1270. Dante represents their leading spokesman in the mode of artistic truth given in his work. Dante’s pantheon truthfully symbolizes intellectual merits of the main protagonists of the first Averroism. The secular priest and philosopher Siger stands above Albert and Aquinas, the most important thinkers of the Order of Preachers. As the last thinker in the series, he completes the philosophical journey of the sun by brilliantly correcting Albert’s and Aquinas’s stance on the question of the unity of the person and the intellect. Dante confirms the contemporary characterization of the Brabant magister as the first intellectual of the West, for whom philosophy became a thankless vocation accomplished in a Socratic way.

Hermeneutics explore Siger’s philosophy in line of Dante. He was Siger’s philosophical disciple, although they probably never met each other. The outstanding connoisseur of the philosophical and political disputes of the time beatified Siger by placing him in paradise, which is not yet the order of the day in the Catholic Church. Bonaventure, Albert and Aquinas received ecclesiastical beatification; fortunately, poets are often prophets of new times. Dante’s companion Vergilius was not allowed to enter the Christian paradise with Dante either. Siger’s struggle against the objectivist construction of metaphysics and for the unity of the person remained misunderstood for entire centuries; the same fate concerned Dante’s evaluation of Siger in *Divine Comedy*. The hermeneutics of objectivity follow the hidden effect of *a/lētheia* that led to emergence of objectivity in the mode of epochal fallacy (*Irrtum*). Dante is the main interpreter of musical *alētheia*, for he followed the course of the divine comedy of his time. This is why we must interpret Siger’s philosophy in the Aristotelian line with regard to his brilliant interpretation of Averroes. Siger rejected Averroism of all kinds because he deformed an authentic interpretation of Averroes made in the Aristotelian line of *De anima*. Using syllogistic arguments, this magister presented a phenomenological analysis of thought that presents the complete unity of the person. His brilliant interpretation of CMDA halted the victorious approach of modernists in Paris for about a decade. That is why the modernists never forgot their lost gigantomachy of substance when they imposed *damnatio memoriae* on it. Being under the influence of Furies, modernists must manipulate the defeats to their own advantage (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). From Siger’s work, hermeneutics is primarily interested in the themes significant for the emergence of objectivity. The interpretation must follow the line indicated by Dante. How does Siger’s treatise *Quaestiones in tertium De anima* (QIIIDA, ca. 1265) defend the line of the first Averroism and against whom? Why does Siger explicitly criticize Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas in his second work *De anima intellectiva*? Why did these two outstanding figures in philosophy (*precipui viri in philosophia*) not offered a complete solution to the unity of the person? Fighting on two fronts at the same time does not pay off, especially not in the turbulent times of 1270–77. Siger claims that Albert and Thomas failed in the crucial question of the unity of the person and were unable to fully synthesize all antinomies concerning the human intellect and soul. Siger’s original contribution, which rejected the errors of the first and second Averroism, necessarily ended in the modern oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). Objective metaphysics does not follow truth as unconcealment (*a/lētheia*). Dante was certainly not an objectivist when he observed the divine comedy of those modernists. The sophistical simulacrum of Siger is given by Western objectivity, which is influenced by the negative evaluation of Siger’s “Averroism” and today only of “Semiaverroism.” Siger’s conception of the unity of the person, however, secretly determines, through Dante’s work, the contemporary madhouse of Western thought (“*Irre*”) by establishing a true and forgotten figure of European humanism (ch. 6.2). Abelard’s original school, transformed into the Cathedral school *École de Paris*, had created Christian unity of the person for the first time around the year 1200 in Blund’s school. Their modern successors refused to preserve this existential definition of a person in an original way in the “*augere*” mode. Due to the decline of “*auctoritas*” of the University in the field of authentic philosophy, there was no longer an act of “*tradere*” concerning the unity of the person. It was the end of the true Christian version of authentic Aristotelianism, because critical philosophy based on deductive evidence was strictly separated from theology. With the disappearance of the person and ultimately of modern God, the phenomenon of the humanistic union of God and man (*religio*) founded by Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3) disappeared as well. By destroying the critical thinking, modernity demolished the fundamental triad “*auctoritas—religio—traditio*” (Arendt 1961, 91–142) that has created the historical identity of the West. By quoting the poet René Char, Arendt rightly says that the modernism was not preceded by any kind of testament.[[190]](#footnote-190) Divine Muses spoke through Dante in the poetic mode of *alētheia*, by unmasking the nihilism of objective modernity and postmodernity. Siger lost gigantomachy concerning the person as a completely uniform hyparchical substance. He was the last authentic Aristotelian (and rector) of the University of Paris and completed the series of outstanding personalities such as Johannes Blund, William of Auvergne and Guillelmus de Sancto Amore. Since academic Paris did not recognize the moment of the truth, the disintegration of the person and the disintegration of the University of Paris followed. The decline of this university in the era of the Enlightenment made the historical consequence of the abandonment of critical philosophy in 1277.

### 4.4.1 Controversy of Twofold Truth

The hermeneutics start from Gauthier’s above-mentioned thesis, according to which the writing *Quaestiones in tertium De anima* (quoted as QIIIDA) was written about 1265–66 and quite soon after the start of Siger’s lectures at the University of Paris (Gauthier 1983, 201). At that time Aquinas was still in Italy. In this work Siger responds, among other things, to Aquinas’s conception of the intellect before his second arrival in Paris in the second half of the year 1269. Siger’s interpretation of the unity of personal existence and intellect is based on both Averroes’s and Avicenna’s interpretation of Aristotle. The logic of Siger’s reasoning in his most important treatise is not accidental. The division of QIIIDA into four groups of questions is very important and follows the basic line of reasoning of CMDA, which is given in the mode of the Sicilian school. The difference between the intellect and the other faculties of the soul (1) leads to analysis of the nature of intellect (2). The definition of the intellect is given by the personal act of recognition (3), which provides a generally given humanistic definition of man as a thinking being within the framework of his specific position in the intelligible structure of the entire cosmos (4). Siger defines the position of man in the integrally given humanism that is based on full unity of the person. Dante adopted this line in the treatise *De Monarchia*. The hermeneutics of objectivity must interpret the theory of the intellect as precisely and attentively as this brilliant connoisseur of Aristotle and Averroes. The interpretation of the faculties of the soul begins with scientific writings of the Corpus. This is a characteristic of the Sicilian school and its interpretation made “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Aristotle deals with three powers of the soul (nutritive, sensitive, and rational) in the work on the origin of animal life (*De generatione animalium*). These faculties of the unique organism are conceptually given in the seed as its potency, but they really exist only in the ensouled individual or the person in their somatic and intellectual faculties (*De gen. anim*. 736b14). The act of walking depends on the legs as a bodily organ. Therefore, bodily potentialities cannot be an external principle to the act of living (ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, 736b24). That hyparchical determination of corporeal faculties determines Siger’s definition of the somatic soul. The unity of existence is postulated at the level of the bodily act of life (ἐνέργεια σωματική, 736b22). The starting point of Sigers definition of human intellect is the first indivisible substance that exists physically as well as mentally and intellectually through the thus given act of the individual soul (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον, 736b12). Let us recall the central meaning of the adjective “*ipse*” (τοιαύτης), which appears in the dispute between Siger and Aquinas about the ipseity of the person soul and intellect (*homo ipse intelligit*). The body is the first substance to make out hyparchical activities (*hoc aliquid*) with regard to various psychic potentialities and abilities. The person is the bearer of the unique act of life and its sensual functions.

A different situation prevails with regard to the intellect, which is immaterial in nature. In the same part of the text, Aristotle states that the intellect, thanks to its unique divine nature (θεῖον εἶναι μόνον), can be understood as the sole activity of the soul (τὸν νοῦν μόνον) with regard to bodily functions, which has reached the bodily potency from outside (θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι). The activity of the intellect has no connection with any bodily organ (οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ ἡ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια, 736b26–28). Siger quotes the statement from Aristotle’s work *De generatione animalium* II.3, according to which only the intellect enters the soul from outside (νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, 736b27). The commentary cites this quotation in the introduction (*solus intellectus est ab extrinseco*; QIIIDA, q. 1, p. 3.48–49). Through his interpretation of *De generatione animalium* II.3, Siger defines two fundamental conditions to which the true philosophical doctrine of the soul and the intellect must fulfill according to Aristotle. The intellect exists as a mental phenomenon only in the act of the existence of the person as a substance that is a hylemorphic substance in the mode *simpliciter* and *actualiter*. At the same time, however, with regard to the immaterial and separated nature of the intellect, it is true that the intellect does not make a part of bodily functions of the organism. The intellect does not require a sense organ for its activity and its act relates to the existentially given soul as the animating form of the unique body. Through its act, the intellect is separated from somatic functions of the soul, but by no means from the act of subsistence of the first substance. Both phenomena that Siger investigates, they make basic experience of each of us. The activity and nature of the intellect are immaterial; however, the intellect is bound to the first hylemorphic given substance as its personal act of operating. The first question, which affects the nature of the soul, includes both antinomies in contrast to the second Averroism. Modernity defines the soul as a collection of dissimilar hypostases given *simpliciter* as objective substances. Siger defends principally the substantial unity of the person that entails the immaterial nature of intellect.

“It must be said that intellectual cognition in the soul is not mixed with its vegetative and animalistic functions (*non radicantur*), which are given in the first real substance (*in eadem simplici*). The intellect is connected with these functions in one and the same soul given in the body (*in eadem anima composita*). Since the intellect is immaterially simple, after its formation it ties in with the vegetative and animalistic faculties of the soul. This connection does not create the simple nature of the soul, but the composite one (*non faciunt animam simplicem, sed compositam*).” [[191]](#footnote-191)

The tension is given between the nature of the sensual soul (*animam simplicem*) and the act of the intellectual soul (*animam compositam*). The human soul is a formally given composite because it contains material—sensual and immaterial—intelligible cognition. The immaterial intellect is not bound to the soul in the same way as the materially given nutritive and sensitive component of the soul (*intellectivum non radicatur in eadem anima simplici cum vegetativo et sensitivo*). These sensually determined faculties exist through the bodily organs and therefore form a *simpliciter* given unity with the hylemorphic essence of the first substance. The intellect is simple and immaterial (*intellectus simplex sit*) with respect to these bodily acts of the soul. Therefore, with regard to the being of the senses, the intellect comes from outside (Aristotle′s θύραθεν, Siger′s *ab extrinseco*) and docks onto the original act of existence of the *simplex* given soul that already consists of both sensorial components. The identity given by the material act of sensual existence is transformed into an ipseity given by the intellectual act of existence. The transformation in the conception of the soul in man occurs because the arrival of the immaterial intellect turns the *simpliciter* given soul into a new compositum (*radicatur cum ipsis in eadem anima composita*). By combining the sensual and the intelligible faculties, a new kind of animated existence is created in the soul. With the arrival of the intellect, the act of sensual subsistence is transformed into the act of intellectual existence (*in suo adventu unitur vegetativo et sensitivo*). Human existence exhibits a special way of the integrity of the body (Aristotle’s τοιαύτης, Siger′s *ipse*). Both sensual components of the soul and the immaterial intellect make the person as a substance animated by the composite soul as a form of the body. The next sentence defines this teaching as an authentic interpretation of the Commentator, who interpreted Aristotle’s teaching in a new way. Siger knows exactly what is given in the original text of *De anima* and what makes the ingenious interpretation that creates the unity of the person in CMDA.

“Therefore, Averroes claimed that according to Aristotle the vegetative, sensual and intellectual components create a soul in the one common substrate (*unam animam in subiecto*). This is true: they create a composite soul (*unam compositam*), by no means a simple soul.” [[192]](#footnote-192)

The first part speaks of the substantial unity of the three potentialities of the one soul (*vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum*), which are connected on a hylemorphic substrate within the framework of the individual act of the soul (*unam animam in subiecto*). The soul given *subiective* in the body as the substrate of mental activity exists *simpliciter*, that is, as the actual form of the first substance (ἁπλῶς τὴν οὐσίαν, *Anal. Post*. 90a10). But the act of intellect is bound to the bodily act of life in a different way than sensory cognition. With regard to the special position of intellect as an immaterial faculty, the existent human soul is a unitary composite (*unam compositam*), which is distinct from the organic faculties of the soul (*non autem unam simplicem*). The organic faculties are given *simpliciter* on the corporeal substratum. This difference was interpreted in the anonymous writings in the last chapter by the difference between the immaterial and therefore external act of the intellect, which is separate from the sensual faculties of the soul. The intellect is given “*subiective*” in the person and is actualized “*obiective*” through the actual phantasms that are necessary for the cognition of the intellect. From the point of view of its activity, the intellect is separated from the bodily existence as a sensually given hylemorphic first substance. The intellect, as defined by Siger, is neither a hypostasis of Porretans nor an Avicennist substance, but has the full character of a separate activity of the bodily soul (*inmixtus*). Otherwise there would not be the immortality of the soul postulated by philosophers and the divine character of intellect, which is separated in terms of its activity from the first substance given as animated sensual body. This reasoning forms the definition between the intellect and the body in the modes *subiective* and *obiective*. This definition of “*subiective—obiective*” made according to Siger and Averroes can only be found in the writings of *Anonymus Giele* and in the *Munich manuscript*. Both of Aegidius’s semiaverroist writings contain this doctrine only formally (*Manuscript Oxford, Anonymus Bazán*), as they have no connection to the writing CMDA and to the doctrine of the Sicilian school. The quotation, with reference to both classical authorities, summarizes the preceding part of the interpretation as an authentic teaching of the first Averroism. Siger highly appreciates the interpretive performance of Averroes. He had modified unclear passages in Aristotle’s teaching on the soul and the intellect. Aquinas and Aegidius refused to do it in that way (ch. 4.4.2). Contrary to Albert’s interpretation of *intellectus speculativus* already given around 1242, they did not want to take the activity of intellect according to CMDA. Siger’s version of the first Averroism showed at the very beginning of the treatise the peculiarity of man and his special existential unity. The soul is composed as a form thanks to the different nature of the immaterial intellect and is given on the one hylemorphic substrate (*subiectum*). The introduction also stated that, unlike the modern Sophists and Averroists, the enviable magister understood the value of clear thinking and the exact meaning of words in the spirit of Dante’s “*silogizzò invidïosi veri*.” All his expressions are with the precisely given logical and metaphysical meanings, which one must correctly distinguish and interpret. It is no wonder that the Latin sophists, driven by the motive of intellectual envy and authoritarian intrigues, turned Siger into an Averroist.

The introductory lecture presented the phenomenology of mental acts that are exercised by specific actions of intellect. The differences between the various acts of the soul gave two basic directions. Firstly, man exists only in one substance and a plurality of substances is excluded. Secondly, the intellect is given as a universal immaterial potency and, according to *De generatione animalium* II.3, it is external to the sensual soul and the organic body. Both points make an appearance observed in the one real substance that everybody can experience in a personal way. In accordance with CMDA, every act of thinking exists as a personal act of existence exercised in the hylemorphic substrate of the body that is experienced in the mode “*ipse*” (*homo ipse intelligit*). That personal activity of the intellect determines the exposure from the front, from the direction of the senses. Cognition takes place thanks to the physical existence of the person. Therefore, the intellect as “*inmixtus*” is bound only “*obiective*” to the body (*ab extrinseco*); but, it is “*subiective*” bound to the soul as its specific faculty, since the soul constitutes a single form of the body. Since the faculty of the intellect refers to bodily acts in the mode “*obiective*,” then the intellect transforms the soul into a new state called “*anima intellectiva*,” which is already a special type of composite activity (*compositum*). The immaterial intellect in man is neither an independent form, as in the semiaverroism, nor a substance, as in the second averroism. The second question, therefore, has no problem rejecting the divine nature of human intellect, which some ancient philosophers understood univocally with the First Cause. Thanks to objective connection of different faculties, human intellect is based on sensual phantasms; therefore, it cannot have the character of the separated active intellect.

“(…) the intellect of the First Mover is, finally and finally, goodness, simplicity and perfection. However, our intellect is not goodness, simplicity and perfection, since a kind of potency is assigned to it. Our intellect is capable of understanding everything and therefore understands through sensual conceptions (*intelligit cum phantasmate*).” [[193]](#footnote-193)

In contrast to the active creative intellect (*Primum Agens*), the human intellect is a composite of potency and actualization (*sit ei admixta potentia*). The composite character of the soul is determined by the exposure of the intellect from the front. With regard to cognition, the receptive intellect is merely in potency (*potentia unumquodque intelligibilium*) and cognizes only through the sensory phantasms (*intelligit cum phantasmate*). The separateness of the human intellect is given by the fact that the primary actualization through the object of thought must be given outside the intellect, in sensory cognition. Therefore, the intellect is not a hypostatized species or a habitus of Avicennist self-reflection, which is given in the substantial and it is always actual, such as the intellect of the “Flying Man.” The fundamental property of human intellect emanates from the immediate knowledge of the body that we experience in a direct and causal way (*ex inmediatis*). The composite and individual form of the soul is not given substantially, by means of *ad hoc* invented matter of the third kind, as is the case in the second Averroism. Siger explicitly rejects any substantialization of human intellect, including the spiritual matter of Rufus and Bonaventure (*dicitur a Quibusdam quod duplex est materia*).[[194]](#footnote-194) The mathematical abstraction is derived from the matter in its sensually perceived hylemorphic being (*ad suum esse est sensibilis*). Therefore, their concepts have no independent existence outside the thinking that makes abstraction in the form of mathematical meaning that comes from sensual cognition (*in mathematicis sit materia sensibilis intelligibilis*). Thus, the possibility of numerical individualization of the intellect became nonsensical. The intellect is real, since it exists in the manner “*subiective*”, that is, in the entelechic soul given as the immaterial form of the body. The composition of intellectual soul is given at the level of the abilities of intellect. They are a final mix of potentiality and actuality made in the process of immaterial cognition. The advantage of immaterial nature of potentially defined intellect lies in the fact that it has a universally receptive character with regard to all recognizable forms. The emphasis on the potentiality of intellect exposed from the front ensured the fulfillment of Aristotle’s basic thesis (*De anima* 431b21) that the soul must be potentially everything in order to recognize everything (*anima est quodammodo omnia*). The immaterial soul is the form for the faculty of immaterial intellect as a universal potency with regard to actualized cognition transmitted through the senses. Therefore, the receptive intellect is really everything in terms of cognition. The interpretation shows that the second question has the principal methodological character. The brilliant interpretation of cognition rejected not only the schizophrenic definition of the person, but also the unitary ontotheology on which stands this problematic doctrine of *Modernorum*. The rejection of mathematical entities given by abstraction of real matter means that any numerical definition of the intellect and the soul lapses as well.

The study of the soul includes in itself the philosophical and theological question of the eternity of the world and the soul, in which the two main topics of the disputes of 1270–77 consisted. Siger, like Averroes, fundamentally defends the reasoning from Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics, because they only make the truthful metaphysical framework find the doctrine of the soul. Thanks to the intellect, the composition of the soul is not of a material nature. The intellectual soul could not be defined according to Aristotle’s physics, that is, in a time tied to the transformation and movement of the body (*transmutatio*).[[195]](#footnote-195) Intellect and soul are immaterial in nature. Any form of matter given in the form of subsistent being is excluded because it presupposes a change in the material substance in the sense given by movement and change. The immaterial intellect and the soul, however, do not exclude *creation ex nihilo*. In philosophy, however, the creation of the soul indicates the question of the transformation of the state and the movement before creation or the question of the creation of the soul or the intellect in eternity or its eternal duration.[[196]](#footnote-196) According to Siger, the cited “*inconveniens”* lies in the fact that the creation of the soul or intellect would accomplish a change in eternity (*transmutatio*) given by the transition from non-being to being.[[197]](#footnote-197) According to Aristotle, this is unacceptable in view of the nature of the first intellect as the Immovable Mover. The creation of the soul for eternity presupposes a change in the divine being (*sua actio esset nova et transmutaretur, si aliquid faceret de novo*). According to Aristotle, the soul is a permanent cosmic form, which exists in the time of eternal duration given by the intellectual movement of thought (*quoddam est tempus quod est mensura motus continui*; QIIIDA, Q.3, p. 9.39). This purely formal potency of the soul is given only in the series of formal and eternal “now”, which are constituted by the movement of the immaterial intellect as a pure cosmic form (*tale tempus non componitur ex ipsis nunc*; ibid, p. 9.40). Siger adds that the creation of even this permanent form would not be hindered according to Christian doctrine. The soul, like all things endowed with a certain degree of potency, was created and exists in the formal and timeless “*nunc*.” This permanent existence of *anima intellectiva* is given as an eternal duration of immaterial cosmic intelligences. It does not contradict the divine creative eternity, which is completely separated from creation. In no case is it possible to define the soul as a species of the third kind in the universal hylemorphism of *Modernorum*. The creation of this species would presuppose a physical change given by the origin of matter, which would mean the abolition of the immateriality of the soul and the intellect. The scripture *De aeternitate mundi* (1272) argues similarly. The eternity of humanity as a whole cannot be given in the same way as with the immaterial cosmic intelligences.[[198]](#footnote-198) Man is born by chance from man, and his secondary destiny in the intellect is tied to the contingent occurrence of the material person. It is not the case in the astral spheres, which are necessarily and eternally given outside of matter. To postulate an eternal “*species humana*” according to the second Averroism and the nominalists is nonsense of almost cosmic proportions. God would create an absolutely superfluous eternal being, which would be given as the first substance outside the occurrence of man. This useless being would exist in the cosmos as a superfluous species given as a mockery of all creative rationality (*frivola ratione decepti*; *De aeternitate mundi*, p. 120.57). Humanity as a species is only a given in our thinking in the form of Averroes’s *quartum genus* in CMDA. The critical Siger separated the intelligible species and the human intellect from the subsistent cosmic forms. The exclusion of eternal species given as exemplars in divine thought fundamentally changed the relationship of the first Averroism to creation. It does not produce an ontotheological form of objectivity according to the biblical version of Oxfordian Fallacy as in Bonaventure’s school. Siger rejected all ontotheological speculations of modernity that looks directly into the divine essence. The reason for the creation or eternity of the soul in the formal series of “*nunc*” lies solely in the divine will itself. From the point of view of philosophy, nothing more can be said about this. What and how this Divine Will gives in and out of itself is absolutely given and is completely unknowable for us. Ontotheological speculation in the context of *potentia divina* or exemplars is unacceptable in the field of natural philosophical cognition. The writing Second Analytics postulates for scientific proof that cognition must be determined by causal effects of existing first substances. The human intellect and the will are not a divine creative intellect and divine will. Divine creative causality and rule cannot be recognized analogously, objectively or anthropomorphically, as we find it in Bonaventure’s modernism. The knowledge of God is only true from the secondary effects given causally in creation. This was explained by Averroes’ term “proof” (*dalā'il*), which Siger and Aquinas, in the spirit of the *Second Analytics*, defined as the only path towards the separate existence of God (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Due to the introduction of a twofold path to God according to theology and philosophy, it became obsolete the basic argument of ontotheological construction of modern metaphysics made in a univocal manner. The way how God created the world or the soul does not belong in philosophy. God’s actions and thoughts are outside the natural cognition of human intellect. An anthropologization of God à la Bonaventure’s two-story system of rules is not possible, as Siger’s commentary on De anima I–II in the Munich manuscript recall (ch. 4.3.2). Let us pay attention to the change in the designation of God as the first mover (*Agens Primus*) in the spirit of Averroes’s metaphysics, which is canonized by Aquinas around the year 1268 in the concept of causal paths to the first cause (ST I, q. 2, a. 3).

“If [the first mover] wanted the intellect to become eternal from eternity, then the intellect has also become eternal, because according to the form of the divine will no other object of his will could have arisen. Anyone who wanted to know whether the intellect was created in the beginning as finite or eternal would have to investigate the form of the Will of the First Mover. But who would be able to explore it?” [[199]](#footnote-199)

Philosophy is able to rationally prove both the unlimited duration of human intellect created in the mode of eternity (*ab aeterno intellectum fieri aeternum, intellectus factus est aeternus*). Whether God created this or that outside of time by the act of the absolutely separate and completely sovereign will—that is, as an unlimited duration or actual eternity of the soul—that is a matter of his doing and it stands beyond of philosophical thinking. The last sentence explains why the dispute over the twofold truth broke out already around the year 1266. The quoted quotation clearly rejects the ill-considered speculations of the second Averroism. All ontotheological speculations are based on the erroneous premise that man can explore the being of the Divine will (*opportet eum investigare formam voluntatis Primi*). The final rhetorical question suggests that such a thing can only be accomplished by a complete maniac. Once again Bacon’s rejection of modernists finds confirmation that they are insane as far as the truth is concerned. Siger does not want to have anything in common with God of *Modernorum* made by the philosophy of Bonaventure and Pecham, whose funeral was done by Nietzsche. Philosophical modernity and, after it, the postmodernism did not want to abandon their mythological ideas about the divine psychology given before the creation of the world. Siger’s later commentary on the writing *De causis* confirms his rejection of speculative ontotheology made by the modernists. In God there can be no potentiality of the creative ideas given in the direction of creation. This would abolish both the principles of the truth given either by the being or non-being of the created thing and the principle of the full actuality of being in the first cause.[[200]](#footnote-200) Siger confirmed the doctrine of the excluded third against all kinds of *tertium ens* in the second Averroism. He abolished the two floors of ontotheological building made by Bonaventure that had founded modern objectivity (ch. 4.1.2). Siger clearly states in the commentary on *De causis* that the creatio *ex nihilo* can be postulated without any contradiction for the totality of creation in the order of Aristotelian metaphysics of eternal motion and forms. The first cause would bring *creatio ex nihilo* into being before the eternal duration of the world postulated by Aristotle (*Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, p. 87.104‒107). The later development of Siger confirms the quality and the argumentative firmness of the basic attitude of the QIIIDA with regard to all the key problems of Latin sophists. The solutions have already been worked out about 1265. Siger takes the intelligent divine will as a phenomenon that cannot be further investigated by the limited human mind, in contrast to the speculative ontotheology of Bonaventure′s and Scotus’s modern metaphysics. The modernists turned Aristotle’s metaphysics into a modern ontotheology and therefore had no inhibitions, see the following dispute of 1277. The preceding quotation from QIIIDA therefore continues by defending Aristotelian doctrine of the Modists from the rue du Fouarre against the unitary ontotheology of modernists.

“If you are investigating whether God wants to create an eternal intellect and why he wanted this more than the creation of the intellect in time, then I answer that God wanted what he wanted (*dico quod sic voluit, quia voluit*). His will does not depend on things as our will do. Although it is not forced by the fact of the existing things, it is nevertheless determined and stimulated by things (*trahitur et excitatur a rebus*). But the will of the First mover is not given from things and it is not determined by their knowledge.” [[201]](#footnote-201)

The secular priest defends unfathomable divine will much more radically (*sic voluit, quia voluit*) than Franciscans led by Bonaventure at that time. The second Averroism introduced into the divine will and intellect the realm of objectively given examplars that were the subject of human speculation. The *rationes* *exemplares* and *seminales* became a component of objective metaphysics and through Leibniz they passed into nihilistic postmodern philosophy. As a result, God of *Modernorum* became an objectively necessary and psychologically understandable creature, which caused his death. The text rejects any speculation with regard to the unattainable will of God, the form of which is radically different from the human will. It depends indirectly on things (*trahitur et excitatur a rebus*); the creative will, on the other hand, does not depend at all on things (*voluntas enim eius non dependet a rebus*). Siger remains a critical Aristotelian in the defense of the two types of the will (and thus also of the intellect) and clearly separates the two modes of cognition and being from each other. Against Latin sophists he defends the theory of twofold cognition, the divine and the human. In contrast to anthropomorphism of modernity, he allows God to be God and does not make him an ontotheological, demiurgically created idol in the human image. Modernity defends the objective conception of Neoplatonic matter of the third kind and of the body outside physical motion. In the demiurgic scenario of *Modernorum*, God is the actualized of the new shadow world (*mundus imaginalis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The new diacosmos of modern scholastics is created by objective being of exemplars in divine thought. Both metaphysical presuppositions are nonsensical from the point of view of Aristotelianism. Aristotle’s version of the eternity of the world and the intellect is only a hypothesis, but from the point of view of philosophy it is much more probable than the ontotheology of *Modernorum* built on nonsensical premises: on the movement in God from potency to actuality and on the establishment of beginning of movement outside time, which, according to Aristotle’s physics, is defined only in relation to the hylemorphic substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). Avicennian Augustinians are unable to critically perceive the fundamentals of their speculations. Siger objectively explains to the first followers of modernism that their ontotheological construction regarding the eternity of the world and the species is philosophically completely confused.

“I maintain that Aristotle’s position on this matter is not necessary in and of itself, as has been stated above. Nevertheless, it is much more likely than Augustine’s position. In fact, we cannot investigate the created creation or eternity from the direction of the divine Will, since we are not able to think about the form of His will.” [[202]](#footnote-202)

Siger rejects the ontotheological speculations of Neoplatonic Augustine with reference to Aristotle by using the logical form of disjunction. The second question concludes, on the basis of formal and metaphysical reasons, the validity of Augustine’s conception of the intellect. According to this, the intellect is created “*de novo*”by God outside the time of creation. This theory presupposes an ontotheological insight into the divine intelligence and the divine Will, which is nonsense from the point of view of the natural mind. According to Siger, Aristotle’s thesis is much more advantageous from a philosophical point of view, which states that the intellect is given in the eternal duration of the formal series of “*nunc*,” which affect the movement of cosmic forms and intelligences. Aristotle’s version of the eternal duration of the world and the intellect does not exclude *creatio ex nihilo* given before this duration in pure eternity, but makes it very problematic from the point of view of philosophy (*inconveniens*). According to Augustine, modernist theory presupposes both *transmutatio* in the order of divine being and human insight into this happening. Both are nonsense from a philosophical point of view. Siger fundamentally rejected the Neoplatonic Augustinism, postulated in Bonaventure’s school by two analogously connected floors of the demiurgic will and the intellect. The knowledge and the will of man and God differ absolutely in fundamental ways. With the philosophical mind we can only investigate God indirectly, i.e. by scientific deduction from causal effects, which are given by the *causa prima* in the real given creation. But the insight into the sphere of the first intelligences in their pure immateriality and in the causality of such first substances is inaccessible to human beings in principle. Cognition limited by the senses only recognizes in a scientific way the real causality of physical bodies. The dogmatically given ontotheology of *Modernorum* creates a unitary concept of God and the domaine de *tertium ens*. In this darkness of modern mind, all cats are then similarly objectively black. Siger opposed the ontotheology in order to defend the truth of the critical and thus distinguishing mind. This connoisseur of Averroes, along with Albert and Bacon, is one of the first thinkers of the Latin West, for whom the philosophical defense of truth against the school of *Modernorum* became a life vocation. The first professional philosophers of the West were not the mythological moderns, but the Aristotelian true ones. The decisive declaration of war against the second Averroism with regard to the theory of twofold truth, which was assumed by Siger’s school from the year 1266, is given in the following statement, which is formulated in the logical form of *argumentum a contrario*. The evidence established appeal from the contrary looks as follows.

“If we take the intellect in its own nature, then it is eternal and was created (*factum aeternum et de novo*). That is why the position of Aristotle is more likely than that of Augustine. Anyone who believes Aristotle’s position cannot accept Augustine’s position. If one believes the position of Augustine, the same is true.” [[203]](#footnote-203)

The quotation summarizes the debate dealing with the creation of the soul and the intellect by expressing the fundamental dilemma in the form of logical contrariety: either Aristotle or Augustine (*si igitur credatur Aristoteli, planum est quod non est credendum Augustino*). At stake was the rejection of Bonaventure’s entire ontotheology based on Oxfordian Fallacy and tied to mystical immersion in divine thinking. There is no possibility of univoke speculation about the state of the world before and after creation; no God’s predestined creative will made by order of exemplars and eternal truths. The same criticism concerns many other mythological speculations of modernists. All these points are connected with the ontotheological insight into the divine Will and the divine Intellect. Siger excluded the ontotheological claim of Avicennist Augustinism from philosophy, because this doctrine is incompatible with Aristotelian metaphysics. Siger does not comment at all on the question of revealed truths explored by theology. He merely states which of these truths are more or less compatible with this or that philosophical school (Aristotle, Augustine) and why both schools exclude each other in their theoretical presumptions. Siger does not dogmatically assert, like omniscient sophists in the mode of one truth, that this philosopher is right and the other is a heretic. Siger explains philosophically why Aristotle and Augustine cannot both be right at the same time. Critical philosophical mind excludes *tertium ens*. This is a brilliant and completely minimalist philosophical argument, which must be defended both then and now in the order of natural reason. Both conceptions of the origin of the soul, which are tied to the dispute about the eternity of the world, are incompatible with each other, because they relate to different types of truth. This is one of the fundamental reasons why in the following five years a fundamental crisis broke out in mendicant Orders, which defended modern Augustinism and Avicennism, with regard to the eternity of creation and the soul. The modernists had to respond to this brilliant position, which distinguished the generic study of theology from philosophy. Let us see the questions addressed to the main intellectuals of the Order of Dominicans by their general in 1271 regarding the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing *De animalibus* and his cosmology (ch. 4.5.3). Siger’s position was defended in Paris in 1272 by the Faculty of Philosophy, which pointed out to the masters and students the fundamental separation of philosophy and theology (ch. 4.1.2). The brilliant point of view taught in the lectures and summarized in the work QIIIDA certainly exerted a fundamental influence on the fact that in 1271 he was elected rector of the artistic faculty by a large part of magisters (*pars Sigeri*) against the Neoplatonist candidate Aubry von Reims. Thus, Siger became the official *Doctor Invidiosus*, which was set out in the subsequent history of the dispute at the University of Paris. Brilliant Aristotelian Siger became the spokesman of Parisian artists after the year 1266. These first professional philosophers were gathered in the school of the first Averroism according to the Sicilian school. They rejected both the Avicennism of *Modernorum* and Aristotelianism of Aquin and partly also that of Albert. After the integral publication of Siger’s commentary on *De anima* (Munich manuscript for DA I–II and QIIIDA), a fundamental dispute arose between the first and the second Averroism. The question of the truth given by divine revelation and the natural mind, which concerned the definition of man, the statute of the soul, as well as cognition, were publicly debated. The second *questio* of QIIIDA presents the balanced text of a Christian thinker that accorded to the philosophy a minimal but fully autonomous field of research established beyond the truths of faith. His view is in no case contrary to these truths, because it does not contradict them. From the point of view of scientific cognition according to *Second Analytics*, theology belongs to the different generic sphere of research.

Siger’s critical philosophy distinguishes exactly between the revealed truths and the critical project of philosophy, which explores the world through the natural light of mind. The conception of the intellect, of the soul, of the species, of creation, etc., according to the Latin sophists, is philosophically absolutely nonsensical, because it is based on objective being of the third kind. The sophisms of modernists created a dogmatic mythology in the line of the dialogue of Timaeus, which Scotus transformed into the objective metaphysics of the West. Siger does not see philosophy and theology as opposing sciences. Nor does he combine them into an ontotheological dogma, as Augustine did in the case of original sin (Ricoeur 1969) and, after him, Bonaventure, into the two-floor construction of the natural and the supernatural science (ch. 4.1.1). Hermeneutics confirm Gilson’s assertion that we find no evidence of a doctrine of the twofold truth around the year 1277 (Gilson 1921, 63). The theory of twofold truth does not exist, because Aristotelian metaphysics does not allow such nonsense. There is a dual generically distinct science, but only one truth as a correspondence of intellect and reality, because we live in one real world. God is one, and the first substance existing in reality is also only one. Truth, as an Aristotelian correspondence of things and intellect in the mode of cognition according to CMDA, cannot be twofold, because otherwise it would not be true. But there is a twofold interpretation of *Second Analytics*, which is given either in Aristotelian way “*ad mentem Averrois*”; or according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The argument of so-called twofold truth existed only as the reason for the attack led by modernists of all kinds gathered in schools of *sophistae Latini*. The second Averroism interpreted the unity of theology and philosophy according to ontotheological version of Oxfordian Fallacy. It was defended in 1277 by two confused decrees issued in Paris and in Oxford. See the introduction to Etienne’s condemnation, which condemned the theory of two fictitious truths, which at that time no one proclaimed (*quasi sint due contrarie veritates*; *Chartularium* No. 473, p. 543). The twofold truth mentioned in the decree was suggested by Sophists. They just founded modernity and had to fight Aristotelians and connoisseurs of Averroes as was Siger. The controversy does not concern the theory of “*duplex veritas*,” which Siger and other masters had never announced. It is about “*unité du savoir*” or “*unicité de la vérité*” (Bianchi 2008, 17). Since Rufus, the second Averroism comprehended the truth univocally and in the framework of ontotheology, that is, in the confused syncretism of modern philosophy and theology (*coaequatio*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The previous interpretations have been based on a similar debate in the Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.5). They showed that Aristotelians have a twofold path to the one truth at their disposal and therefore adhered to two generically different sciences about the first truth: the philosophy and theology. A transition between them is not possible, because one science comes to God as a *causa prima*, and the second explores what God directly and immediately gives of himself as a Creator and Savior in the mode of revealed truths. Both forms of knowledge have a different formal object of investigation; therefore, it is necessary to take the path of scientific proof according to *Second Analytics*. This group that defended the unity of the person and defined the limits of rational cognition according to the first Averroism, the later objective history made the group of Averroists (Gauthier 1984). The second Averroism of the modern *illuminati* took up the ontotheology of *Modernorum*. They created the first version of *metaphysica generalis* that subsumed the objectively conceived theology in the realm of general objective metaphysics. This objective ontotheology of the one truth was abolished in contemporary nihilistic phase of metaphysics after the death of modern God. After his death, everything is allowed in the realm of metaphore and analogy that held together in virtue of knowledge as power produced by modern demonic logic founded by Grosseteste. The burial of modern thought, despite the efforts of contemporary Avicennian Augustinians, took place at the school of Reformed Epistemology, which created a postmodern version of theology based on Oxfordian Fallacy. We live in the tragicomical aftermath of divine comedy that Dante outlined for his time. The first Averroism refused that mixture of objectivist logic of Nominalism, Neoplatonic Aristotelianism and speculative theology à la Bonaventure.

At the beginning of his academic lectures in the rue du Fouarre Siger made it clear which possibilities based on scientific *demonstratio* of theological truths were compatible with Aristotle’s metaphysics and which were incompatible and why. But modernists do not read Aristotle, as Averroes rightly remarked of Neoplatonic contemporaries as objective Avicenna (*moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). Siger’s last major work, the commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, clearly stands behind Averroes’s primacy of the first substance, which, according to Avicenna, finds expression in the context of metaphysical abstraction through the secondary meaning of being. The conception of “*ens inquantum ens*” belongs only to abstract definition of the first substance. But this abstract sense cannot be stated in the categorical mode *by prius*, because it is not justified by actual state of affairs. The unity of metaphysical knowledge relates to existing first substances. This conception of the one metaphysics of the first substance and of two approaches to meaning of being can be found in Albert′s teaching. After overcoming his Avicennist period, Aquinas accepted it as well. This Avicennist period was brought to an end and the treatises *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate* and the work *Summa contra Gentiles* opened a new chapter. The section concerned Albert’s methodology has stated that he divided the study of the soul into an approach given “*simpliciter*” and “*quoad nos*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). Following the Commentator, Albert refused to take Avicenna’s formal, “*simpliciter*” established approach to cognition. Siger took the same realistic position, with reference to *Second Analytics* as the basis of scientific proof. In the order of intellectual abstraction, cognition has two components (*duplex est universale*). The intellect can recognize its own contents without regard to their reference to real things; or, it makes the categorical cognition of things in the framework of the univocal predication related to hylemorphic substance.[[204]](#footnote-204) According to Siger, the method of investigation of the first science in the order *per prius* must relate solely to the causally given substances and not to essences given by definitions in human mind. Since we recognize the causal effect of substances, we can also reflect on the first cause. If, according to the modern Nominales, essence is given in the order *per prius*, then metaphysics does not offer a fully scientific cognition, but merely an analogical cognition established on the level of abstraction given by mathematics, logic and geometry. Siger rejected Neoplatonic sense of being, which the condemnation of 1277 *de facto* defended. The connoisseur of Averroes agrees with the Commentator’s criticism of Avicenna, which is given from the point of view of fundamental “obscurity” in his metaphysics (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Avicenna formed the Neoplatonic predication “*ad unum*,” in which he erroneously combined two different predications of the unity of being into a univocal concept. Let us quote the most important part of Siger’s last known work, which is, of course, the commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Siger clearly recognized and rejected the objective paranoia (*Irre*) of modern thought.

“If, as has already been said, the logical essence is conceived as the metaphysical second substance, then one by no means states the metaphysical imposition that proceeds from a real substance (*non praedicat dispositionem additam ipsi enti*); the logically determined existence in the mode *per se* is taken in the mode of [metaphysically false] convertible univocity and is thus determined by the abstractly given supposition of meaning (*convertibile existens cum eo in suppositis*). The unity of being predicated by the numerically given fundament is related to the properties that are added to the real substance by the abstraction thus determined (*principium numeri significat dispositionem additam rei substantiae*), because they refer to the numerically determined measure of being. But every numerical determination of existence is given in the mode of quantity, as stated in Book X of *Metaphysics*. Then it is clear that the categorical determination of being, which is given by metaphysical imposition [of Aristotle and Averroes], is not the same as the essential determination, which is given by logical imposition [of Avicenna].” [[205]](#footnote-205)

The fatal error of the entire later *metaphysica generalis* is based on the fact that the abstract numerical unity given only in abstracting thought is stated univocally of the unity given *simpliciter* at the level of the hylemorphic first substances (*unum istud non est convertibile cum ente in suppositis*). The unity given in the mode “*ens inquantum ens*” is based on the essential abstraction that considers being as such, in its logical simplicity. We have analyzed the entire debate on the origin of the analytic fallacy by examining the meaning of logical and metaphysical abstraction (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal. Post*. 84a12) that established Oxfordian Fallacy (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). The categorial predication follows the metaphysical dative and states the “meta-physics” of “substance *qua* substance” in relation to hyparchical being of the first substance. In the spirit of the twofold manner of predication “*ad unum*,” the quotation separates the categorial predication according to Averroes from the transcendental predication according to Avicenna. By this distinction Siger separates himself in a fundamental way from Avicennistic modernity and from its metaphysical error. However, already around the year 1266, Siger showed the young generation of philosophers such as Aegidius Romanus the inadequacy of Avicenna’s project of metaphysics. Unfortunately, these Semiaverroists believed in the mythology of the Toledo school and rejected Siger’s brilliant interpretation. Aegidius and Aquinas fell into the trap of Averroism given according to essential abstraction of the intellect as a hypostatized form. Once again, the hyparchical position of the first substance is at play, which is connected with the predication established by exposure of being from the front. The key is the introductory passage of interpretation concerning the book IV of *Metaphysics*.[[206]](#footnote-206) Siger opts for an integral “meta-physics” according to Averroes in the mode of substance *qua* substance. The first science about being as being (*scientia ista considerat ens inquantum ens*) must include in itself the causes and the determinations of the first substance (*considerat causas primas et prima principia*), which give an integral meaning to the search for the first science about being as being. Siger rejected the primacy of metaphysics “*ens inquantum ens*” as insufficient. Avicenna passed over the predication of the categorical unity of being with regard to the causality of the first substance.[[207]](#footnote-207) The correct order of metaphysical “*resolutio*” is absolutely essential. The first science must proceed in the mode *per prius* from the first real substance *qua* second categorical substance (Averroes); then we can proceed *per posterius* to the unity of being as being (Avicenna). Thus we get the whole structure of Aristotelian metaphysics. Siger, as the only thinker of his epoch, understood exactly what was the “obscurity” that was hidden Avicenna’s metaphysics that Averroes criticized (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Let us now quote the key part of Siger’s *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, which presents the deepest understanding of philosophical controversies made during his time.

“If the Being and the One being are stated one after another, then the statement only entails their essence. It follows from this that it is a question of a substantial predication with regard to the being (*substantialia praedicata de entibus*). In the introduction to this work, it was stated that Avicenna claims the opposite of what the Commentator claims in this matter (*Avicenna diceret oppositum, sicut recitat hic Commentator*). The deepest reason for Avicenna’s error lay in the fact that he did not distinguish between the unity given at the level of existing being (*unum quod convertitur cum ente*) and the unity given as a numerical principle (*unum quod est principium numeri*). Both units differ from each other in a considerable way (*multum differant*).” [[208]](#footnote-208)

The quotation begins with reference to the introduction to the fourth book of *Metaphysics*, where Siger justifies the fundamental deficiency in Avicenna’s project of the first science. The modernists are unable to distinguish the difference between the actual metaphysical abstraction, which is integrally defended by Averroes, and the univocal project of Avicenna’s metaphysics. They also based this project on the essence made out in Oxfordian Fallacy, which was perceived in a univocal manner on the level of mathematical abstraction. The unity of the essence is given only in thinking, and therefore fundamentally differs from the real unity of being that makes the first real substance. The modernists combined the study of the essence and the causality of the first substances according to Avicenna to the *metaphysica generalis*. Siger is fundamentally against it, because the unity of the essence and substance differ from each other in a fundamental way (*multum differant*). There is no twofold determination of being and thus also of man, because there is only one real being: that which exists as a real hyparchical first substance. Metaphysics must be the science of the real causes, therefore also of the first substances, and by no means of modern abstractions. The adequate metaphysics is the first science about the being, which is being and thus can also be recognized in the order *per prius* as being (*ousía*). Latin sophists transferred Avicenna’s eclipse of the first substance to the next centuries through *via Modernorum*. In this *epokhē* of modern mind, they necessarily made Siger an Averroist. Philosophers Siger and Bacon were the only thinkers of their generation who knew the epochal meaning of the dispute between Averroes and Avicenna for the development of metaphysics. The theologians Aquinas and Albert adopted Avicenna’s starting points of metaphysics on the question of the unity of the intellect. They changed the metaphysical resolution in that key question that explores the way we recognize the world. Aquinas began by exploring the person as the first substance through Avicenna’s abstraction, i.e., according to Averroes in the mode *per posterius* instead of the categorical predication of hyparchical first substance in the mode *per prius*. But then he could not fully defend the unity of man, because he rejected the integral interpretation of Averroes.

Siger was the only representative of the first Averroism to fully integrate Avicenna, which he criticized, into the “meta-physics” of Averroes (*Avicenna diceret oppositum, sicut recitat hic Commentator*). Having understood the basic metaphysical error of Avicenna, he was able to correct it in a proper way and to assign the right place to abstract conception of “*ens inquantum ens*” by putting it after Averroes’s project. Albert had already made a correct interpretation of the unity of the person according to CMDA in *De homine*, but had not established the unity of both projects of metaphysics in such a precise way as Siger. Albert, like bishop Alvernus before him, needed to ensure the supernatural enlightenment of the soul directly from God in the system of metaphysics, and also to secure the immortality of the soul. Therefore, Albert *per prius* postulates the ontotheologically given the essence of the thing and then adds it to the existing causally given actualized existences (*per dispositionem additam essentiae suae*).[[209]](#footnote-209) The criticism of Albert includes the difficult part in Siger’s introduction to *Metaphysics*. The brilliant reasoning in the line of CMDA examines the person as an autonomous first substance (*esse hominis*) according to *Second Analytics*. Siger separates it from the search for the metaphysical first causes of this substance (*esse enim hominis est ex alio, ut ex Primo*). Siger’s insight into the first substance also includes Avicenna’s formal conception, but in the exact place of the metaphysical dative given according to classical proceeding in the writing *Categories*. If the act of thinking is established by the imposition of the first substance, then it is possible to explore the essence of the first substance given in this way from the point of view taken from *causa* *prima* (*differt homo et esse hominis*). This polemic is important in terms of the basic definition of man in Western humanism, which inherently includes this or that project of metaphysics. Dante knew very well why Siger was the best philosopher of his time. By integrating Avicenna’s metaphysics into Averroes’s project of metaphysics as to unity of the person, soul and intellect, the forgotten synthesis of Falsafa and Christian philosophy has emerged. It established the new unity of the first science and found the destiny of man as a unified substance. Aquin tried the same thing in the work *Summa contra Gentiles*, but from a position critical of Averroes as an Averroist. Thomism rejected the project of Averroes’s metaphysics in its integral form defended by Siger. Duns Scotus also proceeded in the same exclusive way, which, in addition, integrated Aristotelianism of Porretans and *Nominales* into Avicenna’s metaphysic all established in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy.

### 4.4.2 Phenomenology of Intellect

The previous chapter has shown that Siger’s metaphysics is the first science that is related to the real substance recognized in the mode of the metaphysical dative. Averroes begins his exploration of metaphysics with physics to expose the phenomenological description of the effects given by the causal action of the first substances. He then goes on to describe the perception and cognition of all living beings, which includes human beings as well. Siger, who methodically constructs the science of the soul according to the Sicilian school, cannot proceed otherwise if he claims scientific truth according to *Second Analytics*. The brilliant defense of Averroes’s concept of “meta-physics” established, among other things, the basic thesis of the first Averroism: The man exists only in the one substance and a plurality of substances is excluded. The second step in Siger’s phenomenology of cognition is no less binding because it enables us to understand his polemic with the eminent representatives of the first Averroism, Albert and Aquinas. The opening question established what Aristotle meant by the thesis that the intellect comes to us from outside. Aristotle’s above-mentioned quotation from the work *De generatione animalium* II.3 describes the act of the first indivisible substance that exists physically as well as mentally and intellectually through the act of the individual soul (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον, 736b12). Aristotle’s cited writing explains that the cognition of soul and intellect begins at the level of the bodily act of life (ἐνέργεια σωματική), in the framework of the causal activity exercised by the first indivisible substance. Now it is necessary to explore the particular nature of the intellectual act. It starts as the act of existence in the mode of existential ipseity and not from objective identity, which is a typical Averroistic position of modernity. Siger defends immateriality and immutability of the intellect (QIIIDA, qq. 2, 3) and refers to externally given intellect (*ab extrinseco*) that is actually experienced in the personal existence. The fourth question of QIIIDA adds a further phenomenological research principle to the first doctrine of the intellect from the outside, which is taken directly from CMDA. The hermeneutic question of “how” we recognize the world and our self in the act of real existence given in the first person, Siger takes it to be a fundamental question. The new status of phenomenological research in the metaphysics based on the causality of first substances is of an absolutely fundamental nature of Aristotle and Averroes and of Siger as well (*ecce ratio quae potuit Aristotelem movere*; QIIIDA, q. 4, p. 12.67). The fourth question deals with the question of whether the human intellect is of a sensual and material nature (*si est generabilis*, p. 12.70). Alexander and, after him, the modern and postmodern Alexandrians asserted this. They defined the *intellectus materialis* bound to the senses. Then, they separated the immaterial component outside the modern individual, which they linked to the body in the mode of *copulatio*. Following CMDA, Siger rejected such nonsensical solution. He holds with Aristotle to the immateriality of the human intellect in the mode *ingenerabilis*, which comes from outside to accomplish animal faculties of the soul. The intellectual component of the soul cannot have the same principle of cognition as the senses, because the intellect is given in the modality of *inmixtus* and *ab* *extrinsece* with regard to sensory cognition. But in contrast to the dualism of modern Alexandrians, the original unity of the intellect must be found in such a way that it satisfies the scientific demands of *Second Analytics*. Deductive proof is based on causality of first substances that entails the middle link of the syllogism. The approach of QIIIDA to the question of cognition of the world is strictly anti-Cartesian. Siger fundamentally believes in the senses because the intellect is only actualized through sensory cognition. The first modernist Rufus does not believe in “disobedient matter” (*inoboedientia materiae*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2), which postmodernists Descartes and Husserl followed. Siger’s meditation on the mode of cognition proceeds in exactly the opposite way as Avicennists do. Modernism regards thinking as essential activity that stands outside the causality of first substances. Conceived in this erroneous way, the intellect is objectively given to the body from outside. That dualism determines the path of Oxfordian Fallacy, which ends in the Cartesian dualism of the person. The introduction to Siger’s work claimed on the contrary that the cognition begins with the senses and it is an indivisible act of the person. Therefore, there is no direct insight into the nature of the soul because it is not recognizable in and of itself in its pure state. Moreover, every true universal knowledge is the result of scientific proof that investigates the real causality of first substances. It must be applied to the soul as well. For scientific proof of the human soul, this basic thesis of scientific proceeding must be uncompromisingly true. The philosophy investigates scientifically the only being that makes science; therefore, the investigation of “*anima intellectiva*” must be methodologically absolutely valid. Modernists and postmodernists observe the world under the influence of Oxfordian Fallacy; also, they took exactly the opposite approach to Siger. Porretan modernism and postmodern Descartes investigate non-existent hypostases that make the support of the first principles of cognition. They recognize those hypostatized and non-existent entities in a direct intuition. Modern “science” observes its own *scibile*, which does not exist in reality. The modern paranoid subject does not mind, because the modern individual believes only in himself as a fundament of cognition (*Ge-Stell*). Siger knows that modernity begins with the speculatively given substance of the soul (*scibile*) that is inserted in the mythological ontotheology. In the second step, modernists deductively derive the intellect as a hypostatized property or even as a substance out of this imaginary objective world. The modern definition of “*anima intellectiva*” is thus completely paranoid. It stands outside the classical scientific approach of *Second Analytics* and this colossal stupidity establishes the modern concept of man as a schizophrenic individual. In the historically first meditations on philosophy in the Latin West, Siger explores the actual “*operatio*” of the intellect according to CMDA. The act of intellectual cognition shows that the hylemorphic person, as the first substance, possesses a specific causality that concerns the activities of intellect. Following the example of Averroes’s metaphysics, scientifically minded Siger first seeks the fundamental trajectory (*Vor-blickbahn*) in which the sense of being emerges that is recognized by the intellect. The interpretation of the way of knowing follows the same methodology and the same principles as CMDA. Therefore, Siger separated himself from the dogmatic and philosophical mythology of *Modernorum*, as well as from the first Averroism of Albert and Aquinas. In the question of the unity of the intellect, they were influenced by the Avicennism of the Toledo school.

The fourth question established a new phenomenological starting point through which the course of cognition is illuminated. The phenomenally given intellect exists in the mode *per prius* through the observed and experienced activities of the soul. Brabant magister starts from the fact observed by Aristotle that the essence of the soul is not immediately apparent (οὐδέν πω φανερόν, *De anima* 413b25). In his brilliant CMDA commentary, Averroes again addresses the hermeneutic way in which knowledge is given in the human soul, in accordance with the basic question stated in *De anima* (πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν, *De anima* 439a13). The intellect is separated from sensual qualities of the soul, which are located in the various organs of the body. The metaphysics built on real effects of the first substance examines the essential “how” (πῶς) that determines the phenomenological and hermeneutic perspective that investigates the act of intellectual cognition. Siger’s interpretation follows the key argumentation of CMDA II.1, where the fundamental hermeneutic “how” (πῶς, *quomodo*) is defined.[[210]](#footnote-210) It determines Averroes’s methodological approach that makes the cognition of intellect. This passage of CMDA separated the original text of *De anima* from the Commentator’s ingenious interpretation. Aquinas refused to accept it, as we will see later. With this question, the writing CMDA begins the analysis of the real course of cognition. Averroes opens with this question the commentary on DA III that elaborates the most important analysis of intellect as *tertium genus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Siger, and after him Heidegger, took up Averroes’s questioning again. The part quoted from CMDA III.1 helps to clarify the nature of soul and intellect. It becomes the starting point for the research of intellect. The quotation taken from CMDA presents the procedure that goes retrospectively from the effects to the causes. That proceeding determines the entire approach of Siger’s metaphysics and his interpretation of human cognition.

“The Commentator says in the interpretation of the third book of *De anima* that ‘we recognize the soul primarily with respect to us according to its activities and not according to the substance.’ Therefore, the activity of the intellect enables us to recognize the substance of the soul (*actio intellectus facit nos scire substantiam eius*). Thus it is possible to seek an answer to the question of whether the soul is created or uncreated.” [[211]](#footnote-211)

We recognize the soul through its activity (*actio intellectus*), because these acts are given in the order of predicated causality. The cognition of the soul must proceed from the entire architecture of the mental acts (*scire actiones animae prius est apud nos*). Secondarily, we infer the essence of the soul on the basis of activities of the soul with the help of scientific proof. Thanks to the proven and predicated causality of the soul, it is possible to recognize the soul with regard to its essence (*scire eius substantiam*). The intellect reveals itself through its activity, and according to these effects we can infer its essence (*actio intellectus facit nos scire substantiam eius*). We ourselves are capable of identifying and recognizing the mode of our thinking. Therefore, the basis of cognition is the act of the physical existence and not Augustinian or Avicennian self-reflection. Then, we can move from the consequences to the causes, from empiricism to metaphysics, and to investigate the essence of intellect (*scire eius substantiam*). The approach in the research separated itself from the objectivist position of Oxfordian Fallacy, which defined *anima intellectiva* objectively as the essence. Modernity then deduces from this essence the properties of the intellect in Neoplatonic mode made according to *Liber de causis*, whereby the activity of the higher form characterizes the lower activities (*operatio sequitur formam*). On the contrary, Siger scientifically explores the nature of the intellect according to *Second Analytics*. Effects of hidden soul as the cause causality go through mental activities according to classical motto “*operatio sequitur esse*.” It is necessary to understand the term “*esse*” not as Avicennist in the mode “*ens inquantum ens*,” but according to Averroes’s metaphysics of “substance *qua* substance.” Siger is not a modernist as Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventure to believe in the direct insight into the essences. Aquinas began with the study of the intellect as a form and he proceeded to its effects (ch. 4.5.2). The same can also be done with the definition of the soul and the effects can then be deduced from hypostatized being defined in this way. However, according to Siger, this is an incorrect approach given in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. Then we get only a formal definition of this question, in the form “what” is the intellect. The predication of the intellect as an essence is made by illuminating the intellect from behind, from the nominally given meaning of Avicenist being. The intellect studied in that way is given for cognition only in the mode *obiective*, that is, only as an objective hypostasis, a subsistent form of Cartesian *res*, or even as a substance of the third kind in the mode of universal hylemorphism. According to previous interpretation of *De generatione animalium* (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον, 736b12), the body is *subiectum* of intellectual faculties of the soul. In the mode *actus essendi*, the person is bound to the existence of hylemorphic first substance. On the basis of above-mentioned facts, the corresponding operation of the intellect given “*ab* *extrinsece*” must be causally demonstrable as effects of the hylemorphic substance. The existence of the intellect and of the soul is not evident from itself, but it comes from experienced sensual cognition. Therefore, cognition cannot be defined *per prius* by any ad hoc postulated essence or hypostasis, as it is the case in modernism and postmodernism. We have seen that Siger was ready to acknowledge this position in the study of the first and second parts of *De anima*, which we find in the Munich manuscript (ch. 4.3.2). In the third part of *De anima*, the objective and essential approach is excluded. The writing QIIIDA would thus do away with Averroes’s most important hermeneutic question: How does the intellect work as an existentially given potency of the soul in the real human being? Siger adjusted the perspective of understanding the intellect according to the intention of writing *De anima* interpreted in the line of CMDA. Therefore Siger has become the first phenomenologist of scholasticism and the only fully true interpreter of Averroes in the Latin West. The definition of the person founded by him is not identical with the representatives of the first Averroism defended by Aquinas or Albert. Both Aristotelians remained Avicennists on this point. They did not see Avicenna’s erroneous metaphysical position, which is given by the primacy of the essential definition. The previous chapter explained that for this fundamental reason the Brabant master refused to recognize Avicenna’s metaphysics as the first science of being, because it was not the first science about real substances. Aquinas and Albert never went so far in their rejection of Avicenna. Therefore, they stayed with one leg on *via Modernorum*.

Siger and, after him, Heidegger, in the question of existence and cognition, does not essentially define “what” the intellect is, but “how” is the existence experienced in the first person. Now it becomes clear why Siger is entitled to the honorary title of *Doctor Invidiosus*. Let us return to the quotation from the work *De generatione animalium* II.3 (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον) that characterizes the approach of the Sicilian school to the unity of the person and intellect. The act of intelligible existence takes place in the physical person as the first substance, and not in the schizophrenic consciousness of *Modernorum* separated from the body. The plurality of substances in man, given as Neoplatonic body and soul; or, as *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, contradicts Averroes’s concept of the first science based on the causality of first substances. According to CMDA, Siger postulates an interpretation of the phenomenology of soul and intellect in the triadic mode: *per actiones intellectus — apud nos — ad substantiam intellectus*. The causality of cognition is given by the act of the intellect in the mode *tertium genus* that makes a component of the soul as its immaterial faculty. After the establishment of this level of the middle link of the deductive syllogism (*medium*), Siger can deduce a deductive general conclusion about the nature of the intellect in the mode *quartum genus*. Then the intellect is conceived as an abstract entity in the mode *obiective*, that is, as the potential and universal concept. But the essential fact of the intellect, thanks to the complete *demonstratio*, has a scientific character and it is therefore not a mere objective speculation. A similar triad guides Heidegger’s exploration of existence within the framework of the fundamental ontology. With Siger, the threefold act of existential understanding is given by a complete description of the act of recognition, i.e., the real way in which we recognize. The result of the phenomenology presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” makes the new facticity of cognition. It points to Aristotelian principle of “how” the true cognition appropriates the being (*dativus possessivus*, ch. 4). Siger’s commentary on *De anima* not only follows the objective arguments of CMDA, which was factually correctly done by Albert and Bacon in the first Averroism. The fourth question sets out the fundamental starting point in the cognition of the intellect in the investigation of the phenomenological question of “how” we recognize, because soul and intellect cannot be a substance. Siger’s hermeneutic insight first establishes the direction from where the manifestation of meaning comes into the field of research. Seen in the mode of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, man recognizes through the immaterial intellect separated from the senses. All classical philosophers agree on the point “what” the intellect is as such (*Gehaltsinn, Gefragtes*). However, the question is “how” we really recognize as a single person in the body (*Bezugssinn, Befragtes*). One’s own experience of cognition forms the *medium* of a scientific demonstration. Within the framework of deduction, the interpretation goes to “how” the intellectual component of the soul is given, because it has a different character from the senses. The deductive proof comes from the properties of “my” thinking in the body as the first substance. It is only in the third step that the interpretation reaches the metaphysical nature of man, who possesses the ability of intelligible cognition of the world (*Vollzugssinn, Erfragtes*). Because the intellect and the soul are not “something” in the way of substance (*hoc aliquid*), then the metaphysics cannot objectively define the intellect and the soul in the way of Neoplatonic Avicenna. It is therefore necessary to *follow* Averroes, in order to investigate the operation of intellect in the framework of animal faculties of the soul. This activity makes the order of the *demonstratio* in order to infer the essence of intellect. The phenomenological approach to the unity of the intellect can be expressed as the difference between the term “*homo ipse intelligit*” (Siger) and the term “*homo intelligit*” (Aquinas). This is the point where the objectivist interpretation of Aquinas in the mode “*veritas*” differs from the phenomenology of Siger in the mode “*alētheia*.” The conception of the intellect as an “*ipse*” (*tertium genus*) or as an “*idem*” (*quartum genus*) is not the same from the point of view of scientific evidence. That question of metaphysical imposition of sense and logical supposition of meaning is clearly distinguished in the writing CMDA. The scientific proof of intellect must have the correct procedure of categorical predication according to the canonical text of *Categories* (*Cat*. 2a14‒16). In the first case, *anima intellectiva* is defined in the mode *simpliciter* and *actualiter*, i.e., as a description of the existential way in which we recognize. In the second case, it is only about a definition in the mode *simpliciter* when the soul exists as an abstracted species and only as a universal meaning given in mind. Once again, the procedure of deductive proof according to the *Second Analytics* comes into play, whereby the procedure is given according to the twofold metaphysical predication of either the first substance or the essence (*Anal. Post*. 84a11‒14). Aristotelian Aquinas did not see this difference between the two approaches to the intellect and turned Averroes into an Averroist, which Bonaventure’s school had previously accomplished. The work *De anima* does not explicitly include this division into existential and formal recognition of the soul, but only the congenial interpretation of the Commentator done in the mode of the Sicilian school. Only the interpretation of CMDA is authentically given “*ad mentem Aristotelis*” because it upholds the basic goal of the metaphysics of “substance *qua* substance.” The identity of the person is much more than just the identity of the individual act of cognition. The identity actualized but the formal definition of the soul or man.

This distinction forms the fundamental difference within the first Averroism between the followers of Siger in the rue du Fouarre (*pars Sigeri*) on the one hand and the religious representatives of the first Averroism on the other. They included Thomas Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus since 1268, while they separated themselves from “*pars Sigeri*” to defend the new interpretation *De anima* of Thomas as *Expositor Novus*. Similarly, contemporary analytical modernity in the mode of objectivist Oxfordian Fallacy cannot comprehend Heidegger’s definition of existence. The separation of Aristotelian Heidegger from Avicennist Husserl was just as inevitable as the separation of Aristotelian artists in the rue du Fouarre from the modern Faculty of mendicant orders.[[212]](#footnote-212) As a result, gigantomachy of substance entered a new round, which was based on the Aristotelian exegesis of the Commentator and Siger of Brabant. The second Averroism was completely outside the debate of the thinkers in the school of the first Averroism, as evidenced by repeated runs away of Rufus, Kilwardby and Pecham from the University of Paris to Oxford. The modernists presented the nature of the intellect in a fundamentally erroneous way, in the spirit of dualism, borrowed from the world of non-existent simulacra of the third kind. Siger and Aquin reject any dualism of Avicenna’s “Flying Man.” However, Albert and Aquinas were not able to fully interpret the act of understanding within the framework of the way “how” we recognize within the framework of the one person given in the body. Averroes and Siger described the way in which thinking in the mode *per prius* proceeds from the existence of the person in the mode “*ipse*” (*scire actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam*). Siger understood under scientific definition of the unity of the person something different than Toletan modernity, because he followed the path of the Sicilian school. The formal analysis of intellect does not cover the entire perspective of CMDA. Siger’s apology of actual cognition contained in QIIIDA contains the core of the later polemic against Albert and Aquinas, which is described in the work *De anima intellectiva*. In the following chapter, we will deal with it in more detail. Siger’s debate with the modernists returns to the older polemic between Alvernus’ school and the second Averroism. The basic question concerns the status of species, which we are experiencing in the actualized cognition. The treatise must investigate the manner how the universal form of immaterial nature is recognized (*quod* *forma, qua acceptionem universalem fieri in nobis experimur, non sit materialis*; QIIIDA q. 4, p. 13.93‒94). That brings about the next question of the dispute between the first and the second Averroism that concerns the different status of *species intelligibilis*. Does the species have a hypostatic and univocal character or is it a pure product of intellect?

Siger proceeds according to *Second Analytics* that defends the metaphysical primacy of the first real substance. The exposure from the front, from the first substance recognized by the senses, determines the receptive and therefore purely potential component of the immaterial intellect. The immateriality of intellect produces species and it excludes its sensually given materiality. Thus, the univocity of species with the reality of the first substance is excluded. It is the condition for establishing the correspondence theory of truth by the terms *proportio* and *consimilitudo* in CMDA. Different nature of species leads to an analysis of the act of recognition, where this question takes its origin. Truth as a correspondence arises thanks to the difference between the sensual and intelligible species, since the intellect is actualized from the senses. The first intellectual of the Latin West, after Alfarabi as the Second Master, begins with a precise definition of universal species and determines their status by making the connection between the senses and the intellect.

“The truth is what we understand by intelligible forms given by sensual abstraction. But in the act of understanding itself, the intellect does not need a sense organ. Through the sensual phantasms, the intellect takes the immaterial essences of things, which neither the imagination nor the senses are capable of.” [[213]](#footnote-213)

The quotation clearly defines the process of sensual abstraction given from the direction of the senses and therefore materially defined (*cum phantasmate abstractione*). That bodily process is separated from the immaterial act of the intellect (*intelligimus...formae intelligibilis*). The next sentence cancels the basic thesis of the second Averroism and denies the univocal status of species. Siger defends Averroes’s conception of truth as a *proportio* of the senses and the intellect, and by no means the truth of modernity given by Anselm’s *rectitudo*. The hermeneutic principle, “how” we recognize, says that we experience cognition in the real act of existence given in the hylemorphic first substance. The intellect assumes the universal and consequently immaterial *quidditas* of things (*intellectus accipit quidditates rerum insensibiles*) through sensual imagination (*sub phantasmatibus sensibilibus*). Aegidius Romanus refused to investigate this paradoxical connection in the Oxford manuscript and turned Averroes into an Averroist (ch. 4.3.2). Siger starts from a true understanding in CMDA and sets out the real course of cognition. Mediation on the first philosophy unfolds the phenomenology of understanding (*tu quaeres*), which is given by the hermeneutic way how we recognize (*qualiter*).

“Are you looking for the way how we experience in ourselves the reception of the universal forms given by intellectual cognition? What is the proper activity of the intellect? I assert that the intellect has its own activity, given in a certain way (*quodammodo*), and I also assert that we are able to experience it (*dico quod hoc experimur*). This is so because the intellect is given in a certain way (*quodammodo*) as if it were some composition of matter and form (*sicut aliquid compositum*). In the totality of its abilities, the intellect perceives the activity, which is characterized by the form. Therefore, the intellect is a form; further, it is an activity that is characterized by matter, and from there the intellect is a kind of matter.” [[214]](#footnote-214)

The question of the character of species is posed in a completely different way than in modernism and postmodernism that is objectively blind to hermeneutic cognition of the person in the mode *alētheia*. Siger does not investigate “what” the species is, but asks another question: How do we experience in ourselves the emergence of universal meaning? Cognition in the body creates universal knowledge through the personal exercise of the intellect (*in nobis fieri ab intellectu*). The objective “*factum*” is not the same as the hermeneutic “*fieri*.” Following Averroes, the first Latin phenomenologist of the person asks at the level of existence (*Bezugssinn, Befragtes*) how the reception of recognized forms takes place in virtue of real causality (*qualiter ergo experimur acceptionem formae communis*). In the act of one’s own act of recognition, we experience (*experimur*) the species through the composed activities of intellect given both sensually and intellectually. The intellect resembles a hylemorphic composition (*intellectus noster est quodammodo* *sicut aliquid compositum ex materia*). But any mesalliance with Bonaventure’s quasi-matter is excluded; let us see the previous thesis on the intellect separated from matter (*ab extrinseco*). Our direct experience shows cognition both from the direction of the materially given senses (*debetur materiae unde materia est*) and from the direction of the abstracting and synthesizing intellect (*debetur formae unde forma est*). The conclusion of the quotation asserts that we are able to experience both directions or ways in the holistic act of intellect (*in toto enim potentia percipitur operatio*). Let us compare Siger’s “*debetur*” given by necessity according to *Second Analytic* with the dogmatic and sophistical formulations of the second Averroism, namely of the Oxford analytic school (*subiectum debet esse tale*; ch. 4.3.2). Siger defined the necessity of cognition according to the real causality of the middle link of the syllogism, just as *Second Analytics* requires it for scientific cognition. Again, Aristotle’s and Averroes’s basic thesis applies that the universals exist only in the intellect. It was clear to all Aristotelian masters in Paris that Siger defended the metaphysics “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to CMDA and amended the hidden dualism in the original of *De anima*. In the hermeneutic modality, Siger showed “how” the genuine cognition takes place. Around the year 1266 he presented an interpretation of the intellect according to the scientific proof in *Second Analytics*, in complete agreement with the letter and spirit of CMDA. His brilliant interpretation sorted out Oxfordian Fallacy from cognition by starting the demonstration from the middle link of the deductive proof, which each of us personally experiences when we recognize something. Brabant master synthesized the new subject of cognition in the mode of anti-Cartesian evidence based on sensual experience. Let us cite his answer to the question of how the intellect synthesizes the general form on the basis of sensual cognition.

“We are aware of the activity of the intellect (*nos consciii sumus intellectum*) thanks to the bodily faculties (*ex virtutibus corporis*). The proceedings that are given or take place in us are created by the abilities of body and matter defined in this way. In a similar way (*similiter*) we perceive the actions that take place in and through the intellect. It is our own intellect (*ipse est intellectus noster*), through which we experience the apprehension of universal knowledge (*per quem experimur*), which arises in us (*fieri in nobis*). Our intellect experiences itself in the act of its own activity (*apprehendit se ipsum sicut operari*). If we accept these presuppositions, the conception of intellect emerges from them to be immaterial and not bodily produced.” [[215]](#footnote-215)

Let’s return to the question of the act of thinking that we experience in the first person. The first sentence abolishes the myth of Cartesian *cogito*, which operates as a separate substance from the body that makes yet another substance in man. Since the intellect is actualized from the direction of the senses (*ex virtutibus corporis*), we receive both the knowledge from the senses and the knowledge of our knowledge (*nos consciii sumus*). The cognition of intellect to be a *factum* of knowledge is given physically and sensually at first (*conscii sumus...intellectum*). This point forms the core of the theory “*subiective—obiective*” that was introduced at that time. The carrier of the intellect is the immaterial faculty of the composite *anima intellectiva*. The intellectual mode “*inmixtus*” makes the experience of one’s own body as a recognized object (*obiective*). The intellectual capacity of the soul is actualized in the existential mode by the sensual body as a substantial subject of *anima intellectiva* (*subiective*). Cognition is given by our own intellect (*ipse est intellectus noster*), through which we experience the reception of a universal cognition (*per quem experimur*). Siger’s teaching on the twofold character of intellectual cognition in the mode “*subiective—obiective*” was taken over by the magisters in the rue du Fouarre. It is confirmed by *Anonymus Giele* written by Boethius of Dacia (ch. 4.3.1). This reasoning was also used by objective semiaverroists such as Aegidius, who, however, did not understand or rejected existential and phenomenological aspect of that teaching. We recognize the intellect in the first person in such a way (*experimur huiusmodi*) that we experience the act of cognition on a universal level (*acceptionem universalem fieri in nobis*). The intellect is exposed from the front, and at the same time this act takes place in the mode “*ipse,*” since we ourselves make the middle link of cognition in the sense of unique causality. The act of thinking is completely in our power, because we think when we want it by ourselves. First, Siger established mediations of cognition (*experimur…conscii sumus*) on the level of direct causality given in the body and in the mind (*tertium genus*). When he completed the deductive proof, he made a conclusion that can be formulated as a universal concept of intellect (*quartum genus*). Having established both mediations of knowledge given bodily and consciously, it is possible to move on to the final essential level of the general conclusion. Only then does the intellect appear as an essence in the act of Cartesian or Augustinian self-reflection (*intellectus noster apprehendit se ipsum sicut operari*). However, this view is given by Siger only as the conclusion of the deductive judgment, which fully predicts the causal activity of the intellect. The quotation shows that the reflected and recognized intellect as the object of our cognition is no longer an objective *scibile* of the second Averroism, but the notion of intellect in the mode *quartum genus* according to CMDA. This abstracted concept of the intellect neither thinks nor recognizes, because we experience thinking only in the first person (*tertium genus*). Then the immateriality of the intellect applies, since it is separated from the senses by its own act of thinking. The intellect recognizes when we want it by ourselves as a person and its recognition takes place in the immaterial act of thinking. The senses, on the other hand, must recognize at the moment when they are causally influenced by a change in the receptive organ. This basic argument is used in the writing CMDA against the modern Alexandrians in connection with Themistius. The cognition made in the sense of “*ipse*” means that we experience the thinking as being fully in our power (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). We recognize in the first person and in the body and that is why we intellectually cognize something when we want to. The scientifically formed philosopher rejects a definition of the intellect as a Porretan hypostasis that contemplates itself in the act of objective illumination. Siger synthesized the work of bodily senses and intellect according to Aristotelian science. The intellectual experience starts from sensually given cognition (*experimur*); only in the second step this act can produce an Augustinian or Avicennian act of reflective consciousness, which is connected with already actualized intellect (*conscii sumus*). In contrast to modernity, Siger defines the intellect through the causality of a physically existing person, because the cognition is determined by *species sensibilis* that are synthesized in the imagination. The difference between the cognition experienced from the senses and the cognition experienced through the consciousness of the separated intellect establishes the new definition of knowledge. The intellect is in an external position given “*obiective*” with regard to the senses, because their activity has a sensory organ. But the receptive ability of intellect is an immaterial potency and therefore must be actualized from the direction of sensual species (*subiective*). The *intellectus possibilis* cannot receive another actualization, because otherwise it would be a material or immaterial substance. The receptive faculty of the soul, in the mode of *intellectus possibilis*, represents the field of the revelation of universal sense of being in the new, universally and immaterially given type of knowledge. That act of cognition is established in the first person, because it is a physically and sensually conditioned act of knowledge. This brilliant determination of self-consciousness is bound to the existence of the physical person as the first substance. It had been completely forgotten until Heidegger’s *Analytik des Daseins* created a new phenomenology of the person as *tertium genus*.

Siger found the new form of *dativus auctoris* (ch. 4). Brabanter magister phenomenologically described the way, how the existing person recognizes the world. The modern dualistic subject does not exist in the unity of an existential act, and therefore the modern subject has before him the mythological world of objective being of the third kind. For next centuries of modern Averroism, it remained only the Avicennist model of the self-reflexive intellect as a Cartesian substance of the third kind (*res cogitans*). The intellect defined by Siger and experienced in the act of intellectual cognition (*ipse est intellectus noster*) differs fundamentally in the mode “*subiective*” from the general concept of the intellect, which is given at the end of cognition as a pure abstraction in the mode “*obiective*.” The act of existential cognition (*tertium genus*) created an intentional object as a cognition of the intellect as a universal meaning (*quartum genus*). Thus, the *dativus finalis* of the entire process of cognition is also given, through which the specific universality of cognition in the mode *quartum genus* is given at the level of all mankind. This type of intellect exists only as an abstraction in thinking in the form of the universal called “*species humana*.” Aquinas and the modern age could not see this distinction between the intellect as a *tertium* and *quartum genus*, since they rejected the scientific definition of intellect according to CMDA as Averroism. As a result of the eclipse of the person as the first substance, the objective domination of the hypostasis, called “intellect” or “soul,” arose, and this domination of the objective intellect of the third kind opened the historial fallacy (*Irrtum*) of new metaphysics. Siger does never completely separate the two sides of the intellect, but distinguishes them precisely by determining the exposure of the intellect from the front, from the direction of real things. They exist *simpliciter* and they exercise the real causality. That kind of necessity makes foundation of a unified and holistic description of the way how the intellect works in the real person. The new form of consciousness attached to Siger’s “*subiectum*” is not an Avicennian and Cartesian *cogito*, which is given as a fictitious first person that is separated from the body, such as in the framework of Husserl’s transcendental egology. Siger’s definition of the subject is given as a double kind of “*conscientia.*” It subsists on the personal entelechic soul, which is given as a composite of the form updated in the material substrate. The modernists completely missed the fundamental nuance in CMDA given by Siger’s difference between the “*subiective*” given act of intellect in the soul and the “*obiective*” synthesized intellect as a universal cognition made by the personal act of thinking. This gives both the unity of the intellect as “*homo ipse intelligit*” that is separated from the senses. Knowledge must therefore have *pluralis majesticus* because it is one, indivisible, immaterial and separate from the senses (*conscii sumus*). Receptivity in the context of *intellectus possibilis* is an immaterial potency of the soul, through which the act of understanding comes in existence. It is given at the level of the first actual substance in the first person, that is, as a holistic act of the person. Cognition as *tertium genus* is an act of our hylemorphic body in the mode of existentially experienced causality, by no means any separate substance, which we meditate from the height of the modern mind separated from the body. The thesis of the second averroism about the plurality of substances in man is rejected as completely superfluous and nonsensical. It makes an Aristotelian version of *dativus incommodi*. The modernist version of this dative is completely insane, because it developed the objective metaphysics without the first substance and the nihilistic humanism without an existing person.

Siger carried out a phenomenological destruction of modernism that preceded Heidegger’s phenomenological destruction of modernist philosophy (*Destruktion*). New phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle dated from 1922 and it was reinterpreted in the work *Sein und Zeit* (SZ, § 6). Therefore, the scripture QIIIDA rejected the semiaverroism in Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima*, in which the divided intellect is considered an objective form. This hypostatic form, given “*ad mentem Aristotelis*,” uncovers the process of cognition from behind, since it actualizes it by its own actuality. Although this corresponds to the letter of *De anima*, it is definitely not the original meaning of CMDA, nor the unity of the person given “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Then, following the example of Neoplatonism, the actualized soul forms a guiding and separate intellectual principle as the boatman and the ship (*sicut nauta navis*). Siger fundamentally rejects any substantial conception of the immaterial intellect, which once again proves his excellent reading of CMDA.

“The intellect by no means leads the body to perfection through its substance, but through its potency. If he did this through the substance, he would no longer be separable *(non esset separabilis*). Averroes said in the commentary to the second book of *De anima*: since the intellect does not use the body as an instrument, it cannot complete itself as a substance. Similarly, Aristotle said in the second book that the intellect is not in the act with regard to the body. That is, with regard to no part of the body, since he uses the body in a different way.” [[216]](#footnote-216)

The human intellect is separated from the organic body in a very specific way (*separabilis*). It is the immaterially given perfection of the body as a person (*intellectus perficit corpus*). Nevertheless, the intellect does not complete the hylemorphic and physical potentialities, since it would then be another substance in man (*non per suam substantiam*). The intellect is *subiective* bound to the body, because it is not another substance, but merely forms another and faculty of the soul on the higher level, since the soul is the form of the body. However, the intellect is an immaterial faculty, which cannot be separated from the senses in its own act of thinking and therefore *obiective* completes the faculties of the body. The separateness of the intellect, from the point of view of its immaterial act (*separabilis*), is metaphysically different in the mode of potency from the modern intellect given as a separated substance (*separatus*). From the point of view of the dating and authorship of the Munich manuscript, this distinction of the intellect in the mode *separabilis* has a key significance, since it points to the second book of *De anima*.

According to DA I–II that Siger commented in the Munich manuscript, it is possible to create an objective insight into the intellect in the mode “*separatus*” as in Aquinas′s philosophy around the year 1267 (*potest esse*, ch. 4.3.2). But the definition of intellect is made in a way “*obiective*”; it is true if we phenomenologically correctly determine the existential act of thinking in the mode “*subiective*.” Siger wrote the commentary on the first two parts of *De anima* and sent it to Aquinas in Italy either individually or together with the already published commentary on the third part (QIIIDA), which is consistent with the assertion of Agostino Nifo. Therefore, Aegidius has a positive relationship to Siger’s analysis in the mode “*objective*” that established interpretation of DA I–II in the Munich manuscript and he used the scheme “*subiective—obiective*” without inhibitions. However, he conceived the difference as an Avicennist, since the intellect is defined objectively as an intellectual form. According to this, the intellect is a substance given in the mode “*separatus*” of modernists. That is why Aegidius rejected the writing QIIIDA in the Oxford manuscript, because the third part had been composed “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Aegidius replaced the third part of DA explained in QIIIDA with his own creation after Aquinas that was created “*ad mentem Aristotelis*.” That is why the hermeneutics consider Aegidius’s compilation of Siger’s writing QIIIDA as historically first Thomistic (that is, sophistic) interpretation of *De anima*. Aegidius wrote the first Thomistic treatise according to Aquinas’s interpretation made “*ad mentem Aristotelis*.” Siger rejected the interpretation of Aquinas as an incomplete and therefore philosophically incorrect explanation (ch. 4.5.3). Aquinas and Aegidius, who created a new kind of Averroist Averroes, rejected Siger’s conclusions in the treatise QIIIDA. However, the whole school of “*pars Sigeri*” in rue du Fouarre agreed with Siger’s interpretation because it was simply brilliant. That is why Boethius of Dacia in the work *Anonymous Giele* defended Siger’s teaching on behalf of the whole school of first Averroism (ch. 4.3.1). Aegidius as the representative of the school *sophistae Latini* could not claim that he did not understand this clear attitude of two main artistic masters in the rue du Fouarre. Therefore, in 1267–68, this Augustinian turned to Aquinas′s Semiaverroism and he left the Siger′s school. His turning point is clearly visible in the third part of the Oxford manuscript. That treatise O III makes initial *Lichtung* of Thomism as Aegidius’s new doctrine that reveals the truth and the untruth of victorious modernity. The treatise *Anonymus Bazán* confirms the newly emerged Thomism by Aegidius’s defense of Aquinas against Pecham around the year 1270. Siger abolished in QIIIDA any possibility of Semiaverroism to be intellectually flawed; the intellect cannot be a subsistent form in man. This was the explicit position of Aquinas and Aegidius and partly also that of Albert. The interpretation of the third book of *De anima* according to CMDA is the only one that satisfies the conditions of existential exegesis that is necessary for scientific proof of immaterial and separated nature of intellect according to *Second Analytics*. Siger was and still is the *Expositor Novus*, because he understood the meaning of Aristotle’s metaphysics “*ad mentem Averrois*” and from this position interpreted the scripture *De anima* according to CMDA. Other explanations of unity of the person based on bodily defined *anima intellectiva* are insufficient. They proceed only from the theoretically determined essence of *anima intellectiva*, which, moreover, is defined on the basis of the theological postulate of the immortality of the soul. The existential hermeneutic predication of understanding in the mode “*separabilis*” relates to intellect as the act of individual understanding in the body. Averroes and Siger refused the hypostatized intellect in the objective mode of “*separatus*.” This intellect comes to the person from the outside. Modern intellect is a Neoplatonic separated substance (the second Averroism) or a subsistent form (Grosseteste, Aquinas, Aegidius).

Aquinas had to leave Paris at Easter 1272, because the artistic faculty under the leadership of Siger had not accepted his Aristotelian interpretation. He abolished the full unity of the person. Classical Aristotelianism of Aquinas (and even more so modernist Thomism of Aegidius) rejected the interpretation of CMDA and therefore provided an inadequate interpretation of De anima, which included the dualism of two subsistent forms in man. Then we do not cognize when we want, because the hypostatized intellect remains in the mode of *separatus*. In this mode, the soul cannot recognize everything because it lacks the universal immaterial receptivity. Also, it is not possible to define *intellectus possibilis* according to CMDA, but only the material intellect à la Themistius, Alexander and Bonaventure. The definition of cognition from the point of view of the material actualized intellect would mean that the intellect, like the body, is of a material nature. Then he would not be separable in the mode of *inmixtus* from sensual cognition (*si per suam substantiam perficeret, non esset separabilis*). The intellect, by its activity, does not belong to the body, since it has no sense organ. On the other hand, however, it is not a hypostatized form, because it would then be separated as a substance in the mode “*separatus*.” We find both erroneous solutions in the averroism of Cartesian *Modernorum*, which define the person as the composition of two incompatible substances (material, immaterial). It may also be that modernism rejects the erroneous explanation in the modus *separabilis* and reduces the intellect to an act of the body, to be an *intellectus materialis*. The reduction of man to the animal and the thinking to Avicenna’s *vis aestimativa* means that the intentionality remains on the level of sensory cognition. It makes a common error at the very end of modern times in the period of the reign of the cognitive sciences as fully nihilistic form of first philosophy. In the last days of unreason (*apaideusía*), a new demiurge created an artificial intellect to his insane image and began to worship him like a new idol. Modernity takes the person to be a specific and concrete corpse, or a material intellect, either animal or artificial. The reference to Averroes and Aristotle draws attention to the fact that the externality of the intellect in relation to the body is based on its immateriality as a pure potentiality (*intellectus perficit corpus...per suam potentiam*). The potency can never be a hypostasis in Aristotelianism, since it does not exist. Therefore, *intellectus possibilis* is neither the actualized substance of Avicennists nor the independent immaterial form of Semiaverroists. Each person, as a hylemorphic first substance endowed with intellect, has the opportunity to actualize his own cognition from the senses. The cognition is given as an immaterial act of the intellectual part of the soul, which, in turn, is given in the personal body. If the intellect is an immaterial and purely receptive potency of the soul composed in that manner, then we can insist on the complete difference of the potential and immaterial intellect from the actualized material sensual cognition made in the mode of *inmixtus* and *separabilis*. This new form of dualism given within the existing person abolished the substantial schema of the second averroism and modernity. The introduction to QIIIDA insists that the human soul has a composite character, since the intellect is immaterial and simple. In this form it ties in with the vegetative and animalistic abilities of the soul (*non faciunt animam simplicem, sed compositam*, ch. 4.4.1). Following the example of CMDA, Siger gave the intellect the statute of the non-material potency of the soul, thereby abolishing the modern dualism of the intellectual soul and the sensual body. As a potentiality, the intellect complements the existence of the person in the body as an actualized material substance. Although the intellect is of an immaterial nature, it is merely potency. This immaterial potency is separable (*separabilis*) from the point of view of its specific act from the existing body as a material substance. The way how the intellect exists in the mode of *separabilis* starts from the phenomenological description of how we really recognize something. We therefore recognize objectively (*obiective*) in the mode of CMDA, because we recognize our own body as an intellectually animated object. It can never be achieved only by sensual cognition. Intellectual cognition depends on sensual cognition, but it is fundamentally different from it. The soul is *subiective* defined as a new fundament (*subiectum*) of cognition, since the intellectual faculty comes from the outside to the sensual cognition. Its actualized intentional object (*species sensibilis*) is taken in the imagination as an object for the second intentionality of the receptive intellect (*species intelligibilis*). This scheme of “*intellectus in potencia*” was discussed for the first time by the Second Master (*intellectum secundum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The cognition of intellect then proceeds in the mode *subiective* that is bound to the immaterial faculty of *anima intellectiva*. With regard to cognition of the senses, *anima intellectiva* exercises that faculty in the mode *obiective*. Sensual cognition is hylemorphic and actual in the context of the first substance; but the carrier of the intellect is the non-material *anima intellectiva* and not the body. Since the intellect is merely an immaterial potency of the soul, it must be actualized from the direction of the senses. The intellect has no other object of cognition than the sensual intention, because this in and of itself is a pure potency (*tabula rasa*). In turn, the sensual cognitions in and of themselves have no possibility of being universal, because the intellectual faculty comes to them from the outside.

The phenomenology of intellectual cognition is given as existential unity of cognition given in an intelligible manner (*conscii sumus*); thus, it differs from sensual cognition given on the level of bodily senses in the mode “*experimur*.” But intellect in the mode *separabilis* fully depends in the mode *subiective* on the actualization coming from the senses, because it is in itself but a potentiality of the soul. This unique position of Siger was not recognized by modernists of the second Averroism, nor by Semiaverroists as Aquinas and Aegidius. But this ingenious thinking was appreciated by Dante that quite rightly appraised Siger as the best philosopher of his time. Man is not an animal, because the animalistic cognition of the soul is not determined in the mode “*ipse*” as universal act of *anima intellectiva* that is composed (Aristotle’s τοιαύτης, Siger′s *ipse*). But the intellect is intentionally turned towards the actualized senses, and therefore it is given only in the mode of the ability of the soul given in the mode of *separabilis*. The power to universality lies only in the immaterial and separate power of the soul, which, thanks to the pure potentiality, is basically dependent on an actualization from the direction of the senses. Both types and modes of cognition must come together within the framework of the truth as *proportio* in CMDA. Siger preserved real unity of the person that recognizes the world and also the self in various ways. The difference between the immaterial potency of the intellect (*separabilis*) and the rejected statute of the intellect as a cosmic substance (*separatus*) founded Averroes’s nature of truth as *proportio*. The nature of the correspondence between the senses and the intellect are discussed in the QIIIDA, q. 9. The introduction asks the basic phenomenological question, “how” (*qualiter*) the separated intellect is connected with the hylemorphic first substance (*qualiter intellectus nobis copulatur*).[[217]](#footnote-217) Let us now examine the key part of the treatise that brought about the accusation of Averroism for Siger. The previous discussions have shown that the separateness of intellect means many things. Either the intellect is numerically one and actualized given in all people equally and from the outside (*unus intellectus in omnibus*), or the intellect is only a potential immaterial faculty of the soul which is distinguished from the body and from the senses by its immaterial character in the mode of *tertium genus* and *subiective*. As a result, the intellect is effectively present in every person in the mode of “*ipse*” because it is tied to the hylemorphic act of the body as first existing substance (*separabilis*); or it is a numerically different intellect, which is given as an external substance (*hoc aliquid*); or, it is an intellect defined as a hypostatized form or essence of the soul in the mode *separatus*.

Siger confirms that human intellect cannot exist in any of these ways in the mode of *separatus* (substance, form), because then it would be a separated cosmic substance that connects with man from the outside. This theory of “*sequaces Aristotelis*” was strictly rejected as heretical by bishop Alvernus (OBJ II, ch. 2.3). An even greater nonsense is represented by the universal hylemorphism and its simulacrum of *intellectus possibilis*, divided numerically and individualized by Dinant’s *materia prima*. It copulates from the outside with *intellectus materialis* individualized in man by *materia spiritualis*. The modernists attributed this mythology to Averroistic Averroes. Anyone who takes the theory of the numerically individualized intellect seriously makes out of the intellect a separate substance that, moreover, must be materialized. This was and is the solution of all modern Alexandrians. They support schizophrenia of one person and two opposite, numerically determined substances. Cognition, as potency, cannot be a kind of the matter, which is the only one that would individualize the hylemorphic substance. Siger begins by recalling the separateness and the immateriality of the intellect according to CMDA.

“The Commentator gives the following explanation. If the intellect were numerically different in all people (*numaretur numeratione hominum*), then it would be a faculty located in the body. But the intellect is not a physical ability. Therefore, it cannot be individualized in that way.” [[218]](#footnote-218)

Since the intellect is not of a material nature (*virtus in corpore*), any individualization in the material physical body is impossible (*non numeratur numeratione hominum*). Siger and Averroes consider a material individuation of the intellect to be nonsense. The immaterial intellect is merely a kind of immaterial potency. Otherwise, the intellect would be a material and actualized faculty bound to the body (*intellectus esset virtus in corpore*). Intellect has been already determined as *separabilis* with respect to the body, moreover, defined in the mode *inmixtus* and *obiective*. Siger brilliantly understood the reasoning of CMDA against the hylic intellect of Themistius and Alexander. The intellectual activity of the soul is immaterial and does not sit in any sense organs. In the key part of the argument, Siger rejects the numerical identity of the intellect as a false problem. The intellect is not in the mode of the numerical “*idem*” individualized by matter, since it is *inmixtus* and *separabilis* in the mode of the existential “*ipse*.” The problem of the numerical unity of the intellect is to be found in objective averroism of modern Alexandrians, but by no means in critical Aristotelianism of Averroes and Siger. That is why the modern and postmodern objectivists also made Siger an Averroist in the mode of the identity theory of the intellect given as a quasi-material substance of the third kind (*intellectus materialis*). The numerical identity or possibility of the intellect is absolute nonsense from the point of view of CMDA and Siger. The immaterial individualized intellect would have to be given within the framework of mathematical abstraction and would be an abstract number given only in thought. Or the intellect would be individualized in matter and would cease to be an immaterial faculty of the soul in the mode *ab* *extrinsece* for sensual cognition. However, the *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* can neither be a pure abstraction nor a substance, because we experience the receptive recognition of the intellect in our body as the only existing substance (*conscii sumus*). Therefore, on the basis of the existential causality thus recognized, we can synthesize the objective form of the intellect in the mode *quartum genus*. Siger radically and fundamentally rejected the numerical nature of intellect. The numerically shaped intellect would arise only through the individualization of some matter. Such an intellect would be reduced to a mere *intellectus materialis*, and would have no attachment to Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*.

“From the foregoing, the conclusion becomes obvious that the intellect, being immaterial, by its nature cannot be divided according to a numerically given individuality.” [[219]](#footnote-219)

The question of the numerical nature of the intellect is false. The intellect cannot be a mathematical abstraction, because we think as a hylemorphic substance in the first person. The intellect is given “*ab* *extrinsece*” with regard to matter, which is why it cannot be pressed into the procedures of mathematical abstraction (*in eius natura non est quod multiplicetur secundum numerum*). Siger’s intellect is an act of the person. Therefore, he is not and cannot be Rufus’s and Bonaventure’s objective Porretan individual. Modern individual is given at the end of the series by the division of universal meanings, being founded by *materia spiritualis*. The speculation about the numerical nature of the intellect is inserted into the thinking of the second Averroism with the objectively conceived matter as a *tertium ens*. The individuation of intellect is nonsense, because the individual is not an existing person, but only an abstract concept given in thinking. Concepts do not think because they have no possibility to do so. The separated substantial intellect of cosmic forms possesses no matter; yet it lies entirely outside of human existence. Such an intellect in man would be a Cartesian separated actualized substance (*hoc aliquid, res cogitans*). The intellect of the Avicennists and Cartesians is essentially separated; it is individualized by material acts of the body, which it joins from the outside in the mode of Avicennist *coniunctio* or Porretan *colligatio*. Siger recalls that any attachment of materially individualized intellect to the body represents the erroneous teaching of Avicenna, which was rejected by Averroes.[[220]](#footnote-220) The treatise, together with Aquinas, Albert and Aegidius as the author of *Anonymus Bazán* rejected the erroneous solution of the second Averroism. The modernists added spiritual matter to the intellect and to the soul, thus creating an objective hylemorphic substance, to which they ultimately also added numerical individualization. According to Aristotle and Averroes, individuation must proceed differently; let us see the above-mentioned phenomenology of the act of existence in the second and fourth *questio* QIIIDA in the mode *subiective*. Immateriality actualized the unity of the intellect, which resembles the substance only in the mode “*quodammodo.”* Let us see the above quotation (*intellectus noster est quodammodo sicut aliquid compositum ex materia et forma*, QIIIDA, Q. 4). The intellect forms a pure immaterial potency of the soul as a form of the body. The proof of this is our own mental activity, in which the act of personal thinking generates universal mental content (*ex quo intentionum imaginatarum est una ratio*).[[221]](#footnote-221) The next part of the ninth question therefore rejects an exploration of the intellect as a substance or hypostatized form, which, however, was carried out by Aquinas during his first stay in Paris and later in *De unitate intellectus*. Siger must return to the key phenomenological principle of *similiter* or *consimile* explained in CMDA. The acts of intellect are given *per prius*; its essence is recognized *per posterius*. Siger begins with the specific act of intellectual cognition, which is separate from the sensual cognition. Once again, two phenomenological ways are distinguished as to the manner of how we recognize.

“The senses are connected with us by that part of the person which is matter. But the intellect connects with us through that part of the person which is the form. Since the senses are materially connected with us, what is experienced through the senses is also connected with us. But it is not so in the case of the intellect, but just the other way around. It is not that the intellect (*non enim per hoc quod intellectus copulatur nobis*) or the externally given intelligibilia would connect with us, but because we ourselves are connected with the contents of thought (*sed quia intellecta copulantur nobis*).“ [[222]](#footnote-222)

Sensory cognition is essentially given because it takes place in the body as a material substrate (*sensus enim copulatur nobis per partem eius quæ est materia*). The sense organs can be localized in the body as the subject of sensory cognition. The divided immaterial intellect is only formally connected with the physical act (*per partem eius quæ est forma*). The way of connecting the senses with the body and intellect, as well as the intellect with the body, is not given in the mode of copulation, because it is given in the mode *subiective* and *obiective*. Therefore, there is also a twofold way in which we recognize. Sensual cognition is directly bound to the body (*quia sensus copulatur nobis*) and is thus individualized from the point of view of the sensual species (*ideo sensata copulantur nobis*). The immaterial intellect cannot possess the same form of numerical individuation as the senses; therefore, we must proceed in reverse (*non sic de intellectu, sed e converso*). The intellect recognizes the body as an object. Therefore, it is not given as any quasi-substance or a sensory act that works through an organ assigned to a physical substrate (*non enim per hoc quod intellectus copulatur nobis*). Siger is not a modern Averroist and therefore has no form of copulation of the external intellect with the cognizing person. The phenomenological and scientific approach of *Second Analytics* dictates the procedure from the real effects to the real causes; only then does Siger allow a universal definition of the essence. The phenomenology of thinking excluded all modern Alexandrians; it is not some hypostatized intellect that connects with us as a being of the third kind or as some cosmic eidetic form. We perceive the acts of thought as our own, because we experience them directly and thus subjectively (*non quod intellectus copulatur nobis*). The cited part regarding the connection with the recognized contents of thought has a key character and remained misunderstood for centuries. The intellect cannot copulate with us in some mythological way, because it is not a substance; it is existentially connected with us (*subiective, tertium genus*). The intellect exists only in the act as “*ipse homo intelligit*,” of which Siger’s critics were and still are not capable. In the external mode, we only perceive the contents as a recognized objectivity (*obiective*), because we perceive them as a result of our existentially experienced act of cognition (*subiective*). In the mode of “*copulatio*,” only the “intellecta” are associated with us as products of thought, and by no means the “*intellectus*” that forms the potency of the soul. The master of Brabant rejects in principle the idea that any substantial intellect is connected with the body in the way of the sensory organ given in the body. The commentary on *Liber de causis*, Siger’s last known work from the years 1275–76, summarizes his interpretation of intellect according to the Commentator as he defends the ipseity of human being. The differentiation of the intellect cannot be given only by matter, because the mere identity of the person would arise as a result. Man is himself thanks to the unique act and the intellectually given and experienced existence. It makes a different kind of personalization than through the essentially given intellectual forms or through *species intelligibilis*. All these remnants of Avicennism cannot stand after a thorough reading of *De anima* according to CMDA. The rejection of speculations about numerical unity or plurality of intellect, they are contained in following quotation from *Quaestiones super Librum de causis*.

“If the human intellect were divided according to individual bodies, it would be individualized according to matter. As was said above, the difference in the numerical number in the context of the one species is only due to the individual matter (*in formis per materiam individuatis*). But then the intelligible species in such a receptive intellect could not have been a carrier of universal cognition, but only cognition at the level of the individual. Such an intellect would have not differed from the senses or the imagination. All these assertions are erroneous in so far as they assert that the intellect is individualized by matter according to the individual human bodies and is thus numerically different.” [[223]](#footnote-223)

Siger ended the debate with modernism of that time and today about the numerical unity or multiplicity of the intellect. The personally experienced intellect is not a bodily organ in the sense of the localized entity (*hoc aliquid*), which could be individualized with the help of any matter or any bodily organ. The previous part has explained that the act of the intellect includes both empirical cognition from the material senses (*experimur*) and the universal knowledge (*conscii sumus*) of one’s own act of separated immaterial intellect in the mode of *separabilis*. The duality between double experience as a “subjective and sensual perception” (*experimur*) and “objective and intellectual consciousness” (*conscii sumus*) has a fundamental character. Since we know from personal experience how the intellect works in us, we universally state “what” the intellect is as an immaterial potency of man defined in the mode of the essence (*quartum genus*). In contrast to Cartesian “*cogito ergo sum,*” the plural “*conscii sumus*” is absolutely fundamental. The intellect, as an immaterial faculty of the soul, is separated from the senses. As a result, he is completely uniform and inseparable thanks to his being given as a permanent and universal potentiality. After the realization of both physically and consciously given mediations of cognition (*experimur—consciii sumus*), an essential general conclusion arises, whereby the intellect appears in the act of self-reflection (*intellectus noster apprehendit se ipsum sicut operari*). This specific universality of the person in the mode *quartum genus* can ultimately be understood generically as the universal nature of humanity. What we experience in the universal mode is only the intellect as a general thing, which is common to all people and is given only in thinking. Let us see Dante’s terminus “*universitas humana*” that is inspired by this precise “*silogizzò*” taken from Siger (ch. 4.4). The universal concept of intellect can never think, since it is in the mode *quartum genus*. But, the intellect can think in the mode *obiective*, because it is in the state of thinking that exists *subiective*. This detail makes the difference between *sophistae Latini* of all kinds and Siger. He is not an objectivist, because he thinks in the way “*obiective*.” The potency given in the act of existence of the person cannot be an objective substance of the third kind. The intellect, as a pure potency or even as an abstraction given only in thought, cannot copulate with us like some separate substance of *Modernorum*, because we do not experience the thinking in this way. The intellect is *separabilis* from the point of view of its immaterial activity, but not *separatus* from the point of view of its acts, because it is neither a substance nor a form. In the case of immaterial intellectual cognition of the soul, the exact opposite of what was true for sensual cognition applies. We have no bodily organ and no physical substance; but we experience that act, i.e., the personally actualized potency of the soul in the framework of specifically human existential activity. We think the intellectual contents (*intellecta*) in the first person and therefore experience them in the existential act of knowing in the mode *obiective* as separated intelligible contents (*intellecta copulantur nobis*). In the spirit of Blund’s school, Siger distinguishes precisely between the intentional act (*subiectum intentionis*) bound to the thinking person and its resulting object (*intentio*; OBJ II, ch. 2.1.2).

The master of Brabant is much more radical in his rejection of substantial nature of intellect than Albert and Aquinas. Therefore, he criticizes them for their half-hearted solutions of the unity of the intellect. The intellect, as a formal faculty of the soul, has no sense organ, and we cannot point to it as to “this here” (*hoc aliquid*). Every objectification of the intellect makes it an *intellectum*, a universal meaning in thought as a *quartum genus*. The identification of materially given cognition can take place in the case of the sensory organ given in the body, which, thanks to the individualization by matter, also has a numerically distinct character. The intellect has no substantial or essential definition in scientific cognition according to *Second Analytics* and cannot have one, because it cannot be individualized like some substance. But he acts causally in us, because we think when we want ourselves as a person. Therefore, the act of understanding is experienced in the first person, the causality of which forms a medium of scientific syllogism. Through the experience of the sensual cognition of the soul we go to the intelligible, determined “co-knowledge” (*con-scientia*). Then, it is possible to establish the basic characteristics of *anima intellectiva*, which are given on the first substance as their causal effects (*tertium genus*). According to Siger, the debate about the individualization of some *tertium ens*, called the modern or postmodern “intellect,” is completely absurd. The intellect given “*ab extrinseco*” and in the mode “*inmixtus*” is not of a material nature as an abstracted universal and it is therefore not numerically individualized. Where is his existential uniqueness taken from?

“Therefore, it must be said that the intellect, by its receptive nature, can take the sensually given intentions, because it is so connected with us by its potential being. As a result, he connects in his act with sensual intentions in such a way that he refers to them in virtue of his potency (*se haberet in potentia ad illas*); the intellect is connected with us, because it is actualized by this activity (*per hoc copulatur nobis in actu*). Since the sensual intentions are different according to the individual people, the intellect is numerically different due to its connection with sensual perceptions.” [[224]](#footnote-224)

The quotation clearly states, with reference to the previous part, that the intellect makes the immaterial part of the soul. With regard to the perceived sensual intentions, it is a pure potency (*quantum est de natura sua, est in potentia ad intentiones imaginatas*). The potency can neither be individual nor substantial in the way of something that exists. The intellect is not something potential that is afterwards actualized in the way of the first substance (τόδε τι, *hoc aliquid*), as the objectivists mistakenly suppose. The human intellect represents a unique way in which the immaterial part of the soul works in the mode of the phenomenological “*Wie*.” Only *anima intellectiva* is separated from the material cognition of the senses. Thanks to the immaterial potency it can recognize the pure forms. Since the intellectual potency is an act of the person, it is also actualized in virtue of that personal *actus essendi*. Sensual cognition brings a fundamental actuality to the intellectual soul. As a result, the intellect is actualized through the bodily organs and through the sensual cognition of external things. Then the mental cognition of the person takes place in the truest sense of the word (*subiective*). The personal intellect actualizes itself in the existential mode *inmixtus* and *ab extrinseco* taken from sensory cognition that is individualized by sense organs in the body. Sensual cognition has both individuation and actualization through the matter of the body. The intellect as such cannot be numerically individual, because it does not exist as a hypostasis. He is a pure immaterial potency and its individuation runs through the sensual species, because they are the only sensible form that has the necessary formal actuality to set cognition in the movement. The intellect is given only in two modes, as an existential act of the person (then it is personalized by the body) or as an abstract concept (then it is individualized by abstraction). The intellect has no sense organ. It comes to the senses from outside (*ab extrinseco*), because it is the immaterial potency of the soul; therefore it takes over empiric knowledge in the mode of *inmixtus* and *obiective*. This universal potency is actualized for the recognition of everything (including immaterial being) solely from actualized sensual phantasms that arise on a material substrate (*intentiones imaginatae numerentur secundum hominum numerationem*). The phantasms are individual because they represent intentionally recognized forms given sensually by bodily organs (*species sensibilis*). The receptive component of the intellect takes over the sensual intentions through its own immaterial potency. In the act of reception, the intellect is engaged in the mode *tertium genus*, since in the moment of “*intellectio*” that specific immaterial potentiality of the soul is done in the modus subiective. The intellect as potency in the modus *separabilis* transforms *species sensibilis* into *species intelligibilis*. Since they are already actualized as empiric knowledge, they initiate the immaterial and purely potential part of *anima intellectiva*. As a result, the ability of reception for *intellectus possibilis* is actualized and at the same time its individuation occurs through the absorption of the immaterial intentions given from sensual species in the mode of “*experimur*.” The act of the intellect is then experienced as an existential experience of the person in the mode “*conscii sumus*” (*subiective, tertium genus*). As a result, the intellect becomes aware of itself as evident in the mental-physical act (*fieri*) of self-reflexive perception (*intellectus noster apprehendit se ipsum sicut operari*). This ensures the real causality of the intellect. The resulting conclusion of deductive syllogism presents the intellect as an essence (*quartum genus*). The scheme of exposure of the intellect from the front, from the direction of actualized and individual *species sensibilis* shows Siger’s brilliant solution of the unity of the person and cognition according to CMDA. Since the intellect is only a potentiality, it is also in potency to actually given sensual cognition, which is material and individualized. But the identity of sensual cognition is not the same as the ipseity of the person given by the cognition of the intellect. The reflection made through the intellect is given with regard to the sensual identity “*ab extrinseco*”, also in the mode “*conscii sumus*.” However, sensual cognition is indispensable because it ensures the actual individualization. Immaterial potency of the intellect intends, absorbs and synthesizes everything in the mode *separabilis*. Therefore, at the level of its immaterial potency, *intellectus possibilis* takes over the actualized and individualized “*intentiones imaginatae.*” Through the act of this twofold intentionality, individualized understanding becomes a unified act of realized thinking. It is situated outside the senses (*obiective*), but not outside the body (*subiective*). The intellect takes over the species as sensual knowledge in the process of abstraction as it intends sensually and actualized cognitive forms. This second form of intentionality abstracts the separated immaterial forms from the numerically individual, actual and material *species sensibilis*. The intentional orientation of receptive intellect towards materially differentiated perceptions generates resulting *species intelligibilis* through interaction with the active intellect. But the species of intellect, in view of their universality, are only in potency in relation to the singular and actual (also materially) given sensual species. This gives the complete position of the intellect with regard to sensual cognition.

The terms of the type *consimile* and *simile* separate Averroes’s definition of *intellectus possibilis* from Avicenna. His intellect makes a substance given in the body (*intellectus materialis*) that communicates with a completely separate form of cosmic intellect (*intellectus agens*). Averroes rejected the dualistic solution of Themistius and Alexander (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Siger refused the human intellect as *hoc aliquid* of Latin modernists. Intellect is a passive immaterial potency of the soul, which, thanks to the added receptivity of the intellect (*inmixtus, inmaterialis, ab extrinseco, separabilis*...), is capable of individualization through the sensual material contents. Intellect takes these sensually given contents in the act of existential understanding (*conscientia, apprehensio*). The actualization of *anima intellectiva* depends totally on the senses, since the human intellect is *tabula rasa*. The transfer of actuality from reality via the senses to the intellect through the metaphysical dative ensures cognition as the correspondence of the first substances and the intellect. The truth as the correspondence of things and intellect is fully established when the intellect passed through all stages of mediation. Immaterial faculty of the intellect has no numerical individuation given through the matter, because the personal intellect is as a separate, immaterial potency of the soul (*separabilis*). This ability represents the potency of the soul that makes the only form that exists in the act of the person as a hylemorphic substrate. Therefore, for Siger, the intellect is bound to actual species in the mode *subiective*, since it takes the individualization out of material senses. The main characteristic of *species sensibilis* is that they function as diaphanum because they represent a non-material cognitive form. These *species sensibilis* are already actualized forms. The sensory imagination as a faculty of the soul (*imaginatio, sensus communis*) has processed those perceptions that originate from the materially given senses into the form of *species sensibilis*. Each sheep sees its own “wolf” (*species sensibilis*), which represents the synthetic cognition of the individual animal through *vis aestimativa* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The analysis of the Oxford manuscript has shown that even the Semiaverroists such as Aegidius and Aquinas did not properly understand the function of diaphanum in CMDA. Only the diaphanum, by being engaged in the various levels of mediation, explains the way in which intelligible matter receives individuation through the material senses. The rightly defined mediation is essential. The real existing thing is not an empirical knowledge of animals that is already in itself immaterial in nature. What are material in nature, that are perceptions of sensual organs of the body. Moreover, empirical knowledge is not intellectual knowledge. The sensuous immaterial forms are bound to the body, while the *species intelligibilis* are bound to the intellect that Siger defines with the above-mentioned characteristics. Modernity rejected the status of *species sensibilis* as the basic form that establishes human cognition in the mode of the soul as a *tabula rasa*. The *illuminati* have direct access to the higher world of forms and they do not need to actualize their intellect by exposure of the sense coming from the front. Let us quote once again the key part from CMDA II.5, which deals with this twofold nature of intellectual cognition.[[225]](#footnote-225) The intellect cannot be given in any act of its own subsistence, because it is merely the potency of the soul that makes the only form of the body. Intellect taken as a hypostasis would disintegrate the substantial unity of the person; the potential recognition of the whole being would be abolished; the truth would no longer be considered an Aristotelian correspondence. The masters in the rue du Fouarre and Bacon settled then in Paris could not allow this modern suicide of philosophy. It began to take place in front of their eyes at the Faculty of mendicant orders. Bacon precisely characterized the dangerous procedure of his contemporaries, who took up false philosophy to be the fundament of modernist theology (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*, OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The subsistence of intellect has been defended by modernism and by semiaverroist theologians such as Aquinas and Aegidius. These had to make the immaterial intellect as a hypostatized form, in order to ensure the theological postulates, such as immortality of the human soul. Siger was by profession the first critical philosopher in the Latin West. He therefore rejected the mutilation of philosophy through generically different assumptions of other sciences as an unscientific approach. According to *Second Analytics*, theology, as a generically different science, has different criteria of proof than the philosophical interpretation of Aristotle’s *De anima*, which was presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to the Sicilian school. Therefore, the explanation of magisters dated 1272 concerned Aquinas and Aegidius as well. They postulated the intellect as a hypostatized form added to the soul from the outside, in order to save the Christian postulate of immortality of the human soul. Brilliant thinker Siger was elected rector of the artists against Alberich of Reims, because he had saved both the truth of philosophy and that of theology as it was documented in the Declaration of April 1272. Modern God needed not to be born out of erroneous philosophy of Falsafa and to die in the nihilism of Latin West. It must be noted that did not come into *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Falsafa in that heretical form. This is why the Declaration of 1272 was so fundamental, and why the Modernists had to destroy it and the entire Faculty on the rue du Fouarre. For the modernist of second Averroism and for Semiaverroists, on the other hand, the Declaration of Artists of 1272 was the last drop in the full cup of their sophisticated bitterness. Defeated Aquinas left immediately Paris in the Easter, in April 1272. Peter of Auvergne was appointed the new rector of the Artists by the papal legate in May of the same year. After the publication of Siger’s treatise *De aeternitate mundi* and *De anima intellectiva*, the academic silence of the modernists and the Semiaverroists followed. The beaten academicians of the modernist faction, as usual, resorted to authoritarian means. They knew very well that both Parisian bishop and the pope were on their side. The power is the modern form of the truth. The whole dispute over the so-called averroism came to an end in the condemnation and the breaking up of Siger’s group by Tempier’s episcopal decree of 1277.

### 4.4.3 Unity of the Person

Siger’s position was brilliant because *Doctor Invidiosus* was the only Latin philosopher of his time to rescue the full unity of the person and the intellect for Western philosophy. Since the intellect is fully receptive with regard to the senses (*possibilis*), it is only illuminated from the front, from the direction of sensual phantasms. These phantasms form the basis of the sensually made individuality and actuality that entails nature of human intellect given in the *subiective* manner. The conclusion of the ninth question QIIIDA rejects the opinion that the intellect somehow unites with us in the manner of a separated substance. This is the well-known thesis of all Averroists and objectivists, who had understood neither the approach of CMDA nor Siger’s argumentation. They turned the intellect into a modern hypostasis and connected this being of the third kind to the body in the manner of modern colligatio (ch. 4.2.2). Then they attributed their own epochal errors about the material or substantial nature of intellect to Averroes and Siger. This proceeding gave rise to a numerically distinct individual as a substrate that carries the hypostatized intellect as a numerically distinct independent substance. Siger clearly rejected that fundamental error of modernity. Modernists have misunderstood the basic thesis of CMDA because they have not read *De anima* from the first book to the third, but the other way around. Then they postulated the intellect as an independent substance in the mode *separatus*.

“They attributed to Averroes the exact opposite of what he claimed (*oppositum suppositionis Averrois*). They claim that the conceived contents remain with us only because the intellect remains with us. This is a mistake. The intellect remains with us precisely because we produce thought content.” [[226]](#footnote-226)

We do not think because the intellect is connected to us in some Cartesian way of substance or actuality (*quod intellectus continuatur nobis*). Aquinas attributed this Avicennist “*continuatio*” to Averroes in 1268 in his Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima* that can be found in the writing ST I, q. 88. Aegidius quoted this passage in the third part of the Oxford manuscript (ch. 4.3.2). But Aquinas had held this erroneous (i.e. “Averroist”) position long before during his first stay in Paris when Siger was studying there at the same time. The quoted passage shows that Siger explicitly rejected this Averroist interpretation of Thomas’s intellect around 1266 in the name of the Sicilian school. Aegidius certainly knew this as Siger’s student. His sophistry in the Oxford manuscript in 1268 regarding Averroes proves his “Thomistic” perplexity (*per rationes quas ponit Commentator contra seipsum*, ch. 4.3.2). Siger cannot allow any form of exposure of cognition from behind, from the direction of some hypostatized intellect. The act of thinking would be fully dependent on such a connected intellect in modus *separatus*. Anyone who takes the intellect as numerically individualized entity has not understood the basic thesis of CMDA. Siger interprets the nature of the intellect from primarily experienced effects of cognition (*intellecta*). From the first substance as the source of original causality for the intellect of the person (*subiective*) we can scientifically recognize the effect, i.e., the immaterial intellectual potency of anima intellectiva, which is given by the production of the universal knowledge of the person (*obiective*). There is but the real person as an actualized first substance that thinks within the framework of mental faculties. Siger’s supposed Averroism, given by the denial of the numerically individual intellect, is just as much nonsense as Averroes’s Averroism. The thesis about the numerically uniform and different intellect represents a sophistical simulacrum of modernity. In Siger’s philosophy, the speculatively thinking modern age observes and condemns its own errors and sophisms as if in a distorting mirror (*speculum*). Through the pure immateriality and potency of the intellect, Siger fully defended the conception of the intellect as *tabula rasa*, which was not the case in the second Averroism and only partially in the Semiaverroism of Albert, Aquinas and Aegidius.

The twelfth question QIIIDA therefore clearly rejected all theories of *Modernorum* about the innate principles of cognition given in human soul. They are either given through the unification of the substantial intellect with the soul or habitually, in the mode of Themistius’ material intellect or as innate principles of cognition, as was the case of Rufus (*potentia substantialis*). Siger includes Albert and all Avicennists in this group that assumes innate “*intellectus in potentia*” or “*intellectus in habitu.*” They presuppose first innate principles of cognition according to Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). All these opinions are flawed because the principles of cognition are generated in the existential act of cognition and the intellect is *tabula rasa*.

“Some maintain, and it seems that this is Albert’s position as well (*videtur esse positio Alberti*), that our intellect has a certain innate cognition, e.g., of first principles, which is given to everyone, to be a statement of something in the context of affirmation, negation, and the like. They do not hold that those principles of innate cognition are the active intellect; but they say to be the instrument of active intellect (*sunt instrumenta intellectus agentis*), with which the active intellect leads the possible intellect to actuality. But this opinion is mistaken.” [[227]](#footnote-227)

According to Siger’s interpretation, Albert holds the Averroist position. He insists on the innate or habitual first principles of cognition (*intellectui nostro est innata aliqua cognito*), which are actualized by the active intellect (*sunt instrumenta intellectus agentis*). It is a typical position of Avicenna, which Kant and other postmodernists later adopted. The active intellect works in such a way that it autonomously actualizes the receptive component of intellect through these first principles (*per quae educit intellectum possibilem ad actum*). In Albert writing we can find a similar assertion in the above-mentioned Avicennist definition of *intellectus sanctus*, which, following Alvernus’s example, enables mystical cognition in the model of illumination (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). But natural knowledge follows the Aristotelian interpretation, which Albert confirms in *De homine* by using the term “*diffinitio passionis*.” Albert keeps the same standpoint in the case of experienced causality of cognition in the soul as Siger, since he properly created the middle link (*medium*) of scientific proof according to *Second Analytics* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). Albert’s later commentary on *Second Analytics* adheres to the interpretation presented in *De homine*.[[228]](#footnote-228) Around 1240, Bishop Alvernus clearly saw Neoplatonic features of Aristotle, which, however, did not exist in Aristotelian interpretation of Averroes that had been honored with the title *philosophus nobilissimus* for this very reason. Albert’s conception of cognition rejects the hypostatized principles of cognition for the same reasons as Siger. The intellect would not be *tabula rasa* and would become some form of substance. On this point, Albert follows the synthesis of knowledge in the framework of *intellectus speculativus* according to CMDA (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Since the soul is *tabula rasa*, the cognition of the first principles is based on the real, sensually given cognition. We have the principles of cognition at the moment when we draw conclusions of statements and only then do we hold on to them as a habitus of thinking. The inverse order creates a problematic definition of the intellect as an essential form. Siger’s polemic with Albert and Aquinas demonstrated it clearly.[[229]](#footnote-229) Albert’s assertion “*impossibile esset evadere conclusionem*” means both points at the same time: modern intellect as habitus and the intellect of the Commentator actualized by *species sensibilis*. Siger claims against Albert that any hypostatized or innate actuality of cognition (made through the innate or habitual principles, through the intellect as a hypostatic form of the soul) would mean that human cognition has its own actualization given outside the received phantasms. Avicennist soul is no *tabula rasa* and the intellect would actualize cognition out of itself, instead of being actualized from the front, from the direction of real, sensually cognized things. As a result, the soul could not be everything from the point of view of immaterial power of cognition, which is the key thesis of *De anima*. Following Bacon, Siger makes criticism of Bonaventure′s predication “*in artificialibus*” (ch. 4.1.1). There are no innate species in the soul that serve as matter for the active intellect, which processes these *scibilia* as an instrument (*instrumenta intellectus agentis*). Modernist ontotheology advocates the concept of thought as a creative act that processes matter of the third kind within itself, using innate ideas as instruments. The modernists predict the intellect as an actual substance given in the manner of the modern “Flying Man” or its contemporary nihilist version known as “Brain in a Vat.” Thinking does not work in the manner of a craftsman who nurtures the idea of the work and then presses it into the material. The receptive component of the soul’s intellectual capacity establishes cognition by taking everything from the senses. Being *tabula rasa*, Aristotelian intellect cannot conceive of anything out of itself because it has no actuality of its own to initiate the process of cognition. The actualization of intellect comes exclusively from sensory cognition that makes the real subject of intellectual knowledge (*subiective*). Siger’s point of view on this point is the same as Bacon’s opinion quoted above. The universal intention of the creator (*universale quod est in artificialibus*) lies in the mode of universal predication that excludes as such the causality of first substances (*non retinet ratio causalitatis*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Siger’s treatise on the soul refuses any formative actuality in the human intellect itself. This pioneering treatise analyzed and interpreted the true way of knowing, which preserves the separability of the intellect (*separabilis*) as well as the substantial unity of the person. The habitually given intellect would have its own actuality, and this would also apply to innate principles of cognition. Such nature of intellect reminds of Neoplatonist model of the boatman and the ship (*sicut nauta navis,* ch. 4.4.2). Siger uses the argument of the craftsman’s ability in relation to the material (*ut ars ad materiam*) to process the sensual material in order to link the receptive immaterial intellect to phantasms. The intellect has no other principle of actualization than the sensual forms that establish the causality of separated intellectual cognition. Let us see the above-mentioned definition of intellect in the *subiective* mode. But the immaterial form takes the sensory cognition as a diaphanum to be modified in the act of second intentionality and immaterial abstraction (the mode *obiective*). Siger refused Avicennian immanent innate principles of cognition given as instruments used by *intellectus agens*. Such an intellect is a hypostatized faculty of reasoning in the manner of Cartesian *cogito* and has its own actualized instruments that are permanently present in the soul. Siger assigns cognition in predication “*in artificialibus*” to Aristotle’s doctrine. The school of new “*sequaces Aristotelis*” ties the cognition to some form of separated intellect in the soul. This question is of major importance since it separates Aristotle′s definition of intellect in *De anima* from the explanation in CMDA. By using this distinction, Siger separated himself from the Semiaverroists in the school of first Averroism as were Albert and Aquinas.

“Aristotle said that the active intellect can ‘do anything as a craft with respect to matter’; but intellect and craft act in different ways (*differenter tamen agunt intellectus et ars*). Art shapes the form out of itself into the material, but by no means the intellect; it requires sensual intentions to do so. That is what Averroes claims.” [[230]](#footnote-230)

Thanks to its radical potentiality, the intellect defined by Siger cannot use the artistic model of modernity (*differenter tamen agunt intellectus et ars*). The human intellect is not in the position of the craftsman that exists as the first substance. The intellect is actualized from the direction of sensual phantasms and does not have a purely creative character as with the modernists (*intellectus ... eget intentionibus imaginatis*). The craft and artistic ability actively shapes the material (*ars per se sufficit ad ponendum formam in materia*). But this is not the case of theoretical cognition, which is universal only because it is absolutely receptive. The human intellect can serve as an instrument only in connection with the will, which actualizes cognition in reality (*intellectus practicus*, ch. 6.1). The intellect carries within itself neither matter nor actuality and therefore cannot be active by itself. Cognition without the senses has no possibility of existence, because the intellect is not independent like something given substantially or habitually. The intellect is a pure potency of the soul, in contrast to the idea of the craftsman, who actively creates the material through his personally given artistic ability. The soul is also capable of cognizing other than sensually, because it is universally everything through its potency. Aristotle’s quoted saying “*omnia facere*” in Siger′s interpretation of CMDA refers to the way in which the active component of intellect is activated in man. Human thinking has no actuality of its own in the form of innate principles of cognition and recognizes only through phantasms. Therefore, one must interpret the entire Aristotelian corpus including *De anima, Physics* and *Metaphysics* and not dogmatize *Second Analytics* and absolutize the logical writing of *Organon*, as modern sophists, objectivists and positivists did and still do. The interpretation of cognitioon made in CMDA surpassed the interpretation made by *De anima* on this point. This fact separated Aquinas’s interpretation presented “*ad mentem Aristotelis*” and Siger’s interpretation presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” about the year 1266. Semiaverroists and Thomists as Aegidius chose Aquinas’s interpretation after 1266 and made out of him the *Expositor Novus* against Siger. This procedure of newly formed Thomism can be seen in the third part of the Oxford manuscript of Aegidius, written about 1268. Siger, as the true *Expositor Novus*, is a true connoisseur of Averroes and thus also of Aristotle, as his dispute with Aquinas proves that point (ch. 4.4.4). Therefore, he cannot accept the thesis of Avicennists such as Bonaventure and Descartes about the autonomously thinking *cogito* and about the innate idea of modern God in human mind. Let us now summarize Siger’s credo with regard to cognition in QIIIDA, q. 12. He defends the principle of *tabula rasa* and illumination of sense only from the first substances.

“I maintain and believe that there is no innate cognition of intelligible content in our intellect, but that the intellect stands in the pure possibility of everything intellectually cognizable. There is no innate insight into the first principles of cognition, because all cognition arises from sensual phantasms.” [[231]](#footnote-231)

The soul is a blank slate and we have no innate principles of cognition that would produce their own content of cognition (*non est innata aliqua cognito intelligibilium*). The intellect is a mere potency, nothing more and also nothing less, because it is an immaterial capacity of the soul given in the body. The active component of intellect is actualized by the receptive component of the immaterial intellect, which is separate from the senses. This universal potency is actualized solely through the sensual phantasms (*ex phantasmatibus intelligit quidquid intelligit*). Since the intellect is in pure potency with respect to the senses, it has no actuality of its own (*nullius intus habens innatam cognitionem*). Therefore, the intellect has no innate principles of cognition that would reflect something through the intuition made à la Avicenna, Grosseteste, Descartes and Kant. Siger is not a modernist and does not need innate or *a priori* given principles to justify cognition. Ockham took the same position at Oxford against the school of Scotists (ch. 5.4.1). His minimalist interpretation of cognition, which is known today as “Ockham’s razor,” rejected any mythological additions to the concept of cognition according to CMDA. In the case of any hypostatized principles of cognition, the soul would be a separated substance (*hoc aliquid*). This would cause the unity of the person to disintegrate, which in no way disturbed schizophrenic modernism and postmodernism and still does not. Siger emphasizes that the soul actualized in this way could not recognize the whole of being in a purely receptive manner. Taken from the perspective of pure and separated potency, it would not be able to take in all intelligible content (*in pura potentia ad omnia intelligibilia*). This is why Siger brilliantly interpreted the writing CMDA. Siger defined the intellect as an immaterial potency that is actualized from sense knowledge. It determines knowledge as *tertium genus* in the *subiective* mode. However, after the actualization through the senses, the immaterial potency forms immaterial and universal concepts (*intelligibilia*), to which the intellect relates in the mode *obiective* as to its objects. The objective deduction for the scientific proof of intellect (and not modern mythology) has the following form.

* *Maior:* All humans are rational beings by nature. (*Gehaltsinn*)
* *Minor* as the right *medium:* The power of the intellect is defined in virtue of real causality made in the *subiective* mode, by the metaphysical imposition of intellect as *tertium genus*. (*Bezugssinn*)
* *Conclusion*: The intellect as a necessarily correct and therefore scientifically deduced universal essence is *obiective* recognizable, as a correctly postulated *quartum genus*. (*Vollzugssin*)

According to Siger, the modern “intellect” as an objective *tertium ens* is recognized objectively, that is in a false manner. Scientific knowledge based on real causality is excluded from this misleading deductive mode. The “proof” of modernity is dogmatically given. Theological postulates such as the immortality of the soul and contemporary nihilistic nonsense are philosophically misguided. The mythologists use an essentialist and thus logical form of deductive proof to determine the nature of intellect. Siger excluded the logical essence of intellect as a hypostatized form (Aquinas, Albert) from the proof. Metaphysics is not logic; and certainly not a modern logic based on demonic fundamentals as the future arrival of Antichrist (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). In this mode of *demonstratio* we should understand Siger’s seemingly Averroistic assertions, such as the following statement: “*intelligibilia autem nun educuntur de potentia intellectus, sed fluunt in eo ab extrinseco*” (QIIIDA, q. 13; 43.94–96). We recognize everything through material sensory phantasms, because only these really come from outside to immaterial receptive intellect. Therefore, this correspondence of things, senses and thinking is the only way in which we can truthfully recognize the world. Only the potency can be actualized, but not the already given actuality of some intellectual substance. The soul, as an actualized form endowed with immaterial intellectual potency, would lose the only possibility how to really actualize the intellect. It can be done solely by sensory phantasms (*subiective*). The theory of truth as correspondence asserts that we do not generate truth “*in artificialibus*” in the present way of media and ideological simulacra. We recognize the world as it really is. Siger rejected the modern form of *dativus possessivus*. The appropriation of modern truth is made as a subjectively formed “*Ge-Stell*,” that is, completely “*in artificialibus*.” In fact, the original “*Ge-Stell*” of Aristotle, Averroes and Siger is done in reverse, i.e., in the *subiective* mode. We don’t have the truth, but the truth possesses us. Reality appropriates the intellect as the universal faculty of the soul, which recognizes the world in the *obiective* mode, that is, as adequately made knowledge.

From the previous interpretation, it becomes clear that Siger rejects the thesis of second Averroism that the intellect directly recognizes real things in such a way that it takes them in their given state in human cognition (*particulare particulariter non intelligit*).[[232]](#footnote-232) This is not possible due to the completely different ways in which the senses and intellect recognize. The intellect refers to things only by the act of thinking, to be united to them. That act of intellect subsists within the framework of the existing person as the first substance. Through our own cognitive acts, we recognize the formal and common *ratio* of things. Only the resulting product of personal cognition proves, thanks to the immateriality and unity of universally given cognition, that the intellect as a faculty of the soul is common to all human beings.[[233]](#footnote-233) The possible intellect has no actuality of its own that would enable it to retain knowledge in the manner of Augustine’s *memoria* or in the manner of Kant’s postmodern innate principles of cognition. The intelligible species are synthesized through the act of receptive *intellectus possibilis*.

“Aristotle says that the soul is the place of species (*locus specierum*), that is, the intellectual soul. But it becomes the place of species solely through the act of thinking. It follows from this that the contents stored in the possible intellect are necessary for the act of understanding.” [[234]](#footnote-234)

The immaterial “*modus receptionis*” is linked to the way in which we receive the intellectual species beyond the sensual species. The soul has no habitual recognition of species; its act of recognition makes the way through which these species become apparent as recognized objective contents. They cannot exist in the soul in some sphere similar to computer memory RAM. It was the definition made by Bonaventure and Pecham to store the multiplicity of *tertium ens*. The psychic process of intentionality and abstraction create species, and the soul thus becomes the “place” as the origin of species. The active intellect, as another faculty of the soul in the last stage of abstraction, can change *species intelligibilis* to the resulting concept of language. According to *Second Analytics*, the *medium* of demonstrative proof must contain knowledge given by bodily experience. Otherwise, the deduction is invalid in the sense of scientific truth, because it would not meet the real causality at the level of first substance that is introduced via the metaphysical imposition. Albert defended this point against Oxfordian Fallacy introduced by Grosseteste and Kilwardby (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.1). Siger again recalls Averroes’s phenomenological point of view as the twofold way in the mode of the hermeneutic “*Wie*,” that is, how the abstraction takes its propre form. The quote precisely distinguishes the act of universal abstraction from the act of individual intentionality. Each of these acts is made in a different way.

“We experience in ourselves two processes of abstraction (*experimur autem in nobis duas operationes abstractas*). The primary activity of abstraction is the reception of universal knowledge that is abstract (*receptio intelligibilium universalium abstractorum*). The second operation of abstraction, which we have experienced, concerns the abstraction of intelligible content, because previously these were only sensual intentions. Since we both experience these processes of abstraction in ourselves, we know that there must be two mental faculties in us by means of which this activity takes place. The recognition of the activities of the soul in us precedes the knowledge of its essence (*scire enim actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam*).” [[235]](#footnote-235)

The most solid defender of the first Averroism begins with the description of the mental acts (*experimur autem in nobis duas operationes abstractas*). The most important ability of the soul explored through the experienced process of abstraction is its power to absorb immaterial forms of recognition that were generated in the process of abstraction (*receptio intelligibilium universalium abstractorum*). Therefore, the possible intellect is the proper place to keep the received species. Important is the following sentence that defines the path of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) from where this abstraction is determined. The act of understanding as a pure potency cannot think these contents out of itself, because there are no innate cognitive principles. We perceive the act of intellectual abstraction in such a way that we experience it (*operatio abstracta, quam in nobis experimur*). The individually given sensual species are received in the act of abstraction (*abstractio intelligibilium, cum prius essent intentiones imaginatae*). Only now is the scientific recognition of the soul complete, because the upper and the lower part of statement (*maior, minor*) give a deductive conclusion. The reception is a general potency of the soul within the framework of the immaterial *intellectus possibilis*, which is universally receptive (*maior*). This general potency is actualized in virtue of the causality coming from sensual intentions. All this is done in the process of causally given and experienced cognition (*minor*). The result consists in the process of abstraction, which is again recognized by one’s own experience, which, however, is already given within the framework of universal sense (conclusion). The phenomenology of mental acts, in contrast to Descartes, distinguishes two different processes, describing “how” thinking is reflected in one’s own knowledge (*experimur has duas operationes fieri*). The word “*fieri*” means the process of cognition in the mode *subiective*. Then, in correctly constructed deductive conclusion, it can be stated (*scimus quod necesse est*) that precisely these two functions tied to the intellectual nature of the human soul must exist in us (*in nobis duas virtutes esse*). The key character is the transition of scientific evidence from “*fieri*” of the intellect to “*esse*.” Averroist modernism and postmodernism have completely ignored that proceeding of deductive demonstrations. The middle link of the syllogism must include the causally given reality of recognized phenomena (*experimur*). The resulting definition of intellect is given in the mode of universal essence. Siger fully understood the meaning of CMDA, since Averroes supplemented Aristotle in that point. Semiaverroists Albert and Aquin did not explicitly take this view. Siger made explicit criticism of them because of that omission in his second commentary on *De anima*. It was written at the time of the major crisis after the year 1270. The phenomenological question “how” we recognize is given by the experience made in the first person. It must form a component of the description of the intellect and the soul. Siger rejects a definition of the cognition, the soul and the person made through an essential approach to intellect. This is the effect of Oxfordian Fallacy made in the framework of the Porretan principle “*inmediate*” that was inserted in the first Averroism. Siger rightly created scientific *demonstratio* of human intellect according to principle “*ex inmediatis*” in *Second Analytics*. Since a phenomenon is given, i.e., the process of cognition within the framework of the individual *intellectio* as Averroes’s *tertium genus*, the scientifically recognized essence of this phenomenon is also given, that is, the recognized universalia (*intellecta*). Finally, at the end of deductive demonstration, the essence is defined: the intellect as a recognized universal form, which is the same for all people in the mode *quartum genus*. In 1272, the magisters in the rue du Fouarre ordered this procedure to be mandatory for the scientific research of the person and intellect in the framework of true philosophy. Only this procedure, which states the real causality of the intellect in us, ensures that we know what the intellect and what the soul is in the mode of the essentially drawn and necessary conclusion. The scientifically and phenomenologically based transition from “*fieri*” to “*factum*” confirms the validity of deduction selon *Secondes Analytics*. The proof must start by the intellect as “*fieri*” (*tertium genus*) to take up the intellect as “*factum*” (*quartum genus*). That proceeding confirms the validity of the above-mentioned principle of cognition. The proceeding follows the necessity that is generated by the metaphysical dative. Phenomenological description of cognition comes from the real event of *anima intellectiva*, which is existentially given and is experienced *per prius* (*scire enim actiones animae prius est*). The second step goes to the essence of the intellectual soul recognized *per posterius* (*scire eius substantiam*). The cause is in ourselves, because we recognize when we want to, and not because some external intellect connects with us. We do not recognize as animals, because our *intellectus possibilis* is given to our senses from the outside, that is, in the mode of *separabilis* and *inmixtus*.

The later treatise *De aeternitate mundi* shows in the polemic concerning eternity of species that this error of modernists as Bonaventure and Pecham is connected with the erroneous nature of *intellectus possibilis*. The receptive intellect of modernists confusingly integrates all functions of cognition in itself; moreover, it “exsists” in hypostatic mode (*cum sit possibilis sicut subiecti, est ipsius agentis ut efficientis*).[[236]](#footnote-236) The quoted text of Siger confirms with Averroes that universal meanings are pure potentialities; only in this form can they be received by *subiective* given intellect, which is the pure potency of the soul (*intellectus rei qui est in possibili, cum sit possibilis sicut subiecti*). The keyword “*sicut subiecti*” indicates that the intellect is not a subject in the sense of substance, because the intellect would be a hypostatized modern *res*. Thus, the hermeneutic triad of understanding is completed by proceeding from the phenomenon to its cause. We have the immaterial contents of consciousness (*intellecta*, Heidegger’s *Gehaltsinn*), which produces the twofold type of causality experienced directly in us (*experimur—conscii sumus, Bezugssinn*). Due to twofold phenomenological question, we deduce the way of phenomenal “how” the intellect operates. Siger was able to establish in the scientific syllogism the whole process of understanding, which is finalized in the essential definition of the intellect (*Vollzugssinn*). Avicennists start with the essence and then create a theological, ideological and mythological definition of human intellect. Modernity sees no difference between the existential experience of the intellect and the essential definition of the intellect. Essentially, the human being is also seen as a corpse, which Abelard already rejected (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). The Sicilian school based on the Commentator follows the existential act of the soul (ψυχῆς ἔργον, kap. 4.4.2). The first Averroism is not guided by mythological knowledge manipulated by academically trained Furies. Critical judgment follows the path of real phenomena, which the philosophy must save to create the true cognition of being. Therefore, Siger and his school, by word and deed, protect philosophy as the first science about the real state of the world. The *illuminati* had to nullify this true statement about the unity of the person and his intellectual cognition. Latin sophists achieved this goal in a fully rational and objective manner. Tempier’s decree of March 1277 became a philosophical agora where the gigantomachy of the person as the only substance was fought in an artistic manner. Furies in the subjective form were irreconcilable. There were too few wise people in the Church at the times that were able to see through the archaic *alētheia* to discover the original meaning of this fundamental dispute. Such a wise person was Parisian bishop Alvernus in the preceding generation. This epochal fallacy (*Irrtum*) gave the basic objective *factum* of modernity and modernity, which resulted in the nihilistic philosophy of today (*Irre*). The schizophrenic person, broken down into several mythological substances, eventually turned into the difference of a binary one and zero. Dante, under the guidance of Apollonian Muses, demonstrated Siger’s unique place in the philosophy of the Latin West. The honorary title *Doctor Invidiosus*, in the mode of truth and untruth, manifests the full Apollonian *a/lētheia* of his philosophy. The divine comedy directed by Muses and Furies runs in the hermeneutic category called “*dativus modi*” (ch. 4). The modality of intellectual understanding in the person is given either in a true and thus Aristotelian way, or in a schizophrenic and thus modern way. Philosophy must rescue the original phenomenon of Siger as a true Averroist from the tragicomic Siger as modern Averroist. Therefore, it is necessary to go again to the philosophical agora and make a categorical indictment (κατηγορέω) of the divine comedy through a proper form of categorical predication. Pythian reading of “Averroist” Siger must necessarily proceed from the causally determined phenomenon of intellectual understanding, and not from modernist delusions. It is necessary to interpret both the musical and the manic form of the divine comedy exposed by Dante in an unconcealed way. The former form of divine truth is true and hidden in the mode of *obiective*; the latter form of demonic error is tragic and fully revealed in the mode of objectivity. Both forms of proceeding today constitute, in the mode of *a/lētheia*, the destiny of the West, today not only the Latin one.

The first part of QIIIDA is essential in order to understand Siger’s philosophy. It is necessary to take into account the architectural structure of all four parts of the treatise mentioned in the introduction (ch. 4.4.1). The Commentator followed *De anima* in a right way, from the beginning (DA I–II) to the end (DA III). It is necessary to follow the writing QIIIDA in the same manner. The universal receptivity of intellect experienced in the individual act of intentionality (*experimur*) must be kept in the framework of abstracted universal species (*conscii sumus*). Now we can proceed to typical Averroistic speculation of CMDA III.5 about the eternity of *intellectus possibilis* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The general determination of intellect can be analyzed only now, after the finalized proof of all operations of intellect. The intellectual cognition of species will last as long as philosophy exists as a way of scientific cognition based on personally experienced *intellectus possibilis*. The following quotation is read by modern Averroists in such a way that they turn the *intellectus possibilis* into a substance. The preceding analyses have shown that such case does not correspond to Siger’s position. He confirms Averroes’s position on this point with regard to the nature of the intellect as a *quartum genus*.

“The Commentator solves this as follows: the one intellect is connected with the human species (*copulatur humanae speciei*), and the other intellect connects to the existing person through the cognitive form of personal species (*copulatur huic individuo humanae speciei*). The connection between the possible intellect and the human species entail more substantial character (*essentialior est*) than the connection on the level of personal species. This is given in such a way that the human species is an eternal species and must be connected in that way with the intellect, which is eternal. The connection with the individual person is less substantial within the framework of the human genus (*minus essentialis est*). The intellect can detach itself from the individual person; however, the intellect bound to the human species can never detach itself from it (*intellectus a specie humana numquam separetur*).” [[237]](#footnote-237)

We must take into account previous interpretations of scientific proof dealing with the unity of the person and the intellect according to *Second Analytics*. It becomes clear that the text means the intellect as an essence and a universal notion, because it is tied to the specific abstraction under the name of all humanity. Humanity does not think, only the person does it. In Latin it would be better to say that “*species humana*” carried by intellect as *quartum genus* is not “*species hominis*” carried by intellect as *tertium genus*. The determination of intellect is given in one way at the level of the existing person (*minus essentialis*) and in the other at the level of all mankind (*essentialior*). In the first case, given by the existential act of the intellect in the mode *tertium genus*, the intellect is only a quasi-substance and thus given in the mode “*minus*” with regard to its being as a universal species. In humanity, on the other hand, it is fully universal, but at the cost that it exists only in the thinking of the philosopher as an abstraction. Thanks to specific determination of humanity at the level of universality, this definition of the intellect in CMDA does not have a deficient character, as is the case with its real being in the person.[[238]](#footnote-238) In terms of deduction based on the essential “*esse*” of the possible intellect thus given, the second procedure of *Categories* applies. We now predicate in the mode *per prius* the sense from the universally superior genus towards the species (τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, *Cat*. 2a15–16). Now it is clear that we take “*intellectus*” in the mode *obiective* as a kind of “*intellectum*.” The intellect as the essence is connected at the level of the person only in the mode of external knowledge (*intellectus copulatur huic individuo*). That mode of unification concerns only the intellect as a universal notion that we can accept or reject because it is a matter of personal cognition (*minus essentialis*). On the contrary, taken on the level of “*species humana*”, the essentiality of intellect constitutes a genuine form of mankind (*essentialior*). The intellect as universal meaning of human species came into being as the correct conclusion of the scientific deductive syllogism, i.e., on the basis of the causally experienced cognition, which we personally have in our power. Then the conclusion of this deduction is universally valid for all people. The difference between the potential faculty given in the existing person and the universal concept of the intellect as a species is absolutely fundamental, which, of course, the objective interpretations of modernity and postmodernity are not able to see. Bacon and Siger would say that modernity does not think at all, because it has no idea of the act of thinking (*intellectio*), but considers it to be mental content (*intellectum*). The theoretical insight into the specific and universal being of the intellect (*factum*) is in contradiction to the act of the person (*fieri*). Personally, the intellect is manifested by the fact that each of us thinks as a person. Modern *individuum* has the intellect as a mythological and therefore objective *tertium ens*; then “it” cannot think correctly, and the present state of the Western corresponds to this quite objectively. The abstract being (*esse*) of the receptive intellect is deductively given as a universal notion; is fully bound to humanity as a species, which is quite correct. Namely, in the existing person the intellect is destructible (*corruptibilis*), which is not the case of the intellect as a universal meaning. The correctly established scientific proof makes it possible, in relation to the nature of the intellect, to determine the specific and fully universal characteristic of the intellect from the point of view of the general determination of the person capable of philosophy. We find this conclusion with the same series of proofs in Averroes writing CMDA.[[239]](#footnote-239) The universal character of *intellectus possibilis* is tied to the existence of philosophy in the framework of humanity as a species. The immaterial receptivity as a specific and thus general property of the soul is proved in thinking only in the existence of receptively thinking humanity as a species. The philosophy, which, according to *Second Analytics*, compiles the complex *demonstratio*, ensures true scientific cognition at the level of the universality of the intellect. Intellect on the level of “*species humana*” makes the final element in an accomplished series of proofs (*quartum genus*). This categorical statement of intellect as a species is tied to the existence of the personal intellect as the first substance in reality (*tertium genus*). The deductively recognized intellect as a universal is determined in an abstract and specific way on the level of humanity as a species (*species humana*). This universal meaning does not have its own subsistence, because it is an abstraction in mind. Only the existing human being can think and can causally evoke thinking and experience it in the mode *inmixtus*. The humanism of Siger and Dante requires the intellect of the existing person as a *tertium genus* in order to determine the universal character of man or humanity as a *quartum genus*. Without the existentially given receptive intellect, the middle link of the proof would have no effective causality given from the first substance. The same position is defended in the later work *De anima intellectiva*.[[240]](#footnote-240) The key is the passage “*anima secundum apparentia de ipsa*,” which is taken separately from the actual “*fieri*” of the soul in the body. The intellect as an essence can be taken according to the theoretically postulated *esse*, which is ontologically different from the actualization of the intellect as a personal potency in the soul (*non habet opus sine corpore*). The specific determination of *intellectus possibilis* in the mode of the universal species is possible only within the framework of the intellect as an abstract species belonging to human species. Humanity does not think, since it does not possess an intellect as a personalized act of the soul (*subiective, tertium genus*). Therefore, objective modernism thinks in a completely paranoid manner and rejected the supposed Averroism of Siger and the Commentator. The school of the second Averroism created the myth of a cosmic *intellectus possibilis* on the level of humanity according to David of Dinant (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3). That cosmic intellect copulates with the human intellect. Aquinas recognized that such nonsense should not be imputed to Averroes. He therefore created a more philosophically acceptable myth, again associated with intellectual copulation. The history of the modern lunacy (*Irre*) begins long before Foucault’s well-known work *Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique* (1961). The corps does not think, which in no way disturbs the objectively thinking philosophers in determining the identity of the concrete individual. Modernity defines the subject as a *tertium ens,* in virtue of the specific form of copulation with its own intellectual hubris. Mathematical and logical abstraction does not require the reality of the thinking person, because that kind of abstraction works with the essences. For the specific determination of man as an individual, the corpse is sufficient proof, and today only the DNA proof assures the identity of the corpse. Siger and Dante, who was inspired by him, correctly understood the fundamental value of Averroes’s philosophy for humanistic destiny of man given in light of natural reason. Philosophy explores the determination of *intellectus possibilis* in the principled way, in which the intellect truthfully operates in the existing person. From the point of view of Aristotle and Averroes, humanity exists as a species (*quartum genus*) as long as at least one existing exemplar capable of specific human thinking exists (*tertium genus*). To find such personalities was difficult enough, even in those days of the classical age when the history of modern madness just started. Siger and, after him, Dante knew perfectly well that Averroes here speaks of an abstract *species humana*. The existence of this species lies only in our intellect and can never be taken substantially, as Averroists did and still do. The humanism given by the new interpretation of Averroes does not determine the specificity of man from the direction of the corpse, as in the second Averroism and in modern modernism.

Siger criticizes the modern *Nominales* and Averroists in the school of Bonaventure because they take the immaterial intellect as a separate substance.[[241]](#footnote-241) The modernists made out of the intellect a hypostasis instead of observing the manner how we really think. But then they do not see the phenomenological question of “how” thinking takes place through our connection with intellectual intentions (*intentiones intellectae*). It is necessary to follow the way in which the intentions become understandable in us, and not to judge the intellect as some separate substance (*secundum quod copulatur isti et non absolute*). Thinking can be taken purely abstractly (*simpliciter* *in se*); but then we only speculate about “*esse*” of intellect and by no means about phenomenological and experienced “*fieri*.” Once again, the fundamental difference between the definitions of intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus* applies. Siger’s analysis of cognition in QIIIDA clearly distinguishes between the text of *De anima* and the ingenious interpretation of the Commentator. Siger began his philosophical career at the same time as the chancellor of the University and Parisian bishop Alvernus had died. The magister from rue du Fouarre drew dividing lines between Avicennian Aristotle, Aristotelian Aristotle and the interpretation of Aristotle according to Averroes. This was an absolutely masterly interpretation, which unfortunately remained outside the intellectual capacity of modernism at that time. Unfortunately, Siger’s philosophy was rejected by theological Aristotelians, who were settled in the religious schools of *sophistae Latini* (Aegidius, Aquinas). In contrast to the school of second Averroism, these semiaverroists understood Siger’s arguments very well, but rejected them on theological actualized. This was the case of Albert, who became the target of Siger’s criticism. Albert rejected the philosophy of “*pars Sigeri*” indirectly but very effectively. Albert did not come to the aid of this school of bishop Alvernus in the difficult times of the main attack of 1270–74. And yet, he belonged to this school, as Siger clearly stated in his defense. Siger brilliantly defended the tradition of authentic Aristotelianism at the University of Paris in rue du Fouarre, and therefore he was appointed rector of Artists of that time. The following quotation summarizes the conception of the unity of the intellect given according to the correctly interpreted intention of Aristotle’s metaphysics.

“The active and the possible intellect must be understood in such a way that they are not two substances, but two different abilities of one and the same substance. Aristotle had already guessed this (*sentit*) when he claimed in the third book of *De anima* that one genus [of the intellect] has an ability by which everything makes cognition, and the second genus has the ability to be in the potency for everything. In the soul given by the combination of active and passive intellect, we receive everything and make abstraction of it according to the personal will. By this we state that it is about the abilities of one and the same substance and our intellect.” [[242]](#footnote-242)

The unity of the intellect (*de intellectu agente et possibili*) is given by two different faculties of the soul (receptive, synthetic), which are given within the framework of the one existing substance (*sunt duae virtutes eiusdem substantiae*). Thanks to the correct conception of these two faculties, the thesis of the universal receptivity of the soul is valid. Thus, the possibility of universal cognition is fundamentally given by the fact that one ability can synthesize everything and the other different ability can in turn accept everything in pure potency (*est omnia facere et aliquid aliud quod est in potentia omnia*). Both separate faculties of the soul (*passio, actio*) given within the framework of the twofold act of personal understanding form a substantial unity (*virtutes eiusdem substantiae*) of the intellect given within the framework of the cognizing person (*intellectus nostri*). The intellect is not a separated substance as in the second Averroism, because it makes two complementary faculties of the soul. Therefore, we have both acts of passive and active thinking fully in our power (*recipimus et abstrahimus ad libitum nostrum*). The theory of fully personalized cognition is completed; at the same time, all the basic theses of the second averroism are rejected. Dante admired and praised this clear and precise style of Siger’s thinking. Therefore, he added that modest, inconspicuous and persecuted magister to heavenly pantheon of Christian philosophers in a very specific way. Magister Siger completes the philosophy of well-known Dominicans, Albert and Aquinas, in the tenth Song of Paradise. He improved and supplemented what was imperfect in these two Aristotelian thinkers. That is why Dante considers Siger the greatest contemporary philosopher. Bonaventure does not belong to this trinity of philosophical representatives of the first Averroism. He is praised for his ecclesiastical and theological merits (*Paradiso, canto* XII). Dante′s evaluation goes exactly in line with the analysis presented the fourth matrix. The Florentine thinker, in contrast to the then modernists and today’s postmodernists, recognized Siger’s epochal merits for the eternity given in the paradise.

Siger became the objectively forgotten founder of Western humanism. The difference in the determination of man between modernity and the first Averroism was set forth in the dispute about “*homo mortuus*” mentioned in the treatise *De anima et de potenciis eius* (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.1). The previous matrix dealt with the school of *Nominales* that established the figure of modern humanism derived from specific hypostatized corpse. The first Averroism defends humanism in the mode of *dativus finalis* related to the living person. There is the twofold conception of beatitude operated firstly by the intellect that has been further perfected by revealed Christian faith. Determination of intellecthad an historic effect on European thought through Dante, who had adopted Siger’s definition of *intellectus possibilis* with regard to humanity as human species. In his concept of the receptive intellect as a specific universal destiny of mankind, a new *Lichtung* of Western humanism is given, which determines its epochal *a/lētheia* both in the mode of the truth and untruth. Siger precisely determined the way of cognition of the person in terms of truth as a correspondence. He was the best philosopher of his time that defended the substantial unity of the person in a true scientific manner. Therefore, he gave the human species a specific unity in terms of its tasks and the goal of truthfully recognizing everything in its own receptive way, which is not peculiar to animals, angels, or God. The brilliant *Doctor Invidiosus* founded the humanistic version of *dativus finalis* (ch. 4). Humanity is endowed with the specific ability of receptive intellect, which represents a common destiny of humanity. The existence of philosophy is necessary in order to define humanity in the unique mode of the species, because we are animals as to the genus. The possible intellect, presented in a specific universal mode, defined the essence of the entire human species in such a way that the unity of the existing person is preserved as its fundament. Dante used that kind of *intellectus possibilis* in its twofold view (*fieri, esse*) to open the practical epoch of humanism in the framework of “*universitas humana*.” The writing *De Monarchia* follows Siger by making the reference to CMDA. Dante′s form of specific “*esse*” of the possible intellect is given as a specific existence of humanity with regard to real “*fieri*” of this intellect in the existing person.[[243]](#footnote-243) The Florentine thinker and poet did not apply the above-mentioned Siger’s argument in the philosophical framework of eternity of species, but used it for the definition of political rationality. Humanity realizes its historical possibility with the help of the political rationality based on personal activity (*intellectus practicus*). Dante links this political rationality with the personal act of Albert’s *intellectus speculativus* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Siger interpreted the act of the soul as the personal achievement of intellect (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον, *De generatione animalium* 736b12). Dante used Aristotle’s extension of the theoretical intellect into practice (*intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus*, *Mon*. 1.3.9) to shape personally given political action. The connection between *tertium* and *quartum genus* is carried out by the poet Dante with the help of the synecdoche, which through the common causality connects the whole and the part.[[244]](#footnote-244) Rational action creates a specific act of humanity (*operatio humane universitatis*), which, from the point of view of the finality of the intellect, belongs to it as the highest component in man (*ad quam ipsa universitas hominum in tanta multitudine ordinatur*; *Mon*. 1.3.4). Since the act of thinking has an abstractly given universal species (Averroes’s intellect as a *quartum genus*), the unity of humanity is also defined by this universal receptivity at the level of the *intellectus possibilis*, whereby humanity has become a species. We are a unique species for each other (*species humana*), because we respect this specifically human nature within ourselves. As a unique person, we exist and think; but as a human species, we recognize and predict humanity in a universal manner. The connection with Alfarabi’s conception of human nature gave rise to a new form of humanity of humanism, which is objectively repressed today (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The conception of the possible intellect gave the basic definition of autonomously thinking and acting humanity (*ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis*; *Mon*. 1.3.7). As a result of this distinction, the specific receptive human intellect (intellectus possibilis) arises at the theoretical level as the basis of the unity of the human genus. According to QIIIDA, q. 14 cited above, the unity of humanity is given in the form of the specific possibility of the entire human species to have its own specific being (*humana species aeterna est*), which is linked to the equally specific ability of thinking that is peculiar only to man (*intellectus qui ei copulatur aeternus est*). The autonomous action and thinking of the person given at the level of the existential act (*intellectum fieri*), follows the universal possibility of cognition (*intellectum esse*) within the framework of humanity as a specific unity. According to *Nicomachean Ethics*, this cognizing intellect acts in reality here and now like the causally acting practical intellect of the person (*extensione fit practicus*, ch. 6.1). This extension must not be understood by the exposure from behind, from the direction of the hypostatized *intellectus possibilis*, but together with Siger and Dante from the direction of the unique person, i.e. by the exposure from the front, from the direction of ethical and political form of practical intellect as a *tertium genus*. Then the philosophical unity of humanity also establishes the unity given as a universal ethico-political community (*universitas humana*). Political activity and theoretical cognition became the epochal fate of the West and determine the form of its humanity. The material intellect bound to the senses would not build up this specific unity of humanity. The separated active intellect represents a kind of being peculiar to the cosmic and angelic intelligences and not to the sensually cognizing human being. The previous chapter has shown that the human intellect as a species is clearly separated from the eternal created being of the cosmic intelligences that have the fully actualized *intellectus agens* (ch. 4.4.1). Therefore, the unity of humanity is built on the specific character of *intellectus possibilis, speculativus* and *practicus* (mode *separabilis*), and not on the cosmic active intellect (mode *separatus*). Dante opened the epoch of European humanism by changing the philosophical humanism of secular priest Siger into a political humanism. The hermeneutics of “*universitas humana*” pointed out in the interpretation of the scripture *De* *Monarchia* that Dante was not an Averroist (Umlauf 2012). The Florentine poet and thinker, following the example of Averroes and Siger, would have said that the ipseity of man as a political being is based on the fact that humanity as “*universitas humana*” can be defined in the framework of specifically and universally equal beatitude and political wisdom; however, everyone realizes it personally. Dante understood that the universal unity of intellect and the destiny of mankind are given outside the revealed theological truth. The unity of humanity exists in a specific way in the philosophy of great thinkers like Siger. Dante celebrated him in *Divine Comedy* in a divine way. That is why in the next generation of *Modernorum*, Dante became an Averroist as was Siger.

### 4.4.4 Dispute over the Title *Expositor Novus*

After the publication of Aquinas’s work *De unitate intellectus* (1270), Siger realized that the teaching of famous Dominicans, Albert and Aquinas, agreed in some points with Averroistic solution done according to erroneous metaphysics of Avicenna (ch. 4.4.1). But both Aristotelians fundamentally rejected all errors of second Averroism, namely the universal hylemorphism and the plurality of substances in man. Siger clearly saw the fundamental difference between metaphysics of Avicenna and Averroes. This fundamental difference in the interpretation of *Corpus Aristotelicum* leads to a hitherto unexplored debate about the title *Expositor Novus* between Siger and Aquinas in the years 1270–72. This debate was overshadowed by false accusations of Averroism and the expulsion of Siger’s group from the Artistic faculty in 1277. Aegidius founded the Thomism as a sophisticated kind of objective Averroism that founded a new school of *sophistae Latini*. The victors of that school established objectivist metaphysics after the year 1280. Siger’s second commentary on *De anima* appeared in this eventful period after the year 1270. The brilliant Doctor Individiosus had no reason to change the previous arguments in the commentary on *De anima* I–III (Manuscript of Munich and QIIIDA). Both commentaries on DA I–III created the only theory of full unity of the person in the Latin West, before Heidegger’s existential analytics (ch. 4.4.1). According to Magister of Brabant, the scientific proof of the soul must follow the causality of the real person, whose act of thinking is stated in the middle link of *demonstratio*. The investigation must proceed from experienced effects of intellect in us according to *Second Analytics*. The immaterial soul and the intellect are not recognizable in the direct insight of cognition; the deductive proof starts from the abstraction established by *species sensibilis*. Siger’s phenomenology considered the Semiaverroist nature of intellect elaborated in the school of the first Averroism to be a problem. Siger described the deductive scientific syllogism, in which the definition of intellect is based on the existential unity of the person (*homo ipse* *intelligit*). The second phenomenological principle from *De generatione animalium* II.3 is of fundamental importance for the argumentation (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον). A similar debate was introduced into hermeneutics by Heidegger in the mode of double existential understanding (*Bezugssinn*). The key sentence refers to the dual concept of predication of human existence (*vivere, utroque modo dictum, est ab anima*), which explains the explored part of *De anima* (τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, 415b13).

“It must be added to the foregoing that we can understand in a first way (*uno modo*) in virtue of the act of life (*vivere*) that is, the primary being of the living body (*primum viventis corporis*). The Philosopher says in the second book of *De anima* that the actualized act of life for living beings is their being (*vivere viventibus est esse*). But by the act of life we should also understand the generally predicted manifestations of life and the soul (*opera vitae et animae*). Both kinds of life are given by the soul (*vivere, utroque modo dictum, est ab anima*). However, the act of life encompassing the being of living beings is manifested only in the first way (*manifestatur vivere primo modo*) and concerns the being of the soul in animate beings only through life itself, which is the manifestation of the soul and the living being (*per vivere quod est opus animae et vitae*).” [[245]](#footnote-245)

The quotation rejects the essential definition of the soul according to the Toledo school, in full accordance with previously published scripture QIIIDA. The soul is not manifested in its abstract “*esse*,” but only in its factual “*fieri*,” that is, in the acts of life. The act of life as Aristotle’s “τὸ ζῆν” or Sigers “*vivere*” can be understood both in essential and phenomenological manner. The second procedure actualized the cognition of the soul with the help of scientific deduction related to the hyparchical being of the person as the first substance. Only this approach fulfilled the purpose of *Second Analytics* in the mode of “*ex inmediatis*” (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς, *Anal. Post*. 84a14). That kind of evidence leads to full scientific knowledge of the soul and the intellect. It is made through experienced causality, in the mode of “*conscii sumus*” (ch. 4.4.2). Aquinas did not go so far, as evidenced by his disputation *De virtutibus* (1271–72) that was already held in Paris. The disputation cites *De anima* 415b13–14 (*vivere viventibus est esse*) against modernists as evidence of the inadequate definition of virtue according to Augustine (*virtus qua recte vivitur; De virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 15). Aquinas links Aristotle’s act of being with the soul as an essence in the mode of Gundissalinus′s and Avicenna’s definition according to the Toledo school (*anima enim est principium vitae per suam essentiam*).[[246]](#footnote-246) Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* 415b13 has no phenomenological character that Siger established. From both quotations it becomes obvious that Aquinas does not see the phenomenological principle of the exploration of the soul, which is defended in the school of the first Averroism of Siger’s school according to CMDA in the mode *tertium genus*. Siger linked Albert’s erroneous interpretation to Aquinas’s teaching, since both theories concerned the essentiality of the soul mentioned above. The soul is presented as *a priori* established principle of life (*principium vitae per suam essentiam*). This essential definition of the soul according to Avicenna shows the primacy of substantial conception, which does not see the act of one’s own experienced existence for the middle link of scientific judgment (*experimur—consciii sumus*, ch. 4.4.2). The deductive proof of the intellect and the soul according to the metaphysical dative is not established. This fundamental error (*Irrtum*) of the school *sophistae Latini* determines the modern form of *dativus possesivus* (ch. 4) in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The nature of the intellect must be investigated in the twofold mode of scientific predication (*Anal. Post*. 84a11–14). Hermeneutics of objectivity must precisely define the existential definition of the person according to Siger′s proceeding made “*utroque modo*.” According to CMDA, his brilliant definition differs fundamentally from modernist universality, which lacks existential and phenomenological fundamentals. In the Thomism, the definition of the person is given only in the mode *per se* made out in the essential and universal modality. It means that the unity of the person is established exclusively in Avicenna’s metaphysics of the essence. This is a typical error made by Grosseteste and Rufus. They abolished the metaphysical abstraction of Averroes in their interpretation of *Second Analytics* and defined Aristotelian substance as an Avicennist essence. The term “*per se*” is taken either existentially or essentially in the definition of the soul and the intellect. In no case does it have the same meaning in Siger’s school and in the Thomistic school. Both schools share different interpretations of the scientific proof according to *Second Analytics* (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). According to Siger, the ipseity of the person follows precisely the dual logic of the imposition of meaning given by the dual interpretation “*per se*” (καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς, *Anal. Post*. 84a12). The exact order of statements must be established according to the complete evidence (*Anal. Post*. 84a13–14). Properly crafted scientific evidence has come from the “ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ” (a13) towards “ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς” (a14). The school of *sophistae Latini* in the first Averroism (Albert, Aquinas, Aegidius) has an incomplete proof given only on the basis of a “*per se*” determined essence. But then they do not designate the person as Siger’s “*homo ipse intelligit.*” They use only the designation “*homo intelligit*.” The mode of “*ipse*” given by the metaphysical imposition of a unique existence disappeared from the proof. That omission corrected Heidegger’s conception of *Dasein* until several centuries later. The impact of causally determined existence has been replaced by the logical supposition of “intellect” as an essence. The deduction was created in the mode of *Anal. Post*. 84a14 to bring about but the essential identity of the person done in the mode “*idem*.” Siger defined the unity of the person in the mode *alētheia*; that is why Dante celebrated him as the best philosopher of his time. Aquin offered the second-rate definition of the unity made in the mode of objective *veritas*. The term “*ipse*” follows the Aristotelian scientific method that is shown in the case of Sigers phenomenology of intellect as an act of the soul (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον). Only this procedure, given according to full proceeding of *Second Analytics*, clears the definition of the person from errors of Oxfordian Fallacy. The criticism of both Dominicans had already been included in Siger’s first complete commentary on *De anima*. The Munich manuscript and the QIIIDA criticized the moderate version of Oxfordian Fallacy in definitions of the soul and intellect. The brilliant metaphysician clearly saw that Albert and Aquinas were abandoning the phenomenology of thinking. Siger’s school (*pars Sigeri*) was the only one that defended the definition of the person “*utroque modo*” against both unified schools of *sophistae Latini* (*Moderni*, Albert, Thomism). Existential definition of the person assessed the proper place that took Thomistic metaphysical universality in Avicenna’s metaphysics of the essence. This definition must be rejected as insufficient in the name of the predication of *anima intellectiva* in the existential and hyparchical scenario made according to the Commentator’s interpretation in CMDA. Latin sophists followed Rufus’s version of Oxfodian Fallacy (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1) and elaborated an objective definition of the intellect in the mode “*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*” (καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό, *Anal. Post*. 73b27). They combined together both generically different modes of being given *simpliciter* and “per se.” However, Siger already in the writing QIIIDA clearly distinguished between the metaphysical and logical statements that entail the phenomenon called “*homo ipse intelligit*.”

The work *De anima intellectiva* (1272) confirmed the above-mentioned most important points of Siger’s criticism. It was published when Aquinas arrived in Paris with his philosophically erroneous conception of “*anima intellectiva*.” The essential definitions of *anima intellectiva* have no reliable value taken from the metaphysical dative, but from theological presuppositions. As a result, the scientific conception of the cognition was canceled, because the Semiaverroists (Albert, Aquin, Aegidius) committed fundamental mistakes. Albert and Thomas had a poorly established scientific proof that missed real cognitive causality. Without clarifying the basic way in which the person recognizes everything, they cannot define essential determinations of intellect. Since we recognize the world really, we state the intellect categorically. Siger described the act of thinking in the mode “*ex inmediatis*” given in one′s own self. The causality of “my” body as the first substance is experienced both from the causality of the senses and from the causality of the intellect (*experimur—conscii sumus*). As a result, according to Siger’s school, the scientific demonstration of the soul and intellect is secured in the mode *subiective* and *obiective*. Metaphysics of Aquinas and Albert works with the abstracted nature of intellect as an Avicennist essence, instead of predicting the act of the intellect within the framework of the person as the first substance. In Thomas’s and Albert’s proof, the essentially defined intellect supplanted the existential medium of the proof, which is bound to the person as the causally acting first substance. Siger’s real phenomenon of “*homo ipse intelligit*” must be correctly stated in the “*subiective–obiective*” mode. Thomistic “intellect,” on the contrary, is determined in the modern objectivist mode of logical identity given by the supposition. Aquinas thus created a new kind of ontotheological *tertium ens* in order to confirm the general thesis “*homo intelligit*” in a dogmatic manner. Boethius of Dacia observed this difference in the school of the first Averroism. Therefore, he defended the school of “*pars Sigeri*” in the writing *Anonymus Giele*. He explained to the Thomists what the correctly used mode “*subiective–obiective*” should look like according to CMDA. With regard to the philosophical monstrosities of modernists in Bonaventure′s school, these were minor shortcomings. Semiaverroists worked with the correctly made cognition given by exposure of meaning from the front and they adhered to the substantial (to be precise: essential) unity of the person. However, Thomistic definition of the person lacks the fundamental hyparchical determination made in the mode “*ex inmeditatis.*” It means an incorrectly stated proof in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy according to Rufus and Kilwardby; the first triad of cognitive principles was replaced by the second triad. Siger takes the quoted text of *De anima* 415b13–14 (*vivere viventibus est esse*) as a mental act of unique existence. The actuality of the person as the first substance, due to the hyparchical being, establishes the scientific proof of *anima intellectiva*. Then, following the mode “*ex inmeditatis*,” it is true that the stated necessity corresponds to existentical necessity given in the mode of the metaphysical dative. Siger denied the priority of the formal recognition of the soul as a substance, see Aquinas’s above-mentioned formulation “*per suam essentiam*.” Already the first scripture QIIIDA rejected the first Thomistic versions that proposed the essential definition of *anima intellectiva*, as it was in the interpretation of ST I, q. 88. His significance for the nascent Thomistic school at the University of Paris is mentioned by Aegidius in the Oxford manuscript (ch. 4.3.2). This dispute, dated in 1268, opens the next round of the dispute between Aquinas and Siger over the interpretation of DA III.

Siger has no problem with the fact that the immaterial intellectual component of the soul (*anima intellectiva*) is detached from the body after death, because this is the matter of generically different research in the framework of theology. However, the problem lies in what can be said from the position of philosophy in relation to the immortality of the soul. This dispute between philosophy and theology is set out in *Anonymus Giele* (ch. 4.3.1) Boethius of Dacia rejected the separation of the intellect as an independent form (Aquinas) or even as a substance (modernists). The mode *obiective* shows that the intellect has an immaterial act and it is not bound to any organ of the body, such as the senses. But the intellect is attached to the body by the manner *subiective*, because the act of thinking is an act of the soul as an entelechic form of the body. The critical philosophy of Aristotelianism does not provide any scientific proof of the immortality of the soul. There is only the basis of existentially established causality within the framework of the existing person in order to secure deductive *demonstratio*. The other kind of “proof” can be provided by essentially founded Avicennism. The critical philosopher differs from the schools of *sophistae Latini* in that he must correctly establish metaphysical statements given by the dual nature of the universals. The scientific proof must contain universal definitions given only on the basis of an imposition derived from the real causality of first hyperchic substances. This methodology of scientific proof according to *Second Analytics* is ordered in Siger′s school by the mentioned decree of the artists from the rue du Fouarre issued in 1272. The philosophy and theology are two sciences of different genres, and no univocal scientific statements are possible between them. Therefore, it is necessary to explain to Semiaverroists the nature of human soul through the experience of the sensually determined act of thinking made in the mode, “*experimur—conscii sumus*.” Only in this case is the middle link of the deductive judgment causally given directly from reality, both for the sensual and for the intellectual acts of the soul. We are a real cause of our own cognition, because we recognize when we want to do it by ourselves. An inappropriate radicalization of the principles “*ab* *extrinsece*” in the mode of Semiaverroism can easily give the impression that the hypostatized soul in the mode of the Toledo school or even the hypostatized intellect are the actualized carriers (*subiectum*) of the act of thinking and by no means the human being as a real first existing substance. The subsistent soul or intellect are not the real carriers (*subiectum*) of the act of thinking; they acquired a substantial character in the mode of the second Averroism. The previous chapters have shown that the use of “*subiective”* in the objectivist thinking of Aegidius (Oxford manuscript, Anonymus Bazán) and that of existentialists such as Siger (Munich manuscript) or Boethius of Dacia (Anonymus Giele) are fundamentally different from each other. Phenomenology cannot allow a reduction of the person to an essentially defined subject, because it contradicts the reasoning of CMDA. Such definition of the person would cancel Aristotle’s and Averroes’s metaphysics of the first substance, the realistic conception of science and the doctrine of the unified cognition in the existing person (*ipse homo intelligit*). Siger refused the conception of “*tantum anima intelligit*” that hypostatized soul and intellect.

“Everything that is active and that which is one does so by its form and produce some effect which is separate from one’s own act of being (*in esse separatum*). The soul understands not only as such (*non tantum anima intelligit*), but also the person himself understands through the intelligible soul (*ipse homo per animam intellectivam*). Therefore, the intellectual soul is the form and perfection of man and is not separated from him from the point of view of its being (*non ab eo in esse separata*).” [[247]](#footnote-247)

The act of understanding does not only refer to the objective definition of the soul as the essential form of the body (*non tantum anima intelligit*). Understanding includes the existence of the person in the act of existence. The definition of intellect must entail the existence of the person in the mode of “*ipse*” (*ipse homo per animam intellectivam*). The principle “*subiective*” defended by Siger against Aquinas and Aegidius does not belong to the paradigm of the Toledo school. It defined the intellect as another form, next to the soul. The definition of intellect in Bonaventure’s school is totally wrong. The intellect is presented as a Porretan hypostasis according to universal hylemorphism. The introductory quotation of *De anima* comments on the basic phenomenon of unified existence (*vivere viventibus est esse*) that forms the basic interpretative principle of Siger’s unity of the person. It takes up the introductory discussion of QIIIDA, where the act of life is solved according to the Sicilian school based on biological writings of Aristotle. According to Siger, the numerically given identity of the intellect is absolute nonsense, which was explained in the previous chapter. The first commentary on *De anima* fundamentally rejected the possibility that the intellect could be treated scientifically as any individualized substance or as a modern hypostasis of the third kind. The point of contention in the interpretation of the unified intellect, which oscillates between the two philosophers, is the conception of “*homo ipse intelligit*”, which we do not find in Aquinas. The conflict over the title *Expositor Novus* concerns the objective identity of understanding in Heidegger’s mode *Gehaltsinn* and the phenomenological ipseity of understanding in mode of *Bezugssinn* (ch. 4.4.3). The objective interpreters of Siger’s thinking in the mode of analytic Thomism made according to Oxfordian Fallacy are blind to this twofold nature of understanding. The definition made upon the identity of the person sees only the objective simulacrum, i.e., the false dispute about the numerical unity or multiplicity of the intellect.

In the controversies of the years 1270–75, Siger has to deal again with the question of how the intellect and the soul establish the unity of the person, engaged in the personal act of cognition. The first Western Latin humanist after Alfarabi and Ibn Rushd must protect the act of thinking at the level of the personal existence. Only in this way can the human being as a person, achieve the happiness defined in the tenth book of *Nicomachean Ethics* through the free act of philosophical thought and actions. This forgotten mode of ipseity was rediscovered by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of existence, to which Hannah Arendt added the political dimension of actions according to Aristotle. The starting point of Siger’s critique of interpretations of Aquinas and Albert concerning *De anima* is the consideration of the similarity and dissimilarity of the act of seeing and thinking. Siger defines the first form of existential understanding in the Latin West.

“The intellectual soul recognizes only (*non cognoscitur nisi*) by its activity (*ex eius opere*), that is, by the act of understanding (*intelligere*). However, understanding is connected with matter in some way (*quodammodo*) and separated from it in some way (*quodammodo*). If understanding were not connected with matter in a certain way (*aliquo modo*), then it would not be true that it is precisely this unique person who recognizes (*homo ipse intelligit*).” [[248]](#footnote-248)

According to *De anima* III, the separation of the intellect from the senses is a completely fundamental thing done in the *obiective* mode. The soul is recognized only from the act (*anima cognoscitur ex eius opere*), which is thought itself (*scilicet intelligere*). The next argument in the *subiective* mode emphasizes that thanks to matter, a person exists as an “*ipse*” that thinks through a unique exercise of the intellect (*ad materiam ... quod homo ipse intelligit*). The eye works as a bodily organ and the person recognizes something individually through the material act of the eye. This is not the case of human intellect, which works without a physical sense organ (*separatum a materia, cum non sit in organo corporeo, ut videre in oculo*; ibid, p. 80.72). The connection between the perception of senses and the understanding of intellect make a difference of Siger’s and Aegidius’s interpretation of *De anima* I–II (ch. 4.3.2). The question summed up as “*homo ipse intelligit*” must investigate how this potency of the soul is connected to the body and how it is separated from it (*anima igitur intellectiva aliquo modo est unita corpori et aliquo modo separata ab eo*; ibid, p. 80.74). The mode of seeing and thinking of a person differs according to the interpretation of “*aliquo modo*” that separates both modalities of cognition.

Now we can proceed to the basic argument in the gigantomachy for the title of *Expositor Novus*, which will be continued in the rest of the third chapter immediately after the quoted part (ibid, pp. 81–88). According to the Sicilian school, the act of thinking became the basis of criticism of both the inconsistent Sicilian Albert and the consistent Toletan Aquinas. The criticism of both “famous philosophers” (*praecipui viri in philosophia*) begins with the analysis by twofold determination of the soul given in the material body and by the immaterial intellect. Siger noticed that Averroes had interpreted this problem in the mode “*quodammodo*” in CMDA. Then he continues with the criticism of Albert and Aquin.

“In what way the soul is separated from the body and at the same time connected to it, eminent men in the philosophy, Albert and Thomas, say the following. The substance of the intellectual soul is connected with the body in the identical kind of being (*substantia animae intellectivae unita est corpori dans esse eidem*). But the potency of the soul is supposedly separated from the body (*potentia animae intellectivae separata est a corpore*), because this intellectual potency does not carry out its activity through any organ of the body.” [[249]](#footnote-249)

Siger states that both philosophers follow Aristotle’s teaching about man as a unique substance. This substance is defined both by the senses and by the immaterial or immortal determination that concerns the intellectual part of soul (*anima intellectiva sit unita corpori, et separata ab eodem*). The immortal and immaterial soul is connected with the body only externally. The soul is separated from the body (*separata est a corpore*) thanks to the immaterial intellectual potency. Siger defined already in QIIIDA acts of the human soul in the mode “*separabilis*.” Both Dominicans separated the immaterial faculty of thinking inherent in the soul from the sensual experience of the body (*potentia animae intellectivae separata est a corpore*). In their scientific proof, there is no phenomenology of mental acts. By introducing the plurality of hypostases in man, they *de facto* took up the thesis of the second Averroism, which defines man by the plurality of substances. The philosopher Siger refused the interpretation of *De anima* made by two major theologians of the first Averroism. They defined not the act of understanding, but the essence of understanding by using the theological thesis of the eternal soul separated from the body after death (*separata est*). The key difference is given in the question of what constitutes that “*substantia animae intellectivae*” given either in the mode “*separabilis*” or “*separatus*.” The soul is defined either the activity united to the person (Siger), or as a hypostasis (Aquinas and Albert). New interpreters of Aristotle, such as Albert and Aquinas, based the unity of the person on essential Avicennist definition of *anima intellectiva*. For classical metaphysics, the essence is not an existence. According to Siger, the formal scientific definition of man only establishes the Porretan modern subject in the sense of the immaterial and eternal substrate (ὑποκείμενον), which abstractly carries the separated mental activities. Such a soul as an essence is “*hoc aliquid*,” that is, a kind of substance. In such a case, the objective definition of the soul follows the logical statements based on the second manner of deduction (*Anal. Post*. 84a14). They bring about the essential identity of the person in the mode “*idem*.” Such unity of the person based on ontotheological suppositions such the immortality of the soul can establish but an essential definition of mental and intellectual faculties. Semiaverroists such as Aegidius and Aquinas became intellectual cofounders of modernity. They rejected the Aristotelian testament of the University of Paris and split the soul into two forms according to the Neoplatonism of the Toledo school. Siger rejected this sophistic interpretation of Aristotelianism in principle, since it contradicted the Sicilian school. The conflict between Siger and Aquinas as new expositors of the Philosopher covers in fact yet another important dispute. It concerns the question if it is possible to dogmatize philosophy for theological purposes. That instrumentalist manner of philosophy gave rise to the objective form of Western thought. It is based on the ontotheological form of *metaphysica generalis* according to Avicenna’s abstraction of being in the essential mode “*ens inquantum ens*.” In critical philosophy, this proceeding is not possible, because it is not true according to the definition of science related to the causality of real first substances. Therefore, there is different science concerning God called “theology” and this type of knowledge is given by divine revelation and the Holy Scriptures. Philosophy can only scientifically investigate the effects of *causa prima*. It was the teaching of Modists from the rue du Fouarre presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” and following his “meta-physics” that deals with the first principles of “substance *qua* substance.” At the same time, Bacon had the same dispute with Bonaventure (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The dispute over generically different knowledge of theology and philosophy led to Bacon’s internment and his academic ostracism in Paris after the condemnation of Siger’s school in 1277. In this fundamental methodological question, Bacon belongs to the group “*pars Sigeri*,” which is clearly set out in his work *Compendium studii philosophiae* written about the year 1272. Bacon criticized Albert and Aquinas for fundamentally flawed approach to the interpretation of the Corpus, by using Aristotelian interpretation made according to the Toledo school.[[250]](#footnote-250) Bacon sees in that generation of dogmatic theologians a lack of philosophical and scientific education. They neglected the critical study of philosophy and the natural sciences.[[251]](#footnote-251) But in this conflict about the status of *anima intellectiva*, Bacon, unlike Siger, defended Grosseteste’s point of view on the plurality of forms in the soul (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Siger on the contrary claims that essential interpretation of the soul is scientifically inadequate and it does not correspond to existentialist interpretation of *De anima* presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” in the paradigm of the Sicilian school. Siger presents a brilliant interpretation of Aristotelianism according to the Commentator. His criticism clearly denoted Thomas as a Semiaverroist. Albert recognized Sigers criticism indirectly and refused to go to Paris in 1270 to protect the philosophical heritage of Blund′s school. His hesitation or insufficient courage in defending the critical thinking against the Semiaverroists such as Aquinas and Aegidius determined the history of the Latin West. The controversy of the year 1270 revolves around scientific status of theological or philosophical paradigm, which involved Albert′s interpretation of *anima intellectiva* as well. The title *Expositor Novus* decided between the autonomy of science according to *Second Analytics* and the superiority of theological and dogmatic speculation of modernists over philosophy. Modern God died because the modernists won this confrontation and shaped the subsequent history in the mode of epochal kind of sophistry (*Irre*). Their victory was done by the Semiaverroist Aquin, who lost his academic struggle in Paris at that time and had to leave the university. However, his Thomistic cause was not lost, since Albert and Aegidius reached the victory through the newly constituted Thomism.

Let us return to the disagreement exposed in the work *De anima intellectiva*. The difference between the modern numerical substantial identity (*idem homo*) and the existential ipseity (*ipse homo*) has a fundamental significance for Siger. By abolishing this principle, we obtain an external and merely numerical identity of the human being as an essence. The intellect, as the immaterial potency of *anima intellectiva*, comes to the body from the outside as the last and highest perfection and carries out its individualization in the form of immortal hypostasis. This is an Averroistic conception of the soul according to “*sequaces Aristotelis*” as was Avicenna. This view is contrary to the reasoning in CMDA. By adopting the identity-solution of the unity of man according to the Semiaverroism of Albert and Aquinas, it would disappear Averroes’s principle of the cognition of the soul, which is based on Themistius’s modified *intellectus materialis*. In order to establish the scientific proof, the Commentator must predict the causality due to which our intellect recognizes the immaterial forms. Thinking is in our power, which is the proof of the causality of the person as the first substance (*vivere est viventibus esse*). The intellectual capacity of the person exists in the first person, in “my” body (Siger′s mode *subiective*). This makes the difference from the objective “exsistence” of intellect given as a hypostatic form. Such an intellect does not really exist, because it cannot be experienced in the body. Therefore, the intellect is experienced as an externally given immaterial potency of the soul solely and exclusively in the physically given acts of living people. This thesis was fundamentally denied by modernity. It introduced the direct insight into the hypostatized intellect, which is substantially separate from the body. Once again, the phenomenological principle of QIIIDA applies to the principle of real causality and the subsequent definition of the universal essence (*scire enim actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam*, ch. 4.4.2). Albert and Aquin, as the new expositors of Aristotle, let the *anima intellectiva* subsisted in the framework of the intellect as a hypostatized potency (Aquinas) or as a hypostatized soul (Albert). Their reasons were mainly theological, which Bacon knew very well; therefore, he criticized both theologians for erroneous approach to the interpretation of the Corpus. Siger carries out the criticism of these theologians from a position similar to Bacon. However, he leaves aside the educational crisis at mendicant faculties influenced by dogmatic modernism and the teaching of academic *illuminati*. This was the main topic of Bacon’s criticism. The pope Clement IV had personally sought Bacon’s opinion on the reform of university education and the system of scientific studies. In the case of Albert and Aquinas, causality in the middle link of scientific proof is not actualized, because they had overlooked the phenomenological study of the person as a hyparchical first substance. Albert and Aquinas, as modern expositors of Aristotle, began the definition of the person by exposure from behind, from the direction of theologically determined essence; by no means from the direction of the experienced first substance in the mode of *conscientia*. According to Siger, they fell into the trap of Avicennism given as interpretation of Aristotle according to the Toledo school. The above-mentioned Bacon also considered this interpretation to be wrong in principle. In the passage from *Compendium studii philosophiae* quoted above, he stated that if he could, he would burn all modern interpretations of Aristotle (i.e., according to the Toledo school) to the last copy. Theologians as Aquinas and Albert abolished the fundamental premise of scientific cognition concerning the intellect by unilaterally emphasizing the nature of intellect as *inmixtus.* It was necessary for ensuring the immortality of the soul. They began the interpretation of cognition based on direct intellectual vision of the essence of human intellectual soul according to Avicenna (*scire eius substantiam*). In this way, however, they fell into the category of Neoplatonic “*sequaces Aristotelis*” that bishop Alvernus had already criticized and all Aristotelian magisters in the rue du Fouarre after him. The separation of the immortal soul from the dead body was ensured thanks to the ability of the intellect given as immaterial potency of the soul given *ab* *extrinsece*. To start by the essential definition means that the scientific proof according to real causality in the mode “*ex inmeditatis*” is at best given to the second place.

Both modernists from the school of the first Averroism rejected Sigers’s nature of intellect as a *separabilis* that was based on the person’s personality according to CMDA. The immortality of the soul cannot be scientifically proved, only the unique act of *anima intellectiva* in the mode of *inmixtus* and *obiective*. But these two advocates of the first Averroism preserved the substantial unity of the person, which Siger highly appreciated in the epoch of modernist eclipse of critical thinking. Aquinas and Albert did not come up with the phenomenological concept of the unity of the person as it was given in CMDA; therefore, Siger criticized them in this fundamental point. Both Dominicans turned the perspective of CMDA and positioned the cart in front of the horse. In categorical predication *per prius*, they work with the formally defined essence of the soul and not with the existentially experienced faculty of the soul. Siger first analyzes Albert’s position. He carries out an erroneous essence of the soul in the mode of “*debet esse.*” He understands the necessity with the help of the essential and not the causal definition.

“Albert’s argument as to why the substance of the intellectual soul should be connected with the body in one being (*debet esse*) is as follows: in man, the vegetative and sensual faculty belongs to the same being of form and substance as the intellectual potency. It is obvious that the substance to which the vegetative and sensual faculty belongs is material and physically given; therefore the substance to which the intelligible potency belongs will also be given (*dabit*) in the material and physical being. But we use the term ‘intellectual soul’ (*dicimus animam intellectivam*) to denote the substance to which the faculty of the intellect belongs (*substantiam ad quam pertinet potentia intelligendi*). Then it is true that this soul as a whole gives (*dat*) being to both matter and body.” [[252]](#footnote-252)

The Doctor Invidiosus makes the phenomenology of real phenomena and therefore he accurately states what has been observed. The fundamental difference is the difference between Albert’s “*dabit*” in the future tense and Siger’s “*dat*” in the present tense. Albert’s method of deduction starts from the essentially apprehended senses (*substantiam ad quam perinet potentia vegetandi et sentiendi*) and goes to the immaterial intellect that finalizes the preceding potentialities. These subsist on a hylemorphic substance (*ergo et substantia ad quam pertinet potentia intelligendi*). Albert firstly works with the concept of the hypostatized ability of the intelligible soul, and then he finishes it with both lower parts of the soul. The reasoning is formally correct in the mode of “*debet esse*“ that is valid in the mode of logical, i.e., “eternal” correctness. The essential being of the soul is in the mode “*semel—semper*” in the form of abstract deduction according to the above-mentioned mathematical deduction of the essence of the triangle (*Anal. Post*. 84a14). Albert’s definition of the intellectual soul only expresses the essential nature of intellectual faculties. But then the proof lacks the principle of cognition according to real causality in the mode “*ex inmeditatis*” (*Anal. Post*. 84a13). The imposition of the intellect into the scientific deduction and categorical statements can only take place in the mode *subiective*. The causality of the intellect is in the body as the only real first substance in which the intellect exists as *tertium genus*. The necessity of predication follows causal effects of the intellect necessarily given in the body. The effects are included the definition in the middle link of the deductive syllogism in order to determine the intellect as the essence. Siger thus correctly determined the abstract definition of the soul as the essence and established the formal unity of the person in the mode *univoce*. The predication then runs according to *Cat*. 2a15–16, that is, from the essentially superior genus (*anima intellectiva*) to the species (*anima sensitiva*). Therefore, the unity of the person from the higher form of *anima intellectiva* into the sensually given lower forms of cognition can essentially be correctly predicted (*ergo et substantia ad quam pertinet potentia intelligendi dabit esse materiae et corpori*). Then it is possible to state intellectual faculties “*modo geometrico*” in the soul, which includes the comparison with the triangle inscribed in the quadrilateral according to *De anima* 414b31. The exposure of the intellect from the front in the direction of the senses applies, and with it also the deductions given at the level of essential abstraction. Albert’s methodological lapse, however, caused his scientific definition of *anima intellectiva* to be defined in Avicenna’s mode and not according to the Commentator. Albert determines the Aristotelian scenario of the unity of intellect in the mode of the Toledo school, but not in the spirit of CMDA. According to Siger, the definition entails but an abstract thesis, which is falsely presented as an effective causality, outside real effects of the bodily based intellect. We experience thinking causally in the first person, because we think when we want it ourselves. Albert’s version of unity given in the future tense (*dabit*) does not give a clear answer to how the real person is thinking in the present tense (*anima igitur intellectiva dat esse materiae et corpori*). The method of providing evidence is given in an unaccomplished scientific manner. The conclusion is given only hypothetically, and the future tense does not meet the real causality of the intellectually thinking person. The proof predicts the hypostatized soul as an essence, and being of the soul is illuminated from behind, by the abstract concept (*substantiam ad quam*). Albert already mentioned this gradualist conception of the intellect as a form in *De homine* (*quattuor sunt gradus*), but at that time, under the influence of Blund’s school, he insisted on the real trajectory of abstraction and defined cognition by the principle “*ex inmediatis*” (*tres sunt species*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Albert did not use the approach in totally erroneous mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. Siger therefore brought a different criticism against his view than against the Semiaverroist proceeding of Thomas. The essential definition is not erroneous in the case of material substance. This includes the materially given abilities of the senses. But in the case of the immaterial intellect given from the outside to the senses, this is a mistake, because the intellect is in its essence a pure potency and not an actualized essence. Avicenna′s graduality of forms abolished the phenomenological conception of the intellect as *separabilis* and predicts the intellect essence in the Avicennist mode *separatus*, as a separated immaterial substance of the third kind. Siger attributes the erroneous conception to Albert by saying “*substantia…dabit esse*,” which is in contradiction to the scientific and phenomenological approach of *Second Analytics*. The critique of essentialist approach shows the difference between the commentary on DA I–II in the *Manuscript of Munich* (*potest esse*, ch 4.3.2) and the commentary of QIIIDA, where this essentialist view is not possible. The third part of *De anima* explores the intellectual and not the sensual manner of understanding in the soul. According to CMDA, Siger proceeds from the potency of a causal and empirically ascertainable present thought act in the first person (*dat*) to the cause itself, i.e., to the first effectively thinking substance. This is the existing person as a hylemorphic unity (*anima igitur intellectiva dat esse materiae et corpori*). The correct scientific proof goes in the metaphysical dative from here and now experienced acts of thinking (*tertium genus* in CMDA) to the deduced essence (*quartum genus* in CMDA). The grammatical difference between the future tense and the indicative implies a metaphysical error “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*.” Albert has drawn a logically and formally correct conclusion about the nature of intellect and soul (*simpliciter*), but he has chosen an erroneous methodological approach to the research, which scientifically does not stand in the real causal mode “*secundum quid*.” In the middle link of the proof, the unique causality of the intellect is missing. It can be only experienced in the mode of “*ipse*” (*homo ipse intelligit*), also in the mode *tertium genus* according to CMDA. Albert has drawn a correctly given conclusion about the material and immaterial potency of the soul, in which the animating principle of the body consists. However, his approach is not consistent with the real existence of this faculty as it is required in *Second Analytics* for the scientific form of deductive syllogism. This must be given at the level of the causality of the first substance, and not from the definition of the universal essence. The metaphysical “*non sequitur*” is taken from the position of the brilliant connoisseur of Averroes’s “meta-physics.” In contrast to Avicenna, the metaphysics of the Commentator is given as a science about the first substance *qua* substance. It is not the case of Albert.

Immediately after this criticism follows the analysis of Thomas that was celebrated as *Expositor Novus*. According to Siger, Aquin committed a much worse mistake. This theologian states the unity of the intellect and the person in a way that can be regarded as Averroistic. It was not the case of Albert, who acknowledged the interpretation of CMDA. The dispute revolves around twofold interpretation of the term “*anima est qua intelligimus*.”

“Thomas’s thesis is that the act of understanding is executed in the act of the intellect itself (*fit secundum ipsum intellectum*). But understanding can be attributed not only to the intellect, but also to the existing unique human being (*non solum intellectui sed etiam homini ipsi*). This would be impossible if the intellectual soul had its own being, separate from matter and body (*esse separatum*). Therefore, in the second book of *De anima*, the Philosopher says that we understand in virtue of the soul (*anima est qua intelligimus*), and concludes that the soul is an act and the completion of the body.” [[253]](#footnote-253)

Aquinas’s approach consists in the fact that he understands the immateriality of the soul in terms of the specific nature of intellect. Its immaterial nature exists thanks to the specific act of thinking (*intelligere fit secundum ipsum intellectum*). The key problem becomes the statute of the word “*fieri*” that relates to the intellect. Aquinas claims that the intellect exists in the mode “*ipse*” as well, and not only the bodily established person. The theologian Aquinas brings this problematic assertion from Rome to Paris in 1270. The first Thomist Aegidius had proclaimed that thesis in Paris since the year 1268. The intellect is a special intellectual and subsistent form next to *anima intellectiva*. The hypostatized intellect ensures immortality and indestructibility of the person due to its immateriality and separateness. This thesis is of authentic Aristotelian origin, but by no means a Christian one. Alvernus knew this very well around the year 1240, in a similar polemic against “*sequaces Aristotelis*.” He also attributed Aristotle to them (*ex quibus fuit Aristotle, et sequaces eius videlicet Alpharalius, Algaxel, et Avicenna*; OBJ II, ch. 2.3). The publication of this thesis can be found in the first part of *Summa Theologiae* compiled in Italy. That interpretation made Aquins an *Expositor Novus* for perplexed Parisian intellectuals vacillating between the first and second Averroism, as was Aegidius Romanus. The following chapters dedicated to Aquinas show the difference between the two acts of subsistence: the soul as a form of the person (*qua1*) and the intellect as a form in the soul (*qua2*). Siger relates *anima intellectiva* to the holistic act of existence in the mode “*homo ipse intelligit*.” Therefore, he resolutely rejects the dualism of two hypostases in man. The intellect cannot be hypostatized in any way, because then it would be a substance. Once again, the emphasis is on the principle “*subiective*,” which belongs only to the immaterial soul as the actualized form of the body (*anima est qua intelligimus*). In the above-mentioned passages, Siger clearly asserts that the ipseity belongs only to the human being in his holistic act of life and understanding. It is the soul due to it we understand, because we understand only in the body. Therefore, we can experience the activity of intellect in a causal manner (*qua1*). To attribute the mode “*ipse*” directly to the intellect in mode *qua2* means that the intellect became some kind of substance or hypostasis. However, this is a fundamental error in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy made by Rufus. It postulates that the universal essence becomes a real effective cause (*medium et causa idem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). Thomistic *anima intellectiva* is connected to the hypostatized intellect as “νοῦς” of Aristotle. It forms an independent active and causal form that can exist outside the body (*anima intellectiva haberet esse separatum a materia et corpore*). It is precisely this conception of the hypostatized intellectual soul that can be found in Aegidius around the year 1270, as the previous chapters have shown. The theologian Aquinas needs this hypostasis in order to save the immortality of the soul by introducing Aristotle’s form of intellect. The intellectual potency of the soul actualized the unity of the person in the body. At the same time, the form of hypostasis defines the immaterial subsistence of the soul after death, since it can be separated from the body. Siger considers it a pure sophism. Aquinas as a philosopher takes the intellect in the analysis of cognition as a potentiality of the soul. Aquinas as a theologian takes the same intellect as a hypostasis by referring to Aristotle’s *De anima* in order to defend the immortality of the soul. The intellect is taken at the same time and in the same kind of *demonstratio* as a philosophical potentiality and as a theological hypostatic form. This sophistry is set out in the work *De unitate intellectus*, written in Paris that was rejected by the masters in the rue du Fouarre and by Bacon. In 1272, the artists in the rue du Fouarre expressly prohibited that mix of theology and philosophy by issuing the famous decree. Thomas’s reasoning reached the level of a fundamental error of the second Averroism. However, Aquinas defended the plurality of forms in man, not that of substances as the second Averroism.

Siger considered Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* to be a much worse error than the interpretation made by Albert. He advocated the full unity of the person according to CMDA. Siger points out to connoisseurs of the problem that Aquinas misunderstood the central part of teaching of Aristotle and Averroes. The soul makes the act of intellectual life (*anima est qua intelligimus*) and therefore completes the bodily existence (*eam esse actum et perfectionem corporis*). In Albert’s case, the essential intellect acted as a supposition in the deductive proof in the mode *obiective*. It should be stated in mode *subiective* by using the metaphysical imposition of intellect as *tertium genus*. Albert reflected the real course of cognition in *anima intellectiva*. Aquinas misinterpreted the very course of cognition. He let the intellect as an essence to operate causal effects in Rufus’s mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The intellect cannot operate the act of understanding as a hypostasis in the mode “*ipse*” because all acts of the immaterial *anima intellectiva* are personal in nature. Completely all acts of understanding (empirical and intellectual) are constituted in the mode “*subiective*” as activities of a bodily existent person. Siger defended the intellectual soul as a composite (ch. 4.4.1) from the very beginning. Intellectual faculties of the soul are immaterial and come to sensual abilities of the soul from the outside, in the mode of intellect as *separabilis*. The autonomously comprehending intellect would have to include hypostatic and *a priori* given principles of cognition as Avicenna’s “Flying Man” and Descartes’s *cogito*. However, the writing *De anima* defends the exposure of the sense of being only from the front, since the intellect is actualized through the senses. Otherwise, the intellect would not be a *tabula rasa*, which Aquinas, however, uncompromisingly defends against the second Averroism in *De unitate*. Siger objects to Thomas’s incomplete clarification of the unity of the person that his definition presupposes the intellect that is actualized a kind of quasi-substance (*hoc aliquid*). But this sophistic form of intellect, given in the manner of Averroist modernity, could not recognize everything in pure receptivity. Siger clearly and uncompromisingly defends the conception of the intellect as a pure immaterial potency in the mode of *separabilis* and not *separatus*. Aquinas’s thesis defends the intellect in the hypostatized form *separatus* and *inmixtus*, since the intellect must actualized the immortality of the soul. That proceeding makes the second big mistake of Aquinas. He uses the geometrical examples of essences (triangle, quadrilateral) that can be combined together. It is not the case of intellect. He takes the intellect as a one form and the *anima intellectiva* as another form. There is no such kind of intellect in man, since all essences are given exclusively in mind (intellect as *quartum genus*). According to Siger, only the *anima intellectiva* has an actualized form and not the intellect as a hypostatized potency. Through the entelechy of living beings (*esse actum*), we are able to recognize and experience in the act of our own understanding. It is given in the soul as an actualized form (*anima est qua intelligimus*). The soul is engaged in the modality of “*ipse*” in *actus essendi* of the person. Therefore, it cannot be stated with regard to the intellect in the order *per prius*. The soul is not primarily an essence, as Aquinas mistakenly states, but an entelechical form of existence given in the “*qua*” mode. The intellect is primarily only the pure potency of the soul existing in the “*qua*” mode as well. Then the intellect itself is in the mode *per prius* only as pure potentiality and not as actualized essence. Aquinas has destructed the architecture of *anima intellectiva* because he defines the soul primarily in the mode *quartum genus* and then additionally actualizes it in the mode *tertium genus*. He cannot do it otherwise because he needs the intellect in the modality *separatus* to secure the generically different theological postulate of the immortal soul. Hypostatic intellect as suppositum is sufficient for a logically valid conclusion of the proof. A scientific proof in the mode *demonstratio* is not valid in such a distorted manner. Aquinas abolished the imposition of the intellect given causally in the body alone (Siger’s “*experimur—conscii sumus*”). Scientifically and philosophically we know only the existence of *anima intellectiva* given causally in the body (*homo ipse intelligit*). The formal principle of life does not consist in the separated intellect as a faculty of the soul; it is done in virtue of entelechy in the soul as the form of the body. Once again, the past character of cognition according to Second Analytics applies; universal cognition follows the reality of first substances. As a theologian, Aquinas put the theological postulate in the first place, instead of the predication of the real substance, in the mode of the metaphysical dative (OBJ I, ch. 1.1). As a result, he transformed the metaphysical and existential donation of being into an objective donation that is based on the cognizing modern subject (*dativus obiectivus*, ch. 4). Aegidius recognized this sophisticated form of objectivity to be a new philosophical dogma and he thus founded a Thomistic school of *sophistae Latini*. Theologian Aquinas requires the immortal soul in the mode of causally acting essence, which forms the basic interpretation of the person in *De unitate*. This Aristotelianism does not correspond to the critical philosophy according to Siger. He stated the causality of *anima intellectiva* in the existing person as actualized first substance (*anima est qua intelligimus*). In this original mode of *actus essendi*, the causality exists solely in the soul that makes the unique form of the body. Therefore, the intellect as a hypostatized form cannot retain the primacy of effective cause that establishes the cognition. According to Siger, the intellectual soul experienced causality in the body as an animate substance represents the only source of actuality, because it is bound to being of the hylemorphic first substance. Once again, the defense of Averroes’s metaphysics against Avicenna is at work.

Aquinas made a much bigger mistake than Albert, because he took the intellect as the essence to be the source of real causality in the mode of existential “*ipse*” (*intelligere fit secundum ipsum intellectum*). Albert merely confused the mode “*subiective*,” which must be given for the intellect under metaphysical imposition, with the mode “*obiective,*” which is given by logical supposition. The predication *anima intellectiva*, however, remains in the mode of the unity of the person as “*homo ipse intelligit*” of Siger. Aquinas defined the hypostatized intellect as another form added to *anima intellectiva*. After the introduction of the intellect as a new hypostasis, the principle “*homo ipse intelligit*” was no longer valid. The instrumentalist use of intellect (*ipsum intellectum intelligit*) for theological purposes created a simulacrum of *anima intellectiva* defined in a sophistic manner. Thomas and Aegidius declared this simulacrum of the person to be an authentic Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*. Aquinas rejected Averroes’s interpretation of the unity of the person according to CMDA and opted for the original interpretation of *De anima* according to Aristotle. The modern, postmodern and Thomistic followers take the interpretation of *anima intellectiva* made “*ad mentem Aristotelis*” according to *De anima* to be identical with the interpretation made “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to CMDA. They are objectively right, but at those times there were still some critical thinkers in Paris. Such position was fundamentally unacceptable for the last representatives of Blund’s and Alvernus’s school at the University of Paris. The Aquin′s school of “*sequaces Aristotelis*” had no Christian definition of the full unity of the person that is given only “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Thomistic version of *anima intellectiva* was made out in the new mode of Semiaverroism, since it was disintegrated into two forms as hypostases. Aegidius is the author of the Oxford manuscript and of the writing *Anonymus Bazán*, among other things, because he knew exactly the course of this famous debate, “*homo ipse intelligit*.” It took place among the representatives of the first Averroism at the University of Paris before the year 1272. Aegidius changed the result in such a way that Averroes and Siger became Averroists. Aquin’s departure after the lost disputation clearly shows who got the title *Expositor Novus* and why. The whole debate is recorded in Siger’s work *De anima intellectiva* 3. The defeated Aquinas settled in Naples and then travels to Lyon for a council and he died on the journey in 1274. Aegidius was the first Thomist to take Aquinas’s side against Siger and against his secular supporters in the rue du Fouarre (*pars Sigeri*). However, he knew Siger’s arguments well and knew that they were true. Therefore, he sophistically attributed them as true to Aristotle, thus strengthening the position of Aquinas as the New Expositor. On the other hand, he attributed Thomas’s erroneous explanation of hypostatized intellect to the Commentator, thus creating a Thomistic simulacrum of Averroes as a heretic and a bad philosopher. Thus, a new type of Averroes as an Averroist arose in the Thomistic school. The pluralism of forms described in Aquin’s *De unitate* and criticized by Siger, it was in false and sophistical manner attributed to Averroes himself. This view can be found both in Aegidius’s interpretation of *De anima* in the Oxford manuscript and in his work *De plurificatione*.[[254]](#footnote-254) The subject of thought is the subsisting unified intellect, which is actualized in the individual human being through the connection with the body in the Averroistic mode of *continuatio*. Then the person does not think (*homo intelligat*), but his intellectual content is thought through the impersonal act of the separated intellect (*quod intelligatur*). It connects with us here and now (*ex tali unione intellectus ad nos*). The Latin sophist then denounced Averroes as Averroist and a pagan philosopher in the quoted work *De erroribus Philosophorum* (1270). Aegidius could not directly attribute this error to Siger before 1277, because he would have made himself academically stupid. The simulacrum of Siger as an Averroist was created only after the year 1280 by the defeated generation of Oxford′s *Modernorum* with Pecham at the head.

The historical figure of Averroes as Averroist was created by combining the two simulacra: Parisian Thomism and Oxford Modernism. Next chapter shows that Aquinas was more cautious in his criticism of Averroes, but he was philosophically wrong in the same way as Aegidius was. The new school of Aristotelian Semiaverroism (Aquinas, Aegidius) rejected both Avicennian and Augustinian version of Averroism in the schools of the second Averroism, as well as Siger’s group of secular priests and connoisseurs of CMDA at the Faculty of Arts (*pars Sigeri*). Around the year 1275, all the connoisseurs from the school of the first Averroism that followed the debate about *Expositor Novus*, they knew very well that Siger offered a much better solution of the unity of the person. His solution, moreover, adhered to the Christian tradition of the interpretation *De anima* according to the *École de Paris*, given in the Blund′s school. The correct interpretation of CMDA was confirmed in Scotus’s interpretation according to the Sicilian school about 1230. The educated masters of the Latin West knew Siger’s criticism of both Dominicans in the writing QIIIDA and *De anima intellectiva* and they had to react to it, as the case of Aegidius Romanus showed. Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus approached the second Averroism that turned the soul into a mere driving power of the body (*anima ut motor*). Thus, the definition of the intellectual soul was no longer valid in the mode *subiective* that ensured the scientific definition of man as the first existing substance. Siger ends the dispute over the title *Expositor Novus* in the case of the interpretation of De anima with this concise evaluation of Albert and Aquinas Aristotelianism: “*Isti viri deficiunt ab intentione Philosophi, nec intentum determinant*.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 82.98–99) Siger’s assessment of Aquinas and Albert is laconic and brilliant as usual. The magister made a distinction between the “Christian” and “pagan” Aristotle. Both interpretations of *De anima* are correct in an Aristotelian manner; but only one takes into account not only the letter, but also the unspoken intention of the Philosopher. Siger could not recognize the position of Aquinas as the new interpreter of Aristotle’s corpus. Thomas did not grasp the ultimate meaning (*intentum*) of De anima, which the work CMDA completed. Siger’s performance eclipsed the Thomist Aegidius and his sophistical interpretation of the Commentator. This was the last drop in the cup of academic bitterness of the beaten *Modernorum*. The general attack on magisters in the rue du Fouarre began after the publication of Siger’s second commentary, which can therefore be dated to the beginning of the year 1272. It was probably under the influence of *De anima intellectiva* that the Declaration of magisters was written in April 1272. This also explains the departure of the defeated philosopher (and not theologian) Aquinas from Paris at the end of April 1272. Siger stood in the line of the interdict of Chancellor Alvernus (OBJ II, ch. 2.3) and rejected all concepts of human intellect as a hypostatized essence. Siger rejects the hypostatized soul or the intellect according to the phenomenological principle mentioned in the introduction of QIIIDA. We cannot consider the intellectual soul as a universal or substance, because we experience the effects of the intellect only in the body. The universals and thus also the second substance are, as soul and intellect, only specific constructs of cognition (Averroes’s *quartum genus*). Their universal nature and character must be proved in the metaphysics presented “ad mentem Averrois” by the correctly formed deductive proof according to *Second Analytics*. Siger claims that our cognition cannot directly consider the soul as a second substance. Following the mode *per prius* and the principle “*ex inmediatis*,” we only recognize its acts. These experiences are made in the mode “*ipse*” and they are based on the real causality. Therefore, we are aware of fundamental nature of *anima intellectiva*. In the first Averroism, the soul and the intellect can neither be real first substances, nor some Porretan hypostases, as we find in Aquinas′s definition of intellect and in the late Albert′s teaching of essentially considered soul.

The following part of Siger’s writing presents the accomplished exegesis of Aristotle′s metaphysics according to CMDA. The first five arguments explain in detail why Aristotle and Aquinas had a poor understanding of the role of the intellect and the determination of the *anima intellectiva* according to Aristotle. Either they consider the soul to be an independent essence (Albert), or they define the intellect as a separated form that belongs to the soul from the outside and ensures its theologically necessary immortality and separateness from the body (Aquinas). The common error of Albert and Aquinas is based on insufficient individualization of the person that is made only in the numerical mode “*idem*.” The individualization is carried out with the help of the body as a matter, to which the immaterial intellect comes from the outside. This only creates a formally correct (but by no means metaphysically true) description of the unity of the intellect and the person in the essential and analytical mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. This description finds expression in the sentence “*homo intelligit*.” Siger defends the individualization of cognition based on the unity of the person given in the statement “*homo ipse intelligit*.” The individualization is made due to personally experienced acts of understanding. As a result, the first existentialist philosophy came into being in the Latin West. The intellect is the experienced faculty of the soul, through which we recognize in an immaterial way. This experience is universally predicted according to hyparchical causality of the person as an existing first substance. It creates scientific determination of intellect. In the middle link of the syllogism (*experimur, conscii sumus*), the causality of intellect works as the first substance in the animated body. According to Siger, both Dominicans advocate the immateriality and the separateness of the intellect in the mode of *separatus* and not *separabilis*. Albert did this only in the mode of deductive hypothesis. Aquinas is already working with the separation given as an effective principle in reality. This gave rise to another form of Oxfordian Fallacy and another simulacrum of Averroes as an Averroist. This error was handed down in the history of philosophy by Thomism established by Aegidius. The philosophical “*peccatum originale*” of Thomism arose from the fact that theological unity of the intellect is not able to define the act of thinking in such a way that it is immaterial in relation to the senses and at the same time it makes part of bodily subsistence of the soul. Aquinas extended the principle of “*ipse*” ascribed unilaterally to the intellect. He made a dualism of two forms similar to the second Averroism. The second round of criticism is of philosophical nature. Siger explains the actual intention of Aristotle’s metaphysics, given by the primacy of the first real substance, which both criticized adherents of the first Averroism did not understand (*praedicti viri non concludunt intentum*; *De anima intellectiva* 3, p. 83.39). Albert and Aquinas were not able to take the phenomenological perspective of CMDA (πῶς, *quomodo*) that sums up the intellect in unique existence of the person. Siger was the only thinker of the Latin West that fully entered into the perspective of CMDA and understood the subtleties and snares in Averroes’s debate with Alexander and mainly with Themistios (and Siger with Avicenna) that makes the aim of *De anima*. In the following generation after bishop Alvernus, Siger succeeded in fully defending the question of why Averroes is the “*philosophus nobilissimus*” and why he is the best interpreter of Aristotle (OBJ II, ch. 2.3). It is therefore quite clear to whom the magisters in the Rue du Fouare conferred the title *Expositor Novus* and whom they elected as their rector.

Let’s take a look at the supreme value of Siger’s philosophy, which so far represents the best interpretation of *De anima* in the Latin West. Siger first draws attention to the fact that the reasoning concerns solely the philosophical teaching about the soul given by Aristotle and recognizable with natural reason, and not theological determinations of the soul based on Christian teaching.[[255]](#footnote-255) This position founded the arguments found in the decree of Parisian Artists of 1272. This decree defends the different genres of research in theology and philosophy. That is why Siger and his school formulated this statement. The distinction of generic research of philosophy and theology was directed primarily against the Oxfordian Fallacy of the second Averroism. They professed universal hylemorphism and created a sophistic simulacrum of the real person. But the defense of *Second Analytics* made in properly interpreted phenomenology of thought (*homo ipse intelligit*) was directed against Aristotelian Semiaverroism led by Aquinas and Aegidius in Paris, which Siger also attributed to Albert in Cologne. They proclaimed a new version of Oxfordian Fallacy with regard to the hypostatized soul (Albert) and the intellect as an autonomous form (Aquinas); or, they created a sophistic confusion of both (Aegidius). Siger’s argument against Albert is quite simple. Albert integrated the intellect as the potency of the soul into the materially given abilities of the soul. He received the unity of the person, but was not able to bring Averroes’s brilliant integration of Themistius to the end. Averroes accepted Themistius’s principle that separated *intellectus possibilis* with regard to its immaterial origin and put this type of intellect outside of sensual cognition. At the same time, however, he accepted the principle of individuation made by the material intellect, which Themistios rejected (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Albert mistakenly determined the materiality of the intellect, which CMDA accepted by adapting the teaching of Themistius. The intellect is individualized as quasi-matter, that is, in the mode *tertium genus*. Albert took up the intellect as an essence and thus combined the *intellectus possibilis* and the lower component of the soul. It is not the position of Themistius, because he separated *intellectus possibilis* from the senses. Albert cannot fully integrate the intellect in the mode “*homo ipse intelligit*”according to CMDA. His claim to the title *Expositor Novus* is invalidated by the following argument.

“Albert presupposes that the vegetative and sensual potency belongs to that substance to which the intellectual potency also belongs. This is not true, neither according to the Philosopher, nor according to the interpretation of Themistius, as will be described below.” [[256]](#footnote-256)

Albert compromised the factual course of cognition by his thesis on primary cognition taken from the perspective of the soul as a hypostatized essence. Albert has a basic definition of all abilities that are at the same level of abstraction due to logical supposition. Therefore, all faculties retain the same essential nature with respect to the logical subject as the abstract bearer of these faculties (*potentia vegetandi et potentia sentiendi pertineant ad illam substantiam ad quam pertinet potentia intelligendi*). Moreover, the intellect is postulated as *separatus* because Albert must have somehow separated it from the formally defined faculties of the sensible soul. Siger asserts that the soul, as the second substance in the universal essential mode, is located only at the end of the scientific deduction of cognition, and not at its beginning. According to CMDA, Themistius rightly understood that *intellectus materialis* must be linked to individual acts of cognition and the *intellectus possibilis* must be separated from sensual parts of the soul. Unfortunately, Themistius did not carry the synthesis to the end and he completely separated the immaterial *intellectus possibilis*, which Averroes corrected by his conception. Albert did not understand the perspective of CMDA in that point. The *intellectus possibilis* must be separated from the senses only in the mode of *separabilis*, so that the soul could recognize receptively and immaterially directly in the body. Therefore, the intellect recognizes the body and senses in the mode *obiective* and it is given *subiective* in the soul. The intellect is immaterial and a separate potency of the hylemorphic body and it needs material being to be actualized. Only in this way can *intellectus possibilis* be a universal receiver for the metaphysically completely different, i.e., sensually and individual contents given by bodily organs. Siger complemented Albert’s thesis on the key part of reasoning in CMDA as *tertium genus* and renewed the full scientific predication of *anima intellectiva* according to *Second Analytics*. We recognize not because we consider *anima intellectiva* primarily to be some essence of the third kind, but because we experience within ourselves, sensually and thus materially, the way in which we recognize (*experimur*). Therefore, in the mode *per prius*, the personally experienced act of cognition (*ipse*) is given first (*experimur—conscii sumus*). Therefore Averroes corrected Themistius’s concept of the *intellectus materialis* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). Phenomenology conceives the intellect as *inmixtus* or *separabilis* according to the correctly created middle link of the syllogism outside of Oxfordian Fallacy, that is, in a real and causally efficient manner.

The argument against Aquinas criticizes another loss of CMDA’s perspective. His Aristotelianism limps on the other leg, since it took part of Alexander′s mistake.

“Thomas’s argumentation neither follows the intention of Aristotelian metaphysics; it only formally examines the nature (*eius ratio*) of understanding in Aristotle, in the abstract and material composite (*quomodo compositum materiale intelligeret*). This composite would have acquired a human character (*ut homo*) by being an intellectual soul in its essence (*anima intellectiva in essendo*) as separate from matter and from the body (*separata a materia et corpore*).” [[257]](#footnote-257)

Aquinas adheres to unity of the person by studying the act of understanding within the framework of the hylemorphic substance (*quomodo compositum materiale intelligeret*). According to Siger, this is a commendable undertaking in the era of modern confusion of mind and schizophrenia of a substantially divided person. But Siger argues that a correct idea is not enough, because Aquinas’s reasoning does not correspond to real approach of Aristotle and CMDA. Aquinas predicts the essentially defined subject. The scripture *De anima* must be related to the totality of the Corpus, because it considers man in the mode of his existential activity. See the quoted passage in the previous chapters regarding life as an act of the unique hylemorphic substance (*vivere est viventibus esse*). The preceding passages have clearly shown that Aquinas, by his exaggerated emphasis on the intellectual side of intellect, gave the impression that intellectual faculties of the soul were separated from the existing hylemorphic substance (*anima intellectiva in essendo sit separata a materia et corpore*). The key to criticism is the term “*in essendo*,” which exactly matches the erroneous perspective in Thomas’s work *De unitate intellectus*, as the following chapters will show. Aquin’s position is sophistical in that he apparently defines the living person. In reality, he has a simulacrum composed of the hypostatized body and the hypostatized soul in front of him, which is exactly set out by Siger’s diplomatic subjunctive (*ut homo*…*sit*). According to Siger, the unity of the person in Aquinas is a dogmatic postulate of the theologian, and not a properly defended philosophical reality. As a result, Aquinas took up the position of modernists that he criticized. As if the mere corpse assured the specific definition of man. In short, the theologian needs the immortality of the soul much more than a proper existential interpretation of *De anima* according to CMDA. Siger, as the *Expositor Novus*, cannot recognize the activity of intellect in the body as Aristotle’s authentic teaching. Siger acknowledges that Thomistic interpretation follows the letter of *De anima*. The deficiency concerns the intention of the Philosopher himself and not the text of *De anima*. The original “pagan” Aristotle must be transferred from the group of “*sequaces Aristotelis*” to the group of Christian defendants of the uniqueness and unity of the person. Chancellor and bishop Alvernus did it “*ad mentem Averrois*” at the Paris University for the first time. Aristotelianism of Aquinas’s school falls under Siger’s criticism of Oxfordian Fallacy. There is no predication of causality in the middle link of *demonstratio*. Aquinas did not have an act of understanding of the person in the mode of “*ipse*” (*homo ipse intelligit*). We noted it in Siger’s interpretation of *De generatione animalium* II.3, which was commented on at the beginning of QIIIDA (ch. 4.4.1). The existence in the mode “*ipse*” belongs only to the living person as the first substance thanks to its *actualiter* and *simpliciter* given indivisible being. The scientifically minded metaphysician Siger necessarily rejected the theological formalism in Aquinas’s *De unitate* as insufficiently true. The accent on the subsistence of the soul as a quasi-substance is theologically postulated. The externally given hypostatized intellect violates the principle of the act of existence given only in the first real substance (*vivere est viventibus esse*). There is no other human “*esse*” in reality. Aquin upholds the individual thinking in the mode “*idem*.” Therefore, he does not proceed in the same way as Siger. The formal identity of thinking in the essentially conceived hylemorphic substance is not the same thing as the hermeneutic ipseity of thinking in the existing person. Taken in the framework of the first Averroism, Aquinas’s theological formulation “*homo intelligit*” does not have the same meaning as Siger’s philosophical formulation “*homo ipse intelligit*.” Taken theologically, his argument is correctly given, since it is based on the correct logical supposition; taken philosophically as *demonstratio*, it is wrong, since there is no imposition of real causality. In the writing *De unitate intellectus*, Thomas emphasized the autonomous act of understanding in the hypostatized intellect (*intelligere non est nisi in intellectu*).[[258]](#footnote-258) Siger defined the subject of cognition in the mode of the person as “*ipse*.” Therefore, he rejected Albert’s essential definition of *anima intellectiva* and especially Thomas’s version of intellect as a hypostatized form in the soul. The subject of cognition is not the soul in the body as an abstract substance, but the existential act of understanding experienced in the first person.

The criticism of Aquinas and Albert with regard to the nature of intellect compared their positions with Themistius. He had defined the conception of the intellect within the framework of the principle “*ab* *extrinsece*” and according to Aristotle’s model of the ship and the boat (*ubi Themistius dicit quod intellectus sic se habere videtur*; ibid, p. 85.88‒89). Siger clearly sees and criticizes the erroneous use of Themistius’s hypostatized receptive intellect. In Aquinas there is no unity of the person, which is a fundamental error in view of the aim of *De anima*. Aristotle postulated this unity of the person (let us see DA I–II), but Averroes really accomplished it in his writing CMDA. Albert worked out the merely formal proof of the *anima intellectiva*. Siger saw precisely that this view was rejected by the argument in CMDA because Themistius′s argument was used differently. The Commentator took the principle of pure receptivity from Alexander’s *intellectus possibilis* and not from Themistius’s separated *intellectus possibilis*. However, Averroes took from Themistius his conception of *intellectus materialis*. That makes a fundamental difference in relation to Aquinas′s position. Therefore, CMDA contains the principle of volitional determination of the immaterial intellect from the direction of the senses, which Neoplatonist Themistius understandably did not support. Therefore, Siger reminds both Dominicans that Themistius’s conception of the externally given *intellectus possibilis*, which is independent of the vegetative and animalistic side of the soul, is only half correct from the point of view of the whole of Aristotle’s philosophy.[[259]](#footnote-259) The phenomenological principle taken from *De generatione animalium* clearly sees the principle of “*ipse*” in man through the act of being the first substance and defends it together with Averroes. The principle of ipseity explained by Siger applies to the unique person that exists and thinks. The intellect thinks only through the body, but it does it according to its immaterial nature (*intellectus in intelligendo est operans intrinsecum ad corpus per suam naturam*).[[260]](#footnote-260) This quotation and Siger’s entire critique reject Thomas’s intellectual system given in *De unitate*. He turned the intellect into an external mover of the soul in the Neoplatonic mode “*anima ut motor*.” Siger preserves the real activity of the real intellect. This is given in the soul in the manner “*ex intrinseco*,” in the mode of existential reality based on the act of being of the person as a hylemorphic composition (*attribuuntur compositis ex intrinseco operanti et eo ad quod sic intrinsece operatur*). Moreover, taken in the framework of the formal and the final cause, this causality acts as the whole of human being (*formae et perfectiones eorum appellantur*). The intellect cannot be individualized as materially as in the case of the act of seeing tied to a material organ. According to Siger, Aquinas defended this identification of understanding and vision in the mode of the solar intellect according to the Toledo school.[[261]](#footnote-261) As far as the act of seeing is concerned, it is true that the ability of the soul to see gives form to the formless sensory impressions within the framework of the organ of the eye as part of the body. That makes the scenario in the mode “the form versus the matter.” The eye is the formal principle of vision. Sensory perceptions as the matter are formed in the second step. But the intellect has no sense organ, and its species are not of a material nature, like the sensual species for vision. The form created in the *species sensibilis* and the form created in the *species intelligibilis, they* are two different acts of the soul. They are endorsed by two different faculties: the material and the immaterial. The formal capacity of the soul is not a modern Avicennist and postmodern Cartesian hypostasis, but the potency of the soul as an *anima intellectiva*. Siger explains that the perspective in Thomas’s attitude around 1270 is a primarily theological and not a philosophical one. Since it is theologically correctly made, Siger, as a Christian and a Catholic priest, agrees with her. But since Aquinas’s thesis is problematic from a philosophical point of view, the philosopher Siger has to correct Aquinas’s theological teaching on the intellect in such a way that it is in line with the philosophical teaching in *De anima* and in CMDA. Otherwise, it is not a scientific theory about the unity of the intellect, but a theological postulate given at a lower level of abstraction. The required metaphysical abstraction, which is the first science on the basis of being, stands higher. This is the original intention of the Philosopher, expressed in works of the Commentator.

Aristotelianism of Aquinas is primarily theological and dogmatic. From the point of view of Siger’s critical philosophy, his objective simulacrum of the intellect is a rather problematic concept. Between Aquinas and Siger, as the new expositors of Aristotle, there was a dispute about the twofold truth, which is determined by theological and philosophical interpretation of Aristotle done in the framework of first Averroism. Siger clearly sees Thomas’s dilemma. Theologian Aquinas must ensure the immortality of the soul even after the decline of the body. In order to do this, he searched for a suitable philosophical argument according to Aristotle’s *De anima*. This theologizing interpretation is possible according to the letter of the text. Therefore, Siger does not criticize it in principle, in contrast to gross errors of the second Averroism. He no longer dealt with them in detail in the work *De anima intellectiva*. But Thomas’s dogmatic Aristotelianism is fundamentally flawed if we, like Averroes, interpret the totality of Aristotle’s work from the position of “meta-physics” based on the primacy of real first substances (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Bacon defends a similar Aristotelian view established outside of dogmatic theology. This Christian Aristotelianism follows the real intention presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” and was and still is the only Aristotelian interpretation capable of preserving the full unity of the person and his thinking. Aquin’s claim to the title *Expositor Novus* was canceled by Siger’s existential analytics according to CMDA elaborated according to the Sicilian school. Aristotelianism of Thomas and Aegidius is done without the Commentator. They are not capable of endorsing the full unity of the person in the mode of scientific demonstration according to *Second Analytics*. The intellect as an immaterial hypostatic component of the eternal soul took up Alexander′s and Themistius’s position of the separated and subsistent intellect. Such a Neoplatonic intellect done in the mode of *separatus*, externally actualizes the hylic intellect individually given in the body as the first substance. Aquinas’s solution contradicts the thesis “*homo ipse intelligit*” defended by Siger. It is the same mistake as did Alexandrians, that is, the representatives of the second Averroism. The theological defense of the soul existing after death must necessarily protect the hypostatized intellect coming to the senses from the outside. The intellect is the only faculty of the soul, which is immaterial and thus ensures the Christian eternity of *anima intellectiva*. This theological reflection made Aquinas to adopt Alexander′s and Themistius’s perspective and to become an objective Alexandrian. Thomas has to create a formally separated intellect, which exists as a *tertium ens* in the soul as the entelechical form of the body. To hypostatize the intellect for the sake of theology makes an essential difference between the philosopher Siger and the theologian Aquinas.

This difference Dante precisely noticed in *Divine Comedy*. Dante places Aquinas in the stream of the second Averroism and let Bonaventure praise Aquinas as an inspiring theologian (*di fra Tommaso e ’l discreto latino / e mosse meco questa compagnia*; *Paradiso* 12.144–45). That was an excellent version of musical *alētheia*, since that laudatio was in fact a heavy criticism of Aquinas as a philosopher.[[262]](#footnote-262) Dante has revealed *Lichtung* of the truth and untruth of Thomism according to divine Muses. In the question of the unity of the existing person, Thomism created a hidden version of the plurality of forms (but by no means of substances), because they turned the intellect into a hypostatized form. *Doctor Individiosus* continued the criticism of Aquinas as follows:

“By this, Aquinas said how the connection is made, how the intellectual soul is connected with the body and how it is separated from it. Once again it becomes obvious that the existing person (*hominem ipsum*) cannot understand through Aquinas’s concept of causality (*ex causa quam assignat*). According to his view, man would not understand in his ipseity (*non solum homo ipse intelligeret*), but only the material part of the composition defined by him (*sed pars materialis huius compositi*). Through such kind of connection, it would happen that the intellect would be found in the body and in some organ, as has already been said above.” [[263]](#footnote-263)

The key part of the critique clearly sees and rejects Thomistic form of Oxfordian Fallacy given in the erroneous conception of causality (*ex causa quam assignat*). The cause cannot be assigned in the dogmatic mode, because the essence does not act causally, but only universally predicts the already given causality in reality. Thomism has no existentially given personality, which Siger explicitly states in the next sentence. For Aquinas, the act of understanding does not refer to the immaterial and separate potency of the existing person (*non solum homo ipse intelligeret*). Aquinas does give a definition of the person as a substance, but this is only a formal, not an existential one. He must therefore take the fatal step of separating the intellect as the hypostasis of the immaterial form of the soul from the material form of the body. The reason for this is the individuation of the intellect due to the lack of procedure in the “*ipse*” mode. Then the person is only individuated in the mode “*idem*” and not personalized in the mode “*ipse*.” Socrates as a corpse is also such an individual. Then philosophy has no unity of the person, because it reduces the person to an animalistic kind of the individual. The intellect is separated from the body, so that instead of a process of personalization there is only a process of individuation. Aquinas’s hypostatized intellect only forms an essential unity with the person as a formally determined hylemorphic substance (*pars materialis huius compositi*). Again, this is a formal process of composition of parts, functions or faculties in the Porretan mode of hypostases. In fact, Aquinas does not define the person in the mode of “*anima intellectiva*,” because the individuation is achieved through the sensual faculties of the soul. The intellect has become an independent hypostasis, and the soul has become the organ of its exercise, albeit immaterial and eternal. From the point of view of Siger’s thesis “*homo ipse intelligit*,” this means that the performance of the intellect has acquired a material character (intelligere esset in corpore et in organo). Both errors (the formal determination of the intellect and its material determination) are fundamental because they abolish the unity of the person and turn the intellect into another Porretan hypostasis. The nature of the intellect as a hypostatized immaterial potency, which comes from the outside to the soul given in the body, represents a typical construct of Alexandrians. This version of Semiaverroism was defended by Aegidius Romanus in the writing *Anonymus Bazán*. That sophist explained Aquinas’s erroneous position as an error of Averroes himself (ch. 4.3.3). Aquinas’s dilemma became the dilemma of all modern and today’s nihilistic Alexandrians, due to the Thomism founded by Aegidius. The intellect is given outside the body, and if it is to be individualized in a material way, then one must find some corresponding sense organ for it. According to objective Avicennists, the brain functions as a sensory organ of the intellect. As a result, the intellect once again became materially sensual in the mode of Alexander’s *intellectus materialis*, and its immaterial part functions outside the person as an Avicennist or Cartesian separated substance. Therefore, CMDA clearly distinguished the hylic intellect of Alexander (*intellectus materialis*) from the new concept of *intellectus possibilis* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Siger rejects the definition of the purely material intellect in principle, because it leads to a false dualism of two substances in man.

Let’s return to Siger’s first commentary on *De anima.* Now, it makes much more sense what this brilliant Aristotelian wanted to say by making the criticism of Albert and Thomas. The critique includes both Averroistic version of intellect in the manner of the objective species (Avicenna, Rufus, Bonaventure), as well as Albert’s essential definition of *anima intellectiva*, as well as Aquinas’s conception of the intellect as a hypostatized form of the soul. After the year 1270, Aegidius fell into the category of second Averroism, since he conceived a radicalized version of Thomism. That is the reason, why Siger did not deal with him at all. Aquinas’s solution is an Averroistic one, because it turns the intellect into an external intellectual form related “*ab extrinsece*” to the soul. The connoisseur of CMDA summarizes the dilemmas of inadequate solutions that concern the individuation of the intellect in the following quotation. It is very important that it was already published in the first commentary QIIIDA.

“I maintain that the intellect connects with us by the fact that we understand from the sensual intentions (*ex intentionibus imaginatis*). Since these intentions are really connected with us, then the intellect by capturing them is connected with us in an actualized state. But not in such a way that he is connected to us by any material part of the body, as sensual cognition is connected by a material organ of the body. Nor do I claim that the intellect connects with us from the point of view of its essence (*nec intelligo dicere quod intellectus in sui natura aliquam habeat copulationem*). The essence of the intellect lies only in the potency and can only connect with us in this way (*solum est in potentia ut nobis copuletur*). If he were not connected with us as a faculty of the soul, then he would necessarily connect with us externally (*copulari autem deberet nobiscum*). Then the intellect would be a form and a substantially given act (*necesse esset forma et actus corporis nostri per suam substantiam*). From this it necessarily follows that the one who wants to postulate the unity of the intellect in all people must do this through the sensual intentions given in the imagination.” [[264]](#footnote-264)

The intellect exists in us only in the act of thinking, which is given by the exposure from the direction of the phantasms (*intellectus, cum eas intelligit, actu nobis copulatur*). But in and of itself it represents only an immaterial potency of the soul separate from the senses, because it has no material organ like the senses (*non copulatur nobis per partem eius quæ est materia, sicut sensus*). Then comes the decisive part, which, coming out of a real Averroism, blamed both the then modern Avicennists and Aquinas. The intellect cannot be a form, because then the independent actuality of another subsistent form given in the soul would be added to its immateriality. The most important part of the quotation represents the best definition of the unity of the person in the first Averroism. This is given by a precise definition of the intellect: “*De natura sua solum est in potentia ut nobis copuletur*.” According to Siger, the intellect is not “something” that could “somehow” connect with us. The potency cannot connect with anything, because it does not really exist. The intellect is an existential manner, how we live and think as the people. Siger′s first and therefore most important interpretation of CMDA introduced the hermeneutic “*ipse*” in the definition of “*anima intellectiva*” and thus radically rejected all kinds of dualism. Thomism works with the metaphysical identity of the person instead of the existential ipseity. Christian Aristotelians in the rue du Fouarre included the real existence of the person in their definition of the person, and their humanism corresponded to the existential approach. Heidegger recognized again that the abstract person in mode “*idem*” is not the same as the existing person in the mode “*ipse*.” [[265]](#footnote-265) Any conception of the intellect as a hypostatized form (Aquinas) or of the soul as a hypostatized essence (Albert) necessarily presupposes the hypostatized intellect (*necesse est forma est actus corporis nostri per suam substantiam*). Averroistic solution of modern Alexandrians turns the intellectual part of the soul into a separate form, thing or substance. The quotation explicitly rejects the false Averroism that misguided tradition of modernity attributed to Averroes and Siger, following the line of Avicennism in the Toledo school. According to Siger, it is completely excluded that *intellectus possibilis*, as a pure potency, somehow connect itself from the outside with the intellectual soul. Pure potency does not exist in and of itself, because it has no possibility of existence at all. Potency is a universal concept in the mind that refers to so far non-existent possibilities of the first substance. What does not exist cannot be hypostatized and thus objectively actualized in the manner of *tertium ens*. The only way to the definition and unity of the intellect in all people is through the sensually given cognition of existing persons, which is emphasized in the last sentence. This brings us back to the beginning of the treatise, where Siger points out the fundamental difference between the seeing and the understanding. Both acts must be distinguished in their hermeneutic question, “how” they happen. The definition of cognition in Thomas’s and Albert’s theological style does not correspond to the manner how cognition takes place. We find the key theses about the new subject of cognition in the passage of *De anima intellectiva*, which first enumerates the shortcomings of Thomas’s position.

“One cannot accept that man thinks out of himself in such a way that the intellect moves man from the outside (*intellectus sit motor hominis*). Understanding naturally precedes physical movement in humans. Man does not understand because intelligible phantasms somehow connect with us. As stated above, understanding takes place because the intellect works in us without external movement. He is active in the thinking person (*operans in operando*) by creating a unity with the body through his nature (*unite se habens ad corpus per suam naturam*).” [[266]](#footnote-266)

The intellect cannot have an ipseity in the sense of the actualized mover separate from the body. Let us see the previous rejection of Thomas’s intellect as a hypostatized form in the soul (*intellectus sit motor hominis*). Aquinas’s argument about the connection between phantasms and intellect is erroneously constructed if the “*ipse*” of man is taken into account. We experience thinking independently of sensible apprehensions (*obiective*). Therefore, both operations have a different essence, a material and an immaterial one. Their direct union cannot arise because they cannot produce a *tertium ens* as Aquinas supposes (*nec etiam homo intellegit quia intelligibilia phantasmata sint nobis unita*). This would be the model of knowledge according to Rufus and Bonaventure, where different kinds of objective *scibile* given in the mind and in reality are combined. Siger objects that the intellect cannot be hypostatized, because then it would not be able to accept an actualization from the phantasms in its actuality. Averroes had no theory of intellectual cognition based on copulation; but, according to Siger, Aquinas did it. Due to the hypostatized intellect as a form in the soul, he has no way to connect the phantasms and the intelligible contents with each other. We must return to the introductory reflections on the act of existence in the framework of *anima intellectiva* (ch. 4.4.1). Siger phenomenologically explores how the intellect operates in us in virtue of immaterial thinking that we experience (*intellectus intelligendo sit operans sine motu*). Since the intellect is connected to the body as an immaterial potency (*est operans in operando*), it has a different kind of physical subjectivity than the seeing of the sensually given organ (*unite se habens ad corpus*). The intellect is certainly the subject of its acts in the mode *subiective*, because it possesses in the soul its own, *intrinsece* given *operatio*. It is of immaterial nature (*per suam naturam*) and thus separated from the senses. In the mode “*conscii sumus*” we are able to perceive this unity within the framework of experienced causality, because each person thinks when he himself wants. But this subjective nature of the intellect is thought abstractly in the framework of the species. Aquinas has the intellect as an essence only in the theoretical mode (*quartum genus*); the intellect in this form can never be grasped directly (*subiective*), that is, in the “*fieri*” mode (*tertium genus*). The personal acts of thinking take place only in the mode of immaterial potency, which is Siger’s basic definition of *intellectus possibilis*. The intellect does not have its nature made in the mode “*ipse*,” because even the soul does not have one either. According to Siger, only an existing person has the ipseity as a real hylemorphic substance. The corporeal person is the basic source of actuality for all kinds of knowledge (sensible, intelligible), which are therefore always determined in that “*subiective*” mode. Therefore, the purely potential intellect cannot be a hypostatized carrier (*subiectum*) of thinking in the sense of an immaterial faculty coming to the soul from the outside, as Aquinas claimed. Siger points out to Aquinas that his essential definition of the intellect given in the mode *inmixtus* is an error due to the erroneous conception of metaphysical abstraction. It is taken in the mode “*simpliciter*” instead of “*secundum quid*.” In the interest of full truth, it is necessary to understand it from the other side. The intellect must be causally given in reality, from the direction of awareness of the intellectual acts (*consciii sumus*). In the polemic, Siger returns to the conciliatory tone of the first commentary on De anima I–II, which is contained in the Munich manuscript (ch. 4.3.2).

“It is true that if man is defined by the understanding given from the direction of his own activity of the intellect, he is also defined from the direction of his substance. This denomination proceeds both from the accidents and from the substance. In how many ways it is possible to define and to state it, so many ways of being the things exist, as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of *Metaphysics*. The cognition of man is therefore given by the intellect and in that way it is also stated.” [[267]](#footnote-267)

The denomination is correctly positioned from the direction of the substance (*substantia eius habet denominationem*). This is the position of Albert and Aquinas. It is given by the substantial determination of the soul and intellect, as we have seen above. But the scientific definition of man must include the existential determination (*homo denominetur intelligens ab opere intellectus*). The definitions of Albert and Aquinas are objectively correct, but scientifically wrong. They do not take into account the determination given by accidents (Siger′s mode *subiective*), because they take the definition of intellect in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*”. Then, their intellect is a mythological *tertium ens*, and not even the “*quartum genus*” because the determination of the intellect as a *tertium genus* is missing. Siger starts from contingently given thinking of the person, which is causally given in the first person, because we have the act of thinking in our power. This ensures the middle link of the demonstrative syllogism about the unity of the intellect. Only now we are stating the act of thinking in terms of the existentially given causality of thinking operating in the first person. The interpretation presented fundamental reasons why Siger received the honorary title of *Expositor Novus* and became the rector of Parisian artists. Defeated Aquinas left the Faculty of Arts immediately, in the year 1272. After the publication *De anima intellectiva*, this theologian should have publicly acknowledged the errors in his philosophical reasoning. Aquinas chose the honorable retreat to Italy, to play the lower philosophical league. Understandably, Aquinas as a representative of the first Averroism could not teach at the modernist Faculty of mendicants in Paris. Let us see the following chapters.

Siger became the only phenomenologist of existence before Heidegger. The brilliant master determined exactly the trajectory of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*), from where we need to explore the act of cognition. Done in that way, the demonstration according to *Second Analytics* is scientifically true. Only in this way the unity of the person can be preserved. The objective humanism of man as a corpse had lost that unity after the complete eclipse of the first substance. Siger reminds Thomas to correctly perceive the perspective of essential denominations of intellect as a philosopher, and not as a theologian. According to genial interpretation of *Categories*, *Metaphysics*, *De generatione animalium, De anima* and *Second Analytics*, Siger as *Expositor Novus* followed the original intention of Aristotelianism. He offered the scientific proof of man as *animal rationale* based on the effects of the first substance. He observed *anima intellectiva* from the front, taking account of real acts of thinking in the person as the first substance. Then he could also determine the intellect from behind, i.e., as a theologian, from the direction of man’s ultimate goal. Although this perspective corresponds to the letter of *De anima* and the conclusion of *Nicomachean Ethics* preferred by Aquinas, it certainly does not correspond to the overall intention of Aristotle. This intention of the Philosopher was fully revealed in CMDA, which should be understood in the holistic perspective of Averroes’s and Aristotle’s “meta-physics.” Therefore, the above-mentioned criticism applies to both “outstanding men in philosophy” (*precipui viri in philosophia*). Albert and Aquinas did not recognize the actual intention of Aristotle and were not able to interpret the scripture *De anima* in depth (*isti viri deficiunt ab intentione Philosophi, nec intentum determinant*). Siger’s correction of Aquinas’s work *De unitate* is also connected with his conception of metaphysics. This writing took up thinking in the model of Neoplatonic Themistius to be an imprint of the seal in the wax. This is in contradiction with the well-known position of *Nicomachean Ethics* on the ultimate determination of man.

“Thirdly, it must be said that thinking is undoubtedly an act of man himself and thanks to it man also gains the beatitude, as it is said in the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics [εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, E.N. 1077a12]. The intellect, from which thinking originates, is the highest virtue in man and belongs to what is specific to man. But the argument that thinking is man’s very own activity does not mean that the individual man is composed of some substance (*ipsius hominis compositi substantia*), from which, as from a subject of thought (*substantia a qua est intelligere*), a connection would be made with other parts of the ‘man’ called, as if wax were given a form. The arguments against it were given above.” [[268]](#footnote-268)

The quotation once again poses to Aquinas the factual hermeneutic question of “how” man thinks. Aquinas absolutized the intellectual side, which he combined with the physical acts according to the model of Themistius’s seal, which Siger did not agree with (*intelligere uniatur alteri parti compositi ut figura cerae*). Siger claims from his point of view that this view is completely superfluous and, moreover, a very problematic one. Modern mythology is not a critical philosophy, which he clearly interpreted (*sufficit quod modo praedicto*). This Latin formulation is of great importance because it forms the core of Ockham’s reasoning (ch. 5.4). From the hermeneutic primacy given by activities of the soul, it is clear that the principle of thinking is given *intrinsece* in the mode of Averroes’s *tertium genus*. This is precisely evidenced by Aristotle’s postulated conception of human happiness as the highest act of existence (*intelligere sit homini propria operatio*). By using Aristotelian conception of “*propria operatio*” (κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια), Siger clearly rejected Thomas’s conception of the intellect as “*ipsum intelligere*.” The concept of man in Siger′s philosophy and in modern schools of *sophistae Latini* is based on a commentary on the same key text of *Nicomachean Ethics*. But if two people say the same thing in the objective mode of *idem*, it is not the same in the existential and phenomenological mode of *ipse*. Therefore, the humanism of Siger and Dante is not the same as the humanism of Thomism. Let us now return to the basis of this position (ch. 4.4.2). The work *De generatione animalium* II.3 describes the existence of the living organism made through the act of the individual soul (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον, 736b12). Compared to theologians such as Aquinas and mystics such as Bonaventure, Siger returns the interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* discussed at that time to its basic intention, i.e., to the specific position of man, which is separated from animals by the ability of immaterially given cognition. This humanism is scientifically defined and according to natural critical mind, which Dante knew very well. The philosopher Siger disagrees with Themistius’s and Aquinas’s line of thought. They determine the nature of *anima intellectiva* solely from the intellect as a principle given “*ab extrinseco*.” [[269]](#footnote-269) The quoted text also states that it was originally Themistius′s conception, which turned the nature of the exploration of the soul and applied it to the potential intellect as a substance, instead of first exploring the act of our understanding.[[270]](#footnote-270) Aristotle, Averroes and Siger, and after them the politically thinking and acting Dante, hermeneutically defined the intellect from the point of view of phenomenal acts exercised in the body and in the polis. Themistius and Aquinas do this only abstractly, thereby betraying the principle “*ex inmediatis*” in *Second Analytics*. Therefore, they have neither the scientific recognition of the person in the mode of *demonstratio*, or the full unity of the person. The unity of the intellect in the mode of hypostasis does not retain necessary reality for the scientific proof of the essence of the soul. Both theologians took up the direction of Oxfordian Fallacy and defined the soul primarily in a substantial way, instead of exploring the original and causally given act of the practical and theoretical intellect.

Substantial definitions of the soul and the intellect are not erroneous in and of themselves, but they lack the power of scientific proof. The conclusion of the third question of *De anima intellectiva* fully agrees with the official attitude of secular masters of the Artistic faculty declared on April 1, 1272. Philosophy must subordinate itself to theology in this matter, which are defined from the point of view of revealed faith (*sententiam tamen sanctae fidei catholicae, si contraria huic sit sententiae Philosophi, praeferre volentes*, p.88.51‒52). But the questions peculiar to philosophy must be solved by one’s own intellectual responsibility and under the autonomous truth of reason itself. Philosophy is not a handmaid of theology and it should not be instrumentalized for theological purposes. So much for the brilliantly thinking priest and philosopher Siger and his group of artists in the rue du Fouarre, who found a way to the “Christian” Aristotle through the “Muslim” Commentator. Siger’s work became the fundamental inspiration of masters in the Declaration of the Faculty of Philosophy of 1272. If the writing *De anima intellectiva* was written after this declaration, it confirms in an excellent way its validity, in contrast to Avicennian modernists and to Aristotelian Semiaverroists. Siger criticized both the Aristotelianism of Aquinas, which was deficient, and the sophisms of modernists from Bonaventure’s school. At the same time, Bacon carried out the same criticism with the rejection of the primacy of objective and unitary conceived philosophy over theology (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Bacon criticizes the ideologized philosophy of *Modernorum*, which, however, is only apparently the opposite position to Siger. Albert and Aquinas did not present an analysis of the phenomenological course of cognition given *per prius* in the existential act of the unique person. The main reason for the incomplete intention in *De anima* and in CMDA is characterized in the above quote with the word, “*deficiunt*.” Both thinkers of the first Averroism took the intellect as a hypostasis (Aquinas) or *anima intellectiva* as an abstract essence (Albert). Although the substantive conception and definition are factually correct, they do not go from the experienced potency to the postulated substance, as we find it in Aristotle and in CMDA. Albert’s proof is not erroneous, but it is not scientifically *stricto sensu*, because Albert does not follow the procedure of *demonstratio* according to *Second Analytics*. Theologian Aquinas put the being of immaterial intellect in the mode *per prius* and only then sought a way to link it with ephemeral being of the intellectual soul that is active in everyday existence. Aquinas’s conception of the unity of the intellect and the person is given from the position of Aristotelian philosophy, but does not respect the scientifically based unity of the person according to the proof of *Second Analytics*. The insight into the unity of the person is conducted speculatively, that is, from the position of theology. Siger, as the first European philosopher by profession, was the best Aristotelian of his time and to this day is the greatest connoisseur of Averroes. Siger and his group claimed that the thesis of *Second Analytics* on the generic difference of theology and philosophy applies in principle and without reservation, whereby this diversity allows a scientific proof for both disciplines. The truth of supernatural faith cannot be given univocally with the truth made of natural mind. Hermeneutics has shown that this thesis about the proper dignity of philosophy and theology was defended in the scripture *De anima intellectiva* in the dispute over the status of intellect and soul concerning the living person. This dispute broke fully out in the year 1270. Bacon took the same position with regard to “*dignitas philosophiae*” against Bonaventure (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Siger directed the same criticism against both Dominicans; Aristotelians like Grosseteste and Bacon had directed it against Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventure one generation earlier. Siger joins these important Aristotelians by clearly separating the two generically different sciences, theology and philosophy from each other. The search for the nature of the soul is for him, just as for bishop Alvernus, a philosophical task that can be solved within the framework of the common sense, by following Aristotle presented in the line of the Commentator (*quaerimus enim hic solum intentionem philosophorum et praecipue Aristotelis*; *De anima intellectiva* 3; p. 83.44). This also includes the sentence quoted above about the fact that philosophy does not talk about miracles, but with a natural mind explains natural things. The difference between two schools shows that the integration of Aristotelianism into the theology opened by the Toledo school progressed very quickly. In the next generation, Aquinas became the new member of the school of “*sequaces Aristotelis*,” albeit in a different sense than in the second Averroism. Around the year 1235, Grosseteste, in the quoted remark, defends the twofold—philosophical and theological—truth against the nominalist critics of Aristotle in the school of second Averroism. They turned Aristotle into a heretic and thereby convicted themselves of heresy (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). In this connection, let us recall Bacon’s criticism of mendicant theological schools, which were responsible for the inadequate scientific training of modern theologians and, moreover, worked with Neoplatonic translations of the Corpus according to the Toledo school. This deficit of critical Aristotelian thinking is clearly evident in the gigantomachy that concerned new interpretations of Aristotle. According to Siger’s fine but accurate criticism, Aquinas and Albert put theology above philosophy because they had introduced dogmatic Aristotelianism into philosophy. Aquinas took expressly this position, because theology, according to biblical *Song of Songs*, is the queen to whom the other sciences must humbly serve (*aliae scientiae dicuntur ancillae huius*; ST I, q. 1, a. 5; ed. Leonina 4, 16). Siger shows both adherents of the first Averroism and the connoisseurs of Aristotle that the predominance of theology over philosophy in the question of the unity of the person and the intellect leads to the fact that philosophy loses, and with it the truth as well. After all, wisdom is of Christian nature only if it is true, for example with the pagan Averroes and despite the canonized Aquinas. In this, Siger agreed with the attitude of William of Auvergne, who in the previous generation was the real Aristotelian bishop of Paris and chancellor of the University. The wise priest and theologian Siger cannot allow the misinterpretation of Aristotle and Christian theology, especially not two decades after the death of bishop Alvernus, whose work Siger may have studied during his bachelor studies. Siger did not have a big problem with the inquisition investigation led by the papal delegate (Dominican Simon du Val) in the years 1275–76. It was enough to refer to the whole tradition of the first Averroism at the University of Paris. This tradition was actualized by Alvernus’s refusal of heretics, from which the only *philosophus nobilissimus* differed, which understandably was Averroes (OBJ II, ch. 2.3). But he had already had to leave the university. Aforementioned Stalinist five-year period of Latin sophists, modernists and aggressive Semiaverroists such as Aegidius was successful (1272–77). From the present interpretation, it becomes absolutely clear that hermeneutics cannot agree with the romantic story about the philosopher Siger. He was supposedly a moderate Averroist, but after 1270 he subordinated himself to Aquinas’s genius. Gilson already rejected these theses at the end of his monograph on Dante (1939). The polemic concerning the true intention of Aristotle constitutes a fundamental contribution of Siger to the epochal creation of Western metaphysics. The hermeneutics defend Aristotelian *alētheia* of “*pars Sigeri*” in the rue du Fouarre; then, it is absolutely obvious that the title *Expositor Novus* is due to Siger. In contrast to Semiaverroism of Albert and Aquinas, this modest priest and thinker defended the unity of the person, as bishop Alvernus had demanded it when he had made the criticism of modernists. As a merit for the philosophical justification of the unity of the person and the truth, he should be rightfully entitled to the title of “philosophical doctor of the Church.” The *Doctor Invidiosus* will certainly get it one day. In particular, when the teachers of the Church are already theologians like Aquinas and Bonaventure. Thanks to Siger's philosophy, the Commentator has already become the philosophical teacher of the entire thinking West in the honorary title of the “Third Master” and *Philosophus Nobilissimus*.

With the forced departure of Siger from the position of rector in the rue du Fouarre, a new phase of the oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) begins that formed Western nihilistic thought even in the first Averroism. The interpretation of Albert and Aquinas numerically objectified the unity of the person in the deficient mode of identity; modernity took up this development. After all, the second Averroism could not have a numerical identity of the person even in the mode *idem*, since it postulated the plurality of substances in man. The intellectual nature of the subject was no longer an issue in philosophy for half a millennium, because Siger’s brilliant criticism of Albert and Aquinas in the school of first Averroism remained misunderstood. We will discuss his dispute with Thomas in the next chapter from the position of Thomism. Siger rejected the intellect as a hypostatized form (see Aquinas’s term *qua2*), because this would ensure a maximally a kind of the essential identity and not the existential ipseity of man. Any hypostatized form would need some kind of substrate for numerical individuation. The key passage in Siger’s interpretation of the work *De causis* rejects a formally given identity of the human being according to the poorly understood view of *intellectus materialis* that was correctly presented in CMDA. Averroistic interpretation of Averroes was completed by Aquinas, among other things, by the fact that around 1270 he attributed to CMDA only the external individuation of intellect. Siger clearly states in his last known work that the exclusively Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*, as we find it in Aquinas, is not sufficient to ensure the unity given in the context of the ipseity, because it does not have a sufficient differentiation of the act of thinking. The fullness of the unity of man within the framework of the person was offered only by Averroes in CMDA. This *philosophus nobilissimus* was the only Aristotelian who had comprehended in depth what the separated (*inmixtus*) intellect means, who thinks general contents and at the same time remains a living person. Let us quote Siger’s intellectual testament, which reveals his hitherto unsurpassed understanding of Averroes.

“Averroes did not present the body in such a way that it participates in thinking as if it were its subject (*quod esset subiectum eius*). In the context of the intellect, the act of thinking does not need the body as a physical carrier (*corpore ut corpore subiecto*), but rather as an object (*sed magis sicut obiecto*) with which the intellect connects in a natural way. For the generally given account of thinking, it is true that it cannot be accomplished without phantasms. But it is said about Socrates that he communicated a different way of thinking than Plato proclaimed; and the act of thinking of Plato was not carried out by the phantasms of Socrates. The volitional act of personal existence (*sic vitare voluit*) in Socrates does not need that personal act of Plato’s thinking for accord in the thought. The act of thinking is not tied to the body as a subject. The product of thinking is not determined precisely by this phantasm and in this person (*non oporteat intellectum intelligentem ut in hoc corpore et non sine huius corporis phantasmate*), because thinking is carried out in another body in the same way, but with the help of other phantasms.” [[271]](#footnote-271)

The body cannot be a subject of thought in the sense of the material substrate, because then the intellect would not be separated from the senses and only the hylic intellect of Alexander would remain. If the intellect were separated in the manner of modern *separatus*, it would operate as an actualized substance in the manner of modern Avicennists and postmodern Cartesians. However, this gives rise to the modern and postmodern dualism of two separate substances, which for Siger is a squandering of critical mind. The body makes an object for the immaterial intellect (*magis sicut obiecto, cui naturaliter intellectus unitur*) in the sense that the intellect receives individualized and actualized phantasms that form the matter of its own act of thinking (*intelligere enim dixit commune ex modo quo non est sine phantasmate*). In their materiality, the body and phantasms merely create the object of thought, because thought possesses its own immaterial and universal character (*quo est*). Then it becomes clear that Plato’s and Socrates’s intellectual cognitive processes are not the same, because their act of thinking is individual according to the given phantasms (*in alio corpore intelligere ex phantasmatibus eiusdem corporis*). But the universal product of their thinking is already common to both in the sense of Averroes’s *quartum genus*, although it was created by the twofold act of thinking (*tertium genus*). Siger interprets the authentic view of CMDA, see the previous analysis. The identity of thinking does not come from the connection of the material body and intellect as an immaterial form that is in the soul. This is the view of the intellect as a second hypostasis, which we find in *De unitate* of Aquinas. Let us see following chapters and the difference between the two formal acts of the soul as a form (*qua1*) and of the intellect as a form (*qua2*). Siger cannot allow a similar mesalliance, although it is an authentic interpretation of *De anima*. The unity of the person would then be considered as a mere formal (i.e., numerical) differentiation of the intellect given as “*idem*” in the act of identity. The intellectual side of man as an *imago Dei*, and thus also the culmination of philosophy, comes from the faculty of thinking, given as the highest potency of man in the framework of *anima intellectiva*. The soul is experienced in the first person as the only form through which man lives and thinks. The rest consists in animal faculties of the soul that make the identity, but not the ipseity of man. The following sentence therefore contains an implicit criticism of Aquinas for his Aristotelian attitude, which does not correspond to the unity of the according to the ingenious interpretation of CMDA. The immaterial act of intellect is not bound to the body in the *subiective* mode, but only *obiective*. Therefore, thinking in its act is immaterially uniform in all people, because the intellect does not experience individualization through matter. Siger defends the existing person as stated in virtue of the metaphysical dative that establishes scientific proof of the way how the intellect operates.

“According to our conviction, such an opinion is heretical and, moreover, also irrational, and for the following reason: the physical form gives the existing intellect (*intellectus enim existente forma corporis*), as is generally the case with Aristotle for the soul. Then it becomes quite clear that the intellect must be counted and multiplied by the number of individual human bodies (*intellectum numerari et multiplicari multiplicatione humanorum corporum*). If the intellect is stated in this way, then there cannot be only one intellect in all people (*intellectum non posse unum esse numero hominum omnium*).” [[272]](#footnote-272)

Siger defends the ipseity of man by rejecting any numerical identity of man, be it by the already given individuation according to matter or according to the intellect as a form. The intellect is the act of the existing person, which, within the framework of the metaphysical dative, determines his scientific cognition and predication (*intellectu enim existente forma corporis*). Man cannot be “something” in the manner of matter individualized by the soul as an external form, or an intellect as individualized forms given *per se*, which ensure immortality of the soul by its separateness and immateriality. All this only defines the numerical unity of the intellect in the mode “*idem.*” It was the position of Avicennists of the second Averroism or Aristotelians of the first Averroism such as Aegidius Romanus and Aquinas. The quotation once again reminds the adherents of numerically given plurality of intellect that it is nonsense. The intellect is either a personal existential act of understanding (*tertium genus*) or an immaterial and detached faculty of the soul defined as the essence (*quartum genus*). If these thinkers combine both meanings and admit the intellect as a *tertium ens* into the existential act of the person, then they have it as a *separatus* in the Averroistic form of *copulatio*. Then the actualized external intellect has the body or the soul as a subject, to which it joins from the outside, because it has to numerically individualize itself on some substrate. This substrate is either an entelechic hylemorphic first substance (Aquin), or a universally and objective and hylemorphic soul, *cogito*, mind, etc. (postmodernism). Siger defends the relationship of the intellect to the body in the *obiective* mode, because it is through the intellect that the existing person realizes his ability of thinking. The individualization of this ability does not come from matter, as modernity thinks, but from the intended and actualized *species sensibilis*. According to Siger, the interpretations of *De anima* placed outside the framework of CMDA are both irrational and heretical. They do not actualized a full unity of the person, which Aristotle wanted more universally, that is, within the framework of holistic metaphysics. This also includes his conception of the soul (*sicut vult Aristoteles universaliter de anima*). Aquinas, as an expositor, defends Aristotle’s teaching on the unity of the intellect, but not the unity of the person. Siger offered another Aristotelian, also more universally given interpretation of the soul, which was fully consistent with the Christian teaching about the unity of the person. Siger’s brilliantly refused the accusation of heresy, addressed to the Aristotelian interpreters in about 1275. It was the last step before Siger’s authoritarian dismissal from his academic positions. But a true Aristotelian thinker must guard the fundamental truths. Siger presented it to Latin sophists clearly and precisely in the spirit of Dante’s immortal praise (*silogizzò invidïosi veri*). Dante’s aphorism in a Pythian way alludes to this musical and philosophical dispute about the title of the best commentator of Aristotle in the Latin West. Hermeneutics clearly confirm Dante’s point of view. The sophistic modernism led by the first Thomist Aegidius attributed this victory in the mode of objective *veritas* to Aquinas. Dante’s musical *Divine Comedy* turned into an objective divine comedy, which was led by the vengeful and chaotic Furies. Due to schizophrenic division of the person and due to the modern chaos regarding the teaching of Aristotle and the Commentator, a complete figure of the metaphysical error of modernity (*Irrtum*) was created. Dante knew well that Siger was the first humanist of the West to be more universal in the Aristotelian style, and therefore conceived after him the universal idea of Western humanism. Thanks to Dante, at least the idea of the *universitas humana* remained preserved in Western thought, which made possible a hidden effect of Siger’s philosophy within the framework of Western humanism. As we know, to maintain the unity of the human species, according to the Commentator, the continuous existence of philosophy is sufficient. This must be ensured at least by a person, which way is able to think in a wise way. Dante saved the political figure of existential philosophy defended by Siger. Dante’s musical unconcealment (*alētheia*) of Siger’s legacy passed into the epochal eclipse of the modern mind, as did the Aristotelian predication of the first substance.

The hermeneutics of “*homo ipse intelligit*” was resurrected by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity. Its first stage was based on the interpretation of the eschatological passages of the Apostle Paul in his New Testament letters (Umlauf 2010, 401–417). Siger’s humanism took up fundamental hermeneutics based on the temporality and historicity of existence (Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, 1947) and on the existence of “*homme capable*” (*Ricoeur: La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli*, 2000). The radical ethics of Lévinas certainly belongs to the defense of the ipseity. However, he ascended the ontotheological mystic ladder by following the example of biblical Jacob and Christian Bonaventure. Lévinas did not defend the unicity of the person in the framework of the fundamental ontology (he rejected this for the constitution of the ethical subject), but in virtue of the asymmetric ethics of responsibility given by metaphors, Bible and Talmud (*visage d’autrui, illéité, à-dieu, Autre, infini*…). Western Christianity and philosophy have been working for next millennium with the mere identity of the person, which was enforced by the teaching of official Thomism in the Catholic church. The lack of understanding of the phenomenology describing the *anima intellectiva* led not only to the condemnation of Siger as an Averroist, but mainly to the *damnatio memoriae* of Averroes’s metaphysics. His project of metaphysics ended with the epochal victory of objectivity as a historically manifested untruth of the Commentator proclaimed in the mode of objective *Irrtum*. The question of the human identity given in the context of memory arises in connection with Locke’s search for the new “*principium individuationis*” for the postmodern definition of the person. This is shown by the correspondence between Locke and Molyneux (1693–94) and the final redaction of Locke’s essay on the identity of the person (*Essay* 2.27). The subsequent debate between Locke and Leibniz is reminiscent of Siger’s critique of Aquinas in the “*ipse–idem*” mode, but shifted to the epoch of postmodernism, in which the identity of the person is represented as a self-confident substance according to Cartesian intellect. Leibniz, defending the intellectual side in Aquinas’s mode, argues against Locke that his type of identity, which is tied to the material intellect and memory, can also be found in a simple machine.[[273]](#footnote-273) John Locke created the first postmodern treatise in the style of *De anima*, but in the spirit of Cartesian version made out of the second Averroism. He returned to Augustinian *memoria* as the innate principle of cognition and combined it with the Cartesian *cogito* as the bearer of existence and identity. He abolished the innate ideas and, instead of the actuality of the intellect, made memory and the will function as a *locus specierum* for the reception of “primary qualities.” He took them for Rufus’s *scibile* as being of the third kind.[[274]](#footnote-274) The arguments of the tenth chapter in Locke’s essay can be compared with the debates about the relationship of the intellect to the body organs, see, for example, the passage about the damage to thinking and about mental illnesses. For structuralism, linguistics takes over this debate in relation to *intellectus materialis* (Jacobson 1956, 55–82), and today also cognitive neurology. Foucault defines the new production of the meaning of what the “human being” is in the paradigm of the new differentiation introduced between the 17th and the 19th centuries. The new *epistémé* is simply a difference in meaning, which is given by the difference between the syntagmatic flow of the events and the paradigmatic meaning given within the framework of this or that structure. The system of random differences determines the biological, economic and linguistic production of the new “humanities” in the way of the dispositive (*Les mots et les choses*, ch. X). The legal and political definition of the person arose at the turn of the 16th–17th centuries. In the second half of the 17th century, the modern subject (and not a person) assumed the function of the bearer of inalienable rights, first of all, Hobbes’s right to life. The loss of the existential “*ipse*” is completed by the nihilism of technology in the context of totalitarianism and the World Wars of the 20th century, including today’s neoliberal economics, which confirms the destructive identity of a percentage of the ruling global parvenus. After the loss of the first substance as the principle of individuation, both modernity and postmodernism have been looking for that paradisiacal state of unity. They were expelled from the paradise due to the epochal error given by the dispute over Averroism. From the point of view of later development, it becomes clear that Siger, as the only thinker of the Christian West so far, deserves the honorary title *Doctor Invidiosus* and that he is rightfully one of the most important *philosophical* teachers of Christianity. This modest master persecuted by modernists, combined the teaching of Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism into a complete unity that transcended the horizon of modernity for a millennium.

## 4.5 Emergence of Objective Semiaverroism (Thomas Aquinas)

To deal with Aquinas’s role in the conflict between the first and the second Averroism in the scope of one chapter is impossible. Therefore, it is imperative to make a basic choice. The hermeneutics of objectivity focuses on three major points that deals with the reception of Aristotle’s metaphysics and the personal identity. For the first, it is necessary to determine the main line of Aquinas’s criticism of the second Averroism, which starts by commentaries on Averroes’ writings *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. The key work is commentary on the Sentences (*Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*) written about 1253–57. Aquinas took up the first Averroism by rejecting the universal hylemorphism and the Neoplatonic being of the third kind. In this fundamental matter of exposing the meaning of being from the front in the direction of the real first substance, Aquinas remained a strict antimodernist throughout the entire academic career. The second point concerns Thomas’s interpretation of *intellectus possibilis*. Aquinas created the original figure of Averroes, which was not given in the Porretan paradigm of modernist schools. The above-mentioned commentary on the Sentences confirms the original reception of CMDA and completed the first important work *De ente et essentia* (1252–56). Thomas turned Averroes into a Semiaverroist by acknowledging the interpretation of the Toledo school, in order to make the metaphysical concordance of Avicenna and Averroes. Hermeneutics must therefore determine what kind of *intellectus possibilis* Aquinas has in mind when he comments on *De anima* and CMDA. Aquinas shifted the Toledic interpretation of the Commentator towards Neoplatonism by interpreting the possible intellect only according to *quartum genus* in CMDA. He turned the abstracted intellect into a substance of the third kind. The definition of intellectus possibilis changed into a hypostasized substance. This was the fundamental lack of understanding in relation to the basic reasoning in CMDA. Thomism summed up the Commentator’s interpretation of *De anima* in the mode of Avicennian *copulatio*, in which, according to the Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*, the actualized sensual species presses into the receptive component of the possible intellect. In the second step, Aquinas rejected this Averroistic interpretation of Averroes as nonsensical and accused the Commentator of the heretical teaching about the numerically uniform *intellectus possibilis*, which Averroes had never proclaimed. This new interpretation of CMDA was accomplished in both quoted Parisian writings, completed by the year 1257. Aquinas combined the interpretation of *De anima* according to Alexander and Averroes, which, however, contradicts the text of CMDA, which were directed against modern Alexandrians, as Avicenna was one of them. By exchanging *intellectus possibilis* as a universal notion (*quartum genus*) with the substance of the third kind, a new conception of objective cognition arose, which was given by the exposure of *intellectus possibilis* from behind, from direction of subsistent forms such as the separated receptive intellect. According to David of Dinant, this separated receptive intellect had been interpreted as a cosmic substance of the third kind. Aquinas’s interpretation is sophistic, in the new variant of the school of *sophistae Latini* that already Alvernus rejected. The new simulacrum of Averroes was created by Avicennist modernization of the Commentator, but for the most part it remained in the paradigm of the first Averroism. The new figure of Averroist Averroes separated Aquin from the school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre (*pars Sigeri*), and also from the interpretation of CMDA according to Albert and Bacon. In the interpretation of CMDA, Aquinas passed over the conception of the *intellectus possibilis* as a *tertium genus* and abolished the phenomenological conception of cognition, which we find in Alvernus’s school and in Albert the Great about 1240. With the help of his own mythology, the talented Dominican created a new figure of the Semiaverroistic Averroes. He defeded it againt the main representatives in the rue du Fouarre until his death, and despite Siger’s fundamental criticism. A philosopher and theologian of Thomas’s stature could not have carried out such an operation by mistake or unconsciously. The modernization of Averroes into a new heretic figure took place in the context of mendicants attack on the secular masters from the school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre, which included the already quoted Aristotelian Guillelmus de Sancto Amore. Semiaverroistic interpretation of CMDA is based on the real course of cognition given by exposure from the front and on the substantial unity of the person. It was in fundamental contradiction with the modernist school of Bonaventure, to which the newly founded mendicant’s faculty in Paris belonged (1255). The semiaverroistic position did not last long at the University of Paris, because there were only two main artistic faculties there. The newly appointed magister did not belong to any of both Parisian schools. Therefore, he resigned from the function of *magister regens* (1256–59) and returned to his native Italy. For the modernists, Aquinas was an Averroist, which is evidenced by the attack of Pecham, as the main representative of this school, when Thomas arrived to Paris for the second time. The work *De unitate intellectus* was directed againt Pecham and it made him academically impossible. This academic, who had been defeated three times and was also challenged by Siger’s school and the Thomists as Aegidius; he had to flee from Paris back to Oxford after 1270. Aquinas’s interpretation of CMDA was both in clear contradiction to the school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre. Siger addressed his fundamental criticism of Aquinas both in QIIIDA and in *De anima intellectiva*. Both writings reflect both Aquinas’s first stay in Paris and his Italian writings as well as the works created especially after Thomas’s second return from papal Rome to academic Paris (*De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*). The previous chapter has described this important dispute, which took place in the years 1270–72, between Siger and Aquinas over the title of *Expositor Novus*. Aquin’s second stay in Paris has a capital significance for the emergence of objectivity, because he created an objective model of cognition in the school of the first Averroism. Thomistic interpretation of CMDA is adopted and modified by Paris Modernist school of Semiaverroism in the dualistic scenario based on rejection of Averroes as an Averroist. Already during Aquinas’ lifetime, this was led by Thomistic Aristotelian, Aegidius Romanus. The combination of these two actualized of the first and second Averroism gave rise to the modern form of objectivity after the final abolition of both schools. Duns Scotus accomplished that task during his stay in Paris (around 1300).

Thirdly, it is necessary to determine how Thomas solves the question of the unity of the person, which reaches the climax in the scripture *De unitate intellectus*. Thomas’s conception, defended during his second stay in Paris, must be compared with the first Averroism represented by Siger, as well as with the school of the second Averroism represented by Pecham. The negative evaluation of Averroes is of key importance for Thomas’s conception of the intellect and for the unity of the person. At the time of the publication of Siger’s comments on *De anima*, Aquin proposed his own structure of cognition. He defended the interpretation of *De anima* according to the Blund′s school, but rejected Siger’s existential interpretation of CMDA. His independent development can be seen by comparing the conception in *Summa contra Gentiles* (finished about 1263) and in the work *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* (1265–66). The disputations were made in Rome before the second return to Paris, which took place at the turn of the year 1269–70. The interpretation must show how Aquinas’s theory of cognition fulfilled Averroes’s requirement given in the terms *proportio* or *consimilitudo* with regard to the truth as correspondence. Hermeneutics is primarily interested in the correspondence of sensual and intellectual cognition. The works written during the second stay in Paris already reflect Siger’s criticism of Aquinas’s address given in the Munich manuscript as well as in QIIIDA. For the insufficient understanding of Averroes’s teaching on the soul, namely in Thomas’s work *Quaestiones disputatae De anima* and *De unitate intellectus*, he received Siger’s criticism in his work *De anima intellectiva*. The result of this criticism is the second departure of Aquinas from Paris for the same reasons as in the year 1259. Neither Pecham’s modernists nor Siger’s party in the rue du Fouarre accepted his interpretation of Aristotle. Even after the year 1270, Thomas leaves the critical evaluation of Averroes, whose conception of the separated *intellectus possibilis* he assigns to the line of Alexander and Themistios. The last summary of Thomas’s criticism can be found in Siger’s *Quaestiones super Librum de causis* (1275). The lifelong project of the first Averroism according to Aristotle was combined with Thomas’s semiaverroistic interpretation of *De anima*. The *Doctor Invidiosus* criticized it in a brilliant way. The dispute between Siger and Aquinas, which was seconded on the side of Aquinas by Aegidius Romanus, has a fundamental character for the creation of the dispute over Averroism. Aquinas’s semiaverroism became the teaching of official Thomism due to the merit of Aegidius Romanus. This Latin sophist attributed to Averroes all the contradictions in Thomas’s interpretation of *De anima*, and, conversely, attributed to Aristotle all correct interpretations used by Thomas from CMDA. Through this twofold distortion of the truth, Aegidius became the *Doctor Fundatissimus* of philosophical Thomism as an official doctrine and ideology of the Catholic church. At that time, two figures of the Western intellectual existed at the Paris University. The true and sophistical production of knowledge took place according to the twofold *dativus modi* (ch. 4.4.4). The modern-thinking Furies actually began serial production of simulacra of the third kind during this time. The intellect became a hylemorphic substance, which, moreover, was numerically individualized. After the heresies made by David of Dinant and the introduction of universal hylemorphism, the first Christian university of the Latin West became a center of intellectual confusions due to another wave of *illuminati*. Only the University of Oxford had previously produced these simulacra. The remark summarizes the absurdity of the attitude of Bonaventure’s school of universal hylemorphism about the numerically uniform intellect for all people.[[275]](#footnote-275) This doctrine was supposedly proclaimed by some Parisian students before the publication of Tempier’s decree. It is easy to to recognize in this heresy the thinking of David of Dinant about the cosmic form of individualized *intellectus possibilis* in man, which the modernist Averroists attributed to Averroes. At the beginning of 1277, the proliferation of mythological stupidities and intellectual confusion caused by logical sophisms exposed the University of Paris to the risk of disciplinary action on the part of pope John XXI. The pope, with a letter dated January 18, 1277, ordered that bishop Tempier should review the heresies and errors that had appeared at the University of Paris. The bishop was given the task of researching these teachings, identifying their authors and submitting a non-distorted report on them.[[276]](#footnote-276) The destruction of the Aristotelian school in the rue du Fouarre was not at all the subject of the quoted letter of pope John XXI, and bishop Tempier acted on his own in the interests of modernists. The sophistic *Moderni* did not accept the artistic declaration of the faculty of 1272 during the academic five-year period 1272–77 and entered into a power struggle. The excesses of modern sophistry have provoked modern intellectual chaos. The intellectual and ideological stupidities made in the times of contemporary nihilism (*novissimum*) therefore point back to the first crisis of modernist thought in the Latin West. Modern intellectual chaos was triggered by the negligence of the Decret of masters of 1272 that ordered to respect the generic difference between the theology and the philosophy. The preamble from Tempier’s condemning decree of March 1277 clearly states that academic Furies were already working at full speed (*proprie facultatis limites excedentes*).[[277]](#footnote-277) Dante preserved his sound mind, and this critically thinking intellectual, poet and politician saw precisely the unique role of brilliant Siger in the modern chaos of thinking. Aquin’s work in Paris in the years 1270–72 caused the dubious accusation of Averroism to finally hang on Averroes himself and on both artistic masters Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. The fame of Thomas as an objectively victorious *New Expositor* was established by the first Thomist Aegidius Romanus. Nobody took care of the secular priests and the artists in the rue du Fouarre, in contrast to the influential order of the dominicains, to which Albert and Aquinas belonged. Likewise, the Parisian and Oxford Franciscans Bonaventure and Pecham were saved from the official accusation of Averroism. Among these was the Dominican Kilwardby. At Oxford, the Aristotelian Bacon became a black sheep, but his exile in Paris, investigation, imprisonment and ban on teaching did not end with an official conviction. The interpretation of Aquinas’s objective Semiaverroism provides a basic guide for assessing his share in the emergence of objectivity It was born from the specific ontotheological structure of the Late Antique, Islamic and Latin Christian West.

### 4.5.1 Modernization of Avicenna′s Metaphysics

Let us begin with the engagement of Aquinas in the dispute with the secular magisters in the years 1255–56, which is described in the chapter on Bonaventure’s Averroism (ch. 4.1.2). Aquin’s work *Contra impugnantes dei cultum* (1256) responded to Wilhelm’s work *De periculis novissimorum temporum* (1256), which attacked the academic and moral qualities of mendicant pedagogues at the University of Paris. Before the publication of this polemical work or shortly after its publication, Guillelmus de Sancto Amore, the rector of the Artists, was sent into academic exile. During his years of studies in Paris, the theologian Aquinas was on the side of the mendicants not only ideologically, but also philosophically. This attitude probably influenced his negative assessment of Averroes, which in turn was defended by the secular magisters in the rue du Fouarre. The first round of the survey must shed light on the emergence of Aquin′s interpretation of CMDA in the mode of Semiaverroism according to the scripture *De ente et essentia*. It was completed in Paris around the year 1256. Thomas’s interpretation of Averroes followed the paradigm of the Toledo school, which harmonized the teachings of Avicenna and Averroes into a metaphysical concordance. During his studies in Paris, Thomas made an attempt to combine the teaching of Averroes and Avicenna on the intellect. The key phrase from the quotation combines Avicenna’s metaphysics with Averroes’s first philosophy. To this end, he uses Averroes’s statement often quoted by modernists about the intellect that causes universality in things.

“The human nature has a being abstracted from all individual things in the intellect and therefore makes a unified definition with regard to all individual things that are outside the soul. That is why the intellect makes similarity of everything and leads to recognition of everything, insofar as we are human beings. Since we have a relationship to every single thing in the intellect given in this way, the intellect finds a definition of species and appropriates it in this way (*adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi*). That is why the Commentator says in the introduction to *De anima* that the intellect is what causes universality in things. This is also what Avicenna says in his *Metaphysics*.” [[278]](#footnote-278)

According to Avicenna and Averroes, the intellect establishes a universal cognition in things (*intellectus est qui agit in rebus universalitatem*). The quotation combines both metaphysics into a unity in which Avicenna’s conception prevails. The key character is the extremely ambiguous word “*adinvenit*,” which does not clearly say whether the intellect produces universal meanings in the soul or somehow finds them in things themselves. It is characteristic of Aquinas’s entire line. He puts Avicenna in the first place, since his metaphysics determines in the mode *per prius* the question of cognition, the definition of the intellect, as well as the unity of the person and the immortality of the soul. Therefore, around the year 1255, the young philosopher commented in principle neither in *De ente et essentia* nor in his commentary on Sentences on the key passages of Averroes’s *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, which criticized Avicenna for the erroneous project of the first science. The commentary on Sentences sees a difference between the two projects, and this mainly in the question of signification, where Aquin takes Averroes’s side against Avicenna’s essentialism.[[279]](#footnote-279) The rejection of Avicenna in favor of Averroes concerns the rejection of Porretan essentialism and Avicennism in the case of the definition of the person in the Divine Trinity. Thomas’s nature of cognition is based on the unity of the cognizing person in the *QD De potentia* that we will discuss later (ch. 4.5.2). Nevertheless, Aquinas, following the example of the Toledo school, assumes that both projects of metaphysics work with a similar Aristotelian interpretation of the first science and harmoniously complement each other. In the case of Avicenna, there is a fundamental error, which the Sicilian school and Siger clearly saw. Aquinas uses Averroes’s commentaries on *Metaphysics* and *Physics* in his commentary on Sentences, written at the same time as *De ente et essentia*. The commentators of that time knew very well the quotations from Averroes’s *Metaphysics* that rejected fundamental errors in Avicenna’s first philosophy (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). The great commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* similarly asserts that Avicenna’s deduction of the first principles of metaphysics is absolutely erroneous (*Avicenna peccavit maxime*), because he had neglected the deduction of the first principles of metaphysics from physical substances.[[280]](#footnote-280) From Thomas’s quotations of the Commentator up to the year 1257, it becomes clear that Aquin adopted the orientation of the “meta-physics” built on the primacy of “substance *qua* substance” and combined it with the project of Avicenna’s metaphysics built on the primacy “*ens inquantum ens*.” This equivocally made concordance of both forms of metaphysics created a sophism of unitary metaphysics within the first Averroism that gave birth to later *metaphysica generalis*.

The syncretistic view of both Arab metaphysicians can be found in the first important philosophical work written by Thomas *De ente et essentia*. The connoisseur of Avicenna explains to the modernist of Bonaventure’s school that they cannot take Porretan hypostases as the first substances, which, moreover, uncritically identify with Avicenna’s concept of being in the mode “*hoc esse tantum*.” Aquinas turned Avicenna into a pure Aristotelian against the school of modernists. He knows that Avicenna’s essentiality in the mode “*hoc esse tantum*” has its own form of existence, which is not actualized in individual things. According to Avicenna, the intuition of intellect reveals the universal nature of things (*ad modum universalis*), which fundamentally differs from the particular nature, given only in the individual things and modified by the sensual imagination (*ad modum particularis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). According to Aquinas, this concept of Avicenna is strictly separated from the categorical predication given by the imposition from real first substances. Aquinas reminds the sophistic modernists from the newly established chair that Avicenna was an Aristotelian and not a Porretan Platonist.[[281]](#footnote-281) By hypostasizing the pure essence, Porretans turned Avicenna into a pure Platonist. Both main representatives of the Falsafa were Aristotelians. The new interpretation of Aristotelianism rejected the positioning of both projects in the hierarchical position of superordination and subordination, as Siger did. Thomas put both projects on the same level. It is then no longer a problem for Thomas to combine Averroes’s “meta-physics” of the first substance with Avicenna’s theoretical view of “*ens quantum ens*” in the concordance model. The Toledo school sought to harmonize both thinkers, and therefore, like today’s commentators, ignored the fundamental differences in both projects of the first science. The work *De ente et essentia* assesses both forms of the first science from the unbiased perspective of the objective thinker. As a result, a new synthesis of Avicenna and Averroes was created around the year 1258 in the original form of Aristotelianism, which was later rightly called “Thomism.” The first significant philosophical work of Aquinas created the basis for the later unified form of objective metaphysics. The approach of Aquinas was fundamentally rejected by Siger as a phenomenologist, since he defended the conflictual paradigm made “*ad mentem Averrois.*” It is given in the line of Alvernus’s interpretation of *De anima* according to the Sicilian school (ch. 4.4.1). Due to the new synthesis of Avicenna and Averroes, the young students as Aegidius choose Thomas to be the *Expositor Novus* of Aristotelian corpus. Now it becomes clear why the Oxford manuscript defended Thomistic syncretic view and not Siger′s and Bacon’s hierarchy of both metaphysics.

The status of *intellectus possibilis* forms the first and completely fundamental point of interpretation. Aquinas’s concept of Averroistic Averroes shaped the subsequent history of philosophy. The objective Thomistic attitude, leading to sophistic reconciliation of both metaphysics, necessarily had to be reflected in the key question of *intellectus possibilis*. In this question, Averroes separated himself from all previous commentators of *De anima*. Representatives of Blund′s and Alvernus’s school in the rue du Fouarre recognized the uniqueness of Averroes’s solution, because they conceived the relationship between Avicenna and Averroes in the conflictualist paradigm. The Commentator rejected the Neoplatonic dualism and, as the only interpreter of *De anima*, produced the full unity of actualized cognition in the existing person. That explication separated the most exalted philosopher from the other “*sequaces Aristotelis*,” and even from Aristotle himself. The mendicants followed Neoplatonic interpretation of the Toledo school. They read CMDA in the paradigm of exposing the understanding from behind, from the direction of hypostatized solar intellect. For the Toletans, Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* was a separated cosmic substance. Therefore, this immaterial substance must generate some form of *coniunctio* with the human intellect in the act of an individual cognition. In the work *De ente et essentia*, Aquin discovered Avicenna as an Aristotelian and he interpreted CMDA for Porretan and Augustinian modernists in the line of Aristotelian Avicennism. Thomas elaborated the hypostatic nature of receptive components of cognition in the line of the Toletan interpretation of CMDA and created a new version of averroism. From the abstract term *intellectus possibilis*, in the modus *quartum genus* in CMDA, a substance of the third kind was created according to Alexander’s separated *intellectus possibilis*. The new form of Averroistic Averroes was based on the writing CMDA interpreted by Avicenna’s interpretation of *De anima*. The definition of Averroistic receptive intellect is derived from the fact that the cosmic intelligences as created beings contain a certain potency, although not in the form of matter. Thomistic interpretation of Averroes is given by the cosmic form of the possible intellect, which is conceived as a substance. From the possible intellect, which Averroes explained only as a *quartum genus*, Thomas made a new substance of the third kind. Aquinas freely quoted the passage CMDA III.5, which explicitly speaks of the intellect in the form of *quartum genus* (*iste est quartum genus esse*, CMDA 409.657). Averroes asserts that the resulting form of abstraction of *intellectus possibilis* is a permanent species. Continuous existence of philosophy proves that there is always at least one real existing person who has the ability to actualize the speculative intellect (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). In the same way, that is, thanks to the abstracted form of *intellectus possibilis* as a universal concept in the soul, we are able to perceive the world of cosmic intelligences.[[282]](#footnote-282) Averroes demonstrates the ability of intellect to recognize everything, but understandably according to the specific type of physical and mental cognition (*tertium genus*). The specific character of the receptive intellect is contained in the logic of *modus tollens* and *destructio primis* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3), that is, through the permanent existence of philosophy, given in acts of existing thinkers. Toletan Aquinas interpreted the quoted passage of CMDA according to Avicenna. Aquinas turned Averroes’s receptive ability of the real person capable of immaterial cognition of cosmic substances into a new substance of the third kind. The ability of cognition of cosmic intelligences, which is given by the senses as an essence (*quartum genus*) turned into another mode of the intellect as *tertium ens*. According to CMDA, we are able to recognize these actualized immaterial forms, but only in abstraction based on bodily senses, which Siger’s school knew very well. Aquinas as an Aristotelician abolished the model of Avicennian comitation and introduced the principle of potency and actuality into the Neoplatonic celestial hierarchy. As a result, the hierarchy of substances was created, according to their share in immateriality and in the degree of permanent actualization. The recognition of the hierarchy recorded in this way was given according to the categorical predication of Aristotle’s *Physics*. In this way, a new figure of *intellectus possibilis* was created, which is interpreted “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to the Toledo school. In the new model of cosmic forms, maximal and unlimited effects of cosmic intelligence run from top to bottom. On the contrary, the reduced form of cosmic *intellectus agens* on the lower sphere represents the receptive possibility of cognition that can reach the higher level of intelligences. This solution is reminiscent of Bonaventure’s version of substantial *intellectus possibilis* as a mythological mixture of potency and actualization (ch. 4.1.2). However, Aquinas created it without introducing the *materia spiritualis*. Aquinas implanted in Averroes’s cosmology, the teaching on two components of human intellect (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14‒15). Therefore, he compiled the scheme of heavenly hierarchy according to the interpretation of the Commentator on *Physics* and according to the Toledo school. In order to do it, he needed the cosmic *intellectus possibilis* of David Dinant. The lower hierarchy of celestial intelligences as immaterial substances has an increasing degree of potentialities. The mythological projection of human intellect into the heavenly spheres is given by the cosmic form of matter as a pure potency. This form of limitation and finiteness is given by receptivity and represents the cosmic version of *intellectus possibilis*. That was the innovation of Aristotelician Thomas to replace Bonaventure′s obsolete Neoplatonic cosmology. The cosmic intelligences have a specifically limited and finite form of *intellectus agens*, which allows them a limited recognition of the higher spheres (*limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis*).[[283]](#footnote-283) The cosmic intelligences are created beings and therefore have a potency as a specific form of limitation (*finitae quantum ad esse suum*). This potency is actualized in the real act of cognition, when the role of cosmic causality is performed by the hierarchically higher-ranking *intellectus agens* (*quod a superiori recipient*). Taking the direction of the lower spheres, on the other hand, the cosmic forms are fully active in an unlimited manner (*non tamen finiuntur inferius*). Averroes was supposed to make this type of cosmic power of cognition as a hypostasis that was passively given to the cosmic intelligences, supposedly in the mode of *intellectus possibilis*. Aquinas created a completely new mythological concept of cosmic *intellectus possibilis*, which he attributed to the Commentator. That Averroistic interpretation of Averroes introduced the receptive ability to celestial intelligences that recognize the higher-level of the spiritual world according to the quoted part of *De anima*. In this way, the *intellectus possibilis* was created as a cosmic substance and hypostasis. Thomas modernized the cosmology of Avicenna “*ad mentem Averrois*” by introducing the receptive potency of cosmic intelligences according to CMDA. As a result, a new cosmology was created in the Toledo school and its first accomplished version can be found in Thomas’s commentary on Sentences. The recognition of hypostatized forms of *intellectus possibilis* differs in the degree of potentiality, which grows from the first cosmic sphere downwards. The new cosmology made in that way separated itself from Neoplatonic deduction of forms as it was presented in *Liber de causis*. The comitation of Avicenna remained only in the downward direction in the mode of the catabasis of the cosmic intellects from the higher form to the lower one, because the active intellect works unrestrictedly downwards (*exitus*). Cognition in the upward direction is no longer determined by the emanation model of the *Liber de causis* (*reditus*). The new knowledge changed Neoplatonic anabasis by putting it in the Aristotelian model of knowledge in the mode “act—potency” according to *De anima*. In the years 1256–57, Aquinas converted Porretan modernism from Neoplatonism to Aristotelianism. The peculiar commentator of the Commentator abolished the deductive style *modo geometrico* given in *Liber de causis*. The transmission of higher act of being and knowledge to the lower receptive potency is not given through logical deduction, but through the imposition of the cognitive form given at a higher level of actualization towards the lower form, which has a correspondingly higher degree of receptivity. Siger’s school saw very well that Thomistic cosmology has a hidden Neoplatonic nature. In order to build a new cosmology, Thomas did not create the imposition of meaning from real hylemorphic substances, but he hypostatized the cosmic potency in order to replace the cosmic *materia prima* of Dinant. The cosmology is not based on the metaphysical *ordinatio*, but on the logical version of modernist *resolutio*. The logical supposition that makes the cosmological deduction is given in the form of universal metaphysical and hypostatized potency. The new world order exists in the mode *simplex* and is created fully rationally in the sense of logical deduction *per se* (*Anal. Post*. 84a14). During his studies in Paris, Duns Scotus established a new objective metaphysics based on that kind of Thomistic cosmology. The origin of Thomistic simulacrum of *intellectus possibilis* is explained in the following text of *De ente et essentia*.

“Therefore, in the interpretation of the third book of *De anima* [CMDA III.5; 410.667‒72], the Commentator said that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, then we could not recognize the multiplicity in the cosmic substances. Therefore, there is a real distinction between these intelligences according to the degree of potency and actualization, namely in such a way that the higher intelligence is more disposed to the first Intelligence and has more actuality and less potency, which also applies to the other cases.” [[284]](#footnote-284)

According to Thomas’s interpretation of Averroes, the proof of substantial character of *intellectus possibilis* should be given in the mode of Avicennistic *coniunctio* of hypostatized forms. Each hypostasis of the possible intellect receives the potency of cosmic intelligences at its own level of existence and thus in the mode of Aristotelian correspondence. The existence of *intellectus possibilis* as a hypostatized substance (*tertium ens*) is deduced from the recognizability of the cosmic order. We recognize only the cosmic intelligences of the order of immaterial abstraction, i.e., through the humanly given *intellectus possibilis* as the faculty of the soul. It is activated by the cosmic form of *intellectus possibilis*. Aquinas created a new mythology of Averroes as an Averroist. That demonic figure became a cosmic pantheist that followed heretical David of Dinant. According to Thomistic Averroes, we supposedly recognize the cosmic intelligences by the conjunction of human *intellectus possibilis* with its cosmic counterpart. Aegidius refers to this interpretation in the third part of the Oxford manuscript with the quotation ST I, q. 88 (ch. 4.3.2). The theory of the sophistic copulation of *intellectus agens* and *possibilis* we find further in the *Summa philosophiae* cited above, which testifies to the original form of official Thomism at Oxford (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). Both writings were created at the same time as the publication of Siger’s commentaries on *De anima*. But the original Thomistic interpretation predates them by a decade, because it was created during Aquinas’s first stay in Paris. The new receptive intellect became a cosmic hypostasis to follow the cosmic and separate *intellectus agens*. Both forms of Averroist intellect are connected in the mode of *copulatio* with our active and passive abilities in the physically given soul. Following the Toledo school, Aquinas placed the cosmic *intellectus agens* and *possibilis* in the two separate cosmic hypostases and blamed Averroes for this mischief. The cosmic form of *intellectus possibilis* can never exist as a substance in the original of CMDA, because the pure potency has no possibility of autonomous existence.

Aquinas’s modernism possessed an undeniable charm for Porretan and Avicennist nominalists at Oxford and Paris. We find the first case of that Toletan mixture of two separate intellects in *Summa Duacensis*, where the original source of this error is to be located in the school of Philip the Chancellor (*intellectus agens aut possibilis manet semper in sua substantia incorruptibilis et inmixtus materie*; OBJ II ch. 2.2.2). The modernist school in Oxford that followed Grosseteste had no problem with the acceptance of Thomism. That made contrast to Pecham’s school that defended the universal hylemorphism and the plurality of substances with Rufus and Bonaventure (ch. 4.2.2). Latin Sophists desired to become modern Aristotelians in order to enter *via Modernorum*. Among the modernists in Paris, thanks to Aquinas, the pluralism of forms in the soul was introduced. It was the teaching of Grossesteste as well; both interpretations of metaphysics and cosmology were conducted in the mode “*ad mentem Averrois*” following the Toledo school. The new Aristotelian Averroism was inspired by Avicenna’s cosmology of pure substantial intelligible forms (*Liber de philosophia prima* V) and according to the Commentator’s interpretation of *Physics*. Aquinas therefore rejected modern teaching on the cosmic soul (*anima mundi*), which can be found among the modernists at Oxford, including Grosseteste and Rufus. The interpretation of Averroistic *intellectus possibilis* is given in the mode of the heavenly hierarchy of intellects, which represent the fully actualized form of *intellectus agens*. But as a created being, they contain a certain degree of potency. This potency must be given at the level of pure cosmic substance as a cosmic form of *intellectus possibilis*, which allows the receptive recognition of *intellectus agens* when it goes to the lower forms. Through the syncretism of Avicenna and Averroes, a new system of cognition of cosmic intelligences was created, which, according to the scripture *De anima*, corresponds to the passive and active ability of the soul. The passive component of the lower cosmic intelligence adapts to the higher spheres in the mode of reception (*intellectus possibilis*), while the active component of the same intelligence forms the lower spheres (*intellectus agens*). Both types of cognition take place in the mode of truth as an Aristotelian correspondence that deals with the world of cosmic intelligences. That Averroistic version of the cognizing person, as a composite given by conjunction of both intellects, provides a definition of the cognitive subject according to Avicenna. That theory has nothing to do with the conception of the cognizing person in CMDA. According to Aquinas, Aristotelian Averroes teaches, in addition to pantheism, the same nonsense as Neoplatonic Aristotelian David of Dinant, who combines the cosmic and human *intellectus possibilis*. The former is individualized by the *materia prima*, the latter by the potentialities of the body. This form of Averroist *intellectus possibilis* as a cosmic hypostasis acts on our soul in the mode of Alexander’s separated *intellectus possibilis*. Their recipient in the soul is, of course, the hypostatized form of Themistius’s *intellectus materialis*. The following argument sums up the whole theory.

“And so this is also accomplished in the human soul, which occupies the last stage at the level of intelligible substance. The possible intellect in the soul relates to intelligible forms in the same way as the primary matter (*intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima*), which occupies the last stage on the level of material beings with regard to material forms, as the Commentator said in the third book of *De anima*. The Philosopher compares this intellect with an empty table on which nothing is written. Precisely because this fact the human intellect has more potency than the other intelligences; it realizes itself in this appropriate way in relation to material things, in such a way as to use the material thing in order that it makes participation in the being of intellect (*ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum*). In this way, a being and a hylemorphic composition arise from soul and body in the composite being (*ex anima et corpore result unum esse in uni composito*), in which this being of soul does not depend on the body.” [[285]](#footnote-285)

Thomistic definition provides a sophistic form of *intellectus possibilis* as a substance of the third kind. It creates *a priori* given conditions of cognition due to cosmic intelligences in the style of Kant’s later transcendental deduction. The receptive human intellect occupies the last place in the series of comitations of cosmic hypostatized *intellectus possibilis*. Human *intellectus possibilis* is given individually and it keeps contact with the matter, because it directly recognizes the world of hylemorphic substances.

Aquinas defended this interpretation of Averroist Averroes throughout the whole life. This completely flawed version of CMDA needs a redesigned version of Themistius’s and Theophrastus’s *intellectus materialis* as another hypostatized form in the human soul. The work *De unitate intellectus* only singled out this hypostatized receptive intellect from the completely erroneous concept of modernists given in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Aquinas created a new form of Averroistic *intellectus possibilis* in the manner of Avicenna’s Aristotelianism mentioned above and transplanted it into the soul as an independent form. The quotation presents Dionysian celestial hierarchy of the substantial intellects (*agens, possibilis*) descending from the cosmic forms towards the lower levels down to human beings. He gave it out as Averroes’s theory. This fact duly noticed Wéber in his original analysis of Thomas’s corpus; but, unfortunately, this Thomist interpreted the hierarchy of intelligences in a Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian way (Wéber 1991, 218–32). In addition, Wéber generally attributed the type of receptive cosmic intelligence in the mode of Dionysus’s *Peri Phūseon* to the whole school of the first and second Averroism, that is, to Dinant, Alvernus, Albert and Aquinas. He made out of them representatives of Neoplatonism. The most important text is found in the second book of Sentences, in which all the main theories regarding the numerically unified intellect are solved. Aquinas at first rejects Avicenna’s conception of cosmic and separate *intellectus agens*. In accordance with bishop Alvernus (OBJ II, ch. 2.3) rejects as heresy the direct effects of this separate active intellect on human knowledge. Then he rejects the cosmic *intellectus possibilis* according to his own Averroistic interpretation of Averroes interpreted above. In the finale, he takes Avicenna’s possible intellect as Christian theory, because his *intellectus possibilis* is numerically individualized according to cognizing persons. Being a very gifted representative of the school *sophistae Latini*, Thomas created a new mythology of cognitive act. Regarding the interpretation of CMDA, his early Thomistic theory (but not its final phase) is based on two fundamental errors. First: the personal achievement of the intellect as a *tertium genus* according to CMDA was replaced by sophistic exchange of *intellectus materialis* made out by Avicenna. Secondly, he did not at all understand the function and conception of the intellect as a *quartum genus* according to CMDA. He took the intellect as a *quartum genus* for his freely created cosmic *intellectus possibilis*. Based on these two fundamental errors, Aquinas created a Thomistic version of Averroism. The following quotation sets out the basic features of Avicennist conception of the possible intellect, which Aquinas adheres to the end of his thought.

“Avicenna’s third opinion can be found in his treatise *De anima* VII.5–6. He put the individualized possible intellect into each individual (*ponit intellectum possibiliem in diversis diversum*) and based it directly in the essence of the rational soul, and not as a physical ability of the body (*fundatum in essentia animae rationalis, et non esse virtutem corporalem*). This ability starts from the body, but does not end with the extinction of the body (*corpore incipere, sed non cum corpore finiri*). Therefore, we consider his interpretation of the possible intellect to be in agreement with the Christian faith (*ad intellectum possibilem, ejus opinio est quam tenemus secundum fidem catholicam*), although he, along with the other philosophers, made an error in the question of the [separated] active intellect, as has already been said above.” [[286]](#footnote-286)

Avicenna’s *intellectus possibilis* is an immaterial faculty laid out in the rational essence of the soul (*in essentia animae rationalis*). Therefore, unlike Averroes’s version of the cosmic *intellectus possibilis*, this form is tied to individual bodies (*in diversis diversum*). In the body, this intellect arises in an individualized, materially given form (*cum corpore incipere*). But as an immaterial essence, it cannot perish with the body (*non cum corpore finiri*). In the question of *intellectus possibilis*, Aquinas is an Avicennist. He considers the numerical individualization of the receptive intellect in man as a Christian conception. The numerical plurality of hypostatized *intellectus possibilis* according to Avicenna is given correctly in man, since this hypostasis is given immanently. On the contrary, Averroist *intellectus possibilis* is given incorrectly, because it comes to man from the outside in his cosmic form. By the connection of Avicenna with Averroistic Averroes, a new theory of the numerically different *intellectus possibilis* was born about the year 1258. The *intellectus possibilis* is individualized in man correctly, which makes a Christian version of Averroism according to Avicenna. Or, the *intellectus possibilis* is individualized incorrectly, which makes a heretic version of Averroism according to Averroes. That fundamental fallacy (*Irrtum*) of the first Thomism founded the objective definition of modern cognition. Aquinas announced the numerical individuation of *intellectus possibilis* during his first stay in Paris. Now it becomes clear against whom Siger’s fundamental rejection of numerically different *intellectus possibilis* in man is directed. This criticism can be found in QIIIDA as well as in subsequent treatises. Albert does not work with this Averroistic sophism, because his interpretation followed the individual cognition according to Sicilian interpretation of CMDA made in the line of Alvernus and Blund′s school (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). The following argumentation of Thomas’s commentary on Sentences rejects theory of Theophrastus and Themistius of numerically uniform possible intellect in all people according to Averroes’s critique of CMDA. Then, it remains Thomas’s above-mentioned simulacrum of numerically uniform cosmic *intellectus possibilis* that is given externally and uniformly for all people. This erroneous Averroist conception of the receptive intellect (which Aquinas personally created) must be fundamentally rejected in the new version of Avicennist and Christian Aristotelianism. The resulting examination of the Averroistic concept of *intellectus possibilis* according to Thomas’s interpretation of CMDA is as follows. According to Averroes, the active and passive intellect is numerically one in all people, but not *species intelligibilis* that arise in the individual act of cognition. The separated cosmic *intellectus possibilis* acts in an unlimited power in downward direction and consequently shapes the receptive human intellect in the same way as the craftsman works the matter. Like Aegidius, Aquinas, projected the substantial model of the gradually hierarchized forms of cosmic intellects into the interpretation of human cognition according to CMDA. These forms are found in Avicenna’s cosmology and metaphysics. The definite form of Averroistic model of cognition by separated and substantial *intellectus possibilis* is set forth in this quotation.

“Hence Averroes deduced, with regard to the intellect, how in a certain way it is changeable and unchangeable in us. In that case, variability arises from the part which produces the phantasms; the immutability relates to the possible intellect (*ex parte intellectus possibilis est incorruptibilitas*). It follows from this point that after the death of the changeable part of possible intellect in the body, no plurality of individual souls remains. This view is ridiculous for many reasons.” [[287]](#footnote-287)

The separated cosmic substance of *intellectus possibilis* represents a hypostatized form, which joins the human receptive intellect in the mode of *copulatio*. In the cosmology of *intellectus possibilis*, this happens at the lowest level of substantial celestial intelligences. Both forms are immaterial and separate from the sensually given physical cognition. Therefore, they can successfully copulate together. Then the cosmic form of the numerically uniform *intellectus possibilis* forms the human individual form of *intellectus materialis*. That kind of individuation passes through the human body. Averroes allegedly rejected the direct effect of the separated cosmic *intellectus agens* on human cognition, but carried out the entire numerical individuation of cognition in humans via the cosmic form of *intellectus possibilis*. Averroes became a moderate Amalrician in the style of David of Dinant (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3). Avicenna allegedly did not have such a kind of *intellectus possibilis*, because he comprehends it purely individually, which is in line with the Christian nature of the human soul.

Taken from the perspective of real teaching of CMDA, Aquinas presents the Neoplatonist model of the cosmic *intellectus possibilis* put in the order of heavenly hierarchies, which acts as a forming element on the human *intellectus possibilis*. Aquinas’s Averroist interpretation of Averroes is based on Avicennist dualism, which adopted Aegidius as the first Thomist. The final sentence states in the mode of Pythian *alétheia* that it is indeed a ridiculous simulacrum of cognition and intellect (*haec ratio ostenditur esse frivola multipliciter*). In Thomas’s view, Averroes became an imperfect a mistaken Avicennist. Real connoisseurs of CMDA in the rue du Fouarre certainly considered that exegesis to be a truly frivolous interpretation of the Commentator. The mythological interpretation of CMDA according to Aquinas clearly showed them that the school of *Modernorum* immediately after its constitution began the production of sophistical simulacra and beings of the third kind. Let us not forget that Aquinas was one of the first masters of the newly created mendicant Faculty. Thomas condemned the “heretic” Averroes for the nonsense, which he had created himself and then praised the “Catholic” Avicenna for having implanted the *intellectus possibilis* as the individual faculty of cognition in man. The masters in the rue du Fouarre had to reject such theory in principle. Aquin had created a new form of cosmic *intellectus possibilis*, as we find it in David of Dinant. The introduction of this averroism was probably one of the main reasons for Thomas’s first departure from Paris. The connoisseurs of the commentator criticized him for the Averroistic view of the intellectus possibilis and for proclaiming a new theory of comitation according to Avicenna. The school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre rejected the modern Alexandrians. Aquinas's interpretation presented *intellectus possibilis* as a cosmic substance, which was a typically modern product. Critical Aristotelians correctly saw that this substantial simulacrum attributed to Averroes represents yet another sophistic version of Avicennism coming from the newly established mendicant Faculty. The polemic with the masters from the rue du Fouarre appears in *Summa contra Gentiles* written in Italy. Even proponents of Bonaventure and Rufus had to reject Thomas′s theory of *intellectus possibilis*. The individualization of human intellect was carried out outside of the universal hylemorphism proclaimed by them, and, moreover, it denied the plurality of substances in man. Bonaventure’s faculty rejected Aquinas for reasons stated further, because he rejected the main theses of modernists. This was followed by the departure of Aquinas from Paris in 1259, because academically he did not belong to any of two then ruling schools of the first and second Averroism. His cosmological interpretation of receptive cosmic forms put the Commentator in line with the Aristotelian interpretation of David by Dinant. This was unacceptable for the community of true connoisseurs of Averroes. Moreover, only ten years had passed since the death of bishop Alvernus. Averroistic conception of the possible intellect as a substance of the third kind can be found in the definitive form in the commentary on the Sentences, which was written at the same time as *De ente et essentia*. The first Thomistic version of Averroism came into being in 1256–57. The potential intellect became a cosmic substance and it copulated with human material intellect. Thomas adheres to Avicenna’s theory of the numerically individualized intellect in the individual human being. Aquinas defined the possible intellect in CMDA as a universal cosmic hypostatic potency and rejected its individuation in man in the name of the modernized Avicenna. He rejected the Averroistic theory of the intellectus possibilis as a cosmic substance. His interpretation of the individualized *intellectus possibilis* concerns the real person. The intellect is immaterial and remains in the soul after death. Only Avicenna allegedly individualized the possible intellect in man as an individual immaterial form; therefore, he considers Avicenna′s exegesis of *De anima* to be compatible with the Christian faith (*secundum fidem catholicam*).

Thomistic interpretation of CMDA belongs to a specific group of Semiaverroism. Aquin rejected the direct effect of cosmic *intellectus agens* and *possibilis* on the human soul. Avicennistic interpretation of the receptive intellect as an individualized form and substance pretend to be an authentic exegesis of CMDA. Aquinas performed the classic maneuver of the modernists in the defense mechanism of the reversal to the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). He attributed to Averroes heretical form of *intellectus possibilis* that he created by his false interpretation of CMDA. The cosmic *intellectus possibilis* in style of David Dinant was added to Averroes’s heretical portfolio. The Commentator bravely carries this twofold version of Thomistic Averroism to this day in the mode of Christological expiation of someone else’s guilt according to the book Leviticus 16:21—22 and according to Isaiah’s servant of God (Is 53:2‒5). Hermeneutic archaeology uses this Pythian and musical form of the biblical oracle to interpret the hidden history of Thomism in the mode of archaic *alētheia*. Under the leadership of academic Furies well educated in Thomism, the wrong form of Averroism influences the system of modern thinking. The representatives of the first Averroism took Aquinas for an evident Avicennist during his first period in Paris. However, his Avicennism kept a different character from the school of the second Averroism under Kilwadby’s, Pecham’s and Bonaventure’s leadership. According to Avicenna, Albert defended the gradualist view only as an abstraction, which was in line with the interpretation of CMDA (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Albert rejected Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s Neoplatonic gradualness of the intellects (*secundum Aristotelem et Avicennam, potentiae existentis in actu quatuor sunt gradus*) in the name of Sicilian interpretation of CMDA (*Averroes vero videtur ponere tres species intellectus*). Siger certainly knew Albert’s interpretation of *De anima* that was listed in the work *De homine*, since Albert’s other treatises on the intellect followed that line. They were published at the time of the formation of Siger′s QIIIDA. The *Doctor Invidiosus* expressed a different criticism to Albert than to Thomas, whom he had met as an Avicennist and Averroist during their studies in Paris (ch. 4.4.3). Siger, in the name of first Averroism of the Sicilian school, fundamentally rejected any possibility of material individuation of intellect in the mode “*separatus*,” because CMDA rejects all hypostatized forms of modern Alexandrians (ch. 4.4.3). Thomas hypostatized the intellectual potency of the person given in the body and defined this intellect as an essence in the immaterial soul. This interpretation of *anima intellectiva* includes a hidden dualism according to Avicenna’s “Catholic” interpretation of *intellectus possibilis*, in which the immaterial and detached intellect is represented as a hypostatized form of the soul in the mode *qua2* (ch. 4.5.3). Thomism produced the intellect in the soul as a hypostatized form. Such production of *tertium ens* represents a typical error of Porretans and modernists. The later interpretation in *De unitate intellectus* defends a similar Aristotelianism that rejects the Commentator’s interpretation of CMDA. Aquinas established the dualistic unity of the person by “catholization” of Avicenna and by demonization of Averroes. Aegidius Romanus imported it in the first version of Thomism. The critical masters in the rue du Fouarre could not allow the mythological incursion of dogmatic theology into philosophy, especially only several years after the departure of bishop Alvernus in eternity. Siger’s school rejected Aquinas’ Averroism related to the cosmic form of *intellectus possibilis* and to Averroistic interpretation of CMDA. Such work presented for them yet another sophism coming from the school of “*sequaces Aristotelis*.” But the next chapters show that Thomas’s theory of cognition made according to *De anima* belongs to the teaching of the first averroism.

This brings us to the second point, which is the relationship of Aquinas to the school of the second Averroism that was resolutely negative and all the time. The newly appointed master continued the philosophical dispute made by the founders of the University against the schools of *sophistae Latini* and *Grammatici*. His goal was Bonaventure and his Parisian school of *Modernorum*, which he knew well in Paris during the quarrel of secular artists and mendicants. In the dispute against the second Averroism, Aquin proceeded discreetly by taking style *modo obliquo* as did Albert the Great. The hermeneutics of the dispute between the first and second Averroism states that Pecham was the main target of Aquinas’s criticism around 1270. During this time, Aquin comes to the University of Paris and reacts in his lectures to the teaching of local magisters. In the same year, Pecham leaves the University of Paris for the same reason as Rufus before him in 1250. Pecham’s philosophy could not stand up to the criticism of Aquinas and Siger, just as Rufus cannot cope with the criticism of Alvernus and Albert. Aquinas represented a new direction in the interpretation of Aristotle at the University of Paris after his second arrival at the end of 1269. Therefore, the young scholastic philosopher such as Aegidius sided with *Expositor Novus*, and the modernists protected Pecham, as Bonaventure did it indirectly in the Lenten sermons (*Collationes*) of that time (ch. 4.1.1). For Siger’s school in the rue du Fouarre, neither one nor the other of these Latin sophists was acceptable. Thomists and Modernists were Averroists according to Avicennism of Toletans. They destroyed Christian teaching of the unified person by disintegrating it into various forms or even substances. It is no wonder that after the disintegration of metaphysics and the unified worldview, confused Parisian bishop Tempier did not know what to do. He was not alone in this modern confusion, as evidenced by the soon-to-be-quoted letter of the General of Dominicans from the year 1271 with the questions regarding soul and cosmology, to which the main magisters of the Order were to answer (ch. 4.5.3). The quarrel between Thomas and Pecham was inevitable and was connected to Pecham’s quarrel with Albert the Great. The polemical work *Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, today also known as *Quaestiones disputatae De anima*, Pecham composed against Albert and Aquinas to the end in Paris not later than the beginning of 1270 (ch. 4.2.1). Against Siger’s conception of the eternity of the world in QIIIDA (ch. 4.4.1) Pecham polemicizes in the work *Quaestio disputata De aeternitate mundi*, which was finished in about the year 1271. Aquinas attacked Pecham as a second-rate thinker at the end of *De unitate intellectus*. Let us quote the final part of that treatise, which, in other words, repeats Albert’s position quoted above from the commentary on *De anima* (*scientiam veritatis nec ostendunt nec verbis proporiis attingunt*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3).

“This was written so that all the errors described above would be eliminated, but not with the help of church decrees, but through philosophical arguments and treatises. If someone brags about a false knowledge given only by words (*falsi nominis scientia*) and wants to object to what we have written, he should not hide around the corner and not talk about it to immature people who are not able to discern such complicated questions (*coram pueris qui neciunt de tam arduis iudicare*). If he has the courage, let him write an answer to what is being said here, and then he will see that not only my teaching, but also the rest of the followers of the truth will defy his mistakes and correct his ignorance.” [[288]](#footnote-288)

The twice defeated Pecham goes to Oxford in the function of master regent. After the appointment of rector Kilwardby as archbishop of Canterbury (1272), Pecham completes the transformation of this university into a bastion of modernism. Pecham mentions in some letters from the years 1284–85 the fundamental dispute of ideas with Aquinas regarding the question of whether there is only one substantial form in man, which he considered a fundamental error in accordance with the teaching of the second Averroism. We want to deal with the important letter of June 1, 1285, in which Pecham names the points of contention between him and Aquinas. At the beginning, the letter cites as a fundamental point of contention the substantial form in man, uncompromisingly defended by Aquinas, which formed the core of the dispute between the first and the second Averroism. The Archbishop of Canterbury defends the teaching of the Franciscan school of second Averroism in Paris, founded by Alexander of Hales and led by Bonaventure (*memorie fratris Alexandri ac fratris Bonaventure et consimilium*).[[289]](#footnote-289) In the quoted part of the letter, Pecham states that the main change in the thinking rejected by him had occurred within the last twenty years (*citra viginti annos*). The letter was written in 1285, which means that the dispute led by Pecham concerned not only the position of Aquinas around 1270, but also the criticism of Albert the Great (*De unitate intellectus*, 1263) and Siger’s interpretation of *De anima* I–III edited before 1266. Albert published the main writings against the second Averroism already a decade before Aquinas and Siger. Then in Pecham’s letter follows the doctrinal part, which defended the main points of the doctrine of the second Averroism.[[290]](#footnote-290) Franciscan archbishop, who was appointed immediately after Dominican Kilwardby, cites the points of contention one after the other and according to the order of importance in his apology. Pecham begins with the defense of ontotheological *resolutio* of being according to a twofold type of rule and the doctrine the exemplars that corresponds to it (*de regulis eternis*). Then follows the defense of being given by exposure of sense made from behind (*de luce incommutabili*). Then he protects the dualism of the soul according to the mix of the substantially given active and receptive intellect (*de potentiis anime*). Finally, Pecham defends the objective structure of being, given by the form and matter of the third kind (*de rationibus seminalibus inditis materie*). These points of contention were enumerated by Pecham himself, twenty years after the debates of the time, and he regarded them as fundamental objections to the then-established Thomism in Oxford according to the tradition of Grosseteste. Therefore, we accept his list as a factual description of ideological disputes between the two schools. Pecham’s teaching must be read in the contemporary context in the year 1285. The rehabilitation of Aquinas, initiated by Dominicans, is already in full swing at the time of writing the letter, and Albert the Great personally became involved right after Thomas’s death (1274). The greatest modernists associated themselves with the first Thomists and modernized Avicennist metaphysics with the benevolence of archbishop Kilwardby towards newly conceived Aristotelianism of Aquinas. He became the *Expositor Novus* with the help of the proficient Latin sophist named Aegidius. The representatives of the second Averroism went on the defensive after the year 1280 and tenaciously defended only the main points of the condemnation of March 1277, which they initiated. Oxford sophists also carried out the first diabolization of Siger, who, following Aristotle and the Commentator, became another scapegoat of the local modernists (ch. 5.5). The dispute between Pecham and Grosseteste’s school of Thomists, quietly supported by Dominican Kilwardby, symbolizes the fate of Richard Knapwell in the years 1284–86. This Oxford master attacked Franciscan work *Correctorium fratris Thomae* (William de la Mare, 1279) during the reign of John Pecham as archbishop. The courageous thinker, criticizing modernist sophisms, ended as tragically as Bacon, Siger, and, after them, Ockham.[[291]](#footnote-291) In Oxford, dominated by the analytical thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy and the school of second Averroism, Aquinas’s rehabilitation was completed in 1286, when the local chapter of Dominicans declared all Aquinas’s works to be orthodox. It is clear from Pecham’s letter that Aquinas rejected all the fundamental points on which stands the ontotheological construction of objectivity. Their modern version was analyzed in the chapters devoted to Bonaventure and Pecham. The testimony of Franciscan Roger Marston, a contemporary of Pecham and an opponent of Aquinas from the position of second Averroism, shows that the key dispute particularly concerns ST I, q. 85, a. 5–7, where we find a complex critique of Augustinism (Grabmann 1906, 70–72). The passage in which Thomas rejects the position of the second Averroism given by the irradiation of the intellect from behind by the exemplars given in divine thought has a major value.[[292]](#footnote-292) Analytical Porretan and Avicennist Scotus took up Thomas’s position since he was influenced in many respects by Thomistic branch of Grosseteste’s school. Scotus takes the main thesis of Thomism, which defends the illumination of the sense of being from the front, as an authentic Aristotelian doctrine. The rejection of illumination in Augustinism generates the Scotist version of Thomism (ch. 5.3.2). The summary of the cited question 85 ends with the rejection of Augustinian Avicennism from the philosophical position of Aristotelianism. However, the criticism was not as radical as in the metaphysics of Siger (ch. 4.4.1). In principle, Aquinas rejected any form of natural cognition in which meaning of being would be given by exposure from behind. The direct vision of exemplars would be equivalent to the blessed state of the soul in eternity. However, the intellect would recognize exemplars outside the phantasms what is not possible in earthly existence.[[293]](#footnote-293) The cited question 85, conceived against modernists, considers the natural way of cognition given on the basis of illumination as impossible. Thomas′s commentary on the second book Sentences had already presented a similar thesis, which defended the exposure of meaning from the front, by taking the direction of phantasms. Let us now quote the important part of the commentary on Sentences, which, in accordance with Siger’s later interpretation, establishes the mode “*obiective*” for the relationship of the intellect given as “*separabilis*”with regard to the senses. With this, Aquinas clearly committed himself to the scheme of cognition, as it is laid down in the school of the first Averroism. However, his view of the exposure from the front follows the erroneous interpretation of CMDA for the reasons listed above. Already in the commentary on Sentences written during his first stay in Paris, Thomas presents a new interpretation of the third book of *De anima*.

“And in this way, understanding forms part of the exercise of the intellect, as the bodily organ of the eye simultaneously sees through the ability to see. Like this, the intellect understands outside the body, because its activity does not require any bodily organ. However, since this act of cognition is the object of the act of understanding (*illud sit objectum operationis*), as the eyesight cannot see without color, in the same way (*hoc modo*), the intellect also cannot understand in the earthly existence without sensual phantasms. The phantasm behaves to the intellect like the color behaves to the sight, as the Philosopher says in the third book of *De anima*, paragraph 30.” [[294]](#footnote-294)

Now it becomes clear, from where Aegidius in his writing *Anonymus Bazán* took the concept of color that stands in contradiction with the concept of diaphanum in CMDA (*color est ens reale*, ch. 4.3.3). The sensually given phantasm relates to the intellect as the physically given color relates to vision. Both relationships are formally identical and have the character of a real causal event at the level of the first substances. The next important passage concerns the comparison of the intellect with vision, which this quotation puts into the mode of full similarity (*hoc modo*). Siger rejects this equivalence of sensual and intellectual cognition in the commentary on the QIIIDA in principle. Boethius of Dacien supported his point of view as the author of *Anonymus Giele*. Thanks to the immateriality of the intellect, the act of understanding proceeds in the mode of “*ipse*” (*tertium genus* of CMDA). There is no material identity and numerical individuation of the intellect, as is assumed in Aquinas’s Avicennist exegesis of *De anima* III. This important interpretation opens up Aquin’s career as an expositor Novus already in the years 1257–58. Both main schools of the first and second Averroism rejected Thomas’s interpretation; he had to leave the University of Paris in 1259. His position was finally defended by the first Thomist Aegidius, which expounds his modernist modifications in the Oxford manuscript DA I—II. It converted Siger’s commentary of DA I—II in the Munich manuscript into the first version of official Thomism. Aegidius completely converted to Thomism und followed Thomas’s line in the spirit of the modernized first Averroism from the year 1268, but probably even earlier. His conversion to Thomism is evidenced in the fundamental rejection of Avicenna’s *De anima* given in the Oxford manuscript DA III. The conversion to Thomism and against the modernists is certainly connected with Thomas’ disputations between *QD De anima* and *QD De potentia*, which was held in Rome before the year 1268. Therefore, after Aquinas’ first lectures at the University of Paris (1270), Aegidius enters into a dispute with Pecham and his modernist school in Paris (*Anonymus Bazán*). Aquinas criticized the school of modern *Latinorum* from the position of Aristotle’s *De anima*. The exegesis of Siger rejected the illumination scenario of modernists.

Aquinas’s separation from academic *illuminati* of the second Averroism was clear and uncompromising. The original Aristotelian magister, who interpreted Sentences “*ad mentem Averrois*” could not teach at the mendicant Faculty established in 1255, although he was a recognized *magister regens* of Dominicans in Paris. Another reason for the departure from the modernist school was the rejection of Oxfordian Fallacy as an erroneous interpretation of *Seconds Analytics*. Aquinas defended the principle “*ex inmediatis*” with regard to the first substance all the time, as did Albert at the beginning of his career in the writing *De homine* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). The formulation protected the hyparchical primacy of the first substance and rejected the univocal interchange of the first and the third triad of cognition principles. This position was proclaimed around the year 1255 in Paris by Rufus and Kilwardby in their interpretations of *Seconds Analytics* given in the spirit of Oxfordian Fallacy. The clear rejection of Oxfordian Fallacy is evidenced in Aquin’s commentary on *Seconds Analytics* that was written at the end of the second stay in Paris (1271–72). First of all, the principle “*immediate*”is related to the first substance, including Aristotelian division of the group of six axioms of cognition into the three primary principles taken from reality and into the following three principles of the formal properties of judgment (*non per aliquod medium demonstrantur, sed per seipsas sunt manifestae*).[[295]](#footnote-295) Subsequently, the medium of syllogism (*ex causa rei*) is established by the statement of hyparchical causality that gives the basis of the deductive judgment (*demonstratione propter quid*).[[296]](#footnote-296) The primacy of the hyparchical first substance is given for scientific cognition in a fundamental way. That explains negative attitude of Aquinas to all theories of illumination and to the status of Porretan species. The polemic with the second Averroism concerned the relationship of the sensual and intelligible species, which forms the basis of Averroes’s *proportio* and at the same time the basis of the correspondence theory of truth. The combination of both forms of species represents a fundamental stumbling block between the first and the second Averroism. Aquinas clearly follows the line of Aristotle and CMDA on this key issue, which brings to light the analysis of the work Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate. The work was written immediately after his first stay in Paris, that is, around the year 1260. Immediately after leaving Paris, Aquin was the first to settle academic accounts with the modernists around Bonaventure. This was much easier than the polemic with Siger’s school in the later work *Summa contra Gentiles*, where Thomas had to reject the teaching of Avicenna.

We have quoted the importance of the work *De hebdomadibus* in the analysis of hypostatized existence made by Gilbert de Porrée (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). The new interpretation of *De hebdomadibus* stood against Porretan interpretation of Boethius, who played an important role in Parisian schools of *Modernorum* after the year 1250. Bonaventure’s school combined Rufus’s analytical interpretation, adopted by Porretans of Oxford, with the teaching on the transcendentals presented in the Avicennist school of Philip the Chancellor. Aquinas, as well as bishop Alvernus in his criticism of Grammarians, knew very well where and how essentialist and hypostatized conception of *tertium ens* were born. Therefore, he embedded in the interpretation of Boethius’ text *De hebdomadibus* a new rule against Gilbert’s interpretation of the Third Rule. Aquinas established the metaphysical difference between existence in reality and the intentionally recognized essence in thinking (*diversum est esse et id quod est*).[[297]](#footnote-297) The commentators noted that this formulation did not occur in Boethius’s original work (Wippel 2000, 99). Aquinas’s interpretation of Boethius ties in with Blund’s interpretation of intentionality according to *De anima* (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.2) and to the primacy of *actus essendi* of the first substance according to Averroes’s metaphysics. With references to the Commentator’s exposition of *Metaphysics*, Aquinas defends the exposure of the sense of being from real first substances and distinguishes it from being of the universals. At the end of his first stay in Paris, Aquin basically separates himself from Bonaventure’s modernists. The final rejection of being of the third kind is contained in the work *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate*, which was written after the studies in Paris (about 1261).

“The universal concepts being abstracted, they can be determined in two ways. First, they are taken by themselves (*secundum se*), that is, without relation to the movement and without a determination given by first substances (*sine motu et materia signata*). But then they do not exist in any other way than by being they have in our intellect (*secundum esse quod habent in intellectu*). In the second sense, their determination is bound to real things, the determination of which they express (*ad res, quarum sunt rationes*). Things are present in matter and have their own movement. Then the concepts are present through the recognition of these things, because everything is recognizable by its form.” [[298]](#footnote-298)

Thomas separates the definition of being related to the first substance from *rationes* given abstractly and *secundum se* in the universal mode. Being cannot be the highest genus, because the genera have no real existence. This also applies to Rufus’s being of the third kind. The investigation of metaphysics must follow the path of the real being given in the existing individual thing (Aristotle’s τόδε τι). The universal determinations are only in the soul, but in addition to abstract meaning, they carry the truth given in the mode of correspondence with real things (*comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes*). Aquinas reacts critically to the connection of the essence and existence done in Oxfordian Fallacy by Rufus and Kilwardby. They abolished the primacy of existence and introduced into the categorical predication the essence attributed univocally to the second substance and to accidents (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). Thomas’s conception corresponds in its basic features to Averroes’s metaphysics, which rejected the metaphysics of Neoplatonic *Modernorum* made *univoce*. In this he agrees with the school of rue du Fouarre. However, on account of the concordance of both philosophies, he does not see the difference between the metaphysics of Averroes and Avicenna as clearly and critically as Siger (ch. 4.4.1). The separation from all forms of *tertium ens* was done due to the fact that Aquinas rejected any metaphysics based on logical or mathematical abstraction. Following Gilson, McInerny pointed out again the difference between Aquinas and Avicennism in relation to logical abstraction and to existence of the real thing.[[299]](#footnote-299) The primacy of the first substance, in the order of hyparchical actualization, is incompatible with objectively conceived being in the form of the amphibolia and the transcendentalia. Therefore, the key terms of metaphysical cognition (*abstractio, separatio, resolutio*) have a different meaning for Aquinas than in the second Averroism. The foundations of Thomistic Aristotelianism are clearly visible in the three Quodlibetal debates (*Quodlibet VII, VIII, IX*) that Aquinas successively discussed in Paris in the years 1256–58. From the point of view of polemics with the school of second Averroism defending universal hylemorphism, the following parts are important from the cited works: *Quodlibet VII*, q. 1, a. 1–2 (separation from Augustine on the question of cognition); *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 1, a. 2 (criticism of Bonaventure’s exemplars in divine thinking); q. 2, a. 2 (criticism of the autonomous species in *Nominales*); q. 8 (rejection of the causal effect of hellfire as *poena igni*); *Quodlibet IX*, q. 4, a. 1 (rejection of matter for angels). Aquinas took a non-negotiable stance against the assimilation theory of truth in the school of *Modernorum*. This is shown in Parisian disputations, which are devoted to the question of the truth: *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate* (1256–59). This work rejected the direct recognition of individual things in the human intellect and recognized only the indirect recognition. The key part of the answer indicates the difference between the real form of the first substance and the intellectual form given in cognition.[[300]](#footnote-300) Each recognized form has a universal character, and the form of the first substance is not recognizable in its own essence. Thomas rejected the speculative view of *Modernorum*, because the intellect recognizes only phantasms, and the recognized forms are not contained in reality as being of the third kind. The primacy of the *actus essendi* of the first substance determines the basic conception of the soul, which we find summarized in *Quodlibet X*. The work was published at the end of Aquinas′s first stay in Paris in the years 1258–59. The essence and the act of being are identical only in God. Therefore, in the human soul, we must clearly distinguish from each other the act of the existence of the soul and its potency (*impossibile est quod anima sit suae potentiae*; *Quodlibet X*, a. 3, resp.). Following CMDA and Siger, Thomas must investigate the real course of cognition given in the model of Aristotelian correspondence and by exposure of being from the front, from first substances perceived by the senses. Cognition, as an act and potency, refers to real persons. Man is manifested as a substance from the point of view of *operatio* as an act; and on the other hand, as potency. Like this, there is the plurality of potentialities in the soul and their real unity in the hylemorphic first substance. In addition, the thesis from *De anima* applies that matter belongs only to the first substances and never to the universals given in the intellect.

The above-mentioned analysis confirms Aquinas was a strong partisan of Siger’s school during his first stay in Paris, provided we disregard his interpretation of Averroist Averroes. When writing QIIIDA, Siger considers this Dominican, together with Albert, to be a man outstanding in philosophy (ch. 4.4.3). The quoted commentary on Boethius′s work and Aquinas′s *Quodlibeta* prove the separation from the school of the second Averroism. Therefore, soon after obtaining the title of Master of Theology, Thomas left Paris about 1256 and he was admitted to the consortium of Parisian masters together with Bonaventure (1257). After the separation from modernists, the important theological work *Summa contra Gentiles* (1261–63) was created. This treatise is fundamentally directed against the problematic consequences of Avicenna’s metaphysics in the Neoplatonic version of Toledo school. Against the logical necessity and the theory of comitation, the divine creation is emphasized as a free activity, which emanates from God as a completely separate first cause. Thomas repeated the criticism of metaphysical emanations during his stay in Rome, by rejecting the principle of metaphysical and logical equivalence between cause and effect. The cause has the original status of being in reality and is distinguished by this priority in the order of being from the univocal relationship between cause and the effect given in logical abstraction.[[301]](#footnote-301) The protection of the metaphysical dative rendered impossible the mythology of modernists. Thanks to logically capable Furies, they started to climb up and down the ladder of being like angels and “exsisting” modern God. In Aristotelianism, the scientific intellect, thanks to the determination from reality, circulates only in one direction, because only the first substances dispose of the causality. Understood in the mode of metaphysical abstraction, the real effects cannot be deduced from the eternal divine intention as an absolutely simple form. Creation would no longer be regarded as a voluntary and gratuitous creation *ex nihilo*, because the deduction of the created being in the order would confer an emanating necessity. The omnipotence of logical deduction has been and has been a typical error in the mode of Oxfordian fallacy since Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). According to the *Second Analytics*, it is clear that causality at the level of the first substances is not logically necessary, but only on the level of real causality. The first substances in creation points to God as a completely separated substance with the fullness of being. God acts beyond our cognition and logic. Ontotheological construction according to Avicenna’s metaphysics based on the comitation is excluded for Christian theology. There is no *tertium ens* between God and creation, which would create a univocal structure of hypostatized comitations in the manner of the second Averroism. Aquin abolished the projection of modernists. The transfer of ideas from thinking of *illuminati* to divine psychology is a mistake. God must be strictly separated from creation. Therefore, no objective concept between God and creation is possible as in the ontotheology of Bonaventure and later Duns Scotus. The theory of creation as a necessary comitation provoked a fundamental criticism of Albert, Bacon and Aquinas against the contemporaries that took up this scenario from Avicenna’s predication “*in* *artificialibus*.” Emanation of forms according to Avicenna represented the conception of God as an active cosmic intellect in the form of *Dator formarum*. Avicennist nature of modernist God endangered the Trinittary dogma and thus also the identity of the person. Being of God was united by the scheme of natural cognition with separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. The death of the modern God was quite inevitable in this scenario. As we know, the modernists have won in the Latin West and God of *Modernorum* is dead. The first matrix has shown that Al-Ghazālī and Averroes in the Falsafa criticized Avicenna by taking the same position as Aquinas. Moreover, Latin *Moderni* in Oxford combined the emanation of forms (*processio*) from the cosmic active intellect with objectively conceived matter in the mode of universal hylemorphism. The second Averroism adopted the emanation scheme for the objective divine intentionality, in which the intentional recognition of exemplars replaced a direct emanation of forms. Let us see Bonaventure’s and Pecham’s *similitudo* between God and creation, which the second Averroism took *univoce* and objectively, according to Anselm’s conception of truth as *rectitudo*. Already during his first stay in Paris, Thomas vehemently rejected the conception of matter as being of the third kind.[[302]](#footnote-302) The question of emanation established by Bonaventure’s *tertium ens* as objective forms (*rationes exemplares, rationes seminales*) was again treated in *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* (1265–66). During his first and second stay in Paris, Thomas rejected the universal hylemorphism in principle, because it abolished classical metaphysics and the theology based on it. Matter is always bound to the body. Therefore, the immaterial substances and the cosmic intelligences are not composed of matter. The dispute with the second Averroism regarding the way of existence of spiritual beings was discussed in *Quaestiones disputatae De spiritualibus creaturis* (1267–68) and in the later work *De substantiis separatis* (1272‒73). Aquinas does not agree with the basic theses of the second Averroism. The modern nominalists take the primacy of being in the essence and the form, and not in the existence of first substances. Thus, classical metaphysics no longer applies. The *univoce* taken conception of the essence means that it entails both the ideal and the real meaning. This sophistic mixture of the first and second substance replaced the first substance in the framework of dubious ontotheological structure of metaphysics made out by Neoplatonic Aristotelians of Arab and Jewish origin. Modernism abolished the Christian theology of *creatio ex nihilo*. The univocity was settled in the first and exemplary sphere of divine objectivity, given simultaneously as potency and actuality. Aquinas refused to insert the modern mix of potency and actuality into God. He put that Averroistic cocktail of cosmic active and potential intellect a one level lower, to the sphere of created cosmic intelligences. In the commentary *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate,* Aquinas supported Alvernus’s school of the first Averroism in a similar way as Albert had done in his writing *De homine* a decade earlier. Thomas’s critique of the ontotheology of the Avicennian Modernists corresponds to Alvernus’ critique of “*sequaces Aristotelis*.” The univocally conceived matter of the second Averroism also has an individuation function for the pure spiritual beings and the cosmic intelligences. Such a conception abolished the specific position of man in the cosmos, tied to the sensual way of cognition and existence. As a result, according to Thomas, the Christian conception of man, given by the incarnation, is endangered, because man would then no longer be a specific hylemorphic substance. The matter taken *univoce* makes an ontotheological construction of metaphysics as pseudo-theology, which included God himself and his thinking in the field of human cognition. Therefore, it is true that each of these theses eliminates the possibility of Aristotelian conception of truth as the correspondence of intellect and reality.

That is why Thomas had to deal constantly with the truth as correspondence, which he discussed with regard to the Commentator’s interpretation of Aristotle. Already in the commentary to the first book of Sentences, Aquin clearly rejected Rufus’s “*concretum*” as an Avicennistic being of the third kind by citing Averroes’s rejection of Avicenna.[[303]](#footnote-303) Aquinas rejected any possibility of direct connection of the word with external reality. The meaning is not given as in Avicenna and further in Rufus in the mode “*concretive*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). The being of the third kind is impossible. Rufus’s *univoce* conceived species reflect reality in the objective mode of *rectitudo*, because they are particular and universal at the same time. According to Aquinas, the recognized species exists only in thought and cannot be a *tertium ens* considered in the act of modern *denudatio* of reality to pure forms. The intellect cannot recognize intelligible forms by direct insight into essences, but only indirectly, through sensual phantasms. Following Alvernus, Thomas asserted that human cognition differs in principle from the cognition of separate cosmic intelligences defined by the fully actualized *intellectus agens*. This position given by exposure from the front, from sensual first substances, is basically defended in the commentary on Boethius’ writing *De trinitate*.[[304]](#footnote-304) The intellect abstracts from reality (*intellectus communiter abstrahit a materia signata et condicionibus eius*). Therefore, there is no abstracted or denuded matter of the third kind, which formed the basis of a scientific proof (*non autem a materia communi in scientia naturali*). The human intellect is primarily passive, and the soul must be determined as *tabula rasa* by external first substances. They are at first recognized by sensual phantasms. Human cognition is tied to the process of abstraction from the hylemorphic reality by *intellectus possibilis*. The above-mentioned part of Boethius explains the reason why Aquinas, at the end of his Paris studies, separated himself from the basic orientation in Avicenna’s metaphysics that postulates direct insight into the species of the third kind. Aquinas understood that Neoplatonism of the Toledo school stands at odds with the basic principles of Christian theology. That is why he finally had to choose between the metaphysics of Averroes and Avicenna, which is presented in work *Summa contra Gentiles* by defense of God as a free and separate cause. The same position can be found in Averroes’s great commentaries on *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. During the Paris period, Thomas defended the full concordance of the two metaphysics. At the end of this period, he explicitly embraced the metaphysics of the Commentator, but converted it to Thomistic Aristotelianism. We recognize God through the natural reason as the first cause in the order of creative causality. Therefore, we do not look objectively into its psychology and thinking. The creation makes the basic principle of being and of knowledge given *per prius*. The paths of understanding to God, given by the causality recognizable in creation, represent the only possible scientific knowledge of God according to *Second Analytics*. Human cognition generates the *medium* of a syllogism thanks to the real causality of first substances. According to this, the paths of the understanding to the First Cause have scientific validity and at the same time exclude the univocity of any common concept of being between God and man. This view corresponds to the concept of *dalā’il* in Averroes’ metaphysics, which Siger confirmed in his interpretation of *De anima* (ch. 4.4.1). The entire summary of Thomas’s teaching on the question of the exposure of the being from the front shows the integral conception of the first Averroism that remained unchanged in later works.

Hermeneutics dates the new stage of Thomism to the six—month stay in the papal Orvieto (autumn 1262—February 1263), where Albert was also staying at the same time. Aquinas had the opportunity to get to know in detail Albert’s interpretation of cognition according to CMDA and his criticism of *Modernorum*. After this period, Thomas definitely separates himself from Avicenna’s scheme of cognition and adopts Aristotle’s conception in De anima It is tied to the receptive and synthetic intellect that is fully human. This change is confirmed in the work *Summa contra Gentiles*. Thomas, with references to the interpretation of Averroes according to the Blund’s school, separated Avicennist *vis aestimativa* as a mere animal faculty of human cognition and comprehends *intentio* in the framework of immaterial *intellectus possibilis* as an individual synthesis of intelligible species.[[305]](#footnote-305) During his stay in Rome, Aquinas adapted the concept of metaphysics according to Albert, but he rejected Albert′s positive acceptance of CMDA. The synthesis hidden in the term *intellectus speculativus* according to CMDA (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2) helped Albert to clarify the question of the unity of the intellect about two decades earlier than Siger did through his brilliant interpretation of CMDA. However, Thomas accepted Albert’s theory of truth as Averroes’s *consimilitudo*. He thus opted for Aristotelian conception of the first science as a “meta-physics” based on the correspondence theory of truth. He recognized that Avicenna’s project of metaphysics is not scientific to a sufficient extent, because it suffers from the hypertrophy of the essence taken outside of first substances. Metaphysics cannot proceed from abstractly conceived *ens commune*, but only from the first existing substance. The second Averroism of *Modernorum* did not want to see this and does not see it to this day. Therefore, already in the commentary on Sentences, Aquinas adopted metaphysics of Averroes based on the recognition of separated first substances that we recognize by their real causal effect on the senses. This theory can establish knowledge of God through the natural reason. The science is given by effects of the first cause. God is bound to the real (but not recognizable for us in this mode) substance of the Immovable Mover from the book *Metaphysics Lambda*. Hermeneutics distinguishes two perspectives of metaphysical insight (*resolutio*) in the work of the late Aquinas. The first insight into the unity of being starts from Avicenna and it takes the primacy of being in the order of cognition (*quod primo cadit in intellectuu est ens*). Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics is necessary in view of the formally determined sense of being as the most general principle of cognition (*ens inquantum ens, ens commune*). If this definition of the unity of the being is taken as in the second Averroism and further in Duns Scotus in the mode *absolute*, then the concept of being becomes the highest univocal genus as in the Neoplatonism. This is unacceptable both according to Aristotle and according to the first Averroism. The first principles of being at the level of metaphysical abstraction can be studied only in relation to real first substances and they can be predicted *univoce* only to the level of the genus attached to the second substance. Aquinas adopted these principles of the school of the first Averroism and completely rejected the basic thesis of Oxfordian Fallacy, which was also stated by the above-mentioned Pecham in his letters. According to *Second Analytics*, the first philosophy recognizes the categorically stated being in the order of scientific demonstration only in virtue of real substances. Aquinas’s concluding commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (*Expositio libri Metaphysicae*, c. 1273) clearly shows that the development of his thinking on the principles of the first science went from Avicenna to Averroes, who received a Thomistic disguise. Thomas elaborated this interpretation during his first stay in Paris, entering in conflict with masters in the rue du Fouarre and with Bonaventure’s modernist school.

### 4.5.2 Formal Unity of Person and Intellect

So far the period of Aquin′s first stay in Paris has not been investigated in the framework of debates between the school of the first and the second Averroism. Thomistic school cannot do it, because it belongs to the objective actualized of the second Averroism that Aegidius founded. Thomas′s critique of the second Averroism is supplemented by the emergence of Averroist interpretation of CMDA according to Avicennism of the Toledo school. The school of modern Avicennists, however, was critically treated in the work *Summa contra Gentiles* because the objective interpretation of God and creation endangered the very essence of Christian theology. An important synthesis of knowledge according to the first Averroism is presented in the work *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* (ca. 1265–66) that was presented at the papal curia in Rome. This writing was known to both Siger and Aegidius, and both thinkers responded to it in their commentaries on *De anima*. Siger may have written the conciliatory part of DA I–II in the Munich manuscript after reading *De potentia*, because the view of species and intentionality in this writing is to the large extent consistent with the line of CMDA. The excellent study of the poetic work *Liber de statu Curie Romane* (written about 1261–65) comments on the debates at the papal court in Italy (Orvieto, Viterbo, Anagni) at the time of Urban IV, which continued even after his death (†1264). The curial debates of the years 1260–70 mainly concerned the eternity of the world according to Aristotle and corresponded to the debates and events at the University of Paris (Grauert 1912, 116–47). Thomas’s writing *De potentia* presents a fundamental polemic with the second Averroism on several issues. The disputations rejected any possibility of *tertium ens* and therefore they cause the destruction of the modernist ontotheology as the whole. Avicenna′s metaphysics is based on the false univocity between the divine intentionality and the subsequent creation. Aristotelian metaphysic follows the metaphysical dative and the imposition based on the principle “*ex inmediatis.*” Therefore, the difference between the divine act and the subsequent creation cannot be canceled by any kind of *tertium ens*. Important part of the work contains the first attack on the ontotheological metaphysics of *Modernorum* in Bonaventure’s school (*hoc a magistris erroneum est iudicatum*).[[306]](#footnote-306) Thomas rejects the possibility of univocity according to modern *Nominales* and criticizes their univocal conception of essence (*De potentia*, q. 7, a. 6, resp.). This brought up Aristotelian question concerning the eternity of the cosmos when Aquinas clashed with Pecham. Thomas’s position with regard to immaterial cosmic substances was similar to Siger’s stance that also rejected the individuation of cosmic intelligences due to the matter of the third kind. From a philosophical point of view, there is no contradiction in the eternity of created beings with regard to the Christian thesis of *creatio ex nihilo*. These beings are given “*ab alio*” as created by the Creator, and therefore they contain a specific form of potency that is linked to their cosmic intelligible form. Moreover, in view of their purely spiritual nature, they are also eternal (*De potentia*, q. 3, a. 14, resp.). The eternity of intelligible forms raised another controversial issue between the first and second Averroism, and that was the nature of human intellectual soul. Roman disputations *De potentia* capture the resulting state of cognition of *anima intellectiva* at the time when Siger published the work QIIIDA, and in many respects they agree with it. Thomas defended the view of abstraction after the first Averroism already during his first stay in Paris in 1257–59, arguing in Boethius’s commentary on the Trinity in a similar way as Siger fought against modern Porretans from Bonaventure’s and Kilwardby’s school. Roman disputations reexamine the basic question of Boethius’s commentary on *De trinitate*; the cognition of three divine Persons with the human intellect. Modernists abolished Boethius’s definition of the person as a unified substance and they introduced in God the objective multiplicity of different intentions and potentialities. The anthropomorphization of God and nominalist′s abolition of Trinitarian dogma, it was no kind of popular innovations in papal Rome at then time. Modernists had only won at Oxford in the years 1260–70 and were engaged in a decisive struggle for control of the University of Paris. The writing *De potentia* rejects any anthropomorphization of God. The key sentence that abolishes the possibility of objectivity in God is given by rejection of any passive function in the divine being (*in Deo nihil potest esse patiens, cum non sit ibi materia*).[[307]](#footnote-307) Without this function, however, it cannot run the ontotheological psychology that produces objective exemplars as passive objects of divine intentionality. Aquinas criticizes the sphere of divine objectivity for yet another reason, which Abelard had already clearly seen before him when he dealt with the Neoplatonists from Gilbert’s school (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). Through the introduction of objectivity into the divine Being, the Persons in the Trinity were no longer defined within the framework of *relatio* that is strictly bound to the autonomous *actus essendi* of the person as indivisible substance. The objectified Persons of the Trinity in the form of potential essence or intention entered the realm of Arian or Sabellian heresy. Aquinas pointed out the same problem to modernists, because their conception of the person introduces by the intentional relations (*realis relatio intelligi non possit*).[[308]](#footnote-308) Nominally defined relationship of the Persons in the objective Trinity ends in Porretan tritheism or in strict monotheism without distinction of the divine Persons. Just as in Anselm’s time, the unity of the real person became the key question of Trinitarian theology and, then as now, it presupposed a fundamental critique of the plurality of substantial forms in man. This is why the battle of ideas in Paris intensified to such an extent in the years 1270–77 and why Aquinas was sent from orthodox papal Italy to newly modern and already totally confused Paris. The conclusion of the chapter dedicated to Siger explained that the first visible agony of modern God began at the Faculty of mendicant orders about the year 1270. The Porretans and *Nominales* at the time of Abelard prepared the march of this idol by introducing a sophistic form of modern metaphysics (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). The dissolution of unified nature of the person due to the sophistry of modernists bordered on heresy and endangered the fundamental Christian dogma. The dogma of the Trinity was endangered by the disintegration of the person. That fact no longer bothers anyone in the age of complete metaphysical nihilism and after the death of modern God.

Bonaventure’s school defined the Trinity in the mode of analogical objectivity with human cognition in the mode of *regula agentis increati et creati* (ch. 4.1.2). Aquinas’s disputations in Italy, on the other hand, analyzed the course of human cognition according to teaching of Aristotelian Modists, because they had broken away from univocal ontotheology of the second Averroism. The central part of theologically oriented treatise *QD De potentia* describes how the word arises in human cognition and what the relationship of our cognition to external reality consists of. This passage, which analyzes the process of cognition, concludes the first stage of Thomas’s thinking on the unity of the person and the intellect and leads his interpretation of cognition until the publication of *De unitate intellectus* (1270). The quotation first defines the four basic levels on which cognition takes place step by step. The model is the graduality described by Albert in *De homine* (*quatuor sunt gradus*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). However, the schema abandons Avicennian classification of objective forms of intellect and it works with dual schema of Blund′s Aristotelian school in the mode of the act and potency. In this way, the process of cognition is described according to the three species of intellect, as we also find in Albert′s works. Let us now read the most important passages that explain the act of cognition, by taking one sentence after another (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1).

“Understanding has four stages in man: the thing that is recognized; the intelligible species through which the intellect becomes actualized; the proper act of understanding; the universal concept of the intellect.” [[309]](#footnote-309)

The recognized thing forms the final cause (*ad rem quae intelligitur*), because the cognition strives towards it as its goal, within the framework of correspondence with the external thing. Its actual existence outside us makes the basis of human cognition. The transition from the external thing to the intelligible species (*ad* *speciem intelligibilem*) is given as the effective cause of the entire process of cognition (*qua fit intellectus in actu*). This species becomes an effective form through the fact that it is given sensually at a lower level of cognition. Therefore, it derives its actualization from the bodily senses. The sensuous phantasm provides the material causality for the operation of the intellect (*materia causae*; ST I, q. 84, a. 6). The effective cause of cognition is the act of understanding given in the individual intellect, whereby the intellect generates an individual species in the process of individual abstraction. This results in the transition from the potentiality of the species intelligibilis to its actuality. Through the formation of intelligible species, the intellect becomes actual cognition (*ad suum intelligere*). The formal cause of cognition is the actualized concept (*ad conceptionem intellectus*). From the point of view of the effective act of intellect, *species intelligibilis* provides the actual content for the final state of cognition, whereby the active intellect generates the universal meaning given in the concept. Aegidius Romanus took over this scenario of illumination from the direction of sensual phantasms after his conversion to Thomism when he wrote the commentary on DA III in the Manuscript of Oxford (ch. 4.3.2).

The quotation makes a clear distinction between two terms that refer to the process of purely intellectual cognition: the “*species intelligibilis*” and the “*conceptio intellectus*.” The starting point makes the attention of the empty receptive intellect that is oriented to the actual sensory species. That first kind of intentionality provides the starting point of intellectual cognition (*terminus a quo*). The intentionality of the receptive intellect is a specific act of cognition through which the individual *species intelligibilis* arises as the first stage of intellectual cognition. The universal concept (*conceptio intellectus*) appears only as a result and is therefore an entirely universal product of cognition (*terminus ad quem*). Therefore, the cognition is a kind of transition from potential universality given in the intellect as *tabula rasa* to the universal concept in actualized intellect. The cognition of the intellect is causally determined by the actualized content synthesized in the imagination, which is made due to the perception of the senses. The difference between the individual intentional species and the universal concept has a fundamental significance because it founds the theory of truth as correspondence. Neoplatonic modernity, blinded by the intellect as a sun, no longer sees it because *illuminati* define no diaphanum in the same sense as CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The mediating function of *species intelligibilis* is already given in Blund’s school by the determination from the direction of sensible species through the process of individually conceived intentionality (OBJ II, ch. 2.1). The abstracted meaning applies universally in the form of the concept because it is the result of accomplished process of abstraction. Exposure from the direction of the real thing cannot receive any other actualization in *intellectus possibilis* than from the direction of the senses, because the soul is an Aristotelian *tabula rasa*. In this transfer of form from the sensible to the intelligible species, the intentionality of Blund’s school of the first Averroism is of central importance (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.1). Unfortunately, Aquinas did not accept the theory of diaphanum according to CMDA, which proved to be fatal in his debate with Siger. Aquinas defined the *species intelligibilis* only at the level of Blund’s school, that is, as a specific form of cognition. The intellect becomes actualized through intelligible species (*qua fit intellectus in actu*). This is only part of the truth, because the intellect is given in the soul and it makes a component of existential cognitive act of the whole person. Thomas as an Avicennist adept of Blund’s school, unfortunately, did not introduce in the cognition scheme a twofold diaphanum according to CMDA and did not see the real act of soul’s existence. Due to the soul, the potentialities are situated in the body in order to exercise the intentionality given in the twofold manner (*duplex*). Aquinas, unlike Siger, was unable to distinguish the twofold formal mediation of cognition (*experimur ... conscii sumus*). This was his undoing in his unsuccessful debate with Siger for the title *Expositor Novus*. The entire interpretation of intellectual cognition in *De potentia* 8.1 is conducted within the framework of intellect as an essence. Aquinas did not grasp the interpretation of CMDA right at the beginning of his studies in Paris, where he misinterpreted Averroes’s conception of intellect in the mode of *tertium* and *quartum genus*. Thomistic species does not arise in the act of the person’s existence, but in the act of *intellectus possibilis*, which is stated as an avicennistic hypostasis (ch. 4.5.1). The person forms only an impersonal carrier of this specific mental ability (*subiectum*). The existential version of cognition represented by Siger is found in CMDA as the difference between the existential act of cognition in the person (*tertium genus*) and the result of this knowledge, that is, the emergence of a concept endowed with a universal meaning that is the same for all people (*quartum genus*). Siger assumes that cognition is determined on the basis of the imposition of intellect. According to Aristotle and according to CMDA, he follows the real causality of cognition. The activity of the intellect is necessarily given by the body in the “*subiective*” mode. Therefore, Siger has a properly created logical supposition of “intellect” as a concept in the mode *quartum genus*. Aquinas, like Albert, mistakenly assumed the logical supposition of the intellect, which he then correctly defined by making the process of cognition from *species intelligibilis* to the resulting *conceptio intellectus*. But unlike Albert, who read CMDA correctly, Aquin did not just make an erroneous form of deductive proof. His hypostatized intellect canceled the unique character of a person. The latter is reduced in Aquinas (but not in Albert) to the carrier of processes made by the intellect (*subiectum*). Siger saw these differences clearly when he criticized both Dominicans in the scripture *De anima intellectiva*. Thomas’s objective conception of the person as an impersonal carrier of intellectual ability given in *anima intellectiva*, Aegidius took it up afterwards. This argument, based on Thomistic objective subject, then replaced Siger’s interpretation of existential cognition of the person that is upheld in QIIIDA. This objective conception of the person, based on the logical supposition of the intellect, is exposed as the Thomistic equivalent to the interpretation of DA III in the Oxford manuscript, in order to replace the exegesis made by Siger. The definition of the person made by Thomas and Aegidius is merely the impersonal carrier of specific mental capacity (*subiectum*). Aquinas’s synthesis of cognition formally corresponds to Albert’s synthesis according to CMDA, see Albert’s term *intellectus speculativus* in *De homine* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). However, Albert works with the intellect as a *tertium* and *quartum genus* according to CMDA, also in the mode “*ipse homo intelligit*.” Thomistic intellect is given only at the level of form and is not an act of being of the person in the mode of existential ipseity (*homo intelligit*). Siger therefore carried out the critique of Thomas in *De anima intellectiva* and completed it in the commentary on *De causis*, where he interpreted the key passages on the unity of intellect according to CMDA (ch. 4.4.3).

The next part of the answer in *De potentia* 8.1 positioned itself on the level of the resulting universal concept and explores the entire process of cognition from this general perspective given according to *conceptio intellectus*. This time the analysis proceeds anachronically from the end of cognition to its beginning. The interpretation now follows the proceeding of *Categories* in the logical mode of supposition, where the deduction runs from the higher genus and goes to the species determined by logical supposition. In the case of Thomas, however, the metaphysical imposition of intellect as a specific faculty in *anima intellectiva* is missing. The result consists in the complex definition of universally given intellect as a concept, which differs three times from all the preceding processes of cognition listed above (*conceptio a tribus praedictis differt*). The analysis sets out the fundamental differences between various components of cognition.

“Cognition differs in the universal concept from the previous three stages. On the one hand, the cognition differs from the cognized thing, because the recognized thing is given outside the intellect (*res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum*), whereas cognition exists only in the intellect. Furthermore, the universal concept refers to real thing that should be grasped (*conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam*) as to the goal of cognition. This is why the intellect forms within itself the concept of the thing (*intellectus conceptionem rei in se format*) in order to recognize the thing grasped by the intellect.” [[310]](#footnote-310)

The system of the three differences separates the resulting universal meaning in the concept (*conceptio*) from the remaining three components. The quotation defines their role with regard to the resulting universal meaning that determines the overall process of cognition. The first difference rejects the objectively conceived being of the third kind propagated in the second Averroism. The cognized thing (*res intellecta*) is given outside the intellect as the goal of cognition (*sicut ad finem*), and the meaning exists only in the intellect (*conceptio… non est nisi in intelle*ctu). The external thing grasped by the intellect in its own mode and act constitutes the concept as the goal of cognition (*ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem*). Although the second Averroism claimed this point as well, it found an objective mediator between the two levels in the form of various types of *tertium ens*. There were placed directly in real things and in the divine intellect. In the next step, the text assigns the individual species only to the activity of intellect and distinguishes their status from the resulting concept.

“The concept is therefore distinguished from the intelligibile species. It is so because the intelligible species, through which the intellect becomes actualized (*qua fit intellectus in actu*), defines itself as the principle of the activity of the intellect; everything that acts does so with respect to what is actualized. The state of actualization is given by some form that represents the really acting principle in the intellect.” [[311]](#footnote-311)

Intelligible species given through the intentionality of intellect makes the actualized cognizing form. Its state of actualization constitutes Boethius’s act of being (*quo est*). Through the reception of those actualized species, the intellect passes from potentiality to actuality (*species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu*). Aquinas clearly explains to modernists that the intellect has no actuality of its own and received it though *species intelligibilis*. In contrast to Siger, there is no clear connection here with *species sensibilis* that makes the first stage of actualization of intellect in the scenario of CMDA. This omission is of fundamental importance in the debate Siger versus Aquin in 1270. The quotation states that *species intelligibilis* has its own actuality, which is given in the act of cognition (*qua fit*). The *species intelligibilis* then forms the principle of the act of cognition in its existential activity (*principium actionis intellectus*). The difference between an act of cognition (*species intelligibilis*) and its product (*conceptio*) is now clearly defined. The cognitive form as *species intelligibilis* relates to the intellect in the actualising mode “*quo est*” thus replacing the intellect as *tertium genus* of CMDA. This form is not to be confused with the resulting knowledge, which is given in the universal mode “*quod est*” and it replaces the intellect as *quartum genus* of CMDA. Aquin derived this distinction not on the basis of CMDA, but from Albert’s interpretation of CMDA, which he redesigned in his own Aristotelian way. For this achievement he became the *Expositor Novus* for Semiaverroists like Aegidius. This is why Siger criticizes both Dominicans for misunderstanding the act of cognition of the real person, but each time from a different position. The difference between “*quo est*” and “*quod est*” is based on the logical supposition. It cannot replace the definition of intellect as *tertium genus* in CMDA that is based on the definition of the act of knowledge in the real person. It is done in the mode “*subiective*” and “*obiective*” made by the imposition. The writing *Anonymus Giele* explained in vain this major difference to the first adherents of Thomism who fell under the spell of Oxfordian Fallacy.

In contrast to Siger and Albert, Thomas lacks the fundamental actualization of *species intelligibilis* from the direction of *species sensibilis*, which is the only one to actualize the intellect in the scenario of CMDA. Siger rejects the formal view of Aquinas in *De anima intellectiva*. Thomistic *species intelligibilis* has a causal effect on the essentially defined intellect (*species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu*). Siger resolutely rejects in *De anima intellectiva* this modernist view of Aquinas. It is fundamentally wrong, since it follows Oxfordian Fallacy created by Rufus. The essence presented as a supposition is only a general concept and it cannot exercise any real causality. Formally, however, this part of the evidence is constructed correctly. The act of cognition became the movement of thought from potentiality to actuality. This corresponds to general intention of CMDA. For Thomas, the production of intelligible species is bound to sensible species, but is fundamentally different from them. Intelligible species are activated in the environment of the immaterial intellect, which operates as a subsistent hypostasis through the actualization of *species intelligibilis* (*intellectus in actu*). We find an abridged version of this passage in *De potentia* in the first part of *Summa theologica* (*intellectus habet operationem per se*).[[312]](#footnote-312) The intellect is defined as immaterial in Aristotelian mode “*inmixtus*” and “*ab extrinsece.*” Thanks to the actualization by species, the intellect acquired its own level of actuality at the level of the subsistent form given *per se*. Thus, for Aquinas, the intellect makes another principle of being or a form (*qua2*) in the soul, which in and of itself is an integral entelechic principle of the body (*qua1*). The difference between the two forms of actualization of the intellect is of great importance for Aquinas’s debate with Siger, which followed in Paris. The conception of the intellect as a hypostatized form (*qua2*) was elaborated during the stay in Italy in the years 1266–68 and Thomas defended it in Paris as well. Aquinas’s final detachment from the Avicennistic gradual scenario of intellects had a fundamental significance for Aegidius. Under his influence he turned away from the Avicennism given in the Oxford manuscript I–II. Under influence of Thomas′s work *De potentia*, he wrote the third part of Oxford manuscript. He distanced himself from Siger’s work QIIIDA, written in accordance with CMDA (*Thomas de Aquino resistit rationi Commentatoris super secundum Metaphysicae*, ch. 4.3.2). Siger criticized Aquinas’s hypostatized intellect as a new form of Averroism (ch. 4.4.3). According to Siger, the intellect given according to *De potentia* became an autonomous substance (*hoc aliquid*) in the manner of the second Averroism. The conception of the intellect as an autonomous effective form led to a dualism, because there were two forms in the person. Thomas’s definition of intellect as a hypostatized form (*qua2*), defended in *De potentia* q. 8, a. 1, became a Semiaverroist solution due to the formalization of intellect that was stated to be a hypostatic and autonomous essence. Such intellect cannot be a purely receptive. Siger defines the intellect merely as the intellectual capacity of the soul and not as an autonomous form (ch. 4.4.2). According to Siger, the immaterial intellect is merely a pure potency with regard to the sensually perceived intentions. Let us recall the key quote from the first treatise on the nature of the intellect, which explicitly insists on the absolute potentiality of the receptive intellect, because it is not a Porretanian hypostasis and not a modern substance (*quantum est de natura sua, est in potentia ad intentiones imaginatas*; QIIIDA q. 9, p. 28.70‒76). Aquinas would object that the species is an act of the intellect given in the person, which carries the actuality of cognition as a form given in this way (*actu autem fit per aliquam formam*). If the essence of intellect is determined in this way, it is evident that *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* must be individual, as well as is the individual process of cognition. The individuality of cognition in the Thomistic subject is not in the mode “*ipse*” related to the cognizing person. The immateriality and the ipseity of the second mediation by the *species intelligibilis* were expounded by Siger in his brilliant analysis of Thomas’s fallacy. Thomism possesses only the formal univocity of cognition, because the process of mediation from the senses and also from the intellect is tied not to the existing person, but to the hypostatized intellect as an actualized form. Aquinas, like Siger, insisted on the pure potential receptivity of the intellect, but did not define it from the existential position. The Dominican as an Aristotelian rejected Averroes as an Averroist. Aquinas thus missed the phenomenological principle of CMDA. Siger, on the contrary, brilliantly defends the phenomenology of cognition. He describes the existential way in which cognition takes place (*actio intellectus facit nos scire substantiam*, ch. 4.4.2). In the mode of intentionality of the Blund′s school, Aquinas ensures the actualization of the intellect only in a formal and immaterial way (*secundum quod est in actu*). This key part of Thomistic scheme of cognition is presented in the formal mode “*secundum quod*.” Thomistic formalism reduced the person to the subject; the concept of an objectively conceived intellect had a fateful significance for further development. Aquinas considers the intellect objectively and he canceled the phenomenological principle “*homo ipse intelligit*” defended by Siger. Cognition as an existential act was reduced to an essential definition of cognition. It is the same in mode “*idem*”; therefore, modernists of all kinds see no difference in Siger’s and Thomas′s definition of “*intelligere*.” Hermeneutics follow Heidegger’s sense of reference (*Bezugssinn*) because the formal definition of existence is not sufficient for hermeneutics of *Dasein*. The objective identity of understanding (*Gehaltsinn*) is fundamentally different from the ipseity of *Dasein* in the analysis of existence. As a formal cause of cognition, Thomas, like Siger, gives the immaterial species intelligibilis, which is actualized by the sensual species. Siger, however, completed the complete form of the scientific demonstration and linked this cognizing form with the causality of the person as an existing first substance.

The last of the three differences in *De potentia* points to classical difference between the individual act of intellect and its universal product. This definition formally corresponds to difference between *tertium* and *quartum genus* in CMDA.

“The concept is further distinguished from the activity of the intellect. The above-mentioned concept is defined as the goal of activity and as something that is constituted in a certain way by the work of the intellect. The intellect thus forms the definition of the thing or the positive or negative statement about the thing through its own activity (*sua actione*).” [[313]](#footnote-313)

It is necessary to distinguish between the individual activity of the intellect and the resulting universal concept of the external thing (*rei definitionem*). In the order of the essential predication of the intellectual essence, Thomas asserts that there is a difference between how we recognize (*ab actione intellectus*) and what is recognized (*terminus actionis*). Only the resulting concept is universal and not the individual *species intelligibilis*. This mistakenly presupposes the specifically erroneous modernity, which is influenced by the hypostatic worldview implanted by Porretans. It is through the individual species that we recognize the resulting universal concept. Therefore, the species have no eidetic essence in mode “*quod*” as a resultant term; but for this they have an individual existence in mode “*qua*.” This ensures the actualization of the intellect from the direction of the senses and thus also the truth as a correspondence and individualization of cognition. The connection of all the components of cognition into a final concept confirms that the human intellect is unified, immaterial and thus also indivisible and at the same time separated in its specific act (*inmixtus*). Otherwise, no unity of thinking could arise at the level of humanity as a whole. A key problem with regard to debate “*homo ipse intelligit*” initiated by Siger is Aquinas’s final assertion that the intellect generates the essential recognition of the thing by its own act (*intellectus sua actione format rei definitionem*). The resulting formation of the concept is again attributed only to the act of the intellect within the framework of its own formal, immaterial and separately given “*ipse*” (*qua2*). This is the typical conception of the synthetic work of the intellect in the mode of *intellectus formalis* according to the Blund′s school, which created an Avicennistic form of Aristotelianism before Averroes’s arrival in the Latin West (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.1). Siger led this conception to the full unity of the recognition of the person; the revolutionary Aristotelian Aquinas returned to the very beginning of the path that began around the year 1200 (*revolutio*). The cited connection of form and actualization of intellect dangerously approached to the autonomous substance of the second Averroism, or to later Descartes’s *res cogitans*. Aquinas’s definition of the intellect in the mode “*secundum quod est in actu*” confirms the hidden dualism of two hypostatized forms in man. Therefore, the writing QIIIDA and especially *De anima intellectiva* of Siger pointed out the shortcomings of Thomas′s analysis in *De potentia*, which had been included in the first part of *Summa theologica* (qq. 75, 88). Aegidius also saw clearly around the year 1268 that this view did not correspond to CMDA that Siger’s school in the rue du Fouarre interpreted in a different way. This Latin sophist therefore declared Aquinas the New expositor against Siger’s school and attributed his errors to Averroes. To create Thomism in the school of *sophistae Latini*, Averroes had to become an Averroist. This pious lie was necessary for the introduction of objective metaphysics, which united the second Averroism and Thomism. The authentic first Averroism of the Siger school necessarily had to perish, because objective knowledge is not truth, but power. Thomas had to respond academically to Siger’s criticism in 1270 in the well-known treatise *De unitate intellectus*. Its analysis is yet to follow. After the publication of Siger’s *De anima intellectiva*, it became clear to all educated artists that Aquinas had lost gigantomachy concerning the new interpretation of Aristotle. Therefore, he had to leave Paris immediately after the announcement of the decree of Parisian artists in 1272. This decree confirmed the scientific truthfulness of Siger’s interpretation of *De anima* and condemned the conception of the ontotheological truth, which founded the Thomistic interpretation of cognition.

The final summary of the concept in the form of the meaningful word defends the holistic unity of cognition according to the Modists. The disputation positions this unity against the intellect as a substance in the teaching of *Modernorum*. The quoted text *De potentia* combined the theory of cognition in *De anima* III and the conception of signification according to *De int*. 16a3–8 according to Aristotle’s hermeneutic rule. The combination of *De interpretatione* and *De anima* shows the uniform interpretation of language, logic and signification (OBJ II, ch. 1.1). The interpretation of the key passage from *De Int*. 16a3–8 underwent a fundamental change in the Franciscan school during the second half of the 13th century (Mora-Márquez 2011). The modernists tied intentionality to the acceptance of Augustinian inner word, given as a hypostatized species. Thomas argues against the second Averroism by rejecting the psychological or speculative conception of the word (*vox*) as a signification of the inner process of cognition according to Augustine. The quoted part of *De potentia* q. 8, a. 1 cannot allow hypostatizing the word, because its meaning arises exclusively in the intellect.

“This concept of the intellect in us can be called ‘word’ in the truest sense of the word. In this way, what is signified externally that is given with the help of the word (*quod verbo exteriori significatur*). In fact, the word used (*neque significat*) denotes neither the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the concept of the intellect (*intellectus conceptionem*), by means of which understanding refers to the external thing (*intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem*).” [[314]](#footnote-314)

Aquinas separates the universal concept given in the word from all previous stages that formed the preliminary stage of final concept (*neque ... neque ... neque*). The quotation added that the word can be identified neither with the intellect as such (*ipsum intellectum*), nor with that of the intellect (*actum intellectum*), nor with individual *species intelligibilis*. The signification resulting from movements of thought given above is now conceptually symbolized by the universal concept (*intellectus conceptionem*). The word is a medium through which we refer to the recognized thing outside of ourselves (*qua mediante*). The signification of the concept exists with regard to the external thing, which shapes the thinking of the intellect as a *tabula rasa*. This creates another field of similarity and dissimilarity thanks to the process of correspondence between the movements of the soul and the word, see the canonical text from *De Interpretatione* (OBJ II, ch. 1.1) Aristotle’s analysis, up to the emergence of the meaning of the word, includes both cognition in the intellect (*quae sunt in anima passionum notae*) and the symbolization of this cognition at the level of the word (*quae sunt in voce earum*). The actualization of intellect proceeded from the first substance through the movements of the soul, which are determined from the direction of the real perceived thing. The conception of truth as agreement arises from the resulting concept by which (*qua mediante*) cognition refers to the externally given thing (*refertur ad rem*). The modern intellect, on the other hand, reflects the objectively defined species as its own scibile in the mirror (*speculum*) presented by Rufus. Husserl’s postmodern intellect considers its own *noema*, which in the mode of absolute immanence and transcendence of meaning reflects the objective thing with evident certainty. Before Descartes, there were Thomas’s contemporaries from the schools of second Averroism, such as Bonaventure (*species prima, secunda, innata*; ch. 4.1.2) and Pecham. The disputation defends the actual potency of the intellect and reminds the contemporaries from the school of the second Averroism of the Aristotelian conception of *De Interpretatione* given in the school of Modists according to the first Averroism. The recognition of the divine Trinity must, in principle, proceed from the human recognition and language. Following the example of Parisian Modists such as Siger and Boethius of Dacia, Aquinas defends the key difference between singular reality and its universal signification. The conception of Modists proceeds from Aristotelian interpretation of cognition and signification and therefore differs fundamentally from Avicennist’s interpretation of the Franciscan school. The question of reference in this school turned into the conception of the word, which is fixed in the mode *tertium ens* due to meaning conceived as a universally acting essence. The dispute about the twofold truth of substance comes to light in the different view of Bacon and the analytical logicians from Kilwardby’s school, to whom the mere existence of the intellect is sufficient at Oxford to fix the meaning “*homo est animal*” (*est sumpta a quaestione si est intellectus et non si est res*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The key feature is the instrumental pronoun “*qua*,” which is given in the Thomistic definition of the concept (*intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem*). Thus, the predication respecting the metaphysical dative fulfilled Aristotelian determination of truth as correspondence. The thing is given in the past form of its unique being that the apophantic dative holds in universal signification given only in mind. This difference establishes the different conception of signification between the first and the second Averroism, which is also confirmed in Thomas’s interpretation in *De potentia*. He refused the speculative nature of the truth in the mode of Rufus’s *coaequatio* that makes comparison between two sorts of *tertium ens* as Porretan hypostases. Aquinas is not interested in what is objectively given in the thing, and what is objectively reflected in the intellect. The correspondence is not a coincidence in the style of Anselm’s *rectitudo* (OBJ II, ch. 1.2) and also not in the style of Rufus’s objective correspondence based on mathematical univocity (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The disputation reminds that we have a twofold statute for the verb, which is given from the point of view of cognition and the recognized external thing. The word makes the thing present in its recognizability for the intellect (*representatio*). Therefore, the universal meaning of the concept proceeds not from the intellect, but from the actuality of the thing itself. The word is given as a *similitudo* with regard to the matter in reality. In reality, the object is transferred into the medium of actualized cognition in the sensual part of the soul that is given to animals as well (*sensus communis*). It is the faculty where the first intentional object (*species sensibilis*) comes into being through the causally given correspondence of cognizing senses that are determined from the recognized external object. This sensual species then takes up the intellect. Its act of understanding is given immaterially act and it is separated from the senses. The answer of the eighth question continues as follows.

“In this way, the concept is given, that is, the word by which the intellect comprehends the thing that is separated from it (*rem aliam a se*). The intellect starts from this separated real thing and brings this difference to mind (*from alio exoritur, et aliud representat*). The concept starts from the intellect through its act and makes the actual similarity of the conceived thing (*est vero similitudo rei intellectae*). When the intellect recognizes itself, it recognizes that predicted word; it means that the intellect makes the continuation of the concept and its similarity (*eiusdem est propago et similitudo*). This is how the intellect recognizes itself.” [[315]](#footnote-315)

The brilliant metaphysical distinction “*aliam—alio—aliud*” shows that the difference between thing, similarity and representation is of a threefold kind. The thing exists in its *actus essendi* outside of cognition (*rem aliam a se*). Then the matter enters the actualized sensual cognition, from where it actualizes the intellect (*ab alio exoritur*). The separated intellect takes over the sensual species in abstraction and takes it in the immaterial act of one’s own cognition (*aliud representat*). The individually cognizing intellect tends to sensual species due to its own immaterial intentionality and receives sensual species in its potentiality through *species intelligibilis*. In each phase we encounter a different cognition of the external thing, because there is a different potency of the soul standing behind it. Through this total act of cognition, the individually given potentiality of cognition becomes the actualized universal concept (*conceptio, sive verbum*). Intellect is recognized in the practice of self-reflection in the end (*intellectus seipsum intelligentis*), through a concept formed as a word.

In the second Averroism, the intellect recognized itself at the very beginning in the direct intuition, in the manner of later Cartesian *cogito*. Based on Oxfordian Fallacy, there is no theory of the truth as correspondence, but universal assimilation of *tertium ens*. From the modern scheme in *De interpretatione*, the intentional semantics and the conceptual symbolization of the real act of cognition fell out. The last symbolic stage (σύμβολα) establishes the connection between the individual species given by the movement of the soul (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) and the intentionally given universal semantics (σημεία πρώτων). This connection, in the mode of the metaphysical dative, gives full correspondence of reality and universal meaning (ὁμοιώματα). These two key components establish the conception of truth in the mode of Averroes’s similarity as *consimilitudo*. They have been replaced in the analytical conception of language founded by Rufus by the logical supposition. The meaning is exclusively founded on *tertium ens* produced by subjects (*Ge-Stell*). The eclipse of the first substance occurs because in the age of postmodern *epistémé*, which arranges words in front of things, it is no longer clear what kind of reality is actually being intended. Modernists in Oxford believed in miracles and expected the logically necessary arrival of Antichrist. The reality brought them Elias’s raven that had been sent by modern God to regularly visit the Neoplatonist cave inhabited by modern *illuminati* (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). In the age of metaphysical nihilism, the mystical raven objectively no longer exists. God of *Modernorum* died as well. He was necessary in order to establish his activity on the supernatural floor of reality (*regula agentis increati*). In the age of metaphysical nihilism, only the enlightened intellect is the actualized of the meaning of being. The first nihilistic *illuminati* from the analytical school of *Erfurt′s Anonymus* knew this very well (*non supponit quaestionem si est res, sed si est intellectus*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Then the demiurge produces a kind of the absolute truth as *rectitudo*. These concepts of modern mind are given after the eclipse of the first substance in the manner “*absolute*,” that is, separate from reality. This is not Aquinas’s position, which, in the question quoted, gave all the conditions for recognition to be a real correspondence between the intellect and the real thing. The text of the eighth question established the Thomistic form of the metaphysical dative.

“Cognition takes place because the effect imitates the cause according to one’s own form (*effectus similatur causae secundum suam formam*). The form of the intellect is the recognized thing. Therefore, the word is generated in the intellect by the similarity of the recognized thing, whether it is identical with the intellect or exists outside of it.” [[316]](#footnote-316)

From the thing, the mere form is causally transferred to the intellect. Thanks to the similarity already elaborated, it produces the cognition as a resulting effect (*effectus similatur causae secundum suam formam*). Cognition follows formal causality through which the real thing acts on the intellect, namely through the actualized sensual species. The act of immaterial and universal intellect reproduces the form of recognized thing (*forma autem intellectus est res intellecta*). The thing itself exists in reality *simpliciter* and *singulariter*. As taken in and of itself, it does not make part of human cognition. In contrast to the external subsistence of the thing, cognition is given as a mere accident. The real first substance does not act causally directly on the intellect, but only through the abstracted sensual and intellectual forms. Only after an overall analysis of the similarity and dissimilarity between intellect and thing can it be said that the rational word makes correspondence with regard to the recognized thing (*similitudo rei intellectae*). The intellect causally and adequately recognizes the form of the thing. Thanks to all the differences listed above, it becomes clear that there is no objective identity between thing and cognition, as modernism and Cartesian or Husserl’s postmodernism claim. There is a fundamental difference between the singular being of the thing in reality and its universal being in the intellect. A separate act of the intellect conveys the similarity between the thing and the intellect. It is given by production of *species intelligibilis* and universal concepts. The text concludes the definition of truth as *similitudo* with the fact that the causality between the thing and the intellect has only a formal character.

The schema presented in *De potentia*, q. 8 corresponds to the scheme of cognition according to the first Averroism and defends the truth in the causal mode as an Aristotelian correspondence between the external thing and the intellect. Aquinas transformed the Aristotelian scenario in such a way that he evaded the scheme of cognition according to CMDA, which he replaced by formal causality exercised by twofold kinds of species. Thomistic interpretation did not recognize Averroes’s interpretation of *intellectus possibilis* as an authentic exegesis of *De anima*. Since the time of his Paris studies, Thomas classified Averroes as an Averroist. But after the publication of *Summa contra Gentiles*, this Avicennian follower of Aristotle realized that he, like Averroes and Albert, must resort to the synthesis of cognition in the real person. Modernists ended up in dualism and those “*sequaces Aristotelis*” eagerly prepared the death of modern God in objectively presented theology. They introduced an elaborate version of Sabelianism and Arianism into the Trinitarian dogma. Therefore, the Roman treatise *De potentia* returned to the intentionality of the Blund′s school and in a new way introduced the concept of *intellectus formalis*. The connoisseurs of Averroes on rue du Fouarre no longer needed this Thomistic innovation, given after the modernized Aristotle as an Avicennist. Such a formal definition of the unity of the person and the intellect would be correct in the Blund′s school around the year 1200. Aquin successfully defended the formal scheme of cognition by exposure from the front, in the mode of the first Averroism. He had no existential unity of the person that defended Siger’s school. Roman disputations completed the defense of the truth of the correspondence of thing and intellect against the second Averroism represented by modernists around Kilwardby, Pecham and Bonaventure. Therefore, Aegidius accepted this version without reservations. This learned Latin sophist knew Siger’s interpretation of *De anima* and considered modernist interpretations of Bonaventure’s school to be philosophical nonsense. The present interpretation of cognition has shown that the second arrival of Aquinas at the University of Paris had to end with a conflict of principles with the school of second Averroism. In the essentialism introduced by *via Modernorum* and by Oxfordian Fallacy, the truth is not given as the correspondence between thing and mind (*similitudo*), but the ontotheological assimilation of objectively “exsisting” species (*coaequatio*). Modernity has doubled the world in man on the basis of substantial multiplicity; it combined those simulacra into an ontotheological unity. It s fundament was put into divine being that was objecively connected with the creation. Modern God became a psychologizing creature with its own intentionality and thus became a modern man. Modern man became a metaphysical schizophrenic, because he is defined by substantial multiplicity. Such stupidity does not exist even in the simple non-thinking real stone. This universal representation of divine and human thought is either in the positive way of Anselm’s *rectitudo* or in the negative way of postmodern metaphorization, which is given by the infinite movement of the difference between equivocal meaning of being. Aquinas firmly rejected all these theses and their nihilist consequences.

Another, much more complicated problem remained on the table than the refutation of dualist theses. Thomas’s conception of truth as *similitudo* was given in the context of the first Averroism with regard to the thesis “*homo intelligit*” made according to Thomistic Aristotelianism. Man is the first substance, and his cognition is actualized from the senses. The proceeding of cognition was done in a correct Aristotelian way. The problem was a status of intellect that stands in conflict with the position of CMDA that defended “*pars Sigeri*” in Paris and partly Albert as well. Roman disputations have shown that Thomistic version of Blund’s *intellectus formalis* is based on the hypostatized status of intellect as *tertium ens*. Connoisseurs of writing CMDA considered such theory to be a clear example of Averroism and, moreover, the fundamentally wrong explanation of *De anima*. In addition, they were well acquainted Aquinas′s sophistic interpretation of numerical individuation of *intellectus possibilis* that he created under the influence of Avicenna during his first stay in Paris (ch. 4.5.1). Averroistic interpretation of CMDA was confirmed by hypostatized form of Thomistic *intellectus formalis* that was elaborated during the Roman stay by Aquina′s commenting on *De anima*. Siger refused problematic interpretation of Aquinas “*homo intelligit*” in his comments on *De anima* I–III. After Thomas′s second arrival to Paris, Siger explicitly criticized Aquinas version of Aristotelianism in the work *De anima intellectiva*. In the Christian West, two different interpretations of Aristotle emerged, which were defended by two *Expositores* of the Corpus. After the second arrival in Paris, Aquinas started disputations regarding the interpretation of *De anima* with Siger and his school of educated artists (*pars Sigeri*). They interpreted *De anima* according to CMDA in the mode of the Sicilian school. Their collective point of view is presented in the work *Anonymus Giele* that wrote Boethius of Dacia about 1270 (ch. 4.3.1). The thesis of Siger’s school differed in principle from the sophistry of *Modernorum* and also from Aquinas’s interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus, which was defended in Italy until 1268 in the commentaries on *De anima, De sensu et sensato* and *De memoria et reminiscentia*. Although Aquinas takes the classical canon of Aristotelian corpus according to the Sicilian school, he interprets it in the mode of the Toledo school. Siger’s party defended the unity of the person and the intellect in the mode “*homo ipse intelligit*,” which corresponded to the paradigm of the Sicilian school and its conception of biological writings of the Philosopher. The concept of the unitary person originated in the rue du Fouarre in the course of half a century of reflection and commentaries on *De anima*, which were lectured in a obligatory manner at the artistic faculty from the year 1255. This resulted about 1270 in a dispute between the two expositors of Aristotle regarding the unity of the person, which is manifested in the treatises on the soul discussed above (*Anonymus Giele, ms. Oxford, ms. Munich, Anonymus Bazán*). This struggle for the ipseity of the person between Aquinas and Siger was led by punitive powers of academical chaos. Siger lost the battle but he kept the hermeneutic truth as *alētheia*. Aquinas was later actualized as a victor in the objective mode of truth as *veritas*. Aegidius’s school of Thomism adopted Aquinas’s conception of the person and the unity of the intellect. He saved the sophistry of the second Averroism in the mode of Hegelian “*Aufhebung*.” Aquinas’s semiaverroistic interpretation of the unity of the intellect helped to the victory of objective Averroism that founded modern metaphysics after the year 1280.

### 4.5.3 Modern Interpretation of *De anima*

Around the year 1270, the crisis of the new metaphysics deepens fundamentally. Basic metaphysical concepts were no longer considered universal, because there was no longer univocal meaning of the most important terms in the perspective of *via Modernorum* and *via Antiquorum* (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). As evidence, we can cite the answers of Albert, Aquinas and Kilwardby to the question of the general of Dominican Order (Jean de Verceil) regarding the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing *De animalibus*, ch. 17, where the relationship between the intellect and the body is discussed (Chenu 1930, 207). The structure of questions and answers clearly confirms that in the year 1271, there was no longer a unified view concerning the cosmology and the definition of the person. It presented a serious doctrinal problem for the church authorities. The reaction to the disputes that arose after the publication of Aquinas’s *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* is the well-known treatise *De unitate intellectus* (1270). From this well-know writing, we select only two questions. For the emergence of objectivity, the assessment of Averroes in this work and Thomas′s reaction to Siger’s criticism presented in QIIIDA are important (ch. 4.4.3). It is no longer worth commenting on the criticism of Pecham and the second Averroism, because on this point the writing *De unitate intellectus* brings nothing new. Pecham acknowledged his defeat and went to Oxford in 1271, where he then relentlessly rose to higher academic and ecclesiastical dignities. Siger was already able to know Aquinas’s commentaries from Rome up to the year 1268. Perhaps he also knew the interpretation of cognition in *De potentia* discussed above, or some form of *reportatio* imported to Paris from Aquinas’s curial disputations. We have expressed the difference between Siger and Aquin by the difference between “*homo ipse intelligit*” (Siger) and “*homo intelligit*” (Aquin). Siger’s criticism in the work QIIIDA concerned the writings that had been written before Aquinas’s second stay in Paris. Aquinas′s book *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate* (ca. 1257) shows the final agreement between Siger and Aquinas on the question of phenomenological cognition of the person within the framework of “*ipse*” given by the principle “*quomodo*” in CMDA III.1 (ch. 4.4.3). The Munich commentary on DA I–II could take the form of the conciliatory “*potest esse*” (ch. 4.3.2) in reference to Aquinas’s definition of *intellectus formalis*. In the writing QIIIDA, this conciliatory attitude was no longer possible. The formal intellect of Thomism was defined in the mode “*separatus*” that contradicted the Commentator’s interpretation of DA III. For fundamental reasons, the true recognition of intellectual acts must have a scientific character. Metaphysical statements *per prius* follow the causality of first substances. Otherwise, we observe the world not adequately and truthfully, but specifically and objectively. Then we see the world through the mythology of Oxfordian Fallacy. There is the difference between Siger’s phenomenological “*ipse*” and Aquin’s theological “*idem*,” as far as the unity of the person or that of the subject is concerned.

“With regard to the act of cognition, by which a person recognizes that he has a soul, I assert that the soul recognizes itself through its acts (*anima cognoscitur per actus suos*). Thus everyone experiences his own soul, his existence and his being (*percipit se animam habere, et vivere, et esse*). In this way, everyone experiences his own perception and his own thinking and can also perform other life actions. Therefore, the Philosopher says in the book IX of *Nicomachean Ethics*: We perceive because we really perceive; we understand because we really understand. Because we perceive ourselves in this way, we also understand that we exist (*quia hoc sentimus, intelligimus quoniam sumus*).” [[317]](#footnote-317)

The quotation defends the primacy of actualized cognition through the act by which the soul recognizes itself (*anima cognoscitur per actus suos*). The act of cognition has its own actuality that we can experience directly (*intellegimius quoniam intelligimus*). The same was the phenomenological position of Siger, as we have seen above. The key question, however, is how we experience our thinking, whether in the manner of the critical Commentator or in the self-reflective manner of Augustine and Avicenna. According to Heidegger’s existential analysis of understanding, the ontological sense of reference (*Bezugssinn*) can be established. Aquinas’s manner of understanding follows *dativus obiectivus* (ch. 4) and Siger’s way of understanding follows *dativus metaphysicus*. Either we understand the act of thinking in the holistic act of existence, or in the intellect makes a separate kind of the hypostatized form in the soul that establishes the intelligible cognition by itself. As far as *dativus auctoris* is concerned, it is either the person who thinks, or the objective subject. Therefore, according to Aquinas and Siger, cognition is not justified in the same way. The saying “We understand because we are” (*intelligimus quoniam sumus*) can be read in an Aristotelian manner according to CMDA and Siger, or in a modern way, according to Avicenna and Descartes. Then the reflection of *intellectus in effectu* is stated on the basis of the hypostatic actuality of the “Flying Man” that entails Neoplatonic *intellectus agens* in the cosmos or Avicenna’s *intellectus agens* as habitual or intuitive cognition of the first principles. Or, there is Descartes’s hypostatized “*cogito ergo sum*” that makes the evidence of one’s own existence. The act of cognition is given either by ipseity of the person in the Sicilian school, or by identity in the Thomistic subject that makes a bearer of hypostatized *intellectus formalis*. Siger resolutely rejected the path of modernity, which denied the full unity of the person in the mode of hypostases added to the person from outside. Therefore, he became the black sheep of modernists and Thomists, who imposed the objective *damnatio memoriae* on his conception of metaphysics and cognition. The criticism of Siger confirmed that Aquinas took the path of Toledo school that hypostatized the intellect. Any kind of intellect as autonomous form undergo Averroes’s criticism in CMDA regarding Alexander and Themistius, who turned the intellect into an external substance. Neither Averroes nor Siger are Averroists in the style of *Modernorum*, both then and now, and reject any solution that establishes the unity of the person on some separate form of the intellect or another hypostatized substance in man. As the *Expositor Novus*, Aquin had to clarify the key question of whether the intellectual ability given in *anima intellectiva* was some form of hypostasis.

The contemporary interpretation of dispute between these two representatives of the first Averroism relates to the dispute between Wéber and Bazán. They tried to define complicated relationship between Siger and Aquinas. The dispute was opened by Wéber’s monograph, according to which Aquin, after Siger’s criticism in QIIIDA, abandoned his thesis on the difference between the soul as a substance and its potencies (Wéber 1970, 87–107). From the second stay in Paris (1268–72), Thomas, allegedly under the influence of Siger’s criticism, had adopted another thesis about the intellect as a form connected with the body. We find this definition in the first part of *Summa theologica*.[[318]](#footnote-318) Bazán criticized all the important arguments in Wéber’s study: the interpretation of Siger’s QIIIDA (especially the interpretation of qq. 7, 9); the transformation in Thomas’s thinking after the year 1270; the dating of some parts in Aquinas corpus; the interpretation of neoplatonism in Aquinas (Bazán 1974). Wéber answered the criticism in two later works, in which he nuanced some arguments (e.g. with regard to texts of Aquinas published after the year 1270), but did not change the basic line (Wéber 1976, 1991). The polemic of two researchers showed quite well delicate points of Thomistic position. Dominican Wéber made the most important contribution to this debate, despite the general criticism from Thomistic schools. However, his important work did not bring a proper solution to the complicated situation at the University of Paris in 1270–75. The key problem for Aquin since the editing of *Summa contra Gentiles* has been the concept of cognition. This view was given by the term “*formaliter*” in connection with the passive intellect. Already at the first stage of his thought, Aquinas interpreted *De anima* in such a way that the formal principle of cognition fully determines the essence of *intellectus possibilis*. The following sentence shows *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of future Thomism that Aegidius started. The existential act of *intellectus possibilis* is expressed with reference to Aristotle, whereas Thomistic interpretation of CMDA has remained Averroistic to this day. Aquinas remained in the school of “*sequaces Aristotelis*” because his interpretation of *De anima* is made by changing Neoplatonic concepts. Thomas rejected the doctrine of Averroistic Averroes, according to which the process of receptive knowledge is defined as the copulation of external cosmic form of *intellectus posibilis* to its hypostasis in man. This is nonsense which Aquinas himself brought into the world. Thomism of Aquinas and Aegidius arose from the expounded writing of *De potentia*; they defend knowledge as a continuation of *intellectus possibilis* in us in the manner of an autonomous form. This position of Aristotle is defended in the second part of *the Summa contra Gentiles*.

“Man understands only with the intellect. When Aristotle explored the principle of cognition by which we understand (*principio quo intelligimus*), he handed over to us the essence of the possible intellect. Therefore, it is necessary that the possible intellect connects with us formally (*intellectum possibiliem formaliter uniri nobis*), and by no means only through its object.” [[319]](#footnote-319)

The question, however, is whether the formal connection of possible intellect (*formaliter uniri nobis*) fully comprehends the definition of *intellectus possibilis* according to CMDA. The receptive psychic ability is predicted as an essence or as a hypostasis that justifies cognition in the mode of the first principle (*principio quo intelligimus*). This is the view of *intellectus possibilis* according to Avicenna, which was defended in the Thomas′s commentary on Sentences analyzed above (ch. 4.5.1). The receptivity of *intellectus possibilis* is defined in the scheme of intellect as *inmixtus* according to *De anima*. The intellect is separated with regard to the senses by the fact that sensual species act on it only through formal causality. The interpretation of understanding according to formal causality is set out in the work *De potentia*; let us see the previous chapter. Thomas defines the individual act of intellect in the kind of understanding, which assumes the existence of an external thing that this Thomistic subject recognizes in the mode of formally accomplished correspondence. But this distinction was only made in the mode of the intellect, which was predicted as essence. Siger clearly and precisely explained to Aquinas that the intellect as an essence has no causality that could establish the foundation of cognition. The causality is only in the existing person and not in the essence that exists only in thinking as a potential concept. Siger therefore rejected Avicennist concept of *intellectus possibilis* and, with it, Aquinas’s interpretation of CMDA. The writing QIIIDA provides an unsurpassed exegesis of CMDA until today. Aquin’s late writing dealt with actualized cognition (*tertium genus* CMDA, Siger′s mode “*subiective*”) only in the abstract scenario of cognition of the formal intellect according to the Blund′s school. Thomas completely passed over Siger’s phenomenological principle of the unity of cognition in the mode “*homo ipse intelligit*.” That Avicennist concept of cognition is contained in Aquinas’s Roman commentary on *De anima* (1268) that again defends the hypostatized existence of first principles of cognition. Aquinas looks at the act of the *intellectus possibilis* only objectively and formally, whereas Siger does it personally and existentially. Its formal procedure of deduction therefore defends the equivalence between the formal activity of the senses and the intellect as logical maner of supposition (*sicut se habet sensitivum ad sensibilia, similiter se habere intellectum ad intelligibilia*).[[320]](#footnote-320) Thomas defends the unity of the intellect from the essentialist position of what the receptive intellect “is” as a hypostased form given in the substance defined by “*homo intelligit*.” That is why he compares the formal term “*intellectus possibilis*” with the receptivity of the senses, which was shown in the quoted interpretation of *De anima*. The objective reading finds no difference from Siger in the commentary on *De anima* 429a10, because the objectivists ignore the hermeneutic question of “how” we recognize. Objectively speaking, the reading of Aquinas is in the mode “*idem*” (but by no means in the mode “*ipse*”) the same as the reading of Siger. The view made by *Gehaltsinn* is no way of understanding made by *Bezugssinn*. When two new expositors of *De anima* say the same thing, it doesn’t have to be the same. Siger’s school in the rue du Fouarre saw this quite clearly and rejected Aquinas’s exegesis of Aristotle as inadequate. Aegidius took over Thomas’s semiaverroistic position dated to 1268. Thomism founded by Aegidius hypostatized the autonomous activity of intellect that finally ended in Neoplatonist dualism between sensual and intellectual cognition.

Therefore, from the publication of the first commentary on *De anima*, Aquinas and, after him, Albert became the target of Siger’s criticism, which he addressed to the followers of the first and second Averroism. Let us repeat the key thesis of QIIIDA, q. 15, quoted and commented above (ch. 4.4.3). The intellect is essentially connected with us only as an immaterial faculty of the soul (*solum est in potentia ut nobis copuletur*). According to Siger, any other definition of the intellect would mean that the intellect deals with us only externally. It is not connected to us in the mode of existential *separabilis*, but in the Neoplatonic mode of *separatus*. Then the intellect would be similar to the soul as the immaterial form of the body, and would become a hypostatized form of the third kind, which is added to the bodily act given materially. The person would have two forms, namely the intellect and the soul. That would be an Averroistic solution, which creates another sophistic version of plurality of substances in the person. This position is clearly directed against Aquinas’s conception of the receptive intellect, which had already become a hypostatic form during his first stay in Paris about 1259 (ch. 4.5.1). Siger rejected Aquin’s thesis, according to which the intellect is a form of the soul (*qua2*) and the soul is a form for the physically given existence (*qua1*). The hypostatization of soul and intellect makes use of essential concept of habitus, which we first find in Simplicius (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). A more detailed study of the concept of habitus in Aquinas would prove that this term in mode *qua2* implies the thesis about the subsistent intellect. Aquinas needs the habitus because of its “enveloping” or “packaging ability” (*circumdatio*) of Simplicius, which adheres to the quasi-substantial character of the intellect (*quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu*).[[321]](#footnote-321) As a result, the encompassing habitus became a component of a hypostatized immaterial intellect, which permanently adheres to immateriality and ensures the immortality of the soul. For Siger, the clarification of the intellect or the habitus as an Averroistic separated form is fundamentally unacceptable for the reasons listed in CMDA. Thomas’s solution turned the intellect into a hidden form in the manner of substance and abolished the pure potentiality of *intellectus possibilis* as the immaterial potency of the soul. Thomistic solution passed into the modernist solution of the objective intellect as a being of the third kind. The intellect became “something,” also the Neoplatonic “*hoc aliquid*” or the postmodern “*res cogitans*.” This is unacceptable for Siger as well as for Averroes as genuine Aristotelians. There is no Neoplatonic intermediate stage between the universal and potential meaning in thinking and the unique and *simpliciter* first substance given in reality. The exclusion of the being of the third kind applies absolutely, otherwise Aristotle’s metaphysics would not apply. Let us see Siger’s polemic with the second Averroism against the twofold determination of the being in his commentary on *Metaphysics* (ch. 4.4.1). According to Siger, the essential definition of the intellect leads to the denial of the phenomenological principle, which presents the unity of the person according to CMDA (ch. 4.4.3). Aquinas had never understood the position of CMDA and therefore did not adhere to the real IP side of the person in the homo ipse intelligit mode. The equivalence between essence and existence is fundamentally flawed, either according to the scientific proof of Second Analytics and according to CMDA. The phenomenologist Siger was not an objectivist like the theologian Aquinas. The immaterial intellect is not individualized in the mode “*idem*” like the material senses, but only in the mode “*ipse*,” that is, through the existential act of thinking as the act of being a person. The intellect acts on the senses from the outside (Aristotle’s θύραθεν, Sigers *ab extrinseco*), because in the mode of self-awareness (*conscii sumus*) it completes the original act of the existence of the soul, which is given identically and *simpliciter* at the level of sensual components (*experimur*). Siger’s terminus “*conscii sumus*” replaced the terminus “*tertium genus*” given in CMDA. Aquinas does not have the existential act of the person, but only his numerically given identity, which is ensured by the essential predication of the receptive intellect as an individualized immaterial form in virtue of the body.

Aquinas transformed the *intellectus possibilis* mentioned in CMDA as well as in *De anima* into a new variant of Blund’s *intellectus formalis*. The hermeneutics of objectivity consider this point to be the core of the dispute between Siger and Aquinas. We have emphasized the importance of Heidegger’s ontological perspective of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*), from where the fundamental meaning of being come to the fore in the context of *intellectus possibilis*. The previous analysis has shown that Siger’s phenomenological position differs from the objectivist position. Aquinas first defines the essential being of the intellect in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy and then derives its *operatio* from that essential concept. But the separateness of the intellect is not present in the same way in the mode of *separatus* or *separabilis* in the predication of Aquinas and Siger, which cannot be seen in the objective analysis of both authors. Averroes and Siger know very well from the interpretation of *De anima* that Socrates and Plato think for themselves, but at the same time there is the same essence of the intellectual content (ch. 4.4.3). This differentiation between the unity of the formal concept and the existential diversity of the act of thinking is interpreted by Siger as an existential unity of the intellect according to CMDA. Aquinas interprets them from formal actualization of *species intelligibilis* through sensual cognition (*species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu*, ch. 4.5.2). The existential act, which is given in the mode of unique causality bound to the first substance, cannot be formalized in the manner, as Aquinas did it. Then, the formally identical mediation appears in the mode of the senses and the intellect (*sensitivum ad sensibilia, similiter se habere intellectum ad intelligibilia*). This is unacceptable for Siger in the existential mode “*ipse*.” Averroes’s conclusions regarding the unity of thought were recognized by Aquinas on the basis of the difference between the individual *species intelligibilis* and the universal *conceptio intellectus*. Objectively speaking, there is a unity between both thinkers on this point. The final concept is conceived as a universal given only in thought; let us see the previous interpretation of *De potentia* (ch. 4.5.2). However, Aquinas, unlike Siger, does not see that *species sensibilis* is given thanks to the material sensual individuation in the mode “*idem*,” and *species intelligibilis* is given thanks to the immateriality and existential investment of the intellect in the soul in the mode “*ipse*.” There it works in *inmixtus* mode and *ab intrinseco*. This difference is precisely defined by Boethius of Dacia in *Anonymus Giele* versus Aquinas’s school by using the term “*subiective—obiective*” (ch. 4.3.1). The noematic content of the thinking of different persons (*conceptus, vox*) must be universal. The given act of thinking in the synthesis is always personal, because sensual cognition is individual, but it is different from the intellect. Aquinas considers the relationship between the senses and the intellect through the general objective comparison (*similiter se habere*). Siger understands the connection of both species as an existential act of existence. The objective and existential interpretation of “*similiter*” differs fundamentally. Let us see the repetition of this gigantomachy in the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. Sensual cognition is individualized and actualized in the real world. The intellect is individualized and actualized by immaterial abstraction (*inmixtus, ab extrinseco*) from *species sensibilis* given in material ways.

The school of Aquinas and Siger was divided due to fundamental questions concerning the unity of the person. Either, the intellect receives individual *species intelligibilis* and it becomes actualized through them (*qua2*). Or, it is about the act of the whole person, in which we are freely engaged due to personal causality (*qua1*). For Siger, any position of the type *qua2* in the above-mentioned form in *De potentia* is absolutely unacceptable (*intellectus habet operationem per se*). We have quoted Siger’s existential interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* (εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, E.N. 1077a12). Heidegger did it in the same way again, after several hundred years of thinking biased by Oxfordian Fallacy. Siger’s interpretation of *Ethics* has shown that Albert and Aquinas did not recognize the actual intention of Aristotle and were not able to interpret the text *De anima* in depth (*isti viri deficiunt ab intentione Philosophi, nec intentum determinant*, ch. 4.4.3). Siger, after Aquinas’s arrival in Paris, integrally interpreted the Philosopher’s intention in writing *De anima intellectiva*. Thomas rejected Siger’s interpretation of the unity of the intellect according to CMDA, which set out the different position of both thinkers in the exposition of Aristotle’s *intentum*. Aristotelian Thomism, like the first Averroism, defends the exposure of cognition from the direction of real things. But Thomism defines the intellect primarily from the exposure made from behind, from the direction of determining the intellect as a form or essence. Agostino Nifo indirectly testifies to the point of view of Aquinas as a representative of *sophistae* *Latinorum* with regard to the teaching of Siger.[[322]](#footnote-322) Unfortunately, Nifo was the representative of the second Averroism and he misinterpreted CMDA doctrine. In fact, Nifo presents the philosophy of Siger in a totally erroneous way. He accredited to Siger the Thomistic version of Averroism to make a total mess of all errors put together. Unfortunately, that was the way, how the philosophy of Aristotle was commonly explained in the Renaissance. The essential definition of the intellect as a form is primary, and from it, as a result, the act of understanding is deduced that is presented in the first person. The classic “meta-physics” following the real Commentator refused the essence of predicted Thomistic “*esse*” of the intellect. It has no univocal character according to *Second Analytics*, made in the mode “*ex inmediatis*.” Thomism lacks predication with regard to the existentially given hyparchical activity of the intellect (*conscii sumus*). In the definition of the intellect, Aquinas does not have the causal activity tied to the first real substance, because he replaced it with the Porretan intellect as a hypostasis. Thomism did not define the real person according to CMDA, but the cognizant subject of Grosseteste made out of several forms. However, that was exactly the reason, why Grosseteste had to leave Paris for Oxford when the University of Paris, based on the Sicilian school, was created. And that was the excellent reason, why the same kind of semiaverroistic Thomism in the version of Aegidius was warmly accepted in the school of *sophistae Latini* that resided in Oxford. The masters in the rue du Fouarre were not modernists and correctly saw that Thomism had outlined the nature of the person in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. Thomas did not have a full predication of causally given existence, as it is required in *Second Analytics*. The scientific proof of the person as any other real substance must be based on the causality of the real first substances. Thinking is not real by itself, but only in the existentially experienced body (*experimur—conscii sumus*). In Thomistic Aristotelianism, the person has lost the character of *quidditas* given by the metaphysical dative and has become a modern impersonal subject. Aquinas describes the cognition of the objective figure of the intellect based on the essential definition of logical concepts. In Thomistic Aristotelianism, the person has lost the character of *quidditas*, which is given by means of a metaphysical dative. The person became a modern impersonal subject. Siger recognized with absolute accuracy that this is not a full scientific definition of the “*ipse*” in the thesis “*homo ipse intelligit*.” This definition is given in *Second Analytics* in the statements determined by the complete order of deduction, that is, by the metaphysical imposition of causality exercised by first substances. Deduction must go from the first triad of cognitive principles to the second, and not vice versa, as in Thomism. Aquinas stated the mode “*per se*” of cognition within the framework of a logical supposition that referred to the Avicennian intellect of the “Flying Man.” Thomism provides an essential and formal scientific definition of the modern subject in the mode of mere primary semantics (σημεία πρώτων), because it has not found an existential predication for movements of the soul (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς). As a result, Thomistic definition of the person lacks the full correspondence between the reality of the person and its universal meaning (ὁμοιώματα). The later humanism of *via Modernorum* is erroneous in the same way as the Thomistic definition of the person. Thomas introduced into the soul the plurality of two forms, which abolished the unity of the person.

Siger rejected every hypostasis of the intellect as Averroism. Aquinas, in turn, rejected the phenomenological interpretation of Siger based on CMDA as Averroism. According to him, both Aristotle and Averroes had an eternal soul determined through the immaterial and separate nature of *anima intellectiva*. Averroes had the intellect in the soul defined in CMDA supposedly incorrectly, Aristotle in *De anima* correctly. But both philosophers insisted on an immaterial and separate form of the intellect in man, which Siger allegedly questioned with his interpretation of CMDA. But then philosophy has ceased to serve theology, by pursuing its own truth, and it is unable to bring full proof of the eternity of the soul. Roman disputation concerning *De anima* (c. 1267), published after the publication of Siger’s commentary QIIIDA, comprehends the intellect in the essentialist mode, that is, as taken from the form to the effects. Aquinas, as a theologian, thus ensures the immortality of the soul. The nature of the above-mentioned predication of the essence ensures that formalization given in this way entails the scientific proof of formally conceived receptivity. The problem is what kind of receptivity is meant by this. Aquinas insists on the identity of reception for both the intellect and the senses, which Aegidius repeats in the Oxford manuscript (*phantasma se habet ad intellectum possibilem sicut color ad visum*, ch. 4.3.2). The difference between Aquinas and Siger is given in the twofold (phenomenal, essential) question “how” the faculties of the soul and its essence relate to each other. Siger, in accordance with *Second Analytics*, asserts that by the act of cognition given in the physical person, we also recognize the essence of the soul. Thomism introduced a new version of Oxfordian Fallacy with regard to the cognition of intellect. This recognition is determined in the mode of Avicennist comitation of essences. Roman disputations *De anima* confirms the concept of the soul given by deductive proof taken from the essential definition. The cognitive intuition the intellect (*Vor-blickbahn*) is determined by the formal deduction of causality and the effects are derived from the formal deduction. Thomistic interpretation of *De anima* asserts that faculties of the soul are the consequence of its being. Unfortunately, the definition of intellect in the real person is not the same as the definition of the triangle that exists only in mind. The deduction of intellect proceeds from the soul as an essence. That proceeding introduced the thinking according to Oxfordian Fallacy in the first Averroism. The theological dogma, given as the eternity of the soul, necessarily needed a dogmatically determined philosophy. This determined the essence of the future Thomism, which was given by the dispute over the title of *Expositor Novus* in 1270–72. Formal proof according to Avicennism abolished the scientific procedure of metaphysical proof according to the axiom “*ex inmediatis*.” It was this error that Thomas defended in Roman disputations on *De anima*.

“Aristotle claimed that the intellect as the faculty of understanding, has no sense organ. Therefore, the essence of the intellectual soul is connected with the body as a form (*ipsa essentia animae intellectivae unitur corpori ut forma*). It is true that the effect is not simpler than its cause (*effectus non est simplicior sua causa*). The ability of the soul is the consequence of its being (*potentia animae est effectus essentiae eius*), because all potencies emanate from the being of the soul. Therefore, no ability of the soul is simpler than its being. If the intellect were not the act of the body, as is proved in the third book of *De anima*, the soul could not connect with it as a form either.” [[323]](#footnote-323)

Aquinas, like Siger, needs to clarify the question of the intellect separated from the sense organs. But his fundamental position differs from Siger. Following *Second Analytics*, Siger begins with the experience of personal thinking and goes to the essence of the intellect in general. Aquinas does exactly the opposite. The act of thinking is added to the essentially defined intellect, because it forms a logical consequence of its essence. Aquinas fell into his own trap. In the polemic against modernists in *Summa contra Gentiles* concerning knowledge of God, he rejected the procedure of deduction that went from the logical form to its effects in reality (ch. 4.5.1). The definition begins with the essence of the intellect, which is associated with the soul as a form of the body. From this theoretical connection is deduced real knowledge of the intellect given within the framework of the nature determined in that manner. The general rule for deduction is that in the order of being the effect cannot be higher than its cause (*effectus non est simplicior sua causa*). The middle link of the proof says that the nature of intellect as an immaterial faculty determines the effect of the immaterial soul (*nulla ergo potentia animae est simplicior esse animae*). The intellectual faculty belongs to the soul as a form and immaterial essence connected with the body (*ipsa essentia animae intellectivae*). Then all immaterial potency of the soul corresponds to it as effects (*omnes potentiae fluunt ab esse eius*). This syllogism brings to light the basic problem of Thomistic interpretation of *De anima* and the lack of unity of the person.

Aegidius saw this problem of Thomism very well. Therefore, in a key debate in 1270, he sophistically set aside this fundamental error of Aquinas by accusing Averroes, in the modern mode *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*, of conceiving the soul as a hypostatized intellect. This practice was really malevolent, for Aegidius knew exactly all arguments in QIIIDA. It is clearly demonstrated by an important quotation from *De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* written in 1271 (*ex tali unione intellectus ad nos, quam Commentator ponit, non sequitur, quod homo intelligat, sed magis quod intelligatur*, ch. 4.4.4). According to the rules of formal logic, Thomas’s term is defined correctly. The faculties of *anima intellectiva* are derived from the intellect and the soul is defined as a logical essence. It means that the existing person of classical metaphysics was transformed into the cognizing subject of modern Thomism. Man is not a subject, but the person. According to Siger and later according to Heidegger, this objective definition is incorrectly given for the existing person. Man is a fully scientifically defined person in the Latin West only in Siger′s conception of humanism, which modernity has destroyed through the academic and therefore completely objective *damnatio memoriae*. Let us see all explanations of *Anal. Post*. 84a11–14 that refused the metaphysical error called “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*.” The scientific definition of *anima intellectiva* has to follow the causality of the real person, in order to state that causality in the middle member of deductive syllogism. The proof must entail the real act of thinking in the first person in its totality (*experimur—conscii sumus*). Fallacy of Thomism and later modernism derived from it is based on the formal essentialist deduction of the person. Out of the essence as a formal cause, the activities are deduced as its consequences (*effectus essentiae*). It fundamentally wrong, since the essence is a mental concept; it can exercise no causality effects in the real world as the first substances do. In the question of the unity of the person and the intellect, Aquin adheres to the erroneous line of Oxfordian Fallacy, because he conceives the essence as a real cause. On the formal side, it is the same conclusion as Siger did; but, according to *Second Analytics*, this is not enough for the scientific proof of things that exist in the real world. In the school of the first Averroism, Siger represents the philosophical phenomenologist according to the Commentator; Aquinas is a Christian Thomist by following Avicenna. Under the influence of divine Furies, now educated in freshly founded Thomism, a tragic conclusion was necessarily made. The ousted Siger perfectly defended the ipseity of the Christian person, and the victorious Thomism only defended the identity of the Christian subject. That *factum* makes the tragedy of Western humanism, since the person became a Thomistic subject in the new exegesis of *De anima*.

Siger’s criticism of Aquinas also applies to the correct phenomenology of Albert that mistakenly changed the order of *demonstratio*. He deduces the nature of intellect from the essence, instead of stating scientific cognition from the existing causality of the first substance (ch. 4.4.3). Albert, however, takes the real person in the definition according to CMDA, in contrast to Aquinas’s formal dualism. Instead of imposing the meaning for the *intellectus possibilis* from real existence (*ipse*), Aquinas and Albert carried out the deduction of meaning from the essence of man (*homo intelligit*). They put the essential supposition in the first place instead of the causally given imposition. In contrast to Siger, Aquin prefers a weak, objectively given identity of the person (*Gehaltsinn*) and by no means the ipseity in the sense of later hermeneutics of facticity (*Vollzugsinn*, ch. 4.4.1). The same position is also confirmed in the key text from *De unitate intellectus* (1270), which proceeds from the essence of the intellect to its effects. The intellect does not possess a sense organ given in the body; it is immaterial, in contrast to the senses. The soul therefore possesses immaterial potency in the act of its understanding (*immaterialiter recipiens et se ipsam intelligens*).[[324]](#footnote-324) The treatise defends the hylemorphic unity of the person against the second Averroism, which places Aquinas in the school of the first Averroism. However, the way of reasoning with regard to the immateriality of the soul is conducted in the spirit of objective Thomism, as well as in the above-mentioned quotation from QD *De anima*. The deduction from the hypostatized essence of the soul to its intellectual faculty is revealed in the following quote from *De unitate*.

“On the other hand, it is objected that the potency of the soul cannot be more immaterial and simpler than its essence. The reasoning should be correct in such a way that it starts from the essence of the human soul as an immaterially given form (*essentia humanae animae sic esset forma materiae*). This form does not have a being by itself, but out of the hylemorphic single thing (*non per esse suum essent, sed per esse compositi*). The same applies to other forms, which by themselves have neither a being nor an activity of their own, but only through matter. That is why they are called material forms. The human soul, conceived according to its own being (*quia secundum suum esse est*), is given in such a way that the level of its form is higher than that of the materially given ability (*maior est dignitas huius formae quam capacitas materiae*). Therefore, nothing prevents them from carrying out an activity or abilities to which the material part of the soul is not capable.” [[325]](#footnote-325)

The opponents say that the potency of the soul arises from the immaterial nature of the substance; let us see the term “*materia spiritualis*” of Bonaventure and Pecham. In the mode of univocity of matter and form as being of the third kind, these objective modernists have no problem with Aristotle’s thesis that the potency of the soul cannot exceed the essence of the soul (*potentia animae non potest esse immaterialior aut simplicior quam eius essentia*). Matter, as being of the third kind, solved this problem by itself, because he is a spiritual potency and a substance. However, the first Averroism categorically rejected the existence of the third kind. Compared to objective modernity of the second Averroism, the modern Aristotelian Aquinas defends something different, namely the objective Thomism. Therefore, the text accepts this principle (*optime quidem procederet ratio*), but applies it to the hylemorphic composition of the first substance (*essentia humanae animae ... per esse compositi*). The quotation defends the separated intellect, which places *anima intellectiva* in a different position than the vegetative and animalistic faculties of the soul (*est dignatus huius formae quam capacitas materiae*). As we know, Siger defended this conception of the *anima intellectiva* as a compositum already before Aquinas (ch. 4.4.2). The argument starts from the essence of the human soul as a materially given form (*essentia humanae animae sic esset forma materiae*). The soul as the form receives being from the hylemorphic individual thing (*non per esse suum esset, sed per esse compositi*). Aquinas does not state the unity of the existing person, but the unity of the essential and formal subject (*secundum esse est*). The question is again how the soul is to be understood as a composition of material and immaterial activities whether essential or existential. In both conceptions, the soul has its own autonomous activity independent of the senses (*operationem vel virtutem ad quam materia non attingit*). The quotation shows that the principle of deduction from the essence of the soul to its *operatio* is the basic feature of Aquinas’s thinking not only from the time of the Roman disputations up to 1268, but also during his second stay in Paris, where he had to deal with the objections of Siger’s school. Now it becomes clear why Aquinas lost the dispute over the title *Expositor Novus*, and why Thomistic simulacrum created by Aegidius acquired it.

Siger rejected studying the essence of soul according to dogmatic definition of Thomism (*potentia animae est effectus essentiae eius*). The essential definition of man given in the cited mode “*esse compositum*” differs fundamentally from Siger’s phenomenological approach. The action of intellect in the mode *per prius* runs in existentially given causality, and from it we infer the essential nature of the soul in the mode *per posterius*. The phenomenology of the person cannot start from the essential definition. Aquinas is well aware that the act of intellectual mental activities must be present in the body. Only the potency of the soul exists primarily in the hypostatized habitual mode of the Toletan definition of the soul according to Gundissalinus (*actus corporis potentia vitam habentis*; OBJ II, ch. 2.2.1). Aquinas needs the hypostatized habitus because he has no other way how to ensure the immortality of the soul (*semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae*).[[326]](#footnote-326) This corresponds to the argument cited above, which defines the soul as an actual and habitually made hypostatized form in the mode of “*actus primus*” (*ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus*). Siger in QIIIDA rejected intellect as a hypostasis because such a form of intellect is empirically unprovable. The theologian Aquinas must ensure the immortality of the soul at the level of subsistent form and habitus. It is possible only according to Avicennism in the Toledo school. Aquinas’s thesis of the immortality of the soul is considered merely a dogmatic assertion of objective essentialism. Once again, it is about the metaphysical error “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*.” Aquin provides the proof in the mode “*secundum simpliciter*” (and thus only *essentialiter*) and by no means in the mode “*secundum quid*” according to the real experienced causality of understanding that exists in the body. Siger argues that the essential definition does not take the path of real causality, which requires the scientific proof of *Second Analytics* (ch. 4.4.3). Aquinas either did not understand Siger’s criticism already given in QIIIDA; or, he did not want to change his position. The second variant is more likely. The first Thomist Aegidius knew exactly the difference “*homo (ipse) intelligit*” between Thomas and Siger and Averroes was accused of Aquinas’s mistake. The quotation from *De unitate* confirms the deductive principle from essence to effects and defends it against the second Averroism by referring to the specific position of the immaterial soul and the separated intellect. Wéber claims that by deducing the potency of the soul from its immaterial essence (*potentia animae non potest esse immaterialior aut simplicior quam eius essentia*), Thomas responds to Siger’s Averroistic position of separated *intellectus possibilis* (Wéber 1970, 87–91). This thesis is not tenable from the point of view of the present hermeneutics. Wéber did not see Albert’s position correctly (he understood this as an Averroism). Wéber took Thomas’s hypostatized intellect to be a substantial and emanating form of Avicennism. Such thesis can be found in Pecham’s and Bonaventure’s second Averroism, but certainly not in Aquinas′s teaching. But the thoughtful Wéber, in contrast to the objectivist Bazán, saw that Siger’s criticism accurately and rightly rejected the formal side of Aquinas’s conception of the intellect. Unfortunately, Wéber’s definition of *intellectus possibilis* as a cosmic hypostasis and even as a substance in Aquinas starts from the position of the second Averroism. Aquin’s tough stance against modernists was confirmed in Aquinas’s hermeneutics mentioned above, and Bazán also argued in a similar way in his polemic against Wéber. Bazán’s complete rejection of Wéber’s analysis must be corrected as well. Wéber’s conception of formal nature of intellect as a separated substance corresponds exactly to the second Averroism of Bonaventure and Pecham, because both Averroists adhere to the line of Oxfordian Fallacy. The next problem of Thomistic Wéber lies in the fact that the essentialist and formalist definition of the intellect, created for Siger as an Averroist, are in clear contradiction to Siger’s phenomenology. Let’s quote the key part of Wéber’s reasoning regarding Aquinas.[[327]](#footnote-327) This analysis was rightly criticized by Bazán, but unfortunately from Siger’s position as an Averroist, which we also find in Wéber’s conclusions. However, Wéber’s analysis hit at the core of Aquinas’s problematic conception of the hypostatized *intellectus possibilis*, which Siger saw and rejected in a qualified way. Thomas’s hypostatized concept of the possible intellect runs as an Avicennistic *intellectus formalis*. The intellect became an independent form, which essentially defines the activity of intellect. As a result, the definition of *anima intellectiva* became an external addition to the being of the person. Siger defended exactly the opposite position in the mode “*homo ipse intelligit*.” The middle link of the proof in Thomas is essentially defined from the concept instead of the causal action of the real first substance. However, Aquinas’s intellect, as an essence, does not have the character of substance, as is the case in the second Averroism. The partisans of universal hylemorphism defined the soul as a substance through *materia spiritualis*, which Aquinas rejected in principle. The substantiality of intellect imported by Rufus and then defended in Bonaventure’s school, was rejected by all representatives of the first Averroism as philosophically ridiculous or downright insane. The soul cannot be a kind of substance in the parallel universe of objective beings of the third kind, because the immaterial intellect would then function as a separate substance. This was and still is the fundamental error of modernism and postmodernism. Albert, Aquin and Siger knew that we think when we want to and experience this thinking personally in the body. Modern Alexandrians received only the material intellect (*intellectus materialis*) through numerical individuation and by no means the separated and immaterial *intellectus possibilis* of Averroes and Aristotle.

Aquin rejected the solution of CMDA and therefore has to defend the immateriality of the receptive intellect in a different way than Siger. This was shown by his commentary from 1270, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Now it becomes clear why Siger made a repeated criticism of Aquinas in the work *De anima intellectiva* (ch. 4.4.3), to which Aquin no longer wanted to react or perhaps could no longer react after leaving Paris. The debate against Siger is continued by the first Thomist and Sophist Aegidius Romanus through an attack on Averroes. He could not refute Siger’s arguments philosophically, see the manuscript edited by Bazán (ch. 4.3.3). Aegidius only diabolized Averroes, and the subsequent diabolization of Siger performed Pecham at Oxford. After the year 1277, the objectively active Furies transformed the defeated Aquinas into a victorious Thomist, the true Muslim commentator into a false Christian heretic, the real person into a non-existent subject, and the brilliant Siger into a diabolical creature. This great work of academic *transmutatio* brought about the objective *lapis philosophorum*. That tragicomic *opus magnum* was realized by authoritarian bishops Tempier and Kilwardby that were seconded by all kinds of modernists. The modern age really could not wish for a higher quality of mythology to build upon it. That is why modernity was able to walk cheerfully *via Modernorum* and to arrive in nihilism of world wars and totalitarianism.

### 4.5.4 Birth of Objective Thomism

Hermeneutics must shed light on Aquinas’s specific Semiaverroism, which starts in times of editing of *Summa contra Gentiles* to his end. Let’s begin with the theses of the second Averroism that Siger and Aquinas unanimously rejected. The second Averroism does not solve the problem of personal acts of the intellect, because from the very beginning it comprehends it in a purely substantive way. Due to Oxfordian Fallacy, he observes the world as bad as he thinks it and vice versa. Modernity left Averroes’s function of the diaphanum (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4), which is a fundamental element in CMDA and for the first Averroism. Without diaphanum, it was not possible to achieve a correspondence of the material world and immaterial thinking. The mediation disappeared that formed basic phenomenological question of “how” it is possible to achieve a correspondence between reality and thought. Neoplatonism in the version of Themistius and Avicenna interpreted the process of understanding according to the irradiation of the intellect by the sun in the model of exposure from behind, in the form of “sun—ray—eye” (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The ontotheological system of Bonaventure and Pecham already made full use of the metaphor with the rays of the sun irradiating the soul literally and transferred Bible into philosophy (*signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine*; ch. 4.1.2). Without the Giver of forms, the system of irradiation of the intellect from behind would not work; ontotheological metaphysics would no longer be a mystical and thus objectively given theology and philosophy. For objective postmodernism irradiated by the light from God’s face and today by mathematics, by language games and by financial derivatives, mediation of meaning from the thing to the intellect became an unnecessary burden. Within the framework of the conception of truth as *rectitudo*, a whole series of being of the third and univocal transcendental determinations of being necessarily began to be born. Instead of the mediation between thinking and reality, the objective categorization and the description of non-existent beings of the third kind appeared on the scene, since the modern intellect sees them directly in reality. Thinking was anchored in the thing itself that was transformed into a modern *scibile* (Rufus, Bonaventure, Descartes, Husserl). Mystic thinking of *illuminati* goes directly to things themselves and sees in them a universal eidetic meaning. The nature of modern causality proceeds from hypostatized modern intellect that became an exclusive source of the demiurgic production of the sense of being. Aquin, like Siger, rejected this approach in principle and already opposed the school of second Averroism during his first stay in Paris. Hermeneutics must investigate how Thomas’s conception of the intellect was transformed about the year 1270 when his main work against Averroism was created. From Thomas’s specific Semiaverroism, Aegidius and other Latin sophists elaborated the objective Thomism. Like this, the metaphysical error of Avicennist modernity, given by Oxfordian Fallacy, settled directly in the first Averroism. Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* is guided by the hidden form of the myth of solar intellect, which Averroes rejected (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.2). The analogy between the exposure of the senses and the intellect in the mode of univocal formal causality, Siger considers a fundamental error, because this would exclude the basic axiom “*ex inmediatis*” that makes existential cognition of the person. Let us recall the main passage from Themistius’s interpretation of *De anima* (τὸ νοεῖν ἀνάλογόν ἐστι τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι), which characterizes the Thomistic interpretation that Siger refused.[[328]](#footnote-328) Thomas’s erroneous use of Themistius’s hypostatized *intellectus possibilis*, which is completely separated from the sensually based *intellectus materialis*, was attributed to Averroes as an Averroist in the sophistic projection of the reversal to the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). The connoisseurs of Aristotle in the rue du Fouarre, they rejected Thomistic arguments. Let us now return to the introductory difference, which was expressed between that of Siger and Aquin by the sentence “*homo ipse intelligit*” (Siger) and “*homo intelligit*” (Aquin). The clarification of this question decided the dispute over the *Expositor Novus*. As part of the first Averroism, a new dispute broke out about 1270 between religious theologians and secular magisters over the thesis “*homo (ipse) intelligit*.” According to Aquinas and Albert, the unity of the person and the intellect differed from the conception of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre, which Boethius of Dacia represented in those days as the author of work *Anonymus Giele* (ch. 4.3.1). The whole school of first Averroism rejected the sophistic solution of second Averroism and today’s postmodernism, which postulate the multiplicity of substances in man.

But on the table remained Aquinas’s problematic conception of the intellect as a form (*qua2*), which was born in the Roman period when the commentaries on Aristotelian Corpus were finished until the year 1268. The group of artists in the rue du Fouarre called *pars Sigeri* considered Averroes’s definition of intellect as immaterial potency of the soul to sum up the unity of the person. The intellect is actualized in the person as a hylemorphic substance. The person is present in the act of existence when the bodily substance is primarily experienced (*homo ipse intelligit*). The intellect is given as an immaterial potency in the intellectual soul as an entelechic form that actualizes the existing person as a causally acting first substance. This position expresses the definition of the intellect by means of the difference between following three different terms: the essential species of intellect as the pure potency of the general definition; the entelechic soul as the only form of the living person; the existing person as the unique first substance. This view corresponds to the integral concept of Aristotelian metaphysics, which is given methodologically according to *Second Analytics* and according to Averroes in the mode of “substance *qua* substance.” The project of metaphysics according to the first Averroism begins by studying causal effects of first substances in reality, and then proceeds to the general predication of those effects in the deductive scientific proof. The investigation of the real being in the mode of Averroes’s metaphysics establishes the possibility of general statements about the being. Such thinking only secondarily includes Avicenna’s model of metaphysics in the mode “*ens inquantum ens*.” The metaphysics of the first substance made by the Commentator established the unity of the first science. It was handed down by the falsafa of Alfarabi and it presupposes the truth as correspondence of reality and intellect. The model of truth as correspondence prevented the fatal solution of the modern and postmodern Alexandrians, who turned the intellect into a second substance and they defined man as a specific corpse. Aquinas’s conception of intellect as an independent form in the soul introduces a new being of the third kind into the act of cognition. The intellect became a hypostasis in the soul with its own act of “exsistence”, which is theologically necessary to ensure the immortality of the soul. Thomistic theology and philosophy united into one truth was warmly welcomed by dogmatic schools of *Modernorum*. Aegidius was the first Thomist that dominated the University of Paris after the condemnation of Sigers school in 1277. Gigantomachy about substance took place in the years 1270–72 within the first Averroism and concerned the plurality of forms in man, which we already find in Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). The struggle for the title “*Expositor Novus*” between the Aristotelianism of Aquinas and Siger became a key dispute. The modernist branch of the first Averroism was represented by Aquinas and Aegidius, and on the other side of the academic front were Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia.

Siger could in no case accept the thesis that the intellect is another form besides the soul, because the intellect is the immaterial and potential faculty of the soul. It makes the only form of every living body, not only that of man. Semiaverroist definition of intellect as an intellectual hypostasis was defended in the school of the first Averroism of Aquinas and Aegidius. Both representatives of the first Averroism were inspired by Avicenna not only in the question of the soul as a hypostasis, but also in the question of the intellect as a hypostatic form. Albert did not take part in the Paris struggle for the unity of the person and intellect around 1270 for understandable reasons, which are explained in the chapters on Siger. As a connoisseur of CMDA, he certainly understood that Aquinas’s position regarding *De anima* in the period of Roman disputations (1265–68) could not stand up to Siger’s argumentation based on a brilliant knowledge of Averroes’s philosophy. Moreover, he met Aquin during the semi-annual stay at the papal Orvieto (1262–63), so he knew well Averroist′s stance of Aquinas. Albert clearly recognized from the subsequent writings of Aquinas that he had not changed the negative point of view on Averroes and CMDA. According to Albert as a connoisseur of CMDA, Thomas interpreted the individualization of the intellect in a Semiaverroist way. He did not adhere to the unity of the person as a hylemorphic substance, because he added another hypostatic form to it. The act of subsistence turned the intellect into a second form next to the soul, thereby saving the immateriality and eternity of the soul for theology. Through the conception of the intellect as a form, Aquinas extended the subsistence of the form to the intellect, which received an immaterial subsistence similar to the soul (*qua2*). Siger was opposed to this solution in principle. It formally corresponds to Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima* and the second manner of the proof based on the essence according to *Second Analytics*. However, according to CMDA this solution is fundamentally flawed because Thomism had abolished the unity of the person and replaced it with the abstract subject in the mode of the essence. The subject of Christian dogmatic is presented according to Aristotle’s teaching in *De anima*, but in reality that interpretation of cognizing subject follows Avicenna’s writing *De anima*. This subject of Christian Aristotelianism became immortal due to logical and theological reasons, which, according to the critical phenomenologist Siger, we do not directly experience. The subject as an essence does not predict the existence of the person; it is a simple concept given in mind. The intellect is given solely as the immaterial potency of the soul. Nor can any of the immaterial faculties of the intellect (*intellectus possibilis, agens*) be separated from the soul, nor from the person as a hylemorphic first substance. For Siger, the term “*separabilis*” has a completely specific character, which is established against the Averroist statute of soul and intellect conceived in a “*separatus*” mode (ch. 4.4.2). According to Siger, the actuality lies only in the soul as the entelechical form of the body (*anima est qua intelligimus*, ch. 4.4.3). Any definition of intellect as “*separatus*” must subsequently perform the act of Porretan “*exsistit*,” because it must connect the hypostatized intellect with the soul and the body in some form of *colligatio*. Averroes strongly protested against any hypostatic form of intellect in the person according to the intellect of Themistius or Alexander as a being of the third kind (*hoc aliquid*). Intellectual potency exists in and of itself only as a concept in thinking (*quartum genus*) and cannot possess the objective character of hypostasis of the third kind. Every abstraction and universalization forms only a concept of the intellect, which is not and cannot be a substance, but only a mental notion. Therefore, it is possible to determine the abstract and specific existence of the intellect within the framework of humanity as a species. Specifically given humanity has never thought and it will never think, because it does not really exist. The intellect really exists only at the moment of its act, whereby it is actualized by the sensual recognition in the soul as a hylemorphic form of the body (*qua1*). In thinking, a universal concept of the intellect as a form, essence, substance, etc. can be formed. This universal meaning does not really exist, but only potentially. It is given thanks to the work of the intellect in the act of abstraction by the individual *intellectus speculativus*, which was analyzed for the first time by Albert on the basis of CMDA (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). The universal and fully divided *intellectus possibilis* arise through abstraction in the individual act of thinking. Such an intellect, in the sense of the formally given entity, has being only at the level of universal species. The intellect, as a species, can never be actualized in this universal way of being. It is a pure concept that was created in the process of abstraction given due to the real act of thinking.

The mistake of Aquinas and other Semiaverroists in the camp of first Averroism lay in the fact that they turned the conceptually conceived *intellectus possibilis* into a causally efficient middle link of the scientific proof of cognition, which ensures theologically necessary condition of immortality for man. To do this, they sophistically used the Porretan deduction in the “*semel—semper*” mode. They moved from the metaphysics of abstraction to the logical reasoning made according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The essential definition was given by the causal statute of the first substance, which, according to Siger, lies only in the individual person (*homo ipse intelligit*). The person is mortal, but thinks in an immaterial way and is able to discern everything. In the mode of causality, it can also recognize its immaterial thinking, but by no means its immortality, because this is given only as a theological postulate in the mode of essence; such a concept can be found only in thinking. The truthfulness of the thesis about the immortality of the soul is ensured by the science of different genre, because philosophy has no possibility of univocal predication of the immortal soul from the hyparchical causality. Aristotelian philosophy cannot scientifically prove the status of the soul before birth and after death, because it lacks the phenomenally given causality of the first substance. But from the position of correctly defined intellect, one can draw correct logical conclusions about the immortality of the soul. However, such kind of hypothetical proof remains outside the status of philosophy as a strict science according to *Second Analytics*. Therefore, the separation of philosophy and theology as two *univoce* defined sciences is absolutely indispensable. The debate concerning the proof of the eternity of the soul is formally of the same character as the debate about eternity or the creation of the world. Logically, both the eternity of the soul and the eternity of the divinely created world can be defended, but only in the order of logically correct or false hypotheses. Scientifically proceeding critical philosophers speculate about the phenomena occurring outside of causality only in the order of dialectical abstraction. Siger proceeded in this way in the question of the eternity of the world and of the soul by ruling Augustine out (*si igitur credatur Aristoteli, planum est quod non est credendum Augustino*, ch. 4.4.1). Speculation is not a scientific proof, and critical metaphysics is a rigorous science. Siger emphasizes in the QIIIDA that the essence of the soul does not immediately come to light openly (οὐδέν πω φανερόν, *De anima* 413b25). Therefore, it is necessary to proceed from the reasoning of CMDA. According to Aristotle, Averroes addresses the hermeneutic question, “how” we recognize, which determines the basic procedure for recognizing the intellect (πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν, *De anima* 439a13). The dispute between Siger and Aquinas clearly shows the background of the Decree of the Magisters of April 1272. This last “scholastic” decree of the University of Paris defended in the mode of Socrates’s *scholé* (σχολή, *Theait*. 172d4–9) the unity of critical scientific thought in the area of the two paths to the one metaphysical truth explored by the unity of the person. The critical thinking of philosophy as the first science became obsolete due to the attack of philosophically limited modernists. These do not need a *scholé* for the search for truth (ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ λέγουσι, *Theait*. 172d9), because they are driven by theological tasks such as the defense of the immortal soul, and not by the patient search for the truth of the person. The group of *illuminati* adheres to the truth as the assimilation of ready-made knowledge that was certified in the self-reflexive mode of *certitudo* and *rectitudo* by then functioning God of *Modernorum*. In the age of anti-scholastic postmodernism when only money and power manage the instrumental logistics, the University of Paris finally became extinct. The university cannot be guided the calculative intellect (τὸ λογιστικόν), the object of which consists only in changeable events, but also by insight into the scientific truth in itself (τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν, E.N. 1139a12). It was not the opportunist modernists and the dogmatic thinker Aquinas, but the masters in the rue du Fouarre, who defended the independence of critical thinking from sophists of all kinds. Thomistic intellect, given as a hypostatized form, makes a specific “*hoc aliquid*,” which the new Christian Aristotelians need to ensure the immortality of the soul. This position of modernists and Thomists was seen by Bacon quoted above (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The decision of Parisian artists of April 1, 1272 rejected this approach and critically separated the study of theology from philosophy because of their generic diversity. The different statute of theology and philosophy does not allow the creation of a univocal middle link of the deductive proof. The essential definition of the soul, as it is necessary for ensuring immortality, characterizes the identity of thought and intellect only within the framework of the essence. From the point of view of Aristotelian science, it is a valid proof only as hypothetical scientific proof given *simpliciter*. But such a proof is given in the mode of logical supposition “*secundum simpliciter*,” and not in the causally determined implication in the mode “*secundum quod*.” In scientific judgment, the theological postulates cannot replace the real causality (*conscii sumus*), given only in the phenomenological principle of the experience of one’s own intellect due to the activity given through the senses (*experimur*). The manner how the eternity of the soul is given, that is a different question of revelation mediated by theology and not by rational philosophy. The ipseity of *intellectus possibilis*, given as cognitive power within the framework of *tertium genus* in CMDA, ensures the proof of the immaterial (but not eternal) nature of *anima intellectiva* in the mode “*ex inmediatis*.” The study of hyparchical existence of the person distinguishes the human intellect of the cosmic spheres. The cosmic *intellectus agens* is completely separated from human thinking that is bound to phantasms. In the nihilistic epoch of thinking, which is dominated by the primitive instrumental rationality produced at the level of the hypostatized *intellectus materialis*, it must be pointed out that the human intellect defined by the Commentator and Siger is fundamentally different from the animal *vis aestimativa*. Aristotelian critical masters in the rue du Fouarre fundamentally rejected the production of simulacra run by *sophistae Latini* of the time. Siger, as a connoisseur of *Second Analytics* confirmed that scientific investigation of the immortal soul in theology has a different middle link of demonstrative proof than the existential act of thinking; therefore the theology differs generically from the philosophy. The wise man does not play God by jumping into the different generic mode of cognition by creating a mythological science about the essences carried out in the mode of Unified Science. In the era of the nascent modernism, it was not necessary to emphasize the difference between man and animal. Modern God only started walking his way of the cross given by *crux commentatorum* regarding the definition of person and intellect that finished on the postmodern Calvary. Nietzsche, led by archaic Muses, pierced his side with a nihilistic spear, and the faithful Hegel, on the side of this striving simulacrum of modernity, held the Holy Grail of absolute philosophy. He saved the last remnant of “absolute spirit” (*Geist*) of modern God for the epoch of German idealism. In the nihilistic age of mythology given by the poststructuralist domination of metaphor and difference, this Holy Grail of the absolutely given Hegelian objectivity was hopelessly lost.

Let us return to the beginning of this captivating story about the emergence of objectivity, which flared up with the dispute over the objective Raven of Elijah that “exsisted” in Oxford in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). During his student years in Paris, Aquin created an Averroistic simulacrum of cosmic *intellectus possibilis*. He put this simulacrum in the philosophy of the Commentator in a sophistical way and rightly declared this Averroism ridiculous (*haec ratio ostenditur esse frivola multipliciter,* ch. 4.5.1). Therefore, Aegidius claims in the Oxford manuscript that the Commentator is putting evidence against himself (*per rationes quas ponit Commentator contra seipsum*, ch. 4.3.2). The mythological fabulation of *intellectus possibilis* made out of Averroes an Averroist heretic. Aquin accepted the “Catholic” opinion of Avicenna (*ad intellectum possibiliem, ejus opinio est quam tenemus secundum fidem catholicam*, ch. 4.5.1). These dubious theological statements given by the incursion of dogmatics on the actualized of philosophy have nothing in common with approach of CMDA and magisters as Siger and Bacon knew this very well. Averroes sees the possible intellect merely as an abstraction for *species humana*, which is something completely different from the absurd form of *intellectus possibilis* as a hypostatized cosmic potency. Theoretically postulated concept of *intellectus possibilis* in the form of the faculty runs in the framework of definition of man as a species and it is connected with theoretically postulated unity of mankind. This gave rise to the first humanistic determination of the substantial unity of man and the universal unity of all mankind. Thanks to the existence of philosophy, the abstraction of *intellectus possibilis* applies to humanity as a species, see Dante’s terminus “*universitas humana*” (ch. 4.4.3). Averroes, Siger and Dante emphasize that the universal definition of the receptive intellect is given only as a concept at the level of the abstract unity of humanity conceived as a species. The accusations of Latin sophists regarding Averroes and Siger as Averroists arise from the fatal ignorance of CMDA. Aquinas, Albert and sophistic Aegidius had never made these ridiculous accusations of artists in the rue du Fouarre, because they knew well their conception of the unity of the person. Semiaverroist academics belonged to the school of the first Averroism and, by attacking Siger’s school, would have brought about a public destruction of their own position held with Siger against the modernists. This dialectical slalom is perfectly set out in Aegidius’s sophistry in the years 1268–72. At that time, the Decree of the artistic Faculty began to apply to him, which forbade that unscientific way of thinking on the actualized of the main Christian university. The attack of Aquinas and Aegidius therefore followed the line of modernists against Averroes, which Albert and Bacon, as real connoisseurs of CMDA, never did. The essential definition of the individual intellect contained in Albert′s and Thomas’s deduction is factually correct and formally coincides with the conclusions in CMDA. However, neither according to CMDA nor according to *Second Analytics* does it possess the character of scientific cognition of the intellect. The missing postulate of “*ipse*” has the effect that in the middle link of the deduction, the predication of causality given in real terms by the activity of the first substance, is missing. In Thomistic deductive syllogism, the act of existence in the mode “*ipse,*” as real experience of the intellect as an immaterial potency of *anima intellectiva*, is absent. Since we are living beings, we can also perceive the operation of the intellect and initiate it causally. Siger explains to Thomas that the causality of thinking means that the living person keeps it in her power. However, the person does not have this ability *per prius* in the mode of essence, as was the case with the Semiaverroist Aquinas, but has it in the mode of causally given reality, because we experience it in ourselves. This subtle but absolutely fundamental difference, which is defended in the view of “*homo ipse intelligit*”, escaped all interpretations in the following centuries. It came to the epoch of the objective eclipse of the person as the first actual substance. The modernists following Aquinas’s line do not have the exposure of the intellect from the front, in virtue of the person of Siger or in virtue of Heidegger’s existence as *Dasein*. The definition of modern Thomistic subject is given from the back, from the objective meaning of the person defined as in the framework of the essence. Siger’s group, on the other hand, in the mode of Averroes’s correspondence (*proportio, similitudo*), connected the various links of the complicated equation with each other in order to determine the unique existential character of intellectual cognition. This act of Albert, Siger and Boethius of Dacia was applied by Dante in the book *Monarchia* to the new form of politically engaged humanism (ch. 6.2). Therefore, this poet guided by the truth of Muses and not by the mythopoetic sophistry of Furies, appreciated Siger in *Divine Comedy* as the greatest philosopher of his time and turned Aquinas into a theological modernist as was Bonaventure (ch. 4.4.4). Siger defended the phenomenological basic principle of CMDA against Semiaverroists such as Aquinas and Aegidius. In the first Averroism, they made out the dualism of two formes in the person as one hylemorphic substance. Aquinas provides thinking in the mode of two actualized forms in man, since the intellect became an independent hypostasis. Thomism knows that philosophy is a servant of theology. Two actualized forms in man keep Aristotelian origin and it saved the immortality of the soul. The artistic masters from the rue du Fouarre rejected this approach by their Declaration of 1272. Their critical mind stopped for a short time the unstoppable advance of sophistic modernity, the disintegration of the Paris University and the death of modern God in the Latin West. Islam started this path to death of modern God, but stipped it at the very beginning of modernism.

Referring to CMDA, Siger solved the fundamental question of “how” the immaterial intellect works in the mode “*separabilis*.” The intellect is separated from the sensual qualities of the soul, which are located in the various organs of the body. This solution became the basis of the duality proclaimed by masters from the rue du Fouarre in the “*subiective—obiective*” mode. Boethius of Dacia, as the author of *Anonymus Giele*, used this formulation (*anima indiget in intelligere corpore obiecto, non sicut subiecto*, ch. 4.3.1). Aegidius, as the author of the Oxford manuscript and *Anonymus Bazán* uses this subdivision, but in the mode of Semiaverroism. The attack on secular masters came directly from the school of the first Averroism, which is why Siger bears the title *Doctor Invidiosus*. The Trojan horse was introduced into the camp of the first Averroism by *Doctor angelicus*. He opened Pandora’s box of Semiaverroism by publishing writing *De unitate intellectus*. Secular masters and connoisseurs of CMDA rejected Thomas’s figure of the intellect as a hypostatized form (*qua2*) and its proof of the soul as a subsistent eternal form (*qua1*). This solution endangered both the unity of the person and the project of Aristotelian metaphysics, which is defined *per prius* from causal effects of the person as the first substance. Siger described exactly why Albert and Aquin were not able to get into the phenomenological perspective of CMDA. The exact description of the manner how we recognize (πῶς, *quomodo*) ensured the act of the intellect in the unique existence of the person. The intellectual part of the soul subsists within the framework of the act “*homo ipse intelligit*.” This potency of the soul must be investigated on the basis of phenomenology that describes how this potency of the soul is connected with the body and how it is separated from it. Siger’s second treatise begins with the quotation from the introductory text of CMDA I.12 that we must always keep in mind the problem of cognition and self-cognition of the soul.[[329]](#footnote-329) The phenomenology of cognition must see something important in the act of seeing and existential thinking. What did Aquinas not see in the act of understanding? The hermeneutics of objectivity must distinguish his conception of the soul and intellect from the group of philosophers in the rue du Fouarre, which, according to their rector and mastermind, were called Siger’s school (*pars Sigeri*). The previous chapters have explained that Siger understood the comparison between vision and thinking in the mode of correspondence. We also find it in CMDA for the sensual and intelligible diaphanum. Therefore, he rejected the Neoplatonic model of exposure of the being in the intellect, which did not require mediation. The immateriality of the intellect meant for Siger that it is necessary to interpret the whole series of the correspondence of thinking and reality according to the phenomenology of cognition given in CMDA. This means that one must carefully interpret the various mediations given by sensual recognition in DA I–II, which Siger performed in the Munich manuscript. The intention of Aristotle and the Commentator is given by the whole architecture of their thought, which is presented in the Corpus and, in the case of the study of human cognition, is given in all parts of *De anima* I–III. Therefore, Siger says to the address of Albert and Aquinas that they did not understand the essence of Aristotelianism (*isti viri deficiunt ab intentione Philosophi, nec intentum determinant*, ch. 4.4.3). Aquinas comprehends the work of the intellect and the senses *univoce*. Both individual acts of the soul run in the mode of formal causality and they are given by the mediation of *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. He rejected the phenomenological approach according to CMDA on the actualized that Averroes understood the individual act of thinking in man through the detached *intellectus possibilis*. Before his return to Paris, Aquin had either not comprehended the teaching of CMDA in depth or he rejected its conclusions. Aquinas conceived the formal intellect in the mode of *separatus*. The proof of the immateriality of the soul is given by the fact that the divided intellect forms an immaterial hypostasis of this form (*qua2*). Thomism defines the essence of the intellect and the soul theologically, and not philosophically. Aquinas considered the act of cognition from the point of view of the soul as an immortal form. According to Siger, this is a possible interpretation according to the exegesis of DA III, but by no means according to the original intention of Aristotelianism. According to Thomas, the existence of the immortal soul in the individual hylemorphic composition had to be maintained at all costs against the Latin sophists and Averroists, who adhered to the universal hylemorphic dualism of soul and body. The immortality of the immaterial soul given in the unity of the person is in the first place for him. Modernists destroyed the unity of the person, which was absolutely inadmissible for all disciples of Alvernus at the University of Paris.

Aquin took a different approach to the criticism of the modernists than Siger and Albert, who had understood the genius of CMDA. Thomas’s attitude to the question of the *intellectus possibilis* is given by the criticism of Averroes as an Averroist, which was put forward from the formalist and essentialist position. Albert indirectly rejected Thomas’s semiaverroistic position by refusing to come to Paris in 1270. This connoisseur of CMDA, recognized by all, should have criticized his student in the same style as Siger did. Modernism and its Averroists won the key dispute “*homo ipse intelligit*” partly due to fateful absence of Albert. He should have defended his truth about the unity of the person not only against modernists, but also by criticizing Aquinas. He starts from the hypostatized conception of *intellectus possibilis*, without taking into account the conception of this intellect in CMDA as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. The following quotation from the Roman disputation *De spiritualibus creaturis* (ca. 1268), which was written before the second return to Paris, defines Averroism of Averroes according to the pattern of the first texts (ch. 4.5.1). The course of recognition from the writing *De potentia* is made according to CMDA scheme. But Aquinas could not accept this interpretation in full. Therefore, he introduced into CMDA the being of the third kind in the mode “*duplex esse*.” Thomistic interpretation of the Averroes and CMDA is presented in the Averroist mode as *continuatio*.

“Averroes presented the possible intellect as a substance separate from the body (*posuit intellectum possibilem, secundum esse, separatum a corpore*). However, he saw that if there is no connection of this intellect with the real man in any way, then the effect of this intellect cannot be given in the individual. Namely, if there are two completely separate substances, then the active substance has no possibility of acting on the other. Therefore, he left this passive intellect, which he considered to be a substance completely (*omnino*) separated from the body, so that it would be connected with the real person through the phantasms (*continuari cum hoc homine per phantasmata*). The intelligible species, which is the perfection of the possible intellect, is based on the phantasms from which this species is abstracted.” [[330]](#footnote-330)

The possible intellect is really separated from the body in CMDA (*separatum a corpore*), but in a different way than assumes this objective and essentialist presentation. Aquinas uses part of the reasoning of CMDA in accordance with the thesis in *De anima* about the divided intellect, see Aristotle’s θύραθεν and Siger′s *ab extrinseco* (ch. 4.4.1). The error in the Thomistic interpretation of CMDA is hidden in the determination of the possible intellect as a cosmic substance separate from the body (*intellectum possibilem, secundum esse*). It is fundamentally false. There is no possible intellect in the heavenly sphere, since the cosmic intelligences exist as *intellectus agens*. According to Aquinas′s teaching during his first stay in Paris (ch. 4.5.1), their receptivity is done as a degree of potentiality of *intellectus agens.* Following Avicenna′s interpretation of *De anima*, Aquinas excluded the receptivity of cosmic intelligences coming from material world, or from *intellectus materialis* of Avicenna. The theory of cosmic *intellectus possibilis*, is such a nonsense that it cannot be justified even by Avicenna′s standards. In fact, it is the pantheistic theory of David Dinant condemned in Paris in the year 1215 (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3). That is the reason why Aegidius condemned Averroes as a heretic that perverted even the Islamist monotheism. That Averroistic interpretation of Averroes became the radical version of essentialistic exegesis of CMDA according to Toledo school.

Aquinas’s interpretation of CMDA in the mode *separatus* and Siger’s interpretation in the mode *separabilis* fundamentally diverge (ch. 4.4.2). For Averroes and Siger, the being of the intellect as a *quartum genus* is merely a universal being of the intellect as a concept in thinking. This *intellectus possibilis* does not exist in any separate form, because the potency does not have its own being. For the salvation of the immortality of the soul, Aquinas resorted to the inventory of Porretan conception of existence as an objective “*exsistere*.” Let us now quote the key sentence from Siger’s first commentary on DA III, which Aquinas had to know in 1270 as a classical interpretation of CMDA presented in the rue du Fouarre.[[331]](#footnote-331) Aquinas does not want to see this conception of the possible intellect in the mode “*solum est in potentia*” and knows very well that this thesis, according to masters in the rue du Fouarre, is the official interpretation of the Commentator. At the end of his stay in Rome, Thomas made a new simulacrum out of Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* as a fully separated cosmic substance. Siger rejected this Avicennian interpretation of CMDA in principle as a modern sophism presented in some Oxforder (Rufus) and Parisian circles (Philip of Chancellor). The definition of Averroistic *intellectus possibilis* has no differentiation by the cosmic *materia prima* done by David von Dinant. It would have seemed rather ridiculous in the given phase of the dispute with Siger’s first Averroism after the publication of QIIIDA. Aquinas turned Averroes into a modern Alexandrian. It was a pure sophistry in the model of the second Averroism, which Rufus presented for the first time in Paris (ch. 3.3.3). Thomas’s quote says right at the beginning that Averroes was aware of this “mistake” (*vidit tamen*). Let us now compare this saying with the version of the Oxford manuscript quoted above (*per rationes quas ponit Commentator contra seipsum*; O 3.7, p. 314.51‒54). Aquinas made the Commentator be stupid in even twice: first, his theory was a mistake; second, he was a second-rated philosopher that saw his mistake and was not able of correcting it. That is not only wrong judgement of Averroes, but evil intention to destroy him as the founder of classical Western metaphysics. *Corruptio optimi pessima.* Thomas transferred the specific activity of the receptive intellect into the dichotomy of cognition within the framework of *duplex esse*. Aegidius used that theory as the author of the third part of the Oxford manuscript. The key problem of Averroist interpretation of Averroes in the school of the first Averroism (Aquinas, Aegidius) is based on the direct connection of the possible intellect as an external substance with the individual phantasms (*continuari cum hoc homine per phantasmata*). The theory of Thomistic “*continuatio*” created a new Averroist version of the *intellectus possibilis*, which differed from Averroism in Bonaventure’s school. Thomas linked the work of separated receptive intellect with individual *species intelligibilis*. They were not given as a *tertium ens* of modernists, but as an intentional object of the Blund′s school and of the first Averroism. The role of *species intelligibilis* for the individual act of cognition was analyzed in the above-mentioned publication *De potentia* (ch. 4.5.2), which was published at the same time as the first part of *Summa theologica*. Aquinas’s criticism of Averroes in the work *De spiritualibus creaturis*, Aegidius Romanus took it over and colported through his *reportatio* in anonymous treatises (ms. Oxford, ms. Bazán). That kind of evil-intended Thomism has been still considered to be an objective definition of Averroes’s theory of cognition. This version of Averroism completed in 1268, Aquinas brought it from Italy to Paris. Thomas changed the primitive Averroism of Rufus and Bonaventure. It was established in the mode of universal hylemorphism when it came to the copulation of two substances. Aquinas let accomplish that mythological act of individual cognition in the Averroist mode “*duplex esse*.”

“Then the intelligible species has a twofold being (*habet duplex esse*). The one is given in the possible intellect, the form of which is the intelligible species. The second being of the species is given in the phantasms from which it is abstracted. However, the phantasms are in the individual human being, because the ability of the imagination is physically created and given by a body organ. This intelligible species is the mediator which connects the possible intellect with the individual human being (*species intelligibilis est medium coniugens intellectum possibilem homini singulari*).” [[332]](#footnote-332)

The first form of the species must be given in the cosmic hypostatized intellect outside of man, because it exists as an actualized immaterial form. The second form of the species is given by the fact that Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*, divided in the manner of the Alexandrians, supposedly communicate with man through the phantasms (*continuari hoc homine per phantasmata*). According to CMDA, this is nonsense even for several reasons given by the concept of cognition as *proportio* (separation of both components of the soul, the dual role of diaphanum, the dual concept of intentionality, etc.). Thomistic interpretation of CMDA asserts that the immaterial *intellectus possibilis*, which came from outside, sets in motion the process of abstraction of the sensual species into intelligible through its own subsistence in the individual human being. Hermeneutics insist on the fact that such scenario excludes the definition of existing person. Aquinas sees the *intellectus possibilis* in CMDA as a separated substance (*separatus*). The introduction of this absurdity means that the material and the immaterial principle of cognition in Thomas’s and Aegidius’s Averroistic interpretation of CMDA have no possibility of encountering each other. The two separate substances have no possibility to communicate in view of the universally given receptivity of the intellect defined as *tabula rasa*. Both separate substances would be actualized substances; the individual cognition could not arise at all. Therefore, the *species intelligibilis* in Aquinas’s Averroist version of CMDA has a central function. In contrast to the actual letters of the text, this Porretan species of the third kind has a twofold possibility of existence (*duplex esse*), because it must ensure that absurd connection between the separated possible intellect and the individual (and not personal) act of cognition.

Let us return to the quote from the writing *De spiritualibus creaturis*, which heralds the epochal *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Thomistic Averroism. In the name of Averroes as an Averroist, Thomas created a new Porretan species of the third kind. The first being of this objective species in the sense of actuality is given in the possible intellect, the form of which is this objective species (*in intellectu possibili, cuius est forma*). Its second being is given in the sensual phantasms, from where this species is abstracted (*aliud in phantasmatibus, a quibus abstrahitur*). The conclusion of this dubious argument shows that Thomas′s Averroes had the *species intelligibilis* created as a being of the third kind (*medium*), which is both material and immaterial at the same time and that connects the intellect directly with the senses (*ipsa ergo est medium coniungens intellectum possibilem homini singulari*). Thomas’s interpretation of CMDA created a new version of sophistic simulacra (*intellectus possibilis, species intelligibilis*) because he made absurd substances out of them. As a result, he attributed to Averroes’s interpretation an erroneous definition of the intellect in the mode of “*hoc aliquid*,” that is, as a being of the third kind. According to Siger and his school, this is sheer nonsense, which has nothing in common with the real conclusions of CMDA. Averroes, interpreted according to Siger, has a precisely given and scientifically proven *proportio* of the senses and the intellect. Aquinas, on the other hand, created a new Averroism by a contradictory conjunction of *tertium ens* that are given by mythological “*continuatio*” of non-existent cosmic *intellectus possibilis*. It continues its effects in man through the phantasms. This Averroistic interpretation of Averroes would have been rejected by Albert with reference to the factual act of *intellectus speculativus* according to CMDA. Albert carried out the successful synthesis between Averroes and Avicenna by avoiding Oxfordian Fallacy, which he regarded as an error in the polemics with Kilwardby (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). Siger′s school integrated the theory of the cognizing person according to CMDA into a whole of Aristotle’s metaphysics; moreover, they connected that theory with the critically evaluated Avicenna. Therefore, the *Doctor Invidiosus* became the *Expositor Novus* for truly educated philosophical masters, which was indirectly declared by the Decree of 1272. Like Albert, Siger rejected in QIIIDA the Averroist interpretation of Averroes. Albert was the first correct interpreter of CMDA; however, according to Siger, he ended up in the essential unity of the person built upon the identity made through *intellectus speculativus*. In the second commentary on *De anima*, Siger directly criticized Aquin as a Semiaverroist and made a methodological correction of Albert′s proceeding. His interpretation of the unity of the person and cognition followed the existential line of CMDA, but did not have the character of a scientific proof. On the contrary, the *Doctor Angelicus* introduced the dualism of forms in the soul in ordere to preserve the key theological postulate of the immortal soul. The artists who defended the unity of the University of Paris together with the unity of the person given in Blund’s school could not agree to this dualism when founding this first Christian university. Siger defined *anima intellectiva* in the mode of *compositio*, but rejected any dualism of forms in the soul (*unam compositam*, ch. 4.4.1). According to Siger, semiaverroistic Thomism is philosophically untrue, although it serves the good cause. In the interest of Aristotelian agreement as a truth founded scientifically “*ad mentem Averrois*” and interpreted according to the Sicilian school, the artists called for the separation of theology and philosophy with the Decree of 1272, citing the writing *Second Analytics* (ch. 4.1.2). Thomas’s interpretation of *De anima* did not correspond to the basic document of the artistic Faculty and combined both sciences into one truth, although in much more sophisticated manner than Latin sophists had accomplished it.

From the year 1270, the debate about the unity of cognition and the person was conducted only among the real connoisseurs of *De anima* from the ranks of the first Averroism when the zealous Thomist Aegidius had intervened. This Latin sophist openly supported Thomas in the struggle against the modernists and fought against Siger’s group. His finest hour came in 1277, when he helped to edit Tempier’s decree against Siger’s school, because he was the only one of Parisian modernists who really knew their arguments in a qualified way. Pecham, as *magister regens* of modernists of that time, lacked the qualification at this level; therefore, he had to leave the University of Paris around 1271 and returned to modernist Oxford. But immediately after the declaration of the Decree in 1272, the beaten Aquinas also had to leave Paris and returned to Italy. The first version of Aristotelian Thomism, founded by Aquinas and handed down by Aegidius, did not have the phenomenology of intellectual cognition of the soul according to CMDA. Thomas’s understanding of the person relates to the existence in *Nicomachean Ethics*, which he knew well. But for the conception of intellectual cognition, no important conclusions emerged from this writing for him, which would have reached the level of the argumentation in CMDA. Siger combined both *Ethics* and CMDA into the act of the existence of the person, which, according to him, was also adopted by the rest of the connoisseurs of Aristotle and Averroes, such as Boethius of Dacia and Dante. According to Siger, the only intermediate link of proof (*medium*) consists in our own experience of intellectual cognition, because we can evoke it at will by the act of our individual will. Aquinas’s dubious interpretation of the middle link of the deduction has no causality from the first substance, but from the essence made according to Oxfordian Fallacy. Where CMDA mentions the intellect as the “*duplex genus,*” Aquinas confirms the “*duplex esse*.” Aquinas rejected the view of the phenomenological question of “how” cognition is realized according to CMDA, accusing Averroes’s conception of the intellect of a substantial dualism. Siger clearly stated that CMDA describes the way in which the intellect, as the immaterial potency of the soul, is connected with the body and how it is separated from it by it in the mode of *separabilis* (ch. 4.4.3). The writing CMDA does not imply dualism; on the contrary, it categorically rejects such a theory. Siger therefore criticizes Aquinas’s conception as it is presented at the time of his stay in Italy in the later work *De anima intellectiva*. This work added to the criticism of Thomas’s Roman period the erroneous theory of intellect listed in the writing *De unitate intellectus*. Thomas solved the problem formally correctly as an correspondence and as an act of an individualized subject. But his solution does not have the nature of a scientific proof according to *Second Analytics*. The act of cognition is not given as “*ipse*” in the existential mode as it is the case in CMDA. The accusation of Averroes as an Averroist created another unacceptable dualism directly within the school of the first Averroism. Once again the Commentator was accused of this dualism, given by incorrect reading of CMDA, done in a sophistic way. Averroes serves as an epochal projection screen on which the modernists and the sophists of all kinds projected their own objective errors according to Freudian mechanism of inversion into the opposite. Aquinas and Aegidius have a different Averroes in mind than the careful philosopher Siger, who has not yet been rehabilitated for his ingenious reading of CMDA and for his integral humanism. That kind of intellectual revolution presupposes the real *revolutio* of critical modernity to investigate its demonic beginnings.

After his arrival in Paris at the end of 1269, Thomas had to solve the basic question that the magisters in the rue du Fouarre announced in the thesis “*homo ipse intelligit*.” The first argument against Siger is set out in the answer from the cited work *De spiritualibus creaturis* (1268), which rejects the supposed Averroism of Averroes and seeks the nature of cognition through a new interpretation of *De anima*. The key difference in the interpretation of the school in the rue du Fouarre is given in the use of the term “*sicut*” for the equivalence of the senses and the intellect. The artists who know CMDA consistently use Averroes’s term “*similiter*” instead. As we know, this view is already present in the Aquinas′s commentary on Sentences and now he repeated it.

“However, this permanence of the possible intellect in us (*haec continuatio*) is in no case sufficient to ensure the recognition of the individual human being (*hic homo singularis intelligat*). Aristotle, in the third book of *De anima*, compares the phantasms in terms of the possible intellect as a color in terms of vision. Intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms in the possible intellect, just as (*sicut*) species of color are abstracted in the sense-given process of vision. Thus, intelligible species are given in the phantasmata in the same way (*sicut*) as the sensible species are given on the color surface.” [[333]](#footnote-333)

The quotation defends cognition for the individual (*hic homo singularis intelligat*) by using the model of diaphanum given in CMDA. The color is not on the wall, but in the eyesight, which is activated by irradiation of the object. Mediation takes place between the exposure of the physical thing in reality and its visual cognition, because these activities do not belong to the same order. Through the exposure by the sun’s ray, it takes place in reality; but seeing is an act of the senses, which synthesize the individual *species sensibilis* according to real external events. Similarly, there must be a difference between the individual syntheses of cognition in *species intelligibilis* (“how”), in contrast to the universal question of “what” is synthesized as universal content of cognition (*conceptus*). The essence of dispute lies in the fact that the intellect, as a formal substrate (*subiectum*), appears in a same way for all these syntheses. The individualization of both species is given with reference to *De anima* as a formal process of abstraction (*phantasmata comparantur ad intellectum possibilem sicut color ad visum*). The act of cognition in us (Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* as *tertium genus*) is given as an immaterial synthesis of the intelligible species. This activity of the intellect as a carrier of cognition was similar to the seeing of the eye, which produces a sensual species (*species intelligibilis sicut species visibilis*). Then, according to Aquinas’s use of the term “*sicut*,” the intelligible species is potentially contained in the sensual phantasms just as the sensual species is potentially given in the irradiation of the wall. We have commented on the main part of the principle of the proportionality of the senses and intellect through Aquinas’s writing *De potentia* (ch. 4.5.2). Aquinas takes the connection between the senses and the intellect through the potentially given mediation, but in the mode of univocal and formal causality given by the term “*sicut*.” This is not the point of view according to CMDA, because sensual and intelligible cognition takes place in the twofold mode of mediation. The intentionality of the intellect as *diaphanum2* is given only in the mode *similiter* or *consimile* with regard to the sensual species as *diaphanum1* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). There is a fundamental difference between the material and immaterial potency of mediation in the act of cognition. The metaphor of intellectual cognition compared to sensual cognition (*sicut color ad visum*) is flawed because it does not respect the difference “*subiective—obiective*.” The point of view of magisters around Siger was worked out by Boethius of Dacia about 1271 in work *Anonymus Giele* to critize the teaching of Aquinas. He proclaimed the equivalence of the two species in Paris immediately after his arrival in 1270. The formal approach draws neither the immateriality nor the separateness of the intellect given in the mode of *separabilis* from the sensual mediation given by the individualization of cognition by the receptive organ in the body. The immaterial potency of *anima intellectiva* has no sense organ. That is why the intellect refers to the body only *obiective* and in the mode of *inmixtus*. Aquinas must somehow individualize the intellect in the manner of the sense organ; this is not possible. The intellect is an immaterial faculty of the soul, and the latter does not possess such an organ. The immaterial intellect has no organ of its own in the body and is dependent on our immaterial personal will, whereas the senses possess a material organ and their cognition necessarily proceeds in the mode of effective causality. The actualization of sensory cognition proceeds causally and automatically at the moment when the organs are activated by an external impulse from the direction of the real first substance. We can’t turn off the process of seeing something; however, we can stop thinking. Aquinas did not want to take note of in the univocal view of mediation (*sicut*). Siger’s school of Modists, to which Boethius of Dacia also belonged, defended this distinction through a double conception of mediation, which is given as sensual and intellectual diaphanum. This gives rise to the theory of intellect as relatively separate from the senses and the body. Following Siger, the work *Anonymus Giele* distinguishes this fact as a difference in *modus cognoscendi*, which is given in *subiective* and in *obiective* manner. The intellect does not have the same formal causality as the senses. For the intellect, the body is only an object and not a subject, because it is the immaterial potency of the soul. Since there is a twofold diaphanum for the senses and for the intellect, there is also a twofold formal causality that ensures mediation and correspondence in the course of cognition. The first mediation is given causally in the mode of the individuality of the person (*experimur*) and the second solely in the mode of existential ipseity (*conscii sumus*).

Aquinas did not work with this division and did not unify the formal causality presented in the writing *De potentia* (ch. 4.5.2). The comparison in the mode “*sicut*” defines the intellect as a hypostatized faculty that can carry the species in the sense of *subiectum* (*species intelligibilis… est in intellectu possibili*). The intellect became the subject, and as a result, the Thomistic objective intellect arose as a hypostasis in the form of *intellectus formalis*. This Averroist conception that states in a univocal manner the formation of species in the senses and in the intellect, we find it in ST I, q. 75, which was written at the same time as Roman commentaries on *De anima*, that is, about the year 1268. In the quoted part of the *Summa theologica*, Aquinas adheres to the same principle of one and the same formal causality for both kinds of species, which makes the basic principle of correspondence (*phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum*).[[334]](#footnote-334) The key is the term “*ratione obiecti*” connected to the comparison, which means formal univocity. Siger and his school replied that this “*ratione obiecti*” cannot be given for the exercise of intellect (*actio*) in the same sense as for sensible knowledge. Then the intellect would not be separated from the senses and would be given as an essentially determined form in the soul. Aquinas understands the soul in Aristotelian terms, in accordance with the first Averroism, as the existential form for *actus essendi* of the person. The essence of the intellect as hypostatic form in Thomas’s cognitive subject is certainly not the exercise of the intellect as existential mode of understanding in the Siger’s person or in Heidegger’s *Dasein*. The logical supposition of the intellect as an essence (*Gehaltsinn*) is not at all able to distinguish between the two modes of mediation, unlike the metaphysical imposition of the existing intellect given in the mode *tertium genus* (*Bezugssinn*). For Aquinas as a theologian, formally determined analogy of knowledge in the mode “*sicut*” ensures the immortality of the soul. Avicennian intellect exists in the soul in a hypostatic way and through the analogy of “*sicut*” it acts downwards, to the senses. But the intellect, defined as the essence, is merely an Averroes’s *quartum genus*, i.e., a universal of the type of a second substance (*ratio rei, quidditas, essentia* etc.). The division of mediation has a fundamental character, because it establishes two different subjects of cognition (body, soul) and combines them into a unity of resulting correspondence made as *tertium genus*. The intellect works in the body and in the soul as an independent immaterial faculty, in contrast to the senses given in the material organ. The cognitive power cannot be taken in the mode *univoce* of one and the same diaphanum, since the mediation of *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* are fundamentally different from each other (material, immaterial). In addition, it is true that the first sensual mediation is given in the mode of numerical “*idem*,” and the second intelligible mediation exists only in the mode of existential “*ipse*.” Averroes and Siger clearly separate the formation of the sensual and the intelligible species from each other, and consequently combine both forms of recognition with each other in the mode *consimile*. The one act is material and connected with the sense organ (*subiective*), whereas the second act is immaterial, because the intellect has no sense organ (*obiective*). Siger rejected Aquinas’s hidden dualism of cited “*duplex esse*”for both types of recognition potency. This changed the perception of the intellect for the hypostasis given in the mode *separatus*. Aquinas separated the intellect as a pure form in mode *qua2* and thus secured the essential principle of the formal production of the immaterial species in the soul (*subiective*). Since the intellect is essentially defined as the eternal immaterial essence of the soul, the soul is also immortal. Typical text that is used from *De anima* for that purpose is the proof made made *modo geometrico* as Bonaventure did before him (kap. 4.1.2). Aquine make use of geometrical example of *De anima* 414b28–32 that a highly general definition can be given for figure which will fit all figures without expressing the peculiar nature of any of previous figure. Aquin uses it to explain the superiority of intellectual faculty in *anima intellectiva*.

“In a similar manner (*similiter*) it can be said that the vegetative and sensitive faculties are in the intellective faculty as a triangle and square are in the pentagon. For the square is indeed a figure specifically different from the triangle, but not from the triangle that is potentially in the square.” [[335]](#footnote-335)

It is a typical formalist view of Averroism as “matrjoschka doll” that Bonaventure used before Thomas. The intellective faculty makes an envelope of lower faculties that have the same productive cause and it makes the higher extrinsic cause (*vegetativum et sensitivum quod inest intellectivo, est a causa extrinseca a qua est intellectivum*, ibid, 300.837). That procceding formaly correspond to Siger′s divisions “*subiective*” for vegetative and sensitive faculties and “*obiective*” from the intellectual faculty in the mode *inmixtus* given *ab extrinseco*. However, what is the same in the mode “*idem*” (*Gehaltsinn*), that is not the same in the mode “*ipse*” (*Bezugssinn*). Logical inference as geometrical supposition is not metaphysical imposition coming from real causality in man. There is no triangle in man that can exercise the real process of cognition. In comparison to use of DA I–II in Siger′s introductory part of QIIIDA, Aquin makes use of DA I–II in a formally manner that makes a pure sophistry for masters in rue de Fouarre.

Thomistic solution objectively defined the process of cognition by exposure from behind in the direction of the hypostatized intellect as a new form (ch. 4.5.2). The intellect then operates according to the cited work *De potentia* for the actualization of *species intelligibilis* in the mode of subsistent hypostasis (*intellectus in actu*) and has its own actuality according to ST I, q. 75, a. 2 (*intellectus habet operationem per se*). Sensual cognition produces in the soul an individual sensual species, and its subject is given in the sensual imagination. In that point, there is no difference here between Siger and Aquinas; the individualization of this cognition is material (*subiective*). The problem occurred on the second floor of mediation in the mode of *species intelligibilis*. Thomistic immaterial intellect functions in the equally immaterial *anima intellectiva* in the mode of the hypostatized form as another subject of cognition (*subiective*). It produces an intelligible species, which the equally given active intellect transforms into a resulting universal concept. The connection between both types of species is created by univocal formal causality, which is given in the script *De potentia* as a process of actualization of the senses or intellect made by species. From the matter, the mere form is transferred to the intellect through the sensual and intelligible species. This form causes the *univoce* given effect, that is, the sensual or intellectual cognition (*effectus similatur causae secundum suam formam*, ch. 4.5.2). Then it becomes clear why Aquinas defended the comparison (*sicut*) in the univocal formal causality of both kinds of species. Moreover, he does the whole process of deduction *modo geometrico*, let us see the above-mentioned quotation taken from *De unitate*. Cognition at the level of the intellect is based solely on the formal causality with which the real thing acts on our intellect through the actualized sensual species. Thomism needs this formal causality in order to secure the predication of the intellect as an actualized form in the mode *per prius*. The actuality comes from the senses. This is also the scenario of the first Averroism. Since the actuality of sensual species in the mode “*sicut*” is similar to the act of the intellect producing an immaterial species, the intellect is an immaterial form in the soul. This gave rise to the Thomistic “*sicut*–model” of cognition made out “*subiective* (senses)—*subiective* (intellect)”. This is not the model *consimile* in CMDA or *subiective* and *obiective* conception given by the Modists. Thomas elaborated *univoce* conceived unity of formal causality, which established the objective cognition in the objectively defined cognitive subject. Such Aristotelian interpretation of cognition and unity of the person is formally correct, but certainly not scientifically, according to the deductive proof of *Second Analytics*. The definition of the person is not equal to the definition of the triangle, because it proceeds in the generically different mode of *demonstratio*. The proof is derived from the hyparchical statements that relate to the causality working outside of mind. The proof is given in the mode “*ex inmediatis*” according to the first triad of cognitive principles. The hyparchical causality cannot be inferred by the Thomistic intellect as an essence, because such definition is given as a potential concept. The soul is the only form of the body, and not the intellect. The person of Siger and the Commentator as the first actual substance turned into a formally immortal Thomistic subject as intellect that is determined in the mode *subiective*. Aquinas has no effective causality in the middle link of the deduction, which is only possible through the act of cognition in the mode “*ipse.*” The scientific predication starts in the existential experience of one’s own ipseity, which is given by the experienced act of *anima intellectiva* in the body. This was and is Siger’s resulting point of view in QIIIDA. His person-oriented perspective solved all the problems of the soul and the intellect.

Siger criticized Aquinas again after the year 1270 because he performed the same erroneous interpretation of the act of cognition in Paris as during his stay in Rome, including the repeated attack on Averroes as an Averroist. The work *De unitate intellectus* hypostatized the intellect in the schema “*duplex esse*” as a next form in the soul in order to ensure theologically postulated immortality of the soul. Thomistic solution denies the argumentation of CMDA and it does not give the scientific proof according to *Second Analytics*. The brilliant and inconspicuous scholar subsequently became the real *Doctor Invidiosus* for the influential group of Aristotelians around Aquinas and Aegidius. In the tragic attack on Siger’s school, they joined the group of modernists around Bonaventure. Now it becomes clear why in 1270 Aquin could not accept the position of artists in the rue du Fouarre. He should have accepted Siger’s complete reasoning according to CMDA. But the papal theologian came to Paris from Italy and he was not a critical philosopher in the style of bishop Alvernus. The writing *De unitate* directly attacked Parisian tradition of first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre, which, since the bishop and chancellor Alvernus, adhered to Averroes’s interpretation of *De anima* separate from all Neoplatonists and also from Aristotle.[[336]](#footnote-336) Aquinas accepted the criticism of Averroes according to the second Averroism and turned him into a perverted philosopher in the manner of Neoplatonists (*Averroys perverse refert sententiam Themistii et Theophrasti*), because he allegedly defined the *intellectus possibilis* in CMDA as a separate substance. He thus declared himself to be a real Aristotelian that elaborated the individual act of cognition according to *De anima*. Let’s take a look at the text in which was created Thomas’s erroneous interpretation of Averroes that he later brought to Paris. The key testimony is contained in the work *Summa contra Gentiles*, which refers to original *Lichtung* of the truth and untruth that founded the formal Semiaverroism of Aquinas and Aegidius. Here, it was still possible to take both ways, both the path of Siger and Albert; as well as Thomas’s later dualism of two forms, that is, the soul and the intellect. The text lays out the correct interpretation of *De anima* in the course of the editing of the SCG II in the mode of the Sicilian school, although it is attributed only to Aristotle. Siger probably reacted to this passage in the Munich manuscript when he offered Aquinas a better possibility of interpreting the writing CMDA.

“The activity proceeds only through some ability, which is given in itself by the virtue of the form (*formaliter in ipso est*). That is why Aristotle explained in the second book of *De anima* that the act by which we live and perceive is the form and the actualized activity (*est forma et actus*). Both activities, that is, both the passive and the active intellect, are specific to man. In fact, man abstracts from phantasms and, through thinking, absorbs the actually given contents of understanding (*recipit mente intelligibilia in actu*). We cannot come to these insights other than by experiencing them within ourselves (*nisi eas in nobis experiremur*). Therefore, it is necessary that the principles to which we assign these two activities, as the passive and the active intellect, are abilities that formally exist in us (*virtutes quaedam in nobis formaliter existentes*).” [[337]](#footnote-337)

The quotation sets out the tension between the two lines of reasoning that define the intellect. The first, it provides the primacy of experience (*in nobis experiremur*); the second line is built on the formal definition (*in nobis formaliter existentes*). The first path leads to Siger’s phenomenological principle, whereby we recognize the soul from our own experienced first substance (*experimur—conscii sumus*). The second path leads to Thomas’s later principle of the intellect as a form in the soul. Perhaps these passages came from the second book SCG, which was edited in Paris during the second stay in relation to Siger’s criticism (Wéber 1970, 299–305). In any case, they form a milestone; it was possible to take both directions, be it in 1263 or in 1270. The potentialities are formally present in the soul because the soul is a form of the actually existing body (*quo vivimus et sentimus, est forma et actus*). Both components of intellect are classified as faculties of the soul and they are exercised by existing first substance (*convenit homini*). Then, the key sentence follows, which in terms of meaning exactly coincides with the phenomenological attitude of Siger. We cannot recognize the definition of both types of intellect in any other way (*non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus*) than through our direct experience (*nisi eas in nobis experiremur*). However, Avicenna′s and Descartes’s “Flying man” also has the direct self-reflexive experience of the intellect, which exists as an independent form outside the body. This objection of modernists is reflected in the quotation in the last sentence, which says that both intellectual faculties of the soul formally exist in us (*sint virtutes quaedam in nobis formaliter existentes*). The definition of “*formaliter*” can mean Siger’s existential relation from the existential activities to existential being, because the cited form is the soul itself (*qua1*). Or, they directed the interpretation to the intellect as a hypostatized form, the immaterial and separate existence of which is given in the soul as a form of the body during earthly life (*qua2*). It is precisely this view that is contained in the key part of the argumentation of *De unitate intellectus* and it is directed against Siger’s school. In it, Aquinas defends the Catholic view of the individualized *intellectus possibilis* according to Avicenna, which he had already done during his first stay in Paris.

“But that no one tells me, as some claim, that what we understand (*id quo intelligimus*) is not an individualized possible intellect (*hic intellectum possibilem*), but something else. In doing so, they openly reject Aristotle’s assertion in the third book of *De anima* about the possible intellect, where he says: I understand by the intellect in virtue of it the soul is able to judge and to understand (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intellegit anima*).” [[338]](#footnote-338)

The definition of *intellectus possibilis* is given in accordance with the text of *De anima* in the mode of the intellect as a form of the soul (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima*). Aquinas takes the key phrase from *De anima* 429a23 literally, that the soul understands through the intellect (νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή). It is clear from the quotation that it is about the definition of the possible intellect within the framework of the effective form in the mode “*quo*” (νοῦν ᾧ), which is considered as an authentic definition of intellect according to *De anima*. The major philosophical problem is hidden in Aquinas’s substantial definition of the possible intellect (*hoc intellectum possibilem*). According to Siger, this is a fundamental mistake, because *intellectus possibilis* is just “*aliquid aliud*,” since it represents the existential act of understanding (*obiective*) and not a hypostatized form attached to the soul (*hoc aliquid*). It is precisely this hypostatized *subiective*–made definition of the intellect that is defended in Aquinas’s quotation from *De anima* (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima*). According to Siger, this can only be said about the intellect as a *quartum genus*; but this is the concept in thought and not an existential act, about which speaks the quoted text of *De anima*. This Averroist interpretation from *De unitate* is still valid today, including the attack against those “*aliqui*” from the rue du Fouarre. According to the school of Siger defending the legacy of Alvernus, Aristotelian Aquinas joined the dubious group of “*sequaces Aristotelis*” according to Avicenna that professed the plurality of hypostatized forms in man. This conception of the intellectual form in the model *qua2* was rejected by Aristotelian Siger. He refers to the general aim of Aristotle’s metaphysics, to the interpretation of CMDA and to the scientific proof according to *Second Analytics* made in the Sicilian mode “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Aquinas is a patent Averroist according to Avicenna; therefore he must have rejected the true doctrine of the Commentator, who was not an Averroist. Aquinas needed Themistius’s and Theophrastus’s formally separated potency of the intellect as a special hypostatic form, which in the mode of *inmixtus* and *ab extrinsece* ensures the immortality of *anima intellectiva* with regard to the senses. Therefore, in the work *De unitate,* he rejected in principle the interpretation of both authors according to CMDA (*Averroys perverse refert sententiam Themistii er Theophrasti de intellectu possibili et agente*, Leonina 43, 314.389‒91). Siger’s school rejected Thomas’s Averroistic simulacrum because they saw and commented on the real Averroes. This was also confirmed by Aquin in *De unitate* when he adressed the magisters in the rue du Fouarre (*aliqui solum commentum Averrois videntes*; Leonina 43, 314.394). Aquinas was absolutely right in his Pythian fallacy. Through his epochal error, Aquin tells the fundamental and therefore objectively hidden truth in the musical way of *alētheia*. Therefore, the genial poets like Dante truly understood Thomas’s quarrel with the philosophers in the rue du Fouarre.

The philosophy has to start the question of true cognition solely from the interpretation of the Commentator (*solum commentum Averrois*). Following the hidden path of *alētheia*, hermeneutics see the difference between identity and identity in both models that found the unity of the knowing person. For the objectivists, this difference does not exist, because it cannot be seen in the mode of *univoce* made formal *veritas*. The difference lies in the perception of the intellect given by exposure from the front or from the back. Unfortunately, Aquinas’s model as an effective form in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy represents the second approach. Siger was fundamentally opposed to the introduction of any causal hypostasis into the scientific cognition of the intellect. The starting point of cognition must be in harmony with the exposure of the sense of being coming from causally acting reality of first substances, which in this case is the real hylemorphic person, and not the hypostatized intellect. The form as such cannot act causally, because it is a mere abstraction within the framework of the universal essence and it exists only in thinking. Therefore, according to the scientifically arguing Aristotelian Siger, the approach to the study of the intellect is taken from causal acts of the first substance, and not from abstract definition of some immaterial form. Aquinas was fundamentally handicapped by refusing Averroes’s metaphysics in the “substance *qua* substance” mode. The naked text of *De anima* is not enough to determine the unity of the person’s thinking, which educated Aristotelians in Paris already knew for two generations. In the end, the text *De unitate* confirms the original conception of the intellect as a form. It was the final response of Aquinas against Siger’s criticism. The quotation clearly says at Siger’s address that there is no other way of preserving the separability of the intellect, because the intellect must be a form according to *De anima* 429a23 (*intellectum quo intelligit anima*). Aquinas must respond to Siger’s school in the rue du Fouarre that rejected all theories of intellect as a hypostatized form. Let us now quote the semiaverroistic part of *De unitate*, in which Siger becomes *Doctor Invidiosus* in the full meaning of truth as *alétheia*. Aquin indirectly admits his philosophical defeat and the victory of Siger’s school.

“But if you assert that the principle of this act, which we call understanding and intellect, is not a form (*non sit forma*), then you must explain the way in which (*modum quo*) the activity of this principle is the action of this individual human being (*sit actio huius hominis*).” [[339]](#footnote-339)

The quotation clearly sees the intellect as an active form (*modum quo*), where the intellect is individual, on the one hand, and immaterial on the other. Siger found this possibility because he had read CMDA attentively and was a critical phenomenologist. His answer is contained with the well-founded critique of Thomistic Aristotelianism in the work *De anima intellectiva* (ch. 4.4.3). Theologian Aquinas deliberately rejected Siger’s magistral reading of the scripture *De anima* contained in the work QIIIDA. He must have known this writing, because he correctly reproduced its main arguments. Siger’s works were known to all educated masters in Paris. That is why they elected Siger as rector of the artists in 1271, probably under the influence of Aquinas’s semiaverroistic criticism in *De unitate* (1270). One year after Siger’s election as rector, the magisters in the rue du Fouarre issued a statement of principles that made use of *De anima intellectiva*. It was directed against theologians such as Aquinas, among others. The artists gathered around their rector rejected Averroistic teachings of those who are unable to evaluate philosophical and theological problems scientifically to a sufficient extent, according to the correct reading of *Second Analytics* exempt of Oxfordian Fallacy. Let’s take a look at the key passage from *De unitate*, which is criticized by Siger as an Averroist way of thinking. Aquinas held on to the intellect as a partially subsistent form given in mode *qua2* after the death of man (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima*). The quotation turned Averroes into an Averroist in the style of the above-mentioned Roman disputation *De spiritualibus creaturis*.

“Averroes defined the principle of understanding as a possible intellect in such a way that its being is neither in the soul nor a part of the soul, which supposedly applies only equivocally. The possible intellect is a substance that is somehow separate from the body (*substantia quaedam separata*) and claims that the act of understanding this substance is my understanding or another in so far as this possible intellect connect with me or with you (*in quantum intellectus ille possibilis copulatur mihi vel tibi*), and that through the phantasms that are in you or in me.” [[340]](#footnote-340)

Aquinas means the intellect as a hypostatized form, but not as a modern substance, which the second Averroists defended according to the universal hylemorphism. Since he has cognition according to the individual activity of the soul given by the intentional species, he has no problem with taking the solution of CMDA of individualization of thinking through the phantasms. However, Averroes must be an Averroist, because Aquinas rejected his interpretation of the intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. Therefore, he merely adheres to Averroes’s universal concept of the possible intellect as a *quartum genus* in its abstract and objective *esse*. Then, with regard to the well-known “Averroist” texts of CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3), there is only one solution, namely the separated *intellectus possibilis*. Connoisseurs of CMDA took it a pure sophistry. The work *De unitate* confirmed the theory of *continuatio*, to remake Averroes’s Averroism as the above-mentioned analysis of *De spiritualibus creaturis* written two years earlier.

Siger’s answer in writing *De anima intellectiva* and in the work *Quaestiones super Librum de causis* most likely responded to both quoted textes in *De unitate*, which in Siger′s opinion were fundamentally wrong. Aquinas defines the act of thinking in the mode “*ipse*” for the act of the intellect and not of the person. Siger argues that the problem is not formulated correctly. The modus “*quo*” cited by Aquinas according to Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*, belongs to the soul as a actual form of the body, and not to the hypostatized intellect as a potency. We have cited Siger’s paraphrase of De anima 415b12‒14 (*anima est qua intelligimus*), which he opposes Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* 429a23 (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima*). Aquin’s error from the point of view of Siger and also of hermeneutic objectivity is absolutely obvious and is given by his erroneous interpretation of Averroes. Aquinas, in contrast to Siger, was not able to correctly interpret the phenomenological principle from CMDA III.1 (*scire enim actiones anime prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam*, p. 380.37‒41). The theologian Aquinas had to define the intellect as another subsistent form next to the soul (*qua2*) in order to ensure its immortality. Aquinas, moreover, attributed to Averroes the false problem of modern dualism. The separated *intellectus possibilis* is supposedly connected with the individual act of cognition only by the momentary act through the phantasms (*intellectus possibilis copulatur per fantasmata*). Thomas turned Averroes into a modern Alexandrian and, through the sophistic teaching of the first Averroism, handed over to the West the fundamental error that still shapes the objective interpretation of Averroism in the context of *via Modernorum* to this day. On this point, Aquinas inspired the thinking of Aegidius Romanus, who had already made the same turn to the Thomistic unity of intellect before the year 1270, which is set out in the Oxford Manuscript in the commentary on DA III (ch. 4.3.2). Siger is not a modern objectivist and sophist, but a true philosopher and, consequently, defends the true Arabic thinker Averroes. Thanks to the insight into one’s own act of existence, it can be scientifically proved that we have an intellectually given soul. It can be proved philosophically that we have an immaterial thinking, separated from the senses in the *obiective* mode, but no theological thesis that the human soul is eternal. Thinking is in our power and the experience of thinking is not separate from the body. But thanks to the ability of the soul to take on intellectual forms, thinking can be distinguished from the sensual just as fundamentally, in the mode of *separabilis*.

Wéber saw this twofold determination of the intellect as a form or as potency absolutely clearly as a fundamental question of “Aquinas—Siger” dispute, but did not interpret this controversy in the right way. After Gilson’s studies on the non-existence of the twofold truth from the thirties and Gauthier’s discovery of the first Averroism and Siger’s rehabilitation of it, the above-cited dispute between Wéber and Bazán represents the most important research contribution to this period. Both authors consider Sieger to be an Averroist, which is not the attitude of this study. Wéber saw both views in Aquinas (intellect as potency and also as a form of the soul) and correctly interpreted Siger’s critical position towards Aquinas. Unfortunately, he turned Aquin as an Avicennist to be Neoplatonist and he thus canceled the substantial unity of the person that Aquin defended. That point Bazán rejected in principle and rightly in his criticism of Wéber. However, Bazán as a classical Thomist did not see the problem that Wéber understood thanks to his unbiased reading of key scholastic commentaries on *De anima* written up to the year 1270. This is particularly evidenced by Wéber’s second monograph from 1991. Hermeneutics explore the dispute between Siger and Aquinas from a different angle than these two modern Thomists. If Wéber had known the difference between the first and the second Averroism and had not turned Siger into an Averroist (it is obvious with Bazán), then his analysis of disputes concerning the status of the person and the intellect in the years 1250–1300 would have been basically correct. Wéber correctly analyzes Siger’s criticism of Aquin and Albert. The previous chapters have clearly stated that the dispute concerns the different position of the intellect within the first Averroism. Wéber’s argument is based on the passage in QIIIDA, in which Siger, citing Aristotle, defines the intellect as the immaterial faculty of the soul (*perfectio*), which perfects its faculties by this act (*intellectum esse perfectionem quantum ad suam potestatem*).[[341]](#footnote-341) The quotation defines the intellect as the faculty of the soul (*perfectio*), which is given on the basis of immaterial potency. Siger emphasizes the specific position of this ability in relation to the body. The intellect completes the bodily functions (*perficit corpus*) by cooperating with them within the framework of immaterial potency (*quoad suam cooperationem*). This is the reason for the definition of relationship of the intellect to the body in the *obiective* mode, which *Anonymus Giele* endorsed according to Siger (ch. 4.3.1). In the following passage, Siger draws the attention of his opponents to the fact that any deviation from the intellect as *inmixtus* with regard to the physically given senses means that the intellect is no longer an immaterial potency of the soul. The separated intellect forms a single potency (and not a modern hypostasis, form, substance), which, from the point of view of philosophy, defines the immaterial operatio of the soul.[[342]](#footnote-342) Only the potency can be immaterial (*potentia a quo egreditur operatio non est simplicior sua substantia*). But this means that the intellect, as a pure potency, should not contain its own actuality and should not be a hypostasis. The philosopher Siger has only the potential proof of the immortality of the soul by the essentially defined intellect, which is too little for the theologian Aquinas. The intellect given as a concept must remain only potency. Any form of actuality would abolish the universal receptive principle (*anima est quodammodo omnia*) and turn the receptive faculty of the soul into a separate substantial *intellectus possibilis*. By hypostasizing the intellect that is a pure potency, a fundamental difference arose between the potency of the soul given in the mode of Siger’s *separabilis* and Aquin’s formal intellect given in the mode of *separatus*. Both views of both the material and the separated *intellectus possibilis* are clearly rejected in CMDA. Albert and Siger knew it very well, in contrast to Aquinas. He had to respond to their arguments; otherwise he would have ended up with the modernists in the school of second Averroism.

Thomas resolved the aporia of bodily based immaterial intellect by partially adopting the arguments in CMDA. The course of knowledge in *De potestate*, q. 8 agrees with Siger’s interpretation and with Albert (ch. 4.5.2). But the writing *De unitate* sophistically attributed to Averroes only half of to the truth about *intellectus possibilis*, namely its connection with phantasms. The rest of the teaching on the intellect was added to Aristotle, who, in Thomas’s literal interpretation, defended the conception of the intellect in hypostatized form. Aristotelians from the rue du Fouarre read the Corpus “*ad mentem Averrois*” and they knew, in contrast to Aquinas, that the metaphysically true (and not only the logically correct) interpretation of the Corpus requires the exegesis of the Commentator in order to preserve the unity of the person and the first science. Siger knew very well that the interpretation of CMDA is ingenious, since the Commentator had integrated the interpretation of *De anima* to the whole of Aristotle’s metaphysics. In this, the knowledge of the Philosopher’s metaphysics in the mode of *alétheia* differs from the modernist construction in the mode of Thomistic *veritas*. The connoisseurs of the Commentator took into account the totality of Averroes’s “meta-physics” and read the writing *De anima* according to CMDA in the paradigm of the Sicilian school. See the quoted passage De anima 429a23 (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima*), which can be interpreted in many ways. Aquinas founded Thomistic Aristotelianism by taking literally the texts to find his theological arguments that were by no means the full philosophical interpretation of *De anima*. Like this, the dogmatic theological statement about the immortality of the soul after the death of the body by the newly presented Aristotelianism became the objective truth of the West. Aegidius copied Aquinas’s approach from the quoted part of De *unitate* and created another subsistent form from the intellect after the year 1270, which acquired an almost substantial character. Siger saw Thomas’s sophistry precisely in terms of both CMDA and Aristotle. See the following summary of the more universally accepted Aristotelianism, which represents the culmination of the understanding of Aristotle in the Latin West according to Averroes. Actually, it is about the culmination of Western Aristotelianism in general, because it stands outside the objectivist interpretations of *Modernorum* and it perfects the first Averroism. Siger rejected all Aquinas’s efforts to define the intellect as a form. It was in the development of Thomas’s conception of the intellect after the editing of the second book of *Summa contra Gentiles*. The final rejection of the Thomistic intellect as a hypostatized form can be found in Siger’s commentary on the *Liber de causis* (about 1275).

“Some want the essence of the intellectual soul to be the form of man, because this separates the intellectual potency from the other parts of the soul. Therefore, the intellect does not make the completion of bodily matter, because it has no bodily organ. Following consideration brought them to take this position. If man understands, then he must be a form of what he is. In addition, the act of understanding is separated from the body because it has no matter and no organ that completes cognition, as is the case with the act of feeling and longing. Then the intellect is a faculty separate from matter. But this argument cannot stand. If the intellectual soul is the human form and the perfection of man, which is completely true, then it cannot have any separate potency and activity.” [[343]](#footnote-343)

The first sentence defines Aquinas position in the work *De unitate*. The intellect is a form that forms the essence of *anima intellectiva*, because it is separated by its potency from the sensual faculties of the soul (*potentia tamen animae intellectivae sit separata*). Aquinas defends the separation of the intellect by making the intellect a form through which the soul realizes understanding (*hominis formam*). Siger rejected this dualistic conception of two forms in man in both commentaries on *De anima* (ch. 4.4.3). The phenomenological view of the intellect clearly shows that we experience thinking and thus also know that we are thinking in the first person. That is why we think as a whole being, in the actual mode of our existence (*homo ipse intelligit*). Siger’s last known work claims the same thing as his first commentary on the third book of *De anima* had announced a decade earlier. Aquinas’s assertion cannot stand in the case of a critical investigation of the actual act of the intellect as a faculty of the soul. Not the intellect, but the whole soul is the form of man (*intellectiva anima sit hominis forma et perfectio*). Otherwise, the unity of the person could not be preserved, which each of us can experience in a real and therefore also truthful way. Therefore, Aquinas cannot hypostasize the intellect as a special form in addition to the soul as an already known form (*non potest esse potentia et operatio separata*). After rejecting the phenomenological principle of Siger, which he certainly knew at least since his arrival in Paris around 1269, Aquinas fell into the essentialism of Oxfordian Fallacy with regard to the definition of the intellect in man. From the point of view of the first Averroism, Aquinas’s answer is correct in that he clearly gave the primacy of subsistence only to the first substance. Neither the soul, nor much less the intellect, is in any case any form with its own subsistence on the type of substance (*hoc aliquid*).[[344]](#footnote-344) Thomas abolished the substantial multiplicity given in the modernist definition of man, which Siger acknowledges with gratitude. However, Aquinas was not able to conceive the material act of the intellect other than with the help of the intellect as a further immaterial and thus also separate form added to the soul, which is the only one capable of actualized immortality to the soul. This Semiaverroist interpretation in the style of Grosseteste brought to the fore the plurality of forms in man (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). However, this plurality of forms was fundamentally rejected in the interpretation of CMDA defended by Siger and the Parisian artists from the rue du Fouarre. Thomas’s deductive proof of the intellect runs from the immaterial essence (*qua2*) to the causality of the individual act of thinking. The whole process of erroneous deduction is given according to the principle presented in the Roman writing *QD De anima*, where the theological Aristotelianism of Aquinas is fully seen. Perhaps this is also the reason why Albert the Great refused a trip to Paris around 1269. He did not want to criticize his best student in his difficult moments of the struggle against Bonaventure’s modernists. Albert knew well that Thomas’s conception of CMDA was hopelessly flawed. His best disciple considered Averroes to be an Averroist and, contrary to the letter of the CMDA, held Semiaverroist unity of the person within the plurality of two immaterial forms, that is, the soul and the intellect. Therefore, Albert wrote the assessment of the Paris dispute, which was required by the Church, in an absolutely concise and uncontroversial manner (*De XV problematibus*, 1270). In addition, he should have had to polemicize with the brilliant Siger and his school in the rue du Fouarre, which also publicly exposed the shortcomings in Albert’s interpretation of CMDA as well.

The big question is whether Albert would have defended the fundamental point of view of magisters in the Decree of April 1272 in the public disputation. This point of view defines the generic difference between theology and philosophy according to *Second Analytics*. Aquinas’s conception of the unity of the intellect, after the publication of the work *De unitate*, was certainly in contradiction with the Decree of artists. In addition, Thomas already attacked them as Averroists in the writing *De unitate*. If Aquinas conducted any disputation with Siger after the year 1270, then we know nothing about it. Aquin left Paris practically at the same time as the Decree of Parisian secular magisters appeared, that is, at Easter 1272, and he was sent to Naples to lecture in the *studium generale* of Dominicans. The date of his departure from the University of Paris is certainly not accidental. For Thomas, after the publication of *De unitate*, as well as for the defeated Pecham from the second Averroism, it was true that one cannot fight on two fronts at the same time. Thomas was also active against the powerful mendicant modernists under the leadership of Bonaventure, who at that time was preaching a series of public sermons about the errors of an almost apocalyptic character (*isti errores significantur in Apocalypsi in numero nominis bestiae*, ch. 4.1.2). He also attacked the brilliant Siger, who became *Expositor Novus* for the artists in the rue du Fouarre (*pars Sigeri*). Siger’s critique in the commentary on *Liber de causis*, which was probably written after Aquinas’s death (†1274), aims at the core of her polemics. It was the identity of the intellect as the second form of the soul added from the outside to the real existence of the person.[[345]](#footnote-345) Siger once again confirms the unity of the person only in the mode of the soul as the only subsistent form (*qua1*). The act of individual physical subsistence of this form includes all potencies and activities, whether they are material or immaterial (*eius substantia sit actus et perfectio ipsius materiae sic etiam et eius potentia*). Aquinas interpreted the concept of *intellectus possibilis* in CMDA insufficiently and he defined but its separated component. The insufficient knowledge of CMDA and the philosophical sophistry, which is necessary to ensure the theological postulate of the immortality of the soul, made Averroes an Averroist by the thesis about the separated *intellectus possibilis*. Siger, unlike Aquinas, knew very well that Averroes was not an Averroist. Siger’s critique in *De anima intellectiva* considers Thomas’s above-quoted interpretation of Aristotle’s *De anima* 429a23 to be the main point of the argumentation (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima*). Siger rejects both Aquinas’s interpretation of Averroes and Thomas’s interpretation of the separated intellect as another form in the soul. Aquinas considers this interpretation to be authentically Aristotelian, which is set out in his interpretation of *De anima*, presented in Rome about 1268. The commentary quotes *De anima* 429a23 (*intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit anima*) and considers the intellect as the actually given form in the soul (*qua2*).[[346]](#footnote-346) Siger points out that Aristotle’s theorem must be understood as a form in the context of the act of being the first substance, and not the hypostatized intellect. However, this is what claims Thomas’s quoted Roman interpretation of *De anima* and also its subsequent continuation in *De unitate*. He adds to the address of the artists in the rue du Fouarre, that there is no other solution. Siger correctly sees that Aquinas’s definition of *anima intellectiva* does not reach the high quality of Albert’s interpretation of CMDA. A comparison is sufficient between the interpretation of *De unitate* and Albert’s above-mentioned interpretation of *De anima*, which does not recognize the intellect as a subsistent form because it is a hidden Avicennism (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Albert sees just as correctly as Siger that any effort to hypostatize the *intellectus speculativus* (especially *intellectus possibilis*) in the way of form leads to Avicennism and to the plurality of substances in man. Albert rejects any conception of the *intellectus possibilis* as a form, because it would make impossible a universal reception that is necessary for cognition. The receptive intellect must be a mere instrument with regard to the individual speculative intellect given in us individually; otherwise it would no longer fulfill its receptive function (*speculativus erit non simpliciter forma*).[[347]](#footnote-347) Albert’s comment on *De anima* follows the line of CMDA, which is not the case with Aquinas. According to Albert, the Averroism of modern Alexandrians is nothing more than a hidden Avicennism, and in the case of the learned Latins who joined from Oxford, this is also combined with the universal hylemorphism. Aquinas rejected the philosophical solution of Averroes and called him an Averroist. This is the fundamental difference compared to Albert, who had not taken this step because he had read Averroes as a philosopher and correctly understood the meaning of the argument in CMDA. See the preceding analyses of *intellectus speculativus* and its commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima*. Aquinas’s Neoplatonic interpretation of the divine nature of the intellect according to *Nicomachean Ethics* follows the definition of man according to the Toledo school, whereas Siger’s critical philosophical interpretation of the existentially conceived intellect starts from the writing *De generatione animalium* after the Sicilian school (ch. 4.4.2). Once again, the hidden gigantomachy between Plato and Aristotle can be seen. Aquinas as an *Expositor Novus* created by Aegidius became a historically effective figure (and not a simulacrum!) that was absolutely necessary to send the objectivity in a next phase of evolution. The objective and totally erroneous determination of *intellectus possibilis* prevailed within the first Averroism. This created an epochal new place of revelations of being, which was founded “*ad mentem Aristotelis*” and not “*ad mentem Averrois*.” Objectivity, in the view of Aegidius who celebrated Aquinas as *Expositor Novus*, received a new historical exposition of being (*Lichtung*). The totality of being became openly manifestable in the mode of Thomistic objectivity, as well as the fundamental place of its revelation, i.e., the receptive intellect. Aquinas’s insight into the intellect as an objective form became a historical *factum* of the West. Thomas’s dualistic conception of the person in the mode of objective Aristotelian Thomism has prevailed in the history of Western thought. It fundamentally improved the primitive Averroism of the modernists towards the unity of the person as a substance. But it definitely anchored the dualism of two forms in human being and shaped the Western conception of the person in the problematic mode of identity. Aquinas needs the principle “*quo*” to ensure the individual act of thinking within the framework of “*homo intelligit*” only through the intellect. The price for this sophistry is the immortality of the soul, which he needs as a theologian. This view includes the proof of the formal individuality of the person, but not the existential ipseity.

From the point of view of the objective dative (*dativus obiectivus*, ch. 4) a new *dativus possessivus* was created by Thomas’s interpretation. The donation of being was done in the mode of objective Thomism. As a result, a new meaning of being started in Western philosophy, which led to another epoch of the oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) instituted by Thomist Aristotelianism. The objectively defined *intellectus possibilis* became the place of historial manifestation of the objective being (*Lichtung*). From the point of view of *alētheia*, it is an untruth view of the whole of being. Thomistic receptive intellect is mythological nonsense. This intellect does not really exist; its demiurge is the Thomistic modern subject, schizophrenically split into two autonomous forms. Such a subject does not really exist either, for the person, according to Boethius, is a single indivisible first substance. Modern knowledge, which is objectively given, does not follow the path of truth as a correspondence between reason and reality. The non-existent Thomistic subject has created a type of objectively given truth that has instrumentalized philosophy for theological needs of the Church and today for ideological needs of the ruling class. Avicenna became a philosophical Catholic, Averroes a philosophical heretic. Power of the theological dogma over the philosophical truth created a new version of the *dativus incommodi*. The succession of schools explains how the objective metaphysics canceled disputes of previous generations of modernists. Its first result was the theory of modern “unified science” that was proclaimed by bishop Tempier in the opening part of his condemnation of 1277. Siger’s school proclaimed two methodologically different paths to the one truth. Modern *metaphysica generalis* is built on the subject; it does not need the imposition of sense from reality, only the logical supposition from the subject. Thus, the days of the Siger′s school as the last true representative of the first Averroism were numbered. Second; in the year 1272, after the defeated Aquinas had left Paris, Aegidius and other Thomists realized that the second Averroism could not stand up philosophically and theologically to the secular masters of the University of Paris. Aegidius started his attack on Pecham’s school in the work *Anonymus Bazán* and Aquin did the same in the end of the treatise *De unitate intellectus*. Inevitably, the days of the second Averroism were numbered as well. Modernist masters entered the rue du Fouarre and took the place of expelled Siger and his followers. New philosophical ruling class was objectively confirmed by the power of the Church′s condemnation of 1277. Modern Thomists chose Aquin as the winner over Siger and honored him with the title *Expositor Novus*. A further abolition of the second Averroism was carried out by Avicennist Thomist Duns Scotus in Oxford, where it was necessary to abolish the theory of universal hylemorphism. The school of *Oxfordian Fallacy*, under pressure from the Parisian *dativus incommodi*, had to move from dogmatic mythology to the objective necessity founded by modern demonic logic. The progress of modernity cannot be stopped, not even in Oxford, which had been modernist since the very beginning. The victory of sophistry over the philosophy of Averroes established the objective conception of the meaning of beings and the dualistic destiny of man. Objectivity also prevailed through Aquinas’s theological Thomism, which in the version of the later *via Modernorum* became the official credo of the West.

## 4.6 Averroism and Advent of Modernity

The emergence of objectivity is given in the years 1250–70 by the dispute over Averroism. The schools that had sent Western thought to *via Modernorum*, they have won gigantomachy about the objective substance. The hermeneutics followed this dispute in the case of Aquinas and Siger that had to solve the thesis “*homo (ipse) intelligit*.” This sentence joins the previous dispute between the first Averroism and Porretans about the metaphysical status of the human being as a corpse. The new dispute turned this corpse into a specific and concrete individual. Done in that way, the objective humanism of Western modernity has been founded. The objective thesis on the origin of Averroism claims that the unknown master at the artistic faculty in Paris allegedly defended the sophism “*homo non intelligit*” in the disputations with the students around the year 1270 in the context of the *ars obligatoria* with reference to Averroes (Libera 2004, pp. 272, 302–305). From the previous interpretation of objectivity, it becomes clear that this dispute arose due to the insufficient knowledge of the Commentator’s metaphysics and, above all, due to erroneous interpretation of the writing CMDA in the second and even the first Averroism. That fallacy began already around the year 1230 in the school of modern Avicennists; let us see the analysis of the treatise *Summa Duacensis* (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.2). Averroist interpretation of CMDA was first presented by Rufus of Cornwall in his philippic against Averroes (*Contra Averroem*, 1236). This school of *sophistae Latini* continued after the year 1250 in Paris. In the years 1265–70, another dispute was already brewing directly within the first Averroism between Siger and Aquin. Aegidius joined Aquinas and took part in attacks on Averroes and on the school of the connoisseurs of CMDA in the rue du Fouarre and continued it after Aquinas’s death. Averroes was not an Averroist and Thomas was not a Thomist. Aegidius created Thomism in the years 1268–70 (ms. *Oxford I–II*). He left the second Averroism by transforming Avicennian philosophy into the form of modernized Aristotelianism presented “*ad mentem Thomae*” (ms. *Oxford III*). The new form of Aristotelianism in the framework of the first Averroism is set out in the last part of the Oxford manuscript and in *Anonymus Bazán*. Aegidius’s exegesis of the third book of *De anima*, presented in the Oxford manuscript, completely overturned Siger’s interpretation in QIIIDA. Siger′s teaching was incompatible with Aquinas’s interpretation of *De anima* made out in Italy. Aegidius created the Thomism by replacing Siger’s QIIIDA with an interpretation worked out in the spirit of the New Expositor about the year 1268. Therefore, the interpretation of the third part of the Oxford manuscript coincides with Aquinas’s interpretations and with the writing *De unitate intellectus* (1270). Aegidius repeated Aquinas’s Semiaverroist interpretation of CMDA, as it had already been given in Roman times and was confirmed during his second stay in Paris. Aegidius’s work De plurificatione possibilis intellectus, written after the year 1270, was a sophistic critique of the *intellectus possibilis*, which is separate from sensual cognition. This view corresponds to radicalization of his position in *Anonymus Bazán* towards modern dualism. In demagogic attacks on Averroes and, therefore on the school in the rue du Fouarre can be found in Aegidius’s work *De erroribus Philosophorum*. The role of Aegidius and this work in the fateful year of 1277 is still waiting for a critical evaluation. The first step has already determined which kinds of accusations Aegidius attributed to Averroes (Mandonnet 1907, 543–44). Now it is necessary to determine in what form appear those Aegidius’s false accusations of Averroism in Tempier’s decree of 1277. The attack of all three schools of *sophistae Latini* (Thomism, second Averroism in Paris and in Oxford) must finally get a proper evaluation in the decree of Tempier. Aegidius certainly composed the accusation of magisters from the rue du Fouarre in the year 1277. To falsify the truth in a probable and therefore sophistical way, it was necessary to know well the original position of Siger’s school (*pars Sigeri*). The previous chapters have stated that Aegidius was the only connoisseur of both schools from the circles of the second Averroism. The last matrix analyzes its role in the politicization of the model of the one truth, which was officially confirmed in the papal bull *Unam Sanctam* of 1308. Aegidius purposefully attributed to Aristotle all the theses on the individualization of the intellect presented by Aquinas in the mode *qua2*. He knew very well the position of Siger, whose lectures he had attended in Paris. The text of *De anima* interpreted in the Thomist way deviated fundamentally from the interpretation of CMDA. The attack on the Commentator in the model *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil* was the price to pay for the foundation of victorious Thomism. Aegidius radicalized Aquinas’s trajectory by ending up in the camp of second Averroism at the end of life, which is confirmed in his work *Exposition super libros De anima* (1277–78).

Aquinas and Aegidius fundamentally rejected the conception of the intellect and the person in the school of the second Averroism, the last academic victim of which was magister Johannes Pecham. After that defeat the modernists no longer lost any battle. They founded the new form of objectivity and shaped the victorious Thomism and Scotism. Now it is much clearer why Albert the Great, the greatest connoisseur of Aristotle and Averroes in the Latin West after Siger, refused to come to Paris in 1270. The absolute philosophical, theological and authoritarian imbroglio between the first and the second Averroism was already taking place there. Aquinas made a contribution *sui generis* to that intellectual mess of the first victorious modernism in Latin West. But not all educated people were as confused about the unity of the intellect and the person as the then and now *Moderni*. The ingenious poet, philosopher and wise man Dante Alighieri knew exactly Siger’s position and his humanistic conception of “*homo ipse intelligit*.” Modernist *damnatio memoriae* on Siger’s conception of the person was not complete. Thanks to Dante’s writings on the one government (*Monarchia*), it established the tradition of Western humanism, which gave man a double determination of beatitude within reason and faith. After the year 1277 and after the victory of objective Thomism, probably no one understood Siger’s conception of the person as “*ipse*” in depth, because the artistic master Boethius of Dacia was thrown out of the university together with Siger as the rector of artists. The same thing happened in the year 1255 of the school of the first Averroism under the direction of Guillelmus’ de Sancto Amore, who was even put in front of the door together with his students. After the expulsion of these two lovers of wisdom and after their academic dishonor as so-called Averroists, the advent of modernity could no longer be stopped. The modest secular priest, awarded the title *Doctor Invidiosus*, did not belong to the powerful and influential order of Dominicans and Franciscans, who defended the second Averroism. The lack of understanding of the entire dispute was and is given due to the fundamental ignorance of the line of reasoning of CMDA. Ignorance of CMDA at that time was either only partial (Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus in the first Averroism), or complete (all representatives of the second Averroism). Aquinas died in 1274, that is, soon after the publication of Siger’s *De anima intellectiva*, As a result, the only possibility of dialogue between both prominent representatives of the first Averroism became lost. As the last representative of Blund’s school at the University of Paris, Siger as the Master and Rector of the artists defends the original identity of his *alma mater* based on a brilliant interpretation of Aristotle according to the Commentator. His cause lost against the modern Furies because Siger defended the true knowledge of the world and the unity of the person. After the advent of philosophical Cartesianism and political enlightenment through the French Revolution, the University of Paris disintegrated because its *raison d’être* was lost. After the forced departure of Siger′s followers from the artistic Faculty, it came to a fateful condemnation of the year 1277, which in part rejected Aquinas Aristotelianism as well. Let us cite the introduction of the decree that under penalty of excommunication blacklisted 219 philosophical theses. This decree was issued by Parisian bishop Étienne Tempier on March 7, 1277.

“They assert that this is true according to philosophy, but by no means according to the Catholic faith, as if two opposing truths had ever existed, and as if, contrary to the truth of the Holy Scriptures, the truth of the sayings of Gentiles condemned [by God], about whom it is written: ‘I destroy the wisdom of the wise’ [*1 Cor* 1:19]; for true wisdom destroys false wisdom.” [[348]](#footnote-348)

The decree established the one truth identified with the biblical truth (*vera sapientia*) and actualized theologically (*secundum fidem catholicam*). The prologue condemned the idea of twofold truth (*quasi sint due contrarie veritates*) and declared the philosophical truth in the teaching of Gentiles to be damned (*veritas in dictis gentilium dampnatorum*). If we only take the introduction of the explanation, then it would correspond to the fundamentalist relationship with philosophy according to the victorious Islamic school of mutakallim (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). Let us recall the first version of the condemnation thus formulated, which was directed against Abelard in the 12th century (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). The Paris condemnation of the 219 heterodox theses is immediately confirmed by Kilwardby on March 18, 1277, also in Oxford. This diligent modernist, moreover, compiled his own list of errors in the spirit of the analytical version of Oxfordian Fallacy. The preamble of Tempier (since 1263 *cancellarius* of the Sorbonne) confirms that the topics discussed between the first and the second Averroism were taken out of the debates of philosophical schools and placed under the curatorship of dogmatic truth. To a large extent, the thesis of Averroistic twofold truth represented a simulacrum of the first Averroism, which is generated by the school of modernists producing the unified theology (Aristotelian Thomism) and the biblical ontotheology (Augustinian Avicennism). The university debates were no longer just an academic and philosophical matter, because the modernists, defeated in argumentation, transferred the academic dispute to the sphere of power. Rector Siger became the real *Doctor Invidiosus* because he was defamed by Bonaventure’s Modernists and Thomas’s Semiaverroists. The sophistic philosophy of *Modernorum* was transformed into an authoritatively made ideology. At that time, it was given in the form of a dogmatic ecclesiastical discourse and today it is given by political and academic ideology. An objective truth triumphed over true philosophical thought and critical discernment.

It must be noticed that Alvernus took an authoritarian approach around 1240 as well; however, in the opposite direction, by defending the unity of the person and Christian theology against the modernists. This connoisseur of Averroes took a much more sensitive approach to knowledge of philosophical questions that he dealt with. Bonaventure and his school were able to work at the University of Paris under his rule as the rector. Unfortunately, this was no longer the case of Alvernus’s less philosophically and theologically literate successors. It is no wonder that the universal scholar Bacon was preparing on behalf of the pope’s demand a reform of theology and philosophy studies at that time. Bacon knew very well classical Aristotelism at the University of Paris in the years 1240–50. At that time, the masters were able to distinguish the original text of Aristotle and its interpretation in a qualified way within the framework of the Toledo and Sicilian school. The Decree of March 1272 defended the autonomy of two generically different form of cognition based on theology and philosophy. Both sciences explore in the mode of truth as a correspondence the one world and the one creator as a *causa prima*, and therefore they strive for the one truth. The unity of metaphysical sense of being was replaced by the declarative unity given in the legal decree and it was enforced by the authoritarian institution. The preceding matrices have shown that Abelard’s philosophical school ended in a similar way in the defense of authentic Aristotelian philosophy given in the line of Boethius (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). The condemnation of 1277 was annulled in 1325, when the later successor of Tempier in Paris, Bishop Stephen de Bourret, declared that this condemnation had no canonical value in view of the censured Thomistic theses. Thomas’s followers, including Albert, took as a personal mission not the rehabilitation of the secular priest Siger, but of fellow religious brother Aquinas. They achieved his rehabilitation even at Oxford in the year 1286. The doctrine of Aquinas was based solely on the identity of the person and on the hidden dualism of the two hypostatized forms. It became the official doctrine of the Catholic Church through the Neothomism, which survived in the acting role of Christian philosophy until the Second Vatican Council (1965). Siger had not yet been rehabilitated because he had criticized Albert and Aquin for the insufficiently completed synthesis in the first Averroism. Siger was a cautious and critical philosopher because his teaching on the intellect and the unity of the person could not be beguiled by the existence of the intellect as an independent form. The intellect is not an immaterial form of the soul, but merely an immaterial potency of the soul. Only the soul is a form of the body, and the person can no longer have another form.

The theologian Aquinas wanted much more from philosophy than it could give. He therefore created the proof of the immortality of the soul at the price of the dualism of two forms in man. With regard to the criticism of the second Averroism and the plurality of substantial forms in man, the position of Thomas and Siger was the same. All thinkers of the first Averroism followed Alvernus’s school and reject the Neoplatonic school of “*sequaces Aristotelis*” and their scheme of exposing the intellect from behind, from direction of hypostatized and subsistent cosmic forms. The theory of fully receptive *intellectus possibilis* cannot be exposed from the direction of the solar intellect, because otherwise man would no longer be a person thinking on his own. Siger’s conception of knowledge and unity of the person, however, is not speculative like the Averroism of theologian Aquinas, but hermeneutic like Averroes’s philosophical conception of soul and intellect in CMDA. Averroes was not an Averroist, as Thomas Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus claimed. Siger knew and interpreted Averroes best of all thinkers in the Latin West. That artist from the rue du Fouarre based the truth by brilliant thinking in such a way that he was truly envied by everyone and many hated him because of it (*silogizzò invidïosi veri*, *Paradiso* 10.138). Hermeneutics clearly confirm the characteristic of Dante and awarded to this scholastic thinker the honorary title of “*Doctor Invidiosus*.” Dante’s artistic aphorism is as precise, concise and accurate as the thinking of the Brabant magister, who could not stand sophistry and weighed the truth of the words on a pharmacist’s scale. Siger at the time when the first modernist confusion of mind started was an outstanding philosopher, a true theologian and a wise person. Even today, sophistic modernity does not forgive such qualities, and certainly not at the time of its first hour of epochal untruth, when it definitely conquered the University of Paris, in order to finally lead it to its decline. Siger’s critical caution defended in a fundamental way the different generic definition of philosophy and theology. True and scientific philosophy has only a very limited ability to provide proof of the immortality of the soul. Siger clearly saw that thinking in the first person can only exhibit the immaterial potency of the intellect, but by no means its subsistence, given to the soul from the point of view of theological eternity. The intellect can only be potency related to the act, which is realized in the animated body through the actually experienced act of *anima intellectiva*. Any substantialization of the intellect, which is so much needed for theologians, would bring about the dualism of two hypostases, forms or substances. This canceled both the possibility of universal cognition and the ipseity of the person. True philosophy must protect these natural characteristics of the person. It must be wise in a classic manner and not stupid in a modernist way. The immortality of the soul belongs to theology. It can be defended in philosophy as a rational postulate, but by no means in the form of scientific proof based on the causality of the person stated according to *Second Analytics*. From the existentially experienced ability of the separated but personal intellect, it is possible to draw a deductive scientific conclusion about the true nature of the soul, which is immaterial in its act. But the immortal *anima intellectiva* is no more than an abstract concept given in thought. How the soul essence is eternal, whether it was created by God or not, these are questions addressed to theology. The philosophy and theology are different genres and ways of cognitio. According to *Second Analytics*, there is no transition of scientific evidence from one genre to the other. There are two ways to the fullness of truth, which complement each other. Magister Siger knew this well, and so did every educated artist at the University of Paris who had to read the Decree of Magisters issued in 1272. Siger, like Bacon and Dante, defends the theory of a twofold path to cognition, because, according to the cited decree, both theology and philosophy have their own field of research. No kind of generically different knowledge methodologically determines another kind of science.

Aquinas did not withstand the attack of modernists and the followers of Siger in the years 1270–72. He therefore left Paris in 1272, as did Pecham a year earlier. However, the philosophical reasons for Aquin’s departure were different, because he was only half a modernist. After the year 1270, Augustinian theologians and Avicennian representatives of objective ontotheology and logic began to dominate the debates at the University. The result was the first modern confusion of knowledge, which reached its peak at the beginning of 1277 at the University of Paris under the leadership of deities that are responsible for academic Vengeance. After that, enlightened thinking of *illuminati* took up *via Modernorum*. The thinking that Bacon called “insane” became a normal case, that is, a modern and objective state of mind. The epochal reign of the one objective truth continues to this day through the methodology of unified science. The sophists of the second Averroism had to authoritatively dominate the critical and scientific Aristotelians in Paris and Oxford, and this also at the cost of fundamentally deforming Aristotle’s and Averroes’s teaching on the substantial unity of man. Therefore, even the Semiaverroist Aquin became an academic victim of the modernists. The brilliant *Doctor angelicus* could not teach at the chair dominated by Bonaventure’s modernists. No less influential *Doctor Seraphicus* presented the famous series of Parisian sermons dedicated to the criticism of Aristotelianism proclaimed at the school of the first Averroism (*isti errores significantur in Apocalypsi in numero nominis bestiae*; ch. 4.1.2). Hermeneutics likes to quote this Pythian saying of the main founder of modernism at the University of Paris. The foresighted Albert refused any interference in the Paris dispute from 1270. Let us recall the exact opposite attitude of Algazel, when the controversy about modernist began in the Falsafa.[[349]](#footnote-349) At the end of his treatise on errors of modernists, this most influential intellectual and theologian from Baghdad rejected the fundamental points of their teaching and saved Islamic theology from the tragic fate of Western scholasticism by issuing his philosophical fatwa against modernity. Albert would probably have ended up as Siger by defending Averroes’s metaphysics and the theory of cognition. Moreover, Albert should have publicly defended in Paris against Siger the essential conception of the soul, which he defended with reference to Avicenna’s illumination by *intellectus sanctus*. After Siger’s criticism of Albert in QIIIDA, it was philosophically impossible to defend this doctrine. In addition, Albert risked a public conflict with Aquinas on the issue of intellect as a hypostatized form, in order to defend the theological postulate of the immortal soul. The quite justified philosophical attack on Thomas risks unmasking Aquinas a real Averroist. Albert would have to reject Aquin’s interpretation of CMDA as fundamentally erroneous. The dualism of forms defended by Aquinas was not in line with Albert’s unity of the person defined by *intellectus speculativus* according to CMDA. Thomas’s conception of *copulatio* and *continuatio* in relation to the possible intellect as a cosmic substance was absolutely at odds with Averroes’s teaching. Albert knew very well from the years 1240–45 in Paris how Rufus and other modernists had ideologically crafted Averroes as un Averroist. Thomas defended that nonsense. The dispute between Albert and Aquinas about 1270 in Paris would certainly have had the unity of the person on the table. Thomas and Aegidius transformed Averroes into an Averroist; moreover, they created an Averroist interpretation of the person that was based on the plurality of forms. Both points were unacceptable to Albert.

Albert sacrificed Averroes, Siger’s school and the philosophical unity of the person in order to save Thomas’s Semiaverroism. According to Siger and Albert as connoisseurs of CMDA, Aquin’s definition of the person was philosophically problematic, because it introduced the plurality of the two forms into the soul. However, both semiaverroists Albert and Thomas rejected modern thesis of the plurality of substances in man. We find this opinion in the school of the second Averroism, which was led by Bonaventure and then by Pecham. Considering the natural cognition in *De anima*, all representatives of the first Averroism rejected the theory of the illumination of the intellect from behind, passing through some form of spiritualized matter or hypostatized cosmic intelligences. The most famous victim of the dispute was the *Doctor Invidiosus*, and this, unfortunately, also thanks to semiaverroist position of Aquinas. After his second arrival in Paris, he tried to respond to justified criticism of Siger published in QIIIDA. Thomas and Siger belonged to the school of the first Averroism, both taught in Paris and both were exposed to attacks on the part of Bonaventure’s school of the second Averroism. Aquinas arrived in Rome with full power and an excellent reputation, which defended in the Roman disputations and at the Pontifical Academy in Orvieto. The quoted study on the poetic work *Liber de statu Curie Romane* comments on the debates at the papal court, which corresponded to the debates and events at the University of Paris. The philosophical and theological debates in Rome and Orvieto took a similar course in the period around 1265–70 and went on similar topics as in Paris (Grauert 1912). In this complicated situation, Aquinas writes the work *De unitate intellectus*, in which he successfully debated with the second Averroism. Just like Aegidius who wrote the work *Anonymus Bazán*, Thomas attacked in *De unitate* the school of Pecham, who was Bonaventure’s and Kilwardby’s *protégé* and belonged to modern school of thought inspired by Porretans. The University was still dominated by the real philosophers around the year 1270 and not by modern sophists, who were preparing Tempier’s philosophically confused decree of 1277. The incredible transition of modern *apaideusía* took place from 1272 to 1277. Over the course of five years modernity made an intellectual mess of such measure, that the ecclesiastical authorities lost the remnants of its sound philosophical spirit. They destroyed the only school that was capable of making an intellectual cure. Pecham could not continue to work in Paris without loss of academic dignity. A public dispute between two religious teachers during the year 1270 was inevitable, and the better thinker prevailed in it. The Franciscan emigrated to Oxford, dominated by modernists about 1271 where he became a major representative of the school of second Averroism after Dominican Kilwardby. Pecham probably also wrote an answer, which Aquinas had demanded of him in the quoted conclusion of *De unitate*. Hermeneutics consider the work *Tractatus de anima* (completed in 1279) to be this answer. In that treatise, Pecham reworked the lectures given at the Roman Curia, before he took up the post of regent at Oxford. After Kilwardby’s death (†1279), he took over the Archbishopric of Canterbury.

Aquinas prevailed against the second Averroism, but by no means against the connoisseurs of Averroes in the rue du Fouarre. Aquin’s criticism of Siger in the work *De unitate* was not actualized with success and did not go to the heart of the matter, which, by the way, he himself did admit. In this work, he asked Siger to reveal the way in which (*modum quo*) the activity of the intellect is the action of this individual person. However, the *Doctor Invidiosus* had already done this in QIIIDA and all educated masters from the school of the first Averroism knew this. Siger explained his position anew in *De anima intellectiva*, where he also criticized exactly Thomas’s problematic position. Aquin did not recognize the basic phenomenological principle given in CMDA that Siger confirmed right at the beginning of his career. Thomas relied only on the wording of *De anima* 429a23 (*intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit anima*) and defined the intellect as the hypostatized form in the soul. Aquinas rejected the interpretation of CMDA and found no other way to save the unity of the person and the proof of the immortality of the soul than through the immaterial intellect given as another form in the soul. This dispute between the two expositors of Aristotle was followed and commented on by all artists of the time in the rue du Fouarre. They rightly elected the brilliant philosopher Siger as their rector in 1271. As a result, Aquinas also lost, but unlike Pecham, that quarrel took place in the school of first Averroism. Then, with the decree of 1272, the magisters from the rue du Fouarre confirmed the generic difference between theology and philosophy, which concerned Thomas’s philosophical treatise *De unitate*, as well as his writing written before the year 1268, which was also the first part of *Summa theologica*. The animosity of secular artists towards their academic medical colleagues may also have played a role. But Siger’s factual and honorable attitude in the polemic against Albert and Aquinas showed that this was not the truth. The group *pars Sigeri* led the dispute in an excellent way and clarified the most difficult questions of metaphysics *sine ira et studio*. Therefore, their wisdom preserved the truth of the Sicilian school in the mode of *alētheia*, and not in the manner of sophistic and objective *veritas*. The second round of the dispute in Paris continued after the publication of Aquins *De unitate*. The answer of Siger in *De anima intellectiva* and in his commentary on *Liber de causis* was understandably critical of Thomas. He continued to insist on the dualism of the two forms in man, which he had worked out during his stay in Rome. In this situation of a twofold attack, Aquin had no choice but to leave Paris. After the condemnation of 1277, the first Thomist Aegidius probably also left the University of Paris for a short time. However, this sophist later returned victorious with the rehabilitated “Thomistic” Aquinas. But there was also a different development in Oxford where they elaborated the second Averroism outside the dispute of both schools. Scotus made a new metaphysic out of the second Averroism at Oxford around the year 1290. With this he abolished most sophisms, which the previous generation of Latin sophists, led by the Archbishop of Canterbury Pecham, authoritatively defended. The further development of objectivity, which triumphantly proceeded along the *via Modernorum*, abolished the dispute between the two schools as unnecessary, and both forms of metaphysics passed into the epochal Lethe. The modernist Descartes, who was directly linked to Scotist *via Modernorum*, can be classified into Avicennist postmodernism. That new form of dualism realizes the old dream of Neoplatonists of the intellect as an autonomous substance. The difference between both positions forms the core of debates concerning the title *Expositor Novus* at the University of Paris. The debate ends with Aquinas’s death in 1274, when he had been called as an advisor to the Second Council of Lyon and died on the trip to Lyon. In the same year, Bonaventure died at the Council in Lyon. Mendicant schools were fighting against the magisters in the rue du Fouarre in the new generation. After the death of both theorists of modernism, their sophistic successors had no choice but to authoritatively expel the secular masters out of rue du Fouarre. The sanctions were all the easier because Bonaventure and Aquinas belonged to the theological and dogmatic pillars of the Church and both orders initiated the process of canonization immediately after their death. After the year 1275, when the victorious magister Siger, as *Expositor Novus*, published his commentaries on the key philosophical works in the spirit of integral Aristotelianism according to the commentator (*Metaphysics, Liber de causis*), the academic fate of Siger’s school was already sealed. The uprising in the rue du Fouarre was led from the year 1271 by the group of *sequaces Aristotelis* under the leadership of the Magister Alberich of Reims. He belonged to the same Neoplatonic cathedral school that had destroyed Abelard in the previous century. The papal Inquisitor Simon of Brion, who was supervising the activity of artists during this eventful time, tried to select a neutral candidate after the ecclesiastical (but not academic) rehabilitation of Siger, who was suitable for Bishop Tempier. The new rector of the artists in the rue du Fouarre was the modernist Peter of Auvergne (Petrus de Alvernia), who was a doctor of medicine. The majority of the magisters did not consider him a philosopher, and his appointment remained controversial. Henry of Ghent as an Augustinian Avicennist becomes the next rector. Gandavus, together with Aegidius, actively supported the school of second Averroism and worked on the resulting version of Tempier’s decree of 1277. Through this first and hitherto unknown “betrayal of modern intellectuals” (also Julien Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs*, 1928), the University of Paris started to walk to its inevitable end. Its founding event (*Ereignis*) stands and falls in contrast to the modernist Oxford with the Christian defense of the unity of the person. The secular masters in the rue du Fouarre lost their struggle by protecting the philosophy and human dignity. The victory of modernists brought the humanism of secularization, which was brought to the peak by the closure of the university during the French Revolution. The reasons for the global victory of modern Oxford are objectively given by the history of capitalism, by the British Empire and the banking enclave City of London, which are now being duplicated by Wall Street. The postmodern Furies changed the address and profession. Today, they run the economic simulacra and the nihilistic science, which is nearly completely enslaved by corporations and by corrupt political power. Production and reproduction of *scibile* moved from the objective mythology of Bonaventure to objective neoliberalism of today.

Metaphysically confused modernity enabled the young modernists that rejected critical (and difficult) thinking of classical philosophy, to form the meanings of the world *ex nihilo*. This and the previous matrix analyzed the first thought experiments of *sophistae Latini*, who were not able to distinguish the metaphysical, essential and logical level of thinking. Their mental confusion led to fundamental problems in theology, which was shown in Abelard’s time by the dispute over Tritheism. Through the introduction of the soul as a universal essence and at the same time as a hylemorphic first substance, a whole series of paradoxes came into being. After the defeat of critical understanding in the Peripatetic philosophy, they had to be defended in an authoritarian manner. A typical example of such nonsense was the theory of numerically individualized intellect, which, according to the introduction of Étienne’s decree of 1277, some Parisian students of philosophy proclaimed (*nonnulli parisius studentes in artibus*). It is a pity that this decree did not tell which of those Parisian faculties it was, whether the secular artists in the rue du Fouarre or the artists from the Mendicant schools. For a whole generation, the interpretation of *De anima* took place in the rue du Fouarre in the mode of the first Averroism made “*ad mentem Averrois*.” The faculty ordered the artistic baccalaureate to have compulsory knowledge of this script since 1255. Here, similar nonsense would have been eliminated by excluding the baccalaureate from the studies. The proclamation of these heresies as a valid philosophical teaching would not have been allowed to anyone on the faculty, because it would have annulled the *status quo* and the *genius loci* of the Paris University that was built upon Abelard’s metaphysics according to Boethius and Blund’s school. Latin sophists, thinking in the mode of logical abstraction and universal hylemorphism, assumed such nonsense as the numerically unified intellect. Bishop Tempier had to intervene. He accomplished the abolition of this nonsense by destroying the school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre. This unwise bishop poured out the child with the tub, thus definitely destroying the legacy of his wise predecessor Alvernus. The academic community of modernists completed the defeat of the sound philosophical mind by twofold version of St. Bartholomew’s Night, which massacred the philosopher in the rue du Fouarre in 1256 and 1277.

Against the theologian Aquinas, Siger defended Aristotle’s interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*, which was given *ad mentem Averrois*. Dante took over Siger’s definition of beatitude from Boethius of Dacia (*De summo bono sive De vita philosophi*, 1270) and transformed it into the political path of man and his theological perfection in God after death. According to Siger, Dante created a new definition of humanity and found a new definition of man (*sic homo denominatur*) within the framework of the newly discovered “*propria operatio hominis*” according to *Nicomachean Ethics*. Dante took Siger’s two definitions of man, the ipseity of the person and beatitude as an existential act, and used them to construct a new humanism within the framework of the “*universitas humana*” cited above (ch. 4.4.3). Dante discerned exactly the difference between Siger and Aquinas in the conception of beatitude given in the terminus “*intellectus possibilis*.” Humanism received a new value according to Averroes’s act of thinking as *tertium genus*, which Siger took as the basis of existential phenomenology according to *Nicomachean Ethics* (*propria operatio*, κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια). The identity must come from the act of the person that Dante considered to be political existence. In the epoch of humanism, Dante took this spiritual beatitude to be the basis of political philosophy. The writing *Monarchia* transformed Siger’s act of thinking “*homo ipse intelligit*” into political existence of the citizen made in the first person. The political existence of man is exercised in an earthly community. This political determination of the person established a new concept of a politically determined humanism. The Aristotelian thinker Hannah Arendt revived this hidden *alētheia* of Dante′s political humanism in the age of political totalitarianism and philosophical nihilism. Dante opened up two paths to the perfection of man: the activist and the political one made in the context of efficient causality; the substantive and the theological one made in the context of final causality. Each of them has a different method of “how” the beatitude happens. Humanism is not derived from the hypostatized corpse, as in the case of *Modernorum*, but from the real activity of the person (art, morality, politics, philosophy, theology). These activities are most specific to humanity and therefore bring us the highest degree of beatitude. Modern man, on the other hand, is defined by the schizophrenic struggle of counteracting substances and by paranoid relationship with virtual reality. That is why he lost himself, the world and finally God as well. The modern schizophrenic, following the assimilation theory of truth, set off to conquer the world. Thanks to objective knowledge, modernity has conquered everything necessary from reality in the form of being of the third kind. She kept these foundations for the Neoplatonic cave, illuminated by the artificial light of the mind and later also by digital knowledge. The dispute about artificial intellect given in the cloud databases basically concerns the interpretation of CMDA. The term *locus specierum* in the first Averroism, according to *De anima* 429a27‒28, refers to cognition of the soul, which, thanks to the fully potential *intellectus possibilis*, is also open to the cognition of the real world. Modernity related this specific *locus* of intellectual cognition to Augustinian *memoria*. It is the place where the modern individual, as being of the third kind, deposits scientific *scibilia* in the form of being of the third kind. The objective deposition of meaning in the mode of Augustinian *memoria* was objectively perceived in Pecham’s term “*totum virtuale*” to be accomplished in the age of semiconductors and quantum computers. The truth is complete, evident and absolutely certain in the mode of Rufus′s *adaequatio*, because it is actualized by mathematics.

# 5. Birth of Anthropocentric Metaphysics (Matrix V)

The last matrix foreshadows the emergence of the modern subject in three stages. The Franciscan Petrus Ioannis Olivi (Pierre Déjean, †1298) established the objective kind of being based on the primacy of the will and created an ontotheology of the modern subject. Heinrich of Ghent (Henricus Gandavus, †1293) elaborated the fully objective metaphysics implanted in the framework of Augustinian ontotheology. In the next decade, Duns Scotus (†1308) transformed Gandavus’s teaching into a new form of metaphysics made in accordance with Avicennist Aristotelianism. All three Avicennist modernists defended official interpretation of the one truth proclaimed after the year 1277. The stage of accomplished objectivity in the new form of the first science gives rise to the second beginning of metaphysics on the basis of renewed Avicennism (Honnefelder 1987, 2007; Bertolacci 2006). The study published in the commentaries on Aristotle’s metaphysics from the 13th and 14th centuries sees the second beginning of metaphysics in the dispute over *ens commune*, to which belongs the concept of divine existence made in a univocal manner (Zimmermann 1998). His theory defends the continuity of metaphysics in the line “Kilwardby—Scotus.” Gandavus constituted the first project of metaphysics with a fully objective sense of being and Scotus made its definitive form. The transformation of being of the third kind followed the subjective achievement of free will (Olivi) and the evolution of objective science (Scotus). Both modern philosophers completed the construction of the new metaphysics and the emergence of objectivity linked to the new role of the subject. The fundamentally changed *dativus incommodi* after the condemnation of 1277 meant that the original schools of first and second Averroism ceased to exist. The previous matrixes of objectivity have shown that modernity does not recognize reality, but a substance of the third kind (*scibile*). The new *tertium ens* has replaced the hyparchical first substance in the scheme of knowledge, and the enlightened mind of *illuminati* recognizes this non-existent being in the direct intuition. The modern conception of the substance of the third kind (*individuum*) emerged as early as the end of the 12th century in the Porretan school of *Nominales* (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). At the beginning of the 13th century, Neoplatonic *illuminati* began to see the whole world in the mode of “*discrete videamus.*” In the introduction to the fourth matrix, it was shown that Rufus′s notion of “*species obiecti exsistentis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4) contains the complete donation of the objective dative. The objective sense of existence outlined by Rufus founded the school of second Averroism around 1235, which began to take effect in Paris around 1245. The first form of objectivity made in the historicity of *alētheia* passed into the new historical manifestation as *veritas* in the years 1235–45. The manifestation of new metaphysics took place in the University of Paris and Oxford and in corresponding ecclesiastical institutions (religious orders, secular priests, bishops, popes). The historical effect of objective metaphysics through the altered *dativus possessivus* caused the Latin West to appropriate the objectively seen world in a new kind of production. The appropriation of the newly created *tertium ens* in the metaphysics of *Modernorum* was possible because the modern subject became the exclusive producer of these beings of the third kind. This production of objective simulacra created another important modality of the objective dative. The donation of objective being enabled frenetic production of objective *scibilia*. They built up the mythological realm of Western science since the second half of the thirteenth century. After the eclipse of the first substance, there was a kind of *horror vacui* that was fulfilled by ontotheological structure of objective metaphysics (*Ge-Stell*). The production of *tertium ens* created a new form of the objective dative, which took on the character of capitalist production (*dativus modi*). When modern God entered his agony, the capitalist demiurge took his place and changed the *dativus modi* into a new kind of *Ge-Stell*. In the stage of Western imperialism, the empire of *tertium ens* acquired a pure economic value. Due to the new determination of *dativus modi*, the role of the subject acquired an absolutely fundamental character, which must be analyzed in the final matrix of objectivity.

The first modernists had to find an island of reality in the absolute demiurgic subject. In the second step, they had to connect it with the intellect in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The *illuminati* founded the scientific deduction in their own mind and produced the hypostatized forms out of their own solar intellect. That Cartesian approach was the only possible starting point for a prosperous start of modern subject. On the academic level, in the decade 1270–80, it was necessary to find a new theory of truth that avoided Aristotelian definition as the correspondence of external reality and intellect. The modern subject carries in himself the meaning of being in the mode *per se* and *simpliciter*, and thereby replaced the hyparchical meaning of the first substance in the scheme of cognition. The source of subsistence and actuality, which replaced the first substance, was represented by the potentiality in divine and human thought that is hypostatized *per se*. As a result, a new carrier of universal and univocal meaning for the totality of beings was created (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*) that established the unity of being in the objective mode made “*ad unum*.” After the crisis of 1277, metaphysics based on the intentionality of modern demiurgic subject found the desired donkey bridge between both floors of the demiurgic rules according to Bonaventure (*regula agentis in/creati*, ch. 4.1.3). The divine and human intention of objective being operates in the mode of anthropomorphically given correspondence. Modernity is determined by permanent search for the objective unity of man and God. The primary justification of the unity of the being (*rectitudo*) on the side of God must be given secondarily on the basis of the inner unity of the human subject (*certitudo*). The modern subject found himself through the objectively recognized world, which became a new form of his own *scibile*, predicted in the mode of analogical similarity. We must remember Rufus’s dictum that anounced the full assumption of meaning of being by the subject (*ubi est subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). That sentence assumed the absolute validity. The supposition given through demiurgic intentionality displaced the imposition of meaning from real first substances. The first exemplary meaning of being is given absolutely in the fully separated supreme thinking of the Creator. Modern God become the highest actualized of the one objective truth. He was not dead at that time. This simulacrum was officially installed at the University of Paris after the expulsion of Siger’s school in 1277. For the classical thinkers like Bacon, the new metaphysics was a madness of mind. However, at that time, the last witnesses of first Averroism connected with the original Blund′s school were already gone. Latin sophists created the appearance of truthfulness within the framework of metaphysical operation of the natural and supernatural agent, which is known in media manipulation in the terminus “agenda-setting” (McCombs-Shaw 1972). The totality of being received a new metaphysical agenda was the result of the fact that *tertium ens* acquired a categorical meaning in the ontotheological structure of being.

In the system of objective intentionality of God and man, an epochal effective series of modern simulacra were born. The modern educated Furies set it up at the universities of Oxford and Paris. Objective thinking in God of *Modernorum* performs the first and most important deduction of objective being of the third kind given as an exemplary divine intention. Modernism, with the help of Avicenna, created a new form of the underworld, in which the absolute divine psychology and intentionality were combined with each other. It became the first science about being. In the new metaphysics, the hermeneutic circle of understanding connects the demiurgic divine realm with the corresponding human world. Modern God has become man through demiurgic intentionality, and the human demiurge has become modern God. As it is well known, the incarnation of God and the deification of man make two fundamental principles of theology. The objective union of demiurgic determination of God and man was born on the new form of diacosmos. The recognition of exemplary intentionality in the objectively given world (*ratio seminalis*) necessarily includes all available sense of being that resides in the divine mind (*ratio exemplaris*). Due to objectively shared intentionality, then, both demiurges manage one common and really non-existent diacosmos. The school of *Nominales* outlined that kind of worldview for the first time in the work *Dialectica monacensis*. The potentiality became a kind of *tertium ens* (*potens est tantum esse*; OB II, ch. 1.4) that started to replace the cognition of the real world. Modernity designed the fundamental correspondence between things and the intellect through the univocally conceived concepts of *resolutio* and *intentio*. Rufus became the first researcher of this objective world. He created the first theory of modern truth as *coaequatio*. The possibility given in the Porretan logic as Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*” was transformed into an objective causality. The next step was obvious. By virtue of Oxfordian Fallacy, the essentially conceived intermediate link of scientific proof received causal efficacy. The first substance turned into a being of the third kind, which recognizes the averroistic intellect given as a hypostatized being of the third kind. The divine man of Jamblichus gathered all opposites into one form of intellectual insight produced by the act of synoptic theurgic seeing (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The new divine demiurge as an objective creature of the third kind became the absolute producer of objective reality. This subject established a new metaphysical agenda through the sovereign demiurgic will, which is given intentionally and in view of the objective appetite of form and matter of the third kind. By connecting the whole and the part into a mythical circle of eternal return of the same objective *scibile*, the history of the West received a new agenda, given by the history of nihilistic metaphysics. The archaeology of the modern subject having been accomplished in that manner, he set out to conquer the world in the early 14th century.

The fifth matrix explores the triangle of archaic hermeneutics (historiality, historicity, history) to examine the emergence of the new Western subject. Rufus of Cornwall presented the original *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of that subject. Furthermore, we must find the corresponding concept of objectivity for this subject, which completes the new relation “subject—object.” The crisis of modernity was radicalized by the Decree of March 1277. The condemnation helped the epochal philosophical error to triumph, namely the plurality of substantial forms in man. The schizophrenic subject of modernity, composed of either several hypostatized forms (Aquinas) or even of several substances (Bonaventure, Pecham). Such crazy subject was validated as direct consequence of the one theological truth. Modern theologians from the camp of the first and second Averroism supported that view. A new round of gigantomachy concerning the substance produced the winners and the defeated. There were, on the one hand, defeated magisters Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. On the other hand, there was the branch of victorious modernism. The final stage of modern metaphysics in the epoch of objective eclipse of the first substance shows the transformation of classical metaphysics into its objective form. The victorious school of second Averroism established the structure of objective metaphysics and made possible the emergence of postmodern *metaphysica generalis*. This gave rise to the one truth of theological anthropology of *Modernorum*. After the death of modern God in the postmodernism, the one truth was defined completely objectively, in the mode of metaphysical nihilism.

In contrast to earlier epochs, the evolution took place in a very quickly manner. The transition to the new metaphysics was completed in one generation between 1280 and 1300. From 1270 onwards, the dispute between two metaphysical worldviews proved completely irreconcilable. Necessarily, the controversies took on a dogmatic and authoritarian character. The dispute of philosophers was mixed with the dispute over the interpretation of the key theological postulates (the statute of the Eucharist, the question of *creatio ex nihilo*, the status of Jesus’s body after death, the nature of hellfire, etc.). Let us recall the letter of the General of the Order of Dominicans of 1271, who submitted these contentious fundamental issues to main scholars of the Order for assessment (ch. 4.5.3). Theological disputes were determined by the first or by the second Averroism. Let’s briefly look at the important milestones that mark the gradual eclipse of the first substance given in Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The modern concept of being fundamentally changed the ontological statute of “*esse ratum.*” Albert the Great defined it in the mode *per prius* with regard to first substances (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). A series of authors from the second half of the 13th century claims that the intellect recognizes species as a hylemorphic thing that exists in reality. A typical example is provided by the polemical work *Correctorium fratris Thomae* (Guillaume de la Mare, about 1278), which explicitly criticizes the first part of Aquinas’s *Summa Theologica*. After 1280, the classic text of Aquinas became the stumbling block for modernists, since it defended Aristotelian abstraction and strictly rejected direct intellectual cognition of real individual things.[[350]](#footnote-350) Aquasparta, a disciple of Bonaventure and the general of the Franciscan Order, comments on the course of abstraction according to Aristotle’s *De anima* by using Aquina′s writing *De veritate* q. 10, a. 5. He spoke almost prophetically, by saying that this way of solving the problem seemed almost incomprehensible to some people (*iste modus ponendi non videtur multum bene intelligibilis*; Simonin 1930, 294). Franciscan master Vital du Four argues that the intellect directly recognizes singular things in reality in a similar way as the senses. This knowledge runs through a collection of species of the third kind (*intellectus cognoscat rei substantiam per speciem collectam*).[[351]](#footnote-351) Aquinas’s conception of cognition followed the first Averroism by exposing the intellect to hyparchical reality. Such proceeding was for that kind of modernists even “*contra philosophiam*” (Simonin 1930, 291). The changed status of the first substance is clearly documented around 1280. Modernists from the second Averroism and Aristotelians from the first Averroism no longer considered the reality of singular things in the same way. The authors in the end 13th century such as Vital du Four, Duns Scotus and Richard de Mediavilla derive the existence of real substance from the special collection of the secondary species. In commentary on the second book of Sentences, Richard von Mediavilla explains that self-reflection is one of the reasons to recognize individual things (*cognoscimus nos cognoscere singulare*).[[352]](#footnote-352) This Cartesian view was defended for the first time in the work *Anonymus of Erfurt* (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The cited representatives of *via Modernorum* even deny that in the process of Aristotelian abstraction given by the senses we could rightly recognize material substances (*individuum vagum*, *aliquis homo*). The original source of the transformation of the real thing into a nebula of meaning located in Rufus’s “*concretum*” comes to light in Avicenna’s texts. He used the term “*individuum vagum*” by expression of the indefinite or generic individual (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). Modernity does not recognize the reality of first substances, but directly apprehends objective species that representing reality. Cartesian Arnauld accomplished it for postmodernism (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The first modernists appeared after the year 1277. After them, postmodern Descartes and Husserl had to undertake a complicated odyssey through consciousness, logic and metaphysics in order to arrive at the problematic and doubtful first substance given in reality.

God of *Modernorum* became the cornerstone of new metaphysics. This creature did not have it easy at the beginning. Bacon and Albert condemned this travesty of philosophy as an incursion of a misunderstood philosophy into misused theology. They considered modern thinkers to be intellectual lunatics. The birth and death of modern God are inseparably linked with the birth and death of the modern subject. The eclipse of the first substance described in the preceding matrix was supplemented by progressive modernity with the eclipse of the unity of the person as the entelechic first substance. In modernism and postmodernism, the interpretation of the unity of the person was no longer determined by the metaphysics of the first substance. The unity of the person related to theological postulate of the immortal soul (Aquinas); or, the person was determined in the ontotheological interpretation as plurality of substances (second Averroism). In both cases, a dualism of hypostatized *tertium ens* was necessary. They were situated either at the level of form or even at the level of substance. This modern individual was highly valued for his ability to use concretely and adequately his hypostatized intellect to follow demiurgical regulations established by Bonaventure. These rules for the application of the mind, Descartes worked them out in the posthumously published work *Reguale ad directionem ingenii* (1701) to assure the methodical guidance of postmodern subject. After 1270, the question of truth became a question of ecclesiastical law (*quaestio iuris*). At the end of this journey, there was the anonymous and diligent official Adolf Eichmann, who administered the Auschwitz extermination camp according to the Nazi “*regulae ad directionem ingenii*.” Objectivity was given a new status within ecclesiastical *iurisdictio*, which changed the status of the subject. Man’s naturally given desire to explore the world theoretically, according to the opening sentence of *Metaphysics* (*Met*. 980a21), changed into the modern will to power. Modern knowledge has become a form of power based on jurisdiction. The will of the subject affirms truth as *rectitudo* in the realm of the modern subject's historical efficacy, that is, within the new jurisdiction of knowing power. This jurisdiction of the divine and human demiurge was constituted by the rules that established the new background of metaphysical certainty of the Western subject. Greed and desire, which were linked to the demiurgic will, became a new historical factor. The mystical *appetitus* of the objective substance for the objective form is manipulated by the demiurge in the universal logic rightly named “*in artificialibus*.” The natural desire of form is combined with the conscious will of the subject, whose reformatory and later also capitalist determination gave rise to the imperial domination over objectively determined matter. The original *Lichtung* of this ordering will, endowed with elementary greed, is in Avicebron’s work *Fons vitae*. The master says to the student the prophetic words that founded the orientation of Latin West to metaphysical nihilism.

“Matter and form are sprouts of the will. Therefore, it is not possible to determine something else, as long as you do not know the science of matter, form and will.” [[353]](#footnote-353)

The previous stages of modernity introduced the simulacrum of the first substance in the mode of universal hylemorphism. Rufus combined the Porretan matter with the form in order to make an objective body of the third kind. The simulacrum of the objective world already existed in the mode “*discrete videamus*.” The newly born modernity did not elaborate the concept of the demiurgic will as another being of the third kind in the human soul. There was yet no bearer of the capitalist demiurgic will that should conquer the world to transform it into an objective simulacrum. At the beginning of modernity in the 12th century, the lost crusades were coming to an end. From the end of the 13th century onwards, modernism prepared the spiritual actualized for the new crusade of Western imperialism. The first crusade of the capitalist subject created by Bonaventura and Olivi had a spiritual and mystical character. Modern *illuminati* changed into imperial crusaders several centuries later. According to Augustine and Avicebron, the demiurgic will forms the primary source of the meaning of being, and from this basic act of thinking the secondary significations of matter and form are derived (*materia et forma sunt rami voluntatis*). Productive and demiurgic volition accomplished the threefold kind of knowledge (*scientiam materiae et formae et voluntatis*). Bonaventure conceptualized the archetypal meaning of being in the concept of exemplar and linked this primordial form with the creative thinking and the will. The original source of this objective thinking in God we find in the trinitarian conception of Ibn Adī (OBJ I, ch. 2.2). The matter given in the mode of modern infinity is endowed with an immanent appetite to acquire the form given in the demiurgic creative will. The objective and ontotheological forms of being are conceived in a voluntaristic way. As to “*scientia voluntatis*” of Avicebron, Bonaventure set it in the framework of ontological desire for form (*appetitus*). That appetite follows the immanent ratio that God put in creation as objectively given *rationes seminales*. The matter of the third kind is endowed with the primary desire for connection with the form. The demiurgic will of modern God and man wants to create the objective world. In order to do it, the demiurge has as an object of manipulation as a mythological matter of the third kind. This matter objectively looks forward to assume the demiurgic form. This schema led to an ontotheological universalization of predication “*in artificialibus*,” which Aristotelians such as Bacon and others had already refused in debates with Porretan modernists in Oxford around the year 1250 (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Porretans already made use of that confused predication (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). See the above-mentioned modern terms as *appetitus, conatus* and *impetus*, which we later find in the natural philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Galileo. The metaphysical development of this modern desire led Olivi to establish the capitalist subject. This gave rise to the first epochal determination of capitalism in its original *Lichtung*. The new epoch of capitalism was made possible by Bonaventure’s ontotheological and mystical-erotic *factum*, which is given according to biblical *Song of Songs*. At the birth of capitalism, this musical truth was in the mode of Pythian *alētheia*. The modern capitalist Furies opened the history of demiurgic modern will that follows the objective *veritas*. Bonaventure bound that demiurgic will to the new conception of infinity related to the matter of the third kind that was conceived according to mathematical abstraction. That proceeding provided the foundations for the modern conception of objective science, without which Western capitalism would be unthinkable. The postmodernism combined the *exemplaria* and the *seminal rationes* to create the sphere of objectivity. It was governed by mathematics since the 17th century and by economics since the 18th century.

The emergence of the objective Jacob’s ladder in Bonaventure′s mystic philosophy and in the later postmodernism would not be possible without a new conception of the will. In Olivi's philosophy, the will received its own type of intimately given truthfulness (*certitudo*). That kind of the will as correctness illuminates the world directly from the divine truth as Anselm's correctness (*rectitudo*). Olivi's essentialist traits of the will (*potentia essentialis, esse ad*) are conceptually established first by Gandavus and then by Scotus in modern ontotheology. Both modernists turn the essential intimacy of the will into the basic determination of being put in the metaphysics of pure possibility. Olivi's interpretation of philosophy has shown that the combination of *dativus possessivus* and *dativus auctoris* around the year 1280 gave rise to a new aspect of being that is linked to the capitalist subject. By combining both forms of the dative (*dativus possessivus, auctoris*), objectivity comes to the full manifestation of its historical effectiveness done in the framework of irrational and mystically based capitalism. Placed within the new rule of secular faith and objective scientific cognition, the tragic modern individual seeks objective salvation. He must redeem his *peccatum originale*, that is, his paranoia and schizophrenia, which constitute the very essence of the modern subject. After the death of modern God, the postmodern subject uses his powers to establish secular salvation through capitalism. In replacing the dead God, the postmodern capitalist demiurge has become more paranoid than before. He appropriates the world in the act of secular redemption and self-justification through the accumulation of capital. That process of assimilation (*dativus possessivus*) is based on the truth as *coaequatio*. The crusade of capital secures objective salvation through the demiurgic use of the free and intelligent will, which reduces all kinds of being to this or that specific and concrete form of capital. This modern *scibile* indicates the certainty of salvation and carries out the economical bail out of a one percentage of corporate *illuminati* at the price of the damnation of the rest of the world. In Siger's first averroism, only the existing person possessed the statute of ipseity in the mode “*homo ipse intelligit*” and not the concept of the autonomous will. The irrational freedom of the modern mystics and *illuminati*, which is linked to demiurgic God does not follow the rule of critical mind. The redemptive mysticism of capital and instrumental rationality created the cultural hegemony to rule the modernity. Done in that way, the metaphysical vacuum given by the disappearance of the first substance was filled. The nihilistic will given in the stage of imperialist capitalism of the 20th century filled the void of sense brought about as a *horror vacui* by the death of modern God. The modern crusade proclaimed in the years 1230–35 by Franciscan and Dominican *illuminati* in Oxford and then in Paris, it started a new dynamics of the West. Oxford′s *intelligentia spiritualis* conquered the world under the banner of Oxfordian Fallacy to accomplish the divine comedy of Furies and Dante. At the end of the modern crusade, first there is the death of modern God, and then the extermination of the person in the extermination camps of Nazism and Stalinism. The gulag in Europe, however, was preceded by the anonymous massacres committed by the European colonizers in Africa and Asia. In the actualized epoch, the modern will degenerated into individual psychological narcissism, manipulated from all sides, since the postmodern bearer of this nihilistic will is determined solely by the instinct of self-preservation. Guided by the instinct of self-preservation, instrumental mind runs the artificial intelligence and turns modern ideas and ideologies into a media cabaret operated by so-called social networks controlled by a one thousand percentile of corporate *illuminati*. This global paranoia is already purely digitalized in the form of cloud databases. This last form of the *locus specierum* and the planetary *memoria* of the one promille of humanity contain the identity of everything in the nihilistic form of ones and zeros. That kind paranoia, in turn, has a mystical character, because it is veiled by mythological cloud of digital knowledge shared globally and online.

The modern will hypostatized by Olivi became the body of the modern state and established a new political reality. A one generation later, the layman Marsilius of Padua established the sovereign will of the people behind the foundation of political power (*Defensor pacis*, 1324). The postmodern Hobbes unifies this mystical state body into the form of the totalitarian Leviathan. The postmodern state is founded on the basis of the voluntary treaty of atomic individuals, because these individuals are waging the omnipresent war against each other. In Hobbes’s mechanistic model, these atomic substances, which cannot be further divided, are carriers of the instinct of self-preservation (*subiectum*) that cannot be further divided either. Through concretization and individualization of the instinct of self-preservation, the modern political subject emerged, which established a new foundation of the state through social contracts in the 17th century. The inalienable right to biological survival, which founded the epoch of liberal humanism, became the new political *scibile*. Aristotle as last classic of Greek political philosophy would be shocked that an animal desire to be alive makes the fundament of modern state and human rights. However, the modern progress is unstoppable. Following the philosophy of *Modernorum,* le Postmodernism made use of the nature of man as a specific corpse. The path of liberalism based on individual free will (*liberum arbitrium*) was interpreted by Hannah Arendt in her well-known essay “What is Freedom” (Arendt 1961). This essay has clearly set out the epochal fallacy of postmodern nature of political freedom. It is based on liberal definition of subjective free will, which appears for the first time in Stoicism and in the letters of Apostle Paul. Moreover, Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism has set forth the illusion of nihilistic Western liberalism. The idea of modern equality of political subjects is based on the theory of objective truth (*coaequatio*) made by Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The idea of human rights, which was founded as an abstract conception of human nature, produced a new being of the third kind. The history of this postmodern liberal *scibile*, placed outside the political power of the state, ended with the extermination camps that emerged from the rubble of the world after the First World War. Man was defined in the epoch of technical and political nihilism as Pecham’s “*totum virtuale*.” Therefore, he ended up in the extermination camps run by officials with the totalitarian form of consciousness. These officials fulfilled the technocratic instructions of objectively valid ideology. Arendt accurately described the totalitarian process after the First World War. Out of the wordlessness of modern people first became a bourgeois homeless person without a state and without a homeland, which eventually ended up as an anonymous number in extermination camps.[[354]](#footnote-354) Arendt started from Aristotelian concept of political freedom. She rejected the concept of *liberum arbitrium* according to Stoic Epicurus and modern liberals. Their conception of freedom of will is based on the non-existent individual of Neoplatonists and later that of Porretans. This approach creates but a simulacrum of political freedom, which, according to Aristotle, is produced by public activity of citizens in the polis. Modern metaphysics created a specific carrier of one’s own ideas, and this political subject as a corpse objectively produced the warlike and totalitarian world of the 20th century. Today, we have other forms of that ideology, but the same insane nihilistic subject that carries them out. The second Averroism, based on the plurality of substances in man, turned the original *homo sapiens* into a modern schizophrenic. The last form of this schizophrenia is shown by contemporary media manipulations. The global world of simulacra conceals irrational economic neoliberalism, destruction of human personality and global warming associated with the mass extinction of biological species.

## 5.1 Emergence of the Capitalist Subject (Petrus Olivi)

Hermeneutics must discover why it was necessary to colonize the whole world with arms and capital so that it would become a new “*totum virtuale*” for demiurgic activities of postmodern *illuminati*. The first wave of the conquest of the world passed in Spain, where Suárez let modern metaphysics to be transformed into the first ontology (*Disputationes metaphysicae*, 1597). The scholasticism created the first rational theology of modernity as *metaphysica specialis* that was subordinated to univocal *metaphysica generalis*. The real thing turned into an objective “*res*” and received a subjective determination in virtue of twofold rules made by the human and divine demiurge. Modernity received the first form of pragmatism by replacing the disobedient and contingent reality of first substances with modern God as ontotheological producer of objective reality. Bonaventure created the modern Western narrative of objective meaning of being, which became the basis of future capitalism. The appetite of primary mythological matter needs an equally given mythological form so that the world could find its propre nature. The human demiurge continues the same civilizing task. His capitalist appetite as the giver of demiurgic forms and as the reformer took the whole world to be objectively determined as an object of modern manipulations. Bonaventure and his school put theology as a causal nexus of science that was made in the framework of new middle link of the deductive syllogism (*hoc est medium metaphysicum reducens, et haec est tota nostra metaphysica*; ch. 4.1.2). Scientific proof was transformed into modern scientology of the West. Ontotheological speculations became the first really modern ideological fundament of Western science. The first substance became an objective untruth, which the mind must overcome with the help of a suitable rule and by using the demiurgic will. Through this assimilation of the world made in the objective mode of *dativus possessivus*, the mastery of the realm made of *tertium ens* has become a predominant task (πρᾶγμα) of the divine or human subject. Before the discovery of geographic America, modernity had to discover mythological world of modern spirit. It is not about the gnosis of Manichaeans, because the newly emerged objectivity of Christian *illuminati* understands matter positively, within the framework of the value of creation defended by Augustine. Following Anselm and Porretans, Bonaventure created ontotheological concept of being, which had an epochal effect in the next generation. Rufus’s terminus “*inoboedientia materiae*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2) opened the path leading to Bonaventure and to contemporary capitalism. First modernists of the Latin West developed the objective ontotheology as the Jacob’s ladder of modern mind that can be ascended and descended, from modern God to the objective world. Bonaventure’s ontotheology traces the subsequent Baroque era with its characteristic ambivalent features (Kalista 1982). Mysticism stood against fanatical hunger of Spanish colonizers for gold. Mystical corporeality given as *materia spiritualis* stood against the massive human body and massive buildings. Vertigo of the infinity of terrestrial space versus the divine cosmos conceived in the mode of *materia prima*. The majesty of death as the transition of the soul to eternity aganist the decorated artifical corpse placed under the baroque altar. The authoritarian emergence of modernity can be adequately analyzed by the Marxist concept of modernity as a cultural hegemon (*egemonia culturale*, A. Gramsci), as well as by the sociological concept of relative utopia (*relative Utopie*, K. Mannheim).[[355]](#footnote-355) Taking the Gnostic role of the *intelligentia spiritualis*, mystical *illuminati* shaped a new conception of the world through the cultural hegemony of philosophical fabulations, sophisms and the biblical ontotheology associated with mysticism. The hunger for news cannot be stopped, and modernity by its very nature creates an eschatological *novissimum*, which is given by the death of modern God and classical wisdom. In the objective ontotheological form of the relative utopia defined by Mannheim, modern man takes on the role of the second creator to create the fundamental dynamics of the Reformatory and Enlightenment postmodernism. Since the victory of *via Modernorum* in 1277, there has been only one univocally given truth of the modern mind, which points to the objective nihilism of contemporary rationality. It is given as an instrumental and as a virtual state of war with the associated total mobilization of all human and other planetary sources (*totale Mobilmachung*, E. Jünger). The fluidity of sexuality and the virtual body is linked to the fluidity made online by social networks and “human resources” manipulated on a global scale. In the new historical constellation, the demiurge’s appetite for an objective form found a corresponding appetite of primary matter. All necessary philosophical conditions were met in order the illuminated *conquistadores* could repeate the crusades of the Middle Ages. The new worldview required a general conquest of the corresponding global objective matter in the territory of the New World, in order to satisfy the formal appetite of modernity. It gave rise to an expansion of the Spanish Empire. The second wave of the conquest of the world occurred in objectively reformed capitalist England. The globally inclined *illuminati* moved from academic Oxford to financial City of London, which dominated colonial Paris as effectively as Porretan Oxford dominated Aristotelian rue du Fouarre.

Hermeneutics confirmed that the struggle for the unity of subject in interpretations of intellect between Siger and Aquinas was echoed in the school of the first Averroism by the dispute over the identity or identity of the person. The formal identity of the person in the view of Aquinas triumphed over the phenomenological and existential ipseity defended by Siger. The existence as “*ipse*” given by the act of being, Heidegger’s conception of existence let it rehabilitated. However, it was done already outside of classical metaphysics. In the last third of the 13th century, by the synthesis of Semiaverroism, a new form of metaphysics emerged from the school of the first Averroism (Aquinas, Aegidius) and from all actualized of the second Averroism. It was based on the objectification of will and intentionality that modernity projected into hypostatized being of the third kind (*universalia in rebus*). The modern “*operatio*” is located on the two floors of the production. The modern demiurge (the human and the divine) directly recognizes both floors of his work, because he recognizes them within the framework of the twofold act of free creation. The primary being of both agents is determined according to the scholastic thesis “*operatio sequitur esse*.” The essential carrier of this activity (*subiectum*) determines the demiurgic causality given according to Oxfordian Fallacy as his subjective *actus essendi*. The actualized causality existing in reality changed into potential creative idea in the universal and objective mode in demiurgic mind. That kind of divine or human thought was stated in the predication “*in artificialibus*.” The system of two rules and two demiurgic subjects respects the fundamental difference between the Creator and the separated creation. The demiurgic rules are given in two ways. Either they are given directly in the divine thought, or they are considered naturally by the enlightened human intellect. Human intentionality corresponds analogously to demiurgic intentionality of the Creator. The ontotheology of *Modernorum* turned into the absolute divine psychology, which initiated the agony of anthropomorphic God in postmodernity. The intentionality was conceived in a demiurgic and absolute manner, in the order of a pure logical possibility made in a univocal manner for modern God and man. The modern ontotheology opened a new stage of the eclipse of first substances. In the conception of the second Averroism and Aristotelian Semiaverroism, the subject became a multiplicity of substances or forms. These are in the vain search for the unity of the mythological subject that became divided in this way. Archaic hermeneutics and archeology study the original event (*Ereignis*) when the connection of divine and human intentionality took place. That mythological junction (*copulatio*) created the objective psychology of modern divine demiurge. The new being of the third kind, thanks to the connection between divine and human intentionality, received an absolute foundation, completely separate from the first real substance. The enlightened intellect of *illuminati* accomplished this epochal *opus magnum* of sophistic alchemy by combining with the modern divine intentionality and intelligence as well as the Divine will in the mode of demiurgic *coniunctio*. Through this mythological *copulatio* of modern God and modern Man, the Philosopher's Stone was also produced in a completely objective manner. The actualized state of thought and the world, and the inevitable death of modern God, bear witness to this. Under the leadership of goddesses making the academic Chaos, modernity rejected Dante's divine comedy, which was determined by philosophy of Siger. Modern subject created a completely original tragicomedy. Modern rationality, based on the objective copulation of two subjectively conceived *tertium ens*, is nothing other than the Cargo cult of mad modernity. Thanks to this mythologically obsessive and modernly neurotic compulsion to repeat the objectively made identity of the non existing world (*Wiederholungszwang*), the orgies (*conferentia*) of academic infertility are carried out. They objectively imitate the archaic fertility cults based on the natural order. *Corruptio optimi pessima.*

The paths from historicity of the wise West to the history of the Latin West are investigated by the interpretation of hermeneutic existentials made by *dativus obiectivus* (ch. 4). The change in the objective dative confirms that Olivi opened the nihilistic stage of metaphysics that was based on the newly defined subject. The hypostatized will and its carrier kept a fundamental character, because they transformed the entire matrix of objectivity. The new form of *dativus obiectivus* sends modernity on the path of metaphysical nihilism. Lost meaning of the first substance had to be found again. The modern and postmodern demiurge, like Descartes, must create the objective world *ex nihilo*. The demiurge must think the world objectively in the “*semel—semper*” mode. According to quoted Avicebron, matter and form in their real existence, they are a product of the demiurgic will. The objective *factum* of the new form *tertium ens* is defined as the potency of the demiurgic subject (*dativus auctoris*). Objective being is thus appropriated by the intimate and free form of the demiurgic will of the new subject. The world transformed into an objective simulacrum has created a new form of the *dativus auctoris* in the mode of free intimacy that is set in the Western subject (*Ge-Stell*). The subjective will, like the modern god, remains in its inviolable demiurgic freedom. He is separated from its product by the *factum* of intimate free will, just like the modern God ist separated from his objective creation. The new nature of the will changed the ontotheological structure of modern metaphysics. According to quoted Avicebron, the will operates on the plane of matter and form as an additional power that received an ontological status. It created a voluntaristic structure of being determined with regard to the free divine and human demiurge as the absolute giver of forms (*dativus finalis*). Both datives (*auctoris, finalis*) shaped the demiurgic will in that manner that it established the capitalist system of universal exploitation. This created a new totality of being that received the secondary modality, since it is primarily determined by the capitalist subject (*dativus modi*). The first version of this *dativus modi* is given by the drama of free will in the salvation history, which was fundamentally reformed by Martin Luther. The new modality of theology posed a serious challenge to Catholicism, where salvation is mediated by the ecclesiastical institution. The possibility of salvation is always there, because it is human sinfulness and the divine grace that go hand in hand. Both of these basic facts of the new modal dative fundamentally relate to the modern subject, who understands them in the form of Rufus′s *potentia substantialis*. The new form of metaphysics of the will and the objective certainty of salvation got the new mode of the one truth established by salvation. Luther’s Reformation annulled the ontotheological system of medieval modern Catholicism as metaphysically and theologically unnecessary ballast (*dativus incommodi*). The original untruth of objectivity was set as *genitivus subjectivus* in Rufus’s term “*species obiecti exsistentis*”. Hidden effect of modern metaphysics passed in objective unconcealment of the contemporary nihilism based on the scientifically and technically given Western science. Their accomplishment runs by the victory of instrumental rationality that produced totalitarian systems and two World Wars. The age of postmodern democracy and post-truths brought about a soft totality. It was run by one percent of population, and today only one per thousand of global plutocrats. After the twilight of Platonic idols in the nihilism of Nietzsche, it followed the era of postmodern emptiness and the twilight of obligation (Lipovetsky 1983, 1992). The final matrix describes the objective *Hexaëmeron* of the modern world. It is necessary to investigate the emergence of the modern subject in the Latin West and the second beginning of metaphysics. The hermeneutics of objectivity have to join the end of modern Western metaphysics to its very beginning that dates back to Porphyry′s work *Isagoge*. The combination of the first and second Averroism established the objectivity of *Modernorum* based on the intimate volition of the subject. According to Siger’s masterful interpretation of Averroes, the existential ipseity of man determines the full phenomenal unity of the person. Classical metaphysics follows the path of the metaphysical dative (*dativus metaphysicus*) and not the simulacra created through the objective dative (*dativus obiectivus*). The donation of the meaning of being taken from the direction of the existing world of real substances gives the fundamental categorical predication of the person. Olivi followed Siger in a totally sophistic manner. He adopted Siger’s term “*homo ipse intelligit*” but created a new form of essential identity. The new “*actus essendi*” was put into the human will that received the fundamental character of “*ipse*.” The mystical and practical Franciscan Olivi became in the school of the second Averroism an equally gifted and original philosopher, as Rufus of Cornwall was at Oxford. Olivi is the first Western thinker who conceived the will as being of the third kind. Augustine’s and Avicenna’s philosophy took on a thoroughly modern and fully subjective character. The new event of being (*Ereignis*) was established through the metaphysics of the will. By transforming basic existential meaning of *dativus obiectivus*, the history of the West continued through the capitalist subject founded by Bonaventure and Olivi.

### 5.1.1 Modern Subject and Material Memory

Hermeneutics first explores the phenomenon of the will, which has become a new form of being of the third kind and it plays a decisive role until today. The first form of the modern subject as the substrate of cognition elaborated in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy (Rufus, Bonaventure, Kilwardby, Pecham) came into being in the period 1230­–50. However, the first wave of modernism did not bring about a fully fledged modern subject endowed with the free will. In the following decade, Bonaventure changed Rufus’s carrier of the concrete and of individuality to a new form. Bonaventure put the modern subject on biblical foundation to be conceived as a supreme producer of being. Free intentionality of divine and human agent established the supreme source of demiurgic activity. However, such a subject existed as a simulacrum of reality and the educated Aristotelians took it for pure stupidity. Modern subject was composed of two or three substances of the third kind, which, moreover, stood in internal conflict since they had an incompatible character of *tertium ens*. The newly founded subject of the West in the late school of second Averroism illuminates existence from the direction of pure possibility. Bonaventure is the father of modern demiurgic subject, but he did not create its objective metaphysical form. His main task was to keep silent the criticism coming from the school of the first Averroism. In contrast to Kilwardby, Bonaventure and Pecham, Olivi correctly understood that the Franciscan school had to provide an appropriate philosophical and theological response to the challenge of existentially understood ipseity formulated by Siger in his commentaries on *De anima*. The determination of the subject made by an essentially and habitually given will had to be experienced in the mode of ipseity that opened the path to anthropocentric metaphysics. A fundamental change occurred after the year 1270, when all competent artists in Paris studied the debate between Siger and Aquinas. It flared up because of differing opinions concerning the unity of the person and the intellect (*homo ipse intelligit*, ch. 4.5.3). New definition of the subject according to Siger’s ipseity abolished the thesis of Thomism and the second Averroism that defined the person or the intellect in the framework of the substance or of some hypostasis of the third kind. Based on existential ipseity, Siger’s doctrine of the unity of the person determined *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of following epochs. Both Dante and Olivi made use of it. Dante in the school of the first Averroism created a new unity of humanity within the framework of the just rule of the universal monarch, separate from the ecclesiastical power of the pope. In the spirit of the second Averroism, Olivi laid the foundations for a new plurality within the framework of newly born capitalism. His demiurgic subject was made in the mode of extremely efficient simulacra. This new *tertium ens* established a history of the West characterized by permanent conquests and exploitations of all kinds.

The most important text dealing with transformations of the will into the epochal mover of the West can be found in Olivi’s commentary on the second book of Sentences (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*) dating to years 1277–83. Olivi’s philosophical thinking appears in this commentary in an original manner. It is not deformed by later retractions given on the basis of attacks and inquisition trials opened after 1283, nor by editorial revisions of his writings carried out by his students. These retractions characterized his later philosophical writings, in particular the work *Summa quaestionum super Sententias* (ca. 1294–95). Olivi’s philosophical struggle for the new form of subjectivity has already been objectively researched and inserted into the genealogy of the subject in the context of the 13th century thought (Putallaz 1991, Boulnois 2007). The birth of the modern subject in the work *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum* is particularly contained in *Quaestiones* 57 and 58. There we find the original subject of the will that established an irrational capitalist subject of the West. Contemporary analyses of both questions confirmed Olivi’s modernity in relation to preceding theories of the will, e.g., those of Aquinas.[[356]](#footnote-356) The enlightened Franciscan took the will out of the determinism of intellect and turned it into an autonomous source of self-reflection and of the primary actualization of being. Olivi rejected the teaching of *sequaces Aristotelis* from the school of the first Averroism as heresy. His divorce from the first Averroism was of an fundamental nature. It concerned not only philosophy, but also the essence of what this Franciscan understood as authentic Christian doctrine. For Olivi, Aristotelian conception of cognition based on the intellect as *tabula rasa* was unacceptable. The intellect is fully integrated into Augustinian scheme of the second Averroism. The sense of being is given through exposure of the sense made from behind. The intellect abstracts external objective species through Avicenist *denudatio* and stores recognized species in Augustinian form of memory (*memoria*). The assembly of objective species in the passive intellect defined as *locus specierum* formed the basis for today’s database systems. In the scheme of the second Averroism, the species in memory are determined as beings of the third kind. The *intellectus agens* takes this species from memory and actively works with those stored essences. Olivi determines the intellect exclusively within the framework of *intellectus agens*. The receptive role of *intellectus possibilis* is replaced in the second Averroism by Augustinian memory defined as *locus specierum*. The second Averroism replaced receptivity with the reservoir of univocal kinds of being (*scibile*). The existence of *scibilia* is linked to the specific type of Neoplatonic memory. The preservation of objective *facta* (let us see the mythology of such *facere*) determines both the modern identity of man and the actualized form of Western civilization in the digital mode of cloud computing. The objective species stored in memory thus acquire an essential character. The active intellect or the artificial intelligence connected to the database then work with objective “facts” collected in this way. In the age of the eclipse of the first substance, modernity and postmodernity replaced the Aristotelian connection known as “bodily senses—immaterial intellect” with the new pair “objective memory—active intellect.” The identity of thought and subject does not follow reality of first substances, but the memory established as a thesaurus of recognized and deposited species. The world of first substances can pass away, but never the thesaurus of objective meanings. That is why the modern god has become the supreme administrator of this objectively valuable database. This idea created a new *ortus scientiarum*, where the present treasure of Western thought and science is kept to be ready and at hand. Due to Oxfordian Fallacy, modern cognition is separated from the first substance in the metaphysical mode *absolute*. Therefore, the treasure of objective *scibilia* in the cloud databases has an absolute value. Modern schizophrenic and self-conscious subject is the producer and the user of the objective reality accumulated in this way. His self-reflection, i.e., the hypostatized *intellectus agens* works with objective species taken from memory in the mode of computer processor and Random Access Memory. New definition of the person was reduced to the connection of such kind of objective RAM memory and the active (ie. objectively processing) intellect. If modern self-reflexive memory elaborated in modern Augustinian or postmodern mode of Locke fails in any way, then the postmodern subject ceases to be a responsible individual and ends up in psychiatry or geriatrics. The same happens on a global scale if digitized knowledge in play. Olivi confirmed modern trend given by Rufus. He was the first modernist that bracketed external reality for cognition. Following quote confirms the emergence of objective memory linked to the first kind of postmodern subject.

“In memory we put the species that the intellect perceives and considers to be objects of cognition (*ad sua objecta*). Therefore the memory unites with the intellect (*convenit tamen memoria cum intellectu*) by upholding these intelligible contents (*in susceptibilitate expressionum intellectualium*).” [[357]](#footnote-357)

The intellect operates in the immaterial mode (*inmixtus*) as an autonomous form that takes up sensual and intellectual contents stored in memory as the matter. Therefore, the modern intellect is a kind of an objective *intellectus materialis*. The new mythological definition of receptive intellect continues to this day in the mode of universal hylemorphism (*ex forma et materia ipsius*). Since the material intellect is a hypostatized substance of the third kind, it is also actualized in its own way (*intellectus constituitur una potentia in se ipsa operativa*). The passive role previously reserved for *intellectus possibilis* has been replaced by Augustinian conception of memory, which preserves sensually and intellectually recognized species through the act of reception (*memoriam … in susceptibilitate expressionum intellectualium*). Olivi describes this intellect as a material entity, but not because it absorbs the species from the senses. This quasi-substance has a hylemorphic character in and of itself through the species stored in memory that forms a matter of the third kind. The objective being arises through the intention of the active intellect turned to the species (*ad sua objecta*), which are stored in the memory defined as *intellectus materialis*. The intellect is spiritual and material because it forms a whole with modern memory, just like today’s computer processor and its RAM memory. The active intellect then actualizes objective species that are passively stored in the memory (*species illas ad quas conspiciendas convertitur intellectus*). This gives rise to a new form of universal hylemorphism, which combines the active and receptive components of cognition in the soul. The quasi-materiality of memory complements Avicenna’s definition of the intellect as a hylemorphic composition, which is active and passive in and of itself (ch. 4.1.2). By elaborating modern simulacrum of memory as a being of the third kind, Olivi connected the active and receptive intellect in a new way. This rendered obsolete Aristotelian doctrine of sensual and intellectual species made through abstraction from sensually apprehended things. It was replaced by Avicennian *denudatio* of forms previously given and stored in a specific intellectual reservoir. Cognition is based on the fundamentally different status of the species and the intellect than in the first Averroism. This modern *locus* of objective beings exists and does not exist simultaneously and in the same sense. Memory is more than sensually given species since it preserves a greater degree of universality. Olivi hold to universal and immaterial species that exist outside of sensual or material changes (*ex multitudine specierum quae sunt im memoria imaginaria distincte et inconfuse*, ibid, p. 503). The definition of memory and species as material pseudo-entities is based on universal hylemorphism and it defines matter in two kinds. Olivi does not have a twofold intentionality, but a twofold imprint of form into the matter. It is then true that receptive potentialities (*potentiae sensitivae*) are given in two forms of matter.

“In man it is different, because potentialities mentioned have a twofold matter, the spiritual and the material one. Although our spiritual faculties exist principally in spiritual matter (*principalius existunt in sua materia spirituali*) and secondarily in the physical matter, they are nevertheless actualized and specific in spiritual matter and only secondary in the real matter. In the spiritual matter, they are not given separately (*absolute*), but they are ordered and connected with corporeal matter (*habent ordinem et colligantiam ad materiam corporalem*).” [[358]](#footnote-358)

Multiplicity of substances in man means that the act of the soul and the body takes place on two different substrates (*potentiae habent duplicem materiam*). In such Neoplatonist scenario, recognition and determination of species proceed from the higher forms to the lower ones (*principalius existunt in materia spirituali, secundario vero in corporali*). As a mental capacity of a human being, memory contains two types of species: one is given in an unclear manner (sensually) and the other in a precise manner (objectively). The matter of the third kind distinguishes a higher form of *memoria* from the bodily and animal memory. From the perspective of the second Averroism, the existence of these species must be understood as an encroachment of the higher form on the lower (*exsistunt*). Enlightened by exemplars and by the memory, the intellect recognizes the world of first substances through the connection (*colligantia*) with objective species. They are given in the material body but in a contingent manner. That kind of higher memory connected to *intellectus materialis* preserves cognitions in the original state of objective *scibile*, i.e., in the Cartesian mode of clarity and distinctness. Terms such as *collecta, colligatio* and the like define perpetually failed attempts of modernism and postmodernism to unify mental and bodily acts of cognition.

The result of Olivi’s innovation is a curious subsistence of memory of the third kind that mythologically copulates with an industrious active intellect of *illuminati*. This objective connection between memory and the faculties of cognition is based on a mix of hylic and spiritual matter. The course of cognition is determined by deductive logic of *Liber de causis*. The higher formal principle determines the lower level, which imitates this determination according to its level of material intelligence. Therefore, the species given to the senses and stored in memory contains in rudimentary form all basic formal determinations of the higher forms.[[359]](#footnote-359) Olivi endowed the species stored in memory with an objective (i.e., hypostatized) “exsistence.” Memory represents *locus specierum* given objectively-materially. Human faculties bound to the body do not recognize spiritual matter absolutely, i.e., separately from the world of material bodies, as the angels and the cosmic intelligences recognize the exemplaria or the actual immaterial forms. Real cognition arises through the actualization of objective “exsisting” and already stored species. The modern intellect utilizes this treasure of identity by taking intentionality towards memory not from *intellectus possibilis*, but from modern substantial *intellectus agens*. The hypostatized active intellect turns attention to memory and, through its own actuality, transforms stored species of the third kind into objective knowledge. Thanks to the act of memorizing, the modern *illuminatus* knows objectively that there is contingently given and sensually recognized reality outside. From memory as a being of the third kind, there is already a direct link to Locke’s identity of the modern subject based on that kind of memory (ch. 4.4.3). The present epoch transferred Olivi’s duplicated determination of potency as matter of the third kind into objectively made physical matter. In the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, that kind of matter took over all functions of Bonaventure’s and Olivi’s *materia spiritualis*. The key sentence of the quotation reminds us that cognitive potencies given in spiritual matter does not possess the hypostatized being of cosmic substance (*non enim sunt in materia spirituali absolute*), since they are given as human potentialities in the order and in the connection with corporeal matter (*habent ordinem et colligantiam ad materiam corporalem*). The receptive potency (*potentiae sensitivae*) can be conceived in an anabasic way as relating to an objective Jacob’s ladder. Postmodern *illuminati* can ascend from the everyday world into the objectively given sphere of spiritual matter.

Thinking of modern *illuminati* (let us see the emergence of *intelligentia spiritualis* in Oxford; OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2) observes hylemorphic matter with the eye of the soul and finds in it an objective “exsistence” of intelligible forms. In the act of direct intuition of such modern eidetic species, the molecule of DNA represents far more than just a first substance. The *illuminati* equipped with illuminated solar intellect, does not consider the physical molecule, but a mystical being of the third kind. Then, in the mode of present *ortus scientiarum*, the molecule of DNA represents the place of the postmodern identity of man in the biologized version of Augustinian *memoria*. Contemporary evolutionists such as Richard Dawkins created a mythological being of the third kind in the concept of materially replicating evolution (*The Selfish Gene*, 1976). After the death of modern God and finally after Foucault’s death of the postmodern subject, this admirable *scibile* took place under the solar intellect. Under the leadership of academic Furies, it accumulates the nihilist identity of genetically defined human corpse. The new mystic matter of the third kind is now stored in the reservoir of DNA molecules. This simulacrum of memory serves as a new *locus specierum* for the cultural determination of man in the epoch of accomplished nihilism. Scientology of *illuminati* followed the original model of *memoria* established in the ontotheology of pious and mystical *Modernorum* such as Bonaventura, Pecham and Olivi. Contemporary evolutionary atheists build on universal hylemorphism of Oxford modernity and on Rufus’s assimilation theory of truth. The determination of intelligible being as a new essence arose through the projection of spiritual matter into the molecule of DNA. The concept of mythologically defined evolution is based on the exposure of sense of being taken from behind. After the death of modern God, this universal genetic and Porretan *scibile* exposes the objective sense of DNA as a *locus specierum*. The logical predication made in the manner “*semel—semper*” is true for both cases. As in the times of classical Averroism, it can be applied to the logical existence of the mountain of gold or to the mythical unicorn. The physical DNA molecule took form of Olivi′s *memoria* as a result of the creation of separated *intellectus materialis* that runs a mythological kind of evolution. As a result of copulation of two non-existent *tertium ens* (genetic *memoria*, evolutionary *intellectus materialis*), it arose an objective scientific concept of adaptive properties and patterns of behavior and cultural signs. The joyful science of *illuminati* accumulated those *scibilia* in the conception of the cultural meme (English: *meme*), the meaning of which is derived from the Greek word “μιμεῖσθαι.” Evolution, culture and thinking are mytologically stored in matter, because intangible values of culture and humanity are objectively stored in the DNA structure. The chemical structure of the DNA molecule is given as a new *species memoriae*. Made in the mode of evolutionary “*exsistit*,” it passed into intelligible and cultural spheres of nihilistic postmodernism. The human soul and the animal soul ceased to be *tabula rasa*. They acquired an intellectual, cultural, animalistic and physical meaning through the mythical form of imprinting this admirable *scibile* of the third kind. The culture was hypostatized as a potentiality of the third kind, essentially and causally given in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. This gave rise to the scientific mythology of the universal imprinting of the higher cosmic forms (“evolution”) into the lower ones (“DNA molecule”). Hypostatized forms descend *modo geometrico* according to the deduction prescribed in *Liber de causis*. The causality of descent (*exitus, catabasis*) is merely purely formal, because it runs according to the predication called “*in artificialibus*.” This deductive-demiurgic conglomerate was created by the act of illumination of the postmodern mythology, which produces the series of contemporary simulacra. The replication of philosophical fairy tale of the dialogue *Timaios* is repeated again and again. Moreover, the imprinting of forms (*Dator formarum*) established in Avicenna’s metaphysics is running in the mode of objective analogy that makes a universal measure for some cultural biologists. The culture, as Olivi’s innate *potentia sensitiva*, is encoded directly in physical matter by spiritual memory given in DNA. The first modern conception of this mimetic code can be found in the terminus “*informatio*” of Rufus. His concept of “form—essence” becomes evident in the act of self-reflection made by the modern hypostatized intellect (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Olivi’s concept of memory is given in the same manner; it makes a being of the third kind. It is associated with the intellect as an actualized and subsistent substance of *Modernorum*, which is carried by spiritual matter. This concept represents the first modern projection of cognition into objective matter through objectively conceived memory of the third kind. In the context of contemporary nihilist Augustinians, culture and humanity became a new original sin of humanity through the transferred fact of birth from one person to another (*peccatum originale*). The epoch of accomplished metaphysical nihilism found spiritual *rectitudo* and *certitudo* directly in the physical and biological act of DNA replication. It had been defended in the different form of binary opposites two generations earlier, by the structuralist anthropologist Lévi-Strauss. This new *scibile* proclaimed to be an objective factum of mythological evolution became the mysticism of contemporary nihilism. The divine demiurge was replaced by nature after the death of modern God; the human demiurge took the place of God, and Bonaventura’s “*regula agentis creati*” became a universal law of informatics that makes the law of objectively recognized nature. Such a metaphorical concept of cognition has nothing at all in common with the concept of critical science according to *Second Analytics*, except for the use of mathematical analogy for pseudo-mystical and pseudo-scientist speculation. Academic *illuminati*, whose metaphysical habitat has changed into a computer science, created a new evolutionary and mystical Jacob’s ladder. They climb it at will, starting from four nucleobases forming human DNA, as far as to human beings and they go down as well.

The new form of *intellectus materialis* imprinted in DNA has important consequences for nihilistic humanism. Man is no longer just a Porretan corpse made out as an objective *colligatio* of various hypostases. Man is a material collection of specific DNA, which creates a new form of the objective and specific individual. The modern corpse of Porretans was at least formally a human being, which has now completely disappeared. The nihilistic identity of the person makes the last point in the system of contemporary science. It is given at the end of the division of *Arbor Porphyriana* that provides for the division of cultural memes. The further collection of globally tracked and database-stored individual is given by its atomic characteristics, which were created by the division of the physical species. In cultural genetics, the derivation of cultural and individual identity from the matter of DNA is linked to the racially based cultural theory from the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. The ideologists of new science of previous century did not know about the reduplication of DNA, but only saw the genetic transfer of the basic anthropological properties and cultural patterns. Their transfer on the human substrate was confirmed by different morphological characteristics. The preferred *scibile* of eugenicists at that time was given within the framework of the objectively defined parameters of human race. The transfer of spiritual qualities of man proceeded on a cultural-racial substrate, and not culturally-genetically, as it is today, in the woke ideology. As a being of the third kind, that scientific *scibile* still works today; however, it is not called “race,” but “DNA.” The evolutionary humanism of the 21st century replaced the racial anthropology of the 20th century and the picturesque human zoological gardens, where even in the 19th century people were imprisoned instead of animals (ch. 5.5). The newly determined matter of the third kind became the source of metaphysical nihilism. The role of new objective *scibile* was taken over by postmodern metaphors of cultural evolution, whose “innate ideas” and “cultural values” are encoded directly in the DNA. The nihilistic concept of the person is defined on the basis of materially replicating evolution. The postmodern determination of anthropology in the framework of eugenics, racism, genetically based culture and woke ideology successfully uphold nihilistic tendencies of objective science that are directly encoded in the second Averroism.

New determination of Augustinian memory came into being due to the fact that Olivi radicalized already known conception of the matter as being of the third kind. The definition of matter as a quasi-form has been grafted onto the universal hylemorphism adopted by Avicebron (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Bonaventura′s term “*appetitus*” considered the matter in and of itself, as to be predestined for every reception of forms. The form ends its hunger for matter and the appetite of matter is completed by taking the form. Bonaventura and Kilwardby took new conception of matter as metaphysically determined middle element of deductive syllogism (*medium*) that was defined as objective potentialities (*potentiae sensitivae*). Following Bonaventura’s commentary quoted above, Olivi adopted the definition of matter as a medium between nullity and formal determination (ch. 4.1.2). The first determination of perceived being (potential and actualized) arises in a univocal manner, by the fact that the thing is logically separated from complete nothingness. The existence given in this way fulfills the requirement to be the most general determination of being done within the framework of the logical proposition upheld by the Excluded Third. Then it is possible to take this formal definition as *materia prima* in order to establish the basis for all further determinations. The original minimum of beingness in the model of Avicenna’s indeterminate individual (*individuum vagum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2) was transformed into the categorial determination of the essence, which was conceived as a hyparchical first substance. As a result, purely formal definition of matter as the ideal middle between the nullity and the classical determination of matter by the assumed form was adopted into philosophy (*medium inter aliquid et nihil*). Let us recall Bonaventura’s definition of matter as a minimal beingness (*entes in potentia,* OBJ II, ch. 4.1.1). Olivi took up that modern concept of the matter to establish the accomplished mode of formal nihilism. The matter is given as a minimal portion of being only by the difference from nothingness.

“This matter is the kind of being whose actuality does not contradict the potential being and the indefinite being (*ens quod eius actualitati non repugnat in potentia et esse indeterminatum*). But the essential part of matter is in this determination (*hoc convenit sibi essentialiter*), namely that it is the potentiality. However, this does not apply with regard to the matter in itself (*non respectu sui*), but with regard to the other beings that can arise out of it.” [[360]](#footnote-360)

From the point of view of the first Averroism, the definition of matter is truly curious. Taken from the perspective of first substances, the matter is understood as an actualized being (*ens quod eius actualitati ... essentialiter*). Existence is determined under the first form of logical positivism because the postulated potentiality is sophistically determined as a substance. Olivi created objective matter *ex nihilo* and gave it a logical determination within the nominal essence instead of a real form. This is a typical example of the modern predication “*in artificialibus*.” The modern matter is based merely on the negation done within the framework of logical contradiction (*non repugnat esse*), with regard to some potential being or to the indeterminate first matter. The formal definition of matter must not contradict the two most general definitions of being (*esse in potentia et esse indeterminatum*). If this formal condition holds, then matter “exsists” as a substance of the third kind. By this formal logical operation Olivi gave to the matter a kind of hypostatic subsistence (*hoc convenit sibi essentialiter*). The actualization of this objective and primary matter is justified by the fact that matter, as a formally determined “something” (*ens*), is capable of taking all other determinations (*esse in potentia*). Modern hunger for form is given by the fact that matter, as a mythological hypostasis, has no subsistent being of its own. It “exsists” in the mode of “*esse ad*.” The matter as a new *tertium ens* is only a half-substance (*non respectu sui, sed respectu aliorum*). In order to achieve substantiality in the full mode of “*esse in*,” matter must satisfy its hunger for an equally strange form, which in turn is given as a *tertium ens*. Olivi has translated the above-mentioned philosophical fable made by Bonaventura, based on the biblical *Song of Songs*, into the metaphysics of the *Modernorum*. The modern demiurge obtained a complete metaphysical script for the mythological production of capitalist diacosmos. Objective matter longs in an absolute way for objective copulation with the objective demiurge. In virtue of that connection, objective matter accomplishes its own being, which is essentially given in the mode “*esse ad*” (*respectu aliorum*). Modernity produces another substance of the third kind, which has its own hypostasis; it serves as a universal carrier (*subiectum*) for any projection of modern and postmodern *scibile*. Olivi creates a material determination of being given only with regard to pure impossibility of negation (*non repugnat esse*). Olivi’s determination of matter is formal, potential and essential at the same time (*hoc convenit sibi essentialiter, esse scilicet in potentia*). Modern matter is based on the pure potentiality. It makes a subsistent form that is *absolute* and *simpliciter* determined.

Olivi followed essential interpretation of potentiality according to *Dialectica monacensis* (*potens est tantum esse*; OBJ II, ch. 1.4) and he applied that definition to the matter. In the following decade after Olivi, the logical simulacrum of formally defined and mythologically actualized “being—potentiality” established the first metaphysical concept of objective being. In the form of the last universal species, matter has only a formal being, which distinguishes it from pure nothingness. Therefore, according to Olivi, that *univoce* established conception of spiritual matter is given for angels as well (Suárez Nani 2003). This determination of matter then passed into the determination of being as an objective thing (*res*), separated only from nothing. That proceeding had a great future, see actualized methodological principle “anything goes.” Nihilistic epoch of contemporary science projects into this *scibile* the cultural and spiritual destiny of man. Olivi’s method of determining the individual thing as a specific objective *res* was first adopted by Henry of Gent and then by Spinoza in the definition of matter according to slogan “*omnis determinatio est negatio*” (ch. 5.2.1). Matter is defined as an essential potency, because the formally defined substrate (*subiectum*) is able to take over any determination. As a result, the matter became a substance (*hoc aliquid*), i.e., an objectively determined being that took the place of first substances. According to Bacon as a classic representant of the first Averroism, this objective conception of matter as being of the third kind was simply insane; Albert considered it totally ridiculous. Aristotle gives the material determination of the being as “this thing here” (τόδε τι) only to the hylemorphic first substance. Taken in itself, the matter lacks any form and therefore no possibility of existence. Pure potency does not have an actualized determination by itself, because it is given as a concept in thinking. Aristotelianism rejects any kind of “exsistence” proposed by modern *illuminati* that directly contemplate the world composed of objective matter and objectively given things. The potentiality, originally given as a hypothetical concept, Olivi introduced it into the anthropocentric construction of modern metaphysics.

### 5.1.2 Will as Intimate Causa of the Third Kind

The modern world does not exist in reality. For this simple reason, modernists must find the basis of its being in the act of will of an objectively existing demiurge. His will creates the objective world first in thought and, consequently, in the external activity that proceeds *ex nihilo*. Due to this act of demiurgic creation, the will has become the most important *tertium ens* in the modernity and founded the basis of modern metaphysics in the form of a new first substance. The modern will is fundamentally linked to the material intellect, which Olivi connected to the reservoir of species stored in the memory. Olivi’s commentary on Sentences conceived the concept of objective being in the nihilistic mode of “*non repugnat esse*” and grafted it onto substantively conceived will. This was a fundamental change in the environment of *via Modernorum*. After having changed the definition of truth, modernists redefined its carrier (*subiectum*) as well. In the treatise *De voluntate*, Anselm determined the will in the classical manner as a capacity for something (*potestas, aptitudo ad*; OBJ II, ch. 1.2). This ability starts from actions of the person, and not from the essence of the will (*secundum usum, non secundum proprietatem potestatis*).[[361]](#footnote-361) Olivi worked on Anselm’s conception of the will as an active faculty of the soul (*usus*) in such a way that he defined free will as a new being of the third kind. He used Augustine’s dialectic “*uti et frui*” for this purpose. Bonaventure and his school of *Modernorum* hypostatized the human intellectual soul in the mode of substance, but not the will. The addition of another hypostatic form to modern collection of substances mythologically called “human being” led to a fundamental rift between Olivi and the Franciscan school in Paris. Modern sophists had and still have a lot of work to do in order to combine two substances into the unity of the person, let alone three of them. But Olivi was a brilliant and very stubborn modernist and therefore founded the voluntarist subject of the West.

The objectification of the will proceeded in several stages. Fundamental change concerned the nature of habitus. This accident originally determined the characteristics of the person as an Aristotelian substance. Olivi transformed it into an essence. Simplicius accomplished it for the first time and after him Bonaventure by using the terms “*habitus innatus*” and “*habitus acquisitus*” (ch. 4.1.2). Freedom has become the habitus of the will, and this hypostatized habitus constitutes the essence of the will as a new form of substance.

“Anselm asserts that the will is set in motion only by its habitus or by its effects (*voluntas non movet se nisi per suos habitus seu affectiones*). By the term ‘habitus’ we must understand not only the properties added from outside (*habitus superadditos*), but also the essence of freedom in itself (*ipsam essentiam libertatis*). In this mode of determined habituality, the will is naturally directed to objects that have a similar nature (*obiecta sibi connaturalia*). However, it is necessary to add many concretizations to this habitual concept of the will.” [[362]](#footnote-362)

Human freedom is the actual cause of every act of the will, because it possesses a power coming from the actualization that passes through the rational will. The will is actualized in itself and at the same time it has fully developed potentialities with regard to future actions. The *Quaestio* 57 refers directly to Anselm’s conception of truth as a *rectitudo* in order to establish the ipseity of the will as an autonomously subsistent form (*voluntatem ut ipsis informatam*).[[363]](#footnote-363) Olivi crossed the horizon of Neoplatonic Anselm and turned the will, separated from the animal will, into an autonomous essence of the third kind made out in the mode of *ipse*. The will acquired the new properties to become being of the third kind, which previously was only the objectified intellect. Olivi, like the second Averroism, perceives the exposure of being from behind, from the direction of essential abilities of the soul. The will and the intellect are determined according to Oxfordian Fallacy as a causally effective hypostasis or a specific essence “exsisting” in an immanent stage of actualization. A key role is played by the term of “essential potency” (*essentia potentialis*), which is adapted to causal effects of free will.

Let us return to the school of Grosseteste, which, after the year 1265, wrote the work *Summa philosophiae* that introduced one of the first objective conceptions of metaphysical being (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). A fusion of Parisian Thomism with Oxford′s universal hylemorphism took place at those times. The work *Summa philosophiae* used the term “*potentia essentialis*”, which it attributed in an Aristotelian way to the naturally given properties of the first substances. The stone falls down, because the potency to the fall is naturally given in the substance of the thing itself. In the following decade, Olivi transferred the physical conception of *potentia essentialis* to the equally naturally given free will, which objectively and universally determines every act of volition as a kind of similar potentiality. The metaphorical transfer of natural characteristics of the physical body as a hyparchical substance to the free will as a substance of the third kind started epochal influence of the Western subject. The hypostatized will got nature from Aristotle’s *Physics* within the framework of univocally defined species. Modernity freely transfers those species from one genus to another, in the form of univocally given *scibile*. The habitually determined volitional substance acquired the causality according to Aristotle′s *Physics* and it started to operate within the framework of Aristotelian scheme. However, Olivi abolished the intellectual determination of the will from the direction of intellect. Classical Aristotelianism applied in the mode of *extensio* to activities of speculative intellect that reached causal effects in reality through *intellectus practicus*. The first Averroism defends the intellectual conception of the will according to *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book III, VI). Aristotelian determination of the will belongs to the act of intentional choice given by volitional actualization of cognitive faculties (προαίρεσις, *electio*; E.N. 1151a29‒35). The will takes up the good that has been recognized and presented by the intellect. According to Aristotle, the theoretical intellect determines the goal of action, and the practical intellect actively grasps this realized goal as an object of volition (νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός; *De anima* 433a14). Let us see the quoted introduction of the commentary QIIIDA made by Siger, in which this quotation serves as the basis for interpretation of existence done in the mode of *ipse* (ch. 4.4.2). The theoretical intellect becomes practical through this extension (*intellectus extensione fit practicus*), and this thesis determines the connection between theoretical and practical intellect both in the first and in the second Averroism.[[364]](#footnote-364) The will transfers the universality of intellect into causal effects done in reality. Therefore, in the mode of volitive *causa efficiens*, the *intellectus practicus* is directed to the reality of singular first substances, where it produces singular volitions and singular deeds. Theoretical mind became practical thanks to universal recognition of realizable good for us, which wants the personal will engaged in singular actions made here and now. Aristotelian definition of practical intellect will play a fundamental role in debates regarding the political order of society after 1300 (ch. 6.1). Olivi’s scenario of free will takes the Aristotelian definition into the second phase of *electio*, when the will is already determined concretely by a certain object. Olivi changed Aristotelian scheme of intellectual determination of the will by placing the substantially conceived will in the first place, that is, outside of intellectual determination. Original Aristotelian scenario was transformed into the form of modern hypostatized will as a being of the third kind determined within the framework of *potentia essentialis*.

“Volition is an act that completes the faculty of will. Before this act, the will was in the essential potency (*ita ante ipsum erat in potentia etiam essentiali*) as the perfection that the will contains in itself (*ad hanc perfectionem in se recipiendam*). This definition, although it supposedly comes from Aristotle, he does not use it in this sense.” [[365]](#footnote-365)

The act of willing is understood in such a way that will as a hypostatized faculty is first taken in itself as a pure essential possibility (*in potentia etiam essentiali*). The will precedes the active volition. It is by no means a potency of the soul, but a very specific *tertium ens* that is a kind of substance, moreover, given in the mode of existential ipseity (*ad hanc perfectionem in se recipiendam*). The term “*ad hanc perfectionem*” includes another innovative use of the relation principle “*esse ad*” that we know from Simplicius and that Henry of Gent reworked (ch. 5.2.3). Aristotelian conception of the will ceased to apply, because the quotation turns the whole scheme upside down (*non fuit data in hoc respectu*). The structure of action according to *Nicomachean Ethics*, which in the basic state determines the will only as potency, was no longer valid. It understandably applies to the intellect as *tabula rasa* as well. Aristotelian will is rational insofar as it is oriented towards the intellect in the mode of “*esse ad*” that exposes a meaningful good in question to the will. Practical reason realizes the will as a faculty of the soul. The will grasps the recognized singular good and realizes it causally through the body, which the will determines to act. Practical reason is therefore a will determined by reason. What the will lacks in universality that is replaced by a singular effect in reality, which theoretical reason cannot achieve. In classical metaphysics, the will is therefore an instrument of the intellect. Olivi defined the will as a permanent and autonomous hypostasis that operates outside of the realm of reason. Contingent volition only accidentally completes its *a priori* established subsistence (*actus qui est velle*). The transition from the naturally given “potency—substance” to its newly determined actuality of volition completes a priori given hypostatized nature of the will (*perfectio ipsius potentiae*).

From the point of view of Aristotelianism, the new scheme of the will is a total paranoia. Olivi presented the will as another irrational substance of the soul and modified Neoplatonic scenario “*esse ad*” into an absurd form. The substantial will, detached from the intellect, has its own “*esse in*” like every modern Porretan hypostasis. Every act of will affirms the will as an actualized *tertium ens* by assuming this essential potency in the mode of “*esse ad*,” thereby actualizing itself in order to act in the world. Aristotle would have rejected such an argument with reference to *De generatione animalium* II.3 (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον). Let us see the introduction of Siger’s work QIIIDA, in which this quotation stands as the basis of interpretation concerning the existence conceived in the mode *ipse* (ch. 4.4.2). All acts of the soul are established by the fact that all faculties of *anima intellectiva* are pure potentialities of the soul and that they are actualized through the material body. Neither the mind nor the will are hypostases of the soul, because it forms a fundamental unity with the body. However, Olivi programmatically distanced himself from Aristotelianism and fundamentally criticized the thought of this “pagan heretic.” He founded the joyful science of the modern will. Olivi defines the will by the term “*potentia essentialis*” in the order *per prius*, because every act of will is connected with that actualized and hypostatic nature of the will (*potentia enim essentialis ... respectu actus primi*). The concept of the will is given not in view of the nature of man as a hylemorphic substance, but in view of the primacy of the actualized will as a substance (*respectu actus primi*). The primary potency of the will is given substantively in itself as a hypostatized essence. This kind of existential ipseity as a substance underlies every single act of will, since it plays the role of the second substance in the table of categories (*esse in*). All acts of volition are put within the categorial predication as potential actions that relate in the mode of accident to autonomous existence of the will (*esse ad*). The act of concrete volition exposes the secondary determination of the will made by volition of a certain object. In that phase, Aristotle’s definition of the will is already valid, since it is determined by the intellect. However, the object of volition is originally given as an accidental possibility of the substantially free will directed into the world. The original mode of being of the will is given in the modern subject as an objective substance, given by Simplicius as a hypostatized *relatio* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). The substantial potency justified the determination of the modern will as a being of the third kind. As a result, the scheme of the first Averroism was canceled. It determines the volition as a transition from potency to actuality. Becoming a hyparchical essence, the will acquired a causal effectiveness in reality and ceased to be a mere potency. For this purpose, Olivi and, after him, Henry of Ghent use the category called “*habitus*,” which Simplicius already interpreted in the substantive mode by (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Since Pagus’s interpretation of *Categories* dating from 1230, the second Averroism quite commonly used this accident in a purely substantive way (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). Olivi used the scheme of habitual constitution for the will, in which he stood out from the school of the second Averroism. Free will represents a habitual being of the third kind (*hoc aliquid*) that is both actualized and potential at the same time in man. The second Averroism of Olivi continued the expansion of objective determinations of being, which Bonaventure and his school accomplished after 1250. Rufus’s and later Pecham’s nature of the intellect as an innate recognition potentialility (*potentia accidentalis*) was based on Bonaventura’s definition of hypostatized intellect that was actualized by contingent species (ch. 4.1.1). In the will, as a being of the third kind, the essentially given potency and actualization were combined in the same way as Bonaventura had carried out for *intellectus possibilis* and *intellectus agens* (ch. 4.1.3). Olivi extended Oxfordian Fallacy to determinate the will. It represents an epochal new medium of demiurgic free activity, since the will is acting in causal manner as a pure essence. The substitution of the first substance for the active essence as a cause is discussed for the first time in Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). For this fundamental reason, Olivi is the founder of the modern metaphysics of the will. Nietzsche fully accomplished this historical dynamic by emancipating the will as the basis of being that stands beyond theoretical reason. This last step necessarily destroyed the last vestiges of modern metaphysics. It was first irrational and then became completely useless.

The conception of the will as *potentia essentialis* added yet another substance to the plurality of substances in man. Therefore, the quoted commentary on the second book of Sentences goes on in *Questio* 58 that fundamentally rejects Aristotelian definition of the will. If the intellect determines the will, then it is no longer free. According to Aristotelianism, the will acts effectively and singularly in reality because it is determined by the formal and general recognition of the intellect. According to Olivi, the will is free because it is completely emancipated. It is actualized in itself as “potency—substance.” In the redefined schizoid modern subject, the modern will can potentially want everything because it is free in the mythological mode of *absolute*. Olivi’s will is set outside reality and outside intellect. But in Aristotelian scenario the will cannot be completely autonomous and irrational because the definition of the person is based on the unity and on the rationality. The practical intellect determines the volition towards one particular effect given by the intellectual knowledge of the good in question. Aristotelian will is *causa efficiens* because *intellectus practicus* directs it towards a particular good. If the will takes the first place, then the process of cognition must be changed accordingly. Olivi refused the validity of Aristotelian arguments about cognition that is made through phantasms. Medializations though phantasms are no more needed to make the actualization of cognition. The hypostatized intellect and the will exist substantially in the soul. They are experienced directly through the act of Avicennian and Augustinian self-reflection. Therefore *Quaestio* 57 rejects the principle of exposing the intellect from the front, as the school of the first Averroism postulated it.

“In this state, namely holiness, innocence, grace and punishment, our way of thinking can reflect itself directly and beyond of any help made by phantasms. The phantasms in this are more of a hindrance to thinking than helpful, which becomes obvious in the case of the question of whether the soul can recognize itself directly by full intuition. I do not care that Aristotle and his followers say the opposite.” [[366]](#footnote-366)

The objective insight into the interior of a human being arises on the basis of a divine revelation or from direct insight. They directly recognize the essence of the soul in the act of self-reflection (*anima possit se intelligere per se et immediate plenius habet tangi*). Modern Augustinians and Cartesian Avicennists consider phantasms to be an obstacle that prevents the cognition from taking direct intuition of the soul (*phantasmata eas impedunt*). Sensual mediation disturbs the immediate and already actualized cognition made through the pure intellect and through the equally pure will. Similarly, Descartes proceeded in the first step of meditation on the first philosophy. His *cogito* realizes immediate self-knowledge in the mode of full evidence outside the senses. Today′s nihilism completely ignores the fact that in reality it is the objective will and not the *cogito* that drives in Descartes’s meditations the subject out of itself into the world. Olivi’s hypostatized modern and objective will and therefore he made the hidden mythological fundament of Cartesian *cogito*. Olivi rejected the basic principle of cognition of the first Averroism, i.e., the exposure of the sense made from the front, from the direction of the sensually cognized substances. The metaphysics of the will defines the essence of man through the exposure of the sense made from behind. The substantial and essentialist definition of the intellect and the will as being of the third kind corresponds to this scheme. In the second step, the meditations on the modern subject take the objectively given capacity of intellectual insight as the source of objective causality.

“Every act takes its original and most sublime determinations from its effective cause. The highest determinations are contained in the acts of our thinking and they form the essence of existence, such as life, simplicity, intellectuality and the like.” [[367]](#footnote-367)

The pure essence determines the most basic acts, which in the mode of full simplicity entail in themselves higher faculties of the soul given in the mode of “*simplicitatis* *et* *intellectualitatis*.” This essential simplicity serves as the effective cause of all human acts. The soul recognizes itself directly and is fully actualized through the free will. Being an experienced substance, the will is a real and hypostatized entity. The conception of essential hypostases for the intellect and the will as being of the third kind belongs to the school of the second Averroism. As to its semiaverroistic form, we also find this hypostasization of the intellect in Thomism. Olivi already knew the first version of Thomism and therefore radicalized Aquinas’s conception of the intellect as a hypostatized form of the soul (*intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima*, ch. 4.5.4). Olivi defined the will according to Thomistic hypostatized form and at the same time in Siger’s existential mode of *ipse*. Siger had this type of determination only for the person as the first actual substance (*vivere est viventibus esse*, ch. 4.5.4). The new definition of the will made out of it a Thomistic hypostasis. At the same time, it received Sigers’s nature of ipseity, which was linked to Augustinian form of interiority and self-reflexivity. This gave rise to the first conception of *tertium ens* that acquired an intimate character. The modern intimacy of the will draws on Augustine’s inward reflection. The establishment of modern intimacy of the will makes use of Augustine’s reflection, which is directed into one’s own self. Memory, reflection and enlightenment through faith reveal one’s own self, which is given on the basis of the Neoplatonic anamnesis of thinking. The modern will “exsists” in the mode *per prius* in hypostatic simplicity and being. Olivi understood well Siger’s argument against Aquinas in relation to the hypostatized intellect in the mode *qua2* (ch. 4.5.3). He transferred Averroes’s model of the intellect as *tertium genus* to the new form of the hypostatized will in the pseudo-existential mode “*voluntas ipsa vult*.” Following Siger’s example of “*homo ipse intelligit*,” Olivi placed the unity of the person in the intimacy of freely reflecting and experienced subjects.

The will became a new hypostatized substance, following the example of the second Averroism. It was placed in the new unity of the person in the mode of the intimate ipseity given according to Siger’s school of the first Averroism. The substantial will became the common intellectual instrument of Franciscans from the school of second Averroism since 1270. This is confirmed by *Quaestiones disputatae* that Gauthier of Bruges (Gualterus Brugensis) wrote in 1267–68. This Franciscan *magister regens* from Paris (1267–69) proves that the intellect has an actuality given by its own active insight into the first principles of cognition (*educit se de potentia ad actum*).[[368]](#footnote-368) The will also has a similar actualization with regard to the desired good (*voluntas est in actu et determinata respectu boni*). Olivi took up a substantial actualization of the will, but defined it according to Siger’s ipseity. He proceeded in a similar way as Siger, whose teaching he knew well from his days of study in Paris in 1267–72. The commentary on the second book of Sentences is inspired by the phenomenological form of ipseity taken from the treatise *Quaestiones in tertium De anima* (ch. 4.4.2). In contrast to Siger, however, Olivi hypostatized the will and deduced its causal effects from the essentially postulated definition. Siger defined the ipseity according to the first Averroism, because he started from effects to find the cause through the demonstrable experience of thinking in the first person. Olivi does not take the model of Siger’s inner experience (*experimur*, *conscii sumus*) for *anima intellectiva* as a form of the body, but for the essentially conceived will. Due to the introduction of hypostatized free will in the mode *ipse*, another substance was added in a human being. Put in the mode of hypostatized reality, the intimately given will of the third kind establishes secondary determined and contingent acts, which are given as consequences of the causally acting essence. Therefore, in the mode *per posterius*, the will is an effective cause of actions that makes the modern agent as a demiurge. Modernists lost contact with reality due to Oxfordian Fallacy, because they preferred the cognition of bare essences. See their deformation of causal determination within the framework of the middle link of the deduction (*medium*), which the first Averroism, according to the pattern of *Seconds Analytics*, placed only in actions of real first substances (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1).

The creative Franciscan elaborated an objective determination of the will in the mode Oxfordian Fallacy and according to Siger′s ipseity. He thereby established the modern free subject. Being an independent *illuminatus* from the school of the second Averroism, Olivi understood the innovative power of Siger, which the theologian Aquinas from the school of the first Averroism rejected. Siger asserts that the immediately experienced act of cognition is directly captured in the act of cognition that he conceived in the holistic mode of ipseity. Conceived in the same way, the intimately experienced free will of Olivi transcends (*exsistit*) through its effects from the primary and substantial inwardness into the external world. The following quotation sets out the origin of romantic intimacy that possesses the free modern subject.

“If the effects of something separate are given, then they cannot be initiated in us by some agent whose act and nature would not reach into the interior of our thinking (*intimissimie interiora nostrae mentis*). Nothing is more internal (*nihil nobis intimius*) than the acts of our thinking and internally given principles (*intrinseca principia*). In this fullness of intimacy, the acts are given in such a way that our sovereign will can only be changed by God (*non possunt videri nobis nolentibus ab alio quam a Deo*).” [[369]](#footnote-369)

The substance of the will is constructed according to the logic “*non nihil*,” whereby it is hypostatized as a modern *res* with the help of a double negation (*non possunt ... nolentibus*). The extent of this positively given will is given by the second negation in view of the total otherness of God (*non possunt ... ab alio quam a Deo*). Olivi created literally *ex nihilo* the nihilistic subject based on modern will with the help of a double negation, by separating the act of the will from both God and from nothingness. The eminent representative of the second Averroism turned Siger’s phenomenological question, “how” we experience thinking (*experimur*, *conscii sumus*), towards the inwardness of the will defined as a modern “*ens ratum*.” According to Bonaventure, the will is defined in the logic of the double negation as a modern *tertium ens* that was created due to logical abstraction (ch. 4.1.1). Bonaventure then continued with the mode “*conscii sumus*” of hypostatized Augustinian intellect given in self-reflection, and not, like Siger, with abstraction from the senses made in the mode of “*experimur*.” Olivi proceeded in the same manner. Nothing is closer to us than the act of our own free will, which we have created for ourselves *ex nihilo* with the help of a double logical negation (*nihil nobis intimius quam actus nostrae mentis*). Olivi defines the intimacy of the will in the mode of Siger’s ipseity and by no means according to Bonaventura’s objectivity of the soul or Aquinas’s objective form of the hypostatized intellect. The new position of the subject, given by the inwardness of the will, was added by Henry of Ghent in the next decade to the scenario of absolute subjectivity, which was founded directly in God. Duns Scotus created a new metaphysics from this ontotheology and thus completed the development of objectivity.

The modern will became a new hypostasis in the soul to be a causal essence according to Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s model; following Siger′s philosophy, it got its own ipseity. The new form of the will became the first modern substance of the third kind, which received the character of ipseity according to thinking of Siger. This fundamental change in the interpretation of subject established new *Lichtung* of modern metaphysics determined by hypostatic and existentially conceived will. The concept of an intimate will redefined the way in which (hermeneutic *Wie*) the sense of being is illuminated from the direction of modern schizophrenic subject (*Vor-blickbahn*). Olivi overcame the primitive substantial dualism of first modernists, who propagated universal hylemorphism in Oxford and Paris. This model of the plurality of substances in man, which Pecham’s sophistry at Oxford defended even after Aquinas’s rehabilitation (ch. 4.2.1), was no longer tenable around the year 1280. Moreover, the previous generation of Grosseteste’s successors had already adopted hypostatized intellect given in Thomism as the autonomous form of soul. Let us see the interpretation of Aegidius in the Oxford manuscript. The following passage briefly shows all contradictory characteristics of the modern will that was carved out by using essentialist predication “*in artificialibus*.”

“Every substantially given form has a certain degree of active abilities, i.e., it has an active potency, which is founded in itself (*potentiam activam a se originatam*) and is given as an instrument with regard to itself (*respectu sui quasi instrumentalem*). It is impossible that the totality of all created forms possess this ability. But the substantial form of our thinking, which contains this substantial form of our will, i.e., the freedom to the highest degree, is the culmination of all created forms.” [[370]](#footnote-370)

The will is the formally determined substance with its own activity (*forma substantialis*), which is an active potency and carries the source of actuality in itself (*potentiam activam a se originatam*). With regard to itself, the will functions as an instrument (*respectu sui quasi instrumentalem*), because it has its own actualized being. The volitional substance experiences its faculty in the mode of ipseity and makes an original and absolutely sovereign source of volition. The activity of the will is not necessarily exercised (*quasi*) as in the case of the passive instrument moved by an external mover. The will acts freely from the point of view of immanent and active potency, which is indifferently situated with regard to any future actions. Olivi says that no other created being can have a free form of such existence (*impossibile est quin summa omnium formarum creatarum hoc habeat*). The substantial form of free will given in this paradoxical way makes us the pinnacle of creation (*potissimum gradum*). Olivi opened the revolution outside of reality stated by Aristotelianism and positioned man on the top of creation in a new way. The modern subject forms the image of modern God not because of the intellect, but because of an irrational and intimate free will. The free will of *Modernorum* became a highly immanent and effective *causa sui* because it was taken out of Aristotelian definition of causality. The will is free because it can want something and does not want it; it can thereby preserve the indifferent relationship to both possibilities within itself (*esse ad*). The will, as an objective being of the third kind, contains both possibilities simultaneously. Both possibilities are necessarily given in the habitual mode “*esse ad*” that became an objective character.

“And in this way, the conclusion of preceding condition is erroneous, and in view of this, it is not true that the cause is made in the same way for both being and non-being.” [[371]](#footnote-371)

The quotation abolished the principle of the actualization of the will and the logic of *modus ponens* for free will that uphold Aristotelian scenario (*hoc non est verum*). As to the free will, the efficient cause does not give in a determined way the possibility in the order “cause—effect” (*non plus faceret ad eius esse*). The effect of the will is given indifferently with regard to possible causal effects; they can occur, but do not have to, because the will is completely free as to its efficient volitions. For science, the cause refers in the same way to the existence and non-existence of effects (*cause eodem modo se haberet ad esse sui effectus et ad eius non esse*). The principle of identity says that the cause is a cause and the effect is an effect, even if it does not have to occur. The actualized effect of the real cause, which is not blocked by anything, necessarily produces a real and an actualized consequence as well. Olivi must change the principle of identity for the free will: the cause is and is not a cause, because the will has the statute of the cause of the third kind with regard to external effects. Olivi abolished Aristotelian basic principle “*eodem modo*” that defines the causal effect of the cause in the logic of deductive proof as *modus ponens*. The principle “*eodem modo*” does not apply to the will. It does not determine the effect of the cause in the mode “this cause—this effect.” The will holds within itself the possibility of the reverse effect at the same time as its effective actuality. The actuality of the internally effective will is always given; but the effect does not have to occur, because the will is free and can actively and effectively want and not want the same. The effect of the will exists and does not exist at the same time, because both possibilities exist in the will itself in the form of its intimate freedom. The will is taken in the mode *per se* and according to its effective substantial faculty. It subsists in the intimate mode *essentia potentialis*, where it always remains itself, although it does not act in any way (*non se habeat aliter ad ipsa*).[[372]](#footnote-372) But with regard to external effects, the will already behaves like a classical Aristotelian cause (*multo aliter se habet ad ea*).

From the point of view of classical metaphysics, the determination of the will as a “non-effective” intimate cause is sheer nonsense. The will defines itself as a real substance (A) and is at the same time given as a causal “substance—potency” towards the opposite (non A). The being and non-being of causality are simultaneously given in the same sense and on the same substrate. The free man of the new epoch is no longer bound by Aristotelian logic and metaphysics, but by paranoid thinking of *Modernorum*. Olivi abolished classical *modus ponens* and let valid only free and objective effects of the causally endowed will. In the epoch of the eclipse of the first substance, the objective causality of the will, made in the universal mode “*esse ad*,” took the place of effective causality. By using the mode “*esse ad*” for free will, a new foundation of metaphysics was created. The subject of the modern will has become an intimately established *causa sui*. Even modern God could not be a *causa sui* thus determined, for his unlimited being would become a limited substance with a fixed causal effect. The subject of modern will began to operate as a new substance of the third kind, to which a new form of categorical predication had to be created *per prius* and *per posterius*. The will represents a personally experienced freedom in the mode of Siger term “*experimur—conscii sumus*.” The substantially conceived will possesses the source of causality in itself in the form of intimate *causa sui*, which is given as a substantial potency towards this or that action. Olivi restricts the universal causality from freedom only in the second step, which is already contingent. The intimate causality of the will (*esse in*) keeps a distance from the effective effect of real causality by reflexively and freely regulating its effects in the direction of possible achievements (*esse ad*). The new determination of being in “*esse ad*” mode is tied to intimate and *ipse*-status of the human will. The basic principle of causality says that *causa efficiens* necessarily produces an effect in the corresponding potency on which it acts. If there is a given cause and a potentiality corresponding to it, then with undisturbed effect of the cause, it follows the corresponding effect given by the actualization of this potency (*post hoc, ergo propter hoc*). Causality, in the order of real first substances, establishes that the effect necessarily occurs when the effective cause acts undisturbed. In logic, the classical *modus ponens* corresponds to this fact. It forms the basis of deduction and established the demonstrative proof. In view of newly conceived intimate freedom of the actualized and yet potential free will, it was necessary to change Aristotle’s scheme of causality. Let’s take a look at original *Lichtung* of the objective will. It emerges out of itself and establishes a new order of being due to its causal and effective determination. We find the original beginning of the second metaphysics in the sense of Heidegger’s *Beginn* in the following quotation.

“The existence or non-existence of the consequence determined from the direction of the cause can signify the effective and sufficient being of this cause. In this way, the true conclusion of the deductive syllogism applies. But signification can also refer to the very order of effects (*ordinem ipsius effectus*) and to its creation or execution (*factionis eius seu exitus*), depending on how it relates to its cause, or even more so, how the existence of the effect is given from the direction of its cause (*quem est a sua causa*). This order signifies much more the basic determination of being (*ille ordo potius dicit esse ab quam*), to which the entities are predicted (*esse ad*). Then the previous assertion about conclusions of the deductive syllogism no longer applies (*falsura est*). In this case, it is not true that the cause behaves in the same way both to the being and to the non-being of its effect.” [[373]](#footnote-373)

The first case of cause and effect (*virtutem effectivam et sufficientem ipsius causae*) is Aristotelian *modus ponen*s for the efficient effect of the cause (*consequens primae conditionalis*). Olivi does not deny the original principle of causality, but he must suspend its validity for the free will. The second mode contains new determination of the will, which characterizes a new order of metaphysics (*significare ordinem*). The new order proceeds from the principle of free causality of the will. The intimately given causality proceeds from the subsistent will as a substance of the third kind (*exitus secundum quem se habet*). The objectively given causality of the will then operates in the world as a real cause (*ad suam causam*). This causally given will determines the being of the world in the Porretan mode “*exsistere*”, which passed into modern facticity (*factionis eius seu exitus*). The will establishes the new order of being (*ille ordo*), which is determined by effects of causality from freedom as the original source of meaning (*dicit esse ab quam*). For the first time in the history of Western metaphysics, the term “*ille ordo*” establishes the determination of being beyond Aristotelian causality and even beyond of its sophistic version given within the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy.

A kind of hypostatized, demiurgic, intimate and causally operating will is given as an objective substance in the mode *absolute*, i.e., completely separate from the intellect and also from the rest of the world. That absurd kind of human will established a new form of *dativus obiectivus*. Olivi redefines the historically given question of hermeneutic “how” (Heidegger′s *Wie*) the world is appropriated by the modern subject (*dativus possessivus*). Being in the mode of habitual ipseity, the free will must have a constant actualized and therefore substantial possibility for reverse action. Nothing can precede that actuality, not even the act of rational choice given by the intellect. Any preliminary determination interferes with the freedom of will that is given intimately within itself in the mode *per se*. Let us see the status of the intellect as *tertium genus* in CMDA; this is understandably tied to the person as the first real substance. The free will operates as a pure actual being, which contains the ambivalently given potency, because its effect does not necessarily have to occur. But in the second round, the will is already abstractly determined as an Aristotelian concept of intellectually determined will. This objectified will, abstracted in the mode *quartum genus*, stands outside the intellectual experience of the first person and represents only the potency of the will to want something in the world (*potentia accidentalis*). The concrete act (*volitio*) is therefore given in the context of the determined act of deliberate choice (*electio*) known from *Nicomachean Ethics*. Olivi understood excellently Siger’s twofold nature of the intellect. The first way of the intellect arises in one’s own self (*tertium genus*), and the second way of cognition in general is through abstraction (*quartum genus*). The modified scheme of CMDA used the subsistent will in the mode *ipse* for a new scenario. Classic Aristotelianism rejected in principle Olivi’s concept of autonomous will as a being of the third kind. According to Aquinas, the human will always takes up the good, which is recognized by the intellect.[[374]](#footnote-374) According to the first Averroism, which interpreted *Nicomachean Ethics* in the Stoic and Christian sense of *liberum arbitrium*, only the choice of the intellect itself is free (*electio*). The determinism of the will is the inescapable fact of the singular volition as a real cause, because the intellect orients it towards the recognized and thus towards the desired good. The will is free in this scenario because it is rational, which is not the case of animal desire. Olivi created a new substance in man; the will remains in the original intimate habitat of its essential and habitual freedom and then it goes out into the world. Its successors develop a hidden ontotheological and metaphysical potential of this “*esse ad*,” which is habitually added to the substance of the intimately given will. In the following decade, Henry of Ghent turned the terminus “*esse ad*” into a categorical predication of the relationship (*relatio*) and put it directly in God (ch. 5.2.3). The term “*ille ordo*” in the above-mentioned quotation indicates the emergence of the future metaphysics of *Modernorum*, which Henry of Ghent transferred to ontotheology and and his critics Scotus to metaphysics. In postmodernism, Olivi’s teaching about the absolutely free will, placed outside the world, appeared in a hidden way. The third antinomy of Kant’s work *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* rejects the possibility of a cosmology given rationally out of freedom, because freedom cannot be objectively found in the causal order of nature (*dritter Widerstreit*, KdRV, B 472–73). The causality of free will was rediscovered by Kant in the work *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. But Kant’s second critique does not take the path of Olivi’s intimacy of the will, given *per se* and as a substance. The radical modernist Olivi took the will out of the law of any causality and determined the existence of the will only in the relationship with God, which ensures its substantial existence. The will makes in man another substance of the third kind, positioned outside of substantial soul and intellect. The will became an intimate destiny of man and was taken out of the generally valid law of causality. Kant repeats Olivi’s dualism by constructing an aporia of free practical reason in the first critique. Free will acts as a *causa sui* in a mode full of legislative autonomy and outside the causality in the world. However, Kant remains a partial phenomenological realist on the question of freedom, as in the already cited case of causality according to *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (ch. 4.6). Beyond the intimacy of the will, Kant seeks its real determination bound to real and causal laws, because the synthetic *a priori* does not satisfy him as the determination of the will. Kant cannot leave the intimate will as a completely irrational driving force in a person, which Olivi did. The term “*Factum der reinen praktischen Vernunft*” was introduced as “*synthetischer Satz a priori*” (KdRV, A 55). The definition of the free will is fundamentally tied to the fact of always existing moral and human laws. The existing moral laws testify to the destiny of man related to his intimate freedom. This morally responsible freedom acts as a real cause in the human world of practical reason.

Olivi solved the phenomenological question of “how” the volitional substance in the mode of *ipse* relates to itself as well as to the first and immediate object of cognition. The intimate actualized will of the first modern liberal is given in the substantial mode of internal security. As a result, he replaced Neoplatonic solar intellect, which illuminates the soul from the outside and beyond sensually recognized first substances. The following passage brings to light the original source of the romantic intimacy of the West, which is based on the freedom of unlimited and absolute will. The quotation summarizes previous statements from Q. 57 and defines the will as an intimate substance of the third kind.

“There is no denying that we have within our power those acts which we experience and experience within ourselves. This would mean that we are disputing what is most inner and safest in us. If these acts were not in us in the form of the substance subsisting by itself and directly (*sunt a nostra forma substantiali per se et immediate*), that is, without mediation of other faculties arising from it;, then, these acts would only have been given accidentally, that is, only with regard to objects of these acts; or, these acts would have been created in us only in such a way that the ray of the sun penetrates the ether.” [[375]](#footnote-375)

The quotation shows that the subsistent will comes out from itself (*a se originatis*) and does not require mediation from the external world to justify its actualization (*nostra forma substantiali per se et immediate*). The fundamental cognitive principle “*ex inmediatis*” shifted from the causally acting first substance to the intimately experienced and causally acting will. The will is given *simpliciter* in its actuality, because its original act of freedom is subjective and real in the hypostatized will. It acts objectively as a cause with respect to the body. Let us recall the mode “*subiective—obiective*” of Siger’s school, which is given for the relationship between body, soul and intellect. It was used by Boethius of Dacia as the author of *Giele’s Anonymus* (*anima indiget in intelligere corpore obiecto, non sicut subiecto*; ch. 4.3.1). Olivi took it up and placed the will in the same position instead of the intellect. The will is actualized and immediately experienced substance that exists by itself and within itself (*intimum et certissimum nobis*). We experience acts of the will with inner evidence, separated from the other senses (*actus quos intime sentimus esse*). The free will in the inner experience cannot be denied (*non… est negare*). The will has the actuality of its own and operates as the solar intellect of Avicennian and Cartesian modernists. The emergence of the modern free subject in the mode of Cartesian self-reflection of hypostatized thinking is set out in the following quotation, which establishes the metaphysics of solipsist modernity.

“We experience in ourselves most clearly (*manifestissime experimur in nobis*) that our thinking (*mens nostra*) through thinking and through love reflects itself and turns to itself (*ad se*) as the object given directly and closest to it (*tanquam ad obiectum sui ipsius directum et immediatum*). But no ability can reflect directly in itself (*nulla virtus potest se reflectere immediate super se)* if it is not free *(nisi habeat libertatem*).” [[376]](#footnote-376)

The fundamental difference between Siger and Olivi is in the fact that the modern will *per se* performs the act of self-reflection, considering itself directly and immediately as a hypostatized substance of the third kind (*obiectum sui ipsius directum et immediatum*). The principle of “*ex inmediatis*” now refers to the will as a causally acting substance. This Cartesian scenario in the model of “*res volens*” would have excluded Siger and the school of the first Averroism. The soul is *tabula rasa* and takes the first cognition from the sensually recognized world. Avicennism of the “Flying Man” is now adapted to the actualized and autonomous will. Olivi, as a gifted follower of Siger, broke with the entire Franciscan school of Bonaventure at this crucial point. To them, *Doctor Invidiosus* was an academic of coming apocalyptic times, and he had to be removed from the University. From the modernist point of view, this really happened at the twelfth hour, because Aquinas came from papal Rome and began to effectively destroy the whole school of the second Averroism in Paris. Then it became clear to modernists that Aristotelian artists in the rue du Fouarre had begun to establish the rule of the Beast described in the *Book of Revelation* (*isti errores significatur in Apocalypsi in numero nominis bestiae*, ch. 4.1.2). But Olivi, who even condemns Aristotle as a heretic, did not follow Siger’s path of the first Averroism. The two-store architecture of the will is inspired by Bonaventura’s dual rule and Rufus’s difference between accidental and substantial potency (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The human will is essentially given in and of itself *per prius* (*potentia essentialis*) and determines the contingent volition *per posterius* (*potentia accidentalis*). In itself, the will is essentially and permanently intimately free and therefore possesses an absolute character bound to the human immaterial soul and to the intellect. The modern agent of volition is intimately and actually free (the first rule of the will as “*esse in*”); consequently, it acts freely in the world (the second rule as “*esse ad*”). In the second demiurgic mode, the will operates through its contingent and causal effectivity in the world. Due to the combination of a substantial essence and accidental activities, the will acquired the character of a modern substance and became a new being of the third kind.

Modern definition of the person composed of two substances thus received another additional substance, which was unacceptable in the years 1275–77. Aquinas and Pecham left the University of Paris five years earlier because of disputes over much smaller heresy, since they put in man the plurality of two forms or of two substances. After the destruction of the classical unity of the person in Oxford and Paris, the modernists began to proclaim the substantial multiplicity in man immediately after the condemnation of the first Averroism in 1277. However, they preferred to limit themselves to only two substances in man. The introduction of the third substance into the definition of the person explains why this original Franciscan sophist left Paris about the year 1277. Troubled religious leaders did not allow this spontaneous thinker to lecture at the center of education at that time. Even during the time of the greatest crisis of modernism, metaphysical paranoia and schizophrenia were far from being academic norms. Therefore, the hermeneutics interpret Olivi’s texts, which were created precisely in this period. Olivi created an intimate diacosmos directly in man and placed in him another being of the third kind, which received a causal effectiveness in the world. The will as a substance has an intimately given hypostatized freedom, and this actualized state produces subsequent free actions. The actualized volitional substance operates as an effective cause *per prius*. It is given in an undifferentiated manner with regard to both potential possibilities given *per posterius*. The emergence of the modern free subject is set out in the following quotation.

“The will has freedom originally and by itself (*habere libertatem primo et per se*), because the will acts out of itself (*operatur tanquam a se*) and due to another being as an separated agent and mover. Therefore, it determines itself out of itself with regard to acts (*ipsa se ipsam applicat ad opus*). Secondarily, the will is correctly defined as free (*secundario vero dicitur libera*) because it has the possibility of acting with regard to the opposite (*in utramque* *partem oppositorum*). I use the term ‘secondary’ because freedom exists no other way than through that what founds the freedom in virtue of an activity that is quasi self-given (*operatur quasi a se*) and not coming from any separate source.” [[377]](#footnote-377)

The first determination of the will is given from the point of view of its subsistent, intrinsic and *per se* given freedom (*voluntas dicitur habere libertatem primo et per se*). Set in the mode of ipseity, the free will then takes external objects of the volition (*ipsa se ipsam applicat ad opus*). Siger’s adage “*homo ipse intelligit*” is replaced by the thesis on free hypostatized will that Olivi put in the mode of absolute ipseity (*ipsa se ipsam*). Defined like this, the free will is an *ipse*-substance given *per se* in the primary mode. This hypostatized free will is free in the secondary mode by actions in the world (*secundario vero dicitur libera*). The newly determined actuality of the intimate will freely choose among the opposites given in potency with regard to the external world (*in utramque partem oppositorum*). In its intimate *potentia substantialis*, the will is as infallible and self‒assured as modern God that conceives the future plan of salvation in the mode “*semel—semper*.” Let us recall that the basis of this future and already logically determined action of the will was given by the Exclusion of the Third since the speculation about the future arrival of Antichrist. This speculation concerning the pure future possibility established modern logic (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). The arrival of Antichrist is as necessary as ability of the will to want something freely and intimately. Everything else is logically excluded. Then it is only an accidental matter when the free will realizes its necessary, intellectual and intimately given nature that contingently realizes or does not realize this substantial basic possibility. Without this actualized potency, the will would not be free as an intimate causal factor. The creation of a primary and secondary level of the will established the new system of Bonaventura’s two-storied order, but this time only on the level of human-given rule (*regula agentis in/creati*, ch. 4.1.2). Olivi brought man to the divine level, but only in the mode of free intimacy of the will, which operates as a new form of *imago Dei*. Modern God received a new anthropomorphic nature in philosophy and he became closer and more understandable to modern man. The reformatory form of capitalism (ch. 5.1.3) fully confirmed that evolution.

The ipseity of free will, experienced in the first person and at the same time as a substance of the third kind, also determined another important character of the will. Olivi abolished Aristotelian identity of being by postulating an essentially given actuality and potentiality in the epochal new substance of the third kind. This his new substance is given *simpliciter* and in the mode “*intimissime interiora nostrae mentis.*” Through this transformation into a Porretan being of the third kind, the will began to “exsist” in the mode of the intimate power. This ipseity is metaphysically separated from the subsequent action of the will operating in reality. Olivi does not agree with Aristotelian definition of causality, because the free will must preserve the substantial and causal possibility of acting differently. The will contains the necessary, substantial and actualized given indetermination to act with regard to the opposite. The indeterminacy given in this way with regard to the future state we find in Aristotle, Averroes only for the potency. It cannot be determined metaphysically and logically, since there is no determinacy as to a future naval battle. Aristotle’s deliberate choice (*electio*) therefore determines the will as an extension of the theoretical intellect, which becomes practical by the fact that it acts singularly and causally in reality through the will. The rational volition is already related to this or that partial good as a volitional object at the moment of decided volition. But according to Olivi, volition at the level of real choice is merely a secondary and contingent determination of what is determined by the concrete object of volition, and not its *potentia substantialis*. The intellectualist determination of the will in the mode *per prius* represents a fundamental stumbling block for Olivi. Aristotelianism determines the will by the intellect, thereby it takes but the second place. After all, Olivi cannot believe heretic Aristotle on such a weighty issue, since free will is necessary for our salvation. The cited *questio* 57 rejects the thesis that the intellect would determine the will, because then it would no longer be free. Olivi cancels the scenario of dependence of the will on the intellect by attacking Aristotle. It took the path of his Parisian teachers that Albert ironically referred to as *doctores Latini*.

“In the following question it is shown that the will is free and does not take over anything from the intellect or from its acts (*nihil penitus ab intellectuu et eius actu*) and also it does not require any actuality of the intellect for its acts (*nec exigitur ad eius actum*) since the mere representation of the object of the will made by the intellect is sufficient for the will (*nisi pro sola representatione obiecti*). Moreover, it is true that Aristotle does not substantiate his teaching with evidence, but merely presupposes it. To believe the statement of a pagan (*credere dictum hominis infidelis*), moreover without any evidence and in case of endangering the Christian faith and against the reason, it would be an act of great heresy and great stupidity.” [[378]](#footnote-378)

The quotation leaves to the intellect only an auxiliary function of the mode of intentionality (*sola representatione obiecti*). Representation means that the will is determined only indirectly by the intellect. If the intellect determined the will in the mode *per prius*, then the will would not be free at the level of hypostatized *potentia substantialis*. Aristotelian determination of the will runs firstly through the theoretical reason and subsequently it presents a recognized object to the will. It is the task of the practical reason that presents the object created in the mode of “*bonum*” to the will. This means that the good is recognized as an intentional object by the active intellect in the mode *per prius* and subsequently determines the will as the object of its volition. The practical intellect recognized meaning and considered as a kind of “*bonum*” that fundamentally determined the volition of this recognized object. Olivi attacked Aristotle’s principle of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical intellect and separated the connection into two independent substances. The hypostatized intellectual substance, already present in the second Averroism, is now separated from the newly hypostatized will. Both substances are connected only by the act of random coincidence. The quotation confirmed the new position of the will in relation to the intellect. The first floor of the will functions as the first substance in the mode of actuality separate from the intellect. The will is itself in the act of intimately given freedom even without the good recognized and presented by the intellect. Neither the theoretical nor the practical intellect is necessary for the primary being of the will in the mode of *potentia substantialis*. Thanks to free will, the human agent has an effective causality fully in his intimately given and experienced power. This new subject of *Modernorum* becomes an autonomous demiurge, which is placed outside the real causality of first substances and outside rational cognition made in the mode of the truth as correspondence. Irrationally conceived will no longer operates in the mode of the formal causality of the good. That scenario is given by the theoretical understanding of the cause of cognition, which determines the active will as an effect. The modern will became completely irrational and completely insane in its intimacy. Olivi made academic Furies intimately free. Original Aristotelian reason of the will was given with regard to the intellect, which Olivi postponed until the concrete act of *volitio*. The ethical and rational accountability of the will now applies only in the mode of representation and not of determination. The modern and therefore non-existent volitional essence “exsists” in a free intimacy and this substance of the third kind is separated in the mode of *absolute* from the critical, i.e., discriminating intellect, both from its theoretical and from the practical nature. The sovereign will of the modern subject is absolutely free from the world and from the determination of the intellect, and therefore recognizes itself in an internal way. The intimate free will requires the determination from reality and the good defined by the intellect only in the second step when it acts contingent in the world.

The new definition of the will rejected the Aristotelian principle of *extensio*. The action of the theoretical intellect works as a cause in reality through the practical reason and in the next step through the will. The rejection of Aristotelian extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical by the will created a fundamental *Lichtung* for the epoch-making effective will conceived in the mode of metaphysical nihilism. The untruth of modern will in the mode of full revelation (*alētheia*) is given by the fact that, taken from the point of view of classical Aristotelianism, Olivi’s concept of the will became an essentially irrational element in man. In the second Averroism, man became a schizophrenic and now he became completely unreasonable. That is why Olivi is the founder not of modernism but of postmodernism and today’s nihilism. The will and the choice as a faculty of the soul are completely blind in this sense, because only the senses and the intellect can recognize something in the soul. Olivi’s kind of the will, placed outside the intellect, has its own causality, which operates beyond Aristotelian scheme of practical syllogism (E.N. VII.5). According to Aristotle, the theoretical mind presents the good in the universal meaning and modifies it in the direction of its practical expansion into the form of the required good for us, which generates the causality of the middle link of the ethical syllogism. The work *Nicomachean Ethics* claims that the second particular clause determines human action (κυρία τῶν πράξεων, E.N. 1147b10). The connection of the general major and the causally determined minor to a practical syllogism makes ethical founding of actions and entitles the author of *Ethics* to determine so-called practical truth (ἀλήθεια πρακτική, E.N. 1139a26). The correctness of wise actions is grasped by the fact that the practical intellect follows the moral good with foresight. The will subordinates itself to the theoretical intellect, which in the practical extension presents the recognized object to the will in the causal mode of good for us. This is brilliantly expressed in the definition of virtue related to actions of the wise person (E.N. 1106b36—1107a2). Olivi extended the paranoia of modern intellect in the realm of paranoid will that began to act in the world. The free will is not determined in its essence by actualized reality and by the critical intellect, but only in its accidental volitions (*pro sola representatione obiecti*). It is only in the secondary act of representation when the thing is made present to the willing through cognition. The mind does not determine the modern sovereign will as in classical Aristotelianism, but merely brings a specific *scibile* for the will in the mode of non-obligatory and accidentally given representation. The new nature of the will established media manipulations of today′ nihilism and inaugurated the crisis of the contemporary narcissistic subject.

Olivi created a new variant of the Oxford Cave made by *illuminati* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). The absolutely paranoid will of *Modernorum* resides within the intimately given cave, where the Raven of Elias brings the representations of the real world. The modern will engaged in the mode of *electio* either wants them or does not want them. Modernity completely separated those intelligible representations from the existence of the real world. The objectively necessary mystic Raven of Elias had worked reliably until the death of modern God. Since then, the *illuminati* have been completely alone in the cave, which is a very obvious fact nowadays. New manner of “*colligatio*” connects two or three objective substances in the modern subject. The first Averroism would argue that substantive and subsistent volition is total nonsense, for one thing. And secondly, the modern will as substance cannot constitute any object of willing because it has no way of knowing it. Cognition is an act of the senses and the intellect, which are determined from the reality of the first substance. The will represents potency for the recognition of the practical intellect, which endows it with the formal good, and this object is then actualized and wanted by the will. Olivi created a modern determination of the will outside Aristotelian determination of the practical intellect. The receptive primacy of the intellect in the mode of *intellectus possibilis* is just as unacceptable to Olivi as the receptivity of the will determined by the intellect. Olivi shifted the determination of *liberum arbitrium* in the mode of ipseity to the level of the first substance. But at the same time he left the intimately experienced freedom of the will as a metaphysical hypostatized potency to the opposite. The possibility of the opposite exists in Aristotelian metaphysics only as an indeterminable potency, which does not exist in the real world. According to Parmenides, nothing can be said philosophically about the non-being. Therefore, paranoid modernity negated the non-being and considers this *tertium ens* to be positive and objective “substance” as reality. Parmenides called those people “double-headed” and they became modern schizophrenics; thanks to the influence of the academically educated Furies they received philosophical doctorates since 1250. Every substance is basically determined formally and logically by the fact that it is actualized so and not otherwise (*hoc aliquid*). The cause is determined in classical Aristotelianism as a really acting first substance both in the mode of causality and in the logic of *modus ponens*. Aristotelian will is free in its choice because it is practically rational. It is determined by the intellect that adequately recognizes the world. The desired good represents the actualized cause for human action here and now. For us, the willing of good represents the middle link of ethical syllogism, because it is recognizable, predictable and intentional in this effective form.

The will of the modern subject transgressed Aristotelian determination of the rational will given in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Olivi had to abolish the principle of the causal effect of the practical intellect from the direction of the theoretical intellect in order to maintain the indetermination of human freedom given solely in the will. Therefore, compared to Siger, he changed the ipseity in such a way that the will is not a rational potency of man as a person, but represents another substance in man. The modern free will, given as the first substance, is an effective cause with regard to free actions; however, those effects do not have to occur. The act of autonomous subsistence of the will, in the order of causality, corresponds to actions of real first substances, but with a fundamental difference. The will is always in the effective actuality; but the effect does not necessarily have to occur, because the will is free in its action. The will received a statute analogous to divine actuality (*esse a se, per se*) and thereby reached the level of the first substance. In his intimate act, man experiences the possibility of causality, which he controls with regard to effects. External determinations made with regard to the intimate will, they are given in the mode of representations. Aristotelian causality then applies only to the first substances exposed to physical causality. As a result, there is the modern causality of natural determinism and the determinism made out of the freedom. Kant took it over and offered its postmodern distinction in the first and in the second Critique. Therefore, postmodern Kant had to reject heteronomic Aristotelian ethics in the same way as it was the case with Olivi. A similar teaching is unacceptable for the first Averroism, because it would abolish the principle of causality, determined by intellectual cognition of the good. The will is free only as a rational will. According to Siger, only the existence of the person has an *ipse*-character as a causally given fact of volition, because every free action in the world is determined by the body. In the first Averroism, the bodily founded will is free. It is linked to rational consideration and to the theoretical intellect in accordance with *Nicomachean Ethics*. Olivi primarily wants to be free and not rational. He abolished rational construction of scientific evidence according to *Seconds Analytics* (*Anal. Post*. 84a11–14). Therefore, it became obsolete the possibility of critical science, rational ethics and politics, all of which based on the univocal conception of the causality given by hyparchical position of the first substance. Therefore, Olivi rejected metaphysics and the view of science represented in *Seconds Analytics*.

“In fact, the effect cannot arise in the case of an obstacle or even a completely different higher truth, since these can prevent desired effects from occurring in the case of an existing cause. But there is the case of an obstacle in which we have both an operative cause and its concomitant effect, which does not occur even though the cause exists.” [[379]](#footnote-379)

The first sentence describes Aristotelian causality (*praesente causa sufficiente*), which does not satisfy the effect for any obstacle (*effectus possit non esse*). The blind person has the power to see; but this is not actualized, par exemple because of an illness. Otherwise the cause acts in a sufficient way and produces a corresponding effect (*causa sufficiente et dante esse suo effectui simul*). The key is the second sentence, in which Olivi introduces something as an “in-efficient causality” for the free will. The effect does not have to occur even after the introduction of the effective cause (*dum dat, posset effectus non esse*). According to Olivi, this makes the case of free will; there is no necessary connection between the cause and the effect given by actualizing the given potency by an acting cause. The will is free precisely because it is causally “in-effective.” The effect must not necessarily come about; otherwise the will would not be free. The will is an intimate obstacle to itself, so that no effect occurs.

From the point of view of Aristotelian metaphysics and logic, this is sheer nonsense, which Olivi was well aware of. But one cannot believe a pagan as Aristotle on such an important issue, which is shaped by theology and Paul’s and Augustine’s teaching on free will. Olivi adopted Paul’s and Augustine’s dialectic of the internally divided will (*velle—nolle*) as an essential determination of the will. Let us recall the universal validity of Paul’s role in the sense of the actualized effective law of sin that determines the will from the outside (*Romans* 7:15—21). From Paul’s and Augustine’s *nolle*, which is given by sin as the ruling law in our body, Olivi created a new determination of the will, which is itself an intimate obstacle in its work (*dum dat, posset effectus non esse*). But the will, divided by sin, would not be a *simpliciter* given substance and would depend in its freedom on some external impulse. The dualism of the will divided by sin is rejected with reference to Augustine, since he recognized the final unity of the will given in the act of resulting reflection over the will divided by sin. Hermeneutics therefore modify the argument from Arendt’s well-known essay on the degeneration of the Western concept of political freedom (Arendt 1961, 159). The inner free will is fragmented as a personal will in Christianity within the framework of *liberum arbitrium* of Stoics. Olivi rejects Aristotle’s free political choice (προαίρεσις, ἐλευθερία) and, according to Augustine and Paul, follows the theological split into the dialectics of “*velle—nolle*”. But in the explicit opposite to the intimacy of splitted will attacked by sin, he created his own original unity of the will as a *potentia substantialis*. Olivi placed the theological dichotomy of “*velle—nolle*”in the second place, where acts of singular will and choice are determined by sinful volition. At the level of the intimately experienced will as a pure substantial potency, the contradiction “*velle—nolle*”cannot arise. The free will simply “exsists” in the intimacy of “*esse in*.” Being in such a blissful state, the will does not want anything at all. The will remains in an intellectual and intimate manner of being that is peculiar to modern God, in order to meet the realm of non-obligatory representations and intentions. The hypostatized will is given in itself with absolute certainty and timeliness, and only non-obligatory ideas come into its habitat. Olivi made a fundamental shift in the subjective perception of being towards postmodern nihilism (*Ge-Stell*; OBJ I, ch. 1.2). His conception of will as another substance in man ensured the supply of *tertium ens* before the demiurgic form of the will that makes another kind of *tertium ens*. Without this remake of the will, capitalism could not have come into being. For its justification, it was necessary to create an irrational and fully free will to power. After the extinction of the first substance and then also of the critical thinking, Olivi set the basic condition *sine qua non*, which determined the purely instrumental rationality of self-preservation that established the capitalist demiurge.

Olivi as a voluntarist, *illuminatus* and mystic no longer needs Aristotelian critical intellect, because he has no theory of the truth as correspondence. He took up Rufus′s theory of the truth as asimilation. The will is in itself actualized as a first substance. Then, all conceivable determination of accidental volition in the mode of truth emanates out of it as a kind of assimilation. The actuality of the simple act of subsistence is supplemented by the possibility of the will, which can potentially act in a contradictory way, because it is free in the choice between good and evil. Taken precisely, on the fundamental level of *Ge-Stell* as Olivi′s *potentia substatialis*, there is no evil and good, since that moral distinction presupposes some kind of rational judgment. That is the reason, why the capitalism of such “free will” is situated beyond all ethical considerations and why it is fundamentally “a-moral.” Moral considerations appear but in the second stage of concrete volitions and choices. The nature of the will in the categorical and substantial mode *per prius* does not have the character of the concrete *volitio* that aims at the external object of the will. The will given as an actualized acting substance of the third kind exists as free. Being situated in the act of intimacy, it can want and does not want something. Both consequences of internal causality, the wanting and the not wanting the same thing, are positioned by the will from the point of view of its actualized substance. The dialectics of “*velle–nolle*” begins only at the level of this or that contingent of given individual will and choice. Voluntarist Olivi abolished the principle of causality much more consistently than Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1) and Kilwardby (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.1) in their versions of Oxfordian Fallacy. Both modernists merely lifted the effects of actually acting first substances in the middle link of the deductive proof, since they turned it into an essence. The modern person was split into only two substances that were engaged in the act of modern schizophrenic copulation. The hypostatized intellect ensured cognition by exposure of meaning made from behind. Olivi transformed the intellectualist paradigm of modernity into a voluntaristic one, thus establishing a new epoch of the West. Modernity became paranoid in the square, because it had to connect three substances together, by losing the Aristotelian theoretical and practical intellect in the process. From the year 1277, Olivi’s second Averroism defends the free will that is hypostatically determined. Being settled in the mode of *absolute*, it became separated from the intellect, from sin, from logic, from causality and from reality. The modern will thus resemble God of *Modernorum* and followed his path on *via Modernorum*. Nihilist Nietzsche ended this stage by letting that modern God finally die. Nietzsche put in his place the irrational will of Olivi, which he transferred to Greek mythology. Following the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy, Olivi established a new definition of the free subject beyond the rule of the theoretical and practical intellect. Through this intellectual act, liberating the will from both intellect and causality, the modern capitalist subject arose that was ready to conquer the world. The intimately and essentially free subject of *Modernorum* rejected the classical determination of the rational will established in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Olivi’s will is not primarily rational, but free. The modern subject of such “free will” as a substance of the third kind does not need to determine the will through the intellect, in the mode *per prius*. Volition is primarily determined by hypostatized intimacy and by modern freedom.

After the eclipse of the first substance, there was an eclipse of the critical and practical reason that was needed to determine the acts of volition. The twice-blind subject of *Modernorum*, led by intimately free Furies, is now sufficiently equipped to conquer the world. The capitalist subject must conquer the world in the mode of Anselm’s deontological truth (*quod debet esse, recte est*; OBJ II, ch. 1.2). The will given in the mode “*esse ad*” must realize intimately reflected and substantially actualized freedom. Olivi’s conception of the absolutely sovereign will abolished Aristotelian structure of rational action and brought about a further existential determination known as *dativus incommodi* (ch. 4). The practical mind, which was deprived of the critical function of theoretical thinking determined by reality, established through Olivi the instrumental rationality of the West. It makes a completely intimate affair of the paranoid subject. Therefore, the activity created by this demiurgic will is separated from the goals of the wise intellect given in theoretical *scholé* and political freedom. The modern subject can be irrational or rational, because it is intimately free for both choices in the same way. The objective mythology of the Latin West became the instrument of the blind and irrational will and totally instrumental reason, guided by the instinct of self-preservation. In this objectively accomplished form, modernity was finally able to embark on another crusade for capitalist conquest of the world. Olivi suspended the validity of causality for the human will and created a new metaphysics of the will, which is given on the basis of dogmatic anthropology. In this way, he made possible an unlimited activity of the modern demiurge, whose universal rules Bonaventure founded. The new determination of the modern subject caused the degeneration of Aristotelian *intellectus practicus* into nihilistic instrumental activity of postmodernism. The intimately free *conatus* of the demiurgic will is completely irrational in its essence. The rationality of the modern subject is guided only by the instinct of self-preservation, as it is confirmed by postmodern theories of the social contract in the 17th century. The biological instinct forms the only intimate power of the postmodern subject. After the eclipse of first substances, it extinguished the light of the critical reason, which had been practically active in the world. The epochal new will and the instrumental intellect of the demiurge that has just arisen, they are no longer determined by the intellect. Aristotelian intellect is determined by the cognition of actualized first substances; the modern intellect and will are autonomous substances in themselves. This also corresponds to the intentionality of the modern will as a *dilatatio*, which aims at the desired object, but is not determined by this object. This gave rise to the modern *extensio* of the will, which replaced Aristotelian practical intellect. The will can be penetrated by the object of the will, because it formally forms a univocal *scibile* and *volitio*. The quote shows *Lichtung* of narcissistic consumerism and global effectiveness of media simulacra.

“The formal power of the will that we have within us is aimed at the object (*dilatatur ad obiectum*), since it is determined by spiritually given extension. It joins the object by allowing itself to be penetrated by it (*unitur et quasi imbibitur ipsi obiecto*). This is the same in the case of other types and modi, when the will grasps itself spiritually and it experiences those manners directly in the actions and habits of our mind.” [[380]](#footnote-380)

The modern subject recognizes the world of objective simulacra through the hypostatized intellect given as a separated substance. The modern will mystically engulfed objectively recognized simulacra of the third kind in the mode of the truth as assimilation. They make part of the will as its intimate object. Olivi changed the rational (but crazy) manner of the second Averroism that manipulated the objectively made world. The former kind of *dativus possessivus* had to recognize the objective world of *scibilia* in order to manipulate them. Now, it came to nihilist *unio mystica* of the mythological will and its correspondingly desired object of volition. Karl Marx called it rightly to be the fetishist nature of capitalist production. The connection between will and object does not take place in the form of Aristotelian agreement or extension, but in the form of mystical fusion (*unitur et quasi imbibitur ipsi obiecto*). Rufus’s theory of truth as the universal unity of the understanding (*coaequatio*) now received a fundamental confirmation also for the will. The will, separated from the critical mind, wants everything that corresponds to its free, substantial nature. The will recognizes itself as its first intimate *scibile* in the mode *per prius*. The second step is made by voluntaristic (today narcissistic) extension of the intimate will into the world. The instinct of self-preservation of this will is an intimate affair of the individual. Therefore, the will built on this intimacy creates the first *conatus* of modernity and, in the mode *per posterius*, adds to it another volitional *scibile* settled in the objective diacosmos of modernity. Through the connection between the “exsisting” intellect and the will, *Lichtung* of performative reality was created to make a complete simulacrum. Armed with the active demiurgic will, the schizophrenic subject of Olivi completed the modern paranoia and it victoriously took *via Modernorum* to postmodern capitalism. By establishing the modern bond “subject—object” in the mode of being and causality of the third kind, Olivi provided the last building block necessary for the creation of new metaphysics. By introducing the causality of the will as a substance, the hyparchical predication given in the mode “*ex inmediatis*” according to Aristotelian interpretation of *Seconds Analytics* became obsolete. Anthropological metaphysics of *Modernorum* is based on the substantial potency of the will, which in itself is indetermined with regard to every objectively possible effect (*esse ad*). The intimate will as a new being of the third kind created an island of causally given and actualized existence in man. It replaced the lost realm of first substances.

The key term of the new metaphysical insight into the world is the concept of “*realis distinctio*,” which distinguishes between intimate being of the substantial will and external acts of the will. In Siger’s case, the intellectual capacity of the person must be separated from the material sensory experience in the immaterial mode *inmixtus*. Without this conception of *inmixtus*, the intelligible soul of man cannot be universally receptive with regard to the true recognition of reality. Olivi’s intimate hypostatized will was put in the mode of *inmixtus* to be separated from the modern intellect given as substance; otherwise it is not absolutely free. For the separated volitional substance, the basic determination of the intellect from *De anima* then applies analogously, because the soul keeps receptive possibility of cognition with regard to everything. Olivi adopted Aristotelian definition of the soul, which is supposed to be everything in the universal faculty of cognition. He adapted it to the habitus of the will given as the universal faculty of volition. In the habitus given in this way and *per prius*, man actively possesses the world, whereas in the first Averroism the receptive intellect merely recognized the world. For the first time, the world is filled with the sense made from the point of view of metaphysical nihilism based on the will. The essence of the will and its acts create two separate realms of being. These realms of sense are connected with the help of analogy. The quotation presents a new *resolutio* of the metaphysics of the will, whereby this *resolutio* is indicated by the term “*aspectus*.” This term defines the direct insight into the essential nature of the will, which remains uniform in itself, although it produces different acts outwardly. The complete paranoid position of the will appears in Olivi only in the wish-conjunctive (*posset poni*); but this wishful thinking has become today’s reality.

“In the act of this insight, it would be possible (*in ipso actu posset poni*) to provide a real distinction (*realis distinctio*) between the essence of the will and the order or similarity that the will has with regard to objects of the will. In this way, the real distinction between the essence of the will and its external aspects is given (*realis distinctio inter essentiam voluntatis et suos aspectus*). This and that are given in the definite whole, which corresponds to each other (*quasi totum simile*). The essence of these acts has the similarity related to the common extent and the nature given in all active manifestations of the will (*unius rationis et naturae in omnibus actibus voluntatis*). This similarity is also analogously related to the ipseity of the will in itself (*analogia ipsius voluntatis*), because volitive actions participate in that form or nature in the mode of analogy (*participants formam seu naturam ipsius voluntatis per quandam analogiam*).” [[381]](#footnote-381)

The modern will establishes the order of the being connected with the one sense (*unius rationis et naturae*), which is based on the performative power of the will as such (*in omnibus actibus voluntatis*). The analogous unity of being in the epoch of the nascent metaphysical nihilism connects the two floors of being with each other. In the mode *per prius*, there is an analogous relationship (*ratio*) between the *ipse*-essence of the will (*potentia substantialis*) and already aristotelically given rational and volitional actions (*potentia accidentalis*). The entity as an object of the will (*aspectus*) makes part of original nature of the intimate free will. Following the truth as assimilation, the will of the demiurge comes in the world in order to find its representational aspect. This new relationship is given between the willing will, which is engaged in the concrete act of choice, and the objectively given wholeness of acts of will produced in the world (*similitudo analoga ipsius voluntatis*). The singular volition and the wholeness of these volitions have their common origin in substantial potency of free will. It is intimately separated from volitive acts existing in the world in the mode of its own actualized ipseity. The fundamental ratio between the actuality of free will and the object determined by it is transferred to the rest of being determined by the sovereign will (*participants formam seu naturam ipsius voluntatis*). The threefold link of the objective analogy of the being is now complete. The will and its object have a common ratio, which consists of the internal and intimate freedom, which the will keeps substantially (*habitus*). What the will is intimate in itself, it also finds analogously in the world as an aspect of itself. From the point of view of intimate and actualized freedom, it then applies that the will is primarily located in the hypostatized habitus, which is given as absolute and irrational freedom. From this new place of knowledge determined by the objective will (*ortus scientiarum*), the will to power determines the total sense of being. The sense of being is given in the perspective of the will (*aspectus*). In the act of concrete volition, the will sets course for the analogically conceived world, which forms an addition to the modern will. Thanks to this epochal new perspective directed towards the whole of being, the world is transformed into an object of the sovereign will. The objective wholeness of the world gains a meaning by analogical assignment (*per quandam analogiam*) to the intimate will. The will positions itself (*in actu posset poni realis distinctio*) as separate from the wholeness of being (*inter suam essentiam et inter huiusmodi ordinem*). The subject of the modern will is separated from the rest of the world by the term “*realis distinctio*.” The world cannot act directly on the will because it is immanently free and is not determined by intellectual cognition. This distinction provides an epochal new statute of being, which is given from the direction of the determining will of the subject. The free instance of the acting will is subjective, since it aims out of itself at the object from which it is radically separated (*realis distinctio*). The world became the object of free will, which is given as a new causality given by the rest of the world. The intimate free will separates the modern subject from the rest of the world and this separated subject endows the totality of being with an objective meaning made through the world-oriented volition. The analogy is given between the substantial will, which is engaged in the concrete act of volition, and the rationality of the objectively given wholeness of these acts in the world (*similitudo analoga ipsius voluntatis*). As a result, a new system of universal analogy was created in the mode of *analogia voluntatis*. Thomistic Semiaverroism of Aegidius Romanus, after Olivi’s banishment from Paris, changed this analogy of volition into the objective analogy of cognition according to the primacy of an “Aristotelian” intellect (*analogia entis*). In the mode of analogy, the sense of being forms the corresponding ratio to the primary being of the will, which is given *per se* in the substantive and intimate mode. The modern subject was no longer the intelligent person in the mode of classical *anima intellectiva*. It became a rational subject endowed with an instrumental and volitional ratio given by free will. The modern intellect, as a substance of the third kind, exposes the meaning of being from behind, and the equally conceived will endows this objectively given being with an intimately given causality, which in a narcissistic way arises exclusively from itself. Then it is no wonder that such free will of *Modernorum* was able to assimilate in an uncritical and irrational way all Porretan *species* and *scibilia* that were within its reach. The modern will has to connect repeatedly with itself, because this act of self-reflection founds the intimate *conatus* of one’s own self-preservation. Will and intellect are determined *per prius* of themselves and only *per posterius* with regard to first substances. The will is given as substance by the fact that it adheres to the actuality in the act of free self-determination given as the sovereign cause of action.

Olivi created a new kind of instrumental demiurgic will and cognition, which in the first Averroism was the case only for the passive component of the intellect. Now it is true that the modern will is somehow everything and by no means exclusively a receptive intellectual cognition of the soul. The objective sense of being is determined from the direction of the active and subsistent intimate will, which expands its “*existere*” into the world in the mode given by the modern capitalist subject. The demiurge “exsists” in the world regarded in the “*discrete videamus*” mode. The demiurge assimilates all directly apprehended beings evidently and correctly in the *scibile*-mode. Then he stores this wealth of knowledge, given as “things themselves,” in the global memoria of databases. For this fundamental reason, the mystic Olivi became the prophet of capitalist postmodernity and digital nihilismus. Olivi, like the blind Homer, proclaims their future nihilistic glory. After the eclipse of the first substance, there was an eclipse of the rational structure of human action, which is given by the connection of the *Seconds Analytics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. The hypostatized will, placed outside Aristotle’s theoretical intellect, sent a modern man on the journey of another metaphysical lunacy, which is also undertaken by the intimately free subject of modernity. Olivi established the rule of free will, which followed the path of mysticism of *Modernorum*. After the death of modern God, this became the rule of the blind instrumental reason, which obeys only the instinct of self-preservation. This epochal *factum* today represents the ruling, imperial and globally advanced rationality. The West imposes this nihilistic aspect globally and imperially as its will to power. The practical effort of the person is not determined from the direction of the whole of being, which is considered by the true imposition from the direction of first substances. Modernity is dominated by frenetic demiurgic activity of the individual and concrete bearer of the atomic hypostatized will (*conatus*). Moreover, this intimate will, given as the last *principium individuationis* of the modern subject, does not recognize the real world, but only its own *scibile*, given within the framework of the modern supposition. The exposure of being from behind shifted from the intellect to the demiurgic will, and as a result it came to further eclipse of the first substance. The modern carrier of chaotic substances and hypostases ceased to be a person, and this subject recognizes and assimilates the world that is recognized anew. Olivi’s subject created himself with the help of a double negation in the mode *ex nihilo* and also recognizes all beings in the mode of double negation. Thus, the modern *res* and the human corpse are created as a kind of modern *res*. The schizophrenic subject created the paranoid object and wants it freely in the absolute intimacy of his will. As a result, a new form of *dativus auctoris* and *dativus finalis* was created in the hermeneutics (ch. 4). The domination of metaphysical nihilism is given absolutely and it determines the mode of “subject—object” the sense of being. Occitan Olivi from the south of France founded the first worker of the spirit in the instrumental and rational mode of Anglo-Saxon white collars, which was *conditio sine qua non* for the epoch of capitalism. The global nihilistic form and the totalitarian form of this capitalist version of the human being as a corpse described Ernst Jünger in his work *Der Arbeiter* (1932). The analogous relationship is given between the subjective will engaged in the concrete act of volition and the rationality of the objectively given wholeness of these acts in the world. The new rationality, deprived of classical philosophy of wisdom, sees the world as an aspect of its irrational being and appropriates this aspect in the mode of objective truth as assimilation. Without this *epokhē* of critical wisdom, the modern worker would not have been able to establish the epoch of capitalism. Latin sophist Olivi substantiates the metaphysics of capitalism through the intellectual *res gesta* of the original author, because he defined for the first time and in a radical way the historically given subject of the new epoch. It is rightly called rationalism of Enlightement (to read: the crazy rationalism of *illuminati*).

The basis for determining the new epoch of capitalism and enlightenment rationalism is the above-mentioned analogous relation (*ratio*). It is given by the essence of the will producing the act of volition (*essentia ipsorum actuum*) and demiurgic reflection of this essence in all external aspects of the will (*unius rationis et naturae in omnibus actibus voluntatis*). The will of the modern subject, thanks to the sovereign and separated ability to want anything, establishes the analogy of being as a volitive object, which is determined with regard to the essence and of the ipseity of the will (*ipsius voluntatis*). The will, as the Neoplatonic sun, shines through meaning of the world from the point of view of the active being, which forms the sense of everything provided by the modern demiurge. The rest of the reality given outside the will conforms to the will, since it forms the determination of analogical similarity (*similitudinem quam habet cum obiecto*). The object of the will acquired an objective character, because it is determined in relation to the radically separated intimate subject as the absolutely given carrier of the objectively made will. Olivi created a new form of *dativus possessivus*, which is related to the demiurgic will in the mode of sovereign causality. The will exposes the meaning of being as an *intellectus agens*, and this active Neoplatonic solar will replaced the *intellectus possibilis* of the first Averroism. In the subject, a new sphere of being was established, the meaning of which is determined rationally, i.e., in the mode of *ratio*, which is given as an aspect of the absolutely separated will. This fundamental question, “how” the will is formed, finds expression through the above-mentioned term *habitus*. The real distinction separates the habitual essence of the will (*essentiam voluntatis*) from its objective, externally given actions (*suos aspectus*). The will cannot be determined by external reality recognized by phantasms, because it is separated from every reality by essentially and intimately given freedom. The object given outside the will necessarily generates in the world the last link of the tripartite link, which is given by the primary relation of the actualized will to its volition and subsequently to the objective aspect of this volition in external reality (*sunt omnino unius rationis*). The analogically given will unites the objects just as the light beam shines through the transparent things. As a result, the basic form of the “subject—object” relationship is given, which determines the whole of being within the framework of modern *analogia entis*. The world became an aspect of the will, and that long before the nihilism of postmodern Nietzsche, which only completed Olivi’s metaphysics of the will. Olivi replaced Rufus’s *potentia substantialis* from the epoch of the first objectivity before 1250 with the newly conceived ipseity, which was given within the framework of the essentially and substantially conceived will. The real distinction separates the absolutely given will from the real world, which is the secondary aspect and a mere external representation of the intimate will. As a result, he discovered a new metaphysical determination of being as an object of the demiurgic will. Thanks to newly created analogy in the context of “subject—object” relationship, the free will forms a new kind of voluntary and rational unity of all that exists. That *factum* established the manner in which the objectively defined being became a tool of modern scientific technology in order to find its determination (*dativus instrumenti*). The being became an object through the willful and free *aspectus* of the world, which is given objectively from the direction of the sense-giving will. The real distinction of the intimate will, which is separate from the manifestation of being, shows the new aspect of existence. The classical intellect became a rational faculty of the free modern subject, and its extinction by Olivi’s intellectual *epokhē* formed the historical beginning of rationalism dating to Enlightenment. The new variation of the demiurgic diacosmos establishes a new metaphysics in the following decade. The real difference of the intimate will became a component of divine psychology as a fully objective determination of being. Henry of Ghent explains in the following decade that this habitus of the will makes potential properties of divine thinking, through which God considers creation in its objective aspect of being as a possible creation. Thus, the first demiurge appropriates the world absolutely and objectively before the actual act of creation. Duns Scotus fundamentally rejects this primitive anthropomorphization of God in the mode of analogical psychology. His modern God is given in the mode of infinity but with analogically equipped thinking, will and intentionality, as we have. Following the universal analogy of the will, Scotus established the metaphysics no longer of the objectively wanted being (Olivi) and demiurgically intended being (Gandavus), but of the objectively recognized being. The term “*realis distinctio*” will have a great future in Western thinking. Duns Scotus introduces him to the new metaphysics, and with his help cardinal Cajetanus completes the modern concept of *analogia entis*.

Olivi based the metaphysics of the free subject on the analogy of being. The absolute will, given outside the determined will and outside the intellect, received a new habitat with regard to the wholeness of being. He defines the new habitus of man by pointing to the fundamentally transformed question of “how” the free subject is situated in relation to the whole of being. Through this epochal new accommodation of the totality of being in relation to the absolutely given will, a new “subject—object” relationship was created. The following quotation sets out the new form of this unitary ontotheology.

“Furthermore, it is true that the essential freedom given in the mode *per se* belongs to the nature of the Divine Will. The human will imitates and participates in divine freedom and thus stands above every other kind of being that exists or can exist.” [[382]](#footnote-382)

Through freedom, the human will imitated the divine creative freedom in a demiurgic way (*imitatur et participat libertatem ipsius*). Therefore, through this ability, man exceeds any other created genus, which is or can be. By the emanation of the human will into the world in the manner of the divine creative will, the ontotheological construction of metaphysics is created, which is objectively necessary for the emergence of capitalism. The human will generates the emanation of divine freedom thanks to the maximum similarity (*imitatur eam tanquam quaedam emanatio eius*). God is free “*proprie et per se*” and the created human will participates in this divine freedom through imitation. The most important is the last sentence, which establishes the new metaphysics of the will. The emanation model is taken from Avicenna’s conception of the active cosmic intellect and works in an anthropological scenario. The preceding quotation shows that the superordinate position of free will establishes a new aspect of the meaning of being in its wholeness. Now the will is linked to the theological origin and to the original archetypal pattern. As a result, the overall structure of the being is created within the framework of the new metaphysical *resolutio*. The active and sovereign will is not a subject like a passive carrier and the substratum (*subiectum*) of some psychic ability to want something and to create something in a demiurgic manner. Thanks to the real distinction from the rest of being, the bearer of modern free will, given in terms of *ipse*, represents something fundamentally different from the totality of external acts of will. The will of the modern subject is not something objective, because, thanks to the immanent freedom, it cannot be reduced to an object. Olivi’s conception of the person, given within the framework of the second Averroism, is modern in a revolutionary contemporary manner, because it is consistently nihilistic. It is no wonder that even the then modernist-oriented church finally rejected it as too radical. The philosopher Aquasparta, as a general of the Order of Lesser Brothers, protected this original thinker as far as he could. Aquasparta is another founder of the concept of objectivity and therefore understood Olivi’s writings to depth (ch. 5.2). From the point of view of the theory of truth, the way of the emergence of similarity has a key character (*similitudo*). This way is given by the exposure of the sense of being from behind, from the direction of the actualized acting will and the intellect connected with it. Let us return to the hermeneutic “How” (πῶς, *quomodo, Wie*), which Siger, according to *De anima*, clearly assigned to existence of real things accidentally recognized in thinking (ch. 4.4.2). Olivi says something completely different. He has in front of him a world given in relationship “subject—object” and this relationship is determined by the will as an atomic first substance. The modern will exists in the act of Rufus’s *exsistere*, transcending from the direction of the intimate substance to volitional objects within the framework of demiurgic activity. The quarrel between Siger and Olivi, understandably, is also repeated in postmodernism. Spinoza, like Olivi, understood the meaning of self-possessing free will in relation to Descartes’s intellectualism (*voluntas, et intellectus unum, et idem sunt*; *Ethica* II, *propositio* 49, corol.). Spinoza criticized Cartesianism in the same way that Olivi criticized Averroism with its primacy of the intellect. Spinoza introduced the difference between the one substance and its infinite modes directly into the divine reality within the framework of postmodern “*distinctio realis*.” By this he secured Avicennist deduction made *modo geometrico* from the one substance given in the mode of *ipse*. Thanks to the real distinction of the creative being and will, it is separated from the rest of being. The creation, then, with regard to the divine ipseity, represents its aspect, i.e., an infinite kind of modalities. Spinoza thus repeated the pantheism of David of Dinant, which this Aristotelian linked not with the demiurgic divine will as a substance, but with the divine intellect as a substance. The Jewish community of Amsterdam excommunicated Spinoza, just as the University of Paris excommunicated David of Dinant. In principle, monotheistic theology and faith do not get along with modern anthropocentrism. Olivi was the first modernist to reverse Siger’s phenomenological position with regard to the hylemorphic person. He defined the ipseity in terms of the will and thus made it a new substance in man. The absolute will is determined by the objective appropriating dative (*dativus possessivus*) fills the wholeness of being with meaning and thereby creates a new demiurge (*dativus auctoris*). Just as the thing is reflexively wanted and recognized in its fundamental volition, so it is metaphysically given. Every being is or can be an object of free will.

Olivi found a new determination of the wholeness of being, which is given both intimately and universally causally. Anthropocentric metaphysics took the orphaned throne of hyparchical first substances. In the diacosmos of free will, Aristotelian causality is suspended. The modern will is the full sovereign determining sense of *tertium ens* given in the voluntarist and demiurgic manner. Olivi introduced a new version of Jamblich’s diacosmos. Dogmatic philosophy of modernity has successfully created its own version of the third world (*’ālam al-mithāl*) of Islamic mysticism and Falsafa (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The third world of Neoplatonists now became the intimate essence of free will. From the point of view of deceptive Muses, who direct this nihilistic mythology through academic Furies, this is an ideal state. You don’t have to show the donkey an external carrot, because he carries its voluntary representation in itself. The modern run after the desired simulacrum is justified logically and objectively in the mode of essentialist scientific proof. Henry of Ghent extended this objective aspect of being to newly thematized subjectivity of the divine demiurge and thus completed the construction of objectivity at the level of ontotheology. Then it becomes completely clear that pagans as Aristotle and Averroes do not belong in the world of modern Christian *illuminati*. Thanks to Olivi, the subject of *Modernorum* was completely separated from *via Antiquorum* around 1275–77. That path proclaimed outdated principles of Aristotle’s metaphysics and logic, the unity of the person and truth; moreover, this unity was given as critical scientific thinking related to the reality of first substances. The quotations against Aristotle set forth the self-consciousness of the first representatives of *via Modernorum* in the mode of sophistic cultural hegemony (A. Gramsci). They did not have to worry about the truth as a critical correspondence of thought and reality (ch. 4.6). Olivi introduced a conception of a will that regulates the world thanks to the subject’s demiurgic ability. This mystic and philosopher conceived the being as an *aspectus*, which is objectively given by the sovereign will of the subject. It is no wonder that the founder of Thomism Aegidius Romanus became his capital enemy, in the mode of inversion to the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). Aegidius saw in Olivi’s distorting mirror all the errors of modernity that this sophist had helped to bring to the world two decades earlier. On the basis of the demand of the general of Franciscans, Aegidius compiles a list of 24 errors that served as the basis for Olivi’s condemnation at the council in Vienna in 1312. Rufus’s *revolutio* to Avicenna, given at Oxford, was completed by Olivi in Paris by a new type of the *revolutio* to Augustine. This mutual *entente cordiale* of two modern thinkers of the 13th century is the first of its kind. The twentieth century culminates that *Entente cordiale* in British-French colonial imperialism (1904). The power of the demiurgic will, placed outside the critical thinking of Aristotelian intellect, establishes the period of capitalism, imperialism and the actual rule of one percent of plutocrats, which operate the mirage of financial products and media simulacra. Olivi justifies this conquest of the world by extinguishing the first substance and Aristotelian intellect. In doing this, he established the basic rationality for the epoch of capitalist modernity.

### 5.1.3 Metaphysics and Economics

In the next step, hermeneutics must interpret Olivi’s metaphysics of the will in the context of his pioneering treatises on the nature of economics. The revelation of the figure called *homo oeconomicus* at the end of the 12th century is described in the introduction to the first matrix (OBJ II, ch. 1.6). The calculating mentality introduced the economically conceived purgatory that helped to wealthy merchants be happy in the afterlife as well. At the beginning of the 13th century, God of *Modernorum* acquired the features of a lovable and infallible accountant. This simulacrum reflected the growing influence of urban patriciate and wealthy merchant class, especially in Italy and in Olivi’s southern French homeland. Modern God became an aspect of mathematized metaphysics of *Nominales*. In the end of the 13th century, modern God needed a corresponding carrier of objectively given purgatory mentality. The modern subject of the capitalist economy patiently waited for its historical manifestation in the metaphysical and theological limbo. The third world first appeared as Jamblichus’s διάκοσμος, then as the intermediate world of *barzach* in the Koran and finally as medieval *purgatorium*. Olivi brought capitalism out of metaphysical limbo by founding the capitalist subject. This thinker and mystic presented firstly the world from the perspective of the free and intimate will of the demiurge. He later added an economic rationality to that demiurge. The foundations of morally conceived economy are described in *Quodlibet* I, qq. 16, 17 and further in the economic treatise *De emptionibus et venditionibus, de usuris, de restitionibus*. This treatise was written at the time of his pastoral activities exercized in Narbonne in the years 1292–98.

Olivi considers the common good in the spirit of the scholastic tradition given by ancient philosophy and Christian charity to be a higher value than the private good. But in order to investigate the private good, he dealt with economics and provided the first hint of some important economic terms (*capitale, risicum, venditio, aestimatio, probabilitas*). He transformed the commodity into an object of volition and of determination made by the free will, whereas Aquinas solved the question of the just price in the model of intellectual *aestimatio*.[[383]](#footnote-383) Following the writing *Summa Halensis*, Olivi emphasizes the personal value of business (*industria*). Therefore, price and interest must reflect the risks of the entrepreneur concerned (*risicum*).[[384]](#footnote-384) The profit is justified because the entrepreneur contributes his labor, capital, risk and skills to economic activities (*ex honerosis laboribus ac periculis et expensis et industriis*; ibid, p. 63). An important category was the modern equality (*aequalitas*) of the economically active will supported by subjective effort and labor. According to Olivi, the just price (*iustum pretium*) can only come about on the basis of the free decision of the will, which determines the elementary form of economics (Marazzi 1990, 25). The mutual equality of the seller and the buyer with regard to the value of goods determines the fair price. As far as the hermeneutic explanation is concerned, the ratio of capitalism is given in Olivi’s interpretation of prostitution. According to Olivi, this activity establishes the universe of contractual relations between free subjects, which is an indispensable condition for the establishment of capitalism.

“Furthermore, it is necessary to know that although the contract of the prostitute is immoral in terms of its subject matter, it is nevertheless true that the fidelity associated with the observance of this obligation is not immoral, but on the contrary good (*non est vitiosa, sed bona*). Although the woman sells or rents her body for immoral use, she does so with her own body. By renting her body, she generates a real profit (*vere facit pretium*). Therefore, it is true that no one may take your body without your consent and the decision is always her own business (*immo est sibi solvendum*).” [[385]](#footnote-385)

The quotation proves the modern conception of free will as a separate substance possessing the body, whereby the body as working instrument is bound by contractual ethics. Prostitution is immoral; but the fidelity connected with the observance of the contract is morally good (*observatia pacti non est vitiosa, sed bona*). The prostitute sells her body for an immoral purpose, but she sells something that belongs to her (*rem suam*). Therefore, from an economic point of view, she is entitled to a fair remuneration for renting her body (*vere facit pretium locationis corporis sui*). Therefore, it is only up to their free will to whom she gives or rents her body. From the point of view of the free contract, no one has the right to force her to enter into a working agreement outside of her express consent. A prostitute at the end of the 13th century was free to starve to death and so were her children. But Olivi’s reasoning assured her a basic measure of freedom and moral dignity with respect to her profession that prostitutes often do not have even today. The contractually given fair remuneration represents a new *scibile* of modernity in relation to the individual and concrete body. That is why the prostitute protected by liberal Olivi, like any wage worker today, has the moral right to a fair remuneration for renting the body as an intimately posessed and objectively evaluated thing. Again, the fundamental distinction of the first Averroism between *tertium* and *quartum genus* is at stake. The inner free will (*tertium genus*) determines all economical abstractions as secondary relations (*quartum genus*). Capitalist worker sells something that belongs to him due to the ipseity of free will, whereby the will objectifies the body. Its capabilities make an instrument in the mode of profit-making objectivity. The objectified body as an abstract *scibile* arises in the trading environment of supply and demand, but generates a new subject by binding to the economically free will. The modern subject rents the body as a free, intimate and determined labor force. Taken from the perspective of the intimate will of the subject, the body cannot be objectified. The body, just like the free will, is a kind of *potentia substatialis* that represents existence as “*esse in*” (*immo est sibi solvendum*). That kind of capitalist relationship to the body as intimate working instrument, Locke elaborated for the purpose of postmodern liberal capitalism.[[386]](#footnote-386) Taken in the mode of external *aspectus*, the will moves the body as an object to be an instrument of production and profitability. The theory of truth in the capitalism is based on Rufus’s and Olivi’s *coequatio* as universal equality of the productive will and the possession of the body (*rem suam*) in the mode of demiurgic ipseity (*immo sibi solvendum*). Being in the representational mode of the sold and rented body, the demiurgic will expands its power in the world. The formal equality of economic bodies as demiurgic beings of the third kind led to the Industrial Revolution at the end of the 18th century; since the 19th century, a new system of production relations made by the leasing of labor power became free from feudal obligations. Arendt’s analysis of modern homelessness follows the transition from classical property (*Eigentum*) to capitalist possession (*Besitz*). The security of life is given by what is necessary to maintain one’s own life (the house, the land, the workshop). Property changed into holding of anonymous possessions, which is given by the hired labor of one’s own body.[[387]](#footnote-387) The capitalism began in England and in its colonies as Ireland in the 18thcentury due to effectivity of new agricultural methods and due to expropriation of land. Poor peasants became homeless, went to cities, where they became a wage force. The development of dispossession was a necessary condition for the start of the Industrial Revolution and of capitalism. After that, contractual relations named in Olivi’s above-mentioned definition of prostitution began to apply to the full extent.

The new metaphysics of the will changed the relationship to the world, with far-reaching economic consequences. The new *aspectus* of economically active liberal will was transferred into a new form of the body as *tertium ens*. This being of the third kind led to an abstraction called *homo oeconomicus*, which was defined in capitalist terms. Man as a newly (i.e. concretely and individually) defined *scibile* took on a new worldview in the capitalist mode of *dativus possessivus*, which emerged according to Bonaventure’s and later Descartes’s rules governing activities and the rationality of demiurgic agent (*dativus auctoris*). In relation to existentials given by *dativus obiectivus* (ch. 4), the development of capitalism is determined by a double form of nihilism. First, the historial efficiency established by *dativus possessivus* is given by the loss of classical property, which has now been transformed into a digital form of worthless capital and even illusory possession. Secondly, the economic subject established by *dativus auctoris* has become an abstraction squared; Olivi’s notion of the irrational subject of the will has established a new illusory subject in the form of *homo oeconomicus*. Metaphysics of *Modernorum* stood at the birthplace of capitalism as a system of regulated and rational greed. The universal inclination incorporated in the matter of the third kind (*appetitus1*) mystically meets the unlimited greed of the demiurge (*appetitus2*). Bonaventure defined that *appetitus* exclusively as the object of illuminated intellect. Olivi changes it into a globally effective *conatus*, since that *appetitus* became an *aspectus* of the supreme will of a capitalist demiurge. At the end of the 13th century, the world became an aspect of the universally regulated demiurgic will, which led to the colonization of the world in the 17th century. The evolution was accomplished in the 20th century by today’s global domination of one percent of *illuminati* over the rest of the world. The new form of *dativus possessivus* runs through fictitious monetary debts, which were created from sophisticated nothingness of financial derivatives. The objective insight of the will is given in Olivi’s terms *aspectus* and *realis distinctio*, which were interpreted in the previous chapter. The essence of the will based on that modern kind of freedom cannot be subjected to any externally given causality. In contrast to this determination of the will given *per prius*, all other determinations of being are given only as secondary ones. The demiurgic will of Rufus′s, Bonaventure′s and Olivi’s individual determines, through demiurgically regulated knowledge (*Ge-Stell*), the rest of the modern world. What really changes that are economic interests of self-preservation (*conatus* of an biological *individuum*) given as an objective desire of this or that sort of good. As a substance of the third kind, free will of capitalist demiurge dwells permanently in the intimate mode given *per se*.

“The will itself, insofar as it is capable of acting freely (*potens libere agere*) and insofar as it is not capable of doing so, does not differ from itself, neither in the case of concrete volition, nor with regard to its substance and species. In the first and in the second case, only the relationship changes, through which the will habitually takes itself (*alio et alio modo se habens*).” [[388]](#footnote-388)

Secondary determinations describe the appearance of volition (*ad hoc potens*) in the objective mode “*esse ad*.” But the act of objective *volitio* says nothing about the actual essence of the will, which is essentially given in the mode *ipse*. Olivi changed the basic way in which free will owns itself (*se habens*). Capitalism does not dominate the real world, but the objectively possessed and appropriated diacosmos. The term “*se habens*” describes the primary forms of *dativus possessivus* of the capitalistic subject. The categorical determination called *habitus* describes the path of ontological (i.e., capitalistic) understanding of the world (*Vor-blickbahhn*). This originally Aristotelian accident acquired a substantial meaning in the second Averroism. The unity of the will is ensured by its own way of being substantial (*secundum substantiam et speciem*), in which the will does not change with regard to the desired object (*non est alia et alia*). The permanent capacity of the substantial will (*potentia substantialis*) secures the variable and therefore accidental acts of the will (*potentia accidentalis*). In the moment of the willing, the habitually defined will can change only accidentally. What changes that are individual actions of the will realized in this or that act. The substantial habitus of the will forms its hidden ipseity and intimately given essence. The actualized habitus of the will given in the Porretan mode “*semel–semper*” differs from contingent volitions realized in the world (*alio modo se habere*). The essentially given free will manifests itself outwardly in a different way than it habitually dwells in itself as a pure substantial possibility. Conceived in the mode *per prius*, the will is given intimately and hypostatically in itself and it keeps the original causal effectiveness in the habitus given in such a way. This duality of the substantially sovereign and contingently effective will is given for the first time as *realis distinctio* cited above between the essence of the will and its aspect given with regard to the external world (*realis distinctio inter essentiam voluntatis et suos aspectus*, ch. 5.1.2). The intimate and habitual will is engaged in the mode of “*esse ad*” in the world because of economic production of profit. Olivi established a fundamental analogy between following levels, which structurally represent the original elements of the capitalist economy:

* the intimacy of the immutable substantial will (*essentia voluntatis*);
* the subjective realm of various accidental desires (*aspectus voluntatis*);
* the economically conceived “third world” (i.e., Aristotelian abstraction squared), which is determined by external effects and aspects of the substantial will; this diacosmos extends in the real world (*capitale*);
* economic decisions and values produced by the abstraction called *homo oeconomicus* that are singular acts of demiurgic volitions of that indiviual (*risicum, interesse*).

The term “*capitale*” was originally derived from the multiplication of livestock “heads” (*caput*). Through further degeneration of economy, it has become abstract capital. The term “*risicum*” originally meant mutual insurance of merchants on risky expeditions; it has become the nihilistic interest and interest rate. The relationship between the habitual will and the world as an aspect of the will established the original ratio of the capitalist system in the mode of *analogia voluntatis*. Engaged in the mode *ipse*, the subjective will manipulates freely and creatively the rest of the world. The demiurge manipulates the whole of being as an act of the will (*aspectus*) according to Bonaventure’s rules (*regula agentis creati*). The world of the modern subject necessarily represents the alienated object of the demiurgic will. The substantial habitus of the will, in the mode of analogy, recognizes every aspect of the world in the mode of intimate participation. Every being is potentially grasped, since it represents the analogical aspect of the original essential will (*participants formam seu naturam ipsius voluntatis per quandam analogiam*, ch. 5.1.2). The sense of modern world (*aspectus*) arises as an external form of the will (*representatio*), due to analogous connection of volitions. The world represents an analogous aspect of the demiurgic will of God or man. The whole of the cosmos received as an objective aspect, in order to become a representation of the demiurgic will. According to Bonaventura, this modern matter is mystically and erotically predisposed to make the reception of demiurgic forms. The mystical source of alienated greed that determines capitalist postmodernism can be found in Bonaventura’s concept of *appetitus* (ch. 4.1.3). The appetite of the modern will finds in the world the appetite of matter, which strives to get the final form through the greed of the capitalist subject. Thanks to Olivi’s philosophy of the will, the metaphysics of capitalism received a complete “subject—object” relationship. The subject of capitalism “exsists” in the mode of substantial ipseity and freedom. This hypostatized will determines the whole world in the mode of “*esse ad*” through demiurgic appetite for the objective matter of the third kind. The will is obliged to follow the theory of the demiurgic truth as *rectitudo* (let us see Anselm′s *quod debet esse, recte est*; OBJ II, ch. 1.2), in order to imprint the capitalist form on this fundamentally poor matter. According to Olivi, the will that has a causal effect in the world (*ad hoc potens*) creates an analogous totality of objects in the mode of representation (*similitudo analoga ipsius voluntatis*, ch. 5.1.2). These representations are only relatively alienated from the subject, because they exist in a permanent analogical relation to the will. This gave rise to the economically given relativism of the capitalist subject. The habitual will of the modern *homo oeconomicus* goes out towards the accumulation of capital through the justly determined price (*iustum pretium*), to which, according to Olivi, interests of the community and the general welfare belong in principle at the first place. The modern division of man into two or three independent substances makes a connection through demiurgic production that objectively represents the nature of the capitalist will. The previous interpretation of Olivi shows that he separated itself from Aristotelian rational choice. It becomes clear that the modern will is irrational and establishes itself as an intimate substance. These are the main features of paranoid relation that modernity keeps with the world.

The first objective form of capital is given in the substantial potency of the will as a non-existent being of the third kind. The will determined in this way forms the original source of the entire system of mystical greed in the “*semel–semper*” hypostatized mode. The will, originally given in a substantial, intimate and *per se*, aims into the world through personally owned body (*volitio*). On the one hand, the objectively given world forms the universal conclusion of the syllogism of capitalist rationality; on the other hand, taken in the mode of analogy, it represents the objective complement (*aspectus*) of the demiurgic will. In mode “*esse ad*,” the representative volitional essence is a working body in order to make an external aspect of subjective volition. This relationship determines the basic form of capitalist intentionality, which, according to Olivi and Locke, is the original source of wealth. Engaged in the act of *volitio*, the capitalist subject freely disposes of the body as a separate thing from itself in the mode of accidental potency (*proprium,* property). The capitalist body is a modern *scibile*, given in the mode of Rufus’s individual concreteness, which can be rented, bought and sold. The new subject of the third kind and the specific world corresponding to it, they form a unity within the framework of analogically conceived equality (*coaequatio*) made as Porretan univocity. Like this, the modern subject can summarize all modern *scibilia*. The encroachment of the instrumental will into the world in Aristotelian mode of deliberate choice (*electio*) is determined by the modern conception of truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. Mystical greed of the capitalist subject three times dissociated into substances of the third kind (body, intellect, will) brings to the world the modern form of salvation and justification. Due to dissolution of the Aristotelian person into the intellect and the will, the first demiurgic subject of the West came into being. The capitalist subject is endowed with transcendental greed turned towards the objectively given world. As a result, Porretan vision of the world is accomplished in the mode “*discrete videamus*.” The rationality of the self-preserving will was connected with the mathematical vision of the extinct schools of *Nominales* (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). Let us take the secondary act of the body in the mode of Olivi′s *volitio*. The fully rational term “*electio*” made according to *Nicomachean Ethics* has been modified in a mystical and irrationa way to play a key role in the development of capitalism (ch. 5.1.2). Instrumental rationality of the will determines the construction of objectively given capitalism by the ontotheological modification of this originally rational term. In contrast to Aristotle, rational choice passed from the theoretical and practical intellect to the modern will that Olivi placed outside determinations of the intellect. The new form of *electio* is brought out of Aristotelian rationality. It operates in the form that was developed by mysticism of the modern (and later capitalist) *illuminati* that emerged at the end of the 13th century.

Capitalism follows the logic of Antichrist that is based on the caricature of the purely economic plan of salvation. This total irrationality stands full in correspondence with the irrationality of the postmodern subject elaborated by Olivi. The era of capitalism began piously and mystically, because the choice (*electio*) had an eminent theological significance. Since the thirteenth century, enlightened merchants modestly aspired to arive in purgatory. Since the sixteenth century, Protestant capitalist subjects ask a full salvation. Both qualitative forms of the will to self-preservation determine the associated mystical *conatus* as an act of capitalist *volitio*. Weber’s well-known study on the emergence of capitalism demonstrates the modern right to salvation only indirectly, namely through the analysis of the concept of election of Luther and the analysis of the concept of asceticism of Calvin. The bearer of free will is chosen by modern God within the framework of *vocatio* (Luther’s term *Beruf*) in order to live justly and to increase the capital that has been formed or entrusted to him (Weber 1920). Puritans as Richard Baxter (†1691) considered laziness, idleness and rest to be a grave sin; only saints in heaven were entitled to have leisure time (*scholē*). The capitalist subject hates ancient *scholē* that Socrates considered to be the most important value of politically free man.In contrast to Weber’s study on Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism, hermeneutics emphasize a different fact. The theological right to salvation within the framework of the Christian *electio* was gained through the ethical accumulation of capital linked to the capitalist subject of the demiurgic will (*rectitudo*). By his frenetic and at the same time instrumental and rational effort, the subject overcomed the sinful state of the nature that has been instituted since Adam. By accumulating property, modern God meets with the demiurgic will of the modern sinner. The choice of modern subjects depends entirely on completely divided divine will, the *rectitudo* of which remains a secret (*Ephesians* 1:14). On the basis of this choice, we are to go out into the world to do good things that God has prepared for us (*Ephesians* 2:10). The chosen subject gains the necessary certitude of salvation (*certitudo*) by ethically increasing capital or by honestly observing poverty. Wealth and poverty, as the basic forms of secular asceticism, actualized the economic subject the objective *certitudo* of divine justification and election, which is given by eternal divine *rectitudo*. In Calvinism and Puritanism, the accumulation of certainty of salvation has a contractual character given by the divine contract between the individual and God. The divine will wants to redeem the sinner freely through divine justice. The offer of salvation is given by the message of the New Testament. The contingent act of repentance made the sinner, who freely accepts the divine contract and is thus justified, responds to this eternal contract. The confirmation of New Testament contract passes through the ascetic relation established by the accumulated capital. The accumulated capital acquired a pseudo-divine character. In the framework of human certainty of salvation (*certitudo*) there is the right to divine salvation (*rectitudo*). Olivi had no such religious form of rationally and logically determined property relations between God and the capitalist subject. According to Aristotle’s *Politics* I, 8–9, the Catholic Middle Ages believed in the primary common determination of goods, labor and capital as a personally and socially given means of securing life. Protestantism radicalized Olivi’s social-economic *electio* towards the isolated subject of salvation and damnation. The eternal divine rules given in the mode of truth as a *rectitudo* determine the contingent activity of the individual in the world in the mode of truth as a *certitudo*. The economic effort, through the moral accumulation of capital, confirms the already present *certitudo* of personal salvation, given exclusively by justifying God. The reformatory capital of Luther and Calvin is given by the treaty based on the will. The doubly true accumulation of capital in the mode of *certitudo* and *rectitudo* connects both floors of Bonaventura’s rules (*regula agentis in/creati*, ch. 4.1.2). The selection works in the mode of the supernatural and, of course, morally justified accumulation of salvation and wealth. Accumulated capital represents the analogous *ratio* of two relative aspects of the divine and human will. God wants to redeem the damned world by his will turned to the world in the “*esse ad*” mode. The sinner wants to be redeemed in the same mode of the will turned to God. The secret will of the divine demiurge, from the point of view of the twofold rule, is fundamentally different from the demiurgic activity of man given in the world. However, both relations proceed in the mode of the modern *analogia voluntatis*, in which the supernatural demiurge corresponds to the limited human counterpart and vice versa. The analogy is established in the framework of the capitalist demiurge and it is related to Olivi’s real distinction between the essence of the will and its external aspect. The economic aspect of acting on the natural level must be in harmony with the supernatural plan of salvation. The deliberate choice of man through rational and forward-looking action carries out an ethical accumulation of capital (*electio1*). This accumulation of wealth corresponds to the secret divine intention of the Divine election, the former of which is given from eternity in the similarly accumulated capital of divine grace, the latter being given by the history of salvation (*electio2*). The twofold choice is supplemented analogously by the well-known link of relations, which is given in the following modes:

* the secret will of the divine Demiurge versus the *rectitudo* of the New Testament, which brings divine justification;
* the capitalist will of the human demiurge versus the *certitudo* of accumulated capital that brings confirmation of justification.

The key is the analogical *ratio*, i.e., the relation between both levels of the truth. The aspect of the saving divine will (*esse ad1*) corresponds analogously to the aspect of the human will in need of salvation (*esse ad2*). Modern God has been determined in a capitalist manner since the 16th century. Karl Marx noticed it and analyzed accordingly. The ratio of the accumulation of capital, which is given in the measure of profit or bank interest, responds to the secret divine ratio, which can be seen in the history of salvation and in the entire work of creation.

As a result of the introduction of above-mentioned capitalist analogy, the instrumental rationality given by the instinct of self-preservation acquired an almost mystical and salvatrice character. Conceived in the mode of basic mystical certainty, the accumulation of natural capital by analogy ensures (but does not generate) the supernatural capitalization of the certainty concerning the salvation. Therefore, after the death of modern God, today’s banksters continue to perform the work of this deceased capitalist demiurge (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). The difference between *rectitudo* and *certitudo* has a fundamental character that separates the sovereign truth of modern God from the relative truthfulness of the capitalist subject. The analogous relationship of twofold truth in the mode of the divine *rectitudo* and the human *certitudo* is the godfather of capitalism and established its fundamental *ratio*. Through the jonction of the divine and human will in the mode of analogy, the synthesis of the creating and creative will is completed in both floors established by Bonaventure (*regula agentis in/creati*). The act of “exsistence” of the capitalist subject is given by the fact that the plan of salvation given by God of *Modernorum* in the Porretan mode of truth “*semel‒semper.*”It is accidentally projected into the justification effort of this or that capitalist subject. This subject carries the substantial salutary potency (*potentia substantialis*) and it can bring about the accidental actualization (*potentia accidentalis*) of that plan. Like this, the subject capitalizes and thus certifies the contractually acquired right to salvation. The New Testament can be translated literally and literally for the modern age with the term “New Contract.” The intimate will of the capitalist sinner is analogously connected with the demiurgic will of capitalist God. Both modern subjects understand each other directly and intimately. All modern churches in capitalism are based on the wealth to serve the poor eventually. The divine and the human demiurge have the same pattern of behavior and psychology according to the analogy of Bonaventura’s rules (*regula agentis in/creati*). The first agent has free will in the fully active and not limited by anything creative mode. The second agent has a limited creativity and a limited will, because he accepts the sovereign divine *rectitudo* in the act of selection (*vocatio*) given by the limited will and on the basis of humanly possible *certitudo*. The act of the modern will and its collective capital reproduction proceeds from the direction of the demiurge’s personality, which is given *per prius* in the direction of action given *per posterius*.

Capitalism adopted in Olivi’s economic conception of the will later joined capitalist habitus made by Protestant *certitudo salutis*. The accumulation of certainty as a religious capital has a threefold character. The first floor of the will is formed by the intimacy and the act of divine *electio*, which passed into Luther’s concept *ipsa fide*. The second floor is formed by an *aspectus* of the free will, which is alienated from itself by sin and dissolved in the external world. Salvation is offered in Luther’s justification is given as an existential turn of the redeemed sinner. The third level of *certitudo* then empowers the sinner to ethically accumulate the capital. It is necessary instrument in the epoch of modern capitalism in order to confirm the certainty of salvation. Thus, the original alienation between God, man and the world is abolished. The accumulation of salvation and capital combines the truth produced in the mode of divine justification with the certainty of salvation produced in the mode of demiurgic human activity. Both types of production have a demiurgic and analogous character. Both modern forms of truth are given by the act of free will, the *potentia substantialis* of which constitutes twofold *subiectum* of capitalism. This new epoch is given in the mode of *dativus obiectivus*, made by the intimacy of the divided will. It ties in with the epochal new form of the demiurge. Capitalism combined all elements into one whole: the free subject; the divine production of salvation; the production of capital as a confirmation of salvation. In the mode of *similitudo*, the economic system represents the wholeness of being as a product of the free will of the twofold creator. The capitalist worldview sees the world as a demiurgic aspect of the redeeming will, which is oriented towards the world. The new form of *realis distinctio* is given at the level of demiurgic production. The possession of capital is set against its wage production given by the body. This movement of the economic difference given by the classification of the modern being of the third kind that makes *species specialissima* of capitalism. It proceeds in the mode of the Porphyry Tree from modern God to the last individual, which is determined globally by this twofold aspect of the secular redeeming will. The first will has a hypostatic union of body and bank as a source of produced capital. The second will has only a hypostatic union of will and body as a source of reproduced poverty. Thanks to that new real distinction, an objective movement of capital emerged as a new kind of global *scibile*. The movement of capital establishes the sense of being in the capitalist *aspectus* given as a secular salvation. The movement of capital gives rise to its demiurgic *aspectus* that observes the world as a commodity and as objective values created by the free will of various economic actors. Olivi laid the foundation of the modern will, which determines the fundamental aspect of Protestant modern age and capitalism. The triad of the intimate will, existential justification and economic certainty determine the basic hermeneutic question, “how” the intimate will in the mode of truth as Rufus’s *coaequatio* provides for original *Lichtung* of capitalism. This new insight into the world was founded by radically poor Franciscan *spirituales*, who considered the divine poverty as a basic aspect of the world. *Corruptio optimi pessima.* The contingent choices made within the framework of *potentia accidentalis* in the form of this or that demiurgic *electio* were directed to God and to the conquest of the world, which essentially manifests itself as a manifestation of capitalism. The kairos for the conquest of the world is offered over and over again, in the contract of the new and now completely capitalized *Novum Testamentum*. Mystically justified capital operates in the manner of a substance of the third kind and created an objective *scibile* of the new epoch. Everything can be capitalized in the appropriate time; thanks to the subjective aspect of the demiurgic will, there is alway available a new redemptive insight into the realm of being.

The triad of intimate will, existential justification and capitalist certainty through the accumulation of capital generate complete metaphysical *resolutio* of the capitalist system. The deduction of capitalism to its basic elements is given by the rationality, the *ratio* of which forms three aspects of the will given in the analogical mode of the truth. These are: 1) the divine demiurge and donor of justification in the mode of *summa veritatis*; 2) the human receptor of the contract established by faith in the *rectitudo* of the divine justifying will; 3) the demiurgic confirmation in the mode of *certitudo*, which is given by the accumulation of capital as a *scibile* of the new epoch. After the death of modern God, Olivi’s basic imperative of the analogical similarity of two forms of the demiurgic will for the natural and supernatural accumulation of salvatrice capital operates only in an anthropocentric manner. Olivi established a new epoch-making event of the economically active will. The formely damned interest turned into the salutary instrument and the former usurious interest was admitted to the objective theological salon of modern Christianity. Bonaventure secularized appetite that forms the present form of the demiurgic rule and the demiurgic will. The capital, in the mode of analogical similarity (*ratio*), bridges both forms of the legislative and greedy aspect of the will (*regula, volitio*). The unlimited redeeming God found his limited aspect as the earthly carrier of capital carved out in the mode of analogical similarity of both active agents. Medieval wealth became modern capital; the mystical laundering of money for Catholic purgatory or Reformatory redemption established a new epoch under the leadership of Furies that became capitalist. The mythological form of money laundering abolished the former world of problematic wealth. It was burdened by moral curses for interest and strongly admonished by the social criticism of prophets, which was true at the time of the Old and the New Testament. After the death of modern God, the tax havens became a new form of legally constituted purgatory. The capitalist will evaluates the totality of being as capital. Objectively speaking, it is completely understandable and fully justified.

The system of secularly given salvation of modern *illuminati* takes successful continuation in the stage of nihilism, which was introduced by Augustinian Avicennists and by Olivi′s voluntarism. Nietzsche described the primary idol of modern metaphysics as completely superfluous and abolished the entire anthropocentric metaphysics. God of modernity became God of capitalism. After this last transformation, he died of a completely natural death in the 19th century, whereby the capital fully prevailed. After the death of God of capitalism, the mortal subject took his place. Nihilist *illuminati* manipulate financially determined kairos of secular salvation to separate if from the hell of debts. This interesting group of politicians and banksters became successful followers of postmodern rationality determined by the instinct of self-preservation. The divine revelation, which had previously been given in the mystical places of *axis Mundi* such as Jerusalem and Rome, shifted to the City of London and Wall Street in the era of post-capitalism; it may change to Hong Kong or Moscow. After the death of ascetic, ethical and industrious God of early capitalism, the nihilistic and fully secular election establishes a new form of salvation and beatitude. The drama of the religious subject, struggling for his eternal salvation or damnation through labor and accumulation of capital, turned into neoliberal global management of human resources in the model of *animal laborans*. This term refers to the vehicle of instrumental rationality driven by individual animal instinct of self-preservation. This subject of postcapitalism, which works in the postmodern epoch of the human being as a corpse, is fundamentally necessary for industrial and war production. The emergence of this being of the third kind in the first third of the 20th century was interpreted for the first time in Jünger’s work *Der Arbeiter* as well as by his notion of “*totale Mobilmachung*.” It denotes the last period of metaphysical nihilism given by two World Wars. Hannah Arendt’s defense of Aristotle’s conception of active life described the degeneration of the contemporary system of politics in the post-war period. The final chapter of the work *Vita activa* states the global victory of *animal laborans* in the postmodern economics of industrial slavery in the global and in labor camps in the various zones of influence controlled by capitalist corporations (Arendt 1958, 320–35). Olivi’s anthropocentric form of metaphysics and philosophical economics stand at the beginning of this development. In the vulgar neoliberalism of today established by paranoid cognition of reality and by the schizophrenic subject, it is no longer God who justifies, but the capital given in virtual form. Its absurd exponential multiplication created a digital *totum virtuale* in the cloud of digitally designed world in the mode of cloud computing. The age of financial nihilism, the voodoo capitalism no longer needs God of *Modernorum* for the existential justification of indebted sinners. Actual living banksters replaced God of modernity. The nihilism of banksters has a secular and redemptive character; therefore, their global crimes and frauds remain unpunished. The actual neoliberal capitalism of a one percentage of digitally liberated *illuminati* is successfully progressing on the nihilistic path of modernity that the second Averroism laid down for the first time.

## 5.2 Systematization of Objectivity (Henry of Ghent)

The dispute between the first and the second Averroism was ended by an authoritarian way in 1277 as the second Averroism emerged to be the victorious party. The first Averroism, in the person of Albert, set itself the task of rehabilitating Aquinas’s teachings, which succeeded completely in the following decade until the year 1286. Modernity was in a hurry, because the philosophical disputes were decided not only by church decrees. The first step was taken by Olivi, who transformed the ontotheology of the second Averroism into an absolute voluntarism that was put in the framework of newly designed plurality of human substances. The will as the third substance joined the two already existing substances in man. The mystical Franciscan, philosopher and economist added further categories to the epochal determination of objectivity in the mode of *dativus obiectivus* and expanded the objective determination of being. The modern will became fully autonomous, and, moreover, Olivi separated the substantial intellect from receptively given cognition. It was the end of classical wisdom in modern philosophy. That transformation of hermeneutic triad of historiality, historicity and history illustrates the triumphal march of objectivity after the year 1280. Thanks to the concept of essentially conceived free will, man became the original source and the goal that makes all sense of being (*dativus finalis*). Olivi’s voluntarist conception of the person was so radical that he had to attack Aristotle’s philosophy, which the first modernists had done before him at Oxford around 1235 (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). This position was not sustainable in the long term, neither was the multiplication of substances in man. The criticism of Aristotle was no longer a common phenomenon among modernists in the epoch after 1270. Averroes as Commentator became a substitute target of the media offensive made by modernists since the year 1250. Attacks of Rufus and Aegidius testify to perplexity of modernists that has to face brilliant interpretations of the unity of the intellect in CMDA. However, Latin sophists of the second wave became more sophisticated as well. Henry of Ghent initiated a new wave of modernism that Duns Scotus fully accomplished.

In the fifth matrix of objectivity, hermeneutics is interested in the systematization of the relationship “subject—object.” This systematization created a well-rounded system of objective metaphysics. An important impulse came from the Latin translation of Simplicus’s *Commentary on Categories* (*De praedicamentis*) that William Moerbeke finished in 1266. The prehistory of objectivity demonstrated a fundamental influence of Simplicus on the formation of *tertium ens* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). His interpretation of *Categories* created a new concept of the substance based on the exposure of the sense of being made from behind, from the direction of actualized and hypostatized intellect. In the first Averroism, this commentary had a minimal impact, because it was written in the spirit of Neoplatonism. This work had a completely different effect in the school of second Averroism. The effect of Simplicus′ commentary is well documented in works of Henry of Ghent since 1285 (*Quodlibet IX*) and it influenced Duns Scotus as well (Decorte 2002). The period after the condemnation of 1277 is characterized by attempts to elaborate a new synthesis of metaphysics that should replace Averroes′s interpretation of Aristotelian corpus. Aristotelian doctrine had to be integrated into the system of sophistic knowledge of the second Averroism in such a way that the greatest inconsistencies in teaching of *Modernorum* would be eliminated. Aegidius in the first version of Thomism put Aquinas as the *Expositor Novus*. Thanks to Aristotelian form of Thomas′s Semiaverroism that Aegidius popularized after 1277, Aquinas became the most important connecting element among the sophists of first and second Averroism. The newly conceived Avicennism placed the essence and transcendental determinations of being (*passiones entis*) on the level of categorical relations that relate to the second substance and accidents. The second Averroism integrated causality of first substances into the modernist scenario of cognition. Aquasparta, Bonaventure’s follower and the next general of Franciscans understood well that such theory of species would lead to cognition of essences given outside of reality and outside of the theory of truth as correspondence. The study of the theory of abstraction in Franciscan schools shows how Aquasparta criticized Bonaventure’s doctrine of similarity. Augustine’s letter to Nebridius served as an indirect criticism of Bonaventure, who sees the impulse from the senses only as a source for reminiscence in the context of *memoria* (Rohmer 1928, 163ff). According to Aquasparta, the full cognition of species and *rationes seminales* in real things would have abolished the difference between sensual and intellectual cognition. Being the case, *intellectus possibilis* would do the same kind of cognition as the senses. The *intellectus agens* of angels and heavenly spiritual beings, which was researched and discussed at that time, would no longer differ from the human intellect based on sensual cognition. Aquasparta integrated Aristotle’s scheme of cognition in *De anima* into the theory of illumination made by Augustinian intellect. Aristotle’s theory of abstraction ensures the fundamental difference between the sensuous and the intellectual cognition; therefore it must be integrated in the scheme of the second Averroism. However, for Aquasparta, the soul is not *tabula rasa* of the first Averroism. From the point of view of immanently given actualization of cognition, the soul reacts proportionally to the received species. The soul passively perceives the sensual species, but at the same time actively forms those species according to already actualized and considered species. They are stored in memory as *locus specierum* to form an autonomous source of actualization of the soul and the intellect. That cognitive schema is outlined within the framework of Augustinian illumination. Aquasparta adheres to two equivalent principles for cognition: the senses and the soul. He adapted Franciscan illumination to receive the process of abstraction according to the first Averroism, whereby this process is given by sensual and intelligible species. The soul must start the recognition of the species by abstraction from the senses that recognize the real thing; otherwise the cognition would only revolve around itself.

In the Franciscan school after the year 1277, the conception of *anima intellectiva* joined the model of objective semiaverroism. The intellect keeps its own actuality and at the same time it recognizes things from the direction of the senses due to both types of abstracted species (*sensibilis, intelligibilis*). The actuality of cognition comes from the front, from the direction of real substances; at the same time it comes from the back, from the direction of species given as a light for the passive and active intellect. The representatives of Franciscans therefore put an end to the criticism of Thomism and they criticized exclusively Siger’s school. A common feature of this fusion of objectivists coming from schools of the first and second Averroism was the criticism of Averroes as an Averroist. By adapting cognition, the positions of Semiaverroists from the school of the first Averroism (Aquinas, Aegidius Romanus) approached the new wave of modernists led by Aquasparta. The modernists were influenced by the scheme of Semiaverroism that came from the first Averroism (Aegidius Romanus, Godefroid de Fontaines) or from the second averroism (Aquasparta). They no longer needed the actualization of the first substance as the only actualized substance for ensuring the sense of being. Following Aegidius Romanus, Godefroid de Fontaines exerted a decisive influence on the formation of objectivity around 1290 in the environment of the first Averroism. But Henry of Ghent had already created a system of objectivity a decade earlier. That is why we are mainly concerned with his works. Godefroid’s work *Quodlibet V* presents a new conception of cognition, which combines abstraction from phantasms with the exposure of being from the direction of the active intellect, which, through its own actuality, controls the entire process of cognition.[[389]](#footnote-389) The separated *intellectus agens* determines cognition from the direction of contemplation of essences. The causal connection of cognition to phantasms as in the first Averroism is missing, because sensual and intelligible species are separated from each other. Due to individuality of phantasms, their effect on the detached immaterial intellect is impossible, since the separated intellect works only with universals. Godefroid works in the order of universal determination of being, which the active intellect produces out of itself. The process of abstraction is directed by the separate *intellectus agens*, given in the Averroist form of quasi-substance, which acts directly on phantasms by exposure of the sense made from behind. The basic characteristic of this objective Averroism consists in the dualism of cognition, which originates separately in the senses and in the intellect.[[390]](#footnote-390) Godefroid has a conception of objective abstraction similar to that of Aegidius Romanus around 1287 in *Quodlibet II* (ch. 4.3.3). In contrast to Aquinas, objective Semiaverroists rejected the scheme of cognition according to the first Averroism. They abolished the correspondence of intellect and things, which was given by abstracted species with the help of causal and formal causality. The intentional species (*species sensibilis*) given in the imagination are connected in the scheme of Oxfordian Fallacy univocally with Porretan species as essences or forms. This gave rise to an objective determination of the being, which was formed according to Rufus’s model of “*species obiecti exsistentis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). The receptive component of the soul in the form of *intellectus possibilis* is superfluous, because the active intellect creates an *obiectum* of cognition. For this, he has his own actualization and habitually given substantial faculties. In the teaching of the objective Averroists, the concept of *intellectus possibilis* became superfluous after the year 1277, since they identified it with individual and sensual given hylic intellect. Their *intellectus possibilis* operates as Avicenna’s neoplatonic intellect. It keeps cognitive functions only with regard to *intellectus agens* and autonomous species, but not with regard to sensual abstraction. Averroes criticized these modern Alexandrians already in his time and after them the whole school of the first Averroism; let see the termini “*sequaces Aristotelis*” and “*sophistae Latini*.” After the loss of the autonomous faculty of *intellectus possibilis* as Averroes’s *tertium genus*, the recognized thing is not taken in its universal meaing abstracted from the first substance; it operates as a specific *obiectum* of the third kind created by the human subject. In the new realm of being, the essence is viewed from the direction of the active intellect (*discrete videamus* of Porretans); or, it is given as an object of the hypostatized will (*aspectus* of Olivi). The modernists recognize this or that being of the third kind instead of the reality of first substances. This cognition of reality is given by the modern subject that makes another being of the third kind. This twofold paranoia of *Modernorum* established a new representation of reality and a new conception of truth. Thus, in the second Averroism and in the Semiaverroistic objectivism of the first Averroism, the original concept of Aristotelian intellect as *tabula rasa* disappeared. It receives and constructs the concept through the formal causality that is connected to the effective causality of the senses.

The theory of the truth and the cognition in schools of the academic *illuminati* opposed classical metaphysics and it was the object of ridicule for educated Aristotelians until 1277. The new synthesis came about thanks to modern Alexandrians such as Aegidius Romanus and Henry of Ghent (Henricus Gandavus). These academic sophists received their education in the Paris school of the first Averroism. Therefore, they had a good knowledge of the Aristotelian corpus explained according to Siger and Averroes. Those sophists academically destroyed Siger and they proclaimed Averroes a heretic. By merit of these modern Latin scholars, the objective form of Averroism took up the struggle for admission to the highest philosophical salons. After the year 1277, the objective Semiaverroists had to create a new system of metaphysics from chaotically given types and manners that made statements concerning various beings of the third kind. Hermeneutics follow the transformation of the being as a “*res*,” which indicates the emergence of a new form of metaphysics. The objective determination of the *res* placed outside the first substance plays a fundamental role in the new scheme of objectivity. Modernism incorporated univocal definition of being known since the *Nominales* into the new concept of objectivity. The preceding matrices have shown that Rufus, Bonaventura and Kilwardby were the first modernists who changed the conception of *ens ratum* previously bound only to the first substance. Within the framework of the first Averroism, the new conception was criticized, first of all, by Albert the Great. He defended the classical concept of *esse ratum* according to Aristotle and therefore rejected the Oxfordian Fallacy and also the sophistry of modernists such as Rufus and Kilwardby (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Bonaventure’s definition of the thing (*res*) oriented the insight of the modern intellect into the objectively given being. Modernity began to consider the essentially given objectivity of the thing within the framework of the objective determination of the being as the first substance. The insight into the certain being does not begin with the actualized, *simpliciter* given being in the first substance, but with the *ens commune*, which was taken from Avicenna’s definition of metaphysics. The starting point of the first science was the formal statute of being in the intellect (*ens inquantum ens*). The being given more simply has a completely different character than the actualized first substance. Henry of Ghent is also influenced by the Aristotelian substance reworked by Simplicius in his commentary on *Categories*. In the second Averroism, this synthesis of the various actualized produced the resulting concept of objectivity. Porretan collections of various hypostatized determinations of being were set up in the new system of univocal first science on being, out of which *metaphysica generalis* arose. After Duns Scotus worked out the first kind of *metaphysica generalis*, the first and the second Averroism followed the path of *dativus incommodi*. Both metaphysical schools disappeared into the realm of Lethe.

### 5.2.1 Concept of Objective Being

Gandavus’s work *Quodlibet V* written about the year 1280 took up the modern intention of being that worked out the new kind of *resolutio* according to the second Averroism. Let us recall Bonaventure’s and Olivi’s definition of what is objectively given and separated but from nothingness (*non repugnat esse*). Gandavus put the first distinction of being known from the Parmenidian difference between the non-being and the being in the thing bound to the cognition of intellect (*quod non est non contingit scire*; *Quodlibet V*, Q. 2; p. 229). The following quotation sets out the fundamental aspect of being in its minimal beingness. It makes *terminus a quo* that marks objective determination of being.

“The first most general concept is common to the concept of the non-existent thing (*communis ad conceptum vanum*), which we conceive in the privative mode (*modo privatorio*) that does not correspond to the real thing, such as the concept of the chimera or the unicorn. This concept is also common to the true concept, which we perceive in the mode of the real thing (*modo positivo*)…” [[391]](#footnote-391)

According to Avicenna, the insight into the whole of being begun in the most general determination of being (*primus conceptus communissimus*). This is given exactly at the opposite pole as the first substance. The first determination of the thing contains only so much of being as to be separated from nothingness (*cui nihil natum est respondere in re*). The statement of minimal portion of being is ensured by a formal operation that fixes the concept of the thing within the framework of the so-called “empty concept“ (*conceptum vanum*). This first determination of being as “*res*” in the mode of being without content (*modo privatorio*) determines the thing in the most general aspect of being, which is separated only from pure non-being. An example of the concept of the non-existent thing is, for example, the chimera, which occurs only in the imagination (*conceptus fictitius*). Modern objectivity begins the metaphysical determination of the being as a chimera, whereas the first Averroism began with real first substances. The conceptually conceived essence can be taken positively (*concipitur modo positivo*) in relation to reality. Gandavus is the first objective positivist. The new form of positivity starts metaphysics with the being of the chimera and thereby cancels the importance of sensual experience for cognition. The real thing, which exists as a universal essence or as a recognized first substance, is defined within the framework of the so-called “true concept“ (*conceptum verum*). The transition from the concept in the mode “*vanum*” to the concept in the mode “*verum*” brings to light the modern deduction of being (*resolutio*). It starts by logically determining the general concept of being that can be confirmed as really true in the second step. The metaphysical determination begins with a logical operation which separates the first determination of the thing from the pure nothingness.

“First of all, the most general concept and the concept common to every other concept are given, which is the concept by which the thing is conceived and predicted in virtue of the objectivity of each thing (*res a reor reris dicta*). This concept also includes the thing given in the imagination, which is a pure non-being (*purum non ens*), because it is neither an essentially given thing nor has received the actualized existence.” [[392]](#footnote-392)

The first determination of the thing is made from the direction of the minimal form of being, which can be claimed as the first or last common denominator of the objectively stated thing (*res a reor reris*). The thing has its own form of minimal existence as an empty concept in thinking, where it is given in the pure being, separated only from the non-being. In the new metaphysics based on being of the chimera, the thing became an *individuum*, i.e., the final unit of meaning separated from the continuum of Avicennist determination of the being in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. The first division of the being as the highest Neoplatonic genre establishes the metaphysical determination of being in the mode of *resolutio*. Henry’s predication begins at the level of pure nihilism (*purum non ens*) and then progresses towards real being (*esse per existentiam*). The formal univocity of the term “*ens*” as the first transcendental entity ensures the dialectical division of Avicenna’s continuum made out of *ens inquantum ens*. Then it is completely indifferent whether the new metaphysics begins with the chimera or with the existing real person. The first operation of Porretan division ensures the minimal being separated from pure nothing (*purum non ens*). The sense of being as *res* is created *ex nihilo* by the human subject that produces meaning of the chimera in mind (*continet sub se rem imaginariam*). The chimera, considered as *res* in Augustinian memory, became a substance. As a result, the above-mentioned mode of being of the chimera arose in memory and is taken for the empty concept (*conceptus vanus, fictitius*). The determination of modern *res* comes out of the specific work of imagination and memory, which adheres to the objective “exsistence” of this modern individual conceived in the mode *per prius*. The existing real thing outside of the minimal objective existence makes part of imagination (*continet sub se rem veram*). Hermeneutics have to study the connection between real things and that kind of chimeric objectivity given in the minimal form of being (*ratitudo*).

Henry presented the first systematic deduction of being from divine mind. He abolished the primary sense of being made by categorical predication from hyparchical first substances. Modern God assumed the execution of the metaphysical dative, which in Aristotelianism was exclusively made by real first substances. It is no wonder that after his death in the 19th century, nihilistic chaos broke out in the philosophy of postmodern objectivists. The objective determination of the thing begins with the most general determination of *res* that is produced at the exemplary level in the divine intellect. The original difference between being and non-being in divine thinking establishes the meaning of being as something defined and thus separated from nothingness. Therefore, Henry as an Avicennist had to derive a minimal portion of being directly from God as the modern Form-giver. The later Avicennist Descartes started the beginning of cognition with the chimera and therefore, like Gandavus, had to derive the efficient causality for the being of the first substance from postmodern God. The deduction of being from modern God as the Giver of objective meaning establishes the first whole of being in the mode of ontotheological objectivity (*res a ratitudine*). The following quotation establishes the first version of objective metaphysics.

“Everything, whether existent or non-existent (*sive existens sive non-existens*), has its being in God from the point of view of the exemplary definition (*secundum exemplarem rationem*). But then the thing is predicted not only from the point of view of its essential objectivity (*dicta a reor reris*), but also from the point of view of the certain nature and essence (*quod sit natura et essentia aliqua*). Therefore, it is predicted from the point of view of the individual objective being (*dicitur res a ratitudine*).” [[393]](#footnote-393)

In creative mind, God gives to everything the form and definition and thus shapes the first objective being. The first *ratio* has an exemplary character and is therefore produced in divine thinking (*habet esse in deo secundum exemplarem rationem*). The divine species forms the ontotheological basis of every essence and therefore enables rational enumeration and predication of all entities determined in this way (*res dicta a reor reris*). The predication of objective objectivity is combined with the exemplary statement of the truth, since both determinations are available in divine thinking. Divine intentionality created the first intentional object, which has an exemplary character, but is not yet separated from the divine essence. As a result, with the help of the descent from the exemplarily given essence from modern God to the concrete thing, the basis for a further determination of being is created. Gandavus created the first form of objective emanation coming from modern God. Scotus abolished that kind of mythology and replaced it with much more sophisticated version based on the objective predication of divine rationality.

The above-mentioned quotation of *Quodlibet* V, q. 2 clearly mentions twofold determination of the thing. The insight into the exemplary essence (*res a ratitudine*) establishes a kind of deduction that enables categorical predication of objective being of the thing (*res dicta a reor reris*). The connection of truth and being on the exemplary level of being enables Bonaventure’s contemplation of the essences of things given in the primary sphere of the divine subject (*rationes exemplares, seminales*). The species received the statute of being of the third kind. This intention belongs to the divine substance, but “exsists” as an intentionally given potentiality. Henry does not need the reality of the first substance to establish the meaning of being. His Avicennist scenario evaluates the forms and basic concepts according to the work *Liber de causis*.[[394]](#footnote-394) Neoplatonic and Augustinian insight into the being is given from the direction of the general determination of Being as the highest genus of Plotinus. The fundamental difference from Platonism is established by following the metaphysics of Avicenna. The intended species has only a minimal being, because it is only an object in divine thought. The exemplar is not a Platonic idea given as the highest being. After the divine intuition of *exemplars*, it follows the process of transferring that kind of being from the objective exemplary form to the creation. The lower form, placed outside the full Divine Being, acquires its objective meaning with the help of the Divine Intellect. Again, it corresponds to the scenario of deduction based on cosmic forms. The quotation from *Liber de causis* showed that the transition to a lower state of being kept the form in the reduced state of the former universal substance (*substantia diminuta*).[[395]](#footnote-395) Gandavus conceives the descent of the creative form with the help of formal deduction according to the already mentioned *Liber de causis* and categorical predication is performed according to Simplicius. Instead of the categorical predication made *per prius* from first substances, there is a formal deduction of being. The divine intentionality represents the source of *exemplars* and thereby establishes the objective form of the predication.

The anthropomorphic deduction of minimal being from psychologically defined modern God entails that the “*res*” keeps a share of being, solidity, permanence and eternity existing at the level of objective exemplarity. The ontotheological relation of the thing to Bonaventure’s exemplars gives an unchanging, essential and ideal being of everything (*res a reor reris*). The intellect holds objective beingness in the mode of *certitudo*, which is derived from the direct contemplation of pure beingness (*res a ratitudine*). All these qualities are expressed in the concept of the second Averroism. The objective being of the chimera is originally in divine thought, and this exemplarity ensures its existence in the mode of *rectitudo*. According to Anselm, this also gives the original truth of the matter as well as its *rectitudo* (OBJ II, ch. 1.2). Human thinking considers the objective being of the chimera through the divine exemplar in the mode of Avicennist truth as *certitudo*. For the first time, the original meaning of the being and its truth as a complete disclosure for the modern intellect is fully brought out of the concealment of the subject (*in Deo secundum exemplar rationem*) into the full manifestation of the truth given in the objective predication of being (*res a ratitudine*). The objectivity of the thing is ensured by God and is separated from the real world (*absolute*). The objective recognition of the world begins in the higher level of reality, because it must ensure the contemplation of divine species in things. The objectivity carried out in the thinking of modern *illuminati* established the concept of minimal being (*esse diminutum*) with regard to objective existence of exemplars in God. The complete deduction of objective being is given by the fact that modern *illuminati* (or Descartes’s *cogito*) enters in the process of reflection and they become fully aware of the actuality of their reflection. At the level of such *intellectus agens*, the forms are actualized in a full way. According to *Liber de causis*, the intellect performs its essential self-reflection through the series of pure forms (*rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa*).[[396]](#footnote-396) The above dictum shapes methodological proceeding of medieval modernism and Cartesian postmodernism. The intellect goes the complete way back into itself (*reditio completa*), and through this process it ensures the realization in its evident essentiality. This key thesis from *Liber de causis* establishes the entire procedure of the modern deduction of the sense of being, which is repeated in postmodernism in Descartes’s *Meditationes* and Husserl’s *Pariser Vorträge*. After the death of modern God in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, the mortal subject secures that *reditio completa*. With regard to modern *resolutio* of being given in the scenario of *Liber de causis*, the paths of the first and second Averroism diverge in a principled way. The school of Modists from the first Averroism explained to Latin sophists for the last time, and in vain, that human cognition cannot univocally or objectively ascend to the divine level (ch. 4.4.1). Nor can we begin the recognition of the world with the logical supposition of nothing or the chimera, because in the receptive mode of the soul as *tabula rasa* we recognize everything due to the imposition of the sense from real first substances that are recognized by the senses. In addition, the active intellect is not given to us as a separate, *simpliciter* and *actualiter* given form, as it is the case of angels and cosmic intelligences. After the extinction of the first substance in metaphysics, the modern *illuminati* elaborated the deduction of exemplarity from modern God; the postmodern *illuminati* since Leibniz replaced modern God with mathematics as universal knowledge. Gandavus stands at the beginning of the road leading to the death of modern God in Western thought. He proposed the first and highly problematic version of anthropocentric metaphysics. It was based on the fact that human and divine intellect operates according to an analogously similar formal rule (Bonaventure) or mathematical equation (Leibniz). That analogy was originally given in the mode of Rufus’s truth as *coaequatio*. Nietzsche finally abolished this contradictory God of *Modernorum*, and with it the entire psychologizing objectivist metaphysics.

Gandavus completed the long journey of modernity, which began with the concept of being bound to objective determination of the thing (*res*). The certainty of these objective *res* had to be put in divine thinking, because there is no being of the third kind in reality. Rufus handed over the heritage of *Nominales* to modernity in the form of causality that was put in the concept and not in reality (*causa individuationis… est scibile*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The objective determination is not taken in the mode *per prius* out of first substances; therefore, the modernity cannot fully recognize the theory of truth as the correspondence of intellect and real things. The truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo* is based on the certainty of the enlightened subject; firstly, the divine subject and then the human one. The theoretical model of divine intentionality established in modern metaphysics two basic forms of being; one entity is postulated purely hypothetically (*conceptum vanum*) and the second one exists in reality (*conceptum verum*). Both concepts determine the basic aspect of being as a univocal thing, which is objectively conceived. This new kind of *resolutio* concerns the totality of being (*sive existens sive non existens*). We have described the original model of this determination in Jamblichus philosophy divided in the “Unlimited—Limited” mode. He made out the first formal determination of the substance of the third kind that was put in the demiurgic diacosmos (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Modernism found this fundamental division or deduction of the objective sense of being in Porphyry’s commentary on *Categories* and introduced it in the form of the Porphyry′s Tree. The key was the deduction that solved the fundamental question of “how” the subject receives the exemplary objectivity out of divine thinking. Henry confirmed the paranoia of modernity by first assuring the objective existence of the chimera and then arriving at the certainty of the real thing. The ontotheological sense of being begins with the formal determination that is different from the nothingness. Such an exemplary—objective being has an eternal and evident “existence” thanks to the act of divine intentionality. The contingent and unclear nature of this exemplary sense of being “exsists” in actualized first substances as well.

The first determination of being made out of nothing introduced into ontotheological metaphysics Bonaventure′s and Olive’s above-mentioned determination of the matter established by negation of nullity (*non repugnat esse*). The analysis of the first concept of objectivity shows that the determination of the thing begins *ex nihilo*, out of pure non-existence. The logical negation created a positive, purely formal meaning, which is given as the highest and most general genus (*ens commune*). The modern *illuminati* conceived the object of metaphysics (*res*) by a gradual division of originally completely universal sense of being (*conceptus communissimus et communis*). Gandavus gives this Neoplatonic continuum of universally established being in Avicenna’s mode *ens inquantum ens* into the specific determination of being, which is formed as transcendentally defined *res*. The manifestation of meaning of the thing that was conceived in the intellect (*ratitudo*) is given not by the correspondence to actualized and real things, but by the abstract division or deduction following the former schools of *Nominales*. The universal form or the species ensuring the minimum objectivity (*res a ratitudine*) takes the individualized form in first substances. This is the typical concept of “exsistence” according to Porretans, which Rufus handed over to modernity (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The existence of the thing as a being of the third kind arises in the above-mentioned *resolutio* according to *Liber de causis* due to the new form of objective denudation. Let’s have a look at the emergence of the first objective system of division in the cited work *Quodlibet V*, which remade the division of the former Platonic dyad. Conceived by a mere logical negation of nothingness, a new kind of being makes a continuum of objective “exsistence”. This chimeric being, given as the highest genus, can be arbitrarily divided by generic differences that produce Porretan species on the lower floor. Gandavus understands the division of the being (*determinatio*) according to the scenario of *Liber de causis* as a procedure of negation (*negatio*). The individual form put in the subject (*suppositum*) receives the determination with the help of exposure of the sense taken from behind. The determination runs through the hypostatized form, and its classification establishes a new determination of what is (*ratio individuationis*). At the end of ontotheological division (*causa individuationis*), there is an indivisible meaning of being (*res a ratitudine*). This meaning establishes the objectively apprehended thing as being of the third kind (*res a reor reris*). Bacon called this production of the imaginary world insane, and Albert took it for a ridiculous. However, Gandavus, as a new philosophical leader of the rue du Fouarre, wrote his philosophical tales in the year 1285, and no longer in in the year 1255. Such teaching would have been declared heretical in the rue du Fouarre, since it followed the pattern of pantheistic Amalricians. Rufus and Pecham had to leave Paris because of promulgation of much less dangerous heresies and sophisms. The following quotation establishes the emergence of general determination of being. It is based on specific division of original being as a genus that is divided into lower components of meaning.

“In the created forms of species, as they are specific, the definition of their individuation is given in such a manner that these forms are determined as to their essential supposition (*est ratio constitutiva suppositi*). This definition makes the negation (*est negatio*) of above-mentioned specific being of the form given in the intellect (*ex se est specifica in esse rationis*). The subjective being of the specific form is the goal of its existence (*terminus factionis*), because the individual form is given in the suppositum (*facta est individua omnino in supposito*).” [[397]](#footnote-397)

The quotation describes the way in which universal forms produce the lower specific determinations (*in formis specificis*). This new form of objective supposition (*in supposito*) passes these higher transcendental determinations of being to the material substrate. As a result, a modern subject has emerged, which operates as an eternal and/or a contingent carrier (*subiectum*) to uphold those eternal and evident determinations of being. Originally, this objective form exists in the intellect, because it is given there in the objective universal form (*ex se est specifica in esse rationis*). The individualization of universal forms (*ratio individuationes ipsarum*) occurs with the help of the material substrate. It is determined by rationally given forms and by their act of being (*qua*), from up to down, to the level of individual things (*qua determinantur in suppositis*). Due to the individuation into the matter, the formes lose its original form of universality (*est negatio*). By the act of this specific negation of the universal form, a hylemorphic substance given on a material substrate is created (*facta est* *individua in supposito*). The goal of the objective “existence” of the original universal form is to imprint the contingent existence of the form in the material substrate (*terminus factionis*). In the individual substrate, the objective form of the original universality of the form is created by the specific process of negation. This completed the transition from permanent chimerical existence to its contingent and instable form in the real matter. The *illuminati* finally moved on to *via Modernorum* and began to systematically explore this new continent of metaphysics.

Gandavus created a full-blown paranoic deduction (*resolutio*) that founded the objective metaphysics: it starts on the level of heavenly mythology as divine intentionality and descends to reality. Modern deduction based on the metaphysics of chimeras created a system of objective determination of being, and thus it established the so-called second metaphysics. In terms of hermeneutics, the emergence of the “second metaphysics” symbolizes *Lichtung* of the untruth that characterizes the subsequent postmodern epoch. Let us summarize its original *Ge-Stell*, which, after the end of postmodernism dating back to the 17th century, established the today epoch of intellectual nihilism. The original, purely objective form is initially given as an exemplary intentional object in the psychology and in the thinking of modern God that runs in the mode “*semel—semper*.” That original objective form passes into the material carrier. As a result, it acquires a certain kind of negativity, because it has partly lost its original stability and immutability. But this price must be paid so that the objective form given as an examplar in God appears in lower spheres that have a higher degree of contingency related to material reality. Starting from divine species, the deduction proceed to seminal determination in the creation (let us see Bonaventure′s ontotheology); then it proceeds to objective conceived essences of modern *illuminati*; finally, it appears as contingent objective forms in real things. Today’s metaphysical nihilism reduces these objective forms to mathematical models in order to lead them to original mythological state of objective paradise-like innocence in the “*semel—semper*” model. The objective suppositum is not necessarily tied to the existence of real things. It can be a Porretan individual, a chimera or an actualized first substance. The subsistent forms are justified and explained by the divine intellect. Human cognition proceeds from the divine exemplary form to the suppositum given as an objective *tertium ens*. Taken the last case, the form is predicted with regard to the contingent atomic substance, which is an objective being of the third kind (*individuum, concretum*). Objective dialectics can eventually go to the objectively given subject, which is constituted by the matter. The individual, concrete and factual atomic substance represents a manifestation of the original species, whereby the manifestation is given by its transfer into reality (*exsistere*).

Neoplatonic deduction of objective forms to objective individuals and subjects represents a total devaluation of the first substance in the second Averroism. The so-called second metaphysics was born because the original form of the second Averroism could no longer accept this monstrosity of thought; Duns Scotus had to recast the “metaphysics” of Gandavus in a new form. The objectively given form or species represents a typical being of the third kind, because it is simultaneously real, actualized and universal. Modernism transformed the categorical predication of *Seconds Analytics* in an absurd way. Gandavus took Porphyry's statement about *individuum*, which could not be defined for lack of a universal meaning, in the completely opposite direction (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). In modernity, exactly the opposite thesis applies, because “*ens ratum*” has taken on a mythological character. Because the concrete individual exists in a certain and evident objective manner, the real thing should be understood in a true and therefore objective manner. Rufus was the first one to exchange the individual for the actualized first substance. The pure concept given in the intellect acquired a hypostatized existence and causality. The individual arises in the modern thinking through the final division of Avicennist being. The objective thing exists as the last, no further divisible unit of specific determinations that relate to universal objective forms. The determination of the last remnant of meaning, which cannot be further divided, proceeds in modernity and postmodernity through the negation or through the movement of the generic and specific difference. Let’s take a look at *Quodlibet* V.8, where this twofold negation is used for the first time for the determination of being. With the help of double negation, Henry creates the objective form of “*hoc esse tantum*” that Avicenna produced for the first time (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). Due to *duplex negatio,* Gandavus’s method of denudation abolished the hyparchical determination of the first substance. The following quotation shows the first definition of objectivity, which is given as a metaphysical concept of being according to Avicenna (*tantum haec*).

“The negation is not simple, but twofold (*negatio non est simplex, sed duplex*). The approach towards the inside (*ad intra*) takes away all multiplicity and diversity, and the approach from the direction of the external thing (*ab extra*) takes away all identity. Negativity then merely predicts the being as such (*dicatur ita haec*) and as an objectively given entity (*tantum haec*). In this state, the being no longer has the power to be something else (*possibilitatem ad esse aliud et aliud*), as it is formally the case with the species. This individual (*tantum haec*) is so specific that it cannot change into something different from it (*non fit alioque aliarum suae speciei*).” [[398]](#footnote-398)

The twofold negation creates the concept of objective substance. The negation first cancels the form given on the material substrate (*removens ad intra omnem plurificabilitatem*) and then negates it outside of all relations (*ab extra omnem identitatem*) except for the pure *species specialissima*. The quotation clearly distinguishes the above-mentioned possibility of the species as a suppositum in reality and a completely new determination of being as an absolutely simple individual. This Avicennist simplicity (*equinitas tantum*) is no longer a universal form of the species. With the help of a twofold negation in the direction of outer and inner, the thinking of *illuminati* abstracts from all specific determinations until it comes to the last individual given as an objective being (*tantum haec*). This procedure points to the original source of Scotus objective “*haecceitas*.” Through the denudation of all the determinations of the first substance, the deduction necessarily comes to the individual as a new form of the individual existence (*ita haec, quod tantum haec*). The objectively given concept of the thing is defined in the mode “*esse diminutum*” as a pure possibility of not being anything else (*non habedo possibilitatem ad esse aliud et aliud*). This particular individual is conceived as Avicenna’s “*individuum vagum*” to receive a solid and indubitable “*esse ratum*.” Like this, the evidence does not refer to actual first substances, but to the fact of minimal being given by the negation of pure nothingness.

Gandavus introduced the new method of *denudatio* given as the exclusion of otherness with the help of negation. Spinoza adopted Olivi′s and Henry’s method of determining the individual thing in the definition of the matter made in the mode “*omnis determinatio est negatio*.” Spinoza explained in the letter addressed to Jarrig Jelles how the universal geometric figure passes into the individual thing in the mode of negation, in which its original universality turns into nothingness.[[399]](#footnote-399) Hegel directly tied in with Gandavus’s and Spinoza’s objective determination of being as a *res* positioned in relation to a nullity. The first part of *Wissenschaft der Logik* says that Spinoza’s thesis has an utmost importance.[[400]](#footnote-400) The transition from nothing to the formal determination of being provides the beginning of Hegel’s absolute logic. This negation, in the mode of modern deduction, leads the being out of nothingness and thereby creates the human form of *creatio ex nihilo*. The work takes up the modern determination of *res* by negation in the thesis on double negation that generates a primary affirmation (*duplex negatio affirmat*; Hegel 20, 171). The continuation of Gandavus’s quotation provides the key to the emergence of modern metaphysics. The objective being is predicted with the help of a newly created supposition (*suppositum absolutum*) according to Avicenna.

“The double negation produces a purely formal determination that defines the type of form given behind the essence. As a result, negation establishes the absolute form of supposition (*constituitur suppositum absolutum*) and this supposition truly states the objective thing (*vere dicitur hoc aliquid*) set up in the mode of fully individualized being (*tantum hoc*). For this being is nothing else, neither in the direction of itself nor outwards, and thus it can be nothing other than what it is (sic nullo modo aliud quid).” [[401]](#footnote-401)

The new determination carried out the negation of the species in order to create a new hypostatized form (*determinatione supra essentiam formae*). In this way, an epochal new existence of the absolutely separate suppositum came into being that possesses the nature of a pure individual (*constituitur suppositum absolutum*). The immutability, solidity and constancy of objectively defined being in its original objectivity is given negatively, as a negation to anything else that it would not be itself (*non fit alioqua aliarum suae speciei*). The actual existence given in the first substance (Aristotle’s τόδε τι) became an objective form of being (*tantum haec*). Put in the mode of Porphyry’s *individuum*, this carrier of minimal meaning of being is twice separated from the existence of the real thing. First of all, it was necessary to negate the contingency of the thing in order to promote the universality of the form. The second negation deprived this form of the specific content, leaving only an absolute objective meaning that is separated from everything. Modern God and the modern subject consider that objective meaning as a univocally given being. In the formal manner of double negation, Henry created objective copies of the real first substances that received a minimal degree of being. This measure is necessary for them to be identified as essences. This separation from nullity forms the basis of the modern being, which is conceived as an objectively given essence (*quod vere dicitur hoc aliquid*).

The production of a new *tertium ens* created a new diacosmos and a new sphere of objectivity. The individual as a minimal portion of the objectively given meaning is given in the mode *absolute* because it is separated but from nothingness. By formally denying the nullity and with the help of the transfer of the non-being into the being, a concept of objective metaphysics is created that Scotus adapted and changed. The method of absolute supposition established the first construction of modern metaphysics. Let us recall that in classical metaphysics only the actualized substance could be the carrier of abstract determinations such as whiteness (Aristotle’s ὑποκείμενον). The absolute value of the new form of objectivity is given in the mode of the truth as *rectitudo*. The chimera does not exist in reality, so its truth does not exist in the mode of metaphysical correspondence either. The objective being arose from the logically intended nullity through the twofold denial of the first substance. The first negation separated the objective essence from reality, the second one from the non-being. Therefore, the objective essence is stated in the mode of logical simulacrum, which is separated from all other types of statements (*suppositum absolutum*). The objective truth is manifested due to the new type of predication of the objectively given being. The analytic philosophy of Oxford (*suppositio discreta*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3) was introduced in the system of Augustinian ontotheology and Avicennist metaphysics. The logic changed into metaphysics and produced a new form of Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*” and Rufus’s “*species obiecti exsistentis*.” Gandavus rejected the primitive form of universal hylemorphism made in Oxford, since it was absolutely unacceptable in Paris after the year 1270. By introducing objective emanations and predications, this Latin sophist created a new parallel world of modernity, which has its own way of cognition, its own being, its own conception of the truth, as well as its own type of categorical predication. By demolishing the first substance in the new determination of being, its role must be assumed by the divine or the human subject; otherwise, modern metaphysics would have no basis at all. Only the divine or the human subject can actualize the nothingness as the basis of being for the metaphysical nihilism of modernity (let us see the terminus *Gründung* of Heidegger), not the cosmos composed of existing things. The nihilism of Western metaphysics begins through the transfer of the sense of being into the relation “subject—object” that is no longer given solely by the will, as in the case of Olivi, but purely conceptually. The analysis of Gandavus’s *Quodlibet* V, q. 8 confirms Courtine’s study that followed the evolution of so-called „*objectité*“. That kind of primary objectivity came into being in the course of the systematization of new metaphysics that modernists finally defined as *scientia transcendens*. The first postmodernist Suárez finally included fully objectified theology in the structure of *metaphysica generalis*. See the scheme of the structure of the determination of being in first modern science (Courtine 1990, 429). In nihilistic period after Descartes, this twofold function of determination (general, particular) has been taken over, on the one hand, by mathematics and, on the other hand, by the universally applicable Unified Science.

### 5.2.2 Objective Correctness of Being

A new form of objective anthropomorphism appeared after the year 1277. It no longer respected the basic thesis of *Second Analytics* that prohibited the transition of cognition from one genus to another. The thesis on the separation of philosophy and theology as different genres set up in the framework of different sciences, it was defended by Parisian magisters devoted to Siger by issuing the decree of April 1272. But the second Averroism triumphed in an authoritarian manner. It brought about the modern era of philosophical and theological sophisms and fabulations that the representatives of the first Averroism strongly rejected. The generation of modernists lecturing in Paris after the year 1277 had to arrange chaotic collections of *tertium ens* into a unified system that formally became of Aristotelian kind. The predication of various objective entities stashed up in the parallel diacosmos of *Modernorum* had to receive some order. In the opposite case, the second generation of modernists would have been accused of the heresy of the first modernists, which was mentioned in the preamble of Tempier’s decree (*manifestos et execrabiles errores, immo potius vanitates et insanias falsas*, ch. 4.4.4). Gandavus took a decisive step on *via Modernorum*; he linked the deduction of metaphysics based on divine exemplars with the categorical predication made according to Simplicius. Henry conceived *verum ens* under the objectivist perspective (*sub intentione entis*) that consisted of three levels. The first level begins with the real substance, which, however, is not a necessary step. Then follows the floor of the substance considered intellectually and intended in view of the objective species in creation. Their firmness and objective being (*ratitudo*) is given by intended species in divine thought that forms the last or the first level of objectivity. This last level of objectivity represents the highest good of every created thing in God in the form of the final cause. Gandavus’s production of the sense of being is summarized in the quotation from the metaphysics *al-Shifā*, where Avicenna describes the divine reflection of the first created forms. The designer ensures the production of being according to the principle of parsimony, elegance and goodness; thus he actualizes the ultimate meaning of being (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). The objective form of Neoplatonic *exitus* is given as an absolute mode of supposition turned to the world. Descartes and Husserl made out the postmodern and nihilistic form of the supposition by the deduction of meaning from the evident sphere of *cogito*. Modern thinking begins with the general determination of what is, which; it makes the opposite to the first substance that modernity placed in the furthest pole of deduction. Descartes, in the same way, put into brackets God and the external world by transforming everything into Gandavus’s *conceptus vanus* or *conceptus fictitius* that were based on the metaphysics of chimera. After the cancellation of real being and the corresponding sensual experience, Descartes can proceed in the second step to the constitution of the world made *ex nihilo*, that is, in the mode of thinking given within the framework of actualized *ego sum*. The substantial *intellectus agens* reflects itself in the mode of *certitudo*. According to the above-mentioned quotation of *Liber de causis*, it examines a universe full of pure denudated forms (*rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa*; ch. 5.2.1). The previous chapter has shown that Descartes repeated the system of deduction, which was first introduced in *Quodlibet* V, written about 1280. The subject of modernity and postmodernity brings about the production of the sense out of itself, just as Avicenna constitutes the flow of the formally determined being from the direction of the cosmic intellect as the Giver of forms. The new form of the individual took up the role of the substance of the third kind; it is based on a twofold logical negation (*duplex negatio*). The subject considers this particular object through the *denudatio* of forms which has been accomplished according to the second Averroism and *Liber de causis*. The universality of being is given only by the distinction from nothingness, by following the universal validity of the proposition about the Excluded Third. The metaphysics of *Modernorum* began with the formal determination of being (*metaphysica generalis*). In the second step, it put Aristotelian categorical statements made with regard to the first substance on a lower, categorical level (*metaphysica specialis*). The introduction to Henry’s work *Summa*, which was written after 1280, included the determination of the objectively conceived being on the basis of truth as *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. Henry’s second question combines Augustinian illumination and Aristotelianism in a similar way as Aquasparta did. The cognition is always given *ex naturalibus*. After the year 1270, Parisian modernists cannot ignore the influence of Aristotelianism. But they do not bind nature to actualized being of first substances, but to formal *scibilia*. They were produced by deduction in the system of the ontotheological determinations of being in the system of “*augustinisme avicennisant*” described by Gilson. Henry elaborated the version of moderate objectivism that created a sophistic compromise between Avicenna and Averroes. Henry does not make use of Aristotelian abstraction, since he employs Avicennian denudation. Therefore, he does not share the same view of the species with the first Averroism. Through the process of *denudatio*, the intellect considers the universal form (*esse ratum*), which “exsists” in the real thing. First, the process of abstraction of cognition starts from the real thing. This denudation is directed by the subsistent *intellectus agens* given as a substance. After the denudation of the form from the thing, it follows the process of illuminating this universal species in virtue of the active intellect. It recognizes this being of the third kind in the light of divine species. According to Gandavus, there is a fundamental difference between Aristotelian cognition related to the first substance and the objective insight of the essence given in the direct intuition of the already-actualized intellect. Grosseteste elaborated the first form of this cognition (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1), by making the difference between the direct insight of the essence (*intellectus*) and cognition through the senses (*scientia*). The divine thinking intends the exemplary form in the mode of the intentionally given objective being (*esse diminutum*). This minimal being objectively subsists in the hylemorphic composition only in the reduced mode of being (*tantum haec*) that was produced via the above-mentioned method of twofold negation. The deduction goes from the world of forms recognized by God to the forms recognized by modernists.

Henry of Ghent took up the model of double cognition that Grosseteste and Bonaventura outlined for the first time (ch. 4.1.1). The truth of real things is contingent and inadequate. Therefore, we must consider the objective truth through the illumination and deduction of exemplars produced by divine intentionality. The objective form of such insight is given by the composition of both views; but the second floor of insight into evident essences recognizes the eidetic essence of the thing itself. Therefore, God-like insight into objectivity is fully true and evident. This mythological form of non-concealment (*alētheia*) was simply impossible in the first Averroism. The concept of the diaphanum and the *intellectus possibilis* ensures the true manifestation of being from the direction of the real thing in the model of effective and formal causality they follow the first substance, being engaged in the process of sensual and intellectual cognition. Led by theologically educated Furies, Henry found for cognition a kind of mythological *proportio*, which Aristotelianism and the first Averroism rejected in principle. The non-existent species took the position of the first existing substance. The new form of similarity is placed beyond the truth as Aristotelian correspondence that is mediated by sensual and intellectual species. The *illuminati* possess direct intuition of *quidditas*. Gandavus made the systematization of objective meaning that comes from the modern subject. It determinates the metaphysics through a new version of Olivi′s *aspectus* that does not need first substances. The objectively given essence resides as an exemplar in divine thinking, and later in the postmodern version of mathematics and cognitive sciences. Augustinian illumination transfers the cognition of the truth as *rectitudo* and *summa veritas* to the material world. Aristotelian natural knowledge has taken on a modern—supernatural and thus objective—mythological character. Knowledge begins in an Avicennian way, i.e., through the immediate insight of the actualized intellect into the first principles of knowledge.

“In the order of natural cognition, man can come to the realization of the first theoretical principles without any divine illumination; likewise, in the order of natural cognition, he can also draw all conclusions that follow from these first principles of cognition without any divine illumination (*ad cognitionem omnium conclusionum sequentium post principia*).” [[402]](#footnote-402)

The quotation typically confuses the logical supposition, which is given in *Second Analytics* as the second triad of principles of cognition, with the first triad of principles, which according to the first Averroism is fundamentally determined only by the imposition in the mode “*ex inmediatis*.” Logical deduction replaced metaphysics, which was first advocated by Kilwardby and Rufus. This kind of knowledge is given by logical denudation and is higher than mere abstraction of sense. The term “*ex puris naturalibus*” is no longer of Aristotelian origin, but an Avicennist construct. The logically enlightened intellect is able to move from the position of non-existent pure naturalness to higher knowledge. The matter of the third kind plays the role of the universal suppositum, displacing the role of the first substance. This objective aspect of matter as a special form of the quasi-actualized thing establishes a new whole of being in described mode “*ex puris naturalibus*.” The quoted statement points to the first emergence of metaphysics named “*surnaturel*” that Gilson and Lubac analyzed in Bonaventure′s teaching (ch. 4.1.4). At the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, Henry’s objective suppositum first gave rise to the term “*natura pura*” and then to the postmodern ontology. The modern metaphysician Gandavus defends the concept of twofold cognition and thus also of twofold truth (the natural and the supernatural), which Tempier’s decree of March 1277 explicitly rejected.

“The intellectual cognition of created things can be carried out as twofold knowledge; first, we recognize the objectively existing thing (*precise scitur*), i.e., we recognize by direct insight into what the thing is as such (*simplici intelligentia id quod res est*). The second way is that we know and recognize the truth of the thing itself with the help of the synthetic and analytical ability of the intellect (*cognoscitur intelligentia componente et dividente veritas ipsius rei*).” [[403]](#footnote-403)

The form of insight into the created thing (*cognitione igitur intellectiva de re creata*) divides the manifestation of truth into two different processes (*duplex potest haberi cognitio*). The first truth refers to the direct and objective insight of the thing (*id quod res est*) in the mode of denudation of the pure essence (*simplici intelligentia*). This objective individuality of the thing is permanently and exemplarily given in God. Therefore, the first type of cognition is absolute and precise, i.e., separated from the real thing (*qua precise scitur*). Henry introduced into the modern scheme of cognition the concept of Avicennian precision (*equinitas tantum*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2), just as Rufus had made the term of concreteness (*concretive*) out of it. Then comes the cognition as Aristotelian categorical demonstration (*cognoscitur intelligentia componente et dividente*), the truth of which is determined by the real existence of the thing (*veritas ipsius rei*). The first insight looks at the essence of the thing through the substantial *intellectus agens*, because modern *illuminati* do not need to activate cognition from the direction of *intellectus possibilis* and actualized first substances. The sensible conditional truth determines only the lower level of cognition made by empirical *scientia* of Grosseteste. For precise and absolute cognition of the thing in its objective being, the correspondence of intellect and first substances is unnecessary. The modern intellect of *illuminati* is objectively enlightened directly by modern God. It keeps its own actualization in the way of the above-mentioned self-reflection according to *Liber de causis* (*rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa*, ch. 5.2.1). For the production of cognition, the modern intellect does not need a real thing in the mode *per prius*, like the first Averroism. It primarily illuminates itself in the act of modern and postmodern self-reflection. The recognition of *illuminati* objectively considers the divine exemplars in the direct vision (*simplici intelligentia*). The modern “exsistence” of things derives from the self-reflection of the intellect, which Bacon considered pure paranoia. This form of analytical deduction was interpreted in the previous matrix by Bacon’s dispute with *Erfurter Anonym*. The being of the hypostatized intellect ensures the primary production of the sense outside the first substance (*quaestio quid est intellectus non supponit quaestionem si est res*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). This insight sums up the pure beingness of essence or form and forms the postmodern basis of the objectively recognized thing, the individual or the concrete in the system of abstract classifications. As a result, the insight into the objectively given “precise” form was introduced into scientific cognition.

The pious modernist Henry, after the victory of the one truth in 1277, needs modern God to ensure objective reality, as does the pious postmodernist Descartes. Schizophrenic God of modernity, divided into a actualized and potential being, looks at the exemplars and thereby creates them in objective and thus merely potential being. Scotus fundamentally rejected this kind of divine psychology by removing potency from modern God in the new system of metaphysics. The theory of illumination and exemplarism, which are connected with the subjective reservoir of species of the third kind, were indispensable for establishing the objective aspect of being, because they introduced the possibility of analogical proportionality. God handed down the objective exemplar to man through creation, which was stored specifically and objectively in the modern type of memory (*locus specierum*). The composition of both insights (the exemplar in divine thought, the species in human *memoria*) gives rise to analogically made sense of being. Due to the twofold specification of the essence established in the framework of the exemplar and the species, the metaphysical triple link arises, and its ratio establishes the rational conception of the truth of the being. The correspondence of thing and intellect is replaced by the concept of universal *analogia entis*. The univoke concept of being combines God and the whole of being through the new form of ontotheology build up in two floors. The actual synthesis of being arises at the second stage of cognition, whereby the subject is illuminated by the new aspect of being. Objective thinking directs attention (*intentio*) to the species. The specific cognition exists in modern God only as potency, to be an intentional object constituted by active divine intellect. The existence of modern species follows Avicenna’s metaphysics in the abstract mode *ens inquantum ens*. Grasping the exemplar in the mode of objectivity, the divine intentionality replaced the process of abstraction given in the first Averroism through *species intelligibilis*. In the first Averroism, the intentional objects received in *intellectus possibilis* were necessary for Averroes’s *proportio* between the individual thing and universal cognition. In modern times, metaphysical abstraction degenerated into a mathematical and logical abstraction, which, due to the nature of the thing, is unable to provide the metaphysical unity of the world at the level of the real first substances.

Siger explored this specific blindness of modernity in depth, since he was the only thinker to determine the fundamental failure of Avicenna’s metaphysics (ch. 4.4.1). But now, there is the year 1280, Siger is in academic exile and Gandavus took over the artistic faculty. The generation of Latin sophists settled in Oxford and Paris authoritatively presented the new unity of cognition put in objective dualism of the natural and the supernatural truth. The objective insight into being made in the mode of modern intentionality from Gandavus to Husserl looks like this.

“The truth that determines the intention of the thing with regard to its exemplar is not primary, but secondary. The being expresses the intention of the thing in the mode of primary separateness (*ens autem dicit intentionem rei primam et absolutam*). That being, and the truth in everything, we can recognize it directly in the intellect, and in such a way that we recognize the intention of this truth (*intentio veritatis*) from the being as such. The intention of the truth in the real thing (*veritas in re*) is recognized only by making the similarity to its exemplar (*conformitatem eius ad suum exemplar*). The intention of the truth of being as such (*vero entis*) is given in the separated thing (*in re absoluta*), which is devoid of this exemplary relationship.” [[404]](#footnote-404)

In the objective insight of being, the determining negation is again in play. The negation separates the truth as the correspondence of thinking to the exemplar from the truth that is conceived as an absolute being of some separate entity (*in re absoluta*). This new form of existence consists in pure eidetic objectivity. Henry followed Avicenna’s teaching that the first perception of the intellect is the being. The new deduction separated itself from the insight given by divine exemplar and justified the primary cognition within the framework of pure being (*ens autem dicit intentionem rei primam et absolutam*). The intentional insight into the pure *ens* *commune* is of an absolutely principled nature for modernity. Considered on the level of the objective intentionality, the truth of new metaphysics is separated from the divine cognition and from the created reality. This objective truth is manifested in the direct insight of the eidetic being that made out a new existence of things completely separated from reality (*intentio vero entis apprehenditur in re absoluta*). This absolutely based intentionality tends towards an a priori pure being, which establishes the minimal and thus absolutely certain meaning of the objectively manifested thing.

The univocal deduction of metaphysics from the concept of pure being gave rise to the first version of modern *metaphysica generalis* about the years 1280–85. The intention of cognizing intellect does not take up sensually recognized things, but objective species. Like this, Gandavus established a new correspondence between thought and the eternal forms. The next periods of thinking were guided by the modern form of that chimerical truth, whereby this form is given by the intention of the objectively considered thing (*intentio veritatis in rei*) and not through the correspondence of the real thing and the intellect. The thinking of *iIlluminati* produces the truth through the conformity of the objective intention with the divine exemplar (*apprehendendo conformitatem eius ad suum exemplar*). As a result, modern God became an objectively necessary being in the metaphysics of the *illuminati* that created such a God according to the image of the human demiurge. The modern intentionality of Henry, Descartes and Husserl does not need sensual species, since it produces the cognition of the objective thing (*intentionem rei in respectu ad suum exemplar*). This cognition is given as theological or philosophical *scibile* that is essentially conceived and produced by the intellect. Modernity does not need the sensual and intelligible species given by the thing, because they get along with their objective duplicates, stored in the modern form of memory as *locus specierum*. Objective cognition does not go to the real thing, but to its objective exemplar. Through the introduction of the twofold form of intentionality and abstraction, the two floors of cognition were created: the Aristotelian and the Avicennian, the natural and the supernatural (i.e., objective). The sensually given intentionality entails philosophical cognition on the secondary level (*non est prima, sed secundaria*). The exemplar safeguards the first and highest level of knowledge. In the metaphysics of Olivi and Gandavus, the metaphysical truth of being became an object of the substantial will and the hypostatized intellect, which, through illumination, relates to the divine exemplary intentionality. The new period of *via Modernorum* accomplished *dativus incommodi* in regard to the previous form of the second Averroism. By introducing the psychology in modern God, they get rid of its former figure as a theologically and mystically conceived demiurge.

Henry of Ghent objectively constituted the epoch of oblivion of being. He laid the foundation of modern metaphysics, which does not require the real thing for objective cognition. The modern subject determines objective *veritas* as a form of subjective certainty and correctness given from the absolute and precise position of *illuminati*. The mythological conception of the truth and of the scientific knowledge given in the form of enlightened Augustinism and Avicennism could be proclaimed in the rue du Fouarre but after the elimination of critical thinkers after the year 1277. The correspondence of intellect with the real thing plays only a secondary role in the new system of thinking, although it forms a sufficient condition of cognition. The necessary condition of cognition became the objective conception of being, which forms *conditio sine qua non* of modern metaphysics. Full objectivity arises in the system of the truth as supernatural *rectitudo*. The active intellect of *illuminati* “exsists” in the mode of enlightened *certitudo*. It relates to modern anthropomorphic God through the act of transcendence. Due to this transgression of thinking in the mode “*exsistere*,” Gandavus developped thinking in terms of exemplary meaning. It plays the role of the first substance that is potentially given in divine thinking. The new theory of truth as the objective conformity of enlightened thought and exemplar cannot accept the Aristotelian intellect in the purely receptive form as *tabula rasa*. According to modern Avicennism, the act of intentionality at the primary level requires the active nature of the intellect, which in and of itself is already a subsistent substance. As has already been shown, Thomas Aquinas defended this form of intellect as an autonomous form. Only in this way can modernists recognize the pure being in the mode *per prius*, since it does not exist at all in reality. The non-existent being can be recognized only by the fact that it is produced directly in the objective thinking of *illuminati* by the predication made “*in artificialibu*s.” Therefore, the modern intellect must be an actualized substance, or at least a Thomistic hypostatized form. The habitual actualization of modern thinking is related to the objective being in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. This pure insight of being is given beyond all real relationships and outside of the first substance. Bacon reminded the modernists around Bonaventura in vain that the predication “*in artificialibus*” concerns only demiurgic activitivities of the subject. This predication, given only by analogy, does not have the status of scientific cognition, which is given by hyparchical predicted causality in the middle link of the demonstrative proof (ch. 4.1.1). The modern statute *esse diminutum* is completely different from that in the first Averroism. This defines the minimal being as a *species intelligibilis*, which was created in the process of abstraction and is given only in thinking (*ens in ratione*). Modernity took up the divine exemplar to make the metaphysical fixation (*ratitudo*) that passed minimum degree of being to the objective form. The deduction of being (*resolutio*) proceeds in the new metaphysics from the direction of separated exemplars in divine thought (*esse ratum, esse a reor rei*). Henry transformed the voluntaristic determination of Olivi into an objectively conceived aspect of being, which is manifested by the modern form of intellectual *intentio* and not *volitio*. The primary determination of being by the will makes impossible the universal categorical predication of modernity, which runs according to the pattern of objective Aristotelianism.

Gandavus put the final level of *resolutio* as pure transcendental objectivity. That is why he refused Olivi and put the primacy of the intellect over the will, in accordance with *Nicomachean Ethics*. Henry therefore extended the categorical predication based on Avicenna′s intention that primarily related to insight of being as being. The basis of the new metaphysics was the objectively created relationship “subject—object” defined in the univocal mode *ens inquantum ens*. The intention of truth as an exemplary conformity of modern God and the modern thing became the fundamental metaphysical capital of modernity. Averroes rejected this principle of Avicennian metaphysics as a fundamental error of modern thought, because Avicenna based the interpretation of Aristotle on the cognizing subject and not on the first substance (*quasi a se*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). Siger saw the inadequacy of Avicenna’s metaphysics in the same manner as the Commentator (ch. 4.4.1). The first Averroism cannot accept Avicenna’s definition of metaphysics, because it is given outside the causality associated with first substances. Averroes conceives the emergence of the species in thought as an immaterial, universal and individual act of the intellect given in the mode of *tertium genus* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The exegesis of CMDA in the context of the first Averroism has shown that the abstracted *ens intentionale*, given by the first substance in the process of abstraction, is bound to the act of *intellectus speculativus* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Siger explained to modern sophists that each of us experiences cognition in the act of the physically given substance that keeps personal ipseity (*experimur, conscii sumus*). The first substance does not require the evidence of the modern subject for its being, because it exists in and of itself and in real interactions (*passio entis*). Siger drew the attention of modernists to the fact that the abstractions given in thinking do not have a causal character as real first substances. From the point of view of hermeneutics, there is a fundamental difference between the formulation of the first and second Averroism in terms of Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics within the framework of *ens inquantum ens*. The cognition of the first Averroism does not go to the intention given in the modern supposition as an eternal essence in the minimal mode of being and security (*ens diminutum*). The modern kind of being is primarily brought about by modern *illuminati*, since they observe divine exemplars. This is metaphysical paranoia, which Bacon rejected as madness of the modern mind (*insaniunt contra veritatem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). The basis of modernity does not lie in the real substance, because intentionality goes to the first perception of the being in its pure being. The relationship “subject—object” that makes the basis of anthropocentric metaphysics and modern theology, it was born as result of the absolutization of the intention related to the being as the first object of thought (*ens inquantum ens*). The reduction of meaning to the intentionality of the demiurgic subject represents a further step that prolonged epochal effects of Oxfordian Fallacy.

Hermeneutic investigation is interested in the fundamental question: How does the subject appropriate objective being through *dativus possessivus*? Conceived as the habitus of thinking, the intentionality goes to universal being (*ens commune*) at first, in the act of intuitive cognition. The being given in this way is objectively separated from the recognition of the first substance in the mode “*praecise*.” This cognition is primary, in contrast to the secondary cognition through the intentionality of the intellect turned to sensual species. The objective being is actualized within the framework of the permanent habitus of thinking given outside the body as “Flying Man” of Avicenna and Descartes. The modern subject became a new source of science (*ortus scientiarum*), since it produces an objective *scibile* as precisely conceived being (*ens ratum*). The predication “*in artificialibus*” produces a new kind of *dativus auctoris*, since the relation “subject—object” replaced Siger’s determination of real cognition made in the mode “*subiective—obiective*” (ch. 4.4.2). Siger put the body of a real person as *dativus auctoris,* since the intellect is considered in the mode “*inmixtus*” that must be actualized through the senses. Modernity changed the status of *ens ratum* and the metaphysics of chimera created a really non-existent subject that apprehends a corresponding really non-existent object. Albert and Bacon considered the doubling of the world as a real and an objective one to be ridiculous and insane. The comparison with the voluntaristic concept of intentionality made by Olivi shows how thoroughly Henry changed intentionality of modern subject. Gandavus replaced Olivi’s concept of the demiurgic and capitalistic will by speculative ontotheology in the style of Bonaventura. Henry established an intermediate stage of exemplary being directly in God. The objective being possesses its own potentially and intentionally given essence in divine thinking. The species establishing this sphere is not the result of the intentional synthesis as in the first Averroism. Objective meaning “exsists” as a kind of hypostatized intention to be eternally present in the mode “*semel—semper*. ” This new *tertium ens* then manifests itself secondarily in the created world, where the exemplars are present as *rationes seminales* for eidetic contemplation of *iluminati*. The insight into divine demiurgic thinking laid a new foundation of metaphysics. God as the founding simulacrum of modernity began to operate in the first version of anthropocentric metaphysics around the year 1280. This simulacrum forms the objective basis of being through mental processes (*intentio, volitio, reflexio*). The new aspect of being, given in the mode of archetypal divine psychology and intentionality, established general metaphysics in the sense of Heidegger’s *Gründung*. Olivi made the contemplation of being through the will (*aspectus*); Gandavus transformed it back to the intellectual act of cognition located in the ontotheological structure of metaphysics. The exemplar plays a key role in the foundation of the new metaphysics, because it forms a new middle link of the objective demiurgic syllogism. God intends the exemplar in his mind and thus produces it *ex nihilo*. Then he keeps it in his *memoria* and he may creatively send it to the world, where modern *illuminati* consider it to be a secondary objectivity. The new type of intentional object endowed with divine power and intelligence established the objectively given sphere of being. Modern *illuminati* are similar to modern God as *imago Dei*. Following Olivi, Henry describes the first objective capitalization of exemplars in divine thought, which makes an interest rate in capitalist consciousness and actions.

“The exemplaria, as recognized and effective objects in the intellect, are not determined by our cognition (*non sunt obiecta cognita et operata ab intellectu*). They are given as an object of action and activity in order that human intellect should be actualized. Through the actualized intellect, the exemplars acquire a new being in the intellect (*ipsa faciunt esse in esse cognito intellectus*). This would not be possible if exemplars were previously not true entities (*essent entia vera*) due to their own actuality (*ex se secundum actum*). In relation to them (*respectu quorum*) the intellect is somewhat as being in potency (*quodam modo est ens in potentia*). These exemplary beings are in the minimal being with regard to divine being (*sunt diminuta entia*). They are not minimized in the same way as objective entities produced in our thinking (*entia operata ab intellectu nostro*). The species created in thinking are given in such a manner that they cannot have a true being outside the intellect, because they exist only in the intellect.” [[405]](#footnote-405)

The quotation distinguishes the level of minimal being with regard to actualized fullness of being in God (*respectu entis quod Deus est*). In modern God, the external being is in the mode of potency, because exemplars possess only potential and intentional character (*sunt diminuta entia*). This ensures Olivi’s real distinction between the intimacy of the divine essence and the intentional production directed to outside (*realis distinctio inter essentiam voluntatis et suos aspectus*, ch. 5.1.2). Intellectual version of ontotheology replaced Olivi’s scheme of the intimate will by the reflexive self-knowledge accomplished within the framework of the divine demiurgic intellect. God rest eternal in himself in his ipseity and sends objective examples out into the world that we objectively recognize.

The concept of “*esse diminutum*”established the objective flow of forms out of divine mind in the world. Divine exemplars “exsist” in the minimal version of objective *esse*, that human intellect perceives as active intelligible forms. In God, the exemplars are given only potentially, but with regard to us they occur in the mode of hypostatized objectivity as a new sphere of *tertium ens*. Modern God provides his intentional contents (and not the Platonic ideas) with the exemplary type of objective existence in the mode of objective truthfulness (*ex se secundum actum essent entia vera*). These objective paradigms appear to us as an external object of cognition, which the receptive intellect recognizes in its potency (*respectu quorum intellectus quodam modo est ens in potentia*). Therefore, at the end of the quote it is asserted that the objective meanings for us exist only in thinking. The new being of the third kind does not exist in the world as a Platonic idea; it has its own being, in which the material things participate. Henry, like Bonaventura before him, clearly rejects Platonism (ch. 4.1.1). The exemplar does not exist as an idea, because it “exsists” as a potential intention given either in the divine or in our thinking. The diacosmos is no longer the mythological world of the Platonic demiurge Timaeus, but the divine demiurgic thinking, which has acquired an anthropomorphic character within the framework of ontotheological psychology. The exemplar comes to the human soul as an objective being of the third kind; the soul becomes a universal recipient of objective cognition (*quodam modo est ens in potentia*). The objectivity given by examplars in divine thinking is fundamentally different from our demiurgic ideas, which we can master in a demiurgic manner (*entia operata ab intellectu nostro*). The quotation codifies at the level of objective metaphysics Bonaventura’s distinction between the agent as divine and human creator. Divine exemplars are only in potency compared to the real creation and therefore have a lower ontological status than the created substances, which cannot be in God. But as divine entities, exemplars possess a formal existence objectively present in divine thought, which is infinitely higher than the intentional contents of the human intellect (*ex se secundum actum essent entia vera*). This being, given objectively by God, actualizes our cognition in the mode of exemplarily true being (*entia vera*). The exemplars are objectively true and they illuminate the human intellect and thereby primarily actualize it (*ut intellectus noster sit intellectus secundum actum*). This gave rise to the first metaphysical scheme of objective exposure of being from behind, from the direction of the new diacosmos made out of objectively determined entities. Henry considers the exemplar to be a new *obiectum* of the intellect; it does not synthesize the exemplar, but only passively accepts it. The passive and receptive role of *intellectus possibilis* is defined according to *De anima*, thereby preserving the fundamental thesis of the first Averroism, which ensures the universality of cognition. Through the divine contemplation given in the mode of objective *rectitudo*, the fullness of truth arises. On the human side, this corresponds to *certitudo* of modernists that objectively consider something that does not really exist at all. Henry’s form of objective illumination of the intellect differs fundamentally from the way of cognition in the first Averroism, which is given by the exposure of the intellect from reality. The fullness of modern truth arises from the exposure of being that resides in an objective ontotheological sphere made out of divine thinking and intentionality. The objective scenario of the exposure of the being from behind was created by the synthesis of Avicennism and Aristotelianism. This sophistic syncretism shaped the path of objectively determined metaphysics.

Henry conceived the exemplar in a triple modality (*triplici ratione*) that covers the totality of being. Scotus rightly observed that this scheme of objectivity given in the framework of Avicennian ontotheology must conform to Aristotelian schema, because the sphere of *tertium ens* cannot exist in God. Following quotation sets out the first structure of modern metaphysics that Scotus completed in full.

“Through the acceptance of the exemplar given in this way, we come to create a certain and infallible cognition of the truth (*certa omnino et infallibilis notitia veritatis*), which cannot be achieved in the previous threefold way. The first determination comes from the real thing, from which the exemplar is abstracted. The second determination is made from the point of view of the intellectual soul, which takes up this abstracted exemplar. The third determination comes from the exemplar itself (*ex parte ipsius exemplaris*), which receives the soul from the thing (*quod a re in anima susceptum est*).” [[406]](#footnote-406)

The first intentionality generates the knowledge of the exemplar as equivalent to *species sensibilis* (*ex parte rei*) and the second intentionality as equivalent to *species intelligibilis* (*ex parte animae*). But these forms of knowledge are not completely objective. Objective knowledge is based on Augustinian anamnesis, when the intellect of *illuminati* receives the exemplary essence originally given by God (*susceptum est*). The quotation expresses the dual role of intentionality through the verbs “*sumitur*” and “*susceptum est*” that refer to cognition of exemplars. The objective view of the exemplar as pure being in the third mode is separate from its existence in the thing and from Aristotelian abstraction, which regards the exemplar only as potentiality in the mode of *species intelligibilis*. In the third mode, the exemplar has its own objective existence, which lies neither in the thing nor in the intellect. Intentionality in relation to the exemplar plays a fundamental role in the scheme of objective illumination. There is a fundamental identification with the eternally given exemplar at the level of denudation, when the contemplation of pure forms directly enlightens the intellect. The objectively enlightened intellect can then safely accept other forms of the exemplar (*sumitur*), which are given by Aristotelian intentionality as *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. The certainty of contemplation culminates in objective enlightenment of the subject, which restores the original universal sense of the divinely intended form (*exemplar acquisitum in nobis*). The exemplar of the chimera has its own objective, God-given existence outside of the real world. The exemplar “exsists” in us in the manner of *tertium ens* that causally establishes a kind of certain knowledge (*a nobis certa notitia veritatis*). That kind of the truth is habitually grounded in the subject (*in nobis habeatur*) and it takes the form of infallible evidence (*a nobis certa omnino et infallibilis*). The exemplar is recognized directly and immediately, and therefore the certainty of this intuition is proportional to the full manifestation of the exemplar (*infallibilis notitia veritatis*). The subject of Gandavus, and after him the subject of Cartesius, is the guarantor of the justification of the truth as certainty of evidence, because it has become its origin and starting point for the knowledge of the world. The *illuminati* go to “things themselves,” that do not really exist.

The double appropriation of the exemplar from things and from the intellect determines the modern truth of the subject that knows the world objectively. The objective being of God-given forms exists in the mode of *rectitudo*. It enables the truth in the mode of *certitudo* and its demiurgic version, which is given as Olivi’s capitalist *volitio*. Hermeneutics follow the forms of the objective dative; therefore it is interested in the manner how truth is established as an objective form of correspondence. Three kinds of manifested exemplar ensure the certainty of recognition in a threefold way. The objective being determines the exemplar in the mode *per prius* put outside contingent first substances (*ex parte ipsius exemplaris*). Its God-given immutability excludes the possibility of error and ensures the fullness of truth as Anselm’s *rectitudo* and *summa veritas*. The exemplary being exposes our cognition and elevates the acquired intellect towards the divine truth. The second stage of cognition concerns Augustinian memory, which preserves these beings of the third kind. The *memoria* makes copies of original intentional diacosmos made by modern God in order to keep it in the framework of creation. It came to acquisition of *scibilia* made out in the first form of the modern database. From now on, the copy of divine exemplars given in the mode of objective “exsistence” becomes a new *scibile* of modernity (*ex parte animae*). The exemplar forms a certain truth conceived absolutely, i.e., separately from first real existing substances. Then it is true that the less the exemplar actually exists, the more evident its recognition is (*certa omnino*). The final stage of determining the truth comes from the real thing through Aristotelian abstraction (*ex parte rei*). This degree of recognition is not necessary, since it only confirms in the contingent reality the already given objective recognition of the exemplar in the *memoria*—database and, above all, in the divine exemplary database. This threefold insight into the new thing of metaphysics defines objectivity par excellence, because it establishes cognition as an objective illumination of the intellect. After the full eclipse of the first substance, the shining of the exemplar as an objective sun provides a new perspective of the exposure of the being, from where modernity takes the meaning of the world. The truth is given in the context of pure perception of being in its original form of manifestation. Descartes and Husserl took it over as an eidetic intuition of essences. The whole scheme is composed in the mode of the one truth, which is deduced from the objective being of mytological exemplars.

Following Avicenna, Gandavus established the first structure of *metaphysica generalis*. The new metaphysics must exclude from intellect the uncertainty which comes from the senses through Aristotelian abstraction. Gandavus takes the intended essence (Avicenna’s *equinitas tantum*) and compares it with the eternal, God-given exemplar. Henry is the first modern philosopher who helped the new system of objective metaphysics to the world in an authoritative and theoretical manner. The intellect of *illuminati* considers the object in the absolute and eternal certainty of its exemplary manifestation, which is given contingent by the thing existing in reality. Objectivity does not need Aristotelian abstraction. It runs through the sensual and then intelligible species, which are causally determined by real things. The modern form of truth as correctness and certainty is bound to objectively given exemplar. This *scibile* is considered directly and established the scientific capital of the new epoch. The modern subject (the divine and the human) stores the meaning of being in the mode of primary security, which he can then manipulate and capitalize. The receptive component of cognition, causally linked to the existence of the first substance in the mode of the *intellectus possibilis*, disappeared with the school of the first Averroism. Scotus accomplished epochal *Aufhebung* of Gandavus’s ontotheology. He brought the agenda of the first philosophy in the objective and essential realm by transforming Gandavus’ exemplarity into the scheme of Aristotelian categorical predication. By this act of *dativus incommodi* Scotus sent the second Averroism of the preceding generation into the realm of oblivion as well. Suárez’s objective metaphysics includes this “rational” theology of modernity in the mode of *metaphysica specialis*. After the death of modern God, contemporary thought directs its intentionality to the pure difference between *ad hoc* given structural movement of meaning that runs in the flow of metaphorical transfer of meaning. The intention merely reflects the difference of this and that state. The meaning of being comes out *ex nihilo*, i.e., by Gandavus’ double negation of sense (*duplex negatio*). It provides the basic definition of being as an objective thing in Olivi’s mode (*non repugnat esse*, ch. 5.1.2). The difference between formal being and non-being made the basis of the truth that is later taken up by structural linguistics and numerical digitization. From the point of view of the minimal sense of being given by double negation (*ens diminutum*), it is completely indifferent where the modern intention is directed: to the chimera, to the first substance, to the formal difference between the digital one and the zero. The main thing is that at least some movement of thinking takes place, which establishes the primary difference by the difference from pure nothing. Finally, the modern subject became a mere metaphor, whereby it took the role of the sorcerer’s apprentice by founding this nihilistic conception of metaphysics. The reality of the first substance is no longer necessary for the objective form of cognition, because it has been replaced by enlightened insight of the human and divine subject. For the first time, knowledge transformed into objectivity became the exclusive power of demiurgic subjects in the sense of objective *dativus auctoris*. This dative justifies *Lichtung* of the future epoch of the Enlightenment in its truth and untruth. The whole procedure of objective cognition shows that this construction collapses without the ontotheological structure of metaphysics. After the death of God, the reign of the one truth arose within the framework of the unified science given logically mathematically as a kind of mythology. See the actualized rule of metaphor in science and the world of media manipulations, which establish a new matrix universe in which contemporary thinking reflects virtual simulacra of all kinds.

### 5.2.3 Objective Ontotheology and Modern God

The original position (*Lichtung*) that transformed the divine intellect into the modern divine demiurge can be found in the foundation of modern subjectivity that Ibn Adi elaborated (OBJ I, ch. 2.2). The Christian rector of Baghdad’s House of Wisdom conceived the divine Trinity to be the divine Intellect reflecting himself in the performance of his own activity, and thereby simultaneously contemplating himself as an object of self-reflection. The intellect of the person of the Father exists in the full ipseity by exercising his thinking (*'aql, intelligere*); the doubling of thought in the exercise of self-reflection gives the person of the Son as a new determination within the divine essence (*'āgil, intelligens*). The Holy Spirit creates a medium of immanent self-reflection between the Father and the Son, because He understands both divine Persons in their own performance and existence (*mā'gūl, intelligibile*). The Holy Spirit will eventually go out in the creation by taking the form of acting divine wisdom. It phenomenally shows *ad extra* the inner being of the Trinity, which is first defined *ad intra*. Ibn Adi preserved one act of divine Being that established the act of thinking given in three independent hypostases. The transformation of reflection made according to Plotin′s work *Ennead* follows the relations of three divine Persons. The second Averroism followed Avicenna’s metaphysics that took up in the Falsafa the most important characteristics of subjectivity outlined by Ibn Adi. Gandavus had to create a concept of creation in conflict with the first Averroism that refused to speculate on divine intentionality and intellect. Modernists of the second wave had to invent the divine subjectivity that made the creation of the world in a free manner and, moreover, *ex nihilo*. For these fundamental reasons, Christian modernity could not follow the path of Neoplatonic emanations that Avicenna conceived in the model of the active cosmic intellect producing intelligible forms (*Dator formarum*). Aquinas that was a Semiaverroist and follower of Avicenna and subsequent Thomism criticized this model in principle (ch. 4.5.1). Latin Avicennism definitely left Avicenna’s original metaphysics about the year 1280 and it took its own path of thinking.

The objective anthropomorphism of modern God posed a serious problem for the representatives of the second Averroism. They successfully staged the condemnation of 1277 on the academic level. However, they had to react to accusations of Aristotelians from the school of the first Averroism as were Siger and Aquinas. By introducing Neoplatonic Aristotelianism, modernists turned God into a Neoplatonic emanation deity that operates in man through separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. Aquinas turned Averroes into an Averroist and legitimized Avicenna’s *intellectus possibilis* as a Christian doctrine (ch. 4.5.1). These Semiaverroists conceived Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*, presented in CMDA as a *quartum genus*, to be Avicenna’s active cosmic intellect. The confused interpretation of Averroes in the school of Toledo inspired semiaverroist interpretations of Aquinas and Aegidius. They rejected the interpretation of the intellect in CMDA, but accepted the intellect as an autonomous form. This brought the interpretation of Thomism around 1280 into the danger of heresy, which was given by the emanation model of modern God as the Giver of forms. Criticism of Avicennian and Averroist emanations was voiced by all representatives of the school of first Averroism, including Aquinas. Thomist Aegidius, in the role of Aquinas’s *alter ego*, performed a turn of thought around 1270, which is documented in the third part of the Oxford manuscript (ch. 4.3.2). Siger did not need to make such compromises with regard to the objectivity given as Avicennist models of comitation. He fundamentally rejected the primacy of Avicenna’s metaphysics for the same reasons as Averroes did (*Avicenna diceret oppositum, sicut recitat hic Commentator*, ch. 4.4.1). Objective Thomism and Scotism never achieved the full unity of the person, since they introduced the intellect as a hypostatized form in the soul. Siger strictly refused Avicennian comitation as objective deduction of exemplars from the divine intentionality. On the one hand, it was philosophical nonsense; on the other hand, it was Christian heresy. The final consequence of such teaching was the abolition of the substantial unity that kept the Persons in the Divine Trinity (*ista positio in fide nostra est haeretica, et irrationalis*; ch. 4.4.3). Latin sophists could not be official heretics; modern God had to be repeatedly modernized after 1280 into a new form. After academic liquidation of the school of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre, Aegidius Romanus and Gandavus as well as other modern objectivists had to clarify the relations of divine simplicity and the multiplicity of creation. Modernists separated creation and Creator from each other by rejecting Avicenna’s comitation made out according to the deduction in *Liber de causis*; thus, he refused Avicenna’s concept of God as the Giver of forms. However, the mythology of objectivity postulated that a certain form of plurality had to remain in modern God. Otherwise, the theory of one objective truth would not work and neither the ontotheological structure of modern metaphysics would be sustainable. The problem of modern God was very simple: unchanging God creates everything *ex nihilo* and thus introduces a change in his unchanged existence. This objective diacosmos forms the basis of the anthropocentric view of God, man and the world, because it introduced the totality of *tertium ens* in the system of ontotheological metaphysics. In modern God, something must “exsist,” because divine intentionality establishes the exemplary sphere of objectivity. In the mode of ontotheological correctness and certainty, truth is not linked to God as *prima causa*, but to the intimate change given in the exemplary mode “*semel—semper*.” Ontotheological structure of modern metaphysics requires that the foundation of being of the third kind must be projected directly in God as an undoubtedly correct and certain foundation of being.

The first Averroism strictly rejected any anthropomorphization of God. The generically different truth of philosophy allows a scientific investigation of God only as a *causa prima* and only in the mode of cognition given in the mode called “*quoad nos*.” Modernists and Augustinians had a cardinal problem, which the first Averroism did not have at all. Let us see Siger’s point of view displayed in the dispute about the eternity of the world (ch. 4.4.1). Modernity had to create a modern God, which contained the objective truth in an exemplary form. Objectively and therefore anthropomorphically created God of *Modernorum* symbolized the schizophrenia of the modern person by an absolut examplary manner, since this schizophrenia is given by the plurality of forms or substances in man. However, that substantial or formal plurality cannot exist in the absolutely simple act of divine Being and divine Essence. Gandavus introduced intentionality and demiurgic predication directly into the divine essence, thereby creating in God an independent sphere of beings of the third kind. The new construction of reality creates a sphere of objectivity directly in modern God. This metaphysical simulacrum acquired an objective and anthropomorphic character, which made out the basic habitus of modern God until his death in the 19th century. The first Averroism, which uncompromisingly defended the line of Aristotle’s first science, could not allow the analogy between God and man to be the fundament of metaphysical unity of man. The determination of the divine essence belongs either to the theology of revelation or to the mythological tales of ontotheological and poetic license as Bonaventure did. It is not allowed to mix cognition that relates to different genres. Modernity shifted the divine recognizability to the intimacy of the divine essence and turned God into a modern schizophrenic subject. The creative intentionality works in the divine essence in the “*esse in*” mode, because the divine thinking and the divine intentionality make the part of the simple divine essence. The creative will sends this intentional being into creation in the second phase, where it is manifested in the objective mode “*esse ad.*” Then, Aristotelian cognition of God applies in the mode “*quoad nos*.” Taken from the position of Modists (*modistae*), the knowledge of God is made by the intellect limited by the senses as Siger’s dispute with the second Averroism completed it in full (ch. 4.4.1). God of *sophistae Latini* is defined after the condemnation of the year 1277 in explicit contradiction with the teaching of Modists. Aquinas defended their teaching in the introductory part of *Summa Theologiae*. The knowledge of God exists in the two modes: “*secundum se*” and “*quoad nos*”.[[407]](#footnote-407) Taken in the mode “*secundum se*”, God is unknowable to us. Modern anthropomorphization of God is not a scientific proof of divine existence that must be done on the basis of causality. Then, there is either dogmatic mythology according to the dialog *Timaeus*, or a generically different knowledge of theology. The first Averroism could not produce an anthropomorphization of God. Following the critical presentation of *Seconds Analytics* and *De anima*, those philosophers came to knowledge of the divine essence only indirectly (*quoad nos*), i.e. only in the form of the sovereign *causa prima*.

Henry of Ghent took the immanent sphere of divine self-reflection. In accordance with the duality of Bonaventura’s rules (*regula agentis in/creati*), he turned it into a new form of demiurgic subjectivity. Modern God received an exemplary intentionality based on the creative will and the intellect. He became thus divided in a schizophrenic way into an intimate being and objective rational thinking. The reason for this interpretation was not primarily philosophical, but theological. The first form of such predication took place in the context of “*relatio*” related to the reception of Simplicius’s commentary on *Categories* according to the scenario of *Nominales*. Peter of Auvergne (Petrus de Alvernia, †1304) wrote a commentary on *Categories* sometime after the year 1270. The determination within the framework of “*relatio*” entails the universal relationship between the hypostatized genus and the species, and not a statement concerning the accident with regard to the second substance.[[408]](#footnote-408) For partisans of second Averroism, the thinking made according to Oxfordian Fallacy put the relationship at the level of the species and the essences given as quasi-substances that are real causes (*dicitur res naturalis, cum a natura talium rerum causetur*). Therefore, the category of relation that determines the second universal substance in thinking, received the hypostatized causality and essence. Moreover, it was equipped with causal effectivity. Hermeneutic explanation is highly interested in this ontotheological appropriation of being made out in the exemplary form of *dativus possessivus*. The insertion of being into the system of objectively conceived ontotheology changed Olivi’s voluntaristic connection between *dativus possessivus* and *dativus auctoris* and produced an objective *resolutio* of the new metaphysics.

Gandavus’ work *Quodlibet IX* written about 1286 was inspired by Simplicius’s commentary on *Categories* according to Moerbeke’s translation into Latin. Let us recall the key part of Simplicius’s commentary, which establishes the first transcendental determination of being in the mode “*esse ad*” (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.2). He absolutized the relation as a Neoplatonic genus of being superordinate to all categories in order to create a categorical determination of objectivity in the mode *absolute* and *simpliciter*. Simplicius changed the predication for the category called *habitus* as well. The objective determination of *habitus* transformed Aristotelian accidental determination of substance into Neoplatonic generic and essentially given determination of being. We have quoted the key passage of the commentary on *Categories*, in which Simplicius transformed the habitus as an accident into Neoplatonic habitus as an essence. The new kind of habitus took the place of Aristotle’s second substance (*In Simpl. Cat*. 163.31). Previous matrices have shown that the category called habitus determines the thing in its essential identity and in the minimum portion of being. In order to establish a modern theology, Henry had to transform the relationship between substance and accident according to Neoplatonism, because the diacosmos of substances as *tertium ens* must be founded in modern God. In the primary sphere of divine intentionality, there is an archetypal and exemplary *locus specierum*. The craftsman in the dialogue *Timaeus* has mathematical ideas and geometric shapes available for creation. He keeps them in his thinking and then imprints into the intelligible matter of the third kind. Modern God carries in him a storehouse of objective intentions, as well as the contemporary individual endowed with Augustinian *memoria* and digital cloud computing. In God is the objective realm postulated in the mode “*semel—semper*,” because the modern individual is limited and mortal. God as a pure being *per se* can make no categorical difference between substance and accident. Aristotelian work *Categories* fundamentally distinguish the otherness of the being given essentially *per se* and accidentally *ad aliud*. In the first sphere of objectivity, Gandavus had to abolish Aristotelian categorical determinations of being that relate to the second substance. However, the multiplicity in God must be done somehow; otherwise, there would be no basis of the objectivity given as an exemplar for the whole creation. Gandavus had to connect two floors of being. In addition to Aristotle’s interpretation of categories, he needed Simplicius’s predication of categories as hypostases. Terms “*habitus*” and “*relatio*” received the most important role, according to hypostatized meaning made by Simplicius. The objective diacosmos of the sophisticated Latins must be given a form of categorical predication that Simplicius worked out for Neoplatonism. In order to save the objective determination of being by the exemplars, Gandavus had to create an anthropomorphic God in the form of a modern subject. He changed the Aristotelian substance and predicates into transcendental properties of the being. According to the second Averroism, he used these newly conceived determinations of being in Avicenna’s metaphysical scheme of being as being. This ontotheological construction produced the first version of *metaphysica generalis* that Scotus accomplished in full.

Hermeneutics must explore the manner in which *Quodlibet* IX, qq. 1–3 used Simplicius’s conception of *tertium ens* in order to fit into the system of absolute creative subjectivity. In this treatise, the *Doctor Solemnis* provides a complete resolution of the objectively conceived being and not just the concept of objective *res*. Modern *illuminati* observe the creation through divine eyes. The totality of being is exposed from the objective side made by God as a demiurge. The world cannot be recognized in an old manner, from the direction of unreliable and changeable first substances. With regard to God, all intentions of being are given in an absolutely simple way. The plurality in God and the variety of his activities exist only from a human point of view. The master had to cancel the basic principle of Modists about the exposure of being from the front, from the direction of real first substances. Gandavus clarifies the term “*quoad nos*” given in the school of Modists by the fact that the objective essence in God differs only in the way of definition (*secundum rationem*). This mode of being is given in the mode *simpliciter*, because otherwise there would be a substantial multiplicity in God. Gandavus defines habitus as the minimal being (*esse diminutum*) of things perceived intentionally and given only in divine thought. Then the objective being of divine intentions entails a potential character and in no way endangers actualized simplicity of Divine Being. The relationship between Creator and creation is determined by the three basic determinations of the exemplar (*triplici ratione*), which was presented in the previous chapter.

“In God, these three aspects differ only in their definitions and they are given with regard to his being in the same way. They differ only nominally (*differentes solo nomine*), namely: the divine essence as the pure act of creation; the intentions regarding creation; the actual performance of creation given in creation (*deus* *creativus, creaturus et creans*).” [[409]](#footnote-409)

The first purpose is given in the classical scenario of creative causality, which is given in the eternal divine essence, which creates real things *ex nihilo* (*deus creativus*). Objectivity does not exist on the first level. The creative causality is real, and therefore this *actus essendi* makes a component of the divine essence (*esse in*). The second determination establishes the ideal measure of being in the act of the pure intentionality of divine thought, which is oriented towards the exemplars intended in the divine essence (*deus creaturus*). God wants his creative thoughts to exist objectively and eternally in his pure creative being. The active participle of the future proves that this intentional pre-existence of all things as objects of divine thought and divine will establishes the possibility of future creation, since they are given only as a pure possibility. In the mode of *creabilia*, the set of intentional objects forms a world of objective meaning that keeps an exemplary character. This diacosmos of *tertium ens* exists in a mythical manner in divine thinking, but is already intentionally turned towards creation in the mode of future actions (*esse ad*). The primary act of intentionality endows all objects of the divine will and cognition thus given with the exemplary form of being. The objective beingness is given in the mode of the exemplary relativity. Let us see Simplicius′s hypostatizes the category of relation (τῷ δὲ πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεσθαι, *In Simpl. Cat*. 61.9‒10). Being of the third kind is thematized objectively *ex nihilo* as an intentional object conceived and referred only to the simple divine existence. Objectivity is given on the exemplary divine level, to be as *absolute* in relation to the totality of real created being. It is separated from it, because it forms an objective component of the divine essence (*rationes exemplares*). The third determination shows the objective unity between the exemplars intended by God and their actual being in creation (*deus creans*). The objective mode “*esse ad*” became a creative fact thanks to the divine will. The supreme demiurge, in the act of the first real deduction, led the objective being from his mind into the actuality of the created world and revealed them in the Aristotelian mode of sensual and intellectual cognition in the mode “*quoad nos*.” Objectivity is given at the third level with regard to the relative being the totality of real created things, because it became an objective component of creation (*rationes seminales*). The second level of the objective divine intentionality created an ideal substantial infinite measure of objectivity in the mode of *deus creaturus*; the third level ensured its finite substantial realization and imitation in the creation in the mode of *deus creans*.

The threefold aspect of the divine essence established the three-stage construction of objective ontotheological metaphysics in the mode: divine being—objective being—real being. Following the pattern of Bonaventure, Gandavus created a twofold analogy of the exemplary objective being in the divine mind and the seminal-objective being in the created things. As a result, a new metaphysical system was created, which later became known as *analogia entis*. Bonaventura’s architecture of twofold rule received the first metaphysical form as modern *resolutio* of being. Scotus took over the ontotheological structure of metaphysics in this trinitarian form. He modified it by abolishing the objective spirit of God, which is given by reflexive intentionality. He transferred this sphere of objectivity to Aristotelian metaphysics and made it operate in the mode of objective hypostases that exist in creation and not in modern God. The trinitarian system of the second Averroism thus became the modern dualism between the real and the objective concept of being. Following Scotus, postmodern Spinoza transformed the triadic structure into a dual one by shifting objectivity directly into nature in the mode of *deus creans* (*natura naturans*). Spinoza, like Scotus, abolished Gandavus’s objective production of exemplars in God. In the epoch of the death of modern God, Spinoza transposed the creative causality into the fully objectified nature. Unlike Scotus, this postmodern Avicennist introduced the direct Neoplatonic emanation into creation, following the example of Jewish Neoplatonic mystics and David of Dinant. Following the rule of *dativus incommodi*, Scotus and after him Spinoza declared the sphere of divine objectivity to be unnecessary. After the intervention of Spinoza, anthropomorphic God ceased to act and think. Since the end of the 17th century, he entered the vegetative state of mind. Metaphysically empty God of *Modernorum* in the epoch of mythology thus fulfilled the classical kenotic destiny of Messiah as the divine servant mentioned in the *Letter to Philippians* (ἐκένωσεν, *Phil* 2:7). Homer’s epic knows this kenotic myth in the form of the story about the young man named Tithonos. The work *Homeric Hymns* describes how the goddess of the dawn Eos fell in love with that young man (*Hymni Homerici* 5.218–247). The goddess Eos asked Zeus to grant immortality to him, but she forgot about the gift of eternal youth. Tithonos remained immortal; however, the senile appearance and decrepitude brought him into the same vegetative state as the soul in Hades. Henry of Ghent did not go that far in the destruction of modern God, because he was the first to establish his nihilistic and kenotic figure. Gandavus projects in God Avicennian intentions in the mode of divine potentialities. Put in the individuality and intimacy of Divine Being, they objectively generate all possibilities of his free creative will. The nihilistic sense of being is defined as an objectively given relation to divine intentions (*esse ad*), which endows that kind of being with the first determination in the form of objectively given identity. The determination of the real world in its actuality is separated from divine intentionality and, understandably, from the divine substance as well. The ontological statute is not a Platonic idea given as a subsistent being; there is no multiplicity of Platonic ideas as substances in God. Bonaventure’s exemplary objectivity passes through the mode “*esse ad*” into its seminal form exercised in the creation. Gandavus took over this demiurgic scenario from Olivi’s concept of intimate causality of the will (*potentia substantialis*, ch. 5.1.2). The exemplars objectively existing in the divine essence pass into creation according to the scenario of *Liber de causis*. In contrast to Neoplatonic hypostatized forms in *Liber de causis*, the determination of things in divine thinking is given only potentially. It makes the first determination of being in the mode of *esse diminutum*. The divine and human subject considers this objective *scibile* in the mode of Grosseteste′s intuitive insight (*intellectus*). All postmodernists repeated that objective view of non-existent *tertium ens*, beginning with Arnauld as the first Cartesian (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Husserl completed this eidetic view in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism described by Heidegger.

The sovereign divine subjectivity, given in the act of volitional and intellectual affection for the potential creation, established universal similarity of being within the framework of *analogia entis*. The analogy is determined by the necessary products given between the actualized divine substance and the potential products of their thinking and volition. As a result, the primary sphere of the relationship “subject—object” given by examplars and intentions, was born in the modern God. On the first floor of modern *resolutio* of being is the absolutely given *obiectum*, which is intentionally conceived by God in this specific kind of existence. The intentionality given in the direction of creation has an exemplary and fully objective character. At the lower level, created things maintain the real relationship between each other, determined as a categorical determination of substance according to Aristotle (*relatio realis*), which includes the secondary creative activity of human agents. Both relations form an ontotheological whole of univocally conceived unity of being in the mode of objective analogy (*analogia entis*). This scenario established the basis of anthropological construction that is proper of modern metaphysics. Like this, we have found the original place where the objectivity emerged. Rufus conceived the first form of this analogy by the mathematical form of Oxfordian Fallacy (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). Gandavus opened *via Modernorum* to take direction of ontology and modern humanities. Reformed humanist Goclenius systematized it for the first time, since he was a recognized European expert in the study of witchcraft (ch. 5.5). God received an objective hypostatized mind and he became a modern *individuum*. The creation of a new sphere of intentional intimacy in God was made according to Simplicius’s habitual determination of relation as being of the third kind (πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς, *esse ad*). The sphere of objectivity cannot be given in God as another substance; it must become potential and creative intention. This potency received an exemplary—permanent, i.e., objective—habitual character. According to the second Averroism, the substantial plurality can be given in man, but by no means in God. Divine schizophrenia keeps but an objective character and not a substantial one, as in the case of the modern human subject. The *Quodlibet* *IX* literally quotes the key part of Simplicius’s commentary on *Categories* in Moerbeke’s translation (ed. Pattin, t. I, pp. 280.85–281.90). The work established the first objective relation to *tertium ens* that was done in divine intentionality.

“There is [in God] no habitual determination, because it is unthinkable. There is no otherness given to something else, as there is in the predication of habitus with regard to substance. One category is different from the other and they have a different relationship to each other. In these categorical determinations, how we can think of the relation to another (*in istis ipsum 'ad aliquid' considerari*) differently than in the mode of analogy (*secundum aliquam analogiam*); as it is when we say about the cause that it exists where the effect is (*causas dicimus ibi et causata*)?” [[410]](#footnote-410)

Reference to Simplicius’s term “*ad aliquid*” (πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς) states that there is no determination of the second substance in the sphere of the first objectivity. The argument shows patent *apaideusía* of modernists. Gandavus takes Neoplatonist’s determination of *habitus* to be a genuine Aristotelician term. Habitus as a hypostasis cannot exist in God, since he is absolutely simple. The quotation, in accordance with Simplicius, conceives the objective aspect of being as taken from the direction of God to creation (*'ad aliquid' considerari*) and it is created analogically (*secundum aliquam analogiam*). God objectively creates things by intending them, not by actually creating them as Platonic ideas. There can be no multiplicity of being in the sphere of the simple divine essence. Categorical determinations are now made by analogy, since the primacy of the second substance is established by the hypostatized subjectivity of the divine demiurge. The categorial predication from God to creation is given in the intentional mode “*esse ad*.” Let us return to the self-possession of the will in Olivi′s Terminus “*potentia substantialis*” (ch. 5.1.3). As a substance of the third kind, the will is itself in the intimate act of the actualized given freedom and is thus free with regard to every possible kind of volition. Gandavus gives the divine intentionality in the term “*esse ad*” similar meaning as Olivi used for the intimacy of free will. God received an objectively given intimacy that contains the potency of his demiurgic and exemplarily given will. The carrier of that objective et intentional relationship is the divine substance, because Henry cannot predict alterity in God in the mode “substance—accident.” In the case of divine simplicity, Henry could not apply the classical distinction of the second Averroism between *potentia substantialis* and *accidentalis*. Plurality is given in God only intentionally in the mode of pure potency, so that substantive plurality does not enter into the simple divine essence.

In divine demiurgic thinking, there is an intentional and only potentially given sphere of the objective diacosmos. The exemplary relationship of God to creation can be assumed to be valid at the level of creative subjectivity in the mode of creative potency. The intentional object forms a minimal portion of the being (*esse diminutum*) for any conceived object. Set in that relation “subject—object,” every intended object in the divine sphere is objectively given, since the divine reflection is determined only by intentionality. This quasi-substantial relationship is given from the direction of the divine subject in the mode “*obiective*” as it relates in an archetypal and exemplarily manner to the creation. Therefore, it is given universally and applies to the whole of creation within the framework of the newly formed ontotheological metaphysics. The path of vision directed towards the totality of being is now given in the divine mode “*esse ad*” as absolute, necessary and worked out in the mode of pure exemplary objectivity. Conceived in an objective form of Aristotle’s Immovable Mover or Epicurus’s *deus otiosus*,God potentially intends the whole of creation through his mind and the will, thereby establishing an archetypal level of objectivity given *per prius*. After the establishment of that kind of objective deism, modernists could take the broad and convenient path that conceptualized this or that objective being in the mode of “*ad aliquid*.” Scotus processes this objective “*aliquitas*” in such a way that it is not in the divine substance, and creates a full-fledged determination of the objective being (ch. 5.3.3). Descartes and Husserl repeat the objective view “*ad aliquid*” from the direction of the absolutely given subject as *cogito*, since it is based on human subjectivity. Primary level of objectivity postulates that the exemplar proceeds from modern God in the concept of “*exsistere*” according to the above-mentioned relationship between the *deus creaturus* and *deus creans*. Objectivity is fully manifested in the third way when anthropomorphic God relates to the world. In that case, the whole of creation participates in the exemplary definition of objective being in divine thinking in the mode of the seminal species. The objective analogy of God and creation is given by the fact that the objective aspect of divine intentionality analogically reflects its essence in the direction of creation. Thus the objective *resolutio* of the whole of being was created in the mode of mythological analogy, which the Latin West adopted in the term “*analogia entis*.” The following quotation provides the first objective *aspectus* of being according to the hermeneutic question of “how” the objective being arises in the sphere of divine intentionality and how it illuminates the world.

“In the third way of relations, which concerns the correspondence (*modum relationis, qui consistit in commensurationibus*), God refers towards creation by his essence (*essentia sua*). Created things refer to God, because the divine essence is the only measure of all creation (*unica mensura omnium creaturarum*) by the definition of its essential simplicity (*ratione qua est essentia simpliciter*). Through his own essence defined in this way, God recognizes the quantity and degree of the essence in all created things in their original simplicity, as they are given by and of themselves. This divine essence, given in the mode of its own measure, therefore clearly recognizes the essences of created things according to the degree of their determination (*secundum gradum determinatum*). This is possible because the divine Essence contains the perfection of things, as can be seen from the following discussion.” [[411]](#footnote-411)

The objective construction of being is ensured by the new set of generic determinations established by mathematical and geometric abstraction (*in commensurationibus*). The quotation asserts that every real substance is given *per se* in the mode of subsistence and insistence (*esse in*). Thanks to its own simplicity of being (*per se et ex se*), the divine substance given *simpliciter* includes transcendental determinations of comprehensiveness and perfection in objectively given determination (*quantitas essentiae creaturae secundum gradum determinatum*). Simplicius defines both categorical determinations (*relatio, habitudo*) as the highest genera of being outside the first and the second substance. The introduction of new genera results in an order given by different determination of subsistent forms (gradus) and thus the determination of those forms with regard to the greater or lesser degree of the finally also materially given actuality (*quantitas*). Thanks to analogous occurrence of quantity and quality in the primary sphere of divine objectivity, a new kind of objectively measurable identity arises, made in the mode of objective graduality and quantity. Since every created substance exists in reality (*actus essendi*), it also objectively “exsists” in a determined relationship to God. Graduality shifted from actualized first substances to the pure potentiality of concepts. It was unacceptable for the first Averroism. Potency cannot exist more or less, because it is potency; accidents belong to the actualized substance determined by movement and change. Gandavus concocted a kind of ontotheological metaphysics that operate objective divine causality. Objective potentialities given by an essential definition take the place of real first substances. This is the typical version of Oxfordian Fallacy, in which the essential definition replaced the predication of causally acting first substances. The eclipse of the first substance caused God to become the objective measure of the beingness of things in the mode of analogical univocity (*est unica mensura*). About the year 1285, the modernism produced a complete predication “*ad unum*” no longer in the mode of mathematical, but of ontotheological analogy.

The measurability of God and creation in the mode of mathematical analogy (*in commensurationibus*) contains the core of ontotheological structure that characterizes the age of modernity. Suárez transformed into a modern ontology and Leibniz into a mathematical model of the world. The quotation establishes a further definition of the existential dative, whereby objectivity is signified in the mode of *dativus mensurae* (ch. 4). Let us summarize the fundamentals of ontotheology of *Modernorum*. It is based on specific kind of proportionality that forms later conception of *analogia entis*. The objective relation “*essentia—relatio—intentum*” exists in modern God and it establishes the exemplar as a new being of the third kind; then, God copies it in the creation. The exemplar is created in divine intentionality in several steps. It forms the intentional object of the divine essence (*esse in1*) and it is habitually given as an objectified form of his thinking (*habitus1*). The relation of God to the exemplar is of intentional nature (*relatio1*). The first triad of determinations establishes primary “*existere*” of the exemplar in the minimal portion of objective being (*esse in2*). The primary relationship of the exemplar is given with regard to the unlimited divine substance (*esse ad1*). With regard to the future creation, the objective exemplar occurs as an archetypal objective being (*esse in2*). It provides the highest degree of exemplary rationality, which is objectively given for the whole of being outside God (*esse ad2*). The creative modification of the objective-exemplary relationship in the real creation gives rise to modern objectivity. Now, a replication of this divine objectivity is possible in creation. Objectivity is given in creation as the ultimate measure of all being in the direction of God (*relatio2*), which equips every object of this relationship with the objectively and habitually (*habitus2*) given measure of being. The new hypostatized form of the relationship (*relatio2*) is objectively given at the level of creation (*esse ad2*). It is manifested by limited and contingent real substances (*esse in3*). Thanks to the acquired intellect and the enlightenment of modern God, the *illuminati* received the substantial form of *anima intellectiva* (*habitus3*). Thanks to its innate habitus, they recognize objective species in their objective habitus (*habitus2*), which is also present in the contingent being of first substances (*esse in3*). This objective relationship is established at the lower level of empirical scientia (*esse ad3*) with the help of Aristotelian abstraction from the senses in the mode “*quoad nos*” (*relatio3*). But the philosophically proficient *illuminati* does not need this empirical detour and consider the exemplary rationality in its eidetic, God-given hypostatized forms (*relatio2*, *esse in2, esse ad2*). This vision of objective heavenly Jerusalem is ensured by the correspondence of the hypostatized essences, habitus and relations made according to Rufus’s theory of the truth as assimilation (*coaequatio*). Both levels of exemplary and seminal objectivity correspond to each other in Jamblichus’s mode “Unlimited versus Limited” that Gandavus worked on to the modern form. In contrast to Neoplatonism, the archetypal sphere of exemplars forms only a component of divine intentions and not of one’s own created and actually existing substances.[[412]](#footnote-412) The objectivity of the universal species of all kinds is given by the fact that they exist in the divine intentionality as a pure possibility and not as a created entity (*qua numquam futura erant in existentia*). The entire creation then participates in this being given by divine intentions made in objective exemplary and objectively seminal manner.

The objective structure of modern ontotheology was established as a network of mutual relations given as exemplars in creation and as objective intentions in God and in man. The analogy works in the model of metaphysical and mathematical abstraction, because the exemplarity concerns the relations of measure, degree and quantity. The category of hypostatized *relatio* made in the mode “*esse ad*” acquired a fundamental value, since it elaborated the first form of objective *resolutio* of being. There are two reasons for the importance of newly discovered Simplicius′s metaphysics. Firstly, the level of divine intentionality received the first dose of the objective being (*esse diminutum*). Secondly, through this habitual and quantifiable relationship made out of analogous and measurable determination of being, the new metaphysics established the relation *per prius* to the whole of creation that was worked out in the mode of “*ad aliquid*.” The first philosophy sought by Aristotle and related to being of first substances was transformed into an intentionally created security related to Neoplatonic essences and to the solar intellect of *illuminati*. The development of *tertium ens* in modern times denoted an essential and eidetic conception of intentionality inherited from Simplicius and Avicenna. Blind modernity is guided by the objective solar myth, which goddesses of academic Revenge offered to pious Augustinians. In the underworld managed by objectively thinking Furies, quite understandably only the objective simulacrum of the Sun shines. Real wisdom of Parmenides follows the path of the real Sun. The joyful science of *illuminati* established the epoch of objective solar mythology made at the level of individual actualization of objective essences. Gandavus’s revolutionary *fiat*, which *ex nihilo* created modern God and the objective world, represents the first nihilistic *factum*, which established the modern history of the Latin West. By the intentionality given on the basis of the hypostatized active intellect, the being got the meaning only from the subject (*Ge-Stell*). Gandavus fabricated the donation of objectivity that makes a historial event of Being (*Ereignis*). He made out the donation of a nihilist being (*Es gibt*) done in the mode of *dativus mensurae*. God is the highest measure of objective determinations, because in him these determinations are given to an infinite extent and in and of themselves. The divine essence establishes the intentional exemplar and it forms the first level of relations. Its primary being is given in the divine essence (*deus creativus*), but manifests itself in the future creation (*deus creaturus*). The second level of relations considered by human intellect is formed by the objective definition of the thing (Bonaventure’s *ratio seminalis*), which is analogously reflected in the real created thing (*deus creans*). Both levels create the complete threefold link of the new metaphysics conceived *modo geometrico*. The ratio of God and creation is manifested in the central function of the exemplar, which makes the universal and univoke medium in the ontotheological form as *demonstratio*. The transition from the unlimited nature of objectivity to the limited one is given by the fact that the divine intimate essence, melted into the demiurgic intention, represents a sovereign definition and the definition (*ratio*) of what is intended by examplars. Therefore, this ratio is habitually given in the mode “*ad aliquid*” and established the exemplary-objective measure of creation. This basic divine ratio functions as an intentional relationship (*esse ad*) and is passed rationally in the mode of analogy in the direction of creation. As a result, a complete ontotheological structure of the first modern metaphysics was formed that is illuminated by the sun of intellect. Henry created a sophisticated construction of objectivity that took up the Avicennist Neoplatonism of Parisian modernists. He included in that form of the second Averroism Aristotelian categorical predication given according to Simplicius. According to Henry, Aristotle and Averroes quite rightly asserted that nothing else can exist in God but a pure essential act.[[413]](#footnote-413) The object of thought in God (*divinum intellectum*) cannot be an actualized form or the substance in God conceived in the manner of Neoplatonic *tertium ens*. This would determine by the divine intellect from the outside, which is excluded (*nihil est obiectum per se divini intellectus*). The preceding quotations have shown that nothing objective can be added to the first sphere of the separated divine essence (*primo modo nihil est obiectum per se divini intellectus*). The first form of objectivity arises in the act of divine intentionality, whereby in divine thinking the intentionally conceived object arises as a new being of the third kind. Only God in modern times has the right to a full unity of one’s own substance in the mode of existential Ipseität. What paranoid modernity states as a privilege valid only for non-existing modern God, the first Averroism of Siger attributed to every real existing person.

The path to the objective determination of the exemplar was taken by Bonaventure and Olivi by separating the minimal portion of beingness from pure nullity through the form of the excluded third (*non repugnat esse*, ch. 5.1.2). Henry brought this model to the first sphere of being in God, where he excluded the emergence of a new substance; he left in God but logically and psychologically made intentional contents. Bonaventure, referring to the Book of Wisdom, already incorporated mathematical abstraction into the ontotheological determination of the existent as a transcendental determination of the thing by measure (ch. 4.1.3). Henry considers the biblical and Neoplatonic determination of *tertium ens* to be authentic Aristotelianism, because it is contained in Simplicius’s commentary on *Categories* with reference to Pythagorean Archytas. Let us return to the mythological effect of the divine comedy explained due to the transition from archaic and musical Pythagoreanism to Neoplatonism. Furies were certainly pleased with the new act of the theatrical comedy called “objectivity.” The quoted *Quodlibet IX* changed the order of abstraction according to Kilwardby’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy, since it put the objective-metaphysical abstraction as the first one and the mathematical abstraction as the second one. Every being is intended by God, ergo it is intended subjectively and potentially in the mode *per prius*. This form of categorical predication establishes the objective-exemplary determination of being. The new determination determines the minimal measure of the beingness given by the objective *habitus* and the *relatio* as a kind of hypostatized *res*. The primacy of the mathematical tripartite gives rise to the objective form of analogy in the mode *inmediate* and *per prius*. God really acts causally through his essential will, but objectively considers the objective causality in himself. Gandavus shifted the category of relationship to the divine subject, thereby fundamentally changed the entire system of ontotheology. God became a human being by separating the impenetrable sphere of divine intimacy (*esse in1*) from its demiurgic rationality, will and intentionality (*esse ad1*). This gave rise to a demiurgic multiplicity of beings of the third kind in the modern God that became a schizophrenic. The death of that modern divine individual was inevitable. Modern God had objectively and necessarily to become a man, so that the modern man could become a modern God in the mode of objective ontotheology. Thanks to the new form of the mathematical trinomial, the *Doctor Solemnis* left four types of objective analogy of being to victorious modernity. The following quotation shows the first objective *resolutio* of being in the Latin West.

“With regard to the first of these modes, which is given in relation to the form, it must be said that the members of formal relationship can divide the form in the mode of similarity in four ways. The first way is made simply and separately (*simpliciter et absolute*), and the form in one link has no kind of binding to the second link. Another type of relationship is given with regard to the second link communicating the form, and this is done in three ways. Either the relationship is created intentionally (*secundum rationem intentionis*) or by imitation (*secundum rationem imitationis*) or by similarity in the context of production (*secundum rationem productionis*).” [[414]](#footnote-414)

There are four kinds of similarity of form. The unity of the objectively given similarity and the analogical univocity is achieved by communication of the objectively given form (*communicantia in forma*). The first similarity has a completely separate character, because the divine essence is not divisible and cannot be communicated in any form of similarity (*nulla praerogativa secundum formam*). The essence is shared only by Persons in the Divine Trinity through the divine form of communication. Between God and creation, there is no similarity as to the essence, also the first model of similarity is not possible. At the level of the creation, we perceive this form of divine being only indirectly, through the insight into the objective form of pure eidetic being. This first identity does not refer to anything else, because it is absolutely given. The second form of the community of forms (*alio modo*) establishes modern objectivity in three different ways. The relationship is given intentionally (*secundum rationem intentionis*) or by imitation (*secundum rationem imitationis*) or by similarity in the context of production (*secundum rationem productionis*). Let us analyze these relations of the forms of the objective dative (*dativus obiectivus*, ch. 4). The key is the separation of *dativus possessivus* related to the divine essence (*esse in1*) from the communication of the divine intention made in the mode of *dativus auctoris* (*esse ad1*). The *dativus possessivus* is excluded within the framework of objectivity, thanks to the separateness of the divine essence. To her belongs the intimate fullness of being. The relationship of the intimacy possessing the Divine Essence is separated from the other three relationships, which are based on the manifest Divine objectivity. The expression of divine intentions made in the mode of *dativus auctoris* (*esse ad1*) established already the external communication of exemplars in the mode “*ad aliquid*.” God creates in himself the potency of the type “to be something other than the essence,” which is the basic form of objective *tertium ens*. In this way, the hypostasis and objective relation of divine intentionality to divine essence (*esse ad1*) come into being. Gandavus distinguished *dativus possessivus* related to the essence from the act of divine intentionality given as *dativus auctoris*. Modern God is the author of exemplary thinking, since it established the objective production of creative capital (*creabilia*). That objective capital becomes a real one due to real production of the created world. God of Gandavus became an exemplary capitalist and investor in the futuristic mode “*semel—semper*.” The project of the creation of the world is objectively given *ex nihilo* and represents the first entrepreneurial intention, which is given in a fully nihilist, objective and exemplary manner. After the death of this simulacrum, today’s banksters accomplished the age of metaphysical nihilism.

The subjectivity of God is completely separated (*absolute*) thanks to his intimately given existence. Objectivity begins in the mode of *dativus auctoris* in the sphere of divine intentional relations. These emerge from the perspective of creation in the mode of infinity and thus also of imitability vis-à-vis finite creation (*esse ad2*). Thanks to divine infinity, the sphere of secondary objectivity forms a component of the ontotheological structure of creation as a quantitative measure and gradual imitability. The twofold form of the exemplar as divine intention *ad intra*, and as the objective measure *ad extra* establishes the analogical form of similarity between God and creation. This makes possible the communication of the objective idioms of the modern God in the two modes, i.e., through imitation (*secundum rationem imitationis*) or through similarity in the context of production (*secundum rationem productionis*). What modern God intends by mythological exemplars that is recognized objectively by the modern subject. From the point of view of hermeneutics, this opens up the question of objective *communicatio idiomatum*, which was adopted from dogmatic theology into modern ontotheology. This communication of objective idioms gives rise to two further determinations of the objective dative. The analogy of objectivity in God and in creation is established by imitation (*secundum rationem imitationis*) or by similarity in the context of production (*secundum rationem productionis*). The following part of the ninth question (*articuli* 2–4) clarifies the question of the imitation of exemplars in creation (*secundum rationem imitationis*) cited above. The possibility of imitation establishes the status of the objective being in created things according to degree and measure (*mensura, gradus*). The analogy also shows the way in which the objective *ens* became the universal measure of all that exists in the mode of demiurgic production (*dativus mensurae*). Divine intentionality has an absolute character because this sphere of objectivity became the fundament of the first postmodern theodicy. Leibniz remodeled Gandavus’s primary sphere of meaning that was put directly in divine thought. Leibniz took up that intentionality in the mode of mathematical analogy.

“God is consideration and necessity, that is, the necessary nature of things (*nature essentielle des choses*) makes the object of his consideration insofar as it is contained in eternal truths (*en tant qu’il consiste dans des vérités éternelles*). But this object of consideration is internal (*cet objet est interne*) and it makes part of divine reflection (*et se trouve dans l’entendement divin*). Right in here (*c’est là-dedans que se trouve*), there is not only the original form of good (*la forme primitive du bien*), but also the origin of evil (*mais encore l’origine du mal*). It is precisely this realm of eternal truth (*c’est la région des vérités éternelles*) that must be given in place of the matter (*qu’il faut mettre à la place de la matière*), provided we seek the source of things (*la source des choses*).” (*Théodicée* I, § 20; ed. Janet, p. 97)

Leibniz must objectively explain the origin of evil (*l’origine du mal*), which, of course, does not exist in the sphere of a divine being. However, this evil already exists objectively in God, because it is given in intentional mode of *dativus auctoris*. Modern God intends in himself every possible good and also every possible evil. The sovereign good God is objectively responsible for the evil in the world, because he freely allows it. As a result, the dualism of good and evil shifted directly into the objectively exemplary sphere of creation given in divine intentionality (*dans l’entendement divin*). Postmodern God is essentially good (*dativus possessivus*), but objectively evil (*dativus auctoris*). In postmodern view of Leibniz, objectively schizophrenic God of Gandavus became a moral schizophrenic. Leibniz created a new form of exemplary objectivity of good and also evil in God and completed the path of modern nihilism through the ethical dative (*dativus ethicus*). The modes of mathematical similarity show the ontotheological structure in which the objective being, the good and the evil refer to God as the Giver of forms (*dativus finalis*). The unity of God and the world shifted to mathematical analogy, which abolished metaphysical abstraction, and therefore the very essence of metaphysics. The divine intentionality produces objective *scibile*, because the cognition in the framework of mathematical abstraction does not go into reality, but to the objective being. Gandavus created the exemplar as an objective version of Rufus’s *scibile* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2) and expanded the modern repertoire of Avicenna’s *individuum vagum* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The transformation of real causality into an objective essentiality, given in the mode of theological dogmatics, gave rise to the modern medium of scientific objective mythology. This curious middle link of modern scientific proof replaced Aristotle’s middle link of the demonstration that relates to real actions of first substances. With Gandavus established the cognition in a completely objective form put in the context of Oxfordian Fallacy. Henry returns to the beginning of *via Modernorum* opened by Grosseteste′s interpretation of archetypal attributes in God (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). In the mode of basic primary objectivity, the divine intention operates through exemplars as final and formal measure, which is relative, i.e., separated from creation by intentional divine relationship (*creabilia*). Due to these transcendental qualities given a priori, being related to God performs an analogical imitation of original exemplary objectivity (*in commensurationibus*). The mysticism of the Baroque period focuses on the question of the divine imitation (*secundum rationem imitationis*). This mystical imitation of Christ given in the secular spirituality of *devotio Moderna* since the 15th century, was transformed into mathematical form by Leibniz and Pascal. After the death of objectively conceived God, modern worship of mathematics became a universal mysticism of the West.

Henry of Ghent created the first scheme of objectivity for *vulgus philosophicus* that made the objective truth to be understandable in the anthropological and dogmatic scenario. The reality of the first substance is no longer necessary for the objective form of cognition. It has been replaced by a mythical projection of the modern subject towards modern God in order to recognize the world by his intentionality. Both modern subjects became an aspect of mystical and objective imagination of *Modernorum*. After the abolition of critical thinking in the rue du Fouarre, there were hardly any limits given by reality. Modernism, under the leadership of objective Furies, brought out the full cultural hegemony of the one naturally and supernaturally given truth. Gandavus as a pious Augustinian does not yet know the world of digital matrix. Exemplars were not of human creation, since they arose out of divine intentions. The eclipse of the first substance is replaced by the objective academic eclipse of critical thinking, which is manifested by a historically effective form of *damnatio memoriae*. The university was previously regarded as a source of theoretical knowledge in the mode of *vita contemplativa* (Plato’s σχολή, Aristotle’s βίος θεωρητικός). After the condemnation of 1277, it became the place of philosophical tales. Modernism imposed sophistic knowledge of *doctores Latini* with the help of ideological accusations of Averroism, the theory of twofold truth, etc. that were manipulated within the framework of authoritarian interventions. In the mode of *Verkehrung ins Gegeteil* placed irrational modernists their own sophisms on the figure of the Old Testament scapegoat to drive out the wise thinkers out of the Univeristy as demonic figures (Aristotle, Averroes, Siger). The college of *doctores Latinorum* expelled this demonic Other into the academic desert (*Leviticus* 16:10). The objectively written history of the dispute over so-called Averroism was written by the victorious modernist side. The archaic hermeneutics led by Muses revealed the historial sense of Averroism, whose objective form was created under the hidden guidance of objectively educated Furies. The accusation of Averroism displaced from the history of thought the school of the first Averroism, and especially brilliant connoisseurs of Averroes in the rue du Fouarre. After this objective exorcism, a new *intelligentia spiritualis* appeared on *via Modernorum* that was finally established at the University of Paris. Then, the *illuminati* could finally begin the academic conquest of the objective promised land full of modern *scibilia* and they could tame the disobedient matter and human resources with the help of ontotheologically sanctified capitalism. The sophistry of the truth based on that kind of authoritarian disposition became fully evident in the next generation. The new political philosophy was born at the University of Paris as a result of political disputes concerning the papal bull *Unam Sanctam* (ch. 6). Hegel absolutized this postmodern subject in the well-known drama of alienated consciousness, which gathers the redeeming capital of historically reflected species in the self-reflexive memory of absolute spirit. Critical Marx returned Hegel’s capital given in the salutary consciousness of the absolute spirit back to Olivi’s capitalist subject of the will. This subject is the real treasure of the nihilistic epoch of capitalism and the source of planetary power. The restitution of the original universal value of the exemplar made through real and cognized things forms another epochal *Lichtung*, this time for the Neoplatonism and Renaissance humanism with according to the motto “*restitutio ad integrum*.” Roman legal claim of “*restitutio in integrum*” shifted in the Renaissance to legal and textual value of archival sources and biblical manuscripts, which formed the basis of truth as theological, philosophical or historical security. In this way, the falsification of the past in the style of the Donation of Constantine (*Constitutum Constantini*) was discovered. The restituted knowledge, which was first linked to Renaissance archives and now to contemporary databases, forms the extended world of the modern subject in the mode of Rufus’s *coaequatio*. The term “*locus specierum*” or “*thesaurus specierum*” became historical fate of modernism and postmodernism. They took up that kind of *memoria* in order to supplant actualized first substances and to replace them in the mode of objective archiving with this or that form of information or financial capital.

## 5.3 Birth of Objective Metaphysics (Duns Scotus)

The major task of hermeneutics dealing with historiality, historicity and history is to find an answer to complicated question that relates to *dativus incommodi*. How did the new metaphysics of *Modernorum* solve or dismiss the disputes of previous generations that founded schools of the first and second Averroism? Bonaventure, who for the first time actively formed the modern image of man and God, did not need to worry about imperfections and contradictions of modernity. Gandavus and Scotus started their career after the condemnation of 1277 and they had to defend the contradictory picture of the world, God and man, which the first modernists handed over to next generations. Exegesis of Gandavus′s system has shown that the anthropomorphic image of God as an exemplary objectivist needed a permanent theodicy in order to keep it working. This sophisticated simulacrum formed the basis of a new metaphysic, so it had to remain intellectually alive. God dwells intimately in himself; he intends his thinking in a subjective way and thus establishes the meaning of existence objectively and exemplarily; then he reshapes this objective existence through his will and sends it into the world. Gandavus created the first system of capitalist metaphysics, which is based on a mythological form of ontotheology. God as the first and fundamental demiurge produces an exemplary form of objectivity in the mode “*semel—semper*.” The objective demiurgic technology initially runs in the mode of divine intentionality, which produces the realm of exemplaria (*esse ad1*). They form paradigmatic *rationes seminales* in creation (*esse ad2*). Man as a secondary demiurge takes these *rationes*, transforms them into his own ideas (*regula agentis creati*) and runs his own capitalist diacosmos, which has become a new kind of world empire. The academic *illuminati* at the universities of Oxford and Paris fulfilled Sibylle’s prophecy that the great cycle of ages is born anew (*magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo*, *Eclogue* 4.5). The metaphysics of *Modernorum* evolved from Henry’s metaphysical ontotheology to Leibniz’s mathematical theodicy and then to Spinoza’s specific atheism and finally to Nietzsche’s complete nihilism. That kind of forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) respond to another fundamental question of “how” the capitalist being defined by Olivi became an instrument of modern scientific technology (*dativus instrumenti*). The imitation of divine objectivity in creation concerns the era of the voluntarist and capitalist demiurge, whose epochal effect was already launched by Bonaventure, and after him by Olivi in the mode of capitalist *dativus instrumenti*. After the death of modern God, objectivity became a purely human capital. Modern God as well as his modern creator Gandavus are guided by objective intentionality made in *dativus auctoris* in order to create modern objects according to the free and rational will (*secundum rationem productionis*). For postmodernism, mathematics and formal logic are sufficient to create the unity of the world. The evolution was completed in the nihilistic stage of thinking by neopositivism, which abolished metaphysics as useless speculation.

Scotus intervened in the gigantomachy of modern substance and objectivity in a fundamental and final way. It is necessary to identify his role in shaping the beginning of the positive history of objective metaphysics (*Beginn*). Scotus observed all fundamental shortcomings of *Modernorum*, since it studied all contradictory attempts made by main representatives of the second Averroism. Scotus revised the ontotheological construction completed by the last great representative of the second Averroism, which Gandavus, together with Aegidius, had actively prepared for the Paris condemnation of 1277. Scotus was a Franciscan tertiary brother and worked as *sententiarius* at Oxford about 1290–1300; as *baccalarus formatus* he went to Paris to study and lecture during the turbulent university years of 1302–1307; he became Master of Divinity about 1305. The logician and metaphysician of Oxford paid tribute to the local school of second Averroism and he highly respected the Thomism of Avicennists in Paris and Oxford. He created a new Aristotelian metaphysics that replaced the ontotheology of Gandavus. As the first modern metaphysician, Scotus rejected Augustinian exemplars and Neoplatonic emanations that Avicenna reinstated. He took up Gandavus’s objective metaphysics and remodeled it to the first philosophy that was based on Avicennistic Thomism founded by Aegidius. The second Averroism did not find a full unity of being, but Scotus succeeded in finding it. The question is what kind of philosophical price he paid for it. The new unity of the being begins with logical and essential abstraction and not with the recognition of first real substances. Scotus started from Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics based on the concept of being in the mode *ens inquantum ens* and translated it into the new form of categorical predication. As a matter of principle, this form of unity does not include anything that is real, because the form of abstraction as an Avicennian *denudatio* is purely formal and essential. The first science of being renounced the search for real unity of first substances. Scotus abolished Gandavus’s ontotheological analogy of being, because it entails two erroneous premises. First: the analogy of being is based on the category of relationship and habitus that Gandavus hypostatized in the Neoplatonic manner. From the point of view of Aristotelian categorical predication, accidental predication represents an inadequate form of the unity of the being, because it is given only in the mode *per posterius* and requires the second substance. Scotus’s first step was to cancel Gandavus’s ontotheology, which proceeds from the erroneously conceived mode of analogy at the level of the accidental determinations of being. Secondly, the ontotheological form of analogy placed the similarity of being directly in the sphere of divine subjectivity. It connected God and the creation in a univocal manner in the mode of the substance of accident. Following the Thomism of Oxford and Paris, Scotus confirmed that the ontotheological construction needs the objective comitation of forms according to Avicenna. This is unacceptable, because the infinite God cannot pass into the world through the emanation of his being; even in the indirect form of intentional and exemplary activity, as it was the case with Gandavus. Scotus’s second step, therefore, accomplishes the deduction of being outside the divine subjectivity. The new form of objective deduction follows the line of Avicenna’s metaphysics that acquired a strict Aristotelian form. However, modern God is not defined in the mode *per prius* by causality as in the first Averroism, but by the objectively determined potency of the being. The establishment of the new metaphysics does not come from “*esse ad*” that was defined as divine intentionality. The basic determination of being is stated in the mode *simpliciter*, following Avicenna’s *ens inquantum ens*. As a result, it disappeared the tension between the objective divine reflections and the essential immanence. Gandavus’s term “*sincera veritas*” of pious ontotheology passed into victorious “*veritas*” of objective metaphysics.

The first step on the path that led to a new metaphysics can be found in *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* and the writing *Parva logicalia* (c. 1295). That corpus of logical writings was probably edited in Oxford in 1298–99, before Scotus’s departure to Paris. During his stay in Paris, Scotus completed the deduction of new metaphysics presented in the writing *Lectura I–II*. The lectures from Oxford and Paris were included in the corpus of disputations named *Collationes oxonienses et parisenses* (c. 1307). They contain the system of new metaphysics. The entire construction of new metaphysics is completed in the unfinished and revised work *Ordinatio I–IV*, as well as the posthumous editions of writings *Additiones* and *Theoremata*. In both of the last-mentioned works, Scotus’s students present the complete version of *scientia transcendens* that their master elaborated during his lectures in Paris (*Reportata Parisiensia*). Thinking based on Oxfordian Fallacy entered the final phase. The objectivity passed through Scotus’s metaphysics into the full *veritas* and established the second beginning of metaphysics. Newly establishes objective *veritas* made obsolete all previous attempts of the second Averroism. Taken on the philosophical level, it was nonsense and modernity was ashamed of it, since they lost the gigantomachy against the first Averroism. However, it ceased to exist after 1277 and modernists could pretend (and they still pretend) that such a school had never existed. New school of Latin sophists under Aegidius, Gandavus and Scotus started their thinking *ex nihilo*, as it has been a tradition of *via Modernorum*. After the establishment of the objectively given first science, the second Averroism passed into the Lethe. For the sake of protecting historically effective modernism, now given under the influence of fully positivist and objective Furies, the same *damnatio memoriae* was imposed on the first Averroism of rue du Fouarre. Powers of academic Revenge objectively finished their job by initiating the new stage of divine tragicomedy of thinking.

### 5.3.1 Nihilism of the First Substance

Scotus played a decisive role in the transition of objectivity to get it out of the historicity of hidden *alētheia* to the history of the positive truth as *veritas*. Preceding matrices of objectivity have shown that Aristotelian categories have lost their original meaning. It was tied to the difference between the unique existence of the first substance and the second substance, which universally states the unique being of first substances. In the second Averroism determined by the duality of soul and body, the theory of twofold cognition turned into the theory of twofold substance, Neoplatonic and Aristotelian. Scotus abolished both schools by creating a new synthesis of the substance in the mode of Avicennist Aristotelianism. The subject became the exclusive place where the original meaning of being takes place. Since Late Antiquity, the essence was conceived as a quasi-substance; the categoric value of the second substance became unclear (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The key shift occurred in the interpretation of Aristotelian writing *Categories*, especially with regard to hyparchical relationship between the first real substance and the categorically predicted second substance (*Cat*. 2a14–15). The introductory part analyzed the development of Porphyry’s indivisible substance in *Isagoge* (ἄτομος οὐσία) and its transformation in the Neoplatonic substance of the third kind (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The displacement of the first substance caused a fundamental transformation of the categorical predication in the school of the second Averroism. A new interpretation of *Categories* began in Oxford and Paris about the year 1230 and caused the decline of schools named *Logica Modernorum*. These schools adopted the Toledo-version of metaphysics made “*ad mentem Averrois*.” That newly introduced Avicennism proceeded to the predication of amphibolic meaning based on the notion of *ens inquantum ens*. Modern logicians became modern metaphysicians by abolishing the metaphysical abstraction made by the Commentator. That kind of abstraction forms the raison d’être of Aristotelian first science. The metaphysical change in the understanding of Aristotle’s *Categories* related to debate summarized in the terminus “*sufficientia praedicamentorum*” (Pini 2002, 185–89). It worked out the new justification of categories. This debate already concerns Scotus and its predecessors. The deduction of the category as the highest genus went from the modern substance of the third kind to the first triple group of relations (quality, quantity, relation). The middle position held the category of habitus, and at the end of the table was given the rest of the accidents grouped into the group of *postpraedicamenta*. The summary of that problematic development after the year 1277 was analyzed in the quoted commentary on the second book of Sentences made by Olivi (ch. 5.1.1). He takes the diversity of determinations in the Avicennist sense related to being as the highest genus presented in the form of an essence (*essentia unius generis et maxime generis generalissimi*).[[415]](#footnote-415) The commentary shows that the categories in modernist schools had already lost their original Aristotelian meaning. It was bound to the predication of the hyparchical first substance by universal meaning of the second substance. For Olivi, the categorial predication given in the classical table of ten categories (*Cat*. 1b25) is already confused, unclear and contradictory. The existing real substance (*modus essendi*) and the types of modern statements had nothing in common. The first category is given in the second wave of modernism after the year 1280 as a minimal portion of being (*esse diminutum, indeterminatum, vagum*). The minimal beingness of the thing must not be nonsensical or logically contradictory. The category of minimal being fulfills the basic condition of identity, established by Gandavus, that the individual cannot be anything else (*tantum haec*, ch. 5.2.1). The objective substance came into being in the process of double negation (*duplex negatio*) that makes modern basic condition of objective existence. Such individual keeps its own identity, which does not contradict the Law of the Excluded Third. The essence conceived as a minimal portion of identity operates as a substance *sui generis*. New determinations exist either in parallel with the categorical modes of being of the first substance; or, they are set outside the categories in the mode of transcendental determinations of being. Modernism integrated universal properties of the essence into the system of Augustinian and Avicennian ontotheology that completed the Toledo’s interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphysics made “*ad mentem Averrois*.” The value based on hyparchical first substances kept no longer the character made by the imposition; it was replaced by the supposition of meaning that provided the subject. The place of transformation of logical sophists into modern metaphysicians such as “*sophistae Latini*” in the years 1230–40 was the school of Philip the Chancellor and the first Franciscan magisters in Paris. This school started the second Averroism announced in the work *Summa Duacensis* (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.2). The preceding matrices analyzed the shift of the imposition based on categorical meaning to the pure supposition of immanent meaning by taking the example of John Pagus (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). After the year 1255, the logical school in Oxford and Bonaventure’s school in Paris stood against Bacon, Siger, Albert and Aquinas. The attempts of the first Averroism to slow down this insane (Bacon) or ridiculous (Albert) development of the Latin West had only short-lived effects. The first modern interpretation of *Categories* was transferred to analytical philosophy by Petrus Hispanus in his works *Summulae logicales* and *Syncategoreumata*. Their representatives in Oxford were the above-mentioned William Sherwood (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3) and further Simon Faversham (†1306) and Radulphus Brito (†1320). This school of modernists stood against the school of Modists of the first Averroism and the decisive conflict raged at the Paris University in the years 1270–77. The crisis was reinforced by Simplicius’ commentary on *Categories*, which William Moerbeke translated into Latin in 1266. The interpretation of this commentary made it possible to introduce objective Avicennism into the metaphysics of *via Modernorum*. We proposed the interpretation of ontotheology that Gandavus worked out of Avicennism. His teaching put forward the first version of objective metaphysics.

The clouding of hyparchical predication determined by real first substances necessarily provoked another crisis in the interpretation of *Categories*. The attributes of quality, quantity or relation and habitus began to be predicated at the level of hyparchical first substances. The accidental relations became the universal determinations of being. The transition from the metaphysical dative to the objective dative brought about a fundamental change in the status of universal species. They assumed the function of an atomic substance as it was in the Neoplatonism. This “substance—species” became an objective being through hypostatized causality. Let us see sophistic interpretations of *Seconds Analytics* in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy elaborated after the year 1230. Analytical philosophy became metaphysics and it carried out the abolition of former schools such as Porretans and *Nominales*. These schools passed to newly formed analytical metaphysics in Oxford and Paris, which was the case of the school named *Grammatici* that Alvernus critized (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). Rufus introduced the universal hylemorphism into analytical philosophy and turned the analytical interpretation of *Second Analytics* into a new first science about the objective being. But his attempt to modernize Aristotle failed at that time, because critical thinking firmly dominated the University of Paris before 1250. Rufus advanced the version of objective Aristotelianism according to David of Dinant but he took away Dinant′s pantheism. The founding generation of the University interpreted the metaphysics according to the Commentator; they could not tolerate heretical teachings of “*sequaces Aristotelis*.” Leaders of the University as was Alvernus took similar action as did Averroes that was engaged against the Neoplatonism of Avicenna. Averroes improved philosophically inadequate criticism of modernists that Al-Ghazālī proposed. Christian scholars at the University of Paris judged the controversies wisely, like Ibn Rushd and Al-Ghazālī in the Falsafa. For all of them, the disintegration of the person and the death of God in Western thought represented too high a price for the preaching of modern sophisms. Henry of Gent became the key person that witnessed to transformation of the categorical predication into an essential metaphysics. He introduced the predication based on the intentionality of the subject to be an equivalent substitute for categorical predication. Hermeneutics described his deduction of the meaning of the substance to the essence with help of the term “*res dicta a reor reris*” (ch. 5.2.1). Originally accidental determination of the relation and the habitus changed into a substantial predication of the relation and the minimalist essence that were established in relation to modern God. Hermeneutics explored the new conception of relativity and habitus based on the amphibolic deduction of the objective sense of being (*esse ad*) from God to the exemplar (ch. 5.2.3). Let us recall two theses related to Oxfordian Fallacy that organized the mythological production of modern *tertium ens* since 1280. Rufus introduced an absolute supposition of being based on the subject (*ubi est subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The supposition given in the mode of absolute demiurgic intentionality supplanted the imposition of univocal categorical meaning. Aristotelianism scientifically manifests the causality of the first substance by the imposition. The writing *Anonymus of Erfurt* followed Rufus’s innovation by statement that the existence of an hypostatized solar intellect secures the primary production of the sense of being beyond first substances (*quaestio quid est intellectus non supponit quaestionem si est res*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The new metaphysics of the chimera produced the objective type of the solar myth, which determines the sense of the cosmos only from the enlightened subject. The determination made by actualized first substances became the special case of contingent determination that can be derived from eternal essences. They are objectively and exemplarily given in divine thinking. The leading class of *illuminati* recognizes this exemplary thinking on the metaphysical and psychological level that is carried out in the mode of infallible logical deduction. As a result, two determinations of being were born, namely the substantial—categorical and the essential—objective. They run parallel to each other, which classical Aristotelianism considered insane. Modern God and the modern subject permanently deduce the collection of simulacra on the basis of twofold capitalist and today virtual production (*regula agentis in/creati*). This paranoid deduction of the sense of being from the schizophrenic subject, which Olivi already divided into three substances, represented the last product of the second Averroism. The production of the modern sense of being is directed by two apocalyptic subjects that reveal the ultimate meaning of things. Fortunately, these mythological creatures existed only objectively and they are already dead today. In today’s nihilistic version of modernity, only Furies from the underworld rule the world through their capable agents that dwells in the Platonic cave of the objective spirit. Gandavus tried in vain to settle the disputes from the position of the main theologian at the University of Paris. The expulsion of critical philosophers in 1277 did not immediately extinguish their thinking, because it was the whole school of masters working at the local *alma mater* since Blund’s interpretation of *De anima* (1200). The *intelligentia spiritualis* ofOxford founded by Rufus took up the victorious academic path together the pious *illuminati* as was the *Doctor Solemnis*. He was named the *magister regens* of the theological faculty sometime after the year 1277. With the complete victory of modernity and the new beginning of metaphysics, the real history coming to the end of the Paris University took place. The decline of the first Christian university was guided by metaphysical nihilism that determined the basic direction of *via Modernorum* into the joyful science of the Enlightenment.

Modernists did not have a clear metaphysical deduction of theology as a science about the year 1290. They created a collection of mythological and biblical statements, which were connected through Augustinian Avicennism. This was unacceptable for the metaphysical logicians in Oxford influenced by Avicennism of *Summa theologiae* (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3). The successors of *Summa theologiae* joined Averroism of Aquinas that was transmitted as official Thomism. Scotus made his way to Paris with the conviction that the dispute between the two paradigms cited above had to be ended within the framework of modern gigantomachy of substance. The *Doctor Subtilis* of Oxford put an end to the dispute between the first and second Averroism according to the classical sophistic pattern. He founded the victorious metaphysics with the help of the third way outside the school of the first and second Averroism. The shift towards metaphysical nihilism is evidenced in Scotus’s early commentary on *Isagogue*. There is no original difference between reality and its categorical signification. The metaphysical dative changed into the objective dative. The predication concerns the atomic substance as existing *per se* and that relates to the equally real accident (*hoc de accidente reali*).[[416]](#footnote-416) The predication of metaphysical substance as being of the third kind runs in the mode “*impositio prima*.” It is separated from the logical statute of nominal substance. This substance operates as a formal subject of statements given in the logical mode (*impositio secunda*). The predication of the second substance was divided into the logical abstraction of analytical Porretans and the metaphysical essential predication according to Avicenna. The categorical predication passed into logic and the eclipse of the first substance was accomplished in full. In the new scheme of the first and second substance, there is no place for the imposition of meaning from reality. Scotus’s commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories* was probably written at the same time as the commentary on *Isagogue*. It follows the statute of categorical predication according to Avicenna. The being is no longer related *per prius* to the substance and *per posterius* to its categorical meaning. Let’s have a look at the basic attitude in Scotus’s metaphysics to categorical predication, which remained unchanged until the end of his thinking.

“On the question of the ten categories, it is true that they can be assessed in two ways. First of all, from the point of view concerning the extent to which they are a kind of being. Furthermore, they are taken from the perspective of their definitions in such a way that properties are assigned to them, the cause of which is given in the intellect. The metaphysician treats the category only in the first mode, because its primary carrier is being as being (*subiectum enim eius primum est ens in quantum ens*).” [[417]](#footnote-417)

The sense of categorical determination shifted from the realm of the metaphysical dative to the realm of logical abstraction (*in quantum considerantur a ratione*). Aristotle’s determination of the categorical predication from the hyparchical being of the first substance completely disappeared. The new metaphysics took as the basis of the predication only the kind of being in Avicenna’s universal mode (*ens inquantum ens*). The introduction of Avicennistic metaphysics means that the causality for categorical predication does not come from the recognized first substance, but from the cognizing intellect (*proprietas causata ab intellectu*). This mode of being as a substance takes the form of the first principle of cognition. It makes the kind of being given primarily *per se*, so that another substance has no claim to the primacy. Destruction of classical metaphysics and the critical science is based on the fact that the causality as foundation of cognition does not come from reality but from cognizing intellect. It was an explicit statement of *Erfurter Anonyme* (*quod est intellectus non supponit quaestionem si est res, sed si est intellectus*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The categorical predication received only the logical statute. It concerns the attribution of properties to a nominally determined subject. Thereby, the work *Categories* lost its metaphysical value for Scotus. The categorical predication is determined by the exposure of the being from behind, from direction of Avicennian essence. That aspect characterizes modern metaphysics. With regard to the constitution of the first science about being, Scotus follows Alexander’s commentary on *Met.* 1004a2–3 (καθ' αὑτὸ ὂν ἡ οὐσία; *Alexandri in Met. IV*, 250.23) that formally agrees with Scotus′s interpretation. There are as many types of philosophy as there are many types of substances. It makes classical position of Aristotle′s *Metaphysics* to establish starting point for the investigation of the first science. However, Scotus abandoned Alexander and Aristotle in the key question given as the *intentum* of Aristotle’s first science, because he defines the first being according to Avicenna.

Then, it is necessary to define the first substance, which should form the basis of the new metaphysics. The first science must include the concept of being as the first principle of thinking. Scotus’s conception of metaphysics took a fundamentally different path than the first science about the real first existing substance according to Aristotle and Averroes. The *Doctor Subtilis* considers the categorical predication given by the imposition of the first real substance to be a principal deficit of preceding metaphysics. The sense of being taken from the first hyparchical substance to the universally stated second substance represents only an accidental determination of being. There can be no metaphysics based on accidental determinations. Scotus’s path to new metaphysics begins with skepticism towards the categorical unity of being, predicated by the second substance (*ens incomplexum* of Scotus). Aristotle’s predication is determined by the metaphysical dative that follows the donation of the sense with regard to hyparchical first substances (*ens complexum* of classic metaphysics). Again, there is Oxfordian Fallacy at play when the first triad of cognitive principles was replaced by the second triad. The principle “*ex inmediatis*” received an intellectualist status that contested all heritages of previous metaphysics. The representatives of the second Averroism in the period of 1280–90 (Aquasparta, Gandavus) did not dare to contest it in full as Scotus did. This logical absolutist can now build the metaphysics of chimera completely *ex nihilo*. Scotus refused the fundamental “flaw” of the first Averroism that splitted the categorical meaning of being into the metaphysical imposition and the logical supposition. His form of sophistry consists in the fact that hyparchical imposition is a mere “*ens incomplexum*,” which is given as an accident in relation to the absolute supposition of being in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. The commentary takes the categories within the framework of univocal logical predication, which is given outside reality and only in thinking. That attitude fully corresponds to the interpretation made in the analytical school of logicians at Oxford. Aristotelian second substance and categorical statements related to it cannot produce the required metaphysical unity of the being.

“These ten categories form the basis of the one science about reality, that is, metaphysics, only to the extent that it contains the primary unity to which everything else is predicated, as it is confirmed in the fourth book of *Metaphysics* [*Met*. 1003b17–19]. If we judge the categories from the point of view of their definition, then they do not contain anything to which they refer (*nullum est ad quod attribuantur*). How they can be a unique subject of the first science?” [[418]](#footnote-418)

The nihilism of modernity is evident, because Scotus made a radical destruction of categorical predication. According to the quotation, the categorical predication relates to the primacy of logical definition (*in quantum considerantur a ratione*). Therefore, they cannot assure the original unity of being in their Aristotelian form. Aristotelian categories relate to reality, which makes their *peccatum originale* in the perspective of modern *illuminati*. They have no relation to the existence of things in reality (*nullum est ad quod attribuantur*). Categorical attribution does not go to the final level of being given in the mode of metaphysical unity; therefore, it does not secure the unified subject of metaphysical predication (*unum subiectum*). Avicenna’s definition of metaphysics in the mode of being as being serves as the fundamental reference point that establishes the sense of being (*unum primum ad quod alia attribuantur*). The introduction of Avicenna’s metaphysics responds to Aristotle’s definition of the first science concerning the first substance, wherein thinking finds original principles and causes of being (τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον, *Met*. 1003b18‒19). The devaluation of categories into a logical entities abolished the metaphysical difference between substance and accident. In a logical univocity given only nominally, this distinction is unnecessary. It is possible to think logically everything and exactly in the same way. According to Scotus, the nominal accidents in thinking and the categorical accidents on the second substance have only a logical status. The second substance and its accidents are stated univocally, which is shown by the example of whiteness. From the logician’s point of view, there is only a contingent difference between an “*album*” as an independent predicate and an “*album ut concernens,*” which is the predicate that indicates the real being in the substance.[[419]](#footnote-419) There is only a formal difference between the whiteness of the non-existent chimera and the whiteness of the existing white car, which is given by different conception of the predication (*modum oppositum*). Scotus takes the accident as a quasi-substance that received the status of the essence and it began to exist in a mythological mode *per se*. The cognition within the framework of the categorical predication was reduced to logic; it does not concern reality, because it works with the hypostatized properties outside of their substantial carrier. Such a theory had been introduced into Western metaphysics by Porretans (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). That is why Scotus critically evaluates Gandavus’s approach to the predication of minimal beingness (*esse diminutum*), which he classifies into the group of purely logical statements. The formal approach of logic generates any meaning; this creates a completely contingent meaning of any essence, for example the meaning of a chimera. The categories within logical predication do not fulfill the primary task of making the sense taken from real things. According to Scotus, such an essentialist predication has no meaning in itself. Therefore, it must be reduced to logical propositions, which form the basis of a categorical predication. The ontotheological essence of Gandavus is useless because it does not constitute the metaphysical subject of a new doctrine of categories. The essence has no existence of its own, which was in any case constituted by the mythological imposition as “*esse ad*” related to modern God. The original subject of metaphysics is the Avicenist conception of pure being as *esse diminutum* to be stated by the transcendental logic that became the new metaphysics. The transformation of categorical value into a logical equivalence became a generally accepted fact in the schools of *Modernorum* about the year 1290. The search for a new unity of being took up the logical abstraction as the fundament of metaphysics. Scotus changed that scenario dated to schools of Porretans and to analytical approach at Oxford. According to Scotus, that kind of logical abstraction is not enough, because it does not constitute the subject of “Aristotelian” metaphysics. Logical supposition is not the metaphysical imposition of being in the mode of “*inquantum ens*.” Scotus thus definitely broke away from the second Averroism.

Scotus’s *scientia transcendens* abandoned the predication according to *Categories* and thereby abolished the basis of classical metaphysics. The relation of categorical predication to Aristotelian first substances as defended in *Categories* was canceled for two reasons. First: the above-mentioned modern status of logical categorical predication does not actualize the full unity of being. In logical predication, the intentional object is given only in thinking, which cannot create a metaphysical univocal definition at the level of the genus. This is a fatal mistake, which led Gandavus to a faulty construction of the first science of being. Secondly: the logical predication goes from the intellect to the thing, which, from the point of view of metaphysics, generates but an accidental recognition of *ad hoc* given reality. Aristotle says that no science about the accidents is possible (*Met*. 1026b24). Both reasons consider Aristotelian statute of categorical predication as an inadequate path to metaphysics. According to Scotus, both objections to the categorical logic have a fundamental character and they make it impossible to classify the Aristotelian categories in the structure of metaphysics as the first science of being. The subject of metaphysics is not the imposition of meaning from the first substance to the second made in virtue of the metaphysical dative (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas*). Scotus does not need reality as basis of new metaphysics. Avicenna’s being in its pure form stands permanently before his enlightened intellect because it exists in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. The school of *Grammatici* and *sophistae Latini* abolished metaphysics by replacing it with the formal “logic of Antichrist.” For Scotus, the rejection of metaphysical validity of modern logic did not mean that modern metaphysics took up the original nature of the categorical predication, that Boethius and Abelard presented as *Logica Vetus*. The work *Categories* worked out the metaphysical unity on the basis of the hyparchical imposition from the first substance and the universal supposition from the second substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). Scotus rejects to reduce the categorical predication to a logical exercise, since it cannot reach the unified sense of being that the metaphysics looks for. Scotus quotes Aristotelian Boethius to support his position (*logica est de secundis intentionibus applicatis primis*; ibid, q. 1, no. 6; OPh I, 250.2‒3). The appeal to Boethius is a pure sophistry. No classical Aristotelian would have allowed a degradation of categorical predication to a mere logical exercise, because metaphysical predication would have lost the correspondence of thinking to real first substances. Scotus cannot follow the path of Aristotelian metaphysics given by Averroes′s definition of “substance *qua* substance.” In accordance with Avicenna’s metaphysics, he regards categorical predication at the level of substance as an insufficient form of univocal unity (*Avicenna dicit: qui dicit ens, non dicit substantiam nec accidens*).[[420]](#footnote-420) According to Scotus, the determination of metaphysics can neither proceed from the intellect alone nor from contingent first substances. Scotus had to find a new unity of being beyond categorical predication that lost metaphysical meaning preserved in the first Averroism. The new path to the definition of the first science is given only with regard to the Avicennian first substance as a kind of *scibile*, which is given in the pure insight of being as being. Scotus integrated the Aristotelian metaphysics of Avicenna’s amphibolic predication and rejected the “meta-physics” given by the actuality of the first substance as the first Averroism defended it.

New interpretation of *Categories* codified a new difference between formal logic and metaphysics. It points to fundamentally changed statute of categorical statements. This has been stated in the previous matrices. The amphibolic categorical predication introduced by Elias (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.2) replaced for the first time the original meaning of Aristotelian categories. By declaring the status of “logical” categories insufficient for the foundation of metaphysics, Scotus took one step further to the nihilism of the first substance. The new metaphysics had to find the primary metaphysical abstraction from which the first and original unity of being emerges. The original distinction between first and second substance has become the modern duality between the modern logic of Antichrist and the essential metaphysics of the chimera. On the side of Aristotelianism stood the categorial logic (*logica Vetus*) that followed the metaphysics of “substance *qua* substance.” Aristotle’s categorical predication lost all its essential characteristics about 1290.

* It lost the attachment to the first substance as the ultimate source of unity made “*ad unum*.”
* The second substance lost the statute given by the primacy of meaning predicated on the basis that was made by the metaphysical dative.
* The categorical predication related to causally acting first substances was no longer the main component of demonstrative proof, due to the introduction of Oxfordian Fallacy.
* The new “categorical” (i.e. objectively) determining causality comes primarily from thinking and not from reality.

The second Aristotelian substance signifies the unity of being in the realm of logical equivocation and within the framework of subjectively given intentionality. The table of categories does not even entail the analogical unity of being, but only the equivalence of purely nominal determinations given grammatically according to Priscianus (OBJ II, ch. 1.1). As a result, the divorce from the reality that related to the unity of the ten categories was completed. Scotus’s metaphysical destruction of categories confirms the epochal victory of analytical philosophy based on Oxfordian Fallacy. Real first substances became a superfluous ballast for metaphysical speculation. Scotus successfully completed the eclipse of the first substance, which the successors of Kilwardby, as well as the analytical logicians Walcote and Bonkes, were advancing at the same time (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). This fact was confirmed in Gilson’s study of Scotus by analyzing his rejection of Averroes’s metaphysics and the acceptance of Avicenna (Gilson 1927, 97–99). Scotus created a univocal unity of being that goes beyond categorical predication. The imposition of a universal meaning cannot come from the “logical” equivocity of the categorical substance, but only from the univocal view of unity. The deduction *modo geometrico* to the minimal form of being according to Avicenna enables the reduction of multiplicity to the original unity, which is given in the univocal view of being (*omnis multitudo est reducibilis ad unitatem*).[[421]](#footnote-421) New vision determines the original unity of being, which is given in an objective metaphysical mode, and not in a logical predication, which according to Scotus is given by the table of ten categories. Unity is a metaphysical determination of being, it is not merely a logical concept given as an accident.

The disappearance of the first substance and the devaluation of the second substance given as the first category had fundamental metaphysical consequences. Scotus found himself in a paradoxical situation. He created a new metaphysics which, however, had no categorically given subject. The newly created transcendental unity of being could therefore not refer to any foundation. The metaphysics of the chimera always arises *ex nihilo*; Scotus, however, wanted to sell it as an Aristotelian categorical predication. It makes the only form of statement that ranges the order of being in the mode *per prius* and *per posterius*. Without this order there is no *resolutio* and therefore no metaphysics as the first science. Aristotle considers the definition of the first substance to be a fundamental action for metaphysical cognition of reality. The real substance must be given in the mode *per se* and be the first object of cognition. Then, philosophy will be the first science about the “substance *qua* substance”. Scotus rejected the statute of Aristotelian substance as the first category for the basis of modern metaphysics. In Aristotelian metaphysics, this unique connection to the thing predicated in the past order of being guarantees the univocal unity of the categorical meaning that is established in the generic predication. As a result, the connection of the metaphysical dative to hyparchical existence of real things became obsolete in modernity. Scotus took the model of Avicennist parousia; the being is directly given in reality and it manifests itself directly and evidently in the cognition of modern *illuminati*. He must, however, deal with the basic argument of the metaphysics that the substance is in every respect the first (πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον); both in the order of definition as well as in the order of cognition, as well as in the order of the actualized being in time (πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ, *Met*. 1028a32–33). The basic problem of modernists is the temporal primacy of the second categorical substance, which is given by the imposition of meaning on the basis of the causality of the first substances. This order forms the basis of predication *per prius* and it secures the following elements: the true order of categorical statements; the structure of metaphysics as the first science; the truth of deductive proof. The hyparchical existential facticity of the first substance and the categorial meaning of the second substance, which is given according to *Categories*, determine the basic structure of *Metaphysics* and *Seconds Analytics*. The existence of substance is given *per prius*, and from it the definition of essence proceeds *per posterius* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The classical definition of *Seconds Analytics* and thus of *Metaphysics* follows the effects of the metaphysical dative. The hyparchical existence of a real thing precedes its predicated universal essence (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν a ἑκάστου λόγῳ noun τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν, *Met*. 1028a34–35). Porphyry reversed this order for the first time in the term of “doubled being,” in which the prohyparchical being supplanted Aristotle’s hyparchical substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The existence of real first substances is not important for new metaphysics, since it follows the erroneous path of Oxfordian Fallacy. Scotus abolished the causal primacy of the first substance for cognition. This meaning is given by the metaphysical dative. Scotus replaced reality with pure speculation. Let’s take a look at the manner how the Oxford commentary on *Categories* interprets the above-mentioned parts of *Metaphysics* VII.1, in which the central importance of the hyparchical and categorically predicted substance is justified. Scotus created another version of Porphyry’s doubled being and thus established the objective version of the first philosophy.

“Aristotle says at the beginning of the seventh book of *Metaphysics* that ‘the substance for cognition is the first among all beings,’ which must be understood not in the order of temporal succession, but in the order of nature (*non intelligitur de prioritate temporis sed naturae*); like this, the cognition of the substance is accomplished at best (*cognitio eius est perfectissima*). This truth is also confirmed by Avicenna, who defines the ‘being’ as a signification given in view of what is primary, namely the substance.” [[422]](#footnote-422)

The quotation excluded the causal primacy of the actualized essence in time (*non intelligitur de prioritate temporis*) in favor of the eternal essence expressing the fullness of cognition (*naturae, quod cognitio eius est perfectissima*). The commentary reduces the above-mentioned statement from *Metaphysics* Z.1 about the universal primacy of the first substance only to the substance as the first principle of cognition (*substantia est primum omnium entium cognitione*). Scotus continues the line of Oxfordian Fallacy, by reducing the real substance to a universal essence. The primacy in the definition no longer refers to Aristotle’s substance as the first category, which is predicted with regard to the real first substance, but to Avicenna’s essence recognized in the mode *per prius* (*quod est primum, scilicet substantia*). This exchange of Aristotle’s and Averroes’s substance for Avicenna’s essence has the character of an epochal *Irrtum* that founded the second metaphysics. The ideal being of the essence supplanted the contingent being of the actualized first substance. Made in that manner, a new categorical statute of the “substance—essence” was born that differed from Aristotle. After the sophistic exchange of the abstract essence for the real substance, Alexander’s thesis acquires full modern and quite objective validity. There are as many kinds of philosophy as there are kinds of “substances” made as *tertium ens*. Modernity must find the first determination of substance in the order of the first principles of cognition, because this is the field of knowledge of metaphysics as the first science. The being is considered in its pure cognitive potentialities and not as a real substance. The metaphysical recognition of reality no longer has the categorical character, but an objective one, because it is related to the primacy of the recognized essence. For the metaphysical predication of the essence, the hyparchical predication according to Aristotle is ensured only for the logical abstraction given *simpliciter* in thinking (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). From the point of view of cognition of the real world, according to *Seconds Analytics*, the essential definition and predication have the validity of a hypothetical scientific proof, because it does not predict real causality. Scotus included Avicenna’s essence in the definition of the first science according to *Metaphysics* Z.1. It received the status of Neoplatonic atomic substance given in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*.” As a result, the basic determination of the first hyparchical substance given in the mode “*ex inmediatis*,” was taken out of metaphysics. It was exactly the same fatal error that Averroes reproached Avicenna and Alexander (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). According to *Seconds Analytics*, the complete scientific proof is given by the predication from reality, because first substances act as real causes (*Anal. Post.* 84a13–14). This temporal primacy of real existence before the universal essence corresponds exactly to the definition of the first science about the substance in the mode of the metaphysical dative according to *Metaphysics* Z.1 cited above. The cited definition of the first science summarizes all types of cognition of the substance from the point of view of the triple primacy of the substance. It includes the temporary hyparchical existence of the first substance in reality (λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ, *Met*. 1028a32‒33). The scientific cognition based on hyparchical causality is universally and categorically stated as an essential definition assured by the second substance. Then metaphysics is actually the first science about “substance *qua* substance,” because it includes the primacy of the first substance in all forms. Let’s turn this order around. The quoted sentence from *Metaphysics* Z.1 comprehends the recognition of the substance also from the point of view of the already completed metaphysical abstraction, and therefore begins with the essential definition of the substance. But the real cognition of the world (biology, physics, etc.), leading to the first science about the substance, proceeds exactly the opposite. There is the metaphysical dative, that relates to Parmenides that followed the path of the real Sun in the sky (*dativus principalis*). First of all, things are actual physical bodies and therefore have causal effects on each other (*Physics*). We can adequately recognize these first substances (*De anima*), logically define their abstract relationships (*De interpretatione*), correctly predict the properties of the substances (*Categories*), and also scientifically assess them truthfully by observing the real causality (*Seconds Analytics*). Finally, as the metaphysical abstraction is made in that manner, the substance can also be defined essentially and universally in the correctly established first science about what exists (*Metaphysics Γ* and *Ζ*). Scotus abolished this fundamental architecture of the first science about the substance outlined by the Philosopher and the Commentator.

The sophistic transformation of the universal essence into a categorically stated second substance made out a new being of the third kind. It replaced the hyparchical first substance and the univocal categorical predication related to it. Aristotle’s metaphysics is conceived from the position of Neoplatonism, because the predication comes “*ad unum*” outside the reality of first substances. Deduction starts from the essence given metaphysically *per prius* and goes to the real thing given *per posterius*. The critical philosopher Aristotle, on the other hand, ended up with the resulting abstracted substance as the basis of the first science, since he was able to create its true scientific cognition from reality according to metaphysical abstraction. According to Siger, Avicennist Aquinas made the same metaphysical mistake in the study of the soul (ch. 4.5.4). At the very beginning of his intellectual career, Scotus found a new insight into the unity of being outside the classical categories. He was as dogmatic as Aquinas. Meaning of the substance is given by the exposure from behind, from parousia of being as being. Scotus does not proclaim the Augustinian Avicennism taught in the school of the second Averroism. He is a modern Aristotelian influenced by Oxford Thomism of Grosseteste′s school and by Parisian Thomism of Aegidius’s school. The new metaphysics rejects an autonomous being of the form or of the Porretan hypostasis, because that would have meant a return to the emanation scenario of Neoplatonism. The first recognition is given with regard to the “substance,” which Aristotle and Avicenna claim together. Scotus followed Avicennist Thomism and established the new order of being (*resolutio*). Scotus built his metaphysics on Gandavus’s metaphysics of the chimera, but does not take the same procedure in the case of *resolutio*. The intentionality of modern God in the mode of “*esse ad*” cannot find a new metaphysic made according to modernized Aristotelianism. The imposition of pure being (*esse diminutum*) is taken according to Avicenna’s metaphysics in the mode of *per prius*, which is set in a new form of categorial (more precisely: transcendental) predication. Scotus reduced the original amphibolic predication (*ens, unum, verum*) to a single element given as “*ens inquantum ens*.” The actualized existence of being (*actus essendi*) is now conceived in terms of Avicenna’s vision of pure beingness. The birth of new metaphysics in the years 1295–97 is evidenced by the following quotation. It summarizes the objective categorial predication in relation to the new kind of essence.

“Basically, the imposition of the concept of ‘substance’ is given in two ways: as that which exists out of itself (*subsistendi*), and as that which is given as a substrate (*substandi*). It seems that from the point of view of definition, the actualized existence is simpler than being of the essence (*actus essendi videtur ratio simplicior quam actus substandi*). Therefore, the ‘being’ first manifests itself in the intellect as the reason from where the concept is introduced (*rationem a qua est nominis impositio*), because the ‘being’ is the simplest (*est simplicissima*). With regard to the essence thus signified, it is true that the ‘substance’ is given only if the ‘being’ is a primary perception of the intellect.” [[423]](#footnote-423)

The new deduction of metaphysics proceeds from the act of Avicennist pure subsistence of every conceivable substance as a primarily given entity. The sophistry of the new form of Oxfordian Fallacy consists in the fact that the Aristotelian “*actus essendi*” is reduced to an essence given *simpliciter*. Formally, it makes no difference whether the category “*simpliciter*” is given in reality or in the intellect. The second triad of cognitive principles given as universal essences in turn determines the principle “*ex inmediatis*” that Aristotle gives only to the first substance. In the second step, this substance becomes the objective “Aristotelian” substance. It was originally determined as the metaphysical substrate for accidents (*esse substans*), but it is now derived from the pure essence (*esse subsistens*). The categorial predication thus receives a new “first substance,” from which the essential predication of the new “second substance” is derived. Since this pure substance has its own objective *actus essendi*, this objective substance also “exsists” in a modern way in its first being given as a kind of subsistence (*esse subsistens*). In contrast, the Aristotelian substance forms but the basis for real determinations of being (*esse substans*). Their existence is secondary, because the Aristotelian second substances in the sense of Scotus’s deduction already have a primary Avicennian pure (i.e. subsistent) being. Scotus′s original deduction of the categories (*resolutio*) is given in a modern manner *ex nihilo*. The first substance is represented by the construct of pure being, which becomes an essence; this objectively given essence in the mode *per prius* is then contained in every Aristotelian second substance given in the mode *per posterius*. The primacy of absolute and separated minimal being of each thing (*ratio subsistendi*) determines the secondary signification of the specific carrier of this being (*ratio substandi*). Scotus, as a metaphysician, adheres to the primacy of subsistence; but its mode is given beyond the hyparchical first substance. Subsistence belongs to the objective essence of being in the mode of pure simplicity (*actus essendi videtur ratio simplicior*). That kind of categorical predication founded a new metaphysic that does not consist in the primacy of the actualized reality, which is transferred to thinking. It is built on the ideal of logical and reflexive clarity. The intellect recognizes the essence in its pure being. The first determination of the categorically stated substance (*quoad essentiam significatam*) is due to the fact that the second substance became the monopoly carrier of Avicenna’s pure beingness (*quando 'ens' primo intelligitur*). The first imposition of meaning begins with the perception of being in its pure form, which is the first manifestation of the being in the intellect (*'ens' primo occurit intellectui*). This intuition, given only in thinking, establishes the act of the first, absolutely pure imposition taken from the direction of the first intuitive insight into being as being. The imposition of meaning is given in the mode of pure beingness (*'ens' imponitur*). This intuition of pure beingness determines the fundamental imposition of metaphysical meaning (*rationem a qua est nominis impositio*). The direction of the imposition comes from the first perception of the first identifiable being (*quia est simplicissima*). That fact has a major value, because it shapes the fundamental aspect of being given in Scotus’s metaphysics. The twofold direction of the insight (*ab … quoad*) indicates the twofold imposition of meaning (*duplex est ratio a qua hoc nomen 'substantia' imponitur*). The first science is set in the framework of twofold insight of the substance. The act of objective “exsistence” given to the essence (*ratio subsistendi*) stands higher because it comes from the subject. It makes the imposition of metaphysical meaning that takes direction from *simpliciter* given being of being (*Ge-Stell*).

Scotus, as a patented modernist, no longer minds that his pure being, taken as the basis of categorical predication, does not exist in reality at all. Modern metaphysics, led by the objectively thinking Furies, should not deal with the contingent reality of the world and actualized substances. In the parousia of Avicennistic objectivity, the enlightened intellect of *illuminati* considers the direct connection between the eidetic objective being (*esse subsistens*) and its carrier as a categorically given second substance (*esse substans*). The unenlightened intellect of classical metaphysicians, in order to recognize the first science, proceeds empirically on Aristotelian metaphysics, which is certainly not bad. But the analytic *intelligentia spiritualis*, which reigned in Oxford about the year 1290, was already walking the direct and broad *via Modernorum* opened by Grosseteste. Therefore, they did not need to take the classical path of Aristotelian weak intellect (*intellectus debilis*; OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). After all, the main question of signification and predication is not the cognition of contingent first substances. The hypostatized intellect, given as a substance of the third kind, does not require the existence of real things for the production of cognition (*quod est intellectus non supponit quaestionem si est res, sed si est intellectus*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Scotus uses the univocal concept of the term “*simplex*” for the new first substance and also for its cognition. The first substance of the new metaphysics exists as an objective being in the mode *simpliciter* and has a *simpliciter* given essence established by the categorical predication. We can recognize this second substance in the metaphysical mode *simpliciter*. Scotus’s sophistic interpretation of *Categories* established a new metaphysics. The objective substance is defined in the pure insight of the essence according to amphibolic teaching of Falsafa, the school of Philip the Chancellor and Gandavus’s metaphysics. This Avicennism makes a typical sign of Porretan schools that ruled in Oxford and in Paris after the victory of Oxfordian Fallacy. The perspective on the new first category of metaphysics is given by Avicenna’s *ens inquantum ens*. This generic univocal being takes the imposition from the act of objective subsistence of essence (*esse subsistendi*) in the mode of pure beingness (*ab actu essendi*). That kind of being is considered as the first perception of *illuminati* that regard the specific carrier of this being as a categorical second substance (*esse substandi*).

Scotus returned to Avicenna’s being of the third kind and took it as the basis of a new metaphysics. Gandavus’s metaphysics of the chimera received a consistent deductive basis, because the new definition of chimerical being provides the status of the mixed first and second substance. That modified *actus essendi* according to Avicenna is now applied to Aristotle’s hyparchical modality that relates to the second substance (*quoad essentiam significatam*). It is a typical case of the second Averroism made by Rufus, because the supposition of universal meaning had displaced the imposition of the sense from real substances. The first Averroism strictly rejected the deduction of metaphysics made out essences. The logic is not a metaphysics. The first science concerns the final determinations of the real world, since it would be no first science at all. Averroes considered the metaphysics of the essence to be a fundamental error made by Avicenna that abolished the original project of the Second Master. Avicenna applied the deduction to his own intellect rather than to reality (*incepit quasi a se*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The main arguments against Avicenna were quoted in the previous matrices and they are summarized in CMDA 470.42–48. Siger considered this type of essential metaphysical definition made “*ad unum*” as Avicenna’s fundamental failure (*causa deceptionis Avicennae fuit, quia non distinxit inter unum quod convertitur cum ente*, ch. 4.4.1). In the years 1920–21, after seven centuries, Heidegger took up again this intellectual position of Siger with regard to Avicennist Husserl. Scotus is a modernist, and therefore an Aristotelian Avicennist. The imposition begins from the generically pure being and it runs in the direction of the metaphysically determined substance. Scotus took up the unity of being in its own speculation and went through the denudation of being to the last unity given in the pure being as an essence. As a result, he turned the writing *Categories* into a dialectical exercise and into a logical predication. That was exactly the point of critism that Averroes applied to Avicenna. Scotus’s interpretation of *Categories* was based on the Neoplatonic definition of essence. He formally preserved Aristotle’s original approach to categories, i.e., the predication from the substance as the first principle of cognition. However, the act of subsistence is no longer taken in a hyparchical manner, but in a paradigm of the Neoplatonism. The substance is hypostatized in the form of the atomic substance of the third kind. The first imposition of meaning begins with the pure being as *ens inquantum ens*. It started with Avicennist *ens* given *simpliciter*. The deduction ends with the real substance that makes the second imposition of Aristotelian meaning. The logical meaning can be given only in thinking, such as the table of the ten categories conceived within the framework of logical abstraction. This proceeding completed the eclipse of the first substance.

The categorical predication of *ens inquantum ens* given in a generic way founded the new metaphysics. Scotus perfected Oxfordian Fallacy by rejecting the principle of “*ex inmediatis*” according to *Seconds Analytics* and carried out a sophisticated subversion of Aristotle’s categories. Averroes's critique of Avicenna (*maxime erravit*) is fundamentally valid in the case of Scotus's metaphysics. By annulling the first substance as the basis of categorial predication, Scotus fundamentally missed the goal of metaphysics as the first science of real substance. He abolished Aristotle’s and Averroes’s primacy of categorically predicted substance and replaced the second substance with Avicenna’s pure, objectively considered being determined in metaphysical mode *per prius*. The new quasi-substance does not have the hyparchical mode *per se* according to *Categories*. The allocation of modern hypostatized being according to Avicenna takes place in the mode of the primary imposition of the absolutely simple meaning of “to be” (*est simplicissima*). Scotus formally adheres to the procedure of *Metaphysics Z.1* and considers this substance given *absolute* and *simpliciter* as the basis of a metaphysical predication. Thinking preceded reality and, like Avicenna, set the speculation in motion by taking depart out of the human subject. Ockham, as the historically last representative of the first Averroism, recalls the school of Scotists in Oxford of that epochal error. The constitution of the second substance proceeds from the objective dative, which is given by the donation of Avicennian pure *ens*, towards the second substance as the bearer of this minimal beingness. Scotus accepts without difficulty the key thesis of *Categories* on the primacy of the first substance (*destructio primis*; OBJ I, ch. 1.3). The quoted passage *Cat*. 2b5–6 shows that the abolition of the first substance given as *ens inquantum ens* destroys any possibility of a categorical predication given for the second substance as well.[[424]](#footnote-424) In Aristotle, the destruction of reality destroys cognition, because it is determined by the metaphysical dative. Scotus takes for granted that his interpretation of *destructio primis* is the same as Aristotle did.

The new metaphysics developed a new insight into what exists in the mode of *dativus obiectivus*, because the new teaching of categories changed *dativus possessivus*. The imposition of beingness does not come from the metaphysical dative given by the first substance, but from the minimal beingness which any carrier takes upon himself (*subiectum*). The objective appropriation of being proceeds in the thinking of the enlightened subject, which in the act of creating the meaning *ex nihilo* transfers the pure essential being to everything that it can carry first in the divine mode of *rectitudo* and the subsequent human *certitudo*. The modern divine subject leads the being and the truth out of itself by unlimited deduction; the human subject also rectified them by deduction that is limited. The metaphysical dative was determined by the temporal sequence of knowledge that comes from reality. Since the thing really exists, it is universally recognizable. Scotus replaced this order established as an Aristotelian *modus ponens* with a logical priority determined as deduction. That which the subject appropriates as pure being is taken as the fundament of reality. Then the possessive dative is determined by the cognizing subject and establishes a new metaphysics in the order of primary cognition and deduction. Without the knowledge of objective substance as the highest genus, nothing can be predicated downwards, for this proceeding would abolish metaphysics. Scotus’s *modus tollens* does not refer to the first real substance, but to the essence given in the modus *simpliciter*. This *tertium ens* disappears if there is no subject that can produce it. The objective dative (*dativus obiectivus*) establishes the donation of the minimalist essence from the subject alone. The existence of *illuminati* has become an *a priori* given condition to establish the objective deduction. The being as “*ens inquantum ens*” establishes the objective “exsistence” that makes the first determination of everything that exists (*quo est*). The act of the first imposition of the sense enables the subsequent predication of properties of logical substance (*quod est*). An example is Porretan predication of whiteness or humanity, as we have mentioned in the previous matrices.

Scotus transformed analytic logic in universal hylemorphism into a new form of Aristotelian metaphysics without hylemorphism. As a result, the categorical predication of substance as being of the third kind in the form of the pseudo-physical body disappeared from modern metaphysics. A new adaptation of Aristotle fundamentally surpassed that of Rufus. In the school of second Averroism, he determined the objective character in the term “*species obiecti exsistentis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). The determination of Aristotelian categories lies in the order of logic; but the primary imposition of substance as the essence comes from Avicenna’s metaphysics. Scotus’s conception of objective substance corresponds to the primacy of the Neoplatonic atomic substance (*quando ens primo intelligitur ...substantia intelligitur*), but it is transformed into an Aristotelian category. Scotus thus abolished the mysticism of Augustine’s Neoplatonic ontotheology, which the modernist school of Bonaventure had proclaimed in Paris. Scotus created a new version of the predication *per prius* in the sense of a newly conceived universality according to Simplicius′s substance as the essence (τὸ καθόλου καθ' ἑαυτὸ, *In Simpl. Cat.* 85.10). The existence of this atomic substance was defined as the highest genus of Neoplatonic being (τὴν κυριωτάτην οὐσίαν ἔχον, ibid 85.11). This atomic substance is now given in the mode of an pure *scibile* according to Avicenna. The newly defined substance is separated from Aristotle’s second substance because it is defined as a pure, atomically determined *individuum* with a minimal degree of existence. In the guise of the first Averroism, Scotus abolished the ontotheological scheme of the second Averroism. Gandavus’s objective imposition went in the modus “*esse ad*” from divine intentionality through the exemplar to the creation. It makes the typical scenario of Neoplatonic deduction according to *Liber de causis*. Scotus transformed this ontotheology into metaphysics of transcendentally conceived substance. The new set of categorical determinations emerged within the framework of Avicenna’s essential metaphysics of pure being. The categorical determination of the objectively given substance reached the level of the former first substance thanks to the imposition of the hypostatized and *simpliciter* given beingness. From there, the second imposition of meaning goes in the direction of Aristotelian second substance. Scotus definitely separated himself from the former *Nominales* in Oxford and Paris. Following Bonaventura’s and Pecham’s example, these now obsolete modernists understood the innate species, the exemplaria, the spiritual matter, etc. as beings of the third kind. The new metaphysics does not allow a being of the third kind, because it works only with Avicenna’s essence or with Aristotle’s categorical substance. Franciscan superiors in Oxford knew that they had to send this baccalaureus, who was devoting himself to master’s studies, to Paris so that he could spread the light of the new metaphysics.

New predication abolished the being of the third kind produced by the division of universals in the Porphyry’s Tree. Scotus designed a new separation of the minimally certain portion of beingness from all accidental and intentional variations. The annulation of all forms of *tertium ens* put an end to the ontotheology that Henry of Ghent completed in the quoted *Quodlibet IX* dated to the year 1285 (ch. 5.2.3). The new substance carries as a substrate the eternally defined portion of Avicennian pure being. This atomic substance forms the basis of metaphysics, as Aristotle and Averroes supposedly wanted it to be. All other accidental determinations necessarily remained in the mode *per posterius*, including the intentionally given being, which exist either in divine or in human thought. The new form of categories degraded all other forms of *tertium ens* to intentional abstractions. Scotus fully agreed with Thomism that such concepts exist only in the mind of the knower. But the Scotism, in contrast to the Thomism, is able to directly consider the metaphysical and essential mode of being as Avicenna’s pure beingness. Scotus took up modern Thomism, which contains the core of Avicenna’s metaphysics, especially in the question of cognition. The exposure of the sense of being proceeds from the hypostatized intellect, and the manifestation of the essence can be directly apprehended in thinking. The modernists of the second wave were already quite consistently able to defend cognition in the mode of eidetic insight. It was made by an objectively conceived intellect as a hypostatized Thomistic form. Scotus introduced into scholasticism direct consideration of the objective being in the mode of metaphysical speculation. Thus ended the first period of modernists in the disguise of *sophistae Latini*, whose metaphysics was based on mythological collections of hypostases. Porretans such as Rufus turned this chaos into an analytical philosophy and science, to which productive Parisian *illuminati* added a mystical and biblical flavor. The connoisseurs of classical metaphysics already considered such excesses insane at the end of the 12th century (*hoc crediderunt solus mentis alienus*; OBJ II, ch. 1.6). Bonaventura’s school secured a new form of the cultural hegemony of modernity at the University of Paris around the year 1255. This first phase ended in a mental chaos of theories concerning unified intellect for all people as proclaimed in 1277 by Parisian students of modern philosophy (*nonnulli parisius studentus in artibus*). Gandavus helped drive the Aristotelian critics of this sophistic nonsense out of the rue du Fouarre; under the powerful protection of Bishop Tempierre, he created the first form of ontotheological metaphysics. In the next decade after the year 1300, the fate of the second Averroism was fulfilled by Scotus’s remake of Avicenna’s metaphysics. The sophisticated Aristotelianism of the new metaphysics did without the first substance, which was replaced by the universal essence. The categorical determination of the second substance is necessary for existential statements based on the causally given *demonstratio*; it ceased to exist as metaphysical definition of science. The relation to the metaphysical predication of first substances became extinct. The meaning of the first substance, given by the gradual form of Aristotelian abstraction from the physics to the logic and to the metaphysics, was transferred to Lethe. Scotus transformed the primitive sophistry of learned Latins into a sophisticated Aristotelianism. The categorical predication from real first substances was replaced by the deduction from the universally possible substance; the knowledge of possible being stands higher than the real world. From the point of view of the first Averroism, it makes a paranoid view of reality. Thinking starts the metaphysical deduction from human ideas, instead of taking the reality. Cognitive thinking ends with the first substance instead of starting with it. Because of the criticism of this modern paranoia, the Oxford Aristotelian Bacon and, after him, Ockham were persecuted for life. In the new form of the eclipse of the first substance, the first Averroism ended in the Lethe together with the correspondence theory of truth as Averroes’s *proportio* and *adaequatio*.

### 5.3.2 Metaphysical Deduction of Objectivity

The previous chapter has examined the imposition of the sense of being by the newly created substance of the third kind created in Scotus’s early commentary on *Categories* and on *Isagoge*. Scotus found the new place of production of the sense of being located outside the Aristotelian imposition from first substances. At the end of the 13th century, the Oxford school of Latin sophists received a real master, who in a new way joined Aristotelianism of Grosseteste to Avicennist Thomism of Aegidius given in the *Manuscript of Oxford* (ch. 4.3.2). Avicennist supposition of *ens quantum ens* was inserted into the scheme of Aristotelian metaphysics. It created the new interpretation that was not subjected to any school of the second Averroism and did not make part of the first wave of Thomism. Scotus took the side of Oxford modernists in order to remake the Avicennism of Aquinas. His first stay in Paris produced a syncretism of a new metaphysics through the connection of Averroes and Avicenna (ch. 4.5.1). Following Aquinas’s example, Scotus rejected to hypostatize the unified essence in the manner of Neoplatonism; Avicenna would have ceased to be an Aristotelian and would become a Neoplatonist. The first form of deduction of categories ensured the minimum dose of being according to Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum.*” This new substance enabled the predication of the unity of being in accordance with formally conceived Aristotelianism. Scotus’s departure to Paris for studies was the final step necessary for the evolution of objectivity. About 1300, the various currents of modernism merged into a new form of Aristotelianism, which overcame the earlier Neoplatonism of *Nominales* and Porretan schools. The unification of Thomism and Scotism was based on a common form of Oxfordian Fallacy modeled on the metaphysics of Avicenna. This unity of Thomism and Scotism observed Suárez for the last time, because he was the last integral connoisseur of scholastic metaphysics in the Latin West. His first postmodern synthesis combined both kinds of metaphysics into a univocal *metaphysica generalis*. It rejected old determinations of *tertium ens*, already completely unfashionable (*haec conclusio est peripatetica, quam proinde recipient unanimiter Thomistae, et Scotistae contra Nominales*).[[425]](#footnote-425) The postmodernism founded by Suárez “observes” the ontological form of amphibolic categorical predication as well as Scotus; that is, taken objectively and directly from reality (*naturas reperiri ipsas experientia docet*). Scotus made the first deduction of modern metaphysics in a historically new form of deduction based on modern God. The book *Lectura I*, which was probably written in Oxford, unfolds the basic metaphysical perception of the writing *Parva logicalia* written ca. 1295. The treatise *Lectura I* offers the first complete deduction of newly conceived being with regard to God and man. Twofold insight of substance given in the knowledge of God and man had to elaborate some form of univocal predication that joined God and the creation.

Scotus created a new deduction that abolished the anthropocentric structure of the previous ontotheology of modernists. He created a pure, logically and speculatively applied metaphysics. Simplicius’s and Gandavus’s deduction of objective being as “*esse ad*” changed in Scotus′s thought into the subsistent category “*esse in.*” It makes an independent substance fully separated from the divine being. This change produced a unified metaphysics and abolished the various systems of predication and signification that prevailed in schools of the second Averroism. During his stay in Paris, Scotus completed a well-rounded synthesis of new metaphysics. It started in the Oxford’s *Lectura I*, but it was not completed. This work shows the new way of objective metaphysical deduction based on the univocal translation of objectively conceived being from God to man. The first science is separated from the divine essence. The metaphysics is fully deduced from the act of natural human cognition, and by no means from the act of supernatural illumination. Since there is no doubling of the simple divine substance in the course of deduction, the category of being made *per prius* must be defined in a new way. The starting point of new metaphysics rejected previous solutions of both schools: the analogy of the second Averroism and the proof of causality done in schools of Modists of the first Averroism. The work *Lectura I* rejects both paths to God as scientifically insufficient evidence. The cognition of God cannot take the attributive analogy; nor the triple Neoplatonic path of affirmation, negation and eminence, because this proof is based on the supernatural illumination of the intellect. The solution of the first Averroism about causality according to Averroes’s proof and Aquinas’s five paths to God is insufficient. The natural recognition of causality is limited by the senses; moreover, in the first Averroism, God is determined only by the negative way, by the causality of created substances. The rejection of mystical analogy given by the illumination and the predication based on *causa prima* from the creation means that Scotus had to find a new path to God. For him, the key to the cognition of God must be a univocal concept of God and creation. We recognize what exists and what is good with sufficient certainty, which has its secure foundation in God.

Scotus subordinated theology to metaphysics and created the first version of *metaphysica generalis*. The transition to the new metaphysics appears in the writing *Lectura I* that contains the treatise *De cognoscibilitate Dei* probably written at Oxford. The later Parisian work *Ordinatio I* presents the first completed conception of new metaphysics in the treatises *De vestigio* and *De imagine*. The well known *via Modernorum* historically begins in the scripture *Lectura I*. Knowledge of God starts outside of his thought and essence; that indirect manifestation of his rationality is reflected in the metaphysical order of the world. The arrangement of the science about substance is presented *per prius* in the axiomatic form of the first principle of cognition (*ratio cognoscendi*). That ratio works out the intellectual cognition of God, since his essence cannot be separated from his externally manifested rationality. We recognize the creation by participation in the exemplary definition given in the divine intellect; we cannot recognize it directly in its acting. God recognizes himself and his thinking; but this unlimited mode of divine being and intellect is inaccessible to us. The being created in the image of God recognizes the unlimited mode of divine being and intellect through the trace of the divine rationality given in the creation (*vestigium*). This makes the fundament of Scotus’s deduction based on the predication of essentially perceived causality. For the natural mind, God is incarnated into the rationally given world order, which is represented by the structure of Avicennist metaphysics. The cognition of God is therefore primarily intelligible and it does not proceed from sensual recognition, as in Aristotelianism. Let us recall from the previous chapters that the new determination of substance (*quoad essentiam significatam*) begins in the intuition of Avicenna’s pure being (*quando 'ens' primo intelligitur*) and continues with the determination of “substance—essence” (*'substantia' intelligitur*). The deduction goes from the divine rationality transmitted to the creation due to the effective trace of God. That proceeding establishes the necessary and certain knowledge of God. The person defined as an *imago Dei* can reliably recognize the original divine rationality given in creation (*vestigium*). The middle link of deduction is not the divine intentionality, as Gandavus proposed, but the rational structure of created and finite being. The predication *per prius* combined the human cognition and the objectively recognized meaning of being related to God. The connecting line between God and man is formed by metaphysical deduction of univocally formal (but not actualized) way of thinking of God and man. Scotus summarizes the starting position of new metaphysics as follows.

“The second article contradicts the assertion that one cannot think of God through the general concept of the analogy between Him and creation. It is possible to do it in the general univocal concept of God and creation (*in conceptu communi univoco sibi et creaturae*). The being, the good and the wisdom are predicted univocally about God and creation (*dicta de Deo et creatura univoce dicuntur*) and therefore do not make two different concepts.” [[426]](#footnote-426)

Basic qualities of God and creation are given in a univocal manner (*univoce dicuntur*). Fundamentals must be given in the metaphysical form of univocity, because the analogy is not a scientific and deductive way of cognition (*non concipitur Deus in conceptu communi analogo sibi et creaturae*). Scotus excluded the solution of Modists from the school of the first Averroism. Modists rejected both the analogical and the univocal predication that entailed knowledge of God and creation. In the introduction to *Summa theologica*, Aquinas formulated the cognition of God in two modes (*secundum se et quoad nos*). The way of knowing God, as it dwells in itself, is unattainable for the natural cognition. Therefore, the scientific knowledge of God as *causa prima* is ensured by the effective causality of God. That causality is given in the creation and therefore it is given with regard to us (ST I, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; ed. Leonina 4, 27). Scotus does not agree with reasoning of Modists. The accidental cognition, given sensually and by receptivity at the level of *intellectus possibilis*, would only sum up external qualities of God with the help of the attribution based on causal effects of God and the creation. Such a limited recognition would nullify the necessary and completely certain recognition of God worked out in the mode “*secundum se*.” We recognize God *univoce*, that is, in his rational mode of thinking (but not of existence) given “*secundum se*.” The next part of Scotus’s quotation rejects the Neoplatonic solution of *Nominales* that proceeds from the univocal deduction of being in God. The primitive concept of univocity, given on the basis of Porretan hypostases, created another system of Neoplatonic emanations. Therefore, it did not respect the fundamental difference between the Creator and creation. Modernists as Gandavus transformed the emanations into Avicenna’s comitation of *tertium ens* and they began to state these entities categorically with regard to God. By doing this, they abolished the unique statute of the first substance, which they associated with the species of the third kind. Thomists, the first Averroists, Scotus and the aforementioned Suárez criticized them for it. The result was a confused univocity, which abolished the imposition of meaning based on the atomic substance. Scotus confirms that the second Averroism has neither a univocity of being in God nor a uniqueness on the level of hylemorphic substance (*impossibile esset probare aliquid esse univocum, ut hominem respectu Socratis et Platonis*; *Vat*. XVI, no. 24, 233.18‒19). The new solution of the univocity of being overcame contradictions of the second Averroism present both in the Oxford school of *Nominales* and in the ontotheology of Bonaventure’s school. In God and in man, one cannot find the highest concept of minimal being and descend from it to the lower concepts of universals conceived by the univocity. Aristotle’s categorical predication does not allow the Neoplatonic division of genera according to *Arbor Porphyriana*, because it states the meaning of substances. The being is not the highest genus, because the being cannot be divided at all, but it can only be predicted in the order of language. According to the first Averroism, causality represents an inadequate form of the unity of God and the creation. Scotus objects to schools of first Averroism that they take the concept of causality for cognition that is based on the the sensually determined facts and the subsequent abstraction. Such cognition of God would produce but an external and contingent kind of knowledge. The categorical predication is either a non-binding logical exercise; or, made in the form of non-scientific demonstration, it merely states a plethora of contingent accidents. The fundamental *resolutio* of new metaphysics must be based on the scientific deduction given by univocity; otherwise it is not metaphysics.

The book *Lectura I* returned to the second Averroism inspired by Avicenna and adapted the exposure of the intellect from behind to the new proof of divine existence. The knowledge of God must be given by the deduction from the infinite substance to the finite one. Otherwise, the proof would end in the analogy. It states nothing univocal about God, but only the infinite kinds of attributions given *ad hoc*. The external cause given by random receptive cognition cannot generate the univocal cognition of God. Even modern God operates as *causa prima*, which claims the doctrine of first Averroism confirmed by Scotus. What applies to sensual cognition is the fact that no one can absorb more than he can comprehend from the point of view of his potency. Then divine causality would be recognizable only at the contingent level given by sensual experience, and this would be too little in terms of recognizing God in the modern mode of truth as *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. The sensual species cannot actualize the construction of a new deduction. They produce a universal, but only contingent cognition in the intellect. A solution of aporia brought the adaptation of Aristotle’s mode of causality. Because of the evident proof of the existence of God demanded by dogmatic theology and the science of the one truth, it was necessary to find a new version of Oxfordian Fallacy. Acting rationally *ad extra*, the essential being of God forms an effective cause that establishes the cognition in human intellect. According to the proof of *Seconds Analytics*, only the essentially given necessity actualizes the univocal scientific knowledge. God is the innate principle of natural cognition, and this cognition works in us due to His will and causality. As a result, the fundamental dispute between Siger and Thomas over the value of scientific proof is repeated anew. The middle link of the demonstration is defined either by the essence or by the predication of hyparchical causality taken from reality (*Anal. Post*. 84a11–14). Scotus is a Thomist in the matter of dogmatically conceived philosophy, which is given in the theory of the one truth. His proof of the existence of God is based on the essence and it fully corresponds to this opinion. However, Thomism adhered to the essence for proving the existence of God only in the order of final causality that established the proof of the fourth and the fifth path. Scotus therefore refused to take Thomism as the fundament of metaphysical *resolutio*. Aquin as a representative of the first Averroism took up the real causality of first substances as fundament of metaphysical *resolutio*. However, Thomism needed the deduction from the essence to build up the deductive proof of the immortal soul. The proof of immortality is given by the hypostatic intellect as an autonomous form. Thomism kept a definition of the soul as an eternal form and Scotus made full use of it. He was the only modernist of his time to recognize the fundamental value of direct essential causality, which Thomism related to the hypostatic intellect. Thomas rejected essential causality for the process of natural knowledge because his gnoseological scheme made part of the first Averroism. Scotus accepted the “correct” (i.e., mythological) conclusion of Thomistic position regarding the intellect. He proposed a new scheme of essential causality that grounded metaphysical knowledge beyond reality. The reality of the first substances has been replaced by modern God. The new form of deduction is based on mythological causality; it introduced a new knowledge of God in the mode of direct causality caused by God himself. This created a new form of metaphysics that rejected the rational search for the foundations of reality while not using the illuminating scenario of Neoplatonism. The new form of ontotheology thus received a fully objective character based on a dual form of metaphysical error (*Irrtum*). The basis of the new metaphysics makes a direct insight into divine causality. This is a false philosophical position given by the instrumentalization of theology for philosophical purposes, created within the form of the *dativus possessivus* defined by Scotus. The appropriation of theology within a misplaced philosophy as the first science then necessarily entails that the direct illumination of the intellect through essential causality forms the hidden basis of a new metaphysics. Natural reason ceased to be natural and became an objective nonsense. This is another and permanent effect of the form of *dativus possessivus* defined by Scotus. Archaic hermeneutics define it as the objective wandering of modern reason led by metaphysical madness (*Irre*).

The introduction of essential causality into the deductive syllogism ensured scientific necessity in the middle member of the scientific proof (*medium*). It makes evident that Scotus had to abolish the imposition from reality as it was in the first Averroism; he replaced it with the logical supposition following the second Averroism. From the point of view of the *Seconds Analytics*, it means that the necessity of Scotus is not of hyparchical nature, since it is made only in the mind. Like this, the new project of being as meaningful, knowable, manipulable, etc. (*Ge-Stell*) is given by the fact that the essential causality of modern God is directly produced by the human subject. Modernists perceive the divine causality directly in thinking, as well as the causality of the triangle. Both essences work in the order of eternal, *simpliciter* given immaterial substances. This gave rise to a new concept of univocity that unites God and man. The mystical illumination of the intellect coming directly from God is unnecessary; we have to find the general causality that actualized the safe and necessary cognition at the level of substances. In our intellect, instead of illumination, the divine causality operates on the basis of his will and God acts directly. Scotus ruled out mystical analogy and illumination for intellectual cognition of God. Modernity must be dominated by rational philosophy, and not by mysticism. The knowledge of God does not take Neoplatonic illumination given by the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*, but Aristotelian process of abstraction. The intellectual concept comes to being due to human activities; only the causality that triggers the process of cognition is external. According to *De anima*, the soul is a passive *tabula rasa*. However, we know that God and His creative causality exist, the latter being given outside of ourselves and at the same time in us. The creative effective causality is given directly by God and we experience it directly. The causality given by God represents a univocal concept, which by its actuality represents the process of abstraction conceived in an Aristotelian manner. This concept of causality is dogmatically defined according to the theory of the one truth, authoritatively confirmed in 1277. The introduction of dogmatic essential causality abolished the analogous predication of divine properties in the creation. The empty intellect cannot create in itself a concept of something else, since the soul is empty and passive with regard to the first concepts. The leap of thought to separated God is found in the theology of Aquinas, in the dogmatic postulate of the eternal and intellectual soul. The treatise rejects the recognition based on mystical illumination according to Bonaventure’s school. All recognition is natural and causal, as described in the work *De anima*. Scotus worked on the causality of cognition according to the scheme of *Seconds Analytics* and rejected the illumination made by autonomous *intellectus agens*, to which returned postmodern Descartes. Scotus does not need Bonaventure’s hypostatized species (*species innata*) that Descartes introduced again as the innate idea of God. New philosophical relation to God, given in the mode of Aristotelian causality, is set forth in the following quotation.

“And according to the Philosopher in the third book of *De anima*, it is true that ‘the soul and for itself is an empty table,’ etc.; therefore, I claim that the empty intellect cannot generate a concept of the external thing out of itself (*nullum conceptum 'de alio'*); although some claim that it can generate the concept of other beings, because our intellect is always actually present in itself (*sibi semper praesens est*). If the concept of God were analogous in thought and different from the concept related to the creation, then it would be necessary that it should have been in our intellect a different cause [of knowing God] than the intellect itself. But this cause cannot be given in the natural state of our intellect, as it is proved above. This cause of knowing God could not exist, nor could we know anything about God (*nihil intelligimus de Deo*), if God himself did not give this cause into our thinking at his discretion (*nisi Deus velit imprimere*).” [[427]](#footnote-427)

Following *De anima*, the quotation clearly states that the possible intellect is a *tabula rasa* and cannot contain any innate ideas. God works directly in our soul in the way of the first cause (*Deus velit imprimere sicut sibi placet*). Aristotelian Scotus fundamentally rejected the hypostatized conception of modern intellect that is an actualized substance and produces recognized meaning out of itself (*nullum conceptum 'de alio' potest intellectus nudus facere in se*). Illumination, emanation and comitation are not philosophical concepts, but mystical visions and therefore cannot be integrated into the project of modern metaphysics. But in contrast to Modists from the school of the first Averroism, Scotus claims that our intellect considers the action of *causa prima* directly in itself, without the mediation of the senses. Once again, the essential causality of Oxfordian Fallacy according to Rufus and Kilwardby is at play. This view takes the causality at the level of mathematical essences univocally for actions of real first substances. Scotus made God a mathematical entity and thereby accomplished a fundamental eclipse of God as the first substance. God now manifests himself in the thinking of *illuminati* in the mode of *simpliciter* given anthropomorphic parousia that was established in the form of hypothetical scientific proof. As a result, the modern God became a mathematical abstraction in Scotus’s metaphysics. It caused his death accomplished by Leibniz and Nietzsche. Modernists can look directly at objective divine causality in the soul, as in the case of the mathematical or geometric triangle. The concept of God and creation is given univocally, by taking Avicenna’s formal concept of being as being. The introduction of causality into the intellect by the external will of God transformed the course of abstraction, transferring it from Neoplatonic *denudatio* to Aristotelian *abstractio*. According to *Seconds Analytics*, it is given in the framework of logical Aristotelian proof and necessity. We recognize the creative causality essentially in our receptive intellectual cognition; therefore, thinking and cognition are of our own making. The quotation rejects the concept of the analogical and mystical cognition of God, and also the path of the first Averroism and Thomism about the sensual perceived effects of God in creation as *causa prima*. Scotus created a philosophical form of illumination, which is given as a causality of the essence and inserted it into the scheme of Aristotelian scientific deduction. The analogy given in natural human cognition (*pro statu isto*), following the causality of created things, is not sufficient for univocal cognition of God (*causa non potest esse aliquid quod est motivum intellectus nostri*). It is necessary to start from God as the active cause of our cognition, which acts on the soul from the outside, purely intellectually and directly. Aristotelian exposure of the intellect from the direction of hylemorphic substances is sufficient but for the natural cognition of divine effects in the creation. As a result, the cognition bound to the concept of the infinite being is excluded. The analogy, on the other hand, does not provide the univocal concept of God and, moreover, it needs the theory of illumination and emanations; therefore, it cannot establish a scientific Aristotelian deduction. The cognition of God must be done *univoce*, and the analogy has insufficient causality for establishing the univocity. Therefore, according to the analogical proof (*conceptus dictus de Deo analogus*), the scientific proof would have to follow from the causality of some immaterial substance anyway, because the analogy is given only in the intellect (*oportet ponere aliquam causam aliam ab intellectu*). Aristotelian position of Scotus does not exclude sensual cognition from the proof of God, but considers it insufficient.

In contrast to Neoplatonist Descartes, Scotus adheres to the definition of the intellect as a *tabula rasa*. Moreover, he does not exclude the sensually given external causality in order to elaborate the scientific demonstration for cognition according to *Seconds Analytics*. Oxford’s period interpreted cognition based on phantasms in the mode of the first Averroism, thereby valorizing the concept of *intellectus possibilis* for modernity. Scotus’s partial realism ties in with the work of the above-quoted Matteo Aquasparta (ch. 5.2). This Semiaverroist philosopher, who received the first Thomism, pointed out to *illuminati* of the second Averroism that the correspondence theory of the truth, according to *De anima*, proceeds from sensual cognition. Thomistic modernism and Scotus, in contrast to the first Averroism, insist on the fundamental dissimilarity of the senses and the intellect. The senses recognize individual and material things; intellectual cognition takes place through universal concepts. Therefore, modernists cannot connect the senses with the intellect or the mind with the body. This dualistic position in terms of cognition was coined by Aegidius Romanus from the Thomistic school of the first Averroism. All Latin sophists proclaimed that kind of dualism; they attributed their own error to Averroes that was interpreted according to Avicenna. Scotus’s dualism finds its continuation in the line of Semiaverroism, which was created by the sophistic syncretism of Aegidius’s Thomism and Franciscan modernists after the year 1277. Abstraction from the senses is necessary, because the soul is a blank slate. But Aristotelian abstraction is not enough to ensure the univocal concept of cognition. Therefore, we need a direct insight into the essentially conceived causality. Unfortunately, according to the first Averroism, this is not to be found in external reality, because it is merely a logical abstraction in thinking. In contrast to modernity, the thinking of classical metaphysics takes the starting point in reality of first substances. The philosophy of Scotism is not based on abstraction from the senses, but on the univocal predication of direct knowledge of God that has causal effects in the man and in the creation. Scotus is committed to the univocal concept of the one truth in the mode “*secundum se*.” Like this, we can recognize God directly throuth the natural reason. Therefore, Scotus must establish against the Modists from the school of the first Averroism a mixed concept of truth according to Aristotle’s concordance and essential causality made in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. According to Scotus and Descartes, it comes to univocal deduction of metaphysics that starts from the dogmatic presupposition of the existence of God and from causal effects of God in the world. Both modernists are looking for an undoubted basis for deduction. They have to find some island of actualized state in the soul that modern God has put into us by his own will. God is the Aristotelian *causa prima*, and therefore establishes causality in creation and thus also in our cognition. However, these *illuminati* go from modern God to the real world, which is a fatal metaphysical error. Scotus looks for the effective cause of the external being, which we formally recognize in our intellect. The intellect reflects the purely rational evidence, which is given in the enlightened intellect (Avicenna’s *intellectus adeptus*) by the action of the divine essence as an effective cause. Scotus’s speculative metaphysics had no problem to start out of the divine essence given as a cause outside the human intellect. In his time, God of *Modernorum* was not yet dead. After the authoritarian intervention of modernists, philosophy and theology cohabited in the model of the one univocal truth that was directly observed by victorious *illuminati* in Oxford and in Paris. According to Scotus, the actuality made by God in human thinking is given necessarily. God wants it that way with regard to his *rectitudo* and *certitudo* given in the theology and through the history of salvation. The dogmatic presuppositions are as unquestionable as the logically necessary arrival of Antichrist or the metaphysically given eternity of the soul in Thomism. Modern ontotheology and today’s nihilistic ideologies recognize no separation of generically different sciences. Under the guidance of dogmatic Furies, mythological modernity began with objectively considered God and the real world come only in the second round. For classical metaphysicians as was Bacon, such a doctrine represented pure madness and nonsense (*insaniunt contra veritatem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). The first Averroism did not require the direct recognition of God as an essentially considered effective cause for the emergence of natural cognition. From the point of view of Modists, the univocal cognition of God in the mode of essential and causal abstraction is sheer nonsense. God exists as an eminent first substance in the mode of *aseitas*, which cannot be reduced to a mathematical essence. According to *Seconds Analytics*, univocal causality and necessity can be accepted only at the level of mathematical and logical abstraction. Aristotelians content themselves with the actualized first substances in order to know God; their approach to God as *causa prima* makes but the last step of the proof.

Thanks to speculative premises, Scotus accumulated everything necessary to start the metaphysical deduction from modern God to the objective being in the creation. He secured Archimedes’s speculative point in the essential causality that lies outside the cognizing intellect and outside the causality of hylemorphic substances. According to *Seconds Analytics*, he can start the process of cognition that is secured only in the intellect. The first form of new metaphysics is outlined in the work *Lectura I* in the cited treatise *De cognoscibilitate Dei*. The first step bypasses sensual cognition of first substances by introducing a potentially given being of the third kind. The treatise contests Aquinas′s position that the impossibility of knowing God “*sicuti est*” is only apparent (*Vat*. XVI, no. 43, p. 241). Let us recall the fundamental theological teaching proclaimed by bishop Alvernus that we can direct see the divine essence. The second Averroism understood it in the holistic sense (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). The first Averroism refused to take Alvernus’s thesis for natural cognition, because we see the divine essence directly only through the human mode of cognition (*eius essentiam videre non possumus*).[[428]](#footnote-428) Scotus knew Thomas’s criticism concerning direct intuition of the divine essence, since Aegidius’s Thomism had been already lectured at Oxford for a long time. The new form of illumination found the middle link of proof in the divine causality, defined in an essential manner. The first Averroism rejected the essential causality in principle, because it is a typical model of the metaphysical error of the type “*fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). The scientific proof takes the causality only from sensually recognized effects of first substances (*secundum quid*); therefore, human cognition cannot take directly the divine causality. The human mind has no divine character, not even the character of cosmic intelligences; we cannot create the world by thinking or cause real changes in the world by moving the intelligible forms. This is pure paranoia based on mythological predication “*in artificialibus*.” The human mind exists only in the body and recognizes and acts through the body and the senses. Modern metaphysical deduction found a univocal predication concerning God and man. The first Averroism fundamentally rejected it as a hidden form of necessarily and eternally given emanations. God thus becomes the effective cause of our cognition by placing his causality directly in our immaterial intellect. In this key point Scotus abolished the cognition of Modists made in the mode “*quoad nos*.” Aristotelians rejected the direct intelligible cognition of divine qualities in the order of natural cognition. Our intellect would then contain some actualized forms and would be an immaterial cosmic substance similar to cosmic intelligences. Taken that level, God can act directly in the cognition using the causality. Our cognition is given only in the body and through the senses; in the same way, the proof of divine action and divine cognition must be created as well. Scotus’s version of Oxfordian Fallacy is given by the fact that the divine essence is predicted as an individual real cause in the middle link of the proof according to analytical interpretation of *Seconds Analytics* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1) made by Rufus. This is impossible for the first Averroism, because we cannot recognize God and His will through some direct univocal insight of His causality. Scotus’s *resolutio* of metaphysics opened *via Modernorum* by criticizing all previous paths to God as insufficient. The rationality and necessity, which are given in the infinite divine intellect and in the finite human intellect, must correspond to each other in an univocal manner. The cognition from the senses is not fully true, because the abstraction is given only in an equivocal manner. It is actualized only by the external similarity between God and human intellect. Abstraction from phantasms is sufficient for correspondence in the mode of analogy; we know God in an evident and actualized manner. The proof of God made as Augustine’s Neoplatonic analogy of the good is excluded with reference to Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic concept of the Good. This criticism applies only analogically, not univocally. In Aristotelianism, univocity is given only by real causal effects. That thesis Scotus accepts in principle, but according to his own version of Oxfordian Fallacy.

After the rejection of indirect cognition of the divine essence given in the school of the first Averroism in the mode “*quoad nos*,” it is necessary to find the sure and necessary cognition of God with the help of the univocal deduction from the essentially given causality. That proceeding exceeds the concept of God determined by phantasms. All humans have the power to this effective knowledge of God as the cause of our knowledge; otherwise the first science would end up in the equivalence or in the analogy. The deduction given in the analytical mode twists the scheme of cognition in *Seconds Analytics* given in the mode *per prius* from the actualized first substance, since the priory takes the universal essence. Scotus helps himself with Bonaventure’s two-stage construction (ch. 4.1.2) and introduces the concept of objective and natural cognition. The previous chapter explained that Scotus performs a categorical predication as an universal insight of *ens inquantum ens*. Now he applies this universality in the mode *per prius* for the cognition of the essential causality in God, which runs according to determinism of Oxfordian Fallacy. The path of the first Averroism from causality in the creation to God as the first cause was rejected as insufficient. The proof coming from the effects in creation only ensures the equivalent recognition of the divine essence in the mode of *causa prima* recognized *per prius* from the direction of the senses. Scotus claims that we experience God primarily in the universal thought and then in individual things. By using *Seconds Analytics*, the scheme of cognition is applied against Aristotle, since the interpretation of causality follows Oxfordian Fallacy. Theologian Scotus dogmatically knows that we recognize divine causality directly and universally. The direct insight into the universal divine causality is in conflict with the sensual recognition of effects of real substances. That proceeding is granted by the philosophical principle “*ex inmediatis*.” Therefore, the new metaphysics had to abolish the basic cognitive principle of reality made according to *Seconds Analytics*.

“I do not agree with Aristotle if he understands the predication in the above-mentioned way. We experience for ourselves that if we recognize the cause universally (*experimur quod quando cognoscimus causam in universali*), we want to recognize it naturally in individual things. We know the effect; therefore, we want to recognize its cause. Hence, the intellect, which recognizes God universally, naturally desires to know him in individual things as well (*intellectus cognoscens Deum in universali, naturaliter desiderat scire in particulari*).” [[429]](#footnote-429)

The recognition of modern metaphysics runs in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. The starting point is the divine causality, given universally and outside the senses, which is recognized in the logical mode *per prius*. The divine causality is given in the form of a universal essence. In this way, Scotus established a new middle link of deductive scientific proof. We recognize God necessarily and evidently, because he exercises an objective-causal effect in us. Objective causality is justified due to the divine will. God wants us to recognize him in the mode of modern univocity and evidence. Therefore, in the mode , we have a naturally given cognition of God that is *per prius* universal (*cognoscens Deum in universali*). Through deduction, the cognition of the divine universal causality applies in the mode *per posterius*. Of course, we want to recognize its effects in individual things (*naturaliter desideramus scire in particulari*). From the point of view of the Aristotelian cognition , the deduction applies exactly from the opposite sense. The proof of *Seconds Analytics* goes from singular effects in reality to the universally stated cause in thinking. The objective Scotus does not hold the same opinion as Aristotle and that of the Commentator and Thomism. Scotus considers the universal divine causality directly, because God does not exist as a sensually knowable essence.

The introductory part of the treatise *De cognoscibilitate Dei* has shown that God can be recognized universally and effectively in the mode of full scientific evidence that lies beyond the sensual cognition and beyond the analogy. Since we recognize God by his causality and not by his intellect and his thinking, the primary universal cognition of God passes through the natural intellectual cognition. Everyone wants to recognize the cause of some consequence (*quando cognoscimus effectum, desideramus scire causam*). Scotus takes divine causality as an effectively acting universal essence and experiences causally in the direct vision of natural cognition. As a result, the experience of the world came into being as a new form of *tertium ens*, which is given by the objective experience and by the intellectual vision. The new kind of *resolutio* established the ontological way of pre-comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) that keeps everything that is or that can be in that manner of metaphysical deduction. The new way of universal cognition of causal and universally acting divine rationality was fundamentally different from Porretan mathematization of the world in the mode “*discrete videamus*” and from Gandavus’s comitation of exemplars as *tertium ens* from God to the creation. The objective being is not a universal mathematical measure of everything that exists, but an essential metaphysical measure of objectively given experience of the world. The cognition of God begins in the mode *per prius* at the level of direct cognition of the universally given cause (*experimus quod quando cognoscimus causam in universali*). The conclusion takes as first the universal cognition of God in the mode *per prius;* afterwards, it concerns natural knowledge based on the cognition of God in the sensually given and abstracted individual things. Such proceeding stands in direct contradiction both to Aristotle and to the first Averroism. Scotus created an objective Aristotelianism that contested Aristotle′s teaching (*contra Philosophum arguo*). The natural recognition of God in the order of the causality given to the essence is scientific and always possible, even if the real sensually perceived world did not exist at all. Augustinian theory of illumination contradicts the purely intellectual philosophical cognition, because it represents a mystical and not a philosophical path to God. The deduction of cognition from the divine essence causa shows that Scotus works with the key principle of cognition in the mode “*inmediate*” according to the Oxford analytical school. In the first place is the cognition given by the universal essence (*cognoscimus causam in universali*). Since the divine essential causality can be recognized directly by the objective version of Oxfordian Fallacy, it is no longer a problem to carry out this cognition of the first cause in the creation, where we recognize the same cause from its consequences. In the end, Scotus returned to the initial position of the first Averroism, but from the position based on the deduction of divine causality that is given primarily in the intellect. It is the typical position of the two-stage architecture of science as direct eidetic intuition (*intellectus*) and empirical abstraction (*scientia*; OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Through metaphysical deduction from the universal concepts to individual things, the new nature of the hermeneutic “how” was established that makes the fundament of metaphysical objective experience (*experimur quod*). According to Scotus, we experience directly and evidently something that does not really exist and can never exist, also an universal objective causality. Once again, there is at play the tragic confusion concerning the metaphysical dative in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Modernists take the being in its objective parousia to be a real fundament of metaphysics. Ockham’s razor tried to eliminate this paranoia from metaphysics (ch. 5.4.2), however, without success.

Scotus created a new form of knowledge of God and the world, which brought forth the donation of the objective being in the full form of the objective dative (*dativus obiectivus*). This metaphysician found a new way for modernists how to recognize God they objectively created (*dativus modi*). Muses were certainly pleased about this progress of the divine comedy called “objectivity.” Logically deduced objectivity became a directly experienced state of mind that works as a universal cause in modern God and in the creation (*experimur quod quando cognoscimus causam in universali*). This new way of paranoid perception of the world changed Simplicius’s previous innovation (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). The victorious group of *sophistae Latini* took up *via Modernorum* and they began to wear the new and objectively made clothes as the emperor in the well-known fairy tale that is truthful on the level of *alētheia*.

Now, the modernity can elaborate the complete deduction of objective metaphysics based on God as the First cause, which has essential effects and can be recognized in human mind. The speculative unity begins with the attribute of infinity that summarizes in itself all determinations of being. The concept of the infinite being is separated from the finite creation. The work *Lectura I* contains the treatise named *De conceptus Deus infiniti* that established a new version of metaphysical deduction in the mode of modern *resolutio*. Objective deduction of metaphysics begins by naming the basic problem that concerns conceptual cognition of God and the whole of being.

“If the concept of the infinite Being is the most perfect concept to understand God, how do we come to know this concept?” [[430]](#footnote-430)

The solutions of the previous aporias with regard to divine cognition in the school of the first and second Averroism were brought by Avicenna’s notion “*species accidentis tantum*” that was given as a new form of being of the third kind. Scotus defines the new form of the species as a permanent idea in the intellect. The cognition of the divine infinity is based on objective species given outside the phantasms. The first substance given in reality may cease to exist; its species remain in the memory and the intellect. However, the intellect operates only in the mode of Aristotelian abstraction, outside of any form of illumination and out of Augustinian *memoria*. The new insight into objectivity abolished Augustinian memory. It is linked to actively cognising *intellectus agens* as its *locus specierum*. The deduction of the universal rationality from God to creation makes it possible to find a new *locus specierum* that is given absolutely and separately from the senses. The essential permanence of modern species is ensured by the fact that they objectively “exsist” in divine thinking even before the actualized act of creation. Gandavus provided the manner of this objective existence in God through the intentionality of the divine will and intellect (ch. 5.2.2). Scotus sets out anew the way in which species persist. They are not given directly in God as hold previous modern *illuminati*, since they are knowable in the way of divine rational consideration and deduction. The proof proceeds *per absurdum*. The deduction does not come from the Neoplatonic analogy of the exposure of the soul from the direction of the solar intellect, as was the case in the second Averroism since Avicenna (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). The being continues to exist as a species in divine thought, although the first substance given in reality no longer exists or does not yet exist. The objective species represent eternal rational meaning for God and they are derived from the way of his thinking. The substance conceived by God and given in his rationality has the objective form of being and, consequently, it belongs to natural cognition. The character of this species is intentional and given only in the possibility. That modality ensures the univocity for the cognition of God and of man. They recognize the same objectivity, but not in the same mode, since one cognition is finite and the other is infinite. According to Scotus as an objective Aristotelian, this project of species is entirely consistent with his exegesis of *Seconds Analytics* according to Oxfordian Fallacy. We recognize God primarily through the universal concept, which we experience directly as the middle link of deductive proof. God is the infinite universal and intellectual being given as an essence. That essence reveals itself through the objective causality experienced directly in our soul enlightened by God. Therefore, the objective causality cannot depend on the actual state of the world, where causality is already effectively given by actions of first substances. The concept of the knowable substance (the infinite and the finite) connects both poles of metaphysics to the univocal knowledge of God and of the objectively given world that is separated from the real divine *creatio*. Let’s take a look at the proof *per absurdum*. It established the radical Cartesian doubt, which has finally killed modern God. The following argument presents the first version of metaphysical *epokhē* that entails the concept of deceiving God (*deus malignus*) that Descartes remade.

“Let us allow God to remove the substance of the Sun while preserving the sunlight. Then, in the same way, species of Sun’s rays would arise with regard to cognizing intellect, and the light would be active in the intellect in the way of the substance given in this way. In the same way, our intellect takes up the species of this substance given in this way. But this way of substitution cannot replace the species of real substance. If the real substance is destroyed, the species cannot replace it by representation. Then one can also replace neither the species of the real substance nor its accidents given by imposition, since they are given on the real substance and they exist only through it.” [[431]](#footnote-431)

Let us admit the hypothetical and absurd possibility that God abolished the Sun as a substance and left only the sunshine (*si Deus destrueret solis substantiam et conservaret eius lumen*). Then, based on the nature of such paradoxically given light, we perceive the species of light in the cognizing intellect as if it emanated from the now-suspended Sun as a substance (*species luminis… esset activum in intellectu sicut si esset in substantia*). When the Sun disappears, the modern intellect sees the objectively recognized light. The paranoid or dogmatic cognition of light now comes primarily from God as the Giver of objective species. The eclipse of the Sun as the first substance giving the sense of being constituted an objective version of the species, which exists outside the “real” species of Scotus.

The new theory of categories mixed the first and the second substance as a real being; in contrast, there is another universal substance as an objective being. Such proceeding constested Aristotelian theory of the truth. The proof based on “*destructio primis*” had to be changed accordingly. The so called real species perished with the disappearance of the sun as the first substance (*hoc posito non posset suffodere ad speciem substantiae*). But the objective form of the species in divine thought cannot perish because it is given there in the mode “*semel—semper*.” If the objective ratio of the Sun lies in divine thinking, then this definition has a causal effect for human cognition. The deduction runs through the fact of the exemplary objectivity. Its necessity is of logical nature charged with metaphysical and essential necessity given in the mode *simpliciter*. This is why the objective necessity proposed by Scotus’s *epokhē* of the world proved so infectious for postmodern *illuminati* as Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, Husserl and today’s representatives of analytic philosophy. The analytic philosophy in Oxford at the time of Scotus was represented by the work *Erfurter Anonymus*. Then it is not important whether there is a real being, but whether there is an intellect. This is given today in the nihilistic form of the experiment called “Brain in a Vat.” Let us recall the original model of Scotus’s *epokhē* in Porphyry′s teaching, which defended the autonomy of species in the categorical predication given by *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). There is the objective use of *modus tollens* (the real Sun does not exist) and *modus* *ponens* (but its objective species is reflected by God). This sophistry established the primary imposition of objective meaning. Gandavus had this imposition in the mode of “*esse ad*” that presupposed the existence of a divine exemplar. Scotus’s metaphysical *epokhē* abolished the key part of Gandavus’s concept “*esse ad*” that made part of the sphere of divine being (ch. 5.2.3). Scotus’s art of mining is to be admired, since he tunneled his path under Aristotle and Avicenna (see the quoted verb “*suffodere*”). By using the divine or human solar intellect, modernity can establish the objective cognition of Sun-species. But this fact, according to Scotus, cannot replace the real physical causality of the Sun as the first substance. The quotation in the next sentence immediately emphasizes that in reality this objective *epokhē* is not possible, because the first real substance determines the existence of accidental properties. When the real substance is missing, there are no accidents either. Without the real Sun, there is no real light. But something else applies to God. He can abolish the Sun and there is still a causal and objective “exsistence” of sunrays, since they make a cognitive principle through which we arrive to cognition of light. The eclipse of the first substance shows that objective modernity does not need Augustinian illumination in order to know the world.

Scotus’s *epokhē* extinguished the mystical light of Neoplatonic solar intellect and let shine the power of deductive intellect. Scotus started a new epoch by letting the Sun go out, as did Grosseteste and Rufus. The new metaphysics opened *via Modernorum* by completely extinguishing the Sun and replacing it with mythological notions, objectively established. According to Heraclitus, the Sun cannot change the course of its orbit by itself because Erinnyes, as helpers of the goddess of justice Dike, would punish it for doing so (DK 22, B 94). In the following periods, modernity received a corresponding punishment for chaotic thinking, which abolished the basic order of wisdom. The predication of objective species is based on the being as *ens inquantum ens*. God actualizes its simplicity, recognizability and causal effectiveness in human cognition. The Sun exists in reality; but even if it were to go out and disappeared, its species will still exist in God. We can work objectively with this being in the mode of its exemplary “exsistence.” Derrida’s version of logocentrically oriented metaphysics as “*héliotrope*”does not apply to Scotus’s objective metaphysics. It is presented in a much more sophisticated way than is the case with metaphorical Derrida and his criticism of logocentrism. If God decides not to create the thing at the moment, its objective being, eternally given in his thinking, still exists, and this rationality is effectively and objectively recognizable in the creation as a kind of an objective *vestigium*. God’s thinking determines the real being of creation and human thinking as well. But the objective being in the mode of infinite divine potency (*esse cognitum*) is not yet “*esse verum*,” because nothing actualized in reality corresponds to it. Scotus emphasizes the limitation of objective species in the next sentence of the quotation. The existence of objectively given species cannot confirm the existence of the Sun as a causally acting substance, because it is not given to it as a positively determined accident (*non est ibi, cum substantia destruatur*). This positive (*per positum*), i.e., actualized and Sun-related version of species must be clearly distinguished from the objective definition of the solar ray as an independent species in divine thinking. This objective “*species accidentis tantum*” possesses only a minimal beingness; let us see Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*” and Gandavus’s concept of “*ratitudo*” (ch. 5.2.2). Due to the minimal existence given by divine objective and effective rationality, the simple species of light “exsists” even after the extinction of the actualized substance of the Sun. Scotus develops the argument of the confinement of reality in the book *Lectura* I in two other cases, which are important for the emergence of modern metaphysics. First of all, the metaphysical *epokhē* explicitly concerns the existence of God (*Vat*. XVII, no. 33, p. 472.20‒26). Scotus defends the philosophy based on the pure possibilit that builds up the primary identity of meaning. The identity is given *per se*, i.e., outside the real existence of things. Even if, from the point of view of metaphysics, God was not actually proved (if he did not actually work in the creation, not that he did not exist at all), the possibility of objectively established knowledge through his thinking would be given. The second version of Scotus’s *epokhē* uses this argument in the style of Descartes for the disappearance of the real essences, which would be recognizable by their objective species (*Vat*. VI, no. 24, p. 254.14‒20). In its minimal being, the thing would have a sufficient reason to keep its identity, because it would objectively subsist in the imagined identity that is kept in the divine intellect. Scotus makes an epochal turn to the objective form of the experience of God on the logical path called “*reductio ad absurdum*.” The objective experience of the real non-existent *absurdum* follows Avicenna’s proposition of “Flying man.” Descartes and Husserl repeated in postmodern age the absurd thought experiments based on Scotus’s modern *epokhē*. Scotus excluded reality, which Descartes did after him. He then found logically and necessarily the island of reality given by objective species, whose objectivity was guaranteed by the formally equal thinking of a causally acting and rationally thinking modern God. Descartes took this step in the second meditation and Husserl’s *epokhē* repeated this scenario. Transcendent meaning emerges as an *eidos* in the immanence of pure consciousness. Husserl’s art of the mining in the mode of nihilistic “*suffodere*” is shown by the concept of “*Sich-von-sich-selbst-her-zeigen*” in *Kartesianischen Meditationen*.[[432]](#footnote-432) Husserl’s illumination establishes a minimal being that is sufficient for the foundation of the first philosophy. Aristotelian Heidegger rejected this mythological sense of being right at the beginning of his own path to philosophy. He replaced it by threefold execution of a sense that is conceived as the existential mode of *Dasein* (ch. 4.4.4). The nihilism of the first substance caused the thinking of *Modernorum* to go into itself and seek the evidence through causally acting and directly given God in our cognition.

In the epoch following Scotus’s elimination of critical Aristotelian science, deceptive Muses completed the metaphysical work presented in the form of the objective divine comedy. In the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, postmodernism took into its own hands the role of God as a metaphysical substitute for the reality of the first substance. Furies led modernity through Scotus to take *via Modernorum*. In connection with Descartes’s ideas, Arnauld carried out a postmodern eclipse of the first substance for scientific cognition. He made the direct seeing of postmodern ideas, that is, of modern exemplars to be sufficient condition of knowledge (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). After the eclipse of the first substance, modern God makes *locus specierum* for all *scibilia* that industrious modernity produces permanently. After the death of the supreme guardian that controls modern treasures of objective knowledge, the place of divine treasurer was taken by the cloud databases, and finally by the bare DNA. This miraculous and mystical substance represents the postmodern Philosopher’s stone in the epoch of complete victory that established absurd experience of the non-existing third world. The objectively given Philosopher’s stone touched the molecule of DNA and turned this real first substance into a new nihilistic *scibile* called *humanitas*. This objectively given substance of the third kind preserves foundations of humanity for objective *illuminati*. They contemplate their humanity exclusively in the mirror of objectively given nature. Through the extinction of the Sun and the creation of metaphysical darkness, Scotus secured the first difference between the objective and real being. In the darkness that came after the extinction of the first substance, the first day of the objective creation of species took place. Modernity set off on victorious pilgrimage through the world. Mystical mathematician Descartes returned to Bonaventure in the substantiation of metaphysics, whereas the critical metaphysician Scotus took the path of the first Averroism. In the first step of his *Meditationes*, Descartes excluded sensual cognition and returned to the idea of God with the help of innate species. The univocal recognition of God by causality involves the third step of *Meditations*, whereby in the preceding second step he secured the actual substance given *per se* by the act of one’s own cogito (*res cogitans*). From Scotus’s direct causal action of God in us, Descartes made the innate idea of God in us. Cartesian intellect considers the objective reality of ideas in their minimal objectivity (*idea realitatem objectivam*) and it seeks their external cause.[[433]](#footnote-433) On the formal side, this cause must include the same objectivity, which, however, is given in the mode of original effective creative causality. Then such a “Flying man” gets out of his *cogito* into the external world. To leave the Platonic cave is a superhuman task for modernism and postmodernism, which can only be fulfilled in the framework of the new mythology. Their cornerstone was the Raven of Elijah (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3), and now it is newly conceived God of *Modernorum*. The deduction of God from the essentially determined thinking offers a great advantage. Even if God could not be proved metaphysically from creation and if there was no reality of first substances, the objectively given causality would still be enough to secure the cognition of God and the world in the mode of deductive demonstrations. It is enough for the modernist that God thinks, and not that the world exists. The disappearance of reality, given in the mode of *reductio ad absurdum*, is logically correct. Paranoid thinking of modernity is determined by logical necessity, and not by metaphysical abstraction stated due to real causality of first substances. From the perspective of Aristotelian metaphysics, it is sheer nonsense in the mode of the cited error “*fallacia secundum quid*.” In critical philosophy, human thinking states the truth according to *simpliciter* and *actualiter* given reality of first substances, and not vice versa. The mysticism of the ontotheological Jacob’s ladder became superfluous in view of the objectively recognized reality, proved by the logical proof of the abolition of the Sun in the mode *reductio ad absurdum*. The objective scholasticism logically abolished the real sense of the world, which is absurd and therefore completely evident in modern times. After the eclipse of the first substance, modernists as Scotus and postmodernists as Descartes firmly believe that merciful God of *Modernorum* does not want to leave them in the darkness of ignorance. The gnoseological drama of postmodernism began at the moment when Nietzsche abolished the divine shadow world of modern metaphysics. Then nihilists of the last times of thinking are left with the mirror of the self-reflexive consciousness made out of the individual, the divine nature, the mystical evolution of DNA and virtual bank accounts.

Let's return to Scotus’s *epokhē*, which launched the first version of modern metaphysics outlined according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The objective sphere of being does not relate to real substance. It was the case of Gandavus that worked out the concept of being in the mode of “*esse ad*.” Scotus created a new species of the third kind separate from God. It keeps its own causality that ensures the true course of cognition. The Sun could go out eventually; but the objectively given divine rationality can never disappear, because it makes direct consequence of the divine essence. As a result, a new version of the solar myth was created to sustain the objectively enlightened, but really blind modern age. A completely intelligent modern God works directly in our consciousness, which is total nonsense, but objectively necessary nonsense. Modernity and subsequent epochs observed an imaginary world in the objective mode “*credo quia absurdum*.” Cognitive evidence of paranoid *illuminati* does not need the existence of the real world. They can objectively truly observe the real light through hypostatized species that were introduced in Rufus’s analytic interpretation of *Seconds Analytics* at Oxford. The objective form of species is not given in sensory memory, as the first Averroism assumed in the concept of *species sensibilis*. The modern species, as being of the third kind, must be excluded from sensual abstraction, because it possesses an objective character separate from the sensual experience of actual things. The deduction given by the “power of the absurd” (S. Kierkegaard) bypassed the actuality of the first substance. Classical philosophy recognized it sensually and then stated categorically in the mode of Aristotelian imposition. The new reality is deduced *per absurdum* on the basis of a hypothetical, but entirely logical description of divine thought. The modernist can recognize hypothetical species of light directly in his thinking. The objective and universal mode of the essence thus deduced entails an *univoce* given sense. It results from the directly experienced divine causality, which retains a universal character. Then such paranoid metaphysics doesn’t care whether light really exists or not. The objectively conceived Sun does not replace physical effects of the real Sun, but it secures its objectively given recognizable substance. Scotus invented the objective knowledge of God and the world, which do not require the sensual cognition. At the level of the univocal concept of being, the third world is recognized completely objectively.

The new theory of cognition contested the conception of intentionality, which we find in John Blund’s first Averroism (OBJ II, ch. 2.1). The new form of *species intelligibilis* replaced the earlier *species sensibilis* by establishing the first intention as an objectively given minimal existence called “*species tantum*.” This objective species created a new donation of being in the mode of *dativus obiectivus*, which proceeds exclusively from the paranoid modern subject. In the second step, the new school of *sophistae Latini*, under the leadership of Scotus, made a new appropriation of being in the mode of *dativus possessivus*. The aforementioned objective intentionality of minimal being as an objective “second substance” (*species intelligibilis1*) that appropriates the second Aristotelian intentionality (*species intelligibilis2*). Aristotelianism generates *species intelligibilis* through the abstraction based on sensual experience that begins as a double *diaphanum* first in the imagination and then in *intellectus possibilis*. The scheme of cognition according to first Averroism became superfluous. The immediate grasp of universal divine causality immediately produces *species intelligibilis1* in the first step. This eidetic intuition of the “second substance” then establishes a categorical predication that appropriates Aristotelian *species intelligibilis2*. Scotus repeats Grosseteste’s progression of scientific proof from the intuition of first principles (*intellectus*) by means of Avicennian hypostatic intellect to Aristotelian science (*scientia*), which is founded on the basis of double abstraction. The difference between the objective species deduced *per absurdum* in Scotus’s metaphysics and Aristotelian species created by abstraction from reality retains a fundamental significance for hermeneutics. Scotus knows that the causality of the world lies outside of human intellect; otherwise our cognition would have but a chimerical character. In the objective species of the stone, which is intended by God in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*” there are included all objectively given properties that “exsist” independently of the real existing stone. The objective species given in the form of the categorial quasi-substance according to Avicenna’s “*equinitas tantum*” then make part of categorial statements. They establish a modern science given *ex nihilo*. Deductive connection between the thinking of *illuminati* and their modern God ensures the dogmatic proof of the world, designed *per absurdum*. After the extinction of the first substance, nothing would exist without the modern God. It should be remembered that the intellect of Scotus is given in the soul as an Aristotelian *tabula rasa* and it is activated directly, through essential divine causality. After Scotus’s kind of *epokhē*, modern God became necessary for objective metaphysics. His exemplary demiurgic thinking make the first kind of *dativus auctoris* that established the effective causality of objective cognition. Mathematician Descartes starts from metaphysician Scotus; however, he took a step back and reintroduced Bonaventure’s exemplar in the form of an innate idea into a hypostatized Avicennist intellect. Primary reflection is linked to the original *causa prima*, since the human mind as *cogito* reflects the thinking and causality of modern God. This kind of common *dativus auctoris* forms the basic source of nihilistic metaphysical reflection. In a second step, it accomplishes the humanly possible *dativus possessivus*, which is objectively necessary for the appropriation of such an imaginary deduced diacosmos. The analogy of this imaginary and demonic “*possessio*” is guided by subjectively educated Furies. The analogy between the two projects of demiurgic colonization of being is based on mythologically determined and therefore shared rationality of modern God and modern *illuminati*. This paranoid and demoniac *dativus modi* grounds the scientific interpretation of the postmodern world on the basis of Descartes’s deductive method (*modus procedendi*). The divine reflection of infinite being (*ens infinitum*) enables a subsequent deduction of the finite being in the objectively given species. Aristotle excludes any univocal or causal participation in the divine First Intellect. We love the Divine Intellect, and thus we try to resemble it in the move of human existence (κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, *Met*. 1072b3). The immovable Mover naturally attracts all beings endowed with reason and thus indirectly brings them into the movement that is firstly given at the level of the cosmic intelligences in the first sphere.

Scotus chose a position different from Aristotelianism. Theology and philosophy have only one common truth. In the Christian view, God appears as the creator of the world. Scotus accepted Alvernus’s Christian thesis on the direct contemplation of God (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). But like the first Averroism of Modists, Scotus reworked essential causality in such a way that it adhered to the basic thesis of the natural knowledge of God only in the mode “*quoad nos*.” He found a new path of vision given by new insight into the objectively existing being (*Vor-blickbahn*). He transformed the knowledge of God made in the mode “*quoad nos*” from an Aristotelian schema into an objective one.

“In this way, our intellect recognizes the divine being as the infinite being (*Deum esse ens infinitum*), the supreme Good, etc. The universal concept of being is summarized in the concept of creation (*conceptus entis includitur in conceptu creaturae*). If the intellect grasps this existence as the whiteness or the stone, then it can intend the being itself through deduction and abstraction (*potest cognoscere intentionem entis*) that forms the basis of this intention (*ibi sistendo*).” [[434]](#footnote-434)

Deduction begins with the humanly known concept of infinity, which is univocally defined at the same level as the concept of created being (*conceptus entis includitur in conceptu creaturae*). In univocal mode, human cognition captures the being as an objectively existing whiteness or as an objectively existing stone (*ut album aut lapidem*). The real non-existent whiteness and the real stone are deductively included in the predication “*ad unum*.” The common “second substance” is the minimal beingness that is found in the divine and human intellect (*ibi sistendo*). The quotation conceives the univocal being in terms of the original unity of being as being (*in concipiendo hoc ens*), which has replaced the hyparchical role of the first substance (*ascendendo et abstrahendo potest cognoscere intentionem entis*). The intentionality given by the imposition from first substances do not enter into Scotus’s deduction of universals. Their essentiality is fixed by the ontotheological definition. The example of hypostatized whiteness shows that the objective supposition is taken up in a univocal manner. Such kind of categoric statements is completely separated from the original Aristotelian predication bound to hyparchical predication from first substances. There is no categorical statement (et moreover, made as univocity!) for the whiteness in the first Averroism, because that kind of meaning exists only in thinking as a pure abstraction of the second level. The unity of being must first be actualized and be real in first substances and it can then be universally stated in the second substances. The objective intention of Scotus goes to the logical supposition made in mind and not to the metaphysical imposition made from first substances.

However, there is a separation of objectivity from reality in Scotus′s teaching. The objective species exist only potentially (*potentia immaterialis, potentia tantum*) because they have a minimal being. The new concept corresponds to modern definition of *ens ratum* as a minimal portion of being (*ens diminutum*). This minimal portion of being, given in potency, can be recognized only with the pure insight of the intellect. The difference between the first and the second intention and both types of the species (objective, real) lies in the fact that the objective species in the form “mountain of gold” corresponds to real species at the level of “gold” and “mountain”; however, there is no connection in reality between them (*tantum extrema sunt in re et non ipsum coniunctum*; *Vat*. XVI, no. 56, p. 246.23). The new form of predication turns objective species into an abstract class of accidents that take place at the level of the pure intellect. What was ridiculous or insane for Albert and Bacon that became the foundation of a new metaphysics. But first things first; it was necessary to objectively extinguish the Sun and to cover the being with the epochal darkness. By introducing the objectively conceived correspondence of the infinite and the finite, a new form of metaphysics emerged, separate from Gandavus’s and Bonaventure’s anthropocentric ontotheology. Following the example of Modists, Scotus insists that a direct transfer of divine reflexivity into the creation is impossible according to the mode “*esse ad*” as Gandavus did. The analogy does not ensure scientific cognition; therefore, it is necessary to perform a new form of categorical predication according to Simplicius in the mode “*esse in*.” The distinction between God and creation is not made through the univocal concept of Gandavus’s intentionality as “*esse ad*.” Scotus explores the nature of intellect, which is infinite and finite in its hypostatic habitus.

“The habitus depends on the object and intellect. The divine intellect does not have the same destiny as our intellect and therefore cannot have the same habitus. His habitus is infinite, ours is finite.” [[435]](#footnote-435)

The dissimilarity between our cognition and divine cognition is due to the fact that we perceive divine objectivity only with a limited view from the finite side, in the Thomistic mode of cognition of God “*quoad nos*.” The mystical rule of divine action in the world (*regula agentis in/creati*, ch. 4.1.2) became the objective knowledge of God and the world in the mode of deduction that excluded all kinds of voluntaristic production. The demiurgic rule given by the creative will of Bonaventure and Olivi, is now replaced by the rational derivation of the objective properties of being made by metaphysical deduction. As a result, the divine being was separated from the secondarily produced and recognized rationality. This fact separated the divine being from its secondarily produced rationality that we can explore. Scotus rejected Aristotle’s negative notion of the infinite and defined God as the actual given infinite being. This being is objectively knowable because it really wants us to know it and really does so by illuminating our minds through the operation of natural essential causality. This positive and objective given factual infinite (*infinitum in actu*) is given by the univocal and objective concept of divine infinity that makes a specific form of substance. All other properties are deduced from it. Within the framework of the twofold conception of species, Scotus defines two kinds of infinity (*infinitum in actu et infinitum in potentia*).[[436]](#footnote-436) The purely potential infinite is not recognizable. Nor can the infinite be understood in its infinite, God-given actuality (*sub ratione infiniti*), but only in its objectively finite mode for us. God becomes for the first time the object of our objective cognition (*obiectum scientiae nostrae*) in the concept of an effective and objective *infinitum* that was important for Western science. The transfer of the infinite to the objective and virtual God concludes the deductive procedure of the infinitesimal calculus. The original form of integration and derivation was determined in relation to a no longer divisible individual. It was discovered by Porretan vision of the world in the mode of “*discrete videamus*” (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). This infinitesimal atomic *individuum* became the modern human being. To this human individual, Scotus added his infinitely great divine counterpart. Scotus secularized and completed Bonaventure’s theory of objective infinity. This idea created the first concept of an objective Western science in conjunction with theological speculation (ch. 4.1.1). The emergence of metaphysical infinity completed the path to the totality of universe, which was conceived mathematically.

The emergence of the new objectivity in the Porretan mode “*discrete videamus*” is conceived in the work *Lectura* I in the treatise *De conceptu entis infiniti* (ed. *Vaticana* XVI, pp. 244f.). The second step of metaphysical deduction distinguishes the recognition of hylemorphic compositions (*esse confusum*) from the cognition of objective forms (*species tantum*). As a result, the cognition of reality passed from categorical predication to the level of objective categorization of being. According to Scotus, objective cognition must not go to the level of accidental empiric cognition of the type “*homo albus*,” because it would no longer be objective. It would no more “exsist” as minimal and universal being of the third kind. The objective concept is universal because it can reach reality (the existing car) or just stay in thought (non-existent chimera). The new species (let us see the above-mentioned example of whiteness) despised the work *Categories*, which justified the introduction of the second substance through the imposition of meaning from reality. Following Avicenna’s model, Scotus constitutes a class of *simplex* and *per se* given concepts, which replaced the imposition of the first substance with the help of the supposition based on the infinite being. Gandavus begins the objective recognition in the chimera style by the concept of being as “*conceptus vanus*” or “*conceptus fictitius*” (ch. 5.2.1). The critical objectivist Scotus does not start the recognition of metaphysics with the chimera, but with the demiurgic rationality of the infinite God that can be recognized in finite reality. His astute effort did not bring a different result, because modern God had inevitably become a chimera. Nihilistic postmodernism in Nietzsche’s version consequently returns to the beginning opened by Olivi. He determinated the demiurgic will as a fundament of the divine and human subject; the world is considered to be an *aspectus* of that supreme will. Therefore, postmodernism necessarily abolished modern God in the same way as Scotus abolished Gandavus’s metaphysics of the chimera when he established the objective metaphysics. The principle of logical parsimony and Nietzsche’s philosophical hammer clearly proves that to kill modern God is logically much easier than the futile and today completely superfluous proof of his objective “exsistence.” The primary object of new metaphysics must be the being in the mode *simpliciter*. However, according to Aristotelian Scotus, this being is only a *conceptus*, also a specific insight into the whole of the finite universe, which is given from the perspective of the divine infinity (*entis infiniti*). Aristotle and the first Averroism would have unequivocally rejected such perspective. Only the first substance is given *simpliciter* and the second substance, moreover, *universaliter* as the potential accident of our cognition that corresponds to the first substance. Following the second step of deduction, Scotus’s intuition have to distinguish the species of real things from the objective cognition of these things. The definition of the objective species, inspired by Avicenna’s eidetic insight, represents a decisive step on the path to the metaphysical concept of the objective being.

“The concept is twofold in the mode of simplicity, which is conceived in the single act of the intellect and in the single act of understanding. It is given as a concept in objective simplicity (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*) and as a concept outside of this simplicity. The concept given in objective simplicity is the one whose conceptuality cannot be decomposed into other concepts that would be more primary in the order of being (*non est resolubilis in alios conceptus priores*). The concept given outside of this simplicity can be related to previous concepts, such as the concept of man can be resolved into the concept of genus and difference.” [[437]](#footnote-437)

The distinction of the metaphysical insight into the realm of the pure being now proceeds at the level of the second substance that Aristotle took for the last univocal statements in the framework of genus. Scotus rejected this assumption and placed the Aristotelian second substance (*conceptus non simpliciter simplex*) in the category of further decomposable terms (*resolvitur in conceptum generis et differentiae*). The objective predication is set beyond the second Aristotelian substance. The primary predication of the last unit of sense must go down to the last level of the objective (and not categorical) predication of *ens inquantum ens*. The composite being categorically predicted as “*conceptus hominis*” can be resolved into genus, difference and species. Man, as an Aristotelian second substance, is not the final determination of being, because this universal can be further divided into other atomic units of meaning. From the point of view of Alexander’s thesis on the types of science, which are determined according to the types of substances (ch. 5.3.1), this division would end in the logic of Porretans and not in the first science that deals with the “substance *qua* substance.” Scotus must pass from the level of logical predication to metaphysical abstraction, where the universal being can be viewed directly and it is not replaced by the logical concept. Only the direct intellectual insight into the last identity of the species (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*) cannot be divided into further parts (*non est resolubilis in alios conceptus priores*). At this level, there are no primary determinations of being that can be further divided into genera and species; they are stated as pure eidetic essences. On the level of the objective univocal concept given in the minimal measure of being, cognition secures the last level of univocity, because the pure concept of “something definite” can no longer be divided into anything else. The indivisibility of the first concepts (*resolutio*) safeguards according to Avicenna the sphere of the last or the first individual meaning of being. The newly determined amphibolic unity of the being is in fact transcendentally given “beyond” (μετά, *trans*) the first and the second substance. Scotus establishes a new metaphysical resolution of being on the model of Avicenna and the school of Grammarians under the Philip of Chancellor. But instead of Neoplatonic transcendentals, a new form of Aristotelian substance is inserted in the schema.

Hermeneutics of objectivity found Scotus’s original perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) that makes the primary sense of being. Objective knowledge arises *simpliciter* at that level of being. Made in the mode of objectively processed Avicennism, this knowledge is overarching (*transcendens*) in such a manner that it leaves Aristotle’s metaphysics behind. The concepts that do not possess this simplicity (*non simpliciter simplex*) belong to the structure of dialectical division at the level of the Porphyry′s Tree that is established by abstraction. Scotus found the last finite meaning of reality given metaphysically and in direct insight. For this reason, these last forms are absolutely clear and safe. The only thing that is unclear is their cognition taken from the human perspective. Normally, we recognize these simple forms from the direction of composite forms, because we proceed from less perfect entities to more perfect ones (*intellectus noster procedat de imperfecto ad perfectum*).[[438]](#footnote-438) But the Oxford′s *illuminati* in Grosseteste′s line can directly observe these simple forms. The new vision of being out of the categories is based on a univocal *scibile* in the original conception of *metaphysica transcendens*, which contemporary researchers know under the objective variant of *scientia transcendens* (Honnefelder 2006). Immediately in the following paragraph a new definition of the objective being appears, which is the first of its kind in Western metaphysics. The key text for emergence of metaphysical objectivity explores the unity of being through the difference “*confusum—confuse*.” The insight separate the objective being from Aristotelian cognition of the hylemorphic substances that are recognized by sensual abstraction. The being exists as an objective concept with its minimal measure of being only in the hylemorphic substance (*confusum*). But we recognize this minimal being given as a *confusum* in the real thing not only by knowing what is given by abstraction from the senses and from the intellect (*confuse*). Scotus introduced the direct cognition of the essence through the objectively considered concept of the thing (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*). The same thing in reality is recognized in two different ways. Sensual abstraction is given in an unclear (*confuse*) way, because this kind of cognition is determined by the variable first substance (*confusum*). The thing viewed in a confused manner through sensual abstraction must differ from the evident and objective cognition of species that are given through the direct insight. Scotus created a new variant of Rufus’s terminus “*species obiecti exsistentis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). The difference between the two types of cognition determines the difference between the previous conception of metaphysics (Aristotle, Averroes, Siger) and its new objective form (Avicenna, Rufus, Scotus).

“In view of what has been said above, it is necessary to distinguish the cognition of being as a hylemorphic composition (*esse confusum cognitum*) from the contingent cognition of this being (*esse confuse cognitum*). As a result, the objective cognition of the composition (*confusum cognoscere*) differs from the empirical cognition of this composition (*confuse cognoscere*).” [[439]](#footnote-439)

The cognition of the hylemorphic composition (*confusum*) is possible in several ways. Science and metaphysics begin with classical Aristotelian abstraction and categorical predication, which determines the contingent and empirical cognition of the real thing (*confuse cognoscere*). The new version is guided by the direct intellectual insight into the ultimate identity of objective species (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*). We can then clearly recognize the hylemorphic substances (*confusum cognitum*) in objective insight (*confusum cognoscere*). However, this kind of intuition is not given in the manner “*confuse*,” because it is made in *simpliciter* given manner. The last division of being (*resolutio*) was created by the direct insight into the minimal being and makes use of pure univocal essentiality. One can no longer go beyond this last level of the unity, so as not to lose the univocity of the being that is bound to this objective *individuum*. Although this objectively considered state of being is minimal, it is absolutely reliable, secure and essentially given, in the mode of identity given *per prius*. The quotation describes the view of the pure objective being (*ideo ens*), which cannot be resolved into any other parts.

“The being, although it is objectively recognized in its individual form (*confusum cognitum*), is not recognized at this contingent level (*non tamen confuse cognoscitur*), because it cannot be further decomposed into the multiplicity or into the further meaning. The vision of such being (*ideo ens*) makes the cognition absolutely precise and clear (*non potest indistincte et confuse cognosci*).” [[440]](#footnote-440)

The quotation defines the objective mode of being within the framework of the new metaphysics. The composite being (*confusum*) can be of various kinds or can only be thought of equivocally, such as the mountain of gold. But the way of cognition of these composite substances (*confusum*) is objective, because their recognition in the objective mode is no longer contingent and unclear (*confuse*). The thing given in the composite mode “*esse confusum*” manifests itself as a pure *cognoscibile* in objective beingness. From the new reality of being it becomes clear that the objective being cannot be recognized ambiguously (*ens non potest indistincte et confuse cognosci*). We do not see this objectively given thing with the senses, but with the pure intellect. This is the source where Descartes’s catchphrase “*clare et distincte*” finds its ultimate confirmation. Descartes took the path from the first substance into the interior of the intellect, following the same perspective directed towards the objective being. Hermeneutics declare that the term “*ideo ens*” is not just a rhetorical figure, but an epoch-making new vision of the whole of being. The objective being of the third kind is recognized directly and in the modus *simpliciter*. This cognition is explicitly separated from Aristotle’s “*confuse*” given categorial predication made within the framework of the second substance. Rufus’s *scibile* given as objective genitive called “*species obiecti exsistentis*” acquired the modern character of an objective atomic substance.

Scotus completed the final abolition (Hegel′s *Aufhebung*) of the second Averroism and presented a new metaphysical *resolutio* of being in the mode of full objectivity. The new knowledge is absolute because it is completely separated not only from the reality of the first substance, but also from the universality of the second substance. The first substance is sensual cognition and its contingent. The second substance is divisible in the system of the universals according to the Porphyry′s Tree down to the individual. This atomic unity of the categorically given meaning does not in and of itself contain the identity of the objective species (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*), because it is given by division and not by direct insight. Another thing is when the objective metaphysician considers the individual within the framework of the metaphysical abstraction of *ens quantum ens*. The deduction of the being does not proceed from the simple esence of God, as was the case in the previous kinds of theological deductions, but through the enlightened insight into the being. Let us see Grosseteste′s difference “*scientia—intellectus*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). After the objective resolution of being down to the last level of indivisibility (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*), it starts the deduction of new metaphysics. This last contemplation takes place in the metaphysical mode *ens inquantum ens*, because that kind of being cannot be divided into further elements. Again, the concept of infinity, in which all finite meaning of being are contained, helps in this point. This starts the next round of metaphysical deduction given by God to creation. The following part of the treatise *Lectura* *I* first explores the being of this objective concept (*De primo cognito primitate perfectionis*) and then solves the correspondence of the first perception of cognition with regard to the world of finite entities (*De primo cognito primitate adaequationis*). Let us briefly summarize the construction of the first version of new metaphysics, which follows according to the quoted passage from *Lectura I* (*Vat*. XVI, no. 73–81, pp. 252–55). Transcendental deduction defines the first determination of univocity as pure “*potentia tantum*” that takes an immaterial form (*potentia immaterialis*). Therefore, this mode given *per prius* belongs only to the transcendental determination of the infinite in divine thought. The first step of deduction is from the objectively recognized being (*ens ut primo cognitum*) in the direction of the being given in the real world (*ens generabile*). Due to the new cognition of being in the mode *per prius*, a replacement for the table of categories was created. The basic sense of the categorical predication remained “*ad unum*” to the objectively given minimal being (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*). The program of new metaphysics is summarized in these three fundamental tasks.

“In the clarification of the second question, ‘how we recognize the first being,’ we must proceed as follows: first, it is necessary to determine what the first recognized being is in the order given by origin and generation (*primitate originis et generationis*). Secondly, what the first recognized being is from the point of view of its perfection (*primitate perfectionis*). Thirdly, what the first recognized being is from the point of view of correspondence (*primitate adaequationis*).” [[441]](#footnote-441)

The priority of determination given by the origin and emergence is a key determination of metaphysics. The cited comments of *Categories* and *Metaphysics* Z.1 protected the primacy of the first substance reduced to the first principle of cognition (*substantia est primum omnium entium cognitione*, ch. 5.3.1). The concept of the first being results from the intuition of the objectivity given in the simplicity of being as a pure being. This insight can be accomplished with regard to God in the mode of the hypothetical *epokhē* of the extinguished Sun. Through the implementation of causality given by God and made by direct cognition of being, the vision of created things is brought to a level where the concept can no longer be divided into lower components (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*). This level of determination is fundamental because it ensures the objective form of deduction from the one original source of being as being (*primitate originis et generationis*). The new entity has its own form of essentiality, which is given as a form of pure and completely evident cognition (*primo cognitum primitate perfectionis*). This objective substance establishes the conception of truth, since it fully corresponds to the intellect (*primo cognitum primitate adaequationis*). Thus the first stage of purely objective being of being is deductively given, which determines the fullness of being and the truth. This level can no longer be decomposed into simpler principles, since it provides the last level of metaphysical *resolutio*. The primary cognition of objective species takes place within the framework of *ens inquantum ens* and not through the being given in actualized things. Due to the pure immateriality and the divine universal intelligible causality given directly in our intellect, this being represents the first *scibile* of intellect. The intellect of modern *illuminati* must take a step beyond Aristotle in order to ascend to the objective form of being. Avicenna for the first time defined the term “*individuum vagum*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2), from which in the school of *Nominales* made the modern individual as a result of the division of universal meaning in the Porphyry′s Tree. The individual of Porretans became an objective being in the new deduction on the level of amphibolia. The use of Avicenna’s metaphysics in the objective mode *ens inquantum ens* established the historical beginning of modern metaphysics, which Descartes took over. Thus, the archaic beginning of objectivity (*Anfang*), which we examined in the previous matrices, turned into the objectively given beginning of the second metaphysics (*Beginn*) that is manifested in the historical and positive mode.

Done with the help of objective resolution, the first deduction of being goes beyond the categorical division into substance and accident. It is only in the secondary form of cognition that the existing is recognized in reality (*ens generabile*). Let us cite the second step of deduction that sets out Aristotelian insight into real things.

“Secondly, the being is given primarily by origin and birth, and therefore we recognize it by recognizing the individuals (*cognitione distincta*). The proof is as follows: the being cannot be recognized otherwise than as a definite being, because it cannot be divided into the multiplicity of the lower concepts. However, the recognition of something in the mode of definiteness given in this way requires the previous recognition of the being as such (*oportet quod ens praecognoscatur*), because in every certain concept the being is given as such (*in omni conceptu est ens*).” [[442]](#footnote-442)

The quotation describes the recognition of entities that are in the mode of actualized existence (*ordine originis et generationis*). Scotus goes from the confusedly recognized first substance to the recognition of something objectively clear (*quod cognoscitur cognitione distincta*). The whiteness given in Aristotelian abstraction comes from the real white thing and it is stated with regard to the real substance. Such contingent and real being stands outside the eternal and simple, objectively given universality. Aristotelian cognition proceeds through phantasms, because the thing comes to mind through the singularity of the sensually recognized thing. This kind of cognition is included in Aristotelian metaphysics. Scotus takes this way of recognition only in the secondary mode. The recognition of the real existing compositions is considered in the new form of the objectivity that is constructed through metaphysical deduction *per prius*. The metaphysics is based on objective cognition given “*distincte*” as the last *resolutio* of being to keep minimal univocal units of meaning. Their identity is given in a negative way, due to the impossibility of further dividing these concepts into simpler ones (*non est resolubile in plures conceptus priores*). Such individual is clearly recognized in his objective being as the last unity of atomic meaning. The objective individual is not a actualized first substance, but the last unit of the minimal, objectively determined being. The essence is given in the mode “*semel—semper*” that reveals a minimal dose of substantial recognition as “this here” (*hoc aliquid*). Scotus created a new form of atomic substance that the Neoplatonism introduced for the first time (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). The being occurs in the mode *ens inquantum ens* as an *univoce* given universal being (*ens est primum… non est resolubile*). Due to the transition to objective substance as the first link of the univocal predication, the emergence of a new metaphysics is given *in nuce*, although it is fully generated in the later work *Ordinatio I*. This procedure of deduction for recognizing the real world out of the objectivity took up Descartes through the transition from the second to the third and fourth meditation in the mode “*clare et distincte*.” Scotus follows the origin and the statute of the pure concept of minimal being; therefore, he has to ensure the primacy of potential being and not that of actualized things. The priority of the mode “*distincte*” does not lie in the act of recognizing the first real substance, since the first clarity gives to the enlightened metaphysician a direct insight into the pure being. The intellect does not go to cognition of the substance by Aristotelian abstraction (*confuse*), but to the *simplex* and therefore only potentially given being. Such kind of cognition exists in and of itself only in the mode of minimal being, because it is universal and it makes part of the metaphysics. The advantage of objective beingness lies in the fact that it can be predicted in the manner that transcends the categorical predication. Only after this *deductio* of objectivity from God into reality and the *reductio* of reality to objective beingness can Avicenna’s thesis fully apply to metaphysics. The first science is about the being and its principles given in the first recognized “substance” as *tertium ens*. Therefore, the first science as metaphysics precedes the cognition given by special sciences. These special sciences, in turn, proceed in time the construction of the first science.[[443]](#footnote-443) We have direct and clear cognition of the minimal being. Therefore, metaphysics can be actualized the certainty of cognition for the other sciences (*certificare principia aliarum scientiarum*). As a result, the relation between the empirical cognition of things and the objective metaphysical abstraction is established. Scientific cognition arises outside of metaphysics only secondary, in the model of mesure and quantity, see the cited example of geometry. Unlike Scotus, contemporary logicians and methodologists of science abolished metaphysics and enthroned the epoch of objective nihilism in the mode of logical abstraction. Neopositivism and scientism of all kinds, based solely on logic, necessarily and fundamentally had to fail in fulfilling the program of philosophy as the first science about the objective being. It is obvious that such postmodern substitutes cannot at all fulfill the postulates of Aristotelian metaphysics as the first science about the real being.

After finding the new form of the substance and after deducting its properties, Scotus can return to *Seconds Analytics*. He found a new objective substance, given in the mode *ens inquantum ens* and he invented a new universal causality that relates to the divine essence und is directly apprehended through the intellect. Neither of two beings of the third kind had existed before. Equipped with both non-existing entities as the substance and the causality, Scotus can abolish fundamental principle “*ex* *inmediatis*” that established Aristotelian science (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). Scotus does not have categorial predication from first to second substance as the basis of metaphysical deduction. The objectively hyparchical being was created by the deduction of the infinite divine thought, because the first *passio entis* is its infinity, universality and intelligibly given causality. All these fundamental properties of the infinite being (*primo cognitum primitate perfectionis*) can establish the objective correspondence that goes from the objectivity to the creation (*primo cognitum primitate adaequationis*). Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish this first level of adequate truth from the universal concepts given by Aristotelian abstraction. They keep the secondary correspondence of the intellect and things given by the abstraction from real first substances. The contingent starting point of cognition given in the first substance recognized by the senses cannot establish an objective deduction of God as an infinite, substantially given rationality, because it is not given on a sensual level. The path to the objectively given substance of the third kind must bypass the Aristotelian first substance and also the preceding highest determinations of *tertium ens* in the second Averroism that are made with the help of emanations or comitations (*ens, res verum, bonum*). This thesis has a foundational character for modern *metaphysica generalis*. Scotus sees in the objective form of *resolutio* the whole of being *univoce*, as taken from the position of the divine eye, although not in divine infinite habitus of cognition. The first form of objective cognition differs in the minimal version of the essentiality and identity from the categorical predication (*in quid*). The insight of objectivity is built on Scotus’s exegesis of the book *Categories*. Objective categories acquire the being in the new form of the possessive dative (*dativus possessivus*). The objective identity of the first real substance arises as the transfer of original transcendental meaning of pure Avicennist *ens* to the categorically determined support (ch. 5.3.1). Now, Scotus takes God’s standpoint and observes the world in a similar mode of divine thinking as Gandavus did. Metaphysics observe the original transcendental form of objective being, which is separated from the subsequent categorical predication.

“The potency given in things *simpliciter* does not include actuality, and the real being of the substance does not include potency in its essentiality. Therefore, the potential concept to which the metaphysical deduction (*resolutio*) aspires does not in itself encompass the actualized concept (*non includit conceptum actualem*), which, however, does not apply vice versa. It is clear that the metaphysical deduction concerns the being as such (*resolutio stat ad ens*). But then it necessarily applies (*ergo oportet*) that this being determined by this original distinction can neither be given in the categorical mode ‘to be in something’ (*resolutio in ‘quid’*) nor in some other actualized being (*ens non includatur in illo actuali*). It is because the actualized concepts contain different determinations of being, and the objective being is not essentially contained in them, neither in one way nor in the other.” [[444]](#footnote-444)

The opening sentence takes Aristotle at a crucial point: in real things given *per se* and *simpliciter*, potency and actuality are fundamentally exclusive. Every *actus esendi* of a real thing contains a fullness of being beyond potency. But this would not be the basis of a modern metaphysics that stands on chimerical potentiality of being. The quotation first excludes the cognition of what is from the classical construction of metaphysics related to the being of the first substance (*ens non includatur in illo actuali*). Aristotle makes the reduction to the last univocity stated by the second substance with regard to the real substance (*resolutio in quid*). According to Scotus, objectivity is a new way in which the modern metaphysician transgress this type of categorical predication and the reality of the world. Therefore, the second step follows, which shifts the unity of being stated with regard to the second substance to one floor higher, to the objective level of the univocal being. The new version of metaphysics begins in the pure possibility given as a minimal version of individualized being (*potentia simpliciter in rebus*). At this level of pure objectivity, no further resolution into simpler principles is possible. The first science begins with the deduction from this level, at which objectively all univocal meanings of being “exsist” (*ad quem ultima stat resolutio*). Due to the new division of universals (*resolutio*), Scotus found an objective version of Jamblichus’s diacosmos (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Modern theurgy no longer has the character of the mystical divine man of the Late Antiquity, but of the Western *intelligentia spiritualis* that rule the world in a nihilistic way. Joachim of Fiore outlined the objective epoch in his vision about the rule of the Holy Spirit. It began in Oxford and passed into the banking enclave of the City of London in the age of consummate imperialist capitalism. The full-blown nihilism found new address in one street of New York.

The last univocity is defined as a concept of objective potency (*conceptus potentialis*) put beyond the reality of first substances. The reduction to the metaphysical simplicity of being (*resolutio*) does not include the reality of first substances (*nihil includit actualitatis*). The objective form of deduction starts from the minimal conception of being given but potentially. As a result, two forms of metaphysics emerged that are based on twofold form of the indivisible categorial substance: the Scotist “first” substance (*potentia simpliciter in rebus*) and the Aristotelian second substance (*resolutio in quid*). The pure being is given at the level of the objective substance (*conceptus potentialis*). Aristotelian cognition is created by abstraction from hylemorphic substances (*conceptus actualis*). Both forms differ fundamentally from the actualized first given substance (*ens non includitur esssentialiter in utroque illorum*). The first kind of the substance establishes an objective metaphysics in the mode *ens inquantum ens*, because it is not derived from first real substances, but from the objective concept of the divine infinite being. The second version of metaphysics relates to abstracted being of “substance *qua* substance” that establishes the Aristotelian form of metaphysics. Scotus founded a new project of the first science, which differed from Aristotle’s metaphysics. He followed Alexander′s and Avicenna’s definition of the first science about the unity of being, which stands beyond physics (ch. 5.3.1). There are as many types of metaphysics as there are types of substances. Modernists consider the objective substance; thus, there is an objective metaphysics. It is not important that this substance does not exist in reality. The transcendental metaphysics of modernity is not the Aristotelian first science. Following Avicenna, Scotus found the first definition of substance as the first principle of cognition in the order of first being given *absolute*. Knowledge of metaphysics as the first science concerns the being as such. Scotus’s interpretation follows on the level of objectivity the main argument of *Metaphysics*, which describes the desired unity of being (τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλ' ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν, *Met*. 1003b5‒6). Scotus found this unity in the objective mode “*ad unum*.” However, the commencement of his metaphysics stands outside the actualized reality. Scotus canceled the Aristotelian project in an ingenious way, by dogmatically transferring it to the level of the concept of the infinite divine being. The logical necessity given in the slogan “*ergo oportet*” is related to the being of the third kind. The objective being passed through the new *dativus possessivus* in the fully revealed historical figure of so-called second metaphysics (*Ereignis*). Taken from the historial perspective of hermeneutics, this event presents the effective historical worldview of modernity in the mode of epochal fallacy (*Irrtum*). The disintegration of being into absolutely simple determinations (*resolutio*) reached the “zero point” of modernity.[[445]](#footnote-445) The being subsists there in the original simplicity, outside confused substances given in reality. Metaphysics has reached the zero point, in which the fundamental *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of modernity takes place. Scotus found Archimedes’s point of metaphysics in God of *Modernorum* and outlined the construction of being with the help of objective deduction. According to Scotus, it necessarily applies (*ergo oportet*) that this objective and absolutely separate being stands beyond the categorical mode that makes the second Aristotelian substance (*resolutio in quid*). Then it is true that this objective kind of being cannot be given in actualized things (*ens non includatur in illo actuali*). Aristotle, in his search for the first science, rejected several times solutions of the first science based on an non-existent actualized being : against Sophists, Eleates and finally against Plato. The cited necessity in the mode “*ergo oportet*” opened the path of Western objective crusades. Their dynamics are hidden in the objective necessity, which founded the landscape of Western nihilism. It was completely obvious to Scotus and his successors (*manifestum est*) that their structure of metaphysics, given *per prius* contains the same conception of being (*quod resolutio stat ad ens*) as in *Metaphysics* Z.1 with regard to the substance. From the previous interpretation, it becomes clear that this is an epochal fallacy (*Irrtum*). Scotus had replaced the hyparchical first substance by its essence given in the abstract definition. He considers the substance in an objective insight into the unity of being. This unity is dogmatically established as an essentialist metaphysics based on logical deduction. Scotus’s interpretation of metaphysics follows Avicenna’s concept of being that is univocally given in the logical thinking and in reality. This is not a Parmenides′s correspondence of thought given in view of the whole of being that the divine Truth shows to mortals. The mythological deduction represents a modern paranoia, whereby the thinking of mortals determines meaning of cosmic being. Muses together with Mnemosyne guard the whole of being for the living and the dead. They do not like the false mythology of objective *Modernorum*. That is why they lead so deceived mortals on the path of the epochal error (*Irre*) under the rule of divine power Apate and objectively formed Furies. However, they are the thinkers and poets who like archaic Muses in the mode of the *a/lētheia*, as were well-known Homeric seers as Nestor, Teiresias and Kalchas. These mortals want to exist in the realm of original archaic *alētheia*. It preserves the unity of musical being of the world, which embraces the living and the dead in the original unity of historial Being.

The interpretation of the previous matrices has shown that the univocal unity of being constructed according to Avicenna is contrary to the original aim of Aristotelian metaphysics. Plato and Aristotle and, after them, Avicenna and Averroes provide two different insights into the way in which being manifests itself as existing. In Western philosophy, the eclipse of the actual being establishes metaphysical obscurity as the gradual eclipse of the first substance started by Porphyry and Avicenna. Averroes asserted that Avicenna’s speculative metaphysics had began in the darkness of theoretical mind separated from reality of first substances. A new metaphysical unity of being follows Avicenna’s model that bypasses real substances. Scotus ends the first phase of the construction of a new first science like this.

“The substance has in itself something formal, which is not the formally given existence, but the manner of its being (*sed modus entis*). If this kind of being was a formal being (*formaliter ens*), then there would be a further division of the form with regard to this fact; like this, they would differ from each other and it would go to infinity.” [[446]](#footnote-446)

The new definition of being is not given primarily by the categorical substance (*non est formaliter entitas*), because this way of universal cognition is determined by abstraction from contingent reality (*formaliter ens*). At the level of the categorical second substance, the resolution to simple concepts is still possible, because man is divisible in species and difference. The pure objective being appears as a hypostatized form (*aliquid formale*), which is given as a new way of existence (*modus entis*). The quotation proves that the new metaphysics is not compatible with Aristotle’s conception of the unity related to real substances. The identity of the substance as the ultimate unity would still contain in itself that final difference between itself and the objectively given being (*conveniret in ente cum alia differentia*). As a result, unity on the level of categorical substance would be sought to infinity, according to the objection of the “Third man” taken from the dialogue *Parmenides* and from *Metaphysics*. Scotus’s objection to the classical categorical predication is that the abstracted universal essence is not simple enough. It does not possess the original form of objective beingness, which is given by deduction from the concept of the infinite being. The first science is created by objective deduction and by direct insight into the last atomic substance. This more simply given atomic substance contains the last (i.e., objective) level of unity of being that is limited but pure nothingness. The first insight of being is given in its primary unity at the level of pure being (*formaliter entitas*), which corresponds to the view of being given in the mode *inquantum ens*. Aristotelian being (*formaliter ens*) determined within the framework of the categorical predication of the subject stands against this primary view of objectively given beingness. The simplicity originally given in the real thing now came exclusively into the divine and into the human subject. Conversely, the real thing (*confusum*) is not clearly recognized (*confuse*). Aristotle fundamentally rejected this kind of *resolutio* for metaphysics, which, according to him, repeated top representatives of the first Averroism in the rue du Fouarre, referring to the erroneous concept of Avicenna’s metaphysics. According to Aristotelians, the first science concerns a real and not an abstract unity of being. Scotus places the unity outside of reality and the categorical predication of the first and second substance, which was explained by previous parts of the metaphysical deduction given for the being in the mode *simplex*.

Let’s summarize the first metaphysical deduction in the work *Lecture I* by using the example of whiteness, where we can see all three definitions of being (*ratio entis*). The first form is given at the level of categorical predication that relates to the unique being of the hylemorphic substance; the whiteness is stated due to the imposition as a universal accident of the second substance (“the whiteness predicted with regard to this hyparchical and real car”). The first chapter has shown that Scotus’s commentary on *Categories* no longer distinguishes between the being of the first and the second substance, given at the metaphysical level of abstraction. The second form of the resolution deformed the Aristotelian abstraction. It determines the essence of whiteness as a Porretan and Avicennist accident given *per se* that operates as a universal hypostatized essence. According to Avicenna’s comitation and denudation, the relationship of the white essence to the real white car is given (“the essence of the whiteness abstracted by the denudation or stated by the comitation with regard to this car”). The third definition takes the whiteness in its exemplary and simple objectivity. This identity of the whiteness is observed on the last minimum level of its being. Its determination still exists in the sense of the objective individual as “something definite” that is separated firstly from the original concept of unlimited being (“the objective being of the whiteness as the original, *per se* given minimal being of the whiteness given as an objective substance”). There is no car needed at all. This concept of whiteness is objective and univocal for God and for man, because it determines the first atomic substance endowed with the minimum being and the minimum definition. God thinks that whiteness in an infinite way, man in a finite way. The difference is only in the mode of recognizing this univocal objectivity, because it does not exist in and of itself; it is pure potency. From the direction of God, the objective ratio of whiteness is given in the infinite mode; human thinking recognizes it in the finite mode. These three ways of being the white (the categorical, the essential, the objective) extend the totality of deduction from the direction of the objective divine Being into reality. Or, on the other hand, they observe reality in the perspective of essential denudation (Avicenna) and in the perspective of objective intuition (Scotus). Then the objective being manifests itself through the real being. Scotus produced a version of objective Aristotelian exemplarism, thereby abolishing the second Averroism of Henry of Ghent. According to the version of *dativus incommodi* made by Scotus, Aristotelians of the first Averroism are right about *illuminati* of the second Averroism, because no supernatural entities are needed to recognize the truth. This eliminated the necessity of emanations and comitations, which is given in the Avicennist mode “*esse ad*,” as we find it in the work of Henry of Ghent. The island of exemplary nature exists in autonomously given divine rationality and being; they represent the universal and unambiguous pattern of the divine spirit in the world. The objectivist observes this rationality through the finite being determined due to the objective causality. He can afford this supernatural vision of the objective diacosmos because his spirit has the same habitus as that of the modern God. This type of an ontotheological exchange (*Ge-Stell*) is demonic in nature, as the *dativus possessivus* on which it is based remains totally mythological (*possessio*). As a result, modernity completely changed the status of witchcraft processes from the 14th century onwards (ch. 5.5).

The real causality is something different, since it is determined by the demiurgic will that creates things. The new being is given *per se* in the objective mode “*esse in*” because it is a modern “substance.” The newly conceived being is objectively real in the sense of the subsistent *ens inquantum ens*. Therefore, at the level of the substance, it is necessary to distinguish from each other two forms of insight that separate the original objective subsistence and the real existence given on the hylemorphic substrate (*duplex est ratio a qua hoc noun 'substantia' imponitur, scilicet subsistendi et substandi*, ch. 5.3.1). The objective being does not really exist, because it has no possibility to do so. The objective is only the view of being, which sets out the fundamental division (*resolutio*) into an original recognizable objective substance. This substantial and univocal objective unity has a transcendental character with regard to Aristotelian categorical predication, because it is given “beyond” (*metá, trans*) the second substance. The structure of new metaphysics is determined by the phenomenological question of “how” the substance is fundamentally given in the rational constitution of being. Objectivity presents the first and therefore obviously clear and pure insight of modern *illuminati* into the divine rationality, which produces the substantial whole of creation in the mode of original recognition. This *factum* of pure reason is rationally manifested within the framework of dogmatically created metaphysics. Ockham abolished this metaphysical nonsense as useless chatter. The objective *illuminatus* describes this metaphysics in its original structure, determined by the theory of the “one truth” (*metaphysica generalis*). The minimal portion of identity and existence has a quasi-causal effectiveness in the writing *Lectura* *I*, although not at the level of *generatio* that concerns actualized substances (*Vat*. XVI, no. 191–192, pp. 302–303). As a result, the holistic outline of being in the objectively given structure was made for the first time. The manifestation of metaphysical sense of being has a universal and objective character. It is given in the mode of absolute simplicity with regard to both modern intellectuals: to the non-existing modern God and to the paranoiac modern man. The modality of this simplicity differs according to the infinite and finite modes. The mode of infinity represents the first field of the revelation of being in its objective nature. Then the objective form of truth makes a full correspondence through the cognition of the full truth (*in luce aeterna obiective formaliter*; ibid, no. 193, p. 304.2). The effective *causa prima* for creation of such objective level is given by the fact that God wants “something” eternally and necessarily conceived, but by no means necessarily created. The divine exemplary objectivity (*aeternitas secundum quid*) manifests itself in the natural order as an objective being, which we see in the light of natural cognition (ibid, no. 192, p. 303.21). Then we also recognize *univoce* and *obiective*, because our thinking works just like the divine intellect, but in a different habitus given in a dialectic of the infinite and the finite. Thus, the whole of the deduction concerning the objective being is completed. The last Aristotelian Ockham made the criticism of Scotus’s metaphysics from the position of the first Averroism. He abolished it as metaphysically unnecessary and philosophically nonsensical.

The next part of *Lectura* *I* expanded the field of the first philosophy by postulating a contingency as a direct God-given possibility. Scotus tied the determination of minimal being to the will of God. Following Olivi’s example, he determined the first being in the mode “*non repugnat esse*.” Scotus used the fundamentals of Olivi’s metaphysics of the will given as the ipseity of the will in order to constitute the objective existence of contingent events in God. His free ipseity of the will (*potentia substantialis*) makes it possible to want and not to want the same thing, which contrasts with already determined mode of volitions (*potentia accidentalis*). The ipseity of divine intellect operates according to the intimate causality of the will outlined by Olivi (ch. 5.1.2). Scotus transformed Olivi’s intimate substantial potency into an objective “*possibilitas logica*.”

“But the opposite given with regard to the accident and its accidental effects (*accidentis per accidens*) includes the substance which carries this event at the given moment. The will wants A at this moment and for this moment it needs not to want A in the same way. Given these two possibilities of free will, the logic of the possibility (*possibilitas logica*) does not exclude both actually existing opposites as contradictory.” [[447]](#footnote-447)

At the level of exemplary objectivity in God, contingency and necessity apply simultaneously. Contingency concerns the logical fact of cognition as a possibility of the modern divine intellect “to happen—not to happen.” Both possibilities stand in the pure potency for the determining and actualized divine will that is given in the mode of the substantial ipseity. It is true that we are not able to recognize it in its original mode, as it exists in the divine essence. We recognize but the rational production of divine objectivity, which represents the form of divine rationality *ad extra* (*dicimur intelligere in luce increata, et non in voluntate increata*; *Vat*. XVI, p. 302.28). The possibility of a contingency in God takes place on the objective level by linking it to the intimately given free will. The intimate and intellectual logic of the third kind produced a new determination of objectivity for the contingent beings. These are objectively determined in the mode of infinite divine cognition and intimate free will. Scotus thus introduced a modernized version of demiurgic *dativus auctoris*, which Olivi designed for the capitalist subject in the same period. The modern, capitalist God is a free rational producer, and uses the same logic as we do. Univocal objective metaphysics forms a kind of a dogmatic and social capital, which remains common to both modern subjects. Something else is the necessity of what is happening in reality, where there is no longer the indeterminacy of two opposing possibilities, but the determined actuality in the mode of the identity of the substance (A = A). The modern logic given as mythology in Oxford has already been known since Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). It has no problem with looking over God’s shoulder at the totality of creation. Modern God became a modern subject, and banksters continue to do the objective work of God after the death of this idol in the era of nihilism. The first Averroism refused this mythology of modern God as human subject to enter into rational philosophy. We have quoted Siger’s point of view concerning the will of God against modernists (*dico quod sic voluit, quia voluit*, ch. 4.4.1). The theory of one truth gives a greater impetus to thinking of modernity, and this “relative utopia” (K. Mannheim) allows, in the mode of the new “cultural hegemony” (A. Gramsci), to survey with certainty the totality of divine psychology and divine thinking. Modern science is fully joyful and fully stupid. Scotus founded the objective hegemony of modernity, which Rufus, Bonaventure and Olivi opened on the mystical level (ch. 5.1.2). The following quotation establishes the sphere of objective facticity (*sub ratione factibilis*), which determines created beings. Scotus sets out the objective form of predication called “*in artificialibus*” that takes place in divine thinking.

“The divine intellect considers the truth of every composite being from the direction of the creative and active will and immediately visualizes the truthfulness of this being for itself through the being of its own essence. This truth does not manifest itself in the creative state (*non relucet sub ratione factibilis*) and in its essence, unless it is previously determined by God’s will.” [[448]](#footnote-448)

The actuality of the divine will represents the formal determination of the intellect, in which every possible contingent state of the world manifests itself on the basis of the union of the divine will and intellect (*relucet*). The divine intellect considers the truth of the real thing (*veritatem alicuius complexionis*), which is formed by his will (*factam et operatam a voluntate*). The divine will determines the objective truth of such composition (*determinatum sit a voluntate divina*). This gives rise to the objective determination of the providence given in the divine being (*in essentia*) that runs as pure posibility concerning his facticity (*sub ratione factibilis*). The objective truth of real things is created by the will and not only by divine mind (*factam et operatam a voluntate*). The divine intellect sees the truth of the objective not yet created being (*intellectus divinus videt veritatem alicuius complexionis*). The voluntaristic production of objectivity constituted the first version of the objective *factum*, i.e. the objective truth of contingent being that are considered in the mode of voluntaristic demiurgic production. Scotus followed Olivi by creating a new version of *dativus modi* that established eternal modality of objective capitalist production given as such (*sub ratione factibilis*). In God, the modernity found the primordial place of causality established in the mode “*ipse*” that produces potential objects in the form of divine “*facere*.” That demiurgic objectivity consists of the pure possibility without any external effects (*voluntas divina inquantum est operativa ad intra*; *Vat*. XVII, no. 54; p. 497.13‒15). Scotus, following Olivi’s example, created in modern God an intimate universe of contingent possibilities of demiurgic creation limited but by the impossibility given as logical contradiction (*si aliquid est possibile, est ponibile*; ibid, no. 72, p. 504.14‒15). Existence as pure possibility (*possibile*) receives objectivity and also first facticity and positivity in the sense of *absolute*, that is, as a fully separate contingency that exists exclusively in modern God (*ponibile*). The assertion “what is possible, that is feasible” became the fundamental imperative of science in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, whereby thinking is no longer determined by real first substances. Scotus embedded these kinds of objective, absolutely realizable possibilities in modern God. He henceforth became the main donor of an epochal new form of Western madness (*Irre*), which makes an objective form of capitalism. Scotus transformed *dativus auctoris* into a *locus specierum* of objectively feasible species. Modern God has not only become a real demiurge, as was the case with Bonaventure, but he has been transformed into an objective demiurge. The new sphere of the “*ponibile*” is elaborated “*sub ratione factibilis*” that contributed to another important change. The new sphere created under the slogan “what is possible, that is feasible” has established a new form of modern *dativus ethicus* made in nihilistic form of “anything goes.” The first supposition (*Ge-Stell*) of the primary objective truth takes place in the divine will. As a result of this operation, the sphere of the minimal being was born in the sphere of pure possibility, and this mode of objectivity is separated from reality. These forms are bound to the divine will. They established a new field of the revelation of the objective sense that is bound to the demiurgic will. The objectively intended being as “something feasible” is placed in the potentially factual existence (*sub ratione factibilis*). The composition existing in reality has in God the exemplary mode of objective subsistence, which is given as objective facticity determined by the divine will. The objective being intended for real creative production differs from the purely imaginary being, since it is based on the voluntaristic orientation of divine rationality. This makes the basis of Leibniz's project of two worlds. The objectively possible world is given in the ideal divine calculus given by his goodness; on the other hand, there are the remaining, hypothetically possible and therefore much worse variations. Modern God must necessarily produce only the best of the possible; otherwise would have been no more modern. Thanks to the existence of the three orders of objectivity (the infinite *factibile* in God, the finite *vestigium* in creation, the objectively considered *imago* in the contingent thing), there is also a threefold similarity of the being in the mode of potency and the corresponding object belonging to the thus given type of cognition. All these three variants of objective *inesse* had fundamental consequences in the theological disputes since the 16th century. The speculation regarding the divine *factibile* in the divine will and its relation to our freedom gave rise to the totally useless dispute called *De auxiliis* (1582–1607); let us see its contemporary variants in analytical philosophy and postmodern logic. By distinguishing the types of objectivity and connecting them, the path of science and technology to the mastery of nature is also predetermined. The objective facticity of the world, in the mode of providence, is reopened by Descartes’s definition of science in the sixth part of the *Discourse on the Method* (1637), which turns people into “*maîtres et possesseurs de la nature*” done in the framework of Bonaventure′s “*regula agentis creati*.” Giambattista Vico started the nihilistic evolution of modern facticity in human sciences (*Nuova scienza*, 1725); let us see his statement about the full conversion between the truth and human products (*verum et factum reciprocantur seu convertuntur*). The truth became fully dependent on the mode of voluntaristic determination and finally also on the instrumental-technical production of being. The epochal ambiguity of Western modernism cited by Grosseteste (*aliquantulum obscura*; OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1) became an objectively given clarity in the work of Scotus. The deduction of being is absolutely clear, because we directly consider the being in its *simpliciter* given objectivity. This completes Heidegger’s epoch-making fallacy (*Irrtum*) that determines the fate of Western metaphysics by forgetting the being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). After the eclipse of the first substance, the worldview of Oxford′s *illuminati* became a piece of absolute knowledge. That is why Scotus founded the first fully evident form of *via Modernorum*. The *Doctor Subtilis* objectively restored the mythology of Jamblichus’s diacosmos. The non-existent diacosmos of being of the third kind took a new disguise and it was integrated fully into Western rationality. The emperor’s new clothes were indeed beautiful and suited him well. At least according to the opinion of the first Scotists that had expelled Ockham from Oxford. In the darkness of classical thinking, new *illuminati* carried out the metaphysics of *Modernorum*. The capitalist demiurge was finally able to go out to conquer the world under the guidance of the objective vision of modern God. Modernity elaborated the conception of the one truth in the mode of the objective trinity as certainty (*certitudo*), correctness (*rectitudo*) and universal equality (*coaequatio*). Therefore, it does not have to worry about the correspondence of cognition in terms of contingent reality. Scotus stands at the beginning of this path of the West to the realm of objective lunacy (*Irre*). His metaphysical innovation established a new field of revelation of objectivity and created the possibility of mathematical models that objectively determine the properties of bodies, and today also quantum models at the level of cosmology. The first metaphysical modernist hypothetically extinguished the Sun in order to find *per absurdum* the objective meaning of being in the darkness of classical thought. This absurd and nihilistic approach to cognition resulted in the epochal productivity of the West given in the mode of the never-ending capitalist diligence of Western Latins (*industria in agendo, in scribendo*). This frenetic activity used to confirm the certainty of salvation and today only confirms the certainty of virtual bank accounts. After the death of modern God, the possibility of unlimited production (*regula agentis creati*) makes an *ultima ratio* for the explanation of the world. The new *scibile* of modernity corresponds to the unlimited appetite and the unlimited capacity of the individual. It makes the stream of simulacra in the mode of Rufus’s *informatio* in order to produced the universe of virtually thinking *illuminati*. After the decline of classical metaphysical thinking, the association of oligarchs of all kinds (economic, political, academic) represents the actualized nihilistic giver of objective forms that Avicenna originally presented. The intellectual nihilism based on the secularized version of Avicenna’s mystical metaphysics abolished classical philosophical thinking and settled its simulacrum in the form of the objective form of thinking and nihilistic instrumental rationality. The intellectualist worker emerged from original Oxford′s *intelligentia spiritualis*. He carries on his shoulders the global *conatus* of the present epoch, which, after the eclipse of the first substance in the mode of Heidegger’s *Ge-Stell* and Jüngers *Mobilmachung* frenetically digitizes all accessible *scibilia*. The media-savvy Furies turned the scholastic objective theater, visited by God-fearing modernists as Bonaventure and Scotus, into a contemporary cabaret organized for the planetary audience living in the global village.

### 5.3.3 System of Objective Metaphysics

The book *Lectura I* brought basic elements of a modern metaphysics, including the new kind of rationality that made it possible to objectively recognize the world and to manipulate it. The first deduction presents an Aristotelian solution in three important points, that did not have the school of the second Averroism. First, modern metaphysics accepts the *intellectus possibilis* as a passive principle in the mode of *tabula rasa* with regard to the intellectual cognition that concerns the infinite exemplary substance. Secondly, modern metaphysics transformed all cognition of being into categorical deduction worked out in the mode *per prius* and *per posterius*. This deduction is related to natural cognition of the substance according to metaphysics. Like this, Augustinian theory of illumination was abolished. Thirdly, the mind recognizes God and everything else through objective and real causality. During his stay in Paris, Scotus understood that his metaphysical deduction made in Oxford still remained in the realm of second Averroism. Although he had an objective deduction of categorically given being, it was based on a comitative conception of the truth, which was unacceptable. The school of second Averroism was regarded as a debacle of thought by the learned Aristotelian Thomists in Paris that established the modernized school of *sophistae Latini* (let us see the sophist Aegidius). Bacon knew exactly how theology lost the scientific status. The new theology was made by modern logicians and metaphysicians that lacked classical education in natural and human sciences (*philosophia dominatur in usu theologiam*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). God was subordinated to logical and essential speculations and this fact started his slow death. Scotus became the first gravedigger of modern God. That fact makes a worthy conclusion of divine objective comedy staged by Muses. Scotus met a new Thomistic Avicenna in Paris that was interpreted “*ad mentem Averrois*.” That kind of Averroims did not exist in Oxford, which was dominated by the Porretan school represented by Pecham. Scotus fully accepted the Aristotelian criticism directed against the group of “*sequaces Aristotelis*” that followed the Neoplatonism of the Toledo school. Scotus’s Avicennism approached the Thomistic conception of Semiaverroists as was Aegidius Romanus. Aegidius adopted Avicenna’s metaphysics and kept the conception of *intellectus possibilis* of CMDA in order to modernize the dualistic theory of cognition. After his arrival in Paris, Scotus carefully read Aristotelian treatises of the first Averroism, especially of Thomistic provenance. The intellect operates as a Thomistic hypostasis in the mode of eternal and imperishable *tertium ens*. Then it was necessary to bring the objective diacosmos beyond the divine essence and put it in a rational order of infinite and finite being. This first step made in the form of an objective *resolutio* had already been taken in the treatise *Lectura I*. This proceeding created a field of pure intelligibility, which in the 16th century started the development of the concept of “*natura pura*” and it lanced the postmodern ontotheology since the 17th century. Metaphysics produces the objective concept of being that comes from the causally acting God to man, who recognizes its effects directly and universally. The metaphysical deduction carried out by the hypothetical eclipse of the Sun and by the objective causality of divine species brought about the foundations of a new metaphysics. In the darkness of being made after the eclipse of first substances, we recognize modern God through the causality and without phantasms by using the univocal conception of being according to Avicenna. Scotus started the objectification of theology, original authors of which were Bonaventure and Gandavus. The analytically minded *Doctor Subtilis* understood well consequences of Avicenna’s interpretation made by Parisian Thomists for his new metaphysics. Supernatural illumination contests natural cognition; therefore, it is necessary to transform the conception of truth into an Aristotelian correspondence done in the framework of scientific proof according to *Second Analytics*. The theory of the one truth must be valid within the framework of new *metaphysica generalis*, since the rationality of theology is scientifically derived from philosophy. In contrast to Bonaventure and Gandavus, Scotus rejected the dual conception of the *exemplar* elaborated as a kind of objective divine intention that leads to its objective manifestation in the creation. Such ontotheological construction of the second Averroism led to insoluble problems, which the brilliant thinker of Oxford greatly analyzed in depth. Bonaventure’s and Gandavus’s conception of objectivity was produced due to the comitation “*esse ad*” that relied two orders of emanation of *tertium ens*: the *exemplar* came out of God and the *ratio* *seminalis* was embedded in creation. Scotus transferred the sphere of divine thought to Aristotelianism by separating the divine intellect and habitus from its divine essence. He created a new version of an objective “*esse in*” that was made in the infinity accessible to human cognition. Thomistic hypostatic intellect became a universal kind of rationality defined *univoce* and *obiective*. The original form of infinite intellectual potency became inaccessible to man. The finite creation cannot comprehend the actuality of God in its essential infinity, as was the case of Avicennist Augustinians led by Gandavus. Aristotelian theory of truth as correspondence is based on the univocity of the second substance that enables categorical predication through the imposition of meaning from the first substance. In the second floor of objective deduction, Scotus directly observes “*conceptus simpliciter simplex*” as the first objective substance. The transcendental level of predication given in this way therefore requires no second substance. The Aristotelian second substance has been transformed into an objectively determined first substance, thus producing a sophistical form of Avicennist comitation.

Scotus created a new form of objective diacosmos different from previous modernists. In such a diacosmos, the truth was to be established as a univocal and universal form of similarity. On the one hand, the divine infinite *scibile* was given as the trinitarian kind of divine rationality that elaborated the deduction made out in *Lectura I*. The Parisian period completed the deduction of objective metaphysics with respect to the created order of being known by the corresponding form of the natural intellect. The infinite existence of God is directly understood in finite creation in the form of a rational construction of the cosmos. We recognize it in the mode of finite objectivity grasped by the natural mind. However, the new metaphysics was not completed. The deduction of rationality out of God into the contingent being was not solved with regard to the theory of the truth. Therefore, it was necessary to interpret the threefold similarity of being in the mode of potency and the corresponding object, which belongs to the newly established metaphysical cognition. Objectivity univok combines the infinite sphere of divine objectivity (*exemplar*) and its finite objective trace in the creation (*vestigium*). We recognize both elements in the finite world full of contingent and actualized entities (*imago*). The last sphere added to objective cognition already makes possible the Aristotelian scheme of abstraction. Then objective truth arises in the mode of the truth as correspondence. In the order of objectively given deduction, two rational concepts are given potentially and they correspond to each other. The objective, *simpliciter* given being activates our intellect as a potential being both through the Avicenist denudation and through the Aristotelian scheme of abstraction. The correspondence between the objective being in creation and our concept of recognition exists on the level of “*vestigium—imago*.” Scotus worked the correspondence of infinite and finite objectivity with a scheme similar to Aquinas in the work *De potentia* (ch. 4.5.2). He created a concept of truth as the correspondence of the intellect with regard to *species intelligibilis* that are given as potency. The denudation does not create a being of the third kind. The objective essence represents a potential concept in thinking. Scotus, in contrast to Thomism, found a new form of rational insight into objective substance and into its holistic architecture in the mode of objective causality based on modern God. Scotus is the first author of the second Averroism that created a scheme of objective cognition according to *De anima* at the level of “*vestigium—imago*.” He made use of cognition given in the school of the first Averroism. In contrast to the emanation and illumination scenario of Neoplatonism, the being of God was separated from human knowledge. The construction of new metaphysics returned to Jamblichus’s pair “Limited—Unlimited” (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Scotus added Aristotle’s difference between the actuality and the possibility to the difference between infinity and finiteness. Thanks to these changes, the new construction of metaphysics did not need two forms of the divine essence in the mode of comitation, as in Gandavus (*esse in, esse ad*), since it gradually established different spheres of representation. Deduction does not follow the descent of objective forms of being as in *Liber de causis* (*rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa*, ch. 5.2.1). Scotus introduced Aristotelian deductive syllogism that is common to modern man and his God. Instead of Jamblichus’s emanations from the One, the concept of the objective being arose in the second sphere, which ties in with the potency of divine thought according to Avicenna. Ibn Adi used this trinitarian scheme for the first time in order to create the concept of the Trinity (OBJ I, ch. 2.2). Metaphysics conceives the transition from the divine exemplar to its objective representation in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. In the question of *resolutio*, Scotus kept Gandavus’s scheme of the most general determination of being (*primus conceptus communissimus*, ch. 5.2.1). However, the metaphysics does not start from the chimera, but from modern God. He became an Aristotelian; now, he thinks according to *De anima*. The new form of objective being is not a actualized entity, but only a potential concept. Through the introduction of a new resolution of being, three different manifestations of objectivity arose (*factibile* in God, *vestigium* in creation, *imago* in the consistent thing). The first construction of objective metaphysics was completed. During his stay in Paris, Scotus removed from the new metaphysics all remnants of Augustinian and Neoplatonic mystical illumination.

After the introduction of Scotus’s metaphysics, a new kind of *dativus incommodi* came that sent the second Averroism into Lethe. New modernity consists of metaphysical Scotism and Thomism. In Paris, Scotus became acquainted with objective Thomism according to Avicenna. The stay in Paris among the modernist connoisseurs of Aristotle as was Godefroid de Fontaines taught Scotus that the species cannot exist but as an intentional object. The being of the third kind is not a substance, but only a kind of universal meaning given in thought. Scotus accepted the basic thesis of the first Averroism about categorical predication in terms of substance; however, he conceived it as Avicenna’s metaphysically defined essence. Therefore, following the example of the first Averroism, he rejected any categorical predication based on exemplars or Neoplatonic species. This view was already unacceptable for him during the Oxford′s period. The substantial or hypostatized species of the second Averroism existed only in the theory of illumination. For Scotus, this represented the fundamental stumbling block, because it destroyed the rational construction of metaphysics as the first science about being. Moreover, he rejected another thesis of the second Averroism that God directly determines the natural human cognition, which redoubled the scheme of cognition according to *De anima*. There are two reasons for the elimination of illumination from the new metaphysics. Firstly, metaphysics cannot be irrational in its method and in its basis, because it represents the natural cognition of man. Secondly, theology is now given in the mode of the one, fully objective truth. The rationality of the objective ontotheological *adaequatio* between God and creation must be built on the new form of universal deduction. The knowledge of modern God and of the objective being must have but a natural philosophical basis. For these two reasons, there was no place for illumination in the new system, because it would cancel the deductive construction of the first science about naturally recognized objective substances. From the point of view of philosophy, illumination represents *a contradictio in adiecto*, because metaphysics was no longer a natural science about God; moreover, the cognition of reality was possible only through the causality of supernatural illumination. This metaphysical construct given in the Neoplatonic mysticism of the Toledo school was transferred to Avicennist kind of Augustinism. It was later defended in the nihilistic version of the gigantomachy made by postmodern occasionalists (Berkeley, Maleblanche). The Paris period sought after the correspondence of God and thought elaborated within the framework of metaphysics that got rid of the ontotheology of Augustinian *illuminati*. Scotus’s interpretation of *Categories* expounded the conception of the unity of being given categorically and placed behind the second substance (ch. 5.3.1). The work *Ordinatio I* was in its first trinitary version certainly outlined already at Oxford. It was based on above-mentioned deduction of objective rationality coming from God to the creation and combined the natural cognition of philosophy given by reason with the cognition of theology given by faith. But the divine being was exempted of this system, because it would establish a new form of Neoplatonic emanation.

Scotus interpreted the threefold similarity mentioned above as the trinitarian form of objective deduction in *Lectura I* through the new paradigm of universal correspondence. For the first floor of objective metaphysical *resolutio*, a new theory of truth had to be proposed. Such a theory of truth already existed in Oxford; it was Rufus′ universal correspondence between the hypostatized intellect and the *scibile* that was hypostatized in the same manner (*coaequatio*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Theory of the truth of Oxford and Parisian *illuminati* of the second Averroism became already obsolete in the first form of the objective reduction developed in Oxford. The *illuminati* despised Aristotelian metaphysics because they no longer needed it. Therefore, they had no science based on categorical predication. Scotus realized during the editing of *Lectura I* that he had to reform Gandavus’s concept of the truth given in the terminus “*sincera veritas*.” The theory of truth should reflect a new kind of fully rational and objective correspondence between the Creator and the creation. The concept of the truth was necessary to carry out the full deduction of trinitarian metaphysics that founded the project of objectivity mentioned above (*exemplar, vestigium, imago*). This explains the transition of metaphysical deduction from the first project in *Lectura I* to its completed version in *Ordinatio I*. The treatise *De cognoscibilitate Dei* begins with the construction of a new metaphysics of polemics with Gandavus’s terms “*sincera veritas*” and “*veritas certa*.” The main attack is carried out against the theory of illumination, which the previous school of the second Averroism considered a fundamental component of cognition. Scotus presents this theory as a mere general opinion (*opinio communis*) that needs the critical revision.

“If you assert that the uncreated light, together with the intellect and the recognized object, bring about the fullness of truth (*veritatem sinceram*), then it is a matter of a general opinion which puts the eternal light as a ‘distant cause’ (*causam remotam*) in such a way that it brings about all certain truth (*causare omnem certam veritatem*).” [[449]](#footnote-449)

Gandavus’s exemplar acted as the first albeit distant, cause of cognition (*causa remota*). In the scheme of exposure of cognition from behind, it formed the basic component of human cognition in the order of causality (*causet veritatem sinceram*). From the point of view of Henry’s ontotheology, this was indispensable. Modernity, including Descartes, after the eclipse of the first substance, must find some island of causality outside of human thought. Scotus redesigned the Augustinian term “*causa remota*” in such a way that the divine light was no longer a metaphysical cause and it was reduced to a mere metaphor. Given at the level of the correspondence “*vestigium—imago*,” the objectivity, the truth, and the cognition exclude mystical illumination. The cognition of finite entities takes place in the modernized scenario of Aristotle’s metaphysics. For the natural mind, the divine objectivity presents only a trace in the created being (*vestigium*) and not an effective cause of cognition as in the case of previous *illuminati*. Human cognition of the real world must find a corresponding correspondence on a purely natural level. The argument against the illumination theory keeps an Aristotelian character according to the first Averroism.

“Either the eternal light is indispensable for the attainment of the full truth and it acts causally in us before the naturally given cognition, or not. If so, then it is given either in the recognized object, or in the intellect. It cannot be in the cognized object, because the recognized thing has its being only in the intellect and it has no real existence, but only an intentional one. Therefore, the intellect is not capable of accepting any real accident.” [[450]](#footnote-450)

First, illumination has no possibility of being involved in natural cognition, because it has its own causality before the action of real substances (*causat aliquid prius naturaliter actu*). Second, the divine causality given in the real world cannot be directly introduced in human cognition. Third, all recognized forms in human thinking possess only an intentional character (*non habet 'esse' reale sed tantum intentionale*). The eternal light does not act among real things as their direct natural cause, because it is neither a substance nor an accident. If it is given in thought, then only as intentional content. God acts on the human intellect given in the world through the essential and universal causality recognized according to the schema of *De anima*. With the removal of the old type of illuminative ontotheology, Bonaventure’s metaphor of the biblical light that comes from the face of God (*signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine*, ch. 4.1.2) has disappeared from philosophy. In terms of the hermeneutic existential “*dativus incommodi*,” this fact meant the burial of the second Averroism. Natural knowledge created a new type of objectivity that abolished the illuminative theory. After the elimination of the supernatural causality in human cognition, Neoplatonic modernity lost its metaphysical *raison d′être*. Scotus made Hegelian *Aufhebung* of the second Averroism. Scotism took the same path as Thomism against the second Averroism. Natural cognition was connected with the metaphysical concept of being, taken in the pure being according to Avicenna, and not with the first real substance, as was the case of the first Averroism.

Scotus abolished illumination; however, he kept the modern theory of the one univocal truth based on the deduction given in *Lectura I* described above. With the objectivity of divine cognition, a new theory of the truth was created. It was an objectively given correspondence of thinking with respect to the primary sphere of divine rationality. The following passages from the treatise *De cognoscibilitate Dei* in the work *Ordinatio I* contain the first theory of objective cognition and truth (Vat. III, no. 261–264, pp. 160–62). Scotus as a modern *illuminatus* followed the manner of divine consideration and established the full form of objectivity on the basis of the innovated divine psychology. The most important is the statute of “*esse intelligibile*” in divine thinking, which is tied to the primary revelation of being in the objective mode “*secundum quid*.” By introducing intuitive syllogistic into divine thought, Scotus canceled the Avicennist scenario of emanations that Gandavus and all modernists of the second Averroism had used. They defended the model of the correspondence of human and divine thinking based on direct effects of divine substance. Scotus left the divine thought on the level of his infinite and completely separated substance. The truth appears in its original necessary and eternal objectivity, because it makes the logical conclusion of the divine contemplative thought, and by no means of its essence. The first form of theologically orthodox modernism carried out the deduction of being in a scientific manner. According to *Second Analytics*, the rationality goes from modern God to the objective conceived creation.

“In order to recognize the first being, it must be said that all intelligible contents (*omnia intelligibilia*) have the form of intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*) through the act of the divine intellect. In these contents all their truths are manifest (*relucent*) because the divine intellect reflects their intelligible contents. On the basis of these reflected contents (*de eis*), the divine intellect also understands all truths that necessarily follow from them. The divine intellect reflects the contents of divine thought and it recognizes objectively these necessary truths (*istas veritates necessarias*) as the objects of its thought (*videt in eis sicut in obiectis*).” [[451]](#footnote-451)

The divine intellect makes the origin of intelligible contents and truths that are manifested out of those contents (*omnes veritates de eis relucent*). Scotus has no exemplar as a supernatural substance. The divine thinking makes but a hypothetical necessary condition. The deduction starts on the level of “*esse intelligibile*” produced by the divine intellect. The rationality is identical with intelligible contents (*omnia intelligibilia*) that make the first level of divine truth. The exemplarity has the character of logical proceeding based on divine rationality. Modern God is thinking necessarily in an exemplary manner and man has to do the same. There is no categorical being in the mode “*esse ad*” as we find it in Gandavus′s ontotheology. The first correspondence of our intellect with regard to God goes to the divine truths given in creation, and not to the divine essence. As a result, the divine being is fundamentally separated from the divine rationality given into the world. Scotus made God think syllogistically according to *Second Analytics*. Aristotle mentions a direct intellectual insight into the premises of the proof (*Anal. Post*. 88b37). For this objectively necessary action, God uses Aristotelian sharp kind of thinking (ἀγχίνοια), which perceives the conclusion without a syllogism, as it is given directly in its divine reality (*Anal. Post*. 89b10–11). Grosseteste used this type of thinking for the first version of Oxfordian Fallacy (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Scotus attributes this exemplar and objective way of syllogistic thinking only to God. The transition from the exemplary divine rationality to the objective conclusion runs in the mode “*secundum quid.*” The objective conclusion shows the next step in the deduction of objectivity in the form of the Aristotelian truth as correspondence. God reflects objects of his thought in the intuitive inference of immediate and causal-exemplary rational syllogism. In the first step of demiurgic production of “*esse intelligibile*,” a new object is created through the deductive syllogism. The conclusion is given as a form of intuitive syllogism. The first premise (*maior*) is given as universal divine rationality; the middle premise (*minor*) is the *univoce* given concept of “*esse intelligibile*,” which according to Scotus exercises direct causal effects; the resulting rational conclusion takes the form of universal rational contents (*omnia intelligibilia*). Those intelligible contents then manifest themselves in the creation. They are already completely objective and defined in the Thomistic mode of “*quoad nos*.” Truth and necessity belong to the universally valid and recognizable divine rationality. The divine rational intuition has the character of a logical deduction. Scotus rejected the mythology of the second Averroism, which was based on divine intentionality as the middle premise (*medium*) of metaphysical deduction. The first correspondence is given at the level of the divine deductive syllogism that produces eternal truths.

“These [intelligible truths], to the extent that they are the secondary objects of the divine intellect (*sunt obiecta secundaria intellectus divini*), are the truths to the extent that they coincide with their exemplar (*sunt veritates, quia conformes suo exemplari*), that is, with the divine intellect (*intellectui scilicet divino*). As a result, they are the light, because they show themselves and are unchangeable and therefore necessary. But they are eternal only in the mode of objectivity (*secundum quid*), because eternity is given as a condition of their existence. That is why they have no other form than the objective one (*nisi secundum quid*).” [[452]](#footnote-452)

The divine insight into the syllogism creates an unquestionable rational conclusion (*obiecta secundaria intellectus divini*), and this conclusion has an objective “exsistence.” It is given by the above-mentioned form of syllogistic proof (*exsistentia secundum quid*). The secondary contents of divine thought given in the form of deduction already possess an essential being in their own mode of objective beingness. Set in the mode of necessity, the eternal truths are universally true conclusions of deduction that separates these deductive truths from the divine essence. The mythology of eternal light and illumination has now become a real metaphor and nothing more. The rationality of divine thought is given in the form of natural syllogism and that deductive necessity is visible *ad extra*. The objective being deduced in that manner establishes a new objective sense of being *(obiecta secundaria*). The emitted true contents receive the statute of eternal light (*lux aeterna*) and they keep the attribute of necessity, stability and immutability. The exemplar is the divine thinking itself, given in its intellectual actualization (*intellectu scilicet divino*). The contents of thought are merely representational truths of the intellect in the mode of the first agreement given by a deductive syllogism (*conformes suo exemplari*). The realm of necessary truths forms the conclusion of divine exemplary thinking. The two poles of correspondence are connected by the truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. Rationality in the modern God and in the creation is only one and, consequently, it is not given in the mode of analogy. The divine intellect, through intuitive reasoning, considers eternal truths in their exemplary necessity. The eternal truths make necessary conclusions of deductive rationality that the divine intellect directly considers through the middle premise of the syllogism. A necessary condition of truths is the original eternity and the necessity of divine thinking (*aeternitas est condicio exsistentis*). Settled in the mode of “*exsistere*,” divine cognition goes in the world through the conclusions of rational thinking (*secundum quid*), not through the direct causal effect of divine exemplars. Due to the exemplary form of deductive syllogism, intelligible contents have only a secondary statute with regard to the divine intellect (*sunt obiecta secundaria intellectus divini*). The rational deduction of eternal and necessary truths is derived from the primary manner of divine thinking. Modern God uses his infinitely quick intellect intuitively and logically correctly. Divine thinking is the first place of objectivity because the truths appear as the object of divine syllogistic intuition (*videt in eis...istas veritates*). The eternal truths arising from deduction make generally true and necessary conclusions that separate these deductive truths from the divine essence. The secondary contents of the divine thought given in the form of deduction already possess an essential being which makes their objective existence (*exsistentiam secundum quid*). God sees what he has rationally conceived as the necessary conclusion of his infallible deduction. The exemplary divine thinking and truth are given in the mode of objective beingness. They make part of necessary and eternal conclusion of logical syllogism. The exemplary truth is given in the mode of correspondence of the divine intellect and his exemplar as *esse intelligibile*. The consequence of this purely immanent divine thinking and its necessary and true conclusions can be recognized by an intelligible living being, because man is created in God′s image. The objective status of the new sphere of divine rationality “exsists” in the mode of exemplary truth and necessity. The limited intellect recognizes divine rationality in the mode “*quoad nos*.” Scotus′s thesis based on reflective intuitive proof shows the manner of hermeneutic “How” (*Wie*) modern God thinks out of himself, in the infinite but understandable mode “*quoad nos*.” We do not know how he thinks in himself. Scotus definitely separated his objective metaphysics from the Neoplatonic construction of his predecessors. According to Scotus’s anthropomorphic mode, modern God has become the first objectively modern man. Under the leadership of deductive and objective Furies, an objective academic diacosmos was created that present the final product of completely separated divine *scholē*. Scotus created an absolute kind of objective rationality to create the foundation of metaphysics (Heidegger′s *Gründung*). He confirmed the thesis of *Metaphysics* about the divided immovable Mover from the book *Lambda*. God as a Creator is separate from the modern God as an objective thinker. This exemplary objective scholastic makes direct vision of his rationality through his infinite intellectual intuition. Man recognizes him only indirectly, because human cognition is given by finite deductive reasoning. The separated intelligible capital given *ad intra* in divine thinking is accessible *ad extra* to us by the fact that it radiates into creation through the form of rational necessity, which represents the objective conclusion of divine *scholē*. Scotus already conceived that scholastic God at Oxford; he became an exemplary modern intellectual at the University of Paris around the year 1300. The death of this superb creature finally destroyed the University of Paris in the 18th century. Oxford University is objectively living very well off this mythological corpse to this day. Archaic hermeneutics follows the perspective of *alētheia* offered by divine Muses. That perspective having been taken, Scotus′s version of Oxfordian Fallacy represents an objective version of the Osiris myth. The first modern (and therefore manic) academician Set dismantled the dead body of Osiris into various parts in order to build successful branches of Oxford University in the New World. Making use of that objective mythology, nihilistic Furies have finally secured the cult of academic and fully intellectual fertility.

The new form of metaphysics granted to modern God to be himself in his essential intimacy of the intellect and of the creatively active will. However, he is obliged to send a recognizable form of his syllogistic rationality into the world. The rationality of univocal necessity forms the bridge between the divine infinity and the finite creation. God is objectively separated from the world; his infinite intellect, connected with the divine essence, serves as a kind of exemplar. We recognize his objective intellectual production. The second step established the new form of objective deduction of divine truths into creation. This deductive form of objective divine rationality is irradiated into the contingent world as “*lux aeterna*,” because the divine light symbolizes the universally necessary character of these truths. The new metaphysics represents the system of deduction of objectivity that starts by separated God and goes to the creation. The whole of creation makes the representation of these necessary truths, because the created being carries in itself the ratio given by the eternal exemplar. Gandavus made that model in two modes given as “*esse ad*” (ch. 5.2.3). Scotus replaced this scheme with the distinction between the intellectual production of God (*esse intelligibile, exemplar*) and the manifested objective conclusion of his deductive thinking, which is comprehensible in the world. Instead of a subsistent form of “*esse ad*” given by divine intention, there is the realm of eternal truths that operate as a necessary cosmic rule in the direction of the world. These are by no means determined by Bonaventura’s or Olivi’s demiurgic will, but by Aristotle’s *demonstratio* made according to *Second Analytics*. Avicenna’s emanation model of the active cosmic intellect as *Dator formarum* took on the modern form of objective rationality, which was adopted in postmodernism by logic, mathematics and physics. Scotus considers the mode of thinking of the modern God clearly and correctly, for this mode of thinking manifests itself *univoce* in the world. God’s exemplary rationality has taken the place of the divine causality that was given as *causa prima* in the first Averroism. God disposes of the mode of infinite cognition in the act of intellectual intuition; but we are able to draw finite rational conclusions at the level of *metaphysica generalis*. Therefore, we can even recognize the unreal being, see the above-mentioned example of the non-existent Sun and the objectively given light (ch. 5.3.2). Objective univocity in this form of deduction is related to the common way in which God and man think as two rational beings, although they are not equal to each other in their essence. This version of deduction establishes objective metaphysics based on the one and unified truth. Objectivity is no longer Simplicius’s and Gandavus’s substantial relation, which was brought out of the divine essence due to Neoplatonic emanations or Avicennistic comitations.

Scotus created a new God of *Modernorum*. The objective divine capital consists in speculative thinking and the main activity of modern God consists in ontological mediation of necessary thinking *ad extra*. The objective creation arises as an intellectual by-product of the enlightened activity of the exemplary intellect. When the infinite divine will joins this process, then it comes to real creation. The joyful science of modernists led by academic Furies at Oxford and Paris was necessarily and objectively completed. The new metaphysics disregarded the real world and created a non-existent divine intellect with its own *regula agentis increati* that operates through the divine rationality. According to this *regula*, modernists necessarily and obviously deduce the existence of an objectively determined world valid for an objectively formed *intelligentia spiritualis*. Following the example of Scotus, this new group of *illuminati* created its own *regula agentis creati*. Ockham, as the last great connoisseur of the first Averroism, observed this whole tragicomedy and annulled Scotus’s deduction as a nonsensical enterprise. The objective mythology of divine reasoning (and by no means of the psyche as before) grafted itself in a sophistical way to the deductive procedure of *Second Analytics*. Modernists took this divine idol as the most important totem of the academic tribe of *sophistae* *Latinorum* according to the projection mechanism of the cultural hegemony and relative utopia described above (ch. 5.3.2). Objectivity in the form of an autonomous diacosmos separated from the divine intellect and it acquired a necessary, unchanging and true definition. The contents conceived by God have their own objective being in the mode of the first determination of substance as a third kind (*secundum quid*). The rationality of deductive reasoning keeps the univocal manner throughout the cosmos. Modern God is the first objective scientist who sees the world as he thinks it, and vice versa. Divine thinking represents the modern basic capital, which is represented in the mode of finiteness at the level of *vestigium* and *imago*. Scotus created a new simulacrum of modernity in the form of the intellectual demiurge. He necessarily produces an exemplary form of rationality that is objectively given in creation as an *imago*.

Let us summarize the next part of the treatise *De cognoscibilitate Dei* in the writing *Ordinatio I*. This part provides an overview of four modes that reveals the being in the mode of newly established objectivity (*Vat*. III, no. 261–67, pp. 160–63). Divine thinking is given in relation to itself as an intellectual essence and reflects in the form of the exemplarily true conclusion. This conclusion is manifested in the world in an objective form (*secundum quid*). The eternal divine truths are given purely immanently in the mode of infinity, but thanks to the univocity of human and divine rationality, they are recognizable for us in our finite mode of thinking. The correspondence theory of the truth is placed outside the illumination in order to solve the transition from divine objectivity to human cognition. Divine intimacy involves the identity of the intellectual divine essence and its exemplary thinking. The deductive exemplary *positum* creates the first ratio between God and creation, which passes into our intellect in the finite univocal mode. At the level of the transition from the divine *vestige* to the worldly *imago*, the rationality of man and that of God met in an adequate form. For the development of the West, this mode of similarity of God and creation is of utmost importance. It makes a new kind of *dativus possessivus* that regulates the production of objectivity in divine thinking and subsequently in human intellect. This way of doubled cognition establishes Scotus’s theory of the truth as *certitudo*. Objective similarity of divine and human rationality is established beyond the theory of illumination. Let us look at the status of the middle premise in the deductive syllogism that entails an objective causality.

“With regard to the third way, we see in the eternal light as in the cause, which in itself contains the primary objectivity (*sicut in causa obiecti in se*). The divine intellect produces an objective causality through its acts in its intelligible being and, through its actuality, gives this objectivity such a [minimally] given being (*actu suo dat huic obiecto esse tale*). From this it follows (*per consequens*) that he gives a certain rational definition to this intelligible being (*rationem obiecti*). These rational definitions then guide the human intellect (*per quas rationes post movent intellectum*) to evident cognition (*ad cognitionem certam*).” [[453]](#footnote-453)

The quotation begins with the divine essence, which is the effective cause of objective cognition in the sphere of exemplary divine immanence (*in causa obiecti in se*). This cognition produces cognition as an evident objectivity in God (*esse tale*). Cognition became the objective essence given in the modality “*secundum quid*.” Let us see the previous definitions of this objectivity. After the completed intuitive deduction, the thought received an objective definition given in the primary sphere of divine rationality (*actu suo dat huic obiecto esse tale*). The unlimited thing given in the divine intellect now manifests itself as something objectively determined (*esse tale*). The new form of *tertium ens* has the same ontological meaning as Avicenna’s “*hoc esse tantum*” and Gandavus’s concept called “*res a ratitudine*” (ch. 5.2.1). This deduction created the first sphere of objective rationality, which contains exemplarily and objectively determined *scibile*. The abolition of Gandavus’s comitation is found in the second part of the quotation, in the mode of logical conclusion (*per consequens dat eis talem rationem obiecti*). Made in the mode “*per consequens*,” the rationality radiated out into the world. It represents the conclusion of deductive proof and not the emanation of the divine being. The new sphere of objectivity includes the formal truthfulness of correct reasoning given by the fully universal, exemplary and rational forms of divine thinking. Scotus consistently presents the transition of divine rationality into the world in an Aristotelian and logical way, which constitutes his unique concept of modern God. The rationality of divine reasoning has its own necessity given in the mode of certainty (*per quas rationes post movent intellectum ad cognitionem certam*). Since God by his nature produces rational reasoning in the mode of infinity, his rational judgments are recognizable to us in an univocal and deductive manner made in the mode of finite beings. Rationality, logic and metaphysics make one common point for modern God and for modernists. Instead of the comitative “*analogia entis*,” Scotus created an objective form of idiomatic communication with modern God in the form of “*analogia rationalis*.” The subtle doctor objectively completed Gandavus’s interpretation called “*communicatio idiomatum*” that forms the mythological and mystical fundament of modernity (ch. 5.3.2). The intelligibility of the eternal world corresponds to Augustinian illumination. The intimate act of divine thought performed *ad intra* is exposed by exemplars. The divine light now operates in the mode of immanent necessity, which is given *ad extra* through the rational form of divine thinking. Olivi’s intimacy of the free will turned into an objective intimacy of exemplary intellectual reflection.

Scotus transformed the classical scheme of Augustine’s illumination, which Gandavus had philosophically shaped as the last representative of the school of second Averroism. The intentional object is not a component of the divine being projected in the mode “*esse ad*.” Scotus as a reformed Aristotelian set aside Gandavus’s theory of divine objectivity as a causally acting force in our intellect. Pecham explicitly formulated that theory (*quod movet intellectum obiective est res*, ch. 4.2.2). Pecham conceived the divine exemplary *res* as being of the third kind, which had a causal effect on our cognition. The hypostatized species acted as a *tertium ens* to connect reality and human cognition. Scotus rejected this sphere of beings of the third kind as superfluous, because they were not in accordance with the Aristotelian scheme of cognition according to Thomistic interpretation of *De anima*. Descartes reintroduced the innate Neoplatonic ideas into the deduction of objectivity when he developed another version of Scotist objectivity for postmodernism. Scotus’s *metaphysica generalis* is logically absolutely complete and from the point of view of the first Averroism is completely irrational. The new metaphysics created a universal connection between God, man and the cosmos, which was based on univocal objective rationality. Modern man and his God, both of them need logical deduction in order to survive. The order is important because Scotus’s God is an objective human projection, which Feuerbach exactly recognized in the 19th century. In contrast to Gandavus and other *illuminati*, modern Scotus introduced conformity as a recognized necessity. It was not established in God′s ipseity, but was deduced out of his manner of deductive reasoning. The rational nature of objectivity does not consist in emanations of the divine being as *tertium ens*, but in the necessary conclusion of objective thinking. The separation the divine rational objectivity from its essence is determined by the syllogistic mode “*per consequens.*” Gandavus had the basic aspect of objectivity in God given on the basis of intentional species. Scotus changed this conception to a formal structure of similarity given in the univocal form of deductive proof. As a result, direct causal effects of the exemplar on human cognition became obsolete, as was the case with *illuminati* of the second Averroism in the term “*sincera veritas*.” God’s spirit is infinite and is in the mode of absolute and unlimited actuality. There is no level in the creation that corresponds to this level of intuitive reflection made by immanent God. Nevertheless, divine reflection creates a secondary descending series of objective knowledge, which Bonaventure calls the “*regula agentis increati*.” Scotus′s version of this *regula* takes the form of an intuitive deductive syllogism and thus totally differs from the earlier emanation of Neoplatonic hypostatic forms and from the Avicennian intentionality. On the second level of rationality, correspondence is already possible and even necessary due to rational categorical deduction. The second form of objective rationality generates the next level of objectivity, on which the correspondence theory of the truth is given as similarity on the level of “*vestigium—imago*.” This new structure of objectivity represents a powerful impulse for the finite human demiurge. The objectively founded capitalist demiurge processes these necessary and universal divine *regulae*, which are given in the form of divine rationality, into the corresponding form of objectivity on the level of “*regula agentis creati*.” This second version of truth already has the metaphysical character of Aristotelian deduction. Postmodern Descartes transformed these metaphysical rules into mathematical formulas. Logical positivism in the era of philosophical nihilism finally abolished metaphysics as useless.

Scotus was the first modernist who objectively and adequately led the truth out of the exemplary sphere of divine being and intellect in order to sent it in the creation. Through the deduction of being made in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy, the first object of unchangeable and necessary objectivity was born. The new metaphysics saved modernity from the heresy of Neoplatonic emanations and Avicennist′s comitations. The price for the elimination of emanations from the objective metaphysics was the death of modern God that postmodernism carried out. The divine syllogistic truth was secondary element for Scotus, however, it became the first element for Leibniz and his successors. Scotus’s deduction triggered the process of Western secularization, since it introduced a universal concept of objectivity based on a modern God. He makes logical a categorical reasoning with an absolutely quick rapidity that contemporary supercomputer can never reach. Therefore, the beatified Franciscan is the second founder of Western secularization after the canonized Bonaventure. The modern *deus otiosus*, although he thinks truthfully, is separated from the world in his infinite scholastic activity. Sure, even modern God can act as a Creator. For this he needs the act of the will, which endows his primary objective rationality with the subsequent creative causality. Scotus’s objectively defined God always thinks exemplarily in the mode “*semel—semper*” and sometimes acts in a demiurgic manner. God takes exemplary contents of his thought out into the sphere of primary objectivity and does not keep them in his intellect or in his essence. Early capitalism, founded on the twofold rule and the twofold will of Bonaventura and Olivi received a new divine subject that produces a universal rationality. Modern God is no longer the treasurer of objective species. He invested the treasure of the well-funded rationality in the brave new world as a new global capitalist enterprise. The objectivity received a new historical habitat because God got a new habitus of thinking. Scotus abolished Gandavus’s psychology of divine intentionality and replaced it with the logical reasoning of divine rationality separated from the divine essence. He confirmed the separation of the first “Immovable Objectivist” according to *Metaphysics*, book *Lambda*. The exemplar of the second Averroism turned into the demiurgic production of the exemplary objectivity, which is considered and reflected in the act of categorical deduction. If the act of the divine demiurgic will comes to this deductive reasoning, then this objectively and necessarily given conclusion begins to exist in reality. The objective correspondence theory of truth proceeds from the identity between the exemplary divine intellect and the objective conclusions that this intellect thinks. Through the truth transmitted by the divine intellect in the changing world (*sicut in continente obiectum*), we can see the truth in the mode of permanent objectivity. According to Scotus, it corresponds to Augustine’s work *De trinitate* XI.14 (*Vat*. III, no. 263, p. 161.6‒7). Scotus carried out an exegesis of the above-mentioned text on cognition through the eternal divine light in such a way that he took down the basic thesis of the second Averroism. Although the light of the divine face continues to illuminate the world in a metaphorical way, it no longer had an effect on our thinking as a metaphysical “*causa remota*.” The thesis about the objective divine rationality was fully comprehended and used by Leibniz, who was an excellent connoisseur of Scotus’s metaphysics and knew its shortcomings (ch. 5.3.2). Following Rufus and Bonaventura, Scotus completed the construction of Western objective science, which avoided actualized first substances. The new universe of rationality is fully objective and extends from God to the last place of the cosmos. In contrast to the school of Latin sophists in the second Averroism, Scotus rejected any causally effective hypostasis in the divine sphere. The introduction of *tertium ens* in the simple divine Being would bring a substantial multiplicity into God. According to the school of the first Averroism, this point was a clear heresy of Neoplatonic school named “*sequaces Aristotelis*.” Scotus’s metaphysics opened *via Modernorum*, because it secularized the rationality outside of the divine essence and the creative will. Infinite God remains in his actual essentiality. But the form of his thought can be observed as an objective rationality, which guides correct deductive thinking. Objectivity was no longer a being of the third kind and became a universal formal concept as “*secundum quid*.” It is of no use to multiply various kinds of *tertium ens*, since modernized Avicennism and Aristotelianism are sufficient to explain objectivity. The newly determined form of deduction founded the final form of *dativus incommodi* that sent the school of the second Averroism into Lethe.

Let us now go through Scotus’ scheme according to *Second Analytics* that constitutes objective emanations of scientific rationality. The deductive syllogism from the direction of God looks like this:

* *Maior*: the separated divine intellect as the essence and the cause that exists in the intimate mode of infinite actuality and divine being (*causa obiecti in se*).
* *Minor*: the definition of the intelligible contents given in the divine intellect in the form of intuitive insight (*exemplar, ratio obiecti, esse tale, ponibilia, factibilia*).
* *Ergo*: truths and rules that necessarily radiate out into the world as eternal light for the human intellect (*lux aeterna, cognitio certa, esse intelligibile, ens obiective*).

The middle link of the divine judgment is recognizable for us in our finite rationality. It makes a kind of syllogistic consideration, which is given by God in the infinite mode. Divine, infinitely agile thinking brings the primary creative causality and rational exemplarity into the deductive syllogism given in the secular mode. Divine rationality now operates in the new form of scientific deduction, i.e., only as a pure rational form. Following the first Averroism known as Thomism to him, Scotus separated the formal causality of cognition from the effective causality of God that founds the creative activities. The former exemplars given as *tertium ens* have disappeared and, with respect to the world, they manifest themselves only by necessary and eternal conclusions of the demonstrative proof. The divine rationality, which is given by the intuitive divine insight, acts as a middle link of the syllogism. The objective form of divine rationality is not given causally effectively, as in the case of the creative will, but only objectively formally. The divine thinking is recognizable in its objective conclusions that are visible in the creation (*vestigium*). The basic rationality of cognition reflects the universe of eternal truths intimately given in God; they go in the world in the form of necessary demonstrative conclusions. The objectivity given in this combination of formal and final causality leads the human mind to a certain cognition (*movent intellectum ad cognitionem certam*). Scotus placed in the scheme of correspondence the formal and essential causality that leads the cognition from God to man. God recognizes the same potential and necessary concept of essence in the infinite mode, and man in the finite mode. Both subjects recognize the same objective truth and the necessity given in the same way since they use the demonstrative form of objective deduction. The scheme of *Second Analytics* applies to both God and man *univoce* since it made in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy. However, we perceive the original divine rationality only in the mode “*quoad nos*.” This form of divine thinking is also given in the mode “*semel—semper*” before the creation of the world. Therefore, it applies *absolute*, also completely separated from existing first substances. Aristotle’s first substance, given in *Seconds Analytics* as the cornerstone of science, is not present at all in the first stage of deduction. The transcendental form of objectivity is given *per prius*, since it comes directly from God′s rationality that is logical, necessary, essential, formal et causal.

The next question follows the deduction of truth and cognition from the necessary divine rationality. The direction of deduction in *Ordinatio I* is reversed in relation to *Lectura I*, since the reflection proceed from the creation to God. The question is as follows: how is the trace of the Trinity truthfully and necessarily given in creation? Scotus abolished the last remnants of Avicennist deduction, which the Oxford version of objective deduction still contained in writing *Lectura* I. The influence of Neoplatonic *Liber des causis* gave way to logic and to science deduced according to *Seconds Analytics*. The new theory of deduction is based on the scheme of Aristotelian metaphysics of Thomistic provenience that Scotus got to know in Paris. Therefore, the next part of *Ordinatio I* in the treatise *De vestigio* explores the objectivity in the creation. Preserving the exemplary character of necessary divine truths, Neoplatonic attributes of eternity, exemplary necessity and immutability were replaced by the contingent form of objectivity. Scotus returned to the starting point of the second Averroism, to the quotation of *Book of Wisdom* on the organization of the cosmos according to measure, number and weight (*omnia in mensura, et numero et pondere disposuisti*, ch. 4.1.3). For the search for the unity of God and creation, the key question is the measure (*mensura*), which Scotus understands outside the classical scheme of Neoplatonic causality. It was given by effects of hypostatized forms according to *Liber de causis* and from Bonaventura’s exemplars. Following the pattern of the first Averroism, Aristotelian Scotus abolished all previous versions of *tertium ens*. Either the first substances are given in reality, or the universals are given in thinking. The book *Ordinatio I* abolished the basic scheme of the second Averroism founded on the ontotheological similarity of the Creator and his work. This key part of new metaphysics was written in Paris, because it contains direct criticism of Bonaventura’s modernism. The treatise returns to the metaphysical starting point that investigates the objective beingness. It is given in divine thinking and is necessarily deduced in our thinking due to its objective and *univoce* given rationality. In the order of objective rationality, metaphysical deduction implies the necessary degree of similarity between divine and human rationality in Averroes’s theory of the truth as a *proportio*.

“I am talking about the representation made by the proportion (*proportionaliter representare*), because the definition of what exists in the creation is not formally given in God (*ratio illius representantis non est formaliter in Deo*), but stands in the corresponding relation to his rationality (*aliquid proportionale illi rationi*).” [[454]](#footnote-454)

Scotus rejected the formal causality elevated by former modernists to a substance of the third kind. Their analogical and proportional relation was given directly in the divine essence (ch. 5.2.3). The rejection of the principle “*esse ad*” means that there is no sphere of *tertium ens* in God that could act as an objective cause in relation to the creation (*ratio illius repraesentantis non est formaliter in Deo*). The quotation rejects Gandavus’s conception of proportionality conceived in the mode of substantial predication. Scotus is an Aristotelian on this point, following the example of the first Averroism. Aristotelian scenario of causality confirms that the similarity between the Creator and the created has only an indirect character and cannot reach the infinite divine essence. The second Averroism adhered to the emanation scenario by allowing the categorical scheme of “substance—accident” to apply in divine thinking. The apology of natural cognition cannot tolerate the ontotheological ladder of mystical *illuminati*, which leads from creation up to God and vice versa. Scotus enthroned the new age of objective thought in the second Averroism that abandoned the epoch of objective mysticism as modernists did before him. Bonaventure′s and Gandavus’s emanations represent a hidden kind of Neoplatonism that let pass into the creation the accidental divine intentions. They are given in the second Averroism as being of the third kind (*rationes exemplares, seminales*). This conception of emanations and comitations concerning the hypostases was untenable in Paris. It was rejected by victorious school of modern Semiaverroism elaborated by Aquinas and Aegidius. After the rehabilitation of Aquinas, Dominicans and Franciscans accepted Thomistic criticism of primitive Avicennism. Scotus’s rejection of indirect causality for cognition (*causa remota*) abolished the basic thesis of Augustinian Avicennism and renewed the scenario of formal proportionality between God and creation established in the first Averroism. Modern metaphysics cannot hold the emanation from the divine substance by Porretan species of the third kind. In the years 1290–1300 Scotus transferred Oxford′s Modernism to Parisian Thomism. Just like the Thomism, the Scotism forced Augustinian *illuminati* to become objective Aristotelians. The conception of objective *lux aeterna*, therefore, agrees with the scheme of cognition according to the first Averroism, where the similarity is ensured exclusively by *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. In the mode of rationality, two forms now correspond to each other: the rationality given as a rule by the objective form of the divine *demonstratio* and our necessary recognition of this objective form. Formal agreement, within the framework of objective necessity, replaced the causal effect of the exemplar on human cognition. The truth was made as Rufus’s *coaequatio*. The formalization of objectivity gave rise to a new metaphysics, which abolished the ontotheology of the second Averroism. Scotus defended the model of cognition according to the first Averroism, but in the mode of Avicennian objectivity. His metaphysics remained anthropocentric, but in a much more sophisticated way than the previous modernism. From the point of view of hermeneutics, it is about cognition by exposing the meaning of being from behind, from the direction of divine rationality. Scotus claims that cognition objectively and truly comes out from God to the world. Therefore, we recognize God and the world in an objectively natural way. For the deductive substantiation of metaphysics, there is no need for a direct effect of the divine essence and no direct effect of divine causality made through illumination. Divine illumination ceased to act on human cognition as a *causa remota* and passed into the logical form of reasoning and rational necessity given in the mode of infinity and finiteness. Objectivity is exemplarily given in the divine essence, where the second Avicennism applies. But the correspondence of the divine sphere of thinking in our intellect is given on the basis of the rational *demonstratio*, and that not by the causally and effective given demiurgic *volitio*. Scotus abolished the ontotheology of *Modernorum*, because it proceeded from Avicennian model of emanations and comitations, and not from Aristotelian categorical predication. The Creator, understandably, can act directly in the world; but Scotus is not interested in it, since he solves the question of natural cognition of God in philosophy. The emanation from God into creation does not follow the path of tertium ens (*exemplars, rationes seminales*). It follows deductive necessity of divine rules and eternal truths. We are naturally able to recognize them with our own intellect. In the second sphere of the objectivity given in the world (*vestigium*) and our recognition of this objectivity (*imago*) operates the full effectiveness of divine demiurgic rationality based on the recognized form of finite being. The exemplarity of the infinite and completely immanently objectivity remains in God; however, it makes a correspondence in the objectivity of the finite creation.

Another problem of the new metaphysics was the concept of secure existence (*ens ratum*). According to the metaphysical deduction, Scotus cannot conceive *ens ratum* as a actualized first substance in the mode of the first Averroism. The new ratification of the being is ensured by the objectivity given by God that sends objective truths in the creation. The empirical deduction of science from first substances according to *Seconds Analytics* is now superfluous. Objective *illuminati* do not use such a weak form of *demonstratio* for metaphysical deduction. The new conception of solid being (*ens ratum*) is presented in *Ordinatio I* in the treatise *De ratitudine et aliquitate* (*Vat*. III, pp. 183–200). The treatise adopts Gandavus’s definition of *ratitudo* in the introduction.[[455]](#footnote-455) Scotus′s definition invokes Boethius′ work *De hebdomadibus* that Aquinas reinterpreted against Porretans (ch. 4.5.1). Scotus followed the line of Avicenna’s metaphysics on this point and abolished Thomistic conception according to the school of first Averroism. Scotus divided the existing substance (*quo est*) and the formal essence (*quod est*) into two independent principles of being according to Avicenna by making a sophistic reference to Boethius. The new concept of the certain being determined metaphysics and the future ontology. Scotus rejects the hypostatized conception of *humanitas* presented by Porretans as being of the third kind and defends his definition according to Avicenna’s *Metaphysics*.

“According to Avicenna’s fifth book of *Metaphysics*, such existence is in the mode ‘humanity as such’ (*humanitas est tantum humanitas*). The definition of humanity is not a thing endowed with real being (*ratio humanitatis non est res rata*). Then it is necessary that the certain being lies outside this formal definition of man.” [[456]](#footnote-456)

The source of the solid being (*ens ratum*) must be found through a critical revision of the being of the third kind given in the concept of “*humanitas est tantum humanitas*.” Scotus is a strict Aristotelian on this point. From the purely formal determination of humanity, the being of the concrete being cannot be deduced in the Porretan way of any hypostasis in Rufus’s mode “*homo humanat*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). Even if modern God accomplishes a solar eclipse, then we have only the objective cognition of the Sun. Any categorical predication is tied to Aristotelian relation between the first and the second substance (ch. 5.3.2). The fixed being (*ens ratum*) is an actualized being and not its abstraction in thinking.

On this point, there was a change compared to the previous teaching of *Lectura I* that created a concept of objectivity from the divine perspective. Now Scotus determines the objective being in the mode of *vestigium* at the level of finite objectivity in creation. Here, the form of infinite objectivity is represented only in the mode of finiteness and only as a mental concept given in the thinking of the knower. The treatise takes from Avicenna the formal identity of the content (A=A) and turns it into a new form of *ens ratum*. The emergence of metaphysical objectivity in the world is evidenced in the following sentence, which comments on Avicenna’s being of the third kind. Scotus rejected the univocality between the divine being and creation. Therefore, he abolished the Neoplatonic scenario of categorical emanation and replaced it with the deduction of objective rationality. Boethius’s difference “*quo est—quod est*” applies in the new mode of translating the objectivity of the primary rationality issued from the divine exemplary thinking (*lux aeterna*) into the sphere of its secondary representation in the finite creation (*vestigium*).

“That which constitutes a certainty of the being (*ratitudo eius*) in an exemplary objectively (*quo*) and formally (*formaliter*) manner, it is given with regard to the divine trace in creation (*respectus vestigialis*), and that is done primarily like this: what is in the human intellect given by itself in the objective being (*per se intellectuu alicuius in quantum tale*) that establishes the act of the objective being as such (*est illud quo ipsum est tale*) or it possesses a formal identity (*idem formaliter*) with what is objectively given in this way. The objective rationality of God is summarized in creation (*respectus vestigialis*) in every definition of the existent being (*includitur in ratione cuiuslibet entis rati*). Therefore, the argument applies.” [[457]](#footnote-457)

Boethius’ definition of being in the Porretan differentiation between “*quo est*” and “*quod est*” is important for the definition of the objective form that determines the new kind of being. Seen in the mode of Aristotelian abstraction, humanity is only a potential concept given in thought; the objective insight follows the track of the pure essence produced by divine rationality in the form of certain and evident conclusions. Since humanity is one of the concepts that emerged from divine rationality, it has an objective character. The key is the determination of the new *actus essendi* in the mode “*quo est*” for the exemplarily formally given being in its objective constancy and firmness (*quo est formaliter ratitudo eius*). The concept of humanity without attachment to the real person forms the trace of the original divine objectivity in the direction of creation (*respectus vestigialis*). The exemplary and unlimited objectivity produced by God gives the form of limited objectivity in creation (*quo formaliter*). The Subtle Doctor takes Avicenna’s definition of humanity as a formal definition of being and ratifies his concept of “*humanitas tantum*” by deducing divine rationality into creation (*vestigium*). Porretan “man—corpse” turned into the concept of objective humanity. By this deduction of modern God and modern man, both non-existent, being in the form of *tertium ens*, a new era of human sciences began.

Scotus escaped the trap of *Nominales*, who worked with the form as a *tertium ens* given *univoce*. Humanity is now a finite and objective substance (*quid est*) that exists as a concept in thinking. But the act of ratification given by Avicennian denudation is more valid than an Aristotelian concept given by empirical abstraction. The objective being is observed in creation as a trace of divine rationality (*vestigium*) and it does not make a new being of the third kind. The previous part of the deduction has shown that this rational necessity determines every finite objective being (*esse tale, quod est*). The act of objective “*exsistere*” is given by the transition from the unlimited divine rationality into the limited human cognition. The original firmness and certainty of being (*ratitudo*) proceeds from the above-mentioned rational definition of “*secundum quid*” that comes from God. He is the source of the unlimited objectivity in the mode of the first objective determination (*illud quo ipsum est tale*). The act of Boethius’s existence (*quo est*) is given from the direction of the objective form, but it is not a kind of previous exemplar. It became the objective conclusion in the mode “*secundum quid*” in the medium of divine rationality and creative rules; let us see the previous definitions of exemplary objectivity. Rufus’s “exsistence” received a new objective form, given outside the problematic species of Porretans. Scotus takes divine objectivity as a primary rationality (and not as a subsistent entity), which only establishes the objective and therefore only potential act of existence of the third kind (*quo est*). This possibility determines the occurrence of each created essence as an objectively finite being (*quod est*). The new use of Boethius’s definition secures *ens ratum* in its definition of the objective essence, which stands outside the actualized existence of first substances. Scotus ended the scenario of the second Averroism, in which the hypostatized “*rationes* *exemplares*” emanated to creation in the form of being of the third kind that was finally hypostatized for human cognition as seminal forms. The dogmatic mythology of *tertium ens* does not go well with Aristotelianism. Scotus’s metaphysical *Wahrheit* abolished the *Dichtung* of Augustinian Avicennism, in which the biblical and theological speculations created a mythological truth of philosophical nature. The new metaphysics completed the scenario of the transition from the unlimited objective *ens* in divine thought (*exemplar*) to the limited form of objectivity in creation (*vestigium*). The primary objectivity in the sphere of divine rationality, deductively establishes the finite mode of objectivity that concerns contigent entities. The ratification of being in the creation took on a fully objective form in the modified version of Gandavus’s “*esse ad.*” Scotus established a new form of the objective diacosmos between God and creation. The new form of “*esse ratum*” determines the mode of finite rationality from the direction of its infinite, exemplarily and necessarily given form (*respectus vestigialis*). The transition of the infinite into the finite creates objectivity in its positive objectivity, given by the rational objective definition (*in ratione cuiuslibet entis rati*). This creates the objectivity in creation, which is bound to the objective being of the third kind in Avicenna’s metaphysical mode “*inquantum tale*.” The representation of reality got the necessary formal and exemplary causality from the direction of God towards creation. The desired rectitude (*ratitudo*) of new being does not lie in the actuality. The existence mode of “*quantum tale*” is given only in thinking (*in ratione*). This ratio has an objective character given by the deduction of rationality and necessity from the primary sphere of divine objectivity. Scotus designs a new form of Porphyry’s redoubled being (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1), which does not have the character of Neoplatonic being of the third kind. In the case of ratification, divine rationality has only an objective-causal character and no creative, volitional and efficient causality. God does not have to act causally effectively in order to create an “*ens ratum*.” To ensure the rational construction of the being, it is sufficient for God to think objectively. The newly given sense of being is exposed from behind, from the divine sphere of rationality (*respectus vestigialis*). In the remake of Avicennist categorical predication, the *vestigium* represents the first mode of being as objectively determined meaning. The truth radiates from the divine intellect as an intelligible trace (*vestigium*) in the creation. The exemplary act of the infinite divine intellect is given in creation as an objective conclusion of the scientific truth that comes from the deductive rationality of modern God. The objective rectitude of being is given *per prius* by deductive reasoning in divine thought and is projected into creation by demiurgic rationality (*ens ratum*). Therefore, it is possible to state the objectively fixed minimal being in the mode *per prius* in the exemplary divine rationality and *per posterius* in the contingent created world that we objectively recognize in a finite way (*imago*). Objective rationality acquired a modern regulating character, which fully replaced the earlier forms of *tertium ens*. Objective being fixed as *vestigium* is manifested at the last level of human cognition of objectivity (*imago*). Here it has a potential character only because it is a universal cognition in human thinking. Man can recognize this infinite rationality, given in creation as a *vestigium*, univocally by the finite objective reasoning that runs at the level of the intellect created in God’s image (*imago*). The combination of both types of objective apprehension (*vestigium—imago*) created a new path to God as an exemplary and objective simulacrum.

God of modernists lost intentionality and psychology, and gained objective rationality. Previously, this simulacrum of the second averroism was at least formally human; now it has become a pure thinking machine. Scotus’s metaphysical version of *ens ratum* objectified divine rationality according to Porretans, but without creating a new being of the third kind. The exemplary act of divine thinking has a founding character given objectively and causally (*quo est*). But this causality has no effective character, but only a formal and final one, because it is the act of the divine syllogism sent *ad extra*. Effectiveness belongs, first of all, to the creative will, which generates real existing *ex nihilo*, but according to objectively established truths. Scotus found the scientific proof of the divine rational objectivity and not of the divine existence, because this is intimately given in God in the mode “*esse in*.” The new proof of the divine existence and the objectively deduced rationality of the are outside the classical Aristotelian path to God, which is given solely on the basis of causality. The subtle metaphysician created an objective version of the diacosmos, thereby expanding the original repertoire of the third world of Neoplatonism, Islamic mysticism and Falsafa (*′ālam al-mithāl*; OBJ I, ch. 2.3.3). Jamblichus’s diacosmos finally experienced a radical modernization, which founded the scholastic *via Modernorum*. Every finite being is now equipped with the objective kind of being, because it is the product of divine rationality that we reflect *univoce*, but only in the human limited mode of cognition. That is why Scotus integrated into the objective teaching the threefold conception of Modists from the school of the first Averroism. In divine intimacy, rationality is essentially and exemplarily given, because the exemplar is connected with the divine essence (*modus essendi*). The world radiates this exemplary rationality according to the measure of number and weight as an objectively manifested trace (*vestigium*), which ensures the objective signification of divine rationality in creation (*modus significandi*). We recognize this rationality because we are created as *imago Dei* and the creation are built on the same level of *imago* with regard to God thanks to the original rationality. The vestiginal rationality is objectively manifested by every created thing (*modus cognoscendi*). The objective being thus determined (*vestigium quo est*) represents the representation of divine activity in the mode of finiteness (*imago quod est*). Threefold different ratification of being given in the mode of Aristotelian correspondence (*exemplar, vestigium, imago*) laid the foundation for the construction of a new metaphysics.

Scotus can now cite Averroes as evidence of the connection with the first Averroism; however, he must edit his teaching according to Simplicius’s commentary on *Categories*. The genesis of the term “*esse ad*” from Simplicius to Gandavus created Neoplatonic predication “*ad unum*.” Gandavus gave Simplicius’s hypostases as *habitus* and “*esse ad*” directly into the divine essence. He transformed the term “*potentia substantialis*,” which we already know from Olivi’s conception of the will (ch. 5.1.3). In God, the mode “*esse ad*” states the relation at the level of substance (*relatio substantialis*). Through the literal use of categorical predication, the sphere of objectivity, according to Gandavus, became a component of the divine essence. This form of mystical pantheism à la Spinoza was taught at the University of Paris after 1277 by the rector of the Faculty of Arts. The scenario of divine emanations into creation was unacceptable for Christian theology. Scotus created a new minimal certain being *(ens ratum*) through the objective definition. Therefore, he does not agree with Averroes‘s categorical definition of the relationship as a pure accident and corrects it in relation to the Neoplatonic Simplicius.

“We have to argue against Averroes’s assertion in the ninth book of *Metaphysics* that the 'relationship has only a minimal being' (*relatio habet debilissimum esse*); the category of relation is therefore allegedly not a certain being of the existent and that it cannot even formally ensure it (*ergo non est nec potest esse formaliter ratitudo entis rati*). To this it must be said that the definition of the relation is of two kinds: either accidental or substantial. We take the division of the category of relation from Simplicius’s commentary on *Categories*, where he says that there is a determination 'in' which does not belong in the categorical relation (*'in' non constituunt praedicamenta*); such a predicament exists in the way of categorical determinations. These predicamenta are essential or substantial and the others only accidental. The Commentator’s assertion applies only to the categorial relation at the accidental level, not at the level of substance.” [[458]](#footnote-458)

For Averroes, the category of relationship (*relatio*) has only an accidental character and cannot exist outside of substance. Since it is given only in thinking, its being is absolutely minimal (*relatio habet debilissimum esse*). Scotus must transfer the objective necessity from God to creation in Boethius’s mode “*quo est*.” The trace of God in creation has an objective causality given by rational deduction. Set in the mode “*esse in*,” the substance carries a transcendental character, which is given beyond the categorical predication. Therefore, the Commentator’s assertion applies only to the categorical relationship at the level of accident, and not at the level of the modern substance of the third kind (*dictum Commentatoris verum est de relatione accidentali, non de substantiali*). Aristotle’s categorical predication of the relation to substance (*relatio accidentalis*) was transformed into a new form of predication with regard to the original unity of being. The key term “*esse in*” taken after Simplikios, establishes a new version of metaphysics. The categorical statement of Scotus contradicts the principle “*ex inmediatis*” that makes the fundament of Averroes′s metaphysics. The modern Franciscan took the side of the Neoplatonist Simplicius against the unmodern Averroes and thus also against the entire school of the first Averroism. Scotus became the first Thomist in the school of the Porretanian *Modernorum*. That is why he sees exactly the fundamental novelty given in the transcendental predication of Simplicius. This Neoplatonist created a categorical predication outside the writing *Categories*. Scotus must adhere to the objective relation “*vestigium—imago*” beyond the categorical predication of substance, because the eternal and necessary divine truths precede the creation. The defense of metaphysics as *scientia transcendens* once again took up the Simplicius’s interpretation of *Categories*, but in a different manner than Gandavus did. The reference to Simplicius’s “*esse in*” instead of Henry’s version of “*esse ad*” shows the sophisticated construction of the new metaphysics. The vestiginal trace of divine rationality must be given at the level of creation as the objective image of this rationality, like Avicenna’s pure essence (*hoc esse tantum*); otherwise it would not have founded modern metaphysics. Scotus returns to Simplicius as the forefather of modernists and raises the accidental category of relationship to a substantial level (*aliqui respectus sunt essentiales sive substantiales*). The form of habitus worked out by Gandavus in the mode “*esse in*” must remain, but the habitus acquires a new metaphysical mantle made according to Rufus’s twofold division of potentialities. Simplicius abolished the original meaning of the predication in *Categories* by placing the pure being as the highest genus (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). Scotus needs this transformation in order to establish objective metaphysics. In the new insight of the being, the accidental definitions of substance carry the univocal meaning of Simplicius’s quasi-substance. The relationship acquired a hypostatized character in Rufus’s mode “*potentia substantialis*.” The reference to Simplikios removed the last trace of that obscurity which Averroes had rejected in the metaphysics of his predecessors (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1). Scotus separated himself from classical metaphysics in a fundamental, i.e., substantial way (*de substantiali*). Averroes holds the primacy of the first substance, which is stated in the mode of categorical predication given exclusively for the second substance. Scotus is content with ensuring the minimum of objective beingness in creation (*esse in*). This kind of hypostatic beingness is given by a universal deductive type of rationality based on an objective definition of “*esse ratum*.” Neoplatonic metaphysics was transformed into a transcendental version of Aristotelianism. Instead of the Neoplatonic system of hypostases, a transcendental version of caterorically expressed rationality has emerged, in which the generic meaning of being is established outside the theory of categories. Scotus, like Aquinas, needs a fictitious unity of being according to Avicenna (*ens inquantum ens*). Otherwise, the deduction of divine rationality on the three levels (*exemplar, vestigium, imago*) will not work. Based on the objective analogy of divine and human rationality, the new metaphysics eliminated the first substance as the basic principle of Averroes’s metaphysics and allowed the being of the third to act in the new form of objectivity. The distortion of Averroes’s metaphysics provided the last important argument that generated the historical event (*Ereignis*) of the epochal donation of objectivity made in Avicenna’s metaphysics that was bound to ancient Neoplatonism. Hermeneutics found the last transformation of objectivity: the darkness on the plane of *alētheia* turned into a completely objective *veritas*. This type of modern truth makes the donation of being by *dativus obiectivus* as a divine and objective *rectitudo*. The enlightened subject appropriates this kind of divine truth through the human truth as a *certitudo*. That kind of secondary objective truth is established by humanly possible *dativus possessivus* of divine objectivity. This double face of truth supported by two modern subjects (one finite, the other infinite) established a new form of dativus auctoris which established a new vision of the world. Since this subject has become the capitalist demiurge, it acts by dativus modi of the new imperialism which replaced the crusades of the Latin West. The deduction of objectivity in the mode of analytical *veritas* from modern God into the creation has shown the manner “how” the new form of metaphysics of *Modernorum* had solved or annulled the disputes of the previous generation (*dativus incommodi*). The hermeneutic triad of objectivity (historiality, historicity, history) is thus completed.

The break with classical metaphysics enabled the last important correction of Gandavus’s philosophy, which was made in the mode “*relatio—habitudo*.” God has an intentional relation to creation, which is given as a hypostasis in the mode “*esse ad*” (ch. 5.2.1). This hypostasis is realized in creation as habitus. The hypostatized habitus acts within the framework of a divine intentional causality (*causa individuationis*) and establishes a minimal existence of the objective being (*res a ratitudine*). This being determined by the relation “*relatio—habitudo*” establishes the objectively conceived “thing” (*res*) as a being of the third kind (*res a reor reris*). Scotus must determine the objectively first given substance in a different way. According to Scotus, the habitual character defines only the accidental property of the second substance and not the ontological determination of being. In addition, it is not possible to predict accidents as being of the third kind with regard to the divine essence, because this would result in a Neoplatonic emanation of the divine essence into creation. Scotus’s correction of Gandavus’s term “*res a ratitudine*” can be found in the term “*aliquitas*.” It confirms the nihilism of the new metaphysics, since it is based on Olivi’s determination of being as “*non repugnat esse*” (ch. 5.1.2). The formal definition of being as “anything” (*aliquitas*) is given as a formal nomination (*quid nominis*). Every concept can be conceived by the fact that it is something different from non-being. Gandavus’s definition of the chimera (*conceptus vanus, fictitius*) must receive an objective character. Metaphysics can be based solely on the objective at conceptual “*ens ratum*” that is, on the individually defined objectivity separated but from the non-being. Then comes the important difference, which is given by the already achieved rectification of being as an objective *ens ratum*. Scotus explicitly rejected Gandavus’s conception of ontotheology and established an objective metaphysics. The correction of Aristotle in favor of Avicenna has shown that Simplicius’s term of the relation as a hypostasis does not connect to the divine essence, as in Gandavus, but to the divine rationality. Avicenna’s essence as a pure objective substance arises only on the second floor (*vestigium*), and not in the primary sphere of the divine essence and exemplary rationality. Then Gandavus’s approach already applies, because the heretical comitation of *tertium ens* disappears and the pure deduction of the objective essence begins. The first formal doctrine must be made *absolute*, i.e., in the original form of the minimal meaning, which is separated from all other determinations. The argumentation repeats the previous scheme in the work *Lectura I*, which is given as a separation from the categorical predication (*resolutio in quid*) on the basis of the first deduced and considered objectivity (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*, ch. 5.3.2). The first meaning of being as “something” is given metaphysically at the level of autonomous *esse*, which is defined as an objective “substance—essence.” Avicenna’s definition of what is, univocally combines logic with metaphysics and therefore allows the use of logical proofs in the mode *reductio ad absurdum*. If being operated as “anything-ness” (*aliquitas*) in the mode of the highest genus, the definition would have to explore all the subdivisions of the composition of the “man who laughs” (*homo inquantum risibilis*). According to Scotus, the Porretan division into a *species specialissima* is nonsense, since the real person who laughs exists as an Aristotelian first and second substance, which is equipped with this accident. This composite determination of substance makes the last stage of the metaphysical insight into the being as being. It is fundamentally separated from non-being thanks to the minimal conceptual identity (*conceptus entis rati*). The minimal being of man, given as a metaphysical determination *ens ratum*, differs from the *aliquitas* of the chimera. Their being can be defined by the resolution into genera and species; but in reality, nothing corresponds to its purpose, because it is only a nominal definition (*quid nominis*). On the basis of the purely formal determination of being as a difference from nothingness (*non repugnat esse*), the twofold determination of objective identity is born: the substantiated one in real terms and the merely fictitious one. The chimera has no assured existence, because its identity is purely nominal. For this, the humanitas belongs in the objective determination of *ens ratum*, because its meaning is given in every person. The objective humanism of modernity, which is based on the formal principle of non-contradiction, looks like this.

“If we understand the secure being in the second way, then it is true that the real person taken for himself is a secure being (*homo est ex se ens ratum*), because he does not contradict being in a formal way (*formaliter ex se non repugnat sibi esse*). What contradicts each other also contradicts each other from the point of view of the formal definition, and what does not contradict each other is given in accordance with this definition. If man, taken in and of himself, contradicts the objectively determined being (*si homini de se repugnaret esse*), then this contradiction could not be eliminated by any argument coming from outside.” [[459]](#footnote-459)

In the case of empirical cognition, Scotus starts from the Aristotelian position, where the first substance has the actuality in reality (*homo est ex se ens ratum*). But the objective determination of man has a minimal form of being given by the exclusion of another possibility (*formaliter ex se non repugnat sibi esse*). This point makes the fundamental difference from the first Averroism; the cognition is determined by actual first substances recognized by senses, and then by *intellectus possibilis*. Scotus abolished the determination of cognition based on the metaphysical dative, since modernity directly accepts the parousia of meaning given in enlightened thinking. Modern *illuminati* do not need the reality of the first substance for certain cognition; they prefer the logical negation instead of it (*non repugnat sibi esse*). Nothingness forms the basic mode to make the imposition of being. Scotus confirmed the epoch of metaphysical nihilism in its objective form. In contrast to Parmenides, who follows the orbit of the real Sun, it is true in modern times that the formal determination of the minimal form of *ens* at the last level of *resolutio* consists solely and exclusively on the pure difference from non-being. The objective ratification of man as an essential, ex se given corpse contains in itself the basic model of Oxfordian Fallacy, which was first launched in Rufus’s interpretation of *Second Analytics* (*secundum-quod-ipsum-est*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). Scotus again aligns himself with Rufus’s tragic thesis, which substantiates the thinking of modernity (*ubi est subiectum, non ostenditur, sed supponitur*, ibid). The first Averroism asserts that the corpse is not a human being, because the imposition called “*secundum quid*” does not come from the real living first substance. The second Averroism asserts in Scotus’s version that the corpse is objectively a human being. Taken in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*,” it contains the definition of human being that is logically correct and based on the Avicennist essence. According to Scotus, the corpse is not a human being if we proceed through the Aristotelian system of imposition from the reality of the first substance. However, if the rational judgment represents the trace of divine rationality in creation, then, objectively speaking, the corpse is a human being, even if no human being had ever lived. The objective recognition of the Sun is also possible thanks to the divine causality that objectively guides our cognition, even if no Sun existed (ch. 5.3.2). Scotus created a difference between the real man and the objective “man—corpse” by deducing the meaning taken from the divine rationality into the creation. This nihilistic and logically flawless solution established a new metaphysics set outside the reality of the first substance. The objective basic definition of the ratified *ens* comes from the logical difference between the “something” and the nullity. Thanks to Gandavus’s double negation (*duplex negatio*, ch. 5.2.1) the objective supposition of meaning does not need the imposition from reality. Gandavus anchored the *ens ratum* of created things in modern God, because its *ratitudo* is given in the habitus of every being determined as a relational being (*esse ad*). As a result, Gandavus created a predication of divine essentiality in the categoric form of “substance—accident,” also with regard to the divine hypostatized habitus and reflected relation. Both attributes are essentially given directly in the divine being.

Scotus rejects any substantial determination of objectivity in God, because the divine being would lose its actualized simplicity.[[460]](#footnote-460) The treatise on the objectivity of God in creation must first define the new objective objectivity (*ratitudo*) in the secondary sphere of divine rationality (*vestigium*). This new form of objectivity must be separated from any categorical defined relation to the Divine essence and the intellect. Gandavus’s *univoce* taken term “*esse ad*” is an impossible being due to the direct attachment of created things to the divine essence. The quoted writing *Ordinatio I* extends the criticism of Henry of Ghent already given in *Lectura I* that now deals with terms of an objectively determined relation (*Vat*. VI, no. 15–19, pp. 250–251). Scotus asserts that there is no “*esse ad*” in the divine essence in the sense of the intentional object, which is *per se* given by some ratio given directly in the divine essence. God would passively recognize this through the essentially given relation to himself, i.e., he would passively accept himself as a recognized essence. Scotus separated the rationality from the divine essence by the fact that the conclusion is established in the form of the objective essence. The conclusion of the divine rationality is therefore separated from the divine essence (*essentia praecise*). The rationality is determined but indirectly by the essential infinite being that is unknowable to us. In the deductive judgment that put the essence as a rational conclusion, the divine essence as such is no longer present, but the resulting, syllogistically given divine rationality. The objective deduction necessarily defines the object of thought, and therefore that object has a essential character of *ens ratum*. The new form of *aliquitas* is limited primarily by the fact that it differs from other contents (*determinatione repugnante indeterminationi ad contradictoria*). There is a double negation, both of the divine essence and of other objective conclusions made by the divine deduction. The double form of nihilism creates an objective identity of being as “something” in the mode *ex nihilo*. At the same time, this exemplary objectivity given in the mode of minimal being is separated from the real created being (*precise*). The rule “*non repugnat esse*” made with regard to divine thinking, means the bare fact that the ratio of one deductive intuitive divine insight is objectively different from another ratio. The principle of the excluded third applies in the sphere of divine thinking because one object of thinking is different from the other and there is no third possibility, because otherwise divine thinking would have no identity. Scotus created a new logical and objective form of Porphyry′s *individuum* (OBJ I, ch. 1.3) that he inserted between Simplicius’s “substance—essence” as a hypostatic *tertium ens* and the Aristotelian second substance. The new form of *dativus incommodi* now directly involves the school of second Averroism in Oxford. The objective terms of Rufus (*scibile, concretum, species obiecti existentis*) elaborated as modern hypostases in the paradigm of universal hylemorphism ceased to be valid statements of the new objective predication. Scotus became the founder of absolute logic long before Hegel, because with it he replaced Gandavus’s absolute psychology of Avicennian Augustinism. The identity of divine intentionality and rationality differ from the rest of creation on the logical basis. God keeps *ens ratum* as a full *positum* given in an infinite mode because it forms the necessary conclusion of his rationality. The modernist has this *ens ratum* given in a limited negative mode because he logically separates it from another term given *ex nihilo*. The minimal content of being for the objective entity called “*homo*” is established due to the fact that it is not a chimera. Scotus must dispute Gandavus’s determination of being as a habitus given by participation in the divine essence. The basis of objective reality in God is the pure difference from non-being, which is given only in the rational sphere of creation (*vestigium*) and our objective cognition of this rationality (*imago*). The definition of a new being created out of nothing is completely given in the mode *per se*.

Modern nihilism was directly integrated into the realm of divine rationality. Thus the death of modern God was established as an inescapable human *factum* in accordance with the *dativus incommodi* created by the objectively formed Furies. The double negation as a new metaphysical *positum* created a new categorial substrate (*subiectum*), which became the basis for the predication of objective accidents. Simplicius was the original author of the categorial schema that involved this pseudo-substance. The resulting form of objective being in the creation returns to Avicennian determination of being beyond the categories (ch. 5.3.1). The certainty of being proceeds in the metaphysical statements according to categorial predication (*resolutio in quid*). It now includes the possibility of predication of the relation and other accidents.

“The stone as a stone participates in its being in such a way that as a stone it possesses a firmly given being in reality (*positus in entitate rata*). Then, of necessity and from the point of view of this second way of being (*per se secundo modo*), the relation to oneself is also objectively laid out in it (*habet respectum participationis*). Without this relation, its being would contain a contradiction in itself; such as a subject without properties or a determination of the relation without elements, because the relation is determined on the basis of both members.” [[461]](#footnote-461)

The quotation distinguishes two modes of identity. The real entity is primary and given in itself (*positus in entitate rata*). Primarily, there is the act of real being of first substances. As a result, metaphysics returned to the conception of *ens ratum* according to the first Averroism that exists only as the actualized first substance. But on the objective level, given as a positive predication, the objective form of self-reference arises (*participat ipsum esse*). As a result, the objective predication of the created being given in its real or possible being (*positum*). In the guise of the school *sophistae Latini*, Scotus doubled the relation of the completely fictitious existence to itself in order to create *ex nihilo* a new form of *tertium ens*. It should be noted that Porphyry used the same procedure to create the first doubling of Being in the One (διττὸν τὸ εἶναι, OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1). From the point of view of Aristotelianism, this is utter nonsense. No imposition can be produced in Simplicius′s mode of pure hypostasis (*esse in*). It lacks the *ens ratum*, which is given by the imposition from the hyparchical first substance. However, Scotus established his own form of *ens ratum*, which is given in the intellect. He devised a new definition in the mode “*esse ad*,” whereby the objective definition in the mode of logical identity (A=A) established a hypostatic relation according to the Neoplatonic model of redoubled being. He then sophistically placed the objective effects of substances in demonstrative syllogism, because he maintained the objectively conceived and therefore non-existent causality in the middle link of the proof. Since objective causality “acts” on non-existent substances given as *tertium ens*, everything is logically in order. The new “positive predication” thus acquires an objective categorical character that Gandavus did not have. The argumentation points out that this objective self-reference has only a secondary character (*secundo modo habet respectum participationis*). Scotus stands out from pure nullity and once again helps himself with the logic “*reductio ad absurdum*.” Identity is created by the fact that the being has a positive relation to itself on the logical level, because it cannot be anything else from the point of view of minimal being (*posito termino illius relationis*). Without this objective fact, it would not be considered as such, which could constitute a contradiction from the point of view of divine and human rationality (*sine qua ipsum 'esse' includit contradictionem*). Aristotelianism considers this self-reference of the eidetic “thing itself” to be nonsense, because it is given only in thought and not in reality. Such kind of objective relation is a pure mythology, since it presupposes an anthropological point of view in relation to modern (and therefore non existing) God. The doubled being according to Plato′s dialogue *Sophistes* ultimately cannot do without a doubled God that makes a necessary *speculum* to speculative metaphysics as a fata morgana of reality. Taken in the perspective of classic metaphysics, such mythological entity made by redoubling cannot be inserted in the demonstrative proof according to the axiom “*ex inmediatis*”. Metaphysics cannot be based on a chimera, as is the case with logical supposition. Such an identity of a suppositional being is a metaphysical *contradictio in adiecto* and produces a logical philosophical fairy tale, as was the case with Gandavu's metaphysics of chimera. Moreover, from a theological standpoint is such an identity useless, since God is the supreme Creator and not an academic modern thinker. The projection of being from the thinking of *illuminati* into reality in the mode of predication “*in artificialibus*” cannot establish a metaphysics that explores the unity of real substances. For the establishment of a new metaphysics, the key determination of objectivity as an absolutely pure identity differs only from non-being. This minimal meaning originally given only logically now includes a categorical predication based on Scotus’s nihilistic version of Oxfordian Fallacy. The objective identity of being created ex nihilo established the first objective version of *metaphysica generalis*. Scotus cites as an example Avicenna’s “*equinitas est tantum equinitas*” (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.2). The quoted quotation from Avicenna’s objective “equine nature” presented *ens ratum* in its objective and positive occurrence in the creation (*Vat*. III, no. 324, p. 195.10‒14). Scotus found the first carrier of metaphysical meaning (*subiectum*) that concerns the being as being. The nihilistic subject, defined only by the difference from non-being, replaced the Aristotelian second substance. The first Averroism, like Ockham later, would argue that such a “subject” cannot be derived from real first substances by the imposition of meaning. Logical supposition applies to absolutely everything possible, because logic is not metaphysics.

Scotus placed himself on the divine level and proposed a new metaphysical position for the real stone. This *positum* of objective being taken from the divine will into creation was solved in the writing *Lectura I*; let us see the previous chapter. The later work *Ordinatio I* brought about a metaphysical equivalent of this exemplary objectivity in the mode of the finite objectivity in the creation (*vestigium*). In the new form of predication made beyond the classical categories, this minimal subject plays the role of a substance of the third kind separate from all other determinations of being. The new *metaphysica transcendens* had to determine the objective reality of this substance in a modernized Aristotelian manner, because Scotus was not a Platonist. A pure logic cannot establish the metaphysics, because logical abstraction has no determination of being taken from reality, as in the case of the metaphysical essential determination of *ens inquantum ens* (ch. 5.3.1). The new metaphysics transcends classic Aristotelian categories, the metaphysical dative and the reality of first substances. Therefore, Scotus must accomplish a twofold type of ratification of being: first in God and then in reality. This twofold ratification of being constitutes the meaning of the being as an objective “something” (*aliquitas*). Scotus found a full answer to Gandavus’s ontotheological deduction in the triple mode of the *deus creativus, creaturus et creans* (ch. 5.2.3). Carried out in its fullness in Paris, the deduction as a new kind of metaphysical *resolutio* methodically encompasses the previous forms of being and thus formed a unified system of new metaphysics. The synthesis of complete objectivity taken from the direction of God looks as follows.

“The first in the series is a being, which is the Being as such, that is, God. In the second instance, the stone is given as a certain being in its separateness (*ens ratum, absolutum*), which is not intended for anything else and it cannot refer to anything. Thirdly, the relation is given with regard to something existing (*respectus quidam*), which in this case establishes the identity of the real stone.” [[462]](#footnote-462)

The first step outside the existence of God sets forth the exemplary objectivity in God, where the primary nature of the thing lies (*in primo instanti naturae*) and is given in the mode of infinite, necessary and eternal identity. In this separated sphere of the divine infinity, the essence of the thing is founded in an absolute way, which, however, is unknowable to us in the being of the divine ipseity (*est ens quod est ipsum esse*). The being is objective in the divine sphere of deductive rationality in an absolute way. There is a minimal degree of being and a pure specific identity that separates it from any other objective identity. Since the rational being of the stone forms the conclusion of the deductive reasoning, this objective “exsistence” is not a Neoplatonic emanation of the subsistent divine essence. The concept of absolutely given objectivity arises at this level that is given in the rational sphere of necessity separated both from the divine essence and from creation. The second step comprises the previous deduction of the new type of objectively certain being, which in the form of the objective “*exsistere*” spills over from the first divine sphere into the second sphere of creation (*in secundo est lapis ens ratum, absolutum*). The objectivity of the stone is already stated beyond divine rationality, which corresponds formally (but not metaphysically) to the definition of the exemplar of Bonaventure and Gandavus. That form of objectivity follows the rational necessity given by the deduction of eternal truths into creation (*respectus quidam*), by the participation of the stone in the above-mentioned mode “*per consequens*.” This objectivity already has a positive character, because it is related primarily to oneself, and not to divine rationality. The being positions itself as a finite entity and created *positum*; in virtue of such a positive being, it keeps an self-reference to its own objective identity. The exemplar from the second level of the objective emanation becomes a truly given and thus positive necessity in the order of divine cognition, which is bound to the real existence of the stone (*consequens ad ipsum lapidem*). The quotation provides a threefold objectivity, which determines the totality of the thing: its absolutely given being in God (*exemplar*) ; the objectively given existence in his syllogistic thinking (*vestigium*); the relatively participatory existence as objectively necessary being that we recognize in thinking through the *positum* of the real thing (*imago*). These three types of substantiation of the objective *ens ratum* (exemplary, vestiginal, positive) form a univocal whole of metaphysical deduction. Scotus outlined the manner of “how” (let us see the hermeneutic *Wie*) the original objectivity of God (and not in God) comes in the creation. As a result, divine thinking is manifested in the creation that is conceived as a speculative image of divine objective rationality. Through this enumeration and through the interdependence of the above-mentioned trinitarian sense of being (*exemplar, vestigium, imago*), a new metaphysics of the West was founded. The original form of this objectivity asserted Al-Fárábi as the first Aristotelian of Falsafa against the Neoplatonist Al-Kindi. Scotus’s immediate predecessor is the Christian Trinitarian philosopher Ibn Adi, who was the first speculative Aristotelian of Baghdad University (OBJ I, ch. 2.2). The writing *Ordinatio I* completed the project of the first philosophy. Scotus established a new metaphysics of *Modernorum* due to changed statute of the objectively established substance.

The last part of *Ordinatio I* is devoted to the human recognition of the objectivity given in our intellect, which makes the main subject of the treatise *De imagine*. Scotus designs a new theory of cognition, which takes the objective properties of purely formal and potential divine scibile. He puts it into the scheme of cognition according to the first Averroism given as a *tabula rasa*. From the second Averroism, Scotus takes the model of direct observation through Avicennist denudation. The combination of two schools creates a new form of objective vision. The soul recognizes the objective image directly and without any phantasms, because it is given in the mode of intentional being as a potential universal thing. The previous deduction of objectivity in the mode of direct universal causality put in the soul as *tabula rasa* indicates a new way of knowing the general things (ch. 5.3.1). The following quotation sets out the scheme of objective cognition through the syncretism of the first and second Averroism.

“From this it becomes clear that the intellect can recognize the universals, and then following proposition applies: ‘The intellect can grasp the recognized object in the act of universal cognition; this act makes by itself the definition of the recognized object (*in ratione obiecti*) and earlier than the recognition of the real thing.’ As a result, the intellect becomes aware of itself (*per se sibi praesens*), because it recognizes something else earlier than itself. It follows from this that for the intellect the object of cognition lies first of all in the intelligible species. Therefore, in the act of cognition, he first disposes of the cognition of this species.” [[463]](#footnote-463)

Scotus classifies the objective being as a kind of *species intelligibilis* according to the first Averroism. Then he has no problem taking the cognition by exposing the sense of being from the front, while using the complete Avicennist exposure of being from the back. Then it is clear that he must exclude the actualization of this knowledge from the senses alone; otherwise, he would have to let only Aristotelian abstraction operate in the scheme of objective knowledg, and not Avicennist denudation. From the first Averroism Scotus left the fact that we recognize objectivity from intelligible species, which are not given in reality, but only as an intentional object in thinking. The objective species given in the mode of objective positivity broke away from the scheme of the second Averroism taht rejected the basic structure of cognition according to *De anima*. Scotus’s intellect is primarily passive and must therefore be updated from the actualized objective species, which comes into cognition through deduction from the outside. This objective species does not come from first substances, as in the first Averroism, because with the intellect we primarily consider the divine rationality given in creation (*vestigium*). The actuality of *imago* goes from the first real substance to the divine rationality, which is the objective cause for the essential insight of the created being. Scotus excluded sensual cognition from objectivity, which for the first Averroism makes the basic source of actualization for the correspondence of things, senses and intellect. Modernity primarily does not need actuality taken out of reality, because the objective species is a universal and originally given in divine thought. Human intellect acts objectively and causally through the necessarily given divine rationality that is present in the creation. The previous parts have clearly shown that the recognition of the pure, *simpliciter* given species proceeds on the objective level of primary determination that lies outside the phantasms. Let us see the scheme of previous chapters in the categorical mode of “*resolutio in quid*,” which is determined by the insight of “*conceptus simpliciter simplex*.”

From the above-mentioned position of God as the primary cause of cognition, it becomes clear that Scotus takes the universal species to be an *imago* that is present from the very beginning in the act of cognition in the mode of objectively given actuality. Otherwise it would not be possible to determine any being in the mode of ratified reality (*ens ratum*). The term “*receptio intellectionis*” shows the primary role of *intellectus agens* right at the beginning of cognition (*Vat*. III, no. 386, p. 234). The consideration of the primary species as pure objectivity is not dependent on *intellectus possibilis*, which is formally bound to the senses by abstraction. Empirical cognition in the mode of Grosseteste′s *scientia* is not wrong, but it is not necessary for objective speculation. Scotus repeats the thesis of the Semiaverroists, as Aegidius Romanus was one, about the separate singular sensual cognition, which cannot produce common universal species.[[464]](#footnote-464) The sensual species have only a secondary status for cognition, because they are given from the abstraction determined solely by the contingent existence of things (*praesentia reali*). The voluntarist Scotus takes cognition from the species sensibilis as a lower form of cognition because the sensual reception does not depend on the will. Scotus, moreover, takes the function of Augustinian *memoria* entirely in the spirit of the second Averroism. Therefore, he tends to the reception of species from the intellectual memory, which for him makes the basic source of the habitually given identity. For this sphere of objectivity, the treatise *De imagine* confirms Augustinian *memoria* as a *locus specierum*, where the objectively given and the subjectively recognized reality are combined. The field of the revelation of the meaning of being is enlightened from within, and *intellectus possibilis* directly accepts the objectively actualized intellectual species that cause the movement of cognition (*est motus rei ad animam*).[[465]](#footnote-465) Memory, in the form of the actualized *locus specierum*, partially replaced Aristotle’s receptive intellect. John Locke later extended this role of memory to human identity and created the Western definition of the legal subject and identity for the modern *individuum* (ch. 4.4.3). Aristotelian cognition as a *tabula rasa* consists of abstraction from phantasms. Scotus must distinguish this method from objective cognition, which uses the Augustinian form of memoria and the reception of objective species. This Avicenist kind of cognition given by denudation is based on the above-mentioned forms of deduction. The objectively given essence (*obiectum*) is invested in memory and equipped by the form of intellectual reception (*species impressa*) and possesses the substantial being given as the conclusion of divine syllogistic reasoning. We consider and grasp the objective species directly, because they form the essence of intellectual cognition in the sense of syllogistic conclusions. With regard to us, divine rationality is manifested in *vestigium* as an objective substance. The above quote says that the thing (*res*) starts cognition in the intellect (*motus rei ad animam*). Under the expression “*res*,” Scotus comprehends the objective being of the thing given in the above-mentioned trinitarian structure of objectivity (*aliquitas*).

The second version of the metaphysical deduction, this time given from the side of the cognitive subject, is given in the next part of *Ordinatio I*. Let us summarize the part that elaborates the new form of metaphysics from the perspective of *De imagine*. The commentary concerns the key passage of *Ordinatio I* (*Vat*. VI, p. 258.4–15). The first element of the deduction is the recognition of the essence as the absolute identity of the stone, which is exemplarily given with regard to the divine essence (*sub ratione mere absoluta*). This level is given by the intimacy and the absolute exclusion of the divine *actus essendi*. The second recognition of objectivity takes place through the divine intellect, which goes to the stone to the intentional object and whose terminus lies in the divine intellect (*intellectio divina terminat relationem 'lapidem ut intellecti' ad ipsam*). As a result, the relations of metaphysical truthfulness and objective logical necessity arose that are related to exemplary rationality. Its original act is given in the infinite separated mode of the divine essence. This level is given by intimacy and by the absolute exclusion of the exemplary *actus cognoscendi*, which is given in the form of the intuitive divine insight into one’s own intellect. In the third step, God compares these intentional contents with each other. As a result of the comparison of infinite substances given in the reasoning, an objective (and by no means real) relation creates a demiurgic exemplar of pure rationality (*ad lapidem intellectum, potest causare in se relationem rationis*). Thus, in the sphere of the divine intellect, the basic logic is compiled, which establishes the syllogistic relations. Only the secondary form of the original exemplary divine rationality radiates into the world. Therefore, the rationality of creation in the form of the objective *vestigium* is completely separated from the divine essence. The fourth stage of purely objectively given divine cognition reflects these objective and primary causal relationships at the level of the *vestigium* as the object of its cognition (*potest quasi reflecti super istam relationem causatam*). The reflection of God of his own rationality in creation is important because it makes the resumption of this rationality back into the divine essence. This rationality is simultaneously given in the objective mode of *vestigium*. But due to self-reflection, God has permanent mental control over the rationality given on the second floor. There, on the second floor, rationality left the divine intellect. This second level of objectivity corresponds to Gandavus’s determination of “*esse ad*.” However, the divine self-reflexive cognition in Scotus′s metaphysics proceeds only in the intimacy of the divine essence. The resulting divine reflection logically includes the preceding sphere of the divine vestiginal rationality, which is given *ad extra*, in direction of the creation. We find this step of self-reflection in Descartes that created an evident sphere of self-knowledge in the act of *cogito*. The *cogito* replaced the second divine floor of self-reflection in creation. In Descartes, man alone controls the correct course of the transfer of the objective being from God to himself and into creation. Scotus yet needed modern God for absolutely necessary reasons, which is why he created this philosophical concept.

As a result, God of Scotists makes the complete construction of reality on an exemplary-objective level. Deduction at the level of *imago* separated the following levels in God: the absolutely existing essence (*essentia Dei*); the rational objective exemplarity (*exemplar*); their radiated truth and necessity (*relatio, ens obiective*); the potential causal creative relationship (*relatio, mensura, ratio*); the reflexivity of his objectively given work (*factibile, ponibile,* the objective *ens ratum*); the volitive efficient causal relationship of the Creator (*creatio,* the real *ens ratum*). If, in the opposite direction, we carry out a transcendental deduction of objectivity from the direction of creation towards God, then cognition begins with sensual things and passes through Aristotelian abstraction. But the empirical cognition of the world is not important for Scotus. The objective form of things offers itself to us in direct insight, which provides obvious truth and certainty. The recognition of the surface, for example, is given in the cited part of the treatise *De imagine* in a very modern way, like the intelligible species in the intellect itself, because it proceeds primarily from the intellect (*Vat*. III, no. 398–99, pp. 242–44). Only in the second step is the sensually perceived white color detected on the surface. The objective accident has had the effect that the surface, as an object of cognition, is primarily given directly in the intellect and not in the senses. The postmodern Husserl takes this conception of the objective *scibile* as the basis of eidetic reduction. He offers a similar example of the universal reality of whiteness.[[466]](#footnote-466) After all, the mind combines the sensual and the objectively given species into a single whole. The result is the composite recognition of universally given species. But in the mode *per prius*, this recognition is objective and not empirical. See the previous chapter regarding the difference of recognition in the mode “*confusum—confuse*” (ch. 5.3.2). The treatise *De imagine* did not have to carry out a revolution in the question of cognition. The exposure of the intellect from behind was given in the preceding two treatises (*De cognoscibilitate Dei, De vestigio*). Objectivity is revealed primarily in the mode of exposure from behind; the objective and actual species is recognized in the mode of the first Averroism thanks to the receptive character of the intellect. The trinitarian determination of the being is given in the mode *per prius*, and we recognize it in the mode *per posterius* by Aristotelian abstraction, which begins at the level of empirically recognized first substances. But the modern *illuminati* as Scotus, Descartes and Husserl know that objectively present rationality in the world is directly visible to some chosen thinkers. The rest of the less enlightened humanity uses only *intellectus debilis* of Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). Consequently, these people endowed with a “debile” intellect willingly accept the objectively necessary conclusions of modern *illuminati*. Their “gay science” is directed by objectively non-existent Furies. In short, this is the tragicomedy of objectivity making a theater of ancient Gnosticism once again. Today we receive this objective doctrine in the mode of Hegel’s historical necessity, in which the *vestigium* of the absolute Spirit is provided by new *illuminati*. Their objective *religio* forms the last link with the rationality of now dead modern God. It is therefore no wonder that the frenetic activity of contemporary *intelligentia spiritualis* keeps alive the global image of this simulacrum through academic ideologies, media lies and financial manipulations. The academic and cultural hegemony of the first objective *illuminati* as were Olivi and Scotus has been transformed into the instrumental rationality of today’s nihilistic epoch.

### 5.4.4 Death of Modern God and Fate of Postmodernism

Scotus introduced the cultural and academic hegemony of modernity by creating a mystical view of objective rationality given outside the real world that was accepted as a kind of metaphysics. Each level of objectivity has its own constitution and thus its own way of knowing God or man. The objective being was created thanks to the intentionality of the divine intellect (relatio determinans), which produces an essential content (*ratio entis*), which is determined only by objectively given being as a minimal concept of being (*ens deminutum*). The exemplar has only one potential and objective *haecceitas* of the thing, in contrast to the divine creative idea. The demiurgic idea is given in the real creative will, which already produces the actually created thing. The objective being (*ens potentiale*) differs with regard to the creative and effective being of God, because there is no causal relationship (*relatio actualis*) at the level of the objectively determined being. As a recognizable substance, the stone has only a potential being at the level of the pure being and therefore does not exist as the real stone. Then it is true that the objectively ratified being (*ens ratum*) “exsists” only with regard to the exemplary cause and cannot be given in the system of effective creative causality. An example, according to Scotus, can be the statue of Caesar, which also represents him beyond of his real existence, that is, even after his assassination. No one is saying that this is the diminished being of Caesar. Therefore, the Scotist′s “*esse diminutum*” represents a different way of representing the thing in God’s thinking, which has a purely objective character. The minimal objective being is formally taken only in the mode “*secundum quid simpliciter*.” [[467]](#footnote-467) In this determination the core of objectivity is given, because this being is a pure object made by the divine intellect. By the logical exclusion of the third, this minimal being is only separated from the nullity and thus sufficiently differentiated from another being. But the minimal being, defined as a substance, ensured that Scotus rejected an analogy given in the framework of mathematical abstraction and Euclidean geometry. The metaphysical predication “*ad unum*” is taken strictly as categorical statements, but not as Aristotle’s categories, because Avicenna’s essence serves as the basis of the predication (ch. 5.3.1). Scotus predicts objectivity in the mode *per prius* in relation to God and *per posterius* in relation to the creation.

The deduction of objectivity from God into creation as conceived by the following treatises *De vestigio* and *De imagine*. The trace (*vestigium*) of divine intellect in creation is shown by the eternal objectively given divine truths that come out in the world by taking the form of objectively deduced *ens ratum*. Natural human intellect considers the trace of divine objective rationality through the deduction of new metaphysics. What the infinite divine intellect produces through the deductive form of reasoning (*vestigium*), the finite intellect assumes in the same type of deduction (*imago*). Our thinking recognizes divine rationality in the formally identical mode of infinitely and finitely given objective and metaphysical necessity. The rationality of scientific proof ensures the objective correspondence between divine and human rationality, which is separated by the different habitus of infinite and finite thinking. The production of objectivity in the mode of formal causality (*quo est*) abolished the world of *tertium ens* and established a positive definition of being in the mode “*quod est*.” Avicenna’s “*humanitas tantum*” received the final and formal causality and the necessary minimal beingness. Scotus worked Bonaventura’s two rules (*regula agentis in/creati*) in the system of Aristotelian categories. The new form of twofold deduction (Bonaventura’s *resolutio semi/plena*) formed a uniform and strictly deductive structure of metaphysics. This form of rationality continues to have an effect today through *Wirkungsgeschichte* of various versions of objectivity. The derivation of objectivity from the non-existent God of *Modernorum* is logically flawless and completely paranoid. For the advocates of the first Averroism, a similar beginning of metaphysics was proof of the insane state of mind in the school of *sophistae Latini*. Scotus is the first Hegelian because he produced the first objective version of absolute logic based on the insight into the nature of divine thought. Under the leadership of objective Furies, the vision of Oxford *illuminati* as Grosseteste (*immutabilitas praesentialis in mente et scientia divina*; OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2) died out in a new form of *dativus incommodi*. The necessity given in creation as a rational conclusion in the mode of divine *rectitudo* became certain in the spirit of illuminati according to Avicenna’s *certitudo*. According to a logically flawless deduction, the *illuminatus* “sees” the objectivity in creation. After that mythological combination of two kinds of certainty by means of pure essentialist deduction, the odyssey of Oxfordian Fallacy is complete. Scotus is the first modern scholastic, because he created an objective God as an undoubted rational basis of new metaphysics. Scotus’s objective form of theoretical contemplation that joined modern God (let us see *scholē* of Plato and Aristotle) established objective rationality and constituted the second beginning of metaphysics in the Latin West. God became a modern scholastic, and the modern scholastic undoubtedly recognized him as well.

Hermeneutics must find the definitive answer to the following question: How does the objective being become a universal mathematical measure of all that exists (*dativus mensurae*)? The new metaphysics integrates the function of infinite divine rationality (*vestigium*) into the finite world, which is limited by the emergence and decline of being (*imago*). The metaphysician progresses deductively from creation to the objective God and vice versa. Objective metaphysics produces a kind of *tertium ens*, representing an objective imago of divine rationality (*vestigium*). The modern subject takes up the divine rule and transforms it into the objective fact that corresponds to it (*concretum*). The metaphysician knows the formal rationality of the divine rule at all times; through this rationality, he derives the facts objectively and contingently given in creation. The metaphysical derivation given by the innovative form of Neoplatonic catabasis is directed from modern God to modern man (*vestigum→imago*). It is completed by an objective integration that goes from modern man to modern God (*imago→vestigium*). The process of metaphysical derivation of objectivity goes from God to man; the process of metaphysical integration of objectivity goes from man to God. The concept of the mathematical function is defined as “*regula agentis increati*” with respect to point X. The metaphysician performs a mathematical derivation of divine rationality at the point X. He knows the formal rationality of the divine rule at any point in time and then derives objectively given contingent facts based on the formal rationality of the divine rule. Scotus’s term “*conceptus simpliciter simplex*” makes the tangent, or point of contact between the infinite divine *vestigium* and its finite objective *imago*. This metaphysical tangent represents a new form of mythological copulation of the infinite and the finite. It makes a pure metaphysical (later mathematical) concept, since it entails a formal definition of a minimal being. This type of objective rationality offered the basis for the new project of *metaphysica generalis*. Scotus made the important innovation of Porretan system that founded the mathematics of derivation and integration (OBJ II, ch. 1.6). Following the school of *Nominales*, the infinitesimal calculus made according to Scotus is given in the dialectic “*infinitum—finitum*.” A properly derived and integrated *regula* determines in the Porretan mode “*semel—semper*” every contingent state of a particular rational hypostasis that makes out this or that objective *scibile*. By combining metaphysical derivation and integration, Scotus established the universal objectivity (*exemplar, vestigium, imago*). At the same time, the distinction of both conceptions of the objectivity given by the mode of infinity and finiteness was preserved. The infinitesimal objectivity founded a new mathesis universalis first in metaphysics and after the death of the modern god only in mathematics. The substantiation of the integral and differential number by the new form of ontotheological objectivity enriches the existentials of the objective dative by another link in the series of epochal determinations (*dativus mensurae*). The emergence of unitary science shows how the objective essence, given only in thinking, became the universal measure of all that exists. This stage fulfilled the fate of the second Averroism. Augustinian and Avicennian theory of illumination has become completely useless in mathematics, which has become a kind of metaphysics. Scotus’s infinitesimal kind of metaphysics rejected the nominal definition of what is; it did not want to be a mere logic, but the first science about being as being. The objective *ens* was conceived within the framework of natural cognition that relates to the pure being. Scotus changed ontotheology into a rationally based and minimalist speculation. Scotus metaphysically legitimized modern God in his objectively creative role by integrating him into the first form of *metaphysica generalis*. Given in the form of a simulacrum, modern God is objectively separated from his own rationality. This idol of modernity necessarily died of intellectual atrophy due to the exemplarily inactive essence (*deus otiosus*). Later deism destroyed this modern simulacrum by transforming Scotus’s metaphysical deification into a postmodern mathematical and physical deism. By displacing the first and the second Averroism (*dativus incommodi*), Scotus completed the epochal possibilities of the metaphysical dative in the mode of the objectively victorious fallacy of modernity (*Irrtum*). The death of modern God and the deification of science as its last but fundamentally necessary rational relic has become the fundament of postmodern thought. After the death of modern God, objective science is preserved in the academic institutions of the West as an absolutely valuable reliquary shrouded in the mystical veil of cloud computing.

Let us return to the key moment of objective deduction when God retains permanent mental control over the rationality given in the second stage of objectively conceived creation (*vestigium*). At this critical moment in Scotus’s objective mythology, divine rationality leaves the realm of divine exemplarity. It begins to operate in the world in a partially alienated form. God as the former *causa prima* has now changed to secondary rationality. Hermeneutics analyzed this alienation of the modern God according to Olivi’s notion of an inwardly free will operating in the capitalist world (*alio et alio modo se habens*, ch. 5.1.2). Scotus founded a new form of *dativus incommodi* related to the transformation of modern God. After the final departure of the divine voluntarist and capitalist demiurge created by Scotus′s deduction, only objectively given rationality remains in the world. The imperative of ethical regulation was previously given in the form of biblical ontotheology. This form of biblical ontotheology formed its metaphysical basis in the mode of *dativus ethicus*. In the paradisiacal times of the first *Modernorum*, anthropomorphic God was walking in a fresh breeze in the garden of objective knowledge cultivated by *illuminati* in Oxford. This cave was visited by the mystical Raven of Elijah. The objective Tree of knowledge and the theory of one truth was officially planted in the academic paradise of modernity by condemnation of Paris and Oxford in the year 1277. Scotus drove modern Avicennists out of the paradise of divine intimacy and subjectivity with the sword of sophisticated Aristotelian metaphysics right after they had committed the primary sin of emanations and comitation. Avicennist Cartesians tried in vain to return there by the innate idea of God in us. Scotus established a new form of *dativus incommodi* relating to the transformation of modern God. After the departure of the voluntaristic and capitalist divine Demiurge created by Scotus’s deduction, only objectively given rationality remained in the world. The imperative of ethical regulation was previously given in the form of biblical ontotheology. In the new metaphysics of creation, this imperative has disappeared from the nascent capitalism of modernity because it has been replaced by an impersonal rationality. The first capitalist Demiurge no longer operates as a “*causa remota*” in order to ground the logic of things according to the “*regula agentis increati*.” The mythology of modernity absolutely abhors “*horror vacui*”; fortunately, this horror of the void created after the death of the first Capitalist was very easy to remove. After transformation of God into a neutral rational medium, the conquest of the world became a crusade of authoritarian and ideologically based capitalism. Encouraged by Bonaventure, the mystical crusaders and the learned *intelligentia spiritualis* of Oxford and Paris *illuminati* set out on the crusade given by *via Modernorum*. The crusade of the *Modernorum* established a new *dativus ethicus* given by the imperial conquest of the world. It is good to know that China, which was guided by a very different form of *dativus ethicus*, closed at the same time in herself, ending the era of commercial overseas expeditions done between the 15th and 18th centuries.

The introduction of the objectively given being into the system of the first complete metaphysics of *Modernorum* created the basis for the later *metaphysica generalis* (F. Suárez). It became the first science about being; the theology as a rationally conceived science about God was subordinated to *metaphysica generalis*. The final turning point in the conception of metaphysics came after 1600, when the ontology of Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant founded postmodernism. The death God made by Scotists began when postmodern metaphysics and mathematics took over the controlling function on the second level of objectivity that modern God had previously exercised self-reflexively. Postmodern metaphysics thus took up Simplicius’s *translatio* of objectivity (μεταδίδωσι; OBJ I, ch. 1.3.1) in the new form of *translatio entis*. Autonomous deduction of the objectivity by means of the human subject started the evolution of postmodernism. The human demiurge became the sole producer of objectivity. The sphere of finite rationality was separated from the infinite divine essence and from the exemplary intellect. This separation between the two forms of objectivity has caused the death of modern God in Western metaphysics. His evident inability to manage the world set the process of secularization in motion. It became the basic symbol of modernity through the catchphrase “*etsi deus non daretur*” (ch. 5.4.2). In the epoch of deistic postmodernism, it was no longer certain whether dying God of modernity could manage this absolutely important translation of objective meaning from the intimate divine exemplarity into the external world (*translatio studiorum*). The Age of Enlightenment correctly understood that dying God needed help. The translation of objectivity formed the modern metaphysical foundation. The collapse of this process would have deprived postmodernism of its intellectual capital. God of Scotus may have died, but certainly not the foundation of objectivity that this demiurge diligently produced in his thinking. This is why Arendt proclaims, quoting René Char, that modernity ist the first epoch without the testament from previous times (ch. 4.4.3). The last round of divine comedy began with a new act of transferring the meaning of being from dying God to his nihilistic successor. After the demise of the objectively non-existent Furies, the Muses staged the eternal form of the secular and objective *religio* that rebinds us to the lost beginning of Scotus′s metaphysics. Nietzsche stated the death of God, but it brought about by Leibniz’s metaphysics and by Newton’s deism. Leibniz and Newton created modern mathematics and cosmological physics on the basis of Scotus’s homogeneous objective rationality. The new “*communicatio idiomatum*” with already dead God of modernity is carried out by the objective kind of academic necromancy. Leibniz made the first crystal ball necessary for this scientific activity. In the spirit of theodicy, he mathematized Scotus’s realm of eternal truths (*c’est la région des vérités éternelles*), which he put in the place of real matter (*qu’il faut mettre à la place de la matière*). In this region, he found the source of things (*la source des choses*, ch. 5.2.3). Leibniz transferred Scotus’s above-mentioned construction of objective correlation and necessity into mathematics and turned divine rationality into an absolute creative calculation. Made according to the theodicy, God of Leibniz still has to deal at least with mathematics, so that the world can exist in a reasonable measure of good and evil (ch. 5.2.3). Situated in Leibniz’s philosophy, objectively rehabilitated God ceased to think metaphysically and began to think only in an animal manner, in the spirit of the improved *vis aestimativa* given as an instrumental rationality. In Kant’s time, modern God ceased to be good and religious in the mode *per se*, because these essential divine qualities came under the control of natural mind (*Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, 1794). Kant transformed Leibniz’s absolute calculator into a deistic inactive substance that received the task of preserving the basic forms of religion and morality. But their boundaries are determined *a priori* by human mind. Also, there was no rational work left for postmodern God. Kant played a contradictory role in the emergence of postmodernism. His conception of morality buried modern God. But his deduction of objectivity followed Scotus and produced an objective version of the first Averroism.

Kant played the contradictory role of the objective gravedigger of modern God and simultaneously he became an objective reviver of the first Averroism. Kant once again solved the dilemma of *Seconds Analytics* concerning the connection of two types of cognition (*Anal. Post*. 84a11‒14; 87b28–31). Objective scientific thinking cannot exist without the causal relation to real things. The astronomical eclipse exists in the real mode *per prius*, because there are real planets that have a causal effect on each other. No mathematics can replace this phenomenon. As an astronomer he knew well that the determination of the intellect in the central part of cognition must be based on reality. That is why objective empiricists such as Hume are somewhat right about the mathematician Leibniz. Therefore, the exposure of theoretical being proceeds from the front, from the direction of the actually given causality in real things that we recognize by the senses. Direct cognition defends on a sensual level the principle ”*ex inmediatis*” as in the first Averroism. Only the causal effect at the level of the first substances are the adequately perceived senses. Kant created a new medium for the scientific syllogism, in which the middle link of the judgment is determined from the direction of hyparchical first substance. The first substances and their causal effects are given in reality. The first cognition must be individual and empirical; otherwise the correspondence of mind and thing is not given (*Erkenntnis der Objekte durch Wahrnehmungen*).[[468]](#footnote-468) But Kant reverted to an Avicennism based on Oxfordian Fallacy when he coined the concept of causality. Causality is based on an *a priori* defined temporal schema that is universal and objective. Real causality passes through a universal structure given *per prius*, which is established as objective deduction according to Scotus. This means that causality acquired a hypostatic and essential character *a priori*; otherwise it could not be objective. This hypostatized temporal scheme is recognized in the empirical mode *per posterius* by the senses and in the consciousness, which perceive the causality of the real world. Things have a real and *simpliciter* made effect on one another; but in human thought this individual and sensually recognized effect of the first substances is universalized by the *a priori* given temporal scheme. This provides an objective form of correspondence between real causality and the universal concept of causality. The universal temporal scheme is given in the mode *per prius* as an *a priori* established condition of universal causality according to Rufus (*medium et causa idem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). This hypostatized temporal schema is determined *per posterius* by the senses, which perceive the causality of the real world. The temporal schema, which establishes the universal concept of causality, exists in the subject as an innate habitus in the form of *potentia substantialis*. The postmodern Kant defines this schema as a Porretan hypostasis. The causal effect finds expression with the help of Aristotle’s time schema for physical movements of bodies made in the mode “before—after” (*ihre Verbindung in der Zeit überhaupt*).[[469]](#footnote-469) The time acquired an objectively hypostatized character (*die Zeit selbst*). This formal scheme of the temporal sequence is given permanently and universally in human thinking (*durch a priori verknüpfende Begriffe*). As a result, the concept of time in the Aristotle’s work *Physics* is abolished, since time in the soul arises only secondarily, and this is achieved by the abstract recognition of real moving bodies (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). The objective form of Scotus’s correspondence is expressed in the concept of “analogies of experience” (*Analogien der Erfahrung*, KdRV, B 218–64). Kant’s temporal scheme, which is presented within the framework of the analogies of experience, forms a substance of the third kind. Kant took the transcendental apperception according to Descartes. He established the first principles of cognition in the soul as Porretan hypostases. The presence of the pure empiric forms (the time, the space) and pure categories given as schemata in human mind create an immanent habitus of thinking that is settled *a priori*. Postmodern Kant, like Scotus, asserts that *a priori* made sphere of cognition and rationality is given by pure transcendental deduction. This deduction created a second floor of *a priori* given objectivity determined by deduction. It is defined in the form of the hypostatized Avicenna’s *intellectus adeptus* as a being of the third kind. In the end, un *illuminatus* named Kant, like Scotus, must “see” *a priori* given essential scheme of causality directly, since otherwise he would not be able to describe and justify it objectively. Kant’s form of Oxfordian Fallacy is set out in the quotation describing the direct vision of objective identity that deals with eidetic essences (*wenn es nicht vor Augen hätte*).[[470]](#footnote-470) Following Scotus and Arnauld, Kant objectively “observes” things as being of the third kind, which do not really exist. The concept of mind is given with the help of Avicenna′s hypostatized intellect through the categories of pure mind (*Kategorien der reinen Verstand*), which forms a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences (*ein formales und synthetisches Prinzipium aller Erfahrungen*, KdRV, A 119). This schema corresponds in modern times to Rufus’s concept of “*potentia substantialis*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The school of the first Averroism and Ockham would have rejected this in principle, because the soul is a pure *tabula rasa*. If the soul were not a pure potency, it would not be able to recognize the world universally. Kant created a new form of objective habitus and introduced the hypostatized rationality of *a priori* given forms directly into the subject. This conception of hypostases in the soul, the first Averroism had criticized it since the year 1235, when Grosseteste and Rufus introduced these Porretan hypostases into scientific deductive syllogism. The philosopher from Königsberg completed the revolution opened by the founder of objectivity and abolished the last metaphysical competence of modern God. The enlightened subject guarantees the objectivity of creation through its objective habitus. Kant has given to man the epochal task of producing the meaning of being solely out of himself (*er sollte vielmehr alles aus sich selbst herausbringen*; OBJ II, ch. 3.5). The founding role of the first substance in the classical mode of *dativus possessivus* was replaced by an epochal new subject. Its new role in the form of *dativus auctoris* created a new demiurge of rational forms.

Separated from his thinking, modern God necessarily had to die, because he was affected by intellectual atrophy. Dying *deus otiosus* of modernism initiated by Scotus reached the phase of clinical death completed by the nihilism of Nietzsche at the beginning of the 19th century. This radically true thinker only stated objectively in the mode of truth based on Olivi’s will to power that this product of modernity had never really existed; also it could not really die either. The human will to power created God of modernity, and the same will to power later buried this unnecessary simulacrum. God of *Modernorum* never really existed, just as the demiurgic human subject never really existed. He created this founding Golem of capitalism through the mythological predication “*in artificialibus*.” The new form of divine comedy started by issuing the death certificate of modern God. Nietzsche declared dead that idle God of atrophied thinking and religiosity. God suffocated himself by the metaphysics created by intellectual decadents and dreamers.[[471]](#footnote-471) The era of postmodern crusades began with the Spanish catholic, that is, a universal hunger for gold and it found its completion in sophisticated capitalist version of Kipling’s burden of the White Man (ch. 5.5). The White Man of the West sat down on the orphaned throne of modern God and began a new crusade of imperialist capitalism. God took care exclusively of the theological salvation, which postmodernism did not care too much about. The nihilist of last times (*novissimum*) redeems himself due to power of objective knowledge. Instead of God, the European and American white man, celebrated by Rudyard Kipling, now bears the burden of salvation. Modern God died at the end of modernity in the dump of history, far from the objectively victorious centers of instrumental rationality. Postmodernism transferred divine rationality to the imperialist stage of capitalism, which Lenin precisely states in the work *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). The frenetic rationality triggered the First World War. The death of postmodern God was only noticed by a few at the beginning of the 20th century, because his successor had a lot to do. The metaphysical nihilism of imperial *illuminati* carried out a division of the world and diligently prepared the First and Second World wars by taming disobedient matter of all kinds. In the consummate nihilism of metaphysics, an anthropomorphic God became an unnecessary ballast of postmodern mind. The already fully secular nihilistic rationality of capitalism is guided by the imperative of Rufus’s truth as assimilation. Hermeneutics confirm that the principal cause of the death of this simulacrum in the postmodernism was a lack of any reasonable activity. Modern God, objectively separated from his rationality and demiurgic will, ended up with fatal necessity in the cemetery of modern *scibilia*. After the death of that modern deity, Scotus’s kingdom of rationality became fully independent in its activity. Mathematics created a new sphere of the purely human “*esse intelligibile*” and established a new form of secular religion. The world has become a space of neutral rationality, shaped into a nihilistic form by the instinct of self-preservation (*conatus*) established by the now ruling instrumental rationality. Banksters are doing the divine work of objective rationality and nihilistic technoscience is conquering the world for a fraction of the elected *illuminati* who run supranational corporations through the artificial intelligence. The imperial and fully capitalist habitus of Western *illuminati* follows the modern kind of necessity based on the coming of Antichrist that creates the inferno of instrumental rationality. It is determined by the self-preservation instinct of one percent of the global elite that tries to dominate the 99 percent of so-called human resources. The rationality of self-preservation thus established has founded the total *Mobilmachung* operated by the new and almost paranoid global demiurges. This corresponds to the newly formed and objectively true designation of the contemporary nihilistic epoch that is called “Anthropocene.”

## 5.4 Don Quixote of the First Averroism (William Ockham)

In the following decade after Gandavus, Duns Scotus arranged the funeral of the second Averroism. He transformed the ontotheological scheme made according to Neoplatonism of Simplicius into an objectively conceived categorical predication that followed Aristotle′s teaching. The second Averroism took on a definite form that brought about its death. God is not incarnated in the world through objective emanations made by his intentionality and will, as was the case with Gandavus. Scotus’s God objectively dwells in the world through the neutral rationality that can be scientifically recognized (*imago*). The univocal, necessary deduction formally reworked Bonaventure′s relation of infinite and finite rationality based on the term “*regula agentis in/creati.*” Modern *illuminati* marching on *via Modernorum* became shareholders of the divine and fully rational enterprise that constantly produced the necessity based on the objective rationality. After the death of the divine Founder, the postmodern subject completely privatized this profitable work, paying out the minority shareholders at first. The completely unnecessary representatives of the first Averroism were sent to Lethe. The former concept of the “man—corpse” became a “human resource” that must be reworked according to new version of *Song of Songs* (ch. 4.1.2). That *opus magnum* of capitalism started with the mythological copulation of two aforementioned irrational powers of greed (*appetitus*) that created original mythical cosmogony of capitalism. The processing of all kinds of “*inoboedientia materiae*” passed through the term of “*informatio*” that was anchored in the modern thinking since the time of Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The key discovery, which definitely ended with the school of the second Averroism, is represented by the Aristotelian causality and the substance that Scotus introduced into Avicennist metaphysics. The introduction of the essence into the structure of the categorical predication leads to a certain and deductively given cognition of divine properties and divine objective causality. When the exemplary rationality was sent in the world, the human thinking found an objective and necessary rule to proceed. Thanks to the new form of objective deduction, enlightened thinking does not have to take the contingent path of cognition based on real first substances. Scotus made the deduction of creative causality only from the logical way of divine thinking and conceived *ex nihilo* the objectively and minimally given being. The new scheme of Avicennism eliminated the concept of illumination that served as a *cause remota* for the cognition of modern *illuminati*. The exemplar became a component of the divine essence. His objective simulacrum, given in the form of the deductive conclusion of diffuse divine rationality, acquired an objective form of being (*aliquitas*), which is represented in a finite way in creation (*imago*). The modern *homo viator* of Scotus recognizes this objective divine rationality with complete certainty based on the objective knowledge that is recognizable in real substances as well.

Hermeneutics followed the way in which the first substance gradually acquired a negative character in relation to the enlightened intellect of modern Augustinians and Avicennists. The interpretation of *Seconds Analytics*, which Grosseteste presented at Oxford in 1230, initiated the eclipse of the first substance. Disregard of the principle “*ex inmediatis*” that referred to real substances received final confirmation in the first version of Oxfordian Fallacy that was created about the year 1250. A decisive milestone in the advent of modernity was the year 1256, when the academic mendicants won the first battle against the secular Parisian masters and got their own chair at the University of Paris. The emergence of objectivity was tied to the birth of modern theology founded by Bonaventure. Modernist theology became an ontotheology, which in a mythological way engulfed the world, God and man in the assimilation mode of the truth given as Rufus’s *coaequatio*. The modern God became the absolute ground and bearer (*subiectum*) of a new ontotheology through the Cargo cult described by anthropologists, this time concerning modernized Avicennism. Modern God became the main idol and simulacrum (εἰδώλων) of an interesting Western tribe of *illuminati*, which Albert called “*doctores Latini*.” Objective God served as the main academic idol of the Latin West for several centuries. That idol was worshipped by modern Gnostics of the tribe called *intelligentia spiritualis*. That academic tribe of *illuminati* then embarked on the warpath of contemporaries (*via Modernorum*) and since 1255 began to fight the school of the first Averroism. Modern God carried the entire structure of Christian metaphysics and he died in the Age of Postmodernism due to the lack of any reasonable activity. His death was historically necessary; the philosophical *illuminatus* Hegel, as the honored academic bearer of the Holy Grail, explained it in the paradigm of the absolute logic. After the death of modern God, German idealism held on to a little of the absolute spirit for a short time before Karl Marx entered the stage. Modernity has created a new cosmogonic myth that ensures its intellectual reproduction under the guidance of subjectively made academic Furies. The survival of modernity is ensured by an objective mythology that gives rise to all possible variants of *tertium ens*. The human demiurge assumed all metaphysical obligations that modern God had exercised before. Nietzsche arranged the burial of this idol in the age of full metaphysical nihilism. Scotus’s transformation of Aristotle into an objective figure of radically reformed Avicennism created the first philosophical step to the divine funeral. His genial version of Cargo cult made out of Avicennism created a new kind of rationality that prepared the end of the first and the second Averroism. The unitary ontotheology of modernity enthroned a new epoch, in which it gradually appropriated the world, man, and God in order to transform it into nihilistic objectivity. It is given today by the structural difference of all things from nothingness or by the binary difference of the mathematical one from the pure zero. Since then, it has operated in the history of the West in a destructive mode of epochal madness (*Irre*), which, after the death of God worshipped in the tribe of the learned *Latinorum*, ushered in the epoch of contemporary nihilism. The generation of philosophers dominated by thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy adopted Scotus’s doctrine of objectivity about the year 1300 first at Oxford. Those modernists were influenced by the mixture of objective Thomism and Scotism to the extent that they sacrificed classical Aristotelianism proclaimed in the first Averroism. The new metaphysics of *Modernorum* confirmed the victory of metaphysical nihilism and the anthropocentric turn of thinking at the beginning of the 14th century.

The hermeneutic interpretation of gigantomachy about the substance is obliged to describe the final dispute between the school of the first and the second Averroism. William Ockham (†1347) was another brilliant Franciscan tertiary at Oxford, who resolutely opposed the new metaphysics of *Modernorum*. Ockham was the last consistent and radical critic of Oxfordian Fallacy at Oxford, until his academic colleagues from the school of Scotists did not force him to leave the University. Therefore, at the *alma mater* mastered by modern logicians and metaphysical Scotists, the *Venerabilis Inceptor* could only teach logic for beginners. But the classic logic given in *De interpretatione* presupposes the knowledge of the abstraction of the real world according to Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, and this requires the scientific theory of cognition according to the *Seconds Analytics* based on the true cognitive correspondence interpreted in *De anima*. That is the reason why that critically thinking Aristotelian was the real and last *Venerabilis Inceptor* in the school of the first Averroism. We must provide at least the general outline of this last Donquijotic fight with the victorious modernity. At least one thinker at Oxford was following Roger Bacon and defended the thinking of the first Averroism against the interpretations of the then modernists and Scotists; they transformed the doctrine of former *Nominales* into objective metaphysics. This critical thinker joined the effort of the last representatives coming from the school of first Averroism. Hermeneutics consider this thinker to be the philosophical continuer of Roger Bacon and Siger of Brabant. Modernism and postmodernism assigned this author to their own ranks, which makes an epochal irony and conforms an objective success of the victorious tribe called *sophistae Latini*. Ockham’s conversion into a so-called Nominalist gave rise to sophisticated history of philosophy. After the decline of the first and the second Averroism, it codified a new *Wirkungsgeschichte* of objectivity. The hermeneutics of objectivity must find all the main theses of the first Averroism in Ockham′s work. The most important point is the exact interpretation of *Categories* according to the primacy of the first substance and the determination of intellectual cognition from the actualized sensually recognized substance according to the writing CMDA. Ockham’s Aristotelian conception of the imposition of meaning (*suppositio*) made the fundamental defense of the exposure of the sense of being made from the front that forms the basis for true knowledge of reality. Ockham uncompromisingly defended the principle “*ex inmediatis*” according to *Second Analytics* by dismissing the teaching based on the Oxfordian Fallacy defended by Scotists of that time. He rejected Scotus’s metaphysics in all key points with references to Aristotle’s teaching and to the interpretation of *Corpus Aristotelicum* according to Averroes. According to Ockham, Avicenna′s and Scotus’s concept of objective universals *in re*, autonomous species and all species exhibited in the panopticon of thinking made by nominalist species of *tertium ens* cannot exist at all; it is completely absurd from the point of view of classical metaphysics. Ockham did not comment on the writing *De Anima* or *Seconds Analytics*, the interpretation of which determines the affiliation to one or the other Averroistic school. The next generations therefore lacked the decisive element of interpretation, which is necessary for the classification of Ockham’s philosophy into the school of the first Averroism. That is a principal reason that explains why his philosophical struggle against the second Averroism, which he had led especially in the first part of his eventful life, remained misunderstood. His philosophical struggle ended in May 1328, when Ockham joined the antipapal Louis the Bavarian during an inquisition launched from papal Avignon. William brilliantly defended Louis’s political claims, with regard to the primary sovereignty of the people and the political power arising from it. Just as in the case of Siger of Brabant and Olivi, the teaching of this Franciscan was never publicly condemned as heretical. The ecclesiastical punishment concerned his escape from Avignon, which probably saved his life. Hermeneutics must explain the original meaning of well-known sentence “*entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*.” Later Scotists such as John Ponce (c. 1639) summarized Ockham’s teaching under that phase; including the “Ockham’s Razor,” which William Hamilton introduced into philosophy about 1852. The original meaning of this idiom meets the basic character traits of Ockham’s Aristotelian correction of Scotus. Ockham brilliantly defended the doctrine of the first Averroism, leaving no form of being of the third kind that undermined the cognition of reality.

The University of Oxford at the time of Ockham was completely dominated by Oxfordian Fallacy; moreover, it was the birthplace of the objectivist Scotism. It is no wonder that Ockham found himself in the same situation as Roger Bacon, who had contested Kilwardby’s and Pecham’s school. Scotists academically rejected this Aristotelian and connoisseur of Averroes and persecuted him as zealously as in the previous generation the followers of the second Averroism had rejected and persecuted Roger Bacon. By eliminating Ockham and transferring him to the school of so-called nominalism, modernity blurred the last trace of that “obscurity” which Averroes had seen in Avicenna’s metaphysics. The suppression of this dispute and all subsequent conflicts between the first and the second Averroism confirmed the beginning of the new epoch and determined the nihilistic orientation of modern metaphysics. Ockham’s dispute with the second Averroism given as Oxford′s Scotism was inevitable, because it concerned the last round of gigantomachy about the substance between both schools. Previously, the Aristotelian Abelard had argued in a similar way against the Platonists as was Anselm. This dispute ties in with the previous dispute in the Falsafa between Averroes and Avicenna. The preceding matrices have analyzed a whole series of different forms of the eclipse of the first substance (Avicenna, Grosseteste, Rufus, Scotus). The historical oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) was connected with the objective manifestation of being and transformed in the metaphysics of *Latinorum* as the eclipse of reality due to modern form of the truth. It became the correspondence of the enlightened mind with itself (*rectitudo*). This gave rise to the nihilistic character of modernity, which is connected with the decline of the first substance for scientific cognition. The Oxfordian Fallacy gave rise to the paranoic vagabondage of Western philosophy (*Irre*), which took the path of *Modernorum*. The whole journey of this modern “science” began after the modernist′s school in Oxford and Paris misinterpreted the metaphysical and scientific proof given in *Seconds Analytics* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). Let us recall the oracle of the mysteries given through Plutarch, which commanded a new and already confused philosophy to save the phenomena (OBJ I, ch. 1.3.3). The last analysis of the eclipse of being between Avicenna and Averroes (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.1) must necessarily concern the conflict between Ockham and Scotus. According to Ockham, the basic theses of the second Averroism and Scotism lead to the dualism between thought and reality, which forms the absurd philosophy of *Modernorum*. The previous matrices of objectivity have shown that Alvernus, Albert and Bacon took a similar critical point of view against the group of *sophistae Latini*. The new constellation of the gigantomachy around the substance started by the emergence of Scotist′s metaphysics. The last representative of the first Averroism argues against Scotism in a similar way as his predecessors did against the first modernists. According to Ockham, Scotus’s objective entity firstly does not exist and secondly has no meaning in properly conceived metaphysics. The objectivity in metaphysics therefore represents a model case of an unnecessary multiplication of *tertium ens*.

Ockham did not save metaphysics from its objectivist devaluation in the nascent Scotism. The dogma of anthropomorphic God was so brilliantly presented in Scotus’s metaphysics that the subsequent generations of modernists, postmodernists and contemporary philosophical nihilists could not resist the appearance of this objective necessity made in the mode of objective *veritas*. William Ockham played the ungrateful Donquichotic role of the last first Averroist at Oxford. This brilliant Aristotelian thinker and logician integrally defended the reality of first substances that make causal effects on the naturally given cognition. The sense is basically made from the direction of real things, also by exposing le sens to the thinking coming from the front. The primary intention of cognition given in this way (*intentio prima*) is determined by the primary imposition of meaning given *per prius* from the direction of the first substance (*personaliter*). Ockham defended cognition according to CMDA and salvaged the relation between the active and the receptive part of the intellect. In the polemic against Scotism, he defended the theory of knowledge and truth, which produced a synthesis of sensory and intellectual experience. It was the first Averroism of Blund’s school and of Siger and his followers. Against Avicenna’s metaphysics, it was necessary to put an updated version of Averroes’s “meta-physics” and to defend the cognition of first substances in the new historical conditions. Ockham brilliantly fulfilled this task, by focusing his criticism against Scotism. In the interest of truth, that Franciscan tertiary took the same consistent approach to Scotus as Bacon did to Rufus, Albert to Kilwardby, and Aquinas to Pecham. Ockham explained the original sense of *Categories* and of *De Interpretatione* from the Aristotelian position. Then, in the mode of the Sicilian school, he critically interpreted the erroneous points of Scotus’s metaphysics. The last defender of the first Averroism for the last time defended the theory of truth as a real correspondence. There is no ontological intermediate link between the first and the second substance, because the one is given *simpliciter* in reality, and the second is given *universaliter* in human thought. Therefore, all kinds of *tertium ens* are superfluous. For true knowledge of the world, those entities that exist in reality or in thought are completely sufficient. For the logical and semantic criticism of modernists, he used Averroes’s commentaries of *Corpus Aristotelicum* and fully defended the interpretation of cognition according to CMDA. The title of the chapter devoted to his philosophy shows that it was a kind of Donquichotic struggle. The last Mohican of the first Averroism could not stop the victorious offensive of *sophistae Latini*. Ockham’s struggle against Scotus’s conception of *tertium ens* remained isolated and misunderstood, as did Siger’s defense of Averroes in Paris. Scotus’s victorious abolition of the first and second Averroism, accomplished by his followers at Oxford, already fully shaped the history of the epoch through newly opened *via Modernorum*. Ockham probably completed his studies in London, where he was awarded the title *Doctor theologiae* around 1317. It is quite understandable why this brilliant philosopher did not get this academic title at Oxford. He was academically challenged by main representatives of modernism and about 1323 was sent to Avignon for an inquisitorial investigation. The Oxford connoisseur of Aristotle and Averroes and an outstanding classical logician met an equally tragic end in his *alma mater* as his predecessor Bacon experienced one generation before Ockham.

### 5.4.1 Defense of Authentic Aristotelianism

Let’s start with the most important find for hermeneutics, which is the exposure of the sense of being taken from the front, by actualizing cognition from the direction of first substances. Ockham’s authorship of the work *De intellectutu possibili secundum Averroem* (OTh 8, 237–47) is considered controversial. Hermeneutics confirm that the conception of *intellectus possibilis* in this treatise is interpreted according to original intention of Averroes (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). The rejection of the divided cosmic intellect is explained by the interpretation of the two problems (*duae difficultates*) in Averroes’ teaching. The first step must eliminate the Avicennist interpretation of Averroes, because it is wrong. Ockham rejects the conception of the cosmic intellect, which acts on our cognition as an external mover, because it contradicts the Christian faith.

“I say that the intention of the Commentator in his third book *De anima* is given in such a way that there are two intellects that are really (*realiter*) different as substances. These are not given in man as his abilities (*non sunt in homine sicut perfectiones in perfectibili*), but act on him only from the outside as a mover of the body. In this way, he defined the cosmic intelligences connected with the celestial sphere as the movement of the spheres done by initiating movers. This view must be rejected from the point of view of Christianity.” [[472]](#footnote-472)

Averroistic interpretation combined univocally two completely different forms of the intellect into one being of the third kind, which is a principled error. The above-mentioned treatise *De intellectu possibili secundum Averroem* interprets the process of cognition according to Averroes with references to the term “*copulatio.*” William explains the important part of CMDA that deals with the question of the unity of the material and speculative intellect (CMDA III.5, p. 392.158‒63). Ockham respects the Commentator’s warning about the difficulty of the subject. Following the example of bishop Alvernus and the school of the first Averroism, he clearly distinguishes two phenomena, namely the cosmic form of the intellect as an immaterial actualized substance and the human faculty of the intellect, which is given by activities of the person. These two forms are fundamentally different from each other as to their being. Then it becomes clear that in the case of human cognition, it is not possible to use the cosmic substantial forms of *intellectus possibilis* and *agens*, but only the above-mentioned abilities of man. After this fundamental differentiation of two sorts of the intellect, it is possible to start the interpretation of the ability of understanding according to CMDA, which presents another fundamental difficulty. We must strictly follow the direction of reasoning that starts from *intellectus possibilis* as *quartum genus* to arrive at this intellect as *tertium genus*.

“Whoever wishes to follow the Commentator's teaching must say that the possible intellect is the first faculty that fully belongs to man (*intellectus possibilis est prima perfectio hominis*). The action of this intellect (*intellectio*) comes as second and makes the completion of this human capacity. Then we can see that the possible intellect in man is given by a special link or acquisition, which the Commentator calls by the term ‘through connection’ (*copulationem*). On the basis of this connection, man can be said to be a creature endowed with understanding and rationality.” [[473]](#footnote-473)

The receptive part of the intellect individualizes cognition at the level of the first actualization that concerns intellectual cognition (*intellectus possibilis est prima perfectio hominis*). The possible intellect in its acting establishes the whole process of understanding in the mode *per prius*. That active component then creates the universal content (*intellectio, quæ est actus secundus*) in the completed process of abstraction (*ultima perfectio*) done in the mode *per posterius*. Averroes names the relationship of both components of the intellect in the soul with the term “*copulatio*,” which in CMDA has nothing to do with the separated intellect of Neoplatonists and Avicenna. Let us recall Siger’s similar statements about the composite human soul. He defined the intellect that comes from the outside with regard to the sensual part of the soul. Ockham knows well that the possible intellect relates primarily to actualize sensual cognition and not to some separated active intellect. The potency of the intellect is done by the fact that the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* is actualized by sensual species and, thanks to its immateriality, receives them as intelligible species. The *intellectus agens* then change these contents into universal cognition made out in the process of abstraction. The unity of individual cognition, which is universally given to all people, is stated in the last sentence (*homo sufficienter dici intelligens et rationalis*). This statement must be taken in Averroes’s general definition of the intellect as a universal species made in the mode of abstraction; it refers to man as an equally universal and abstractly conceived species in Averroes’s mode *quartum genus*. Let us recall the similar view made by Siger of Brabant, who clearly points out that CMDA uses this term to connect the passive and active components of the individual intellect (*de natura sua solum est in potentia ut nobis copuletur*; ch. 4.4.3). The connection of the receptive intellect with the human being (*homo*) in the objective mode of *copulatio* according to the definition of the intellect in the CMDA proceeds solely as abstraction, also in the mode *quartum genus*. The following part of the treatise defends the individual act of the intellect according to CMDA in the mode *tertium genus*. The quotation separates the authentic conception of the intellect of Averroes from the Averroistic interpretation of modernists.

“The intention of the Commentator is to see that understanding is effectively caused by phantasms and is worked out by the intellect (*intellectio causatur a phantasmate effective et intellectu*). Then it necessarily applies that a certain sensual idea is given in one concrete person and not in another. The one who does not have this idea lacks a part of the causality necessary for cognition, and therefore he does not have the intellectual cognition based on phantasms.” [[474]](#footnote-474)

The quotation defends the exposure of the sense taken from the front, from the direction of the actualized sensual species. It is necessary for the process of individually conceived abstraction and thus the unique kind of cognition (*intellectio causatur a phantasmate effective*). Since sensory perception is personalized, the process of cognition given by the actuality of these phantasms belongs to each person in a unique way (*unum phantasma potest esse in uno homine et non in alio*). The conclusion points out that cognition is not complete without phantasms (*deficit causa partialis requisita ad intellectionem*). Due to this deficit, the scheme of cognition is defective both in the second Averroism and in the Scotism. Their cognition does not go to real first substances, and as a result, the first intention given in the phantasm never becomes a *cause efficiens* of the second universal intention. A classic consequence of this failure of modernity is the inability to accept Aristotle’s conception of truth as the correspondence presented by the Commentator as *proportio* or *similitudo*. We find the defense of the exposure made from the front following the first Averroism in the short but philosophically very dense passage in *Quodlibet I*, q. 11. The author rejected not only the conception of the numerically unified intellect for all people, but also the reasoning of the second Averroism. The answer distinguishes the authentic and the inauthentic teaching of CMDA in the form of the two aporias which have to be solved (*duae difficultates*). Done in the framework of the first and second Averroism, intellectual cognition takes two completely different perspectives. Ockham’s distinction is exact and taken with deep knowledge of the dispute between Aquinas and Siger, which was presented in the previous matrix. By the unity of the intellect, Ockham understands the intellect as potency, which represents only the abstract concept of the intellect in thinking, given as a *quartum genus* in CMDA. The more complicated question is aimed at the recognition of the intellect as the mover of the soul, taken as a real process of cognition (*tertium genus*).

“With regard to the second point, there is a twofold problem (*duae difficultates*). The first is given by the fact that we understand by the intellect given as a body form, that is, by the intellect given as a faculty of understanding (*intellectu tamquam per formam corporis vel potentiam intellectivam*). The second difficulty is given by the fact that the intellect acts in us only as a mover of the body and not as its form (*intellectus sit in nobis solum sicut motor corporis et non sicut forma*).” [[475]](#footnote-475)

Ockham adopted Siger’s brilliant interpretation of the unity of intellect as cognitive ability of the soul, which acts through the soul as the unique form of the body. Thus he rejected the Semiaverroism of Aquinas, which took the intellect as a hypostatized form in the soul. Ockham is well aware that there is a twofold interpretation of CMDA in the school of first Averroism. The key is the twofold conception of the supposition that concerns the perspective of the insight into the nature of the intellect; it is explored in the syllogism concerning the unity of the intellect (*suppositio quod*). Ockham distinguishes precisely between the existential nature of the intellect (*tertium genus*) and its universal concept (*quartum genus*). The term “*supposito*” includes, first of all, the authentic interpretation of Averroes presented by Siger. He defends the intellect as the faculty of the soul, which is the form of the body. Ockham takes it for granted, since only in this way is it possible to achieve the unity of the person according to Siger’s principle “*homo ipse intelligit*” (ch. 4.4.3). The second conception of the intellect according to Aquinas defends the hypostatized *intellectus possibilis* as an autonomous form in the soul (*qua2*, ch. 4.5.3). Thomas’s view is clearly rejected in the second sentence. The intellect cannot act as an independent form next to the soul (*non sicut forma*). The human intellect, taken in itself, represents a pure potency and can never be in man as an actualized form of autonomous acting and subsisting nature. The soul is the only form of the body and not the intellect. Ockham was probably the last connoisseur of CMDA interpreted according to the Sicilian school that distinguished the major difference in the interpretation of the first Averroism between Siger and Aquinas. The second part of the supposition rejects the Neoplatonic notion of *copulatio*, which is given by the influence of an external cosmic intellect on our intellect. If the intellect is defined as *tertium genus* according to CMDA, then it is given in Siger’s mode “*inmixtus*” and “*ab extrinsece*” relative to the body as its intellectual mover (*intellectus sit in nobis solum sicut motor corporis*). As we have explained in the previous parts, modern Alexandrians defended this view of a separated hypostatized intellect. Averroes clearly rejected Avicennism as a fundamental fallacy of the Falsafa. After him, the first Averroism did the same with respect to the school of Latin *Modernorum*. Ockham has no problem with the rejection of Averroistic numerically uniform *intellectus possibilis* for all people; this is clear nonsense in terms of cognition (*impossibile quod idem simul et semel sit sciens et ignorans*, ibid, p. 67.25). Ockham’s critique understandably rejected the primitive dualism of soul and body made as two independent substances, because it represents the typical Averroism of *Modernorum*. For hermeneutics, the defense of the exposure of the intellect from the direction of phantasms makes the key. It conveys the actuality of the recognized reality to the intellect and provides it with the sensual content necessary for intellectual abstraction. The quotation criticized the representatives of the second Averroism for assigning this actualizing kind of cognition to the active separated intellect, which connects itself with the knowing soul.

Ockham rejected in principle all explanations of natural cognition that are not based on bodily phantasms. Modernists presented the Avicennist conception of *copulatio* that they mistakenly took for the doctrine of Averroes. See the above-mentioned and rejected conception of *copulatio*, which is linked to the autonomous *intellectus agens*. The other Averroists claim that the actuality of *intellectus agens* causes the diversity of recognized contents by the fact that the active intellect connects directly with individual phantasms. Ockham draws the attention of modernists to the fact that this individual recognition would not be possible in the case of the separated intellect. Such kind of *intellectus agens* is the actualized given immaterial substance or form; as such it entails a causal effect according to principle “*operatio sequitur esse*.” According to the unique being of the substantial cosmic intellect, its causality is also given in the mode of “*hoc aliquid*.” Then the detached active intellect would connect with thinking each time in the same way, on the basis of its unique being. Following the existential interpretation of CMDA and Siger, Ockham argues that intellectual cognition is in our power. The autonomous *intellectus agens* (even in the form of Aquinas *qua2*) cannot bring about acts of thinking as the proper subject of thinking, because it would causally determine the act of intellect as its own effect. Ockham defends the line of Siger in the mode “*subiective—obiective*,” because he was the only philosopher after Averroes and Siger to establish the unity of cognition in the mode of the ipseity of the person. Intellectual cognition is the act of the existing person.

“If you claim that the individualized act of thinking can be held by the different act of connecting the intellect with phantasms, it is wrong. In case of various connections to the intellect, it would be impossible that the subject of those connections would think the opposite. However, since phantasms are an effective cause of cognition for recognized contents in the intellect, the opposite acts of thinking are contained in the intellect in a subjective way (*sunt in intellectu subiective*).” [[476]](#footnote-476)

The quotation explains to modern Alexandrians as Bonaventure, Kilwardby and Scotus their fundamental error given by the exposure of cognition made from behind. The modern intellect stays in its immanent actuality as a substance or some form and it joins the phantasms of the person (*propter diversam copulationem intellectus cum phantasmatibus*). Aquinas ascribed the same theory to Averroist separated *intellectus possibilis*. However, from the point of view of Aristotelianism, this is sheer nonsense. The intellect is not a *tertium ens* in the sense of the actualized quasi-substance (*in eodem subiecto primo*), which by itself would cause cognition by initiating a connection with the phantasms. The quote again follows the line of Siger’s school. The connoisseurs of the Commentator conceive the act of the separated immaterial intellect as a pure potency in the mode *subiective* and the intellect rules with the body in the mode *obiective*, because it has no sensorial organ (ch. 4.4.2). The sensual conceptions exercise an effective causality; the hylemorphic person is the only subject as the bodily made carrier of intellectual faculties. The second Averroism and Aquinas in the first Averroism took as the subject of cognition the hypostatized intellect. It forms a substance of the third kind in the second Averroism and Aquinas took it for a form of the third kind. Only Siger takes the intellect as a mere potency; therefore, his act of cognition is fully personalized and the person is fully unified. Ockham explains in vain to Oxford’s Semiaverroists, that is to say to Thomists and Scotists, that the substance of the third kind brings cognition out of itself. Siger’s thesis “*homo ipse intelligit*” would lose its validity. The modern soul cannot be potentially everything, according to *De anima*. Each substance already has its actualized determination by the fact that it is “*hoc aliquid*.” The next sentence reminds modernists of their fundamental error. The thinking given by the *intellectus possibilis* has no necessary actualization in order to change itself. The causal determination of the intellect proceeds solely from phantasms (*phantasmata non se habent nisi effective ad illa quae recipiuntur in intellectu*). Therefore, Averroes adhered to Themistius’s concept of *intellectus materialis* as a receptive component with regard to the already-actualized senses, in order to maintain the individual act of cognition. According to Ockham, if the intellect were given as a substance, it would not be able to recognize something different from itself or to know the sense of alternating accidental oppositions (the sitting, lying Socrates) that need an substantial and thus actualized basis. The substance is given *simpliciter* and *per se*; it is therefore what it is, and cannot be something else by itself. The intellect of *Modernorum* made in this way would be sheer nonsense. The change in cognition always takes place through the effective causality of sensual species. We change cognition because the intellect makes a potency in our soul; it is given in the mode *subiective* as to its own act of immaterial thinking and *obiective* as to the external (but actualizing) relation to the material body. Cognition changes due to effects coming from outside in order to keep the truth as correspondence. The *intellectus possibilis* accepts actualized *species sensibilis* from sensual cognition; the composite soul comprehends them in the mode “*inmixtus*” and thus “*obiective*.” For the fullness of receptivity, it is true that the universality of intellect is given only subjectively and potentially and only with regard to the effects of actualized phantasms. Therefore, the intellect *per se* cannot bring about any real change in itself. If the opposite were true, then the extreme version of Anselm’s truth as *rectitudo* would occur, whereby the essentially given intellect (Descartes’s *res cogitans*) compares its own or assumed intelligible forms as opposite accidental determinations of its own substance. Such an “intellect—substance” does not really exist and it would represent a nonsensical and superfluous being of the third kind; moreover, it did not recognize anything real. Each of us thinks personally and not because some intellectual form unites with us. Truth as a correspondence is possible because the cognizing potency of the intellect is actualized by the sensual phantasms (*ad illa quae recipiuntur in intellectu*). The actualization of phantasms primarily determines the purely passive component of intellect in the mode of exposure coming from the front. Such effect of reality on the intellect (*ad illa*) has the fundamental character of causally given effectiveness (*phantasmata non se habent nisi effective*). Only under these conditions, according to *De anima*, the intellectual component of the soul is potentially everything. Precisely for this reason, the *intellectus possibilis* cannot be a substance or a form, as the modernists mistakenly claim to this day.

A change caused by *species sensibilis* and subsequently by *species intelligibilis* can be caused only by actualized things that affect the bodily senses. Thanks to the cognizing substrate of this animated body as the actualized first substance, we are able to absorb the opposites of perceptions (body—eye—black/white). Since we recognize real things with the bodily senses, our body changes and, in the mode of *proportio*, the intellectual cognition of the receptive soul changes accordingly. The intellect does not produce cognition out of itself, because it recognizes only thanks to its receptivity. We are not an angel with his actualized intellect, let alone the divine intellect. The criticism of the exposure of the intellect from behind is contained in the quotation, which confirms Ockham’s unity with the first Averroism. The relation between passive and active intellect is defined against the second Averroism. The key is the distinction between the terms “*intelligibile in actu*” and “*intellectum in actu*.” Ockham rejects in principle the theory of the hypostatized *scibile* given objectively in real things. This modern way of cognition, given by the denudation of universal forms, is considered the fundamental sign of the second Averroism. The modern scheme of the hypostatized active intellect does not need the possible intellect, because it actualizes the potential universal forms directly from things. Ockham is fundamentally opposed to such theory. This interpretation is neither in line with the argumentation of Aristotle nor with the view of CMDA.

“If one claims that actualized knowledge arises from a potential state given in knowable things (*de intelligibili in potentia intelligibile in actu*), then I claim that neither the Philosopher nor the Commentator reasons in this way. Both argue like this: the active intellect generates (*intellectus agens facit*) from the passive intellect its actualized form (*de intellecto in potentia intellectum in actu*). And this is true because the active intellect produces knowledge in such a way that something is given as actualized thought content (*aliquid est in actu intellectum*) that was previously only potentially given (*prius fuit in potentia intellectum*).” [[477]](#footnote-477)

The initial sentence basically rejected the possibility that cognition would have arisen as a result of *intellectus agens* that transfers the species of the third kind as potential universalia (*intelligibili in potentia*) into a actualized universal form (*intelligibile in actu*). Such a translation of hypostatic or objective universals (*scibile, concretum*) into reality has a mythological character, which is given by the actualized and hypostatic nature of the intellect of the academic *illuminati*. That false cognitive schema founded the modern error of Western thought (*Irrtum*). The history started with Avicenna that produced objective reality out of himself (*incepit quasi a se*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The difference between the hypostatized intellect of modernity as a demiurgic producer of cognition and the abstracted content (*intellectum*) taken from sensual species has a fundamental character. Again, the twofold nature of species is clearly distinguished in the first and second Averroism. The being of the third kind is not the same as the intentional object assumed in the act of *anima intellectiva*. According to CMDA, the intellect absorbs the actuality from the sensual and intelligible phantasms and therefore needs the intentionality and the *diaphanum*. The preceding matrices have explained how and why the mediation due to the diaphanum has ceased to exist in modernity. The intellect does not create intelligible species in itself by absorbing intelligible contents through formal mediation. An active synthesis of knowledge is accomplished only by *intellectus agens* (*facit de intellecto in potentia intellectum in actu*). Modernity exchanged the *intellectum* made out of reality with its own simulacrum in the form of *intelligibile* and created an absurd scheme of objective cognition and objective truth. They keep no kind of the truth as an Aristotelian correspondence of external reality and the human intellect.

The quotation clearly explains to modernists, in the last historically correct knowledge of Averroes, that the process of acquiring knowledge is absolutely different from the cognitive manner of victorious *via Modernorum*. The modern *intelligibile* of the objectivists is not the *intellectum* of the Commentator. The active intellect cannot by itself form universal contents of thought from its own actuality given outside of sensual experience, and then transfer them to actualized cognition. Bacon declared this to be nonsense, and his follower at Oxford claims the same. From the point of view of knowledge, the soul is a pure *tabula rasa*. The human *intellectus agens* is given as a mere faculty and has no innate content (see Augustinian *locus specierum*), which it could transfer to actuality. The indicated role of the active intellect, with regard to the actualization due to the species of the third kind or due to modern God as Scotus’s and Descartes’s effective cause of thinking, such a schema does not exist either in teaching of Aristotle or Averroes. Ockham considers the hidden Platonism of modern Avicennists to be nonsense. A similar thesis posits the plurality of substances in man. Moreover, this plurality of nonsensical entities is doubled by the misconceived supposition related to the existence of the third kind. This impossible being replaces the first substance and its recognition. The previous matrices have stated that this scheme arose about 1230 in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy, whereby Porretan essences began to play the role of the first substance. True cognition must go to things in reality, as Aristotle and the Commentator did all their lives. Therefore, the beings of the third kind cannot be multiplied in the manner of Neoplatonists and modern Avicennists. It is necessary to describe the actualization of the intellect by real things themselves. Ockham’s phenomenology made in the style of Siger clearly says that we must see the act of knowing made by the active intellect (*quod intellectus agens facit*). The activity of the intellect does not primarily relate to the objectively given being, because it does not exist in reality. The determination of the intellect is actual because it takes place in the mode of *abstractio* and not of *denudatio*. There is no being of the third kind in the form of the modern intelligibile, which can be viewed directly through any enlightened intellect. The projects à la Rufus’s *scibile*, Scotus’s *intelligibile* or Husserl’s *eidos* claim the opposite. The quotation says that the intellect comes to the contents of cognition (*intellectum*) through the receptive component of intellect. Hermeneutics therefore does not take as Ockham′s testament his famous defense of universals being given only in the mind.[[478]](#footnote-478) Of course, universals exist only in the mind, but that does not mean that they come out *ex nihilo*, as the modernists believe. This so-called “nominalistic” testament, which is often quoted, must be placed in the previous context of cognition according to Siger’s interpretation of the Sicilian school. The universals are given as universal concepts in accordance with the general teaching of the first Averroism in the mode *quartum genus*; therefore, they exist only in the intellect. Scotus adopted this conception of universals from the first Averroism, so that there is no difference between his Semiaverroism and Ockham on this point. The core of Ockham’s teaching is the defense of the authentic unity of the intellect according to CMDA, which, in terms of meaning, follows the fundamental phenomenological option that substantiates the ipseity of the person as Siger did (ch. 4.4.3). The key term “*ad omnem*” in the following quotation determines the exposure of the sense of being according to Siger.

“We know well by ourselves that for any movement from one place to another or for change (*ad omnem motum localem et alterationem*), the actions of the body and of everything that we sensually experience within ourselves are sufficient, as is obvious in the case of cognition and volition.” [[479]](#footnote-479)

We experience sensory perception and intellectual activities on the physical substrate, which is the basis of our personality (*dispositiones corporis*). Thanks to its potential receptivity and substantial actualization, the animated body is capable of accepting any contradictory determinations, because it is an actualized first substance and forms a *subiectum* of cognition made in the mode *ipse*, who is the actualized person (*experimur in nobis*). Ockham insists on the actualization of the intellect only from the senses and through the animate body as the only substrate of cognition. Only the animated body has the ability to undergo a change, whether it is given materially or immaterially in the intellect. This connection of the sensual and the intellectual side of the soul as the only form of the body establishes the phenomenological way in which the actualization of cognition really takes place. The experience of cognition corresponds to Siger’s view of the ipseity in the first person (*experimur—conscii sumus*), which the Master of Brabant set against the “Flying man” of Avicenna. The intellect is actualized as the immaterial potency of the soul from the direction of the senses. All our faculties and abilities are given in the first substance, the unique form of which is the soul subsisting in the personal body. Then, according to Siger, we acquire both the knowledge of the senses and the reflection of knowledge (*nos enim consciii sumus ex virtutibus corporis intellectum*, ch. 4.4.2). The unity of the intellect is summarized in Ockham’s following quotation from the above-mentioned defense of Averroes.

“In the actualized act of existence (*in primo instanti in quo est*), man has no intellect that would be added from the outside and connected with man (*intellectum sibi copulatum et unitum*). Then he did not need any phantasms to recognize, due to which he makes an abstraction of things.” [[480]](#footnote-480)

Ockham defends the existence of the person as a personal kind of *actus essendi* that is unique (*in quo est*). It had been accomplished maybe for the last time in history of thinking before Heidegger brought about the phenomenology of *Dasein*. The intellect forms a component of the act of this unique subsistence. Therefore, we cannot add to them anything from the outside (*non haberet intellectum sibi copulatum*). The intellect is not added to man from the outside like some quasi-substance or quasi-form of *Modernorum* that is different from hylemorphic first substances. The addition of some “being” to the existing person is nonsense, which should be rejected. Only the person exists as the first substance, and nothing substantial can be added to the act of his existence from the outside. One cannot multiply nonsensical and completely unnecessary beings of the third kind; metaphysics is not a fancy cabaret of modernity. The quotations have also shown that the hypostatized intellect of modernity cannot be actualized in such a way as to have a natural sensual cognition of the world. The mystical contemplation of God and his rationality does not make part of philosophy. Only the receptive immaterial intellect made as an act of *ipse*-existence on a sensual and bodily substrate is able to extract the actualized cognition from phantasms. Due to the immateriality and actualization, the separated intellect of modernists have no possibility to accept any actualized determinations given by the phantasms (*tunc non habet phantasma quod abstrahitur a rebus*). The result of similar nonsense is the dichotomy of cognition, man and reality, which determines the mental confusion of modernity and postmodernism. Either the Cartesian *res cogitans* runs in the artificial matrix, which is a pure simulacrum of reality, or the postmodern Alexandrians transferred the human intellect to the material level of animal abilities, which are given only by the senses and brain functions. Both theories make a degradation of man, which culminates in the epoch of Western metaphysical nihilism. To the first group of sophists let the external world disappear; the second group, in turn, lost the uniqueness of man that is based on the specific way of his intellectual existence and his immaterial cognition of the world.

Ockham was the last follower of the first Averroism, which rejected both variants of the modern destruction of Aristotelian mind defined in the Commentator’s interpretation of *De anima* in a principled and well-founded manner. According to the last Western connoisseur of CMDA, the defense of the real nature of *intellectus possibilis* gives a fundamental reason for Averroes’s rejection of the possibility that *intellectus possibilis* would be a uniform substance given to all people from the outside. The writing CMDA resolved the connection between the receptivity of the intellect and sensual content by distinguishing between the *tertium* and *quartum genus*. Receptivity is common to all people in terms of the ability to “be receptive.” Averroes’s concept of *quartum genus* in CMDA follows the first part of Aristotelian quotation in *De intepretatione* (OBJ II, ch. 1.1). The primacy of the receptive intellect as a fundamental *potentia substantialis* is universally valid, because it defines human cognition (*intellectus possibilis sit prima perfectio hominis*). The universal ability of the intellect as potency explains why all people formally think the same content (Averroes’s *quartum genus*). The primary actualization of the intellect from the senses, in turn, ensures that the concept is not thought existentially in the same way, because the act of thinking is a personal faculty (*tertium genus*). The act of understanding is real and, consequently, only the personal course of thinking as well. Cognition proceeds through the actualization of the *potentia accidentalis* at the level of the receptive intellect as the first-actualized stage of intellectual cognition (*prima perfectio*). In this potential form, the actual course of cognition corresponds to the term “*tertium genus*”in CMDA. Ockham once again returns to the scene of Averroes’s theory of the truth as correspondence that the first Averroism defended. According to CMDA, the relation of substantial and accidental potency is explicitly given in the mode of *proportio* in order to create the correspondence of sensual and intellectual cognition of the real external thing as it is required by Aristotle. This cognition is the same for all people in terms of the way of receptivity of the object (but not as to the act of subjective reception). The difference describes both sides of the appearance of the one and the same individual intellect. For the distinction of both provisions, Ockham uses the difference between the *potentia substantialis* and *accidentalis*, which had been developed in the Franciscan school by Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). The term “*potentia substantialis*” was given a new status by Olivi and Gandavus with regard to the categorical predication of the relation at the level of substance (*relatio substantialis*, ch. 5.3.3). Ockham rejected a transformation of potency into a substance of the third kind; no critical Aristotelian can multiply beings of the third kind. We want to quote the swan song of the last authentic connoisseur of Averroes and the last defender of the first Averroism.

“This is evident from the interpretation of the third book of *De anima*, where it is said that the intellect is given in potency before something joins it or before it begins to recognize, and other ways come after that. Before that, it is in the pure substantial potency (*ante est in potentia essentiali*) and after that, when he leaves this state through activity, he is in the accidental potency to the act that is similar to him (*in potentia accidentali ad actum consimilem*). Therefore, the habitual state of the intellect is given in the act (*intellectus per habitum generatum ex actu*) and is in the accidental potency (*in potentia accidentali*). But then one cannot experience anything in the pure accidental potency with regard to cognition (*nunquam experitur*), because it is produced but after the act of understanding.” [[481]](#footnote-481)

The quotation defines two modalities of the receptive intellect: the first mode is given as the intellect in itself in the form of an abstract species; the second mode means the actualized personal cognition (*aliter est intellectus in potentia ante addiscere vel invenire quam post*). We recognize only from the senses, and the receptive intellect a pure *tabula rasa*.[[482]](#footnote-482) In this perspective, the *intellectus possibilis* represents an empty concept of Averroes’s fourth genus, which does not exist in reality, because the potency does not exist in reality, only as a concept in thinking. Ockham understands by the term “*potentia essentiali*” something quite different from Rufus’s and Scotus’s conception of hypostatic intellect as *tertium ens*. The intellect is essentialist in nature because of the sense-based knowledge that is tied to the body as a singular substance. Hermeneutics commented on the key text about the ability of the intellect to understand everything (*De anima* 430a14–15). The Commentator clearly states in the corresponding page of CMDA that this abstractly conceived intellect as potency becomes an existential faculty in the act of the soul (*illud quod fit*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Ockham refused the Oxforder term “*potentia substantialis*” as a being of the third kind that makes a mix of passive and active intellect. The universal and immaterial form of the intellect exists only as a concept in thinking, also in the mode of *quartum genus* according to CMDA. Ockham, like Siger, emphasizes that the human intellect in and of itself is a mere mental potency. The term “*potentia essentialis*” must by no means be understood as a Porretan substance according to Rufus, but with regard to Siger’s conception of the intellect as the immaterial potency of the person given as the first substance. The intellect is potency given as “*inmixtus*” with regard to the body as a material substance, because the intellect has no physical organ. Therefore, the intellect cannot be hypostatized in any way, as modernists mistakenly do. The possible intellect of the first Averroism has no substantial possibility of existence in and of itself.

The second Averroism and the Thomistic Semiaverroism postulate, out of ignorance of CMDA, a separated *intellectus possibilis* of Averroists as an immaterial “substance—potency” that is the same for all people. Ockham, in contrast to sophistic modernists, read CMDA as carefully as Albert, Bacon or Siger. The essential definition of the possible intellect of the above-quoted passage CMDA 437.18–438.24 shows the twofold ipseity of the intellect with regard to the abstractly defined intellect (*hoc pronomen 'ipsum' potest referri ad intellectum materialem*) and with regard to the person who understands something (*ad hominem intelligentem*). Ockham’s first conception of the intellect as abstraction (*ante est in potentia essentiali*) expresses the same definition as we find in Siger (*de natura sua solum est in potentia ut nobis copuletur*, ch. 4.4.3). No universal intellect can recognize something in the real act of cognition; the intellect as a being of the third kind does not really exist. Something else is the existential form of the intellect given in the actualized cognition of the person. We experience the act of recognition in the first person and contingently, also only through *potentia accidentalis*. This is an actual habitus of passive reception in the sense of Averroes’s *tertium genus*, which is bound to the personalized act of intellect (*intellectus per habitum generatum ex actu*). This passage builds on the quoted commentary of CMDA, because Ockham comments on the following sentence in CMDA with regard to habitus. Averroes’s intellect becomes an intellect only in the act of real cognition (*illud quod fit*) and thus receives its habitus (*quod est in habitu*). The quotation emphasizes against the modernists that the habitus of receptivity arises only in the personal act of cognition. It cannot be otherwise at all, since pure potency has no possibility of existence. One cannot make out of the intellect an *a priori* given quasi-substance. This would mean the multiplication of beings of the third kind, which is nonsensical from the point of view of CMDA and Ockham. Scotists and modern Porretans hypostatized the habitus and thus created another being of the third kind. Ockham reminds the school of Scotists that the possible intellect through this personal act becomes an actualized receptive ability of the bodily experienced soul (*est in potentia accidentali*). The possible intellect exists only in the personal soul and in the body; therefore, the actuality of the possible intellect is not innate in the sense of an objective potency given in some universal and actualized intellectual substance (*potentia substantialis*). Since the receptive habitus of acceptance is given in the soul as a faculty, we can recognize universally in the mode of correspondence (*ad actum consimilem*). The keyword “*consimile*” expressly refers to the central part of the teaching in CMDA 409.654–62 with regard to the receptive intellect as the fourth genus in the sense of the common human ability (*intelligible esse oportet dividi in consimilia hiis duobus*; OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). Ockham strictly rejected the scenario of cognition according to second Averroism, which we also find in Scotus′s teaching. The modernity hypostatizes any ability or phenomenon by putting it into the Avicenist form of some essence (*potentia essentialis*). Then, they state the “exsistence” of this quasi-substance as a contingent occurrence of this Porretan hypostasis in reality (*potentia accidentalis*). Ockham abolished this concept by abolishing the absurd intellect of *Modernorum* that produces this fallacy. The second Averroism and the school of Scotists must find in the intellect an island of actuality, which is constituted by the *a priori* and substantially given habitus taken beyond of accidental cognition made out of sensually given perceptions (ch. 5.3.2). Since Pecham, the modernity has introduced the Augustinian memory of the third kind (*memoria*) as the mythological place of the actualized species, from where it pulls out the actualized substantial intellect at will (*locus specierum*, ch. 4.3.1). This mythological actuality, which refers to the world of *tertium ens*, is, of course, only immanent because the nonsense does not really exist. The academic Furies then kindle the much-needed light of objective enlightenment in the enlightened intellect of *Modernorum*, which ensures the illumination of the sense coming from behind.

Ockham fundamentally contested this crazy solution of “natural” (also: objective) cognition. Let us see the entire argument devoted to this problem in the treatise *Reportatio II*, qq. 12–13. The habitus is given neither by God, nor by the actualization of some innate ideas or first principles, nor by the memory habitually given as an Augustinian *locus specierum*. Ockham fundamentally rejects all possibilities of *a priori* given actualization of intellect. Modernity stands and falls with the exposure of the intellect made from behind, because it separated its paranoid cognition from the actuality of sensual phantasms. Ockham clearly states that other cognition is not possible for man (*intellectus possibilis nihil intelligit nisi per conversionem ad phantasmata*; OTh 7, 278.6‒7). The transition from the pure potentiality of the intellect as a *tabula rasa* cannot be realized by any immanent path à la Avicenna or Descartes’s and Husserl’s concept of “Flying man.” The objectively given habitus as hypostasis does not exist, because the habitual possession of cognition arises only on the basis of the already learned acts of cognition, which are given at the level of accidental and strictly personal receptivity of the intellect. The modernists define the intellect as a habitus, which is endowed with its own immanent actuality from nature or from God. Ockham opposes such a solution in principle.

“Habitus cannot transfer the intellect from the essential potency to an accidental one. The habitus presupposes the existence of the already given actualized cognition and assumes that the transition from the essential to an accidental possibility is already being realized. The habitus is given only with regard to the cognition of real things.” [[483]](#footnote-483)

The intellect is in and of itself a pure potency given in thought. In itself, nothing actualized exists in any form of habitus (*non potest esse habitus*). The quotation reminds us that habitus, as a classical accident on the second substance, is the faculty of cognition, which has its origin in the external act (*habitus praesupponit actum*). The habitus presupposes that the abstract intellect, as a pure *potentia essentialis*, is already actualized by the act of this or that individual action of the intellect (*praesupponit intellectum reductum de potentia essentiali*). Therefore, from the point of view of the imposition of meaning, the habitus is determined by the hylemorphic first substance (*habitus non est nisi respectu complexorum*). The insight of modern *illuminati* exists as such before any sensual experience. From this insight of modernity, the dubious conception of truth as the assimilation of *tertium ens* was brought about, to make the dogmatic system of the one truth. According to Ockham, all these possibilities deny the statute of the receptive intellect and cancel the Aristotelian definition of the soul as a *tabula rasa*. In the next quotation, Ockham explicitly rejects Rufus’s and Scotus’s innate habitus of the first principles of cognition, which Descartes, Kant and Husserl adopted. The radically potential intellect cannot be a previously given actualized habitus, because it arises from the senses and from the real substances thanks to cognition. Let us summarize the conclusion of the entire argument in *Ordinatio II*, qq. 12–13 together. Ockham’s razor stands out for its simplicity and precision, because it nullifies Scotus’s objective species by pointing to the real course of cognition. The objectively existing species needed the hypostatized habitus as an *a priori* actualized component of the intellect. Ockham’s razor did away with both nonsensical entities.

“Therefore, everything that can be defined by objective species can be defined by the habitus of cognition. Then the habitus is sufficient for recognition and all those species are superfluous.” [[484]](#footnote-484)

Modern mythological species are put in the diacosmos of objective rationality between God and man; Ockham considers them unnecessary. Their function quite reliably fulfills the Aristotelian habitus given by exposure of cognition taken from the front. The habitus given by repeated cognition is able to completely explain the autonomy of intellect as a cultivated faculty of cognition. When the habitus is established through exposure of the sense from the front, it generates the recognition and reflection of the first principles of cognition (*omnia … possunt salvari per habitum*). Then no univoke objective species is necessary, which justifies a recognition of the simulacra given outside the real thing (*species superfluit*). Such a recognition cannot exist because it would abolish the basic presupposition of *suppositio*, which we have stated in the introduction of *Categories* in the form of the hyparchical predication given for the relation between the first and the second substance (OBJ I, ch. 1.3).

Ockham knows exactly what he is talking about when he explains the basic rules of predication and supposition according to Aristotle, Boethius and Abelard. We can summarize his concept of supposition. It is given by the difference between the imposition of meaning of the first substance (*suppositio personalis*) and the logical supposition made in the mode of equivalence (*intentio secunda*).

“The terms signify in the mode of the first intention (*nomina primae intentionis*), provided that they have a supposition of meaning given with regard to real things (*supponunt personaliter*). Therefore, these terms are predicated only with regard to real things (*supponunt tantum pro rebus*). Then they can only be verified by the fact that these terms have a supposition related to meaning of the term given in this manner (*supponunt pro suis significatis*). Therefore, these terms are neither related to themselves (*non pro se ipsis*) nor to any other meaning, which is derived solely from the signification itself (*nec pro aliis a suis significatis*). Then it applies that the saying ‘man is a unique thing,’ which is given in the mode of the first intention, is only related to the actualized person (*pro re*) and does not apply within the framework of the second intention (*non pro aliqua intentione secunda*).” [[485]](#footnote-485)

The first assumption of universal meaning comes solely and exclusively from reality (*supponunt tantum pro rebus*) and is therefore verifiable only with regard to reality (*verificantur de nominibus rerum*). This supposition is given in full measure as an imposition, which signifies the hyparchical meaning from reality (*illa nomina supponunt pro suis significatis*). The quotation defends the line of the fundamental principle “*ex inmediatis*” taken from *Seconds Analytics* interpreted according to Abelard and to the first Averroism. The first supposition of meaning goes to the first substances (*nomina primae intentionis*) in the mode of the metaphysical dative. This supposition is given as an imposition of the univocal meaning related to hyparchical real substances. Ockham is well aware that the writing *Categories* defends a completely different concept of imposition and supposition than modern Porretans. They sophistically had been mixing metaphysical meaning of the unique first substance and the universally predicted meaning of the second substance at Oxford for almost a century. Ockham asserts that the conception of truth in the context of the correspondence of the real thing and its scientific cognition cannot be replaced by anything, because the primary imposition of meaning (*suppositio personalis*) in the order of cognition is categorical and univocally separated from mere naming and from analogical or otherwise equivalent correspondence given only in thinking (*secunda intentio*). The second substance cannot be replaced by any being of the third kind in the sense of Scotus’s objective *ens*, which defines the abstract thing in a univocal manner. This coincided with the objective metaphysics created by Scotus and his school, because it postulates a universally given objective supposition (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*, ch. 5.3.2). The objective signification of being cannot exist at the level of hyparchical first substances, because they exist in and of itself. That is why the univocity of meaning exists at the level of the second substance, if the statement signifies in the mode of the first intention (*nomina primae intentionis*). In such a case, the imposition of meaning is given with regard to real first substances. All other forms of predication already belong to the equivalent sphere of logical meaning given only in thought (*intentio secunda*). Such a signification refers from one concept to the second on the level of pure plurivocity, since the concepts refers to each other (*per se ipsis nec per aliis a suis significatis*). According to Ockham, Scotus’s objective predication is merely an logical exercise and not a metaphysics. The plurivocal signification cannot replace the first intention given in the context of the categorical univocal predication (*enuntiatio*). This categorical predication with regard to reality is defined by the writing *De anima*, the introduction of *De interpretatione*, as well as the position of the middle link of the deduction in *Seconds Analytics*. Ockham defends against Scotists the same position that Abelard had already taken against Porretans. Once again, it is true that any doubling of the first intention by the second intention is nonsense, because it creates an unnecessary and absurd being of the third kind. Univocity and plurivocity have a different status in terms of scientific cognition (*demonstratio*), because they differ in the fundamental metaphysical question of how the first imposition or the second supposition is given. The true statement (*enuntiatio vera*) is determined only by the supposition given from the external thing (*quando supponunt pro rebus supponunt significative et personaliter*).[[486]](#footnote-486) Let us recall Abelard’s distinction between the mere *significatio* and the scientific *enuntiatio* for the demonstrative deduction of scientific syllogism (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). For Ockham, the Scotism and the second Averroism apply only in the mode of plurivocity, that is, at the level of the second intention established as logical abstraction.

The separation of the imposition from real first substances and the supposition given only in thought was defended in the generation before Ockham by Bacon against the Oxford analysts from Kilwardby’s school (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). This key division of meaning, according to the canonical text *Cat*. 2a14–16 explains the series of the so-called “nominalist” assertions of Ockham, which allegedly agree with Scotus’s teaching. Hermeneutics, in accordance with the previous interpretation, asserts that this correspondence is valid only in the mode of the second intention, which, for Ockham, establishes the meaning only in the mode of logical equivalence. See, for example, the polemic with Scotus’s term “*esse completive universale*”. The writing *Ordinatio II* of Scotus considers that objective determination of being to be valid *univoce* for all individuals (*ipsum idem aliqua identitate est praedicabile de quodlibet individuo*; *Ordinatio II*, d. 3, q. 1, no. 38; ed. Vaticana VII, 407). Scotus mixed imposition and supposition because his individual replaced the Aristotelian second substance. Then this objective determination is clearly meant as univoical in Scotus′s metaphysics. According to Ockham, this is a fundamental error, because logical plurivocation cannot replace the univocal categorical meaning given by imposition. Metaphysics is not logic. For the classical metaphysics of imposition, the principle of “*destructio primis*” applies, while logical supposition makes do with the metaphysics of chimera. The objective identity is given by the negation of nullity and in the mode of minimal being, and not by the predication with regard to first substances. But due to the minimal being of the third kind, it forms a universal substrate for any predication of individuals and it is thus objectively unified. Ockham critically states that Scotus’s concept of “*esse completive universale*” is conceived in the mode of sophistic imposition towards reality. For Ockham, the universal being can therefore never be given in the Porretan mode of “*exsistere,*” because the objective mode “*completive*” would replace the imposition of meaning given by hyparchical first substances. According to Ockham, Scotus’s predication is not univocal and thus neither scientific nor metaphysical. Scotus’s conception merely imitates the imposition of the meaning taken from real first substances. Such an imitation of the categorical statement, according to Ockham, abolished the truth as a correspondence and the Aristotelian concept of science according to the principle “*ex inmediatis*” in *Seconds Analytics*. The erroneously established signification represents a typical error in the mode “*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*,” which justified the fundamental fallacy (*Irrtum*) of modernity. Ockham explains to Scotists that their objective determinations are sophistically issued for a categorical predication; they are but universal and equivocal, and they exist as mere second intentions in the thinking of the knower. This is proved by the principle “*destructio primis*,” because after the destruction of the first real substance named “Sortes,” the imposition that establishes the universal meaning expires as well (*destructo sorte destruatur quodlibet essentiale sibi, sequitur quod aliquod commune vere destruatur*).[[487]](#footnote-487) As a result, imposition in the mode of “*suppositio personalis*” differs from the mere equivalent term “Sortes” (*secunda intentio*) established only in thought. But equivocally (metaphorically, poetically, logically, etc.) it is true that this individual is a human being because he is left with some minimal and no further divisible meaning (*certum est quod remanet aliquod commune ex quo remanet individuum*). The quotation clearly shows to Scotists that their individual makes but an equivocal term that has nothing in common with the categorical signification of the second substance. Its meaning disappears after the disappearance of the first substance, because the corpse is not a human being.

### 5.4.2 Reality versus Metaphysics

The second step of Ockham’s razor shows what a nonsensical situation was created in the case of an objective doubling of reality. Ockham expertly attacked the most problematic point of Scotus’s objective deduction of categories. This fundamental deduction of objectivity is denoted by *dativus possessivus* (ch. 5.3.1). The group of *illuminati* took Avicenna′s minimal essence as a nominal subject that replaced the Aristotelian second substance. The logical supposition is taken in the sense *absolute* and the metaphysical imposition has been completely removed. This absurd operation doubled the determination of being into a real one and into an objective one. The dispute over the interpretation of “*destructio primis*” (OBJ I, ch. 1.3) expose the fundamental difference between the modernists and Ockham. Scotus extinguished the Sun and kept its ray in the mode of the objective species (ch. 5.3.2). Let’s return to Scotus’s point of view. Scotus explained the key thesis of *Categories* about the primacy of the substance (*Cat*. 2b5–6) in the sense of an Avicennian essence (ch. 5.3.1). Ockham considers this point to be a fundamental error of *Modernorum*. The universal concept of essence arises only in the process of logical abstraction; consequently, it has the character of the second intention. The supposition of meaning contained in the second intention cannot replace the imposition of meaning given by real first substances. In the second intention, the supposition merely establishes an equivalent concept of truth. This evolution was completed in the contemporary stage of intellectual madness (*Irre*) in the manner of Derrida and Rorty’s differentiation and metaphorization of so-called post-truths. Or this assumption is realized by the media lie and the manipulations of the one percent of *illuminati*, who defend their power and financial interests through the cloud computing. In line with the entire school of the first Averroism, Ockham fundamentally denies that the corpse is a human being in the sense of the objectively existing person, which presupposes Scotus’s thesis “*esse completive universale*.” Man objectively does not exist, because the objective “exsistence” can be found only as a being of the third kind. Ockham clearly states that similar theories apply only in the order of the second intention and do not refer to real substances and to supposita in the order of the first intention. Within the framework of the second intention, Ockham is not particularly interested in the supposition, because it has no direct relation to reality and has a completely equivocal character. As a result, it is not based on truth as an Aristotelian correspondence that is necessary for scientific cognition of reality. The assumption of the second intention is valid only in the order of the sense determined by the nominal meaning of the word. That anti-modernist point of view is expressed in Ockham’s main work *Summa logicae* and especially in the part devoted to imposition of meaning from the direction of the real existing single thing. The following quotation rejects the fiction of modern Porretans; they interpret the real thing by analytical decomposition into two hypostases in the mode “*quo est*” and “*quod est*.” This procedure, they borrow it from Boethius (ch. 5.3.3) by using it in a sophistic manner.

“If it is claimed that the individual named Sortes means a signification related to the composition of the essence and individual difference, and that this composition is capable of carrying its essence, then this is invalid. As it was shown above, such a composition is nonsense.” [[488]](#footnote-488)

Averroists of the second wave linked two kinds of species together since Rufus that made out the concept of univocal *scibile*. The first species is considered essence in thinking (*quod est*), and the second species comes to being in the process of Avicennist *denudatio* related to real things (*quo est*). They combined both hypostases in the Rufus’s theory of the truth as *coaequatio* in order to create an objective “*res*” within the framework of the universal hylemorphism. The being of the third kind thus composed, according to Ockham, is nonsense. Things are separate from our cognition and actualized exist in reality in the mode *simpliciter* and not *universaliter*. The quotation says that a supposition of meaning would arise with regard to the absurd composition (*Sortes supponit pro uno composito*). The nominalists and objectivists made an absurd mixture of real things (*ex natura*) and of the last difference, which separates the *species specialissima* from the meaning that cannot be further divided (*ex differentia individuali*). It cannot be more absurd; the signification is never directly united to real things and the *individuum* entails practically no propre meaning. All that makes a stupity on second degree. The objective supposition of *Nominales* follows the example of the division of universal meaning within the framework of the Porphyry′s Tree. It goes down to the level of the individual or to the univocal conception of *ens inquantum ens*. For Ockham, such kind of sophistry represents a bare nonsense (*hoc non valet*). No essence or difference can be inserted into real things in such a way that a Porretan individual could be created. The primary imposition exists only with regard to external and actualized first substances; let us see the previous remark from the commentary on *Peri hermeneias* (*quando supponunt pro rebus supponunt significative et personaliter*). If we doubled the first simple substance by some additional difference, then the absurd world of modernity would arise at the level of a second creation of the world in the doctrine of universal hylemorphism (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Scotus transformed the ontotheology of first modernists into an objective metaphysics. The criticism of Scotist′s doctrine shows that modern metaphysics, due to the erroneous categorical predication, is only a sophistical exercise at the level of the former schools of *Nominales*. Scotists and postmodern objectivists created suppositions of the third kind, which are objectively or even univocally valid for existing real things in the Porretan mode “*completive*.” This gave rise to nonsensical entities of the third kind (*individuum, concretum, scibile*) that make a sophistic simulacrum of reality. Similar chimerical excesses of diligent academic mind, according to Ockham, are given only in human thinking, because they are not determined by real first substances. Nothing can be added to the thing in reality; we only state its existence truthfully. We neither form the meaning *ex nihilo* in the hypostatized Cartesian intellect, nor do we reflect it from the divine rationality, as Scotist′s *illuminati* assumed.

Scotists abolished the original sense of the metaphysical dative. Aristotle claims that the second substance states the being of first substances. Ockham rejected in principle a doubling of the second substance into an objective pure being and a categorical substance. Metaphysics must predict the unity of meaning in the mode of the metaphysical dative, in relation to real first substances given *simpliciter* and *actualiter*. Lost in their objective parousia of mythological meaning, modernists proceed exactly the opposite way; they project their gnostic fantasies into actualized first substances.

“In this way, the existing individual cannot be conceived, because, according to them, any individual essence includes differentiation. Then an existing individual given in terms of its own essence and differentiation would also include another [objective] individual composed of individuated essence and differentiation; this is nonsense.” [[489]](#footnote-489)

The assumption of the modernists, in the mode “*completive*,” forms an absurd composition of the objectively given nature of this or that thing, which would then be differentiated to the level of the atomic individual (*unum compositum ex natura et differentia individuali*). They then proclaim this composition as a second predicable substance (*compositum*), which they state within the framework of the numerically conceived unity (*unum*). This composition of the real substance and the objective simulacrum (*unum compositum*) exists neither as a real thing nor as an intentional content that is made through Aristotelian abstraction. According to Ockham, this kind of objective fairy tale made in the mode “*completive*” is metaphysical nonsense (*quod est absurdum*). Within the framework of the movement of difference in the universal *Arbor Porphyriana*, the division represents a mere equivocal or logical exercise in thinking, which cannot affect the real thing (*nullam naturam individuam sustentat*). It is all about a wrong supposition that lacks the first intention. Such an equivocal assertion is valid only when comparing the meaning within the framework of the second equivocal intention. In the order of logical and mathematical abstraction, one can think of everything in all ways and means, because abstraction based on the logical imposition is a pure equivalence of universal concepts. In the order of logical abstraction and the second intention, one can project everything possible into everything possible, provided that it is logically correct. And the metaphysics of chimera is logically correct. Unfortunately, logical correctness does not at all ensure metaphysical truthfulness; it is given on the basis of the correspondence of meaning that is categorically stated within the framework of the first intention. The difference between the first and the second intention means that both quoted versions of the “*unum compositum*” cannot be placed in the relation of correspondence; the modernists did it on the basis of the misguided doctrine of universal hylemorphism and due to its Scotist’s objective variant. The correspondence of mentally given concepts proceeds only in thinking of modern *illuminati*, which is an absurd position in terms of the true cognition of reality. Ockham, like Bacon, called for a return to the first substance, pointing out to Oxford′s modernists the absurd consequences of their paranoid attitude.

Ockham’s razor turned out to be a useful tool. The modern conception of intellect, cognition, truth and species produced nonsensical beings of the third kind and thus disqualified itself. The person in her or his animated body makes the actualized substratum of all intellectual activities. Due to the definition of intellect as *tertium genus* we do not feel any metaphysical dualism à la Avicenna, Scotus or Descartes. Ockham reminds the modernists in Oxford that there is a real man as the first substance. True philosophy must take that hyparchical substance to state the cognitive processes and deductive categorical statements accordingly. Modern paranoia can proceed in reverse, that is, to decompose man in two or several modern substances in order to put that nonsense together as objectively given “man.” Since the receptive intellect forms the faculty of the soul as a form or faculty of the body, the Avicennistic scheme of *Modernorum* was false. The rejection of being of the third kind is connected with the fundamental criticism of Scotus’s conception of the objective species. Scotists postulated the cognition of autonomous intelligible species given as an objective being. They grasped those species objectively and *univoce* in things, in God and in thinking (ch. 5.3.3). Even if an objective supposition existed in the mode “*esse completive universale*,” because of the logical supposition, it could not ground metaphysical knowledge. The real Sun goes in one direction; from this follows the imposition as deductive proof; only at the end there is the logical supposition and nihilistic thought experiments of today. The metaphysical (and not logical or objective) knowledge is based on the actuality of real first substances that are taken by sensual species in order to determine the first imposition of universally given meaning. The corpse is not a human being, because for the predication of man as a second substance, there is no imposition of meaning from reality. The actualization of intellect by first substances preserves the most important value that modernists destroyed even in several steps: the devaluation of reality, the dichotomy of sensual and intelligible cognition, the dualism between the two substances in man, as well as the objective deduction of cognition from God instead of from reality. Ockham knows that we cannot multiply beings because they are given in reality; that is fully sufficient for normal and critical cognition. Ockham’s criticism is aimed primarily at Scotus’s divine causality that we experience directly in our soul, which establishes objectivity (*experimur quod quando cognoscimus causam in universali*, ch. 5.3.2). Since the modernists took up a falsely oriented direction of cognition, they must insist on a division of intellectual cognition from the bodily senses. For knowledge, the principle of actualization applies in one direction; the real Sun goes across the sky and we see it. Objectivists like Scotus derive their species theoretically even in the absence of the Sun. Afterwards, they falsely claim that those species actualize knowledge.

“No universal can actualize the sensual faculties, because it is not given in things, as was stated above. The senses relate to real things and not to universals.” [[490]](#footnote-490)

The universal is a potential entity and as such it can never justify the cognition of the actualized single thing (*nullum tale commune movet potentiam sensitivam*). Cognition starts thanks to the hyparchical thing that is recognized by the senses in its individuality (*sensus tantum est particularium*). One cannot recognize otherwise, because the universals do not exist at the level of the first real substance (*quia non est in re*). The intelligible species arises only thanks to the receptivity of the through the actuality of the sensual species, which actualizes the receptivity of the universal intellect. The exposure of meaning comes from reality and it grounds the determination of cognition. Since a person such as Socrates and Sortes really exist or existed, the imposition of meaning concerning the word “man” is given due to their existence. The individual and actualized species are given by material cognition through the senses. They represent the basis for the imposition of the potential and universal meanings in the intellect.

The defense of truth as an Aristotelian correspondence proceeds from the difference between the universal cognition of the intellect and the singular cognition of the senses. But this difference is not given in the form of the impassable modern dualism, as was the case in the second Averroism since Bonaventura and Aegidius Romanus (ch. 4.3.2). The exposure of the being from behind, by Avicennist *denudatio* makes the process of Aristotelian abstraction impossible and abolishes the truth as correspondence. The intellect is then moved by its own ideas. The Oxford′s philosopher explains to then prevailing sophistic modernists that the difference between the two types of cognition is not given as an impassable dualism, which modernity overcomes by introducing being of the third type. The difference between the two modes of cognition concerns the actualized reality of the first substance and its accidental and potential cognition in the order of universality. Let us return to the polemic regarding the recognition of the white according to Scotus’s objectivity and Husserl’s noematic inexistence of the objective meaning of the “whiteness” in consciousness (ch. 5.3.3). Ockham uses the difference between the *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* to explain the absurdity of modern thinking. The essence of whiteness is not a “real” or “objective” presence of truth on a actualized substrate (“white car”). True cognition entails but the real first substance that establishes by its actuality the cognition of whiteness. We cannot recognize the other way around, that is, to go from the potentially given abstraction in thinking (“whiteness”) to the real thing (“white car”). Ockham unequivocally rejected the exposure of the sense of being taken from behind, which Scotists and modern Porretans defended.

“Furthermore, according to them, the possible intellect is guided to cognition solely by the intelligible species and by the active intellect (*species intelligibilis et intellectus agens*). In the actual sense of the word, these species are not the object of cognition for the receptive intellect, because they are something else and represent the object of cognition in a different sense.” [[491]](#footnote-491)

According to representatives of second Averroism (*secundum istos*), the intellect is actualized beyond sensually recognized first substances. In such a case, *intellectus possibilis* is determined not by sensual species, but by intelligible species, which are given by the active intellect. The key part of the criticism concerns the conception “*inmediate*,” because both elements changed Aristotelian conception of cognition (*movet intellectum possibilem ad intellectionem immediate*). The quotation clearly states the fundamental fallacy of *Modernorum* given in the analytical conception of the principle “*immediate*.” This principle is taken by the exposure of being taken from behind, from the direction of hypostatized essences. The actualized *intellectus agens* justifies by itself the cognition. It disposes of and manipulates already existing species that are either “really” or “objectively” found in things or habitually stored in modern memory as *locus specierum*. The last sentence reminds the modernists that the intended and abstracted *species intelligibilis* and the corresponding active component of the intellect is carried out in a different part of cognition than *intellectus possibilis*. The receptive intellect absorbs the sensual species within the framework of the first intention, while the active intellect works with abstracted entities, which it compares with each other as objects of cognition. The modern scheme of cognition given by exposure from behind is not true, because it has no reception of the content taken from hyparchical reality; therefore, it has no correspondence of intellect and reality. The scheme known from Kilwardby’s model of “*inmediate*” abolishes the principle of causality, which acts on our cognition through the middle link of syllogism (*medium*). Against the teaching of Rufus and other modernists about the essentially conceived *medium*, Ockham defends the concept of cognition in the mode “*ex inmediatis*” that Albert defended before (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). The middle link of the deduction must be done in the mode “*ex inmediatis*,” that is, it must take the relation to first substances that establish effectivity of things in reality. In Aristotle, the primacy of existence (εἰ ἔστι) comes before essence (τί ἐστιν); the existence of real substance thus given determines the middle link of proof by the principle of causality. The quotation defends exactly the above-mentioned order of the cognitive axioms made according to *Seconds Analytics*, which Grosseteste changed for the first time (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). The action of real substances (*passio*) cannot be replaced by the concept, because the principle of the metaphysical dative would be abolished. The real substance is actual and unique. Therefore, it determines the true signification, where the first substance is predicted in the past tense and therefore universally. There is an eclipse of the real Sun, and not the eclipse of the essence of the Sun, as was the case with Rufus (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1) and then Kilwardby (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.1) and Scotus (ch. 5.3.2). The previous matrices of objectivity have shown that the Oxfordian Fallacy did not include the principle “*ex inmediatis*” in the definition of the middle term of the syllogism. Modernists formally allowed the existence of the first substance to be valid due to the essentialist definition. The definition of the middle link, according to the second Averroism (*de qua iste loquitur*), is nonsense. The following quotation sees this error in Scotus’s metaphysics, which is derived from Rufus’s metaphysics of the essence. This essence acts as a causal factor in the middle link of demonstrative proof.

“With regard to the separated thing that brings about by its real effect on cognition (*rei absolutae importatae per passionem*), there is no other cause than the external one, because only this cause is given as the simple being of the real thing. Based on the middle link of the syllogism, scientific cognition is determined by an external cause. Therefore, there cannot be a mere formal conditions as Scotus (*iste*) claims.” [[492]](#footnote-492)

Cognition is affected by real and extrinsic effects of first substances on each other that passes through sensory experience (*non est alia causa realis nisi extrinseca*). Causality and its effect on cognition cannot be replaced by any concept; the first substance, and therefore also its primary effect, exist absolutely simply (*propter simplicitatem ipsius*). The middle link of syllogism predicts the universal definition of causality (*definitio, quae est medium*) because it is determined by real actions of first substances (*sumitur a causa extrinseca*). Ockham reminds the victorious representatives of Oxfordian Fallacy that their definition of *medium* does not include deductive and demonstrative proceeding, which in turn includes the actions of real first substances. The modernists make only a logical predication in which they plant a set of *tertium ens* that they sophistically substitute for the action of real first substances. Aristotle conceives the *demonstratio* as a kind of reasoning that concerns the effective cause of events. Once irrevocably made as the eclipse of the Sun, they exert a real necessity that enters into demonstrative proof. In such a case, the statements represent the point of view concerning what the thing is as a *substantialiter* and *simpliciter* given being in itself (*Anal. Post*. 90a10). For the modernists, the formal definition of the middle link of the statement (*definitio formalis de qua iste loquitur*) does not include the imposition of meaning taken from the direction of first substances that provide for the causality of things in reality. The same meaning expresses Ockham’s difference between the supposition of the first substance and the absolutely separate existence of the first substance (*ens completum*), to which there is nothing to add from the intellect (*incommunicabile per identitatem, nulli natum inhaerere, et a nullo sustentatum*).[[493]](#footnote-493) Ockham pointed out to contemporaries their fundamental error regarding *Seconds Analytics*. The defense of scientific predication according to the sophistic principle “*immediate*” raised the basic principle of metaphysical cognition. The second Averroism and Scotism represent two very similar forms of Oxfordian Fallacy.

This precise reasoning certainly outraged mainstream academics at Oxford. Ockham, as well as Bacon before him, destroyed the modernist view of the world, which had already reigned here for half a century. In addition, he also brought down the painstakingly compiled picture of Christian ontotheology, which had been created by Bonaventura and maintained at Oxford by the regents Kilwardby and Pecham, both well-known archbishops of Canterbury. The condemnation of the first Averroism of March 1277 showed that every academic institution also knows how to defend itself authoritatively when it is necessary for its survival. Ockham’s greatest opponent was the Scotist John of Reading. He was Franciscan *sententiarius* at Oxford in 1315–17 and his contemporaries described him as Scotus’s best successor. His academic attack on Ockham culminated in 1320. Among Scotists at Oxford was also the editor of Scotus’ work, William of Alnwick, who, however, soon left for a Franciscan mission to Italy (Spade 1999, 22–23). When reality abandoned the modern path of scientific recognition, this was not immediately recognizable, but over the course of several centuries. Then, the whole dispute had to break out anew. Original thinkers as Heidegger see again this fundamental lack of true cognition as a fundamental problem of philosophy. The modernists as Scotus, Descartes and Leibniz bypassed the actualization coming from first substances and put the fundamentals of cognition exclusively in the intellect. See the above quote from Ockham that summed up fatal error of modernity given by the exposure of being taken from behind. The Franciscan Aristotelian, just like his predecessors from the first Averroism, could not allow the dominance of hypostatized mind over the reality. The autodetermination of paranoid thinking separated from the body and thus also from reality is quite characteristic of modernity and postmodernism, as is the schizophrenic relation to the person, which is given by the division of man into two or more substances. Between Scotus and Ockham, for the reasons given above, a dispute had to arise necessarily; the eclipse of common sense was connected with the eclipse of the first substance. Let us recall Scotus’s version of the confinement of the Sun, given in his scheme of the species deduced from the logical mode *per absurdum*. Scotus allowed the theoretical possibility that God could abolish the Sun as a substance and only allow the sun’s ray to be recognized (*si Deus destrueret soils substantiam et conservaret eius lumen*, ch. 5.3.2). Scotus introduced a thought experiment similar to Avicenna’s “Flying man.” This time, it was designed to bypass the external reality of first substances. Light, thanks to the previously given species of light recognized by God, has an objective being in the mode *per prius*. Scotus contented himself for scientific deductive judgment with the universal species given by divine rationality and does not need the real existence of things. From the point of view of Scotus, Descartes and Husserl, nothing terrible happened after the suspension of reality, because the cognition of *illuminati* does not require a contingent world. Oxford modernism lives in the Neoplatonic cave, where, according to Bacon, the mystical Raven of Elijah brings the real food (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). This important creature was indispensable until Scotus’s work, since he destroyed the theory of illumination. Then the role of the mystical raven was replaced by objectively thinking God. This mythological idol of modernity enlightened Scotus’s and Descartes’s evident thinking in such a way that they were able to deduce the objective existence of external world.

The defense mechanism against Ockham as an anti-modernist and a critic of scotism was created by the projection made by inversion in reverse (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). It worked very well, since modernity declared Ockham to be a nominalist. Ockham as a realist and critical thinker reminds academic *illuminati* of the basic principle of cognition, which is the effective causality of first substances working in reality. The real causality cannot be replaced with a formal concept of essence. Objective mythology is not the same as the true science about real first substances. According to Ockham, Scotus’s thought experiment given as *epokhē* of the Sun in the above-cited paper *Lectura I* is nonsense.

“The species is supposedly necessarily given as an effective cause to make a direct insight into cognition, because this species is said to be permanent even in the absence of the recognized thing. Therefore, supposedly, cognition could have acted naturally even in the absence of the given thing. This is false and against the human experience.” [[494]](#footnote-494)

The modern species is defined by the exposure of cognition from behind, due to objective deduction. It cannot replace the causal connection that runs on the level of real substances (*non posset causare naturaliter cognitionem intuitivam in absentia rei*). The real existence cannot be deduced from an essence. Conversely, it is true that a universal essence can be abstracted from real existence and to make a true deductive judgment (*enuntiatio, demonstratio*) can be formed in that manner. According to Ockham, only the exposure of being from the front justifies the correct conception of metaphysically given science, and not only logically, as it is in mathematics and geometry. The quotation indicates the real effect of the first substance (*causa eius efficiens*). If the existence of the thing is given and is demonstratively recognized, then we can subsequently draw valid general conclusions in the scheme of causality. Ockham defends the principle of the metaphysical dative, by which hermeneutics define the Aristotelian metaphysics. But, conversely, this is not true (*quod falsum est et contra experientiam*), because the essence in the intellect is not given before real existence. Let us recall right proceeding of the deductive proof based on the principle “*ex inmediatis*” that is based on the imposition taken from hyparchical existence of external things (*Anal. Post*. 84a11‒14). The rejection of the theory that the species remain even after the disappearance of the real thing (*illa species possit conservari in absentia obiecti*) is directed against Scotus’s thought experiment. He abolished the Sun because the logical permanence of the species is sufficient for objective cognition. Aristotelianism defends the opposite position as Scotus’s analytical science, which operates within the framework of logical proof done *per absurdum*. The causality of the eclipse requires the existence of real astronomical bodies. Our cognition is causally determined by reality and not by the universal concept, which arises *ex post* in cognition. Since the effect of the real first substances actually exists, we are also looking for the general causes in the order of universal cognition (γνόντες δὲ ὅτι ἔστι, τί ἐστι ζητοῦμεν, *Anal. Post*. 89b34). The second Averroism replaced the real existence with the recognized essence and adapted the middle link of the proof to the formal form. Scotus’s objective species cannot ground true knowledge of reality; there is no kind of Aristotelian *medium* that implies the causal action of first substances in a deductive proof. Since the eclipse exists in reality, the deductive theory about the eclipse is given. The order of scientific proof (*demonstratio*), generalizes real causal effects of the Sun and the Moon. The eclipse exists because there are the Sun and the Moon as the first substances. One cannot deduce a real case of solar or lunar eclipse if this fact would not be observable in reality. The entire dispute is repeated objective constellations when Popper attacked the Neopositivism of the Vienna Circle (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Deduction proceeds up to the generalization of empirical experience in universal proof. The essence is given potentially and *simpliciter*; the thing exists *realiter* and actually *simpliciter*. In the sense of hermeneutic diclosure (*alētheia*), the manifestation of existence by Ockham takes the opposite direction than Rufus did. The analytically conceived existence, in the mode of Porretans, proceeds deductively (*exsistit*) from the universally given species into the contingent material reality given species. The existence of the external first substance is deduced in modernism and postmodernism of Descartes and Husserl; also it is led out by general concepts of essence (*idea innata, primum cognitum, scibile, eidos* ...). Therefore, according to the metaphysical dative and according to Parmenides’s real solar trajectory, the process of deductive scientific proof takes only one direction, from reality to universality. Let us recall the orthotomic division in one direction that the dialogue *Sophistes* defends (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). Under the guidance of goddesses of Chaos, modernity runs up and down the mystical Jacob’s ladder like angels; this can only be carried out in the paranoid thinking of *illuminati*. Causality, in the middle link of the proof, follows the exposure of being from the front, because we recognize only through the phantasms. The exposure of cognition from the direction of the real thing led Ockham to the integral defense of cognition according to Averroes. The first Averroism, according to the CMDA, has stated that cognition in the mode of truth as correspondence cannot exist without the corresponding mediation; the singular things causes the emergence of the universal meaning only indirectly, through cognition given as accident.

The next dispute between Ockham and Scotists concerned the position of the *diaphanum* in the scheme of cognition. His conception follows the line of the first Averroism of Blund’s school and the subsequent interpretation of CMDA in the Sicilian school. The actual relevance of *diaphanum* does not stand in relation to the light, because the color moves it only formally and not materially (*secundum quod dat diaphano formam*).[[495]](#footnote-495) Thanks to this receptive character, the *diaphanum* plays an intermediary role between sensual and intellectual cognition. Ockham interprets exactly all important texts of CMDA regarding “*duplex esse*” of *diaphanum* (OTh 6, pp. 68–78). The main argument concerns the separate being of *diaphanum* as the material carrier of light and the intentional ability of the soul, which recognizes this materially given light in a material way through the eye as a sense organ. Scotus can extinguish the Sun because the species of light is permanently and objectively present both as a ray and in the eye that receives it. Ockham considers this theory to be a fundamental error with reference to CMDA. Scotism once again fabricated superfluous species as being of the third kind. Ockham cannot allow the existence of the external world to be suppressed; after the eclipse of the first substance, there would necessarily be an eclipse of the common reason. Following the example of CMDA, Ockham established a connection between the material transmission of light and its sensual cognition, which is an immaterial ability of the soul and not of light itself. The recognition of color is the resulting cognition given on the basis of the individualized intentionality. This is followed by the key part of explanation that determines the diaphanum according to the intentional conception of *proportio* given in CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). The diaphanum, like the *intellectus possibilis*, mediates between both types of cognition. The diaphanum plays a key role. It enables the emergence of both species, which are given by the existence of a thing, on the basis of a double act of intentionality: the first kind of *species sensibilis* is given in animals by *vis aestimativa*; second kind of *species* *intelligibilis* is given in humans by *intellectus possibilis*.

“The color exists in the visible object purely materially; in the eye, however, it arises (*exsistit*) in an immaterial way. But the color arises in the middle link of the act of recognition (*in medio exsistit*) in an immaterial and spiritual manner (*aliquo modo immaterialiter et spiritualiter*). Nature proceeds through materially determined mediation; but matter as such cannot act on immaterial cognition (*purum materiale non agit in immateriale*). Therefore, the sensual object is not causally given in the senses, but arises through the mediating species (*species in medio*). Seeing as mental ability recognizes immaterially ; therefore, this ability cannot directly be affected by anything material.” [[496]](#footnote-496)

The color is given on a material substrate, which carries the recognition, because it is an actualized first substance. This actualized existence of the white thing acquires a new character in the process of cognition. Ockham rejects the conception of Porretans and Scotus that claim the objective being; the mythology of modernity does not belong in critical thinking. Taken by the phenomenology, Ockham following Averroes must explain knowledge in terms of the hermeneutic “how” (πῶς, *quomodo*) that Siger, following *De anima*, clearly assigns to the real thing that is accidentally recognized in mind (ch. 4.4.2). It is then necessary to describe precisely the way in which color actually manifests itself in the process of cognition (*color exsistit in obiecto visibili pure materialiter*). Sensual cognition is given as a faculty of the animalistic or intellectual soul, which is the immaterial form of the body. Cognition, as the faculty of this immaterial soul, recognizes color as already true abstractly and separately from the material reality of the thing (*in oculo autem exsistit immaterialiter*). The term “*in oculo*” does not mean the material sense organ, but the already immaterially given receptive and synthetic recognition faculty of the animal or human soul. The eye is the material instrument of this immaterial mental faculty, which is entirely individual in its act in both animals and humans. Therefore, one can replace the eye prosthetically, but not the recognized species given by the mental act of the animal or the person. Therefore, the diaphanum must in some way include both methods of cognition, because in the process of intellectual mediation an immaterial species arises in the receptive intellect (*in medio exsistit aliquo modo immaterialiter et spiritualiter*). The quotation corrects the fundamental error of the second Averroism. It separated the sensual and intellectual cognition from each other, because it abolished causal mediation through the diaphanum. The second Averroism rejected Averroes’s *proportio* and thereby abolished the correspondence theory of the truth. A direct connection between the material and the immaterial cognition is not possible (*obiectum sensibilie non immediate agit in sensum*). Therefore, the process of mediation that establishes this correspondence (*species in modo*) must exist with the help of the sensual or intelligible species. Ockham is well aware that the term *proportio* makes the central argument of CMDA and he literally quotes the related part in another polemic with Scotists.[[497]](#footnote-497) Therefore, the abstracted species of the first Averroism have a different character than denuded species of the second Averroism that make a being of the third kind. Ockham’s cited term “*species in modo*” is not a substance of the third kind according to the nominal or an objective being that produced Scotus in the categorical mode “*resolutio in quid*” determined by the insight of the “*conceptus simpliciter simplex*” (ch. 5.3.2). The existence of the intentional species is tied to the actualized first substance, which triggers the immaterial recognition process given in the human or animal soul. The sensual or the intelligible species ensures the mediation between both types of cognition. The species cannot exist in the first substance in the sense of any objective insistence, as it suggests Gandavus’s term “*esse ad*” and its objective variation done by Scotus (ch. 5.3.3). The first substance is given *per se* and *simpliciter* and our cognition does not touch it at all. Made according to CMDA, the next quotation shows a brilliant distinction between reality, its physical mediation and subsequent individual recognition.

“Color does not exist materially in the cognitive faculty of vision. If it were received [in the soul] in this material way, it would be given as an extensive material body. It is the same for the color given by mediation, because the color in the [physical] diaphanum would arise purely materially as in the external object (*ibi exsistit pure materialiter sicut in obiecto*)and not intentionally or spiritually(*non intentionaliter nec spiritualiter*). Therefore, it can be said that color arises immaterially in the ability of cognition, because the form of inclusion in the potential cognition has a different definition than the form existing in the material object (*forma recepta in potentia est alterius rationis a forma exsistente in obiecto*).” [[498]](#footnote-498)

Taken in the physical perspective, the diaphanum forms a material carrier of light and thus gives it the necessary material extension on the color surface of the body (*ibi exsistit pure materialiter sicut in obiecto*). This materially given causality, ensured by the transfer of light to the surface, is transferred to the physical senses, which are at the same level as the efficient and material diaphanum. Vision is laid out physiologically, also in the materially given physical organ. The senses are material, and the effect of things on the senses is also direct (*color non exsistit in potentia visiva immaterialiter*). The correspondence at the level of the eye is possible because the light in the environment of the diaphanum exists only materially (*eodem modo est de colore in medio*). The quotation emphasizes against Scotus that the existence of light in the diaphanum in and of itself has only a material character, because it does not contain any intelligible species (*non intentionaliter nec spiritualiter*). The immaterial manifestation of light arises (*exsistit immaterialiter*) thanks to the reception in the sensual or intellectual capacity of the soul, which operates as another kind of diaphanum for mental cognition. This individual act of cognition, through the process of abstraction, firstly forms an individual sensual species and than it synthesizes the universal intelligible species. In the process of the sensual and intellectual abstraction given by the soul as a form of the body, a completely different type of mediation is created (*forma recepta in potentia est alterius rationis a forma exsistente in obiecto*). That is why the hylemorphic form in the first substance and the recognized form in the soul are fundamentally different from each other. From the above quote, it becomes clear that the existence of the Sun as the first substance cannot be enclosed, because the diaphanum in and of itself does not contain an objective species of light. The diaphanum as *perspicuum* transfers the light and the color to the material objects; but these objects we recognize in a completely different immaterial mode by the faculty of the animal or the human soul. The transfer is necessary, and Ockham, unlike modernity, knows the reason. He has to defend the conception of truth as a correspondence and within the framework of the unity of the person. According to CMDA, the exact description of the phenomenology of seeing and cognition excluded any *tertium ens* that would act as Scotus’s objective art after the extinction of the Sun. The ray has a substantial and causal effect, and the diaphanum transmits this causality of light in the material mode. Our cognition receives the various forms of the diaphanum and therefore directly depends on the existence of the first substance. The immaterial forms of mediation by which we recognize individually and personally (*species sensibilis, intelligibilis*) do not have an ideal or objective character, as the school of *Nominales* and Scotus claimed. There is no ontological intermediate member in the sense of some hypostatic universals of modernity that can enter this scheme of knowledge. For one thing, it would be meaningless, and for another it would abolish true knowledge of the world in the mode *proportionaliter* as CMDA postulates it. The first link of material mediation, which is necessary for our immaterial cognition, would be missing. In the case of the confinement of the Sun, the physical diaphanum cannot keep the light in a hypostatic and hypothetical manner, because it conveys the real light and heat in the given act of mediation. Its originator is the Sun as an autonomous first substance, which has a causal effect on the diaphanum as physical *perspicuum*. If God removed the Sun, its causal effect would end and so would our knowledge of the world. Scotus’s construction, which ensures objective recognition, is therefore fundamentally flawed.

“If God were to cancel the effect of the Sun with regard to the light, then the Sun could not cause heat, because he cannot cause it otherwise than through the mediation given by the light.” [[499]](#footnote-499)

The series of the causal action from the Sun to the heating or to the exposed colored surface is given primarily in real actions of first substances (*sol causare calorem*). The chain of causality given by the Sun and its emitted rays cannot be replaced in the order of the objective species, because then the mediation instances given materially and therefore really and causally would cease to exist.

The dispute over the suspension of the Sun and the subsequent recognition of reality within the framework of modern *epokhē* preserves a fundamental character. Ockham rejects the direct insight into the first principles, as well as in the existence of objective species, which in modernity supplanted causal effects of real things. This model of “objective science” is fundamentally false. According to Aristotelian Ockham, the basic order of the principles of cognition according to *Seconds Analytics* applies in science that proceeds from the causal primacy of the first substance. The second Averroism and Scotus abolished this order given by the common sense and by *Seconds Analytics* built on common sense. The existence and causality of first substances, according to Ockham, precede the essence. The reality of the world, by its actuality, determines the universal human cognition, the result of which consists in the adequately true statements made within the framework of the universal essence. In the mode of the hyparchical predication “*ex inmeditatis*”, we can truthfully recognize only those things that are actually given; only the first substances given in this way can have an effect on our cognition. The previous chapter has shown that conceptual cognition without imposition and thus also without correspondence is based on cognition only at the level of the second intention (*intentio secunda*). The cognition of the reality given only in thinking is therefore only equivocal. In the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy, analytical *illuminati* extended the generic determination of mathematics given only in thought. They began to state the cognition of reality from this utopian position. Ockham objects against Scotists that the cognition by a direct essential insight is given only in the mode of formal logic and not of metaphysics. Vision of essences in the form of Grosseteste’s or Bonaventura’s exemplar does not require a real thing for its act of existence. Modern paranoia, according to the brilliant definition of Ockham, is given in the fact that for the realization of the analytical Cartesian and Husserl’s version of the illumination, only the formal meaning is sufficient. The modern and postmodern *illuminati* recognize with certainty when the act of seeing reaches its final object of their eidetic intuition (*possit actum intuitivum terminare*).[[500]](#footnote-500) Whether this object of illumination really exists or not, that is a completely different question, which is unfortunately quite marginal for modern *illuminati*. The quotation reminds the modernists that their cognition is true even if the thing does not exist at all (*hoc stat quod obiectum sit nihil*); or, when it is removed from real things due to logical abstraction (*quod sit distans per maximum distantiam*). Within the framework of logical or mathematical abstraction, the real science cannot be established, nor can we achieve a true cognition of the world. Ockham does not deny that the intuitive insight into reality transcends the sensually determined natural cognition. The presence or absence of the work of God, angels, etc. is no longer determined with the help of sensual experience. However, this realm belongs to the supernatural mode of cognition.

“Through direct insight I can know that a thing does not exist if it is not directly given. But such cognition cannot be natural (*ista cognitio non potest esse naturalis*). If there is such cognition, it is not grounded in us in a natural way that is based on a present and actually existing object of cognition. And if this object does not exist, then there is no natural cognition.” [[501]](#footnote-501)

The quotation reminds that the direct recognition of immaterial forms, beings and objectivity cannot be obtained in the natural order, because no corresponding actualized object is determined (*obiecto praesente et exsistente*). In the natural order of things, such cognition did not arise because it does not experience actualization from the hylemorphic reality (*ista cognitio intuitiva naturalis corrumpitur per absentiam obiecti*). To recognize the existence or non-existence of first substances by direct insight is a supernatural achievement (*ista cognitio non potest esse naturalis*). The modern *intelligentia spiritualis* imagines that they keep an actualized intelligible form, just like cosmic intelligences. However, such cognition is not determined by the presence of matter. The insight is valid in the order of pure forms and it is given in the act of illumination; it means the transgression of the order of human cognition that is limited by the senses. According to Ockham, the objective recognition of modern *illuminati* is a real supernatural achievement. Their direct insight into the immaterial pure essence was inspired in his time by the mysticism of Scholasticism, the Kabala and the Neoplatonic Falsafa. We find the mystical exits of thought from the body in the New Testament epistles of Paul (2 Cor 12:2), including its ability of prophetic seeing (Ef 1:18; 3:9). The same tradition exists in Sufism for Muhammad (*Kitab al Miraj* alias *Liber Scale Machometi*), and the same can be found in the Jewish mysticism of the Merkaba, which speculates about the chariot of Elijah in a similar symbolism, as is the case with Muhammad’s mystical leap with the horse to the Heaven. The echo of these theories in Ockham’s time can be found in his contemporary Dante. See his important letter (*Epist*. 13), which was written to the duke Can Grande in Cremona (March 1318), which explains the plan and the idea of *Divine Comedy*. Philosophical modernism adopted this vision in Avicenna’s concept of *intellectus sanctus*, which recognizes itself, God and the world through *virtus sancta* and through *modus prophetiae* (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1). Prophetic vision became a normal philosophy in the environment of mystically inflamed modernists in Oxford. We have interpreted the original state of this dispute with regard to the new worldview in Grosseteste that proposed the construction of determined contingent events in the future (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). This was the fundamental difference from bishop Alvernus and other representatives of the first Averroism, who paid attention to the teaching of critical and true philosophy at the University of Paris until the year 1250. It was in this *alma mater* of the first Averroism, when the theories of Italian and Latin sophists were combined with the teaching of Neoplatonic “*sequaces Aristotelis*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). Modernists founded Bonaventura’s school after the death of bishop Alvernus. Ockham is the last representative of the first Averroism, which saw and criticized the objective recognition of Scotists and modern *illuminati* based on their uncritical mysticism.

The direct insight into the timeless essence of the matter initiated the last hermeneutically interesting dispute between Ockham and Oxford scholars from the school of *Modernorum*. The Aristotelian logician argues against Grosseteste and the Oxford school of modern logic from the point of view of the naval battle mentioned in the work *De interpretatione*. He defends the Aristotelian line strictly, which defends the fundamental indeterminability of future contingent events. An absolutely pure potentiality has no subsistent character; therefore, in the order of the logical statement there is nothing to determine. Logic, in the order of truth, must follow metaphysics as a correspondence, because the metaphysical imposition determines the logical supposition from reality. The work *Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia divina* rejects the entire ontotheological construction of *Modernorum* that justifies universal logical determinism with reference to divine providence. Ockham never combines both modes of necessity given by God and given in reality with each other. On the contrary, he proposed the metaphysically based disjunction of both modes of necessity because of their fundamental incomparability. The antimodern logician once again argues consistently according to Aristotle. The logic is true because we adequately recognize reality, and not vice versa, as Neoplatonic modernists claim since the foundation of modern logic (ch. 5.1.2). This makes the entire ontotheological scheme of *Modernorum* obsolete, on which modern formal logic has stood since Grosseteste and since Leibniz. Ockham fundamentally disagrees with Scotus’s univocally formed necessity, which establishes his system of objective metaphysical deduction in the order “*exemplar—vestigium*” (ch. 5.3.2). The reasoning of modernists is erroneous for a principled reason. The *illuminati* are not critical realists, and their thinking began to look into divine thinking. We are not God and we do not know whether the world would have come into being or not.

“The saying ‘God predestined Peter’ has been and has been true (*fuit*) since eternity and therefore cannot be erroneous. Therefore, he is supposedly necessary. I dispute this conclusion. Some sayings given on eternity are true here and now; but in another mode they are erroneous. For example, the saying ‘The world does not exist’ was and is completely true for eternity; but in another mode this saying is erroneous. Therefore, I maintain that although the saying ‘God predestined Peter’ has been true since eternity, it can nevertheless be erroneous and must never have been true (*potest esse falsa et potest numquam fuisse vera*).” [[502]](#footnote-502)

The predestination of Peter’s denial and the appointment as the head of the apostles is not a problem in the order of eternal and irrevocably given necessity (*haec propositio fuit vera ab aeterno ... est necessaria*). Ockham, however, denies the univocal conclusion “*semel—semper*” given in the school of *Nominales* that and Scotists adopted in the order of objective emanations of divine rationality. According to Aristotelian metaphysics, the conclusion of modernists cannot apply if it concerns the univocal necessity in God and in the creation (*nego consequentiam*). The problem, which the objectivists do not even notice, lies in the non-existent imposition of this necessity. The imposition of necessity always corresponds to the order of human knowledge and not of the divine order. We know nothing about divine knowledge; we are not God. Ockham abolished the key element of modern anthropocentric metaphysics. The world did not exist before creation, so the statement about its non-existence was true (*ista fuit vera ab aeterno 'mundus non est'*); yet, in our mode of cognition (*tamen modo*) it is false (*est falsa*). In such a case, there is no connection between the true and the false statement. Taken from the divine perspective concerning Peter’s denial, the fundamental indetermination of these contingent future events applies to us. We are not God and therefore cannot even determine whether Peter denies Jesus or does not deny him (*tamen potest esse falsa*). The key is the second part of the conclusion. Ockham, thanks to the previous examples of indetermination, explicitly declares that we can never know the mode of truthfulness of this event (*potest numquam fuisse vera*). In contrast to Grosseteste, he claims that future events à la Petrus’s denial, the arrival of Antichrist or the future naval battle are fundamentally unrecognizable for us from the point of view of their truthfulness and therefore not determinable. Let us transfer this to the example of the necessary arrival of Antichrist, which we find at Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). According to Ockham, this necessity is given by God, but not with regard to us, because in the order of reality it is affirmed only by faith, and not by empirical cognition given on the basis of effects coming from real substances. According to Ockham, the necessary arrival of Antichrist does not have a valid supposition given by really acting first substances. From the point of natural cognition, we cannot predict anything philosophically and scientifically true as to this interesting event. Objective modern logic let it be dogmatically and mythologically substantiated, in despite of its real non-existence. In the case of the future arrival of the biblical Antichrist or Aristotle’s future naval battle, the imposition of meaning from the first real substance is absent. For Ockham, to take the Antichrist as a modern *tertium ens* means a defeat of common reason, because philosophy and theology are two sciences of different genre. The debate again concerns the previous dispute about the imposition given by the denial of Scotus’s concept of “*esse completive universale.*” Destruction of univocal necessity canceled the basic principle of unified *metaphysica generalis* founded by Scotus on the speculative mystical logic of Oxford′s *Modernorum*. The truth of theology is not the truth of philosophy, although theology does not stand in conflict with philosophy. Let us recall Siger and Bacon’s position, which was expressed by the Declaration of Masters at the University of Paris in April 1272 (ch. 4.1.2). Ockham, like Bacon, defends the twofold method of cognition, because both theology and philosophy have their own subject of research (*dignitatis philosophiae*). According to Bacon, the theory of two “*dignitates*” that are different in genre means that no kind of knowledge may methodologically determine another kind of science (*nulla facultate extranea debit dominari*; OBJ II, ch. 3.4.3). Now it becomes clear why Ockham, as a follower of twofold way of cognition in the manner of *Second Analytics*, could not remain in the Oxford community of objectively thinking logicians, analysts and Scotists, who diligently and victoriously walked along *via Modernorum* towards the objective arrival of Antichrist, corporate capitalism and financial derivatives. Even among academics, it is sometimes true that the one who flees, he wins. Ockham even had to flee twice in his life, for the first time from Oxford. After escaping from papal Avignon, he remained alive and was able to write a new interpretation of Aristotle’s political writings, which the last matrix deals with.

Averroists and Semiaverroists of all kinds definitely dominated the academic environment of both main universities of the Christian West after the year 1277. The persecuted and objectively repressed first Averroism no longer could defend the classical form of metaphysics under new conditions. Ockham unfolded in a new and completely original way the basic thesis of the first philosophy according to Ipseity of Averroes and Siger that was given as an existential act of understanding the person (*homo ipse intelligit*). Ockham recorded no success against the windmills of sophistic modernism that had been diligently actualized the new kinds of *tertium ens* for already a one century. This task was completed in the following millennium by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity. The new fundamental ontology, based on the existential interpretation of Aristotle, was presented in the work *Being and Time* (1927). The next generation of modern Avicennists understood Ockham’s criticism of Scotus within the framework of the objectively constituted metaphysical agenda that dominated Western thought after the year 1300. In the Age of Postmodernism, Ockham received the label of a nominalist because he fundamentally rejected being of the third kind. The simulacrum of Ockham as a Nominalist was victoriously introduced into the modern history of philosophy. It proves, in the mode of inversion to the contrary, the fundamental error of modernity and postmodernism, as well as it was the case with “Averroists” as Averroes and Siger. Ockham’s philosophy stands on the opposite pole in comparison with the teaching of Porretans and *Nominales*. On the other hand, the analytical philosophy of Scotus emerged out of this milieu. Hermeneutics carried out the rehabilitation of Ockham in the same mode of *alētheia* as in the case of Siger. These two brilliant, critical and true thinkers belong to the authentic Averroism characterized by the correct interpretation of CMDA, in contrast to the Semiaverroist Aquinas. Hermeneutics made it sufficiently clear why Siger and Ockham were objectively punished by the philosophical version of *damnatio memoriae*. After the escape from Avignon on May 26, 1328, when Ockham, like Siger before him, had to answer to the Inquisition for his anti-modernist philosophy, the meaning of the entire debate between the two schools was definitely lost in Lethe. From the point of view of the hermeneutic triad, the day of Ockham’s escape from Avignon denotes the historical date of the emergence of modernity and the historical beginning of modern theology. With this date, the history of the first and second Averroism ended in the mode of epochal *alētheia*. Both schools passed into the historial concealment given in the form of the truth as Lethe. Siger appeared before the Inquisition and passed, because this took place half a century earlier. His inquisitors were educated, knew the problems of modernity and accepted his reasoning. Ockham fled because he probably would not have passed before the tribunal of the already completely modern inquisitors. Modern history, as a teacher of life in the mode of truth as *veritas*, then created the history of the objective simulacrum called “Latin Averroism,” which was understandably edited by the victorius side of gigantomachy.

The effects of the objectively given truth did away the last traces of the original *Lichtung* that manifests the original being of Aristotelian metaphysics. The eclipse of the first substance included the epochal event of Being (*Ereignis*). Its original sense was no longer obvious and understandable for metaphysical thinking of *Modernorum*. The nihilism of Western metaphysics expressed through *dativus incommodi*, completed all existential categories that were exposed for donation of objectivity within the framework of *dativus obiectivus*. Descartes repeated Scotus’s first exhibition of the world in the mode of the rational *epokhē* that started the secularization. The classic definition of secularization as “*Entzauberung der Welt*” (Max Weber) may be objectively right, but it is hermeneutically false. The modernity done away with the first substance and the postmodernity done away with modern God. The real God and the real world had nothing to do with divine comedy of *Modernorum*. The process of postmodern secularization historically begins in the preface of the work *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625). The Reformation humanist Hugo Grotius endeavors to interpret the meaning of law *ex nihilo*, without the effect of God as the ultimate source of the truth.[[503]](#footnote-503) Even if God did not exist (*etsi deus non daretur*), the permanent species of law must remain in the mode “*semel—semper*.” After the agony of confessional schizophrenic God in the Thirty Years’ War, the humanist Grotius separated divine causality from the postmodern legal order in the manner of “*causa remota*.” The legal order must be rational, following the example of Scotus’s model of “*vestigium—imago*.” Modern legal rationality was endowed with the objective causality and rationality necessary to secularize the rule of law. The idea of the Christian state was destroyed by the reality of the confessional Thirty Years’ War. The objective conception of nature established the modern *scibile*, which is necessary for the theory of natural law and for the substantiation of modern political science. The species of law given in the mode “*semel—semper*” includes the objectively necessary condition of evidence based on the modern subject. The law also applies in the epoch, when God of Deists, of postmodernism or confessionally schizophrenic God of Catholics and Protestants does not care about human affairs. In the mode of the subjective *certitudo*, Grotius outlined the basis of natural law given as the object of absolute *rectitudo* of modern law that was created *ex nihilo*, as yet another kind of *tertium ens*. Based on the principle of “*etsi deus non daretur*,” Hobbes and above all Rousseau conceive a system of social contracts. The deduction of society goes *ex nihilo* through the course of mythological history; it starts from the “zero point” mentioned above (ch. 5.3.2). That kind of political history was founded as a pure construct of modern human nature and its transformations. The tragic fate of the subjective God of modernity was then completed by the postmodern Deism of the Enlightenment. Spinoza abolished the divine subjectivity in the cosmic nature (*Deus sive Natura*). Anthropomorphic divinity, or Spinoza’s pantheistic nature, held God of postmodernists until the philosophical crucifixion of this idol in the 19th century. At the very end of Western metaphysics, this was taken care of by three well-known masters of suspicion (*maîtres du soupçon*), namely Nietzsche, Marx and Freud (Ricoeur 1965, 43). The humanistic educated world had long been able to do without this idol, see the above-mentioned development of modern law and the contractual theories of the state. Finally, Bonhoeffer thinks through the keyword “*etsi deus non daretur*” at the time of historically active nihilism before his execution on April 9, 1945 in the Flossenbürg concentration camp. Evangelical pastor, who is engaged in the fight against Nazism, thinks about God in prison from the position of his modern non-existence and devises an irreligious interpretation of the Gospel.[[504]](#footnote-504) Bonhoeffer was the first Christian thinker in the epoch of real nihilism and the new witch trials of Nazism, who took note of the historical and factual death of modern God. He is thinking about the historical fate of the West at the same time, when on the French side of *Résistance*, René Char wrote his famous oracle about modernity which had not been preceded by any testament (ch. 4.4.3). The objectively conceived God as the basic capital of modernity functioned as a useful instrument for centuries in the mode of the *dativus instrumenti*. After his death, the being of the third kind became an instrument of modern scientific technology and began to destroy man in the world wars through the totalitarianism of the one ideological truth, the instrumental rationality, the nihilism of technology and the vulgar economism of contemporary corporate fascism. After the death of modern God, this nihilistic event constituted an epoch full of oblivion of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The poet Jan Zahradníček, imprisoned for almost 10 years in the period of Czech Stalinism, described new features of the epoch in the poem *Sign of Power* (*Znamení moci*, 1950–51). He announces the rule of totalitarian abstraction under the rule of the eschatological figure called “Mr. Nobody.” Hermeneutic archaeology has shown how the objective truth of triumphant modernity has destroyed the original meaning of Aristotelian metaphysics. In the scheme of metaphysically conceived *alētheia*, the first Averroism plays the historical role of the original event (*Ereignis*) that revealed the truth and falsity of Aristotelian substance. The origin in Greek also means the dominion over that which follows and that which is secretly determined by this origin. Divine Muses cannot be permanently silenced because they can speak through untruth. Unfortunately, this speech then has a fundamentally tragic character. The hermeneutic archaeology interpreted through the individual matrices the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth that concerns the objectively conceived being. This mythological being was interpreted in the history of Western irrationalism (*Irre*) through the existentials described in the framework of *dativus obiectivus*.

## 5.5 Objective Science and Witch Trials

Philosophical disputes of Albert, Siger and Aquinas against the erroneous thinking of their contemporaries called *Latini* or *Moderni* manifest the figure of an autonomous Western intellectual from the school of the first Averroism. He was engaged in gigantomachy against the sophists from the school of the second Averroism. Aristotelian thinkers of Falsafa became the first autonomous Western intellectuals: Alfarabi, Al-Ghazālī and Averroes should be mentioned above all. The emergence of Latin intellectuals is linked to the humanism of the first Averroism, as it was given in the line of the first European intellectual Alfarabi (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). This humanism is fundamentally different from the nature of man created in the schools inspired by Augustinian Neoplatonism and Avicenna. The new type of thinker based in the rue du Fouarre defended the generic difference between philosophy and theology against the uniform and syncretic school of modernists gathered in Bonaventure’s school in Paris and Kilwardby’s school in Oxford. Finally, real Western intellectuals defended the truth of science against Thomistic version of humanism, in which the dogmatic truth of theology prevailed over philosophy. Following *Second Analytics*, the dignity of philosophical thought took a different path to the one truth, in the philosophy or in the theology. It then becomes clear that the dispute concerning the two paths leading to the only truth took on a fundamental character marked by authoritarian conflicts. In this struggle, it objectively necessarily happened that victorious academic group of modernists destroyed classical Aristotelianism in the historical modification of the logical rule known as *modus ponens*. The will of power that formed the new subject came as first in order to manage (*Ge-Stell*) objectively manifested meaning of being. The world has been determined by free demiurgic greed of the subject, which sees everything by an analogical similarity to the intimate given will. In the Latin West, led by subjectively powerful deities of academic Vengeance, unfortunately, that divine *alētheia* worked in the mode *modus tollens* as well. The first substance has disappeared from metaphysics and with it the true approach to reality. Fortunately, Dante let undisclosed the whole *alētheia* of this quarrel. The universe of objectivity produced in the world corresponds by its rationality to the will of the divine Creator that is essentially intimate and free. Through the modern will as an irrational being of the third kind, the nihilism of the Latin West acquired its epochal facticity. The capitalist subject embarked on the postmodern crusade in the mode of *dativus auctoris*. The meaning of being acquired the sense taken in the mode *absolute*. The mode “*ipse*” belongs to the hypostatized will in an absolute way, since the intimacy of freedom constitutes the substantial nature of the will that is separated from real acts of *volitio*. The will became a new substance of the third kind in man and established the nihilistic form of the Western subject. This kind of modern will established the causality based on freedom that generates the demiurgic activity *ex nihilo*. Modernity found the Archimedean point, from where started the new history of the world without the testament taken from previous epochs. The new metaphysics of the will was detached from the domination of the intellect and the modern demiurge became an objectively irrational schizophrenic subject.

At the University of Paris, it was impossible to proclaim such theories before the year 1250, since the thinkers as Albert and Bacon considered the teaching of modernists completely insane. However, the objective paranoia of *Modernorum*, under the leadership of industrious Furies, became a common academic norm. Olivi as the first subjective modernist rejected a definition of the will in the mode of the practical intellect. The modern will has become another being of the third kind. The will became a new substance, and even of the highest level, because by Olivi′s primacy of the intimately free will replaced the primacy of Aristotelian intellect. In Aristotelianism, it is about the causal extension of the universal and thus only potential practical intellect into reality, where the theoretical mind acts singularly causally through the one given by the will (*extensione practicus*). Olivi put Aristotelian volition determined by the intellect only to the second phase of the choice. The understanding determines the will only secondarily with regard to this or that recognized good that the will considers to be the object of choice (*electio*). Olivi’s will is absolutely irrational in the objective mode *absolute*, which is given by the separation from Aristotle’s practical intellect. It determines the will in the metaphysical mode *per prius*. The metaphysics of the will began to look at the world within the framework of the schizophrenic conception of the person. Olivi’s will became another substance of the third kind and substantially increased the collection of modern hypostases called “man.” The church institutions began to take this rapid multiplication of substances in the person conceived in a sophistical manner and the multiplication of *tertium ens* in the world with great unwillingness. Olivi was attacked and posthumously condemned by Franciscans from the ranks of the second Averroism. His multiplication of substances in man, enriched by the substantially divided will, was not accepted by the official theology of Thomistic modernists led by Aegidius Romanus. Franciscan Aquasparta had to pull the brakes about 1280, when he became the main papal theologian in Rome after Pecham (*Lector sacri Palatii apostolici*). This modernist tried to bring academic *illuminati* from the fictions of the “Flying man” back to the reality of first substances. The official church honeymoon with modernity, which lasted since the condemnation of Paris in 1277, lasted only until the Council of Vienna (1312). Then the plurality of substances was again confronted with the principle of the soul as an entelechical form that establishes the unity of the person. This was already after the first and the second Averroism had passed into Lethe and when modernity has definitely triumphed through objective Thomism and Scotism. First, the person disappeared; then God of *Modernorum*; now, the Western subject finally disappeared in the play of metaphors.

The triangle of historiality, historicity and history has to investigate a kind of *dativus modi* that is bound to the objective *veritas* of historical facts. From the point of view of *alētheia*, the objective *veritas* of history makes the false form of historicity (*Geschichte*) controlled by academic Furies. Modern history is produced by the subjectively understood will to power. The historicity of philosophy thus received a subjectively conceived simulacrum of history. This simulacrum has been created by the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of modernity based on the historical impact of Oxfordian Fallacy. The victors of the dispute, which ended in 1277, created a universally accepted history of their battle with the secular masters from rue du Fouarre in the mode of objective mythology. Modernists imposed *damnatio memoriae* on the defeated side and, in the irrational defense known as *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*, they projected their major fallacies on the account of the defeated group. Modernists transformed the correct and critical Aristotelians into vicious and diabolical Averroists. Gauthier’s important study deals with the start of modern witch trials, which necessarily took on an objective and therefore modern scientific character. Gauthier reveals the gradual demonization of Siger that began immediately after his death. In order to display Siger as a damned Averroist, modernism used the usual academic disputes about the appointment of the rector at the University of Paris in the years 1271–75 (Gauthier 1984, 20–28). To turn the misunderstood secular priest and philosopher Siger into an Averroist was not a problem even for Dominicans as advocates of the first Averroism. They began the struggle for academic rehabilitation of Aquinas immediately after his death. Thomists like Aegidius needed to purposely denigrate Siger in favor of an impeccable Aquinas, who became the recognized *Expositor Novus* in the Catholic Church. Siger’s tragic academic fate was shared to a certain extent by his colleague Boethius of Dacia, whose commentary on *De anima*, unfortunately, was not preserved. It is necessary to search for him anew in anonymous works of the school of the first Averroism about the years 1270, as was *Anonymus Giele* (ch. 4.3.1). Following French medievalists as Libera and Gauthier, the birth of the legend concerning cursed physician Faustus must be dated immediately after the death of Siger as the main representative of misunderstood philosophy of the unified person that was explained according to CMDA. From the years 1319–22 we have the proven legend about the blasphemer and the haughty genius Siger, who has to flee from Paris to Italy. There he was allegedly assassinated by his own secretary, who went crazy after the deed. It is a typical Faustian mythology about philosophers who represented the first figure of the independent intellectual in the Latin West (Libera 1991, 157–67). In reality, the Siger as a canonist went to the papal Orvieto to negotiate some kind of dispute on behalf of his chapter in Liege and died in Italy under unclear circumstances around the year 1281. Siger’s contemporary Dante claims that this philosopher died by a slow death (*gravi a morir li parve venir tardo*; *Paradiso* 10.135). After 1300, the key representatives of first Averroism acquired legendary traits in modernity, which are linked to magical abilities (Bacon, Albert) or to devilish powers (Siger). The myth about the death of a “blasphemist” Siger is documented by Pecham in a letter from the year 1284, where the myth about Siger’s death is cited as a historical fact. The same letter proclaims that the one thesis must be banned under all circumstances. This concerns the terrible error of those who understand man as a one substantial form. At the Oxford University, when Pecham as modern sophist was the rector, Siger and the first Averroists became demonic creatures. After the lost crusades of the West, they announced the ultimate arrival of the age of Antichrist, whose intellectual work was described by Bonaventure in the Lenten sermons pronounced at Paris in the years 1267–73. We have quoted the example of the diabolical work of his Aristotelian contemporaries taken from his Lenten sermon made in 1268 (*isti errores significantur in Apocalypsi in numero nominis bestiae*). The activity of the modern intellect and the sleep of common sense led to nightmares, which the philosopher Roger Bacon and, after him, the painter Francisco Goya described very well. The emergence of Averroes as an Averroist and diabolical Siger served as a paradigm in order to describe the projection carried out by the group of *sophistae Latini*. Speculative modernism projected in Averroes its own confused interpretation of his philosophy and then presented this scholar as a pagan and a heretic. Modernity fatally and necessarily changed Siger into Faustus, because the objectivity cannot live without the sort of mythological *scibilia*.

Modernism brought out sophisticated academic *damnatio memoriae* on all masters from the rue du Fouarre, who defended the unity of the person about 1270–75 according to Averroes’s ipseity (*pars Sigeri*). The school of the first Averroism related to ostracized Averroes lost the possibility of any philosophically relevant defense in the epoch of universally approved Oxfordian Fallacy. The first round of the conquest of the most important academic fortress of the Latin West had already taken place at the University of Paris in the years 1255–56, as the previous matrices let it explained. Modernists did not quite win in those times; however, they conquered the first academic bastion by establishing the mendicant artistic faculty in 1255. In the years 1272–77, after twenty years of siege of the rue du Fouarre, modernists carried out a fundamental breach of fortifications. In the first line of the struggle for an authentic interpretation of Aristotle “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to the Sicilian school we find diocesan priests Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. These representatives of the first Averroism were indirectly ostracized by the Paris and Oxford Decree of March 1277. From the ranks of the old comrades-in-arms of the first Averroism, Roger Bacon, Albert the Great and partly also the Semiaverroist Thomas Aquinas that were protected by authority of mendicant orders, can be assigned to this group. The lay philosopher Dante Alighieri wrote *Divine Comedy*, which celebrated Siger; thus he became a new Homer, who recorded this gigantomachy about substance in the mode of musical (and thus objectively hidden) *alētheia*. Archaic hermeneutics confirm the right to glorious immortality of these first European intellectual priest; their modernist opponents from the ranks of the second Averroism received the right to inglorious immortality. The erasure of the school of the first Averroism from the positive history of thought has a fully objective character given by the defense mechanism of *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*. The modernists in turn celebrate the beginning of modernity and created a historical simulacrum of philosophical disputes given in the years 1253–77 in their order chronicles, letters and protocols. For many reasons, their version is unilaterally critical of secular masters in the rue du Fouarre. They first defended the rector Guillemus de Sancto Amore and later Siger of Brabant. Historians guided by prejudices of objectivity should have stopped reading the history of this period through the eyes of objective victors. It is time to examine this period without the objectivity, in the model of truth as *alētheia*. We owe the justice to innocent victims of this dispute about the character of modernity and postmodernity. Following Aeschylus’s saying “through suffering to wisdom” (πάθει μάθος; *Agamemnon*, v. 178), the search for real wisdom differs from academic fallacies that frenetically follow the objective and therefore historically blind truth as *veritas*. In the objective history of philosophy, manipulated by the victorious group, a pure simulacrum of the real history has remained. The will not to see, under the guidance of powers of Revenge, forms the irrational part of modern history. Objective victors kept from gigantomachy of substance but the positive *veritas* that is given as modern history of philosophy.

Since the Commentator and Siger, the principle of reality as the imperative of true thinking have established the permanent existence of philosophy. It is a generically unique science that pertains to *species humana* in the form of *quartum genus*. Philosophy comes into being in virtue of the existence of wise people (*tertium genus*) who think in the right way. Modernism follows the truth as demiurgic assimilation that concerns the mythological subject of the demiurgic will and of the blind instrumental reason. Therefore, led by the truth as *rectitudo* and *certitudo*, the modernity erased the truth as *alētheia* concerning the dispute over Averroism out of the official academic history dealing with the years 1250–77. At the very beginning of the second Averroism, following Anselm and Grosseteste, the definition of the truth determined by the will, it showed that the modern subject received the new demiurgic right (*rectitudo*) to create a new sense of being. Aristotelian critical intellect played a second fiddle in this scenario. Truth as the correspondence between thinking and reality ceased to play a determining role of modern thinking. Averroes and Siger defended the specific character of the receptive intellect through the logic of *modus tollens* and the categorical rule of *destructio primis*. The modern intellect and the will, enlightened by their own truth, do not need a mediator who critically determines the intimately given freedom of modernity. The sovereign and free will, positioned outside of the critical intellect, is completely actualized in the intimate freedom. It is substantially separated both from the intellect and from the concrete decisions of the will. Such a blind objective will, masked as an objective science, became the leading force of witch processes from the 14th century onwards. The free and insane will of *Modernorum* makes its own beginning in the demiurgic mode of *factum*, because it appropriates the world in the new form of *dativus possessivus*. This kind of obsession (*possessio*) has a demonic character determined by the irrational deities of academic Revenge. The subjectively constituted Furies operated by the defense mechanism of *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*, by projecting their own illusions into “witches” to be condemned. Western *illuminati* carry their truth within themselves because they are enlightened directly by their solar intellect (*certitudo*). In addition, they are linked to their God created speculatively by the act of Augustinian memory and the innate Avicennist intellect (*rectitudo*). At the beginning of the 14th century, the modernist errance of thought (*Irre*) was a fait accompli. Previous interpretations have shown that the movement of truth as an archaic *alētheia* is linked to the trajectory of the Sun, as Dante confirmed it in *Divine Comedy*. The similarity of modernity with Homer’s *Odyssey* is much greater than just the ordinary poetic license. Hermeneutic explanation of Homer contests the conclusions of Adorno and Horkheimer made the writing *Dialektik der Aufklärung*.[[505]](#footnote-505) Odysseus was not the first Modernist in the history of the West who was led by the metaphorical sun of the instrumental intellect (*von der Sonne der kalkulierenden Vernunft*). The previous interpretations have shown that the movement of truth has the character of *alētheia*, which is linked to the orbit of the Sun. The structure of Odysseus’ wandering is guided by the irreversible movement of the Sun and its cosmic trajectory given firstly in the Egyptian and Sumerian myths (West 1997, 154–72). Modernism and postmodernism undertook yet another journey of metaphysical nihilism. That kind of journey is guided by mythological domination of the modern solar intellect. Let us recall that Parmenides’s philosophical epic is open under the guidance of Heliades that lead the philosopher in only one direction, to the goddess of the Truth. Mythological modernity illuminates the path to the objective truth through its own solar intellect. Led by their own hubris, the *illuminati* do not respect the path of the metaphysical dative and, consequently, do not have a correspondence of thinking and reality; they take their own erroneous paths. Modernity introduced both the will and the truth into the immanent sphere of the subject illuminated from behind, from the world of autonomous forms. Rufus placed the truth beyond the correspondence. The intellect possesses its own actuality given beyond the external first substances. The correspondence of mind and the thing through the mediation of the senses is unnecessary in order to attain the fullness of truth. Such an Aristotelian kind of the truth is given on the lower stage of intellectual cognition as “*intellectus debilis*.” The main component of cognition is formed by direct enlightenment of intellect made by the higher truth settled first mystically and later objectively. Gandavus placed the intimacy of free will in the mode “*esse ad*” in the free divine intellect and in its potential intentionality. Iluminated modernists placed the entire collection of *tertium ens* in modern God. The psychology and the enlightened thinking of this divine simulacrum are guided by the principle of anthropomorphic projection operated by the academic *intelligentia spiritualis*. This scientific production of the most valuable idol of modernism in terms of capital was analyzed and completed by Feuerbach and Nietzsche. However, their “hermeneutics of suspicion” (P. Ricoeur) did not cancel the postmodern production line of these simulacra. Due to the cultural hegemony and the creativity of modernists given in the mode of objective ontotheology, the first structure of objective metaphysics was formed in the years 1230–50. This creation was so insane (Bacon) and so ridiculous (Albert) that it could not enter the academic salon of the Paris University. Until the year 1250, this eminent papal and Christian University stood under the leadership of Blund’s students. In modern God, nonsensical contradictions can be objectively well kept together. The modern subject first had to create such absurdly founded modern God in order to constitute the objective world of modern witches at its opposite pole. Modern God as simulacrum is absolutely separated from creation thanks to his objective *actus essendi*. The witch as another *scibile* is not completely separated from the world; she exists in the finite modality and operates through *causa remota* of demonic powers. Modern God and witches exist only in objective thinking, because it is not controlled by the principle of reality. Until the death of bishop Alvernus, modern God was historically effective only at the Oxford University, where he objectively coexisted with the Raven of Elijah. In the next phase of the dispute led by Bonaventura, the new structure of the first philosophy arose, which was ontotheologically established at the University of Paris as well. Modern scientific mind was determined from the very beginning to the end (*de fine*) by Oxfordian Fallacy that took place directly in modern God. This imaginative capital of modernity became schizophrenic like his creator, since both subjects suffered from the plurality of hypostatized potentialities and even substances. Modern God became objectively paranoid, while the modern subject suffered yet from another childhood illness of modernity, i.e., the schizophrenic division of the person into several conflicting substances. Modern God has become an objectively sublime schizophrenic of the modern theology, while witches have become objectively damnable schizophrenic types of modern science.

The stay among half-blind modern troglodytes with a university diploma involves the risk of persecution and even of death, which the dialogue *Republic* expressly mentioned (*Rep*. 517a5‒6). The modernists project the simulacra of the real world onto the wall of consciousness. Being in the Platonic cave, the *illuminati* look at themselves through the reflection of their own solar intellect. The dialogue *Sophistes* clearly says that beyond the methodological boundary, the sophistry and the rule of simulacra begin, when the things are the same and they are not the same. Faith and reason can only follow a common path to a certain degree (ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, *Soph.* 243d7). Albert’s prophetic word about modernity as a path of error, on which the contemporary Latins were walking, was gradually fulfilled already during his lifetime (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Almost all Western thought is now following the path of ignorance condemned by Albert and Bacon. The anarchists of scientific method, such as Paul Feyerabend, know very well that truth can prevail in science by following authoritarian, mystical or other irrational manners.[[506]](#footnote-506) Hermeneutics have to find the first mechanism that made the modern science to be a diabolical enterprise. After the eclipse of the first substance and by issuing the academic *damnatio memoriae* on the Siger′s school, the existence of the person became obscure. Under the leadership of Furies, the enlightened *intelligentia spiritualis* kept a demonic character led by divine powers of academic Vengeance. The demonic logic founded by Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.3) provided a fundament of modern science by issuing logical statements that concerned the future arrival of Antichrist. Now, we must explain the transformation of the demonic logic into the demonic anthropology. After the eclipse of the first substance made in the historial mode of *dativus ethicus*, the first positive (also: historical) effects of modern speculative *scientia* came into being. Therefore, it is necessary to find a mechanism of the transfer of demonic qualities from the cosmic sphere to the human sphere, which since then operated in the mode of objective science.

The founder of modernity created a fundamental ambivalence in the cognition by following the act of the reversal into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). Rufus needed the mythical *intellectus possibilis* of David of Dinant because it was necessary for the act of objective copulation with the receptive human intellect. Rufus inserted Dinant’s cosmic *intellectus possibilis* directly into the modern subject through the simulacrum of Averroes as an Averroist. The one part of modern *anima intellectiva* was thus heretical, insane and irrational, which is still true today through Freud’s interpretation of the unconscious and the subconscious part of the soul. This demonic intellect makes part of modern subject and it was directly linked to the celestial or diabolical cosmic intelligences. Modernity, founded by Rufus, began to perform an objective intellectual exorcism of that demonic part of the receptive cosmic intellect established by David of Dinant (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). The exorcism of philosophical modernity was based on a strictly scientific approach. This is the main reason why hermeneutics considers this exorcism to have a fundamentally different character from that of previous times. The exorcism of the cosmic *intellectus possibilis* stood on philosophically nonsensical foundations and was a pure *contradictio in adiecto*; the mythological character of the cosmic intellect was demonic and at the same time it was necessary for the functioning of schizophrenic epistemology. The divine, pantheistic, receptive intellect became both the curse and the blessing of modernity. After the excommunication of David of Dinant, modernists had to abandon the philosophy of Dinant; however, they needed his panteistic *intellectus possibilis* for their schizophrenic concept of cognition. The defense mechanism of transfer sent this pantheistic intellect to Averroes’s conception of *intellectus possibilis*, which was defined as *quartum genus* in CMDA. After this transfer, Averroes became the first philosophical Satanist of modern times. The first Thomist Aegidius famously confirmed that fact in his attack on the Commentator. Subsequently, the process of diabolization was again accomplished in the case of Siger. Since 1280, he became the first *Doctor Faustus* and, together with Mephistopheles (Averroes), concluded the first diabolic contract to exercise an impartially founded scientific activity. At this point, the founding myth of modern Western science has a true basis; let us see the hermeneutic distinction given to Siger by the title *Doctor Invidiosus*. The conception of modern man, which is connected with the world of the cosmic intellect relates to the art of objective demonology and witchcraft trials. The inquisition process with Olivi (1283–87) takes place at the same time, as it begins the first demonization of Siger, Bacon and partly also Albert the Great.

The making of the key figures of the first Averroism to be diabolic came about because modernity, guided by divine powers of academic Vengeance, rejected the product of its own mind as demonic idea. Unfortunately, this was only one part of the truth, for the narcissistic nature of the modern subject did not allow him to separate himself from his own intellectual delusions. Then modernists led by their own academic schizophrenia created a diabolical representation of the Other by making a paranoid projection of their own fallacies onto an objective simulacrum in the mode of the defense mechanism *Verkehrung in Gegenteil*. Academic Furies took on a radically subjective character from the 14th century onwards. It is therefore clear that the result of this projection took the same form of a subjectively conceived demonic being that should be endowed with an intellectual character. The demonization of intellectuals from the school of the first Averroism gave birth to the first version of Stalinism, Maoism and McCarthyism, which Western culture still uses today as a basic instrument of ideological and political *damnatio memoriae*. Quoted Kipling quite normally saw devils and demonic beings in the conquered colonies (“half-devil and half-child”; OBJ II, ch. 3.5). The mechanism of demonological projection first took place at the level of metaphysics at the time of the emergence of *via Modernorum*. The previous matrices described this process with the help of Freud’s defense mechanism of reversing to the opposite. The work of Aristotle and Averroes and of his eminent defenders such as Siger was demonized by the mental projection of *sophistae Latini*. After the condemnation done in the year 1277, effective *damnatio memoriae* of the first Averroism sent the dispute over witchcraft to the next stage. The scheme of the defense mechanism, given by Freud’s inversion to the opposite, ran for the first time in the demonization of Averroes and Siger, and then repeated itself in schizophrenic postmodernism in the classification of witchcraft. In Catholic Germany and especially in Spain, the majority of Inquisition trials before the year 1300 were not primarily directed against witchcraft, but against theological heresy (heretics, Muslims, Jews). After the year 1300, a new *scibile* of modernity began to take effect, and an objectively given witchcraft arises, which is explored by educated modernity.[[507]](#footnote-507) The modern and postmodern subject represents an absurd collection of various opposing powers, hypostases and substances. One and the same person could be controlled by several external substances based on the separated *intellectus agens* or on the separated will. Modernity had no problem with the paranoid production of witchcraft recognized in the mode of objective *scibile*. Demonization arose at the time of the eclipse of the first substance and in the modern conception of the subjective truth as *certitudo* and *rectitudo*. Therefore, the cited modern and postmodern mythology related to witchcraft and to demonology started in the period when the first Averroism was demolished. The eclipse of the first substance caused the eclipse of critical thinking. The destruction of the first Averroism let to abandonment of the critical research into the causality of real first substances; morerover, the gay science of modernity did away with the rationally founded unity of the person. The witch trials after the year 1300 confirm the sleep of the modern philosophical mind when *via Modernorum* began in earnest.

The witchcraft represents the first scientific exploration of man in the newly enthroned mode of humanitarian objective truth as *veritas*. The schizophrenia of modernity worked through the irrationally conceived subject, which is divided into several independently acting substances. One of the most important “scientists” that researched witchcraft was Joseph Glanvill (†1680), who earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees at Oxford. His posthumously published book *Saducismus Triumphatus* (1681) exercised influence in Germany (Peter Goldschmidt) and influenced the witch trials, for example in Salem (USA) in the years 1692–93, in the course of which 14 women and 5 men were hanged. Witchcraft is defined on the basis of scientific knowledge determined by the paradigm of Oxfordian Fallacy. The essence of witchcraft in the middle link of the judgment has its own effectiveness in the mode of causality of the third kind (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.1). It is therefore true that this objectively determined *tertium ens* makes yet another diabolical substance that was hypostatized in man. And this demonic substance, endowed with its own objective causality, is even capable of controlling the other mythological substances that make up modern man. Consequently, we must act in the interest of another, quite endangered essence called *humanitas*. Modern humanism is formed due to the fact that an active study of witchcraft is carried out with the help of the Inquisition and even the mythical ordeal trials.[[508]](#footnote-508) Modernity divided witchcraft into properly designated *scibilia*, which were defined within *Arbor Porphyriana*. This established *rectitudo* of the first completely independent, objective science in the Latin West. The scientifically advancing inquisitor, equipped with an equally valid subjective *certitudo*, then found through torture the intimate source of the will of these individualized powers and hypostatized substances in the examined subject. By uniting the two kinds of truth, the witchcraft was incorporated into a new scientific system that appears in modern *veritas* as Rufus′s *coaequatio*. The modern individual called “witch” represents an atomic individual in the form of *tertium ens*; it is produced at the end of the series of differentiations made in the framework of modern *epistémé*. That objectively constructed *veritas* of witch-science confirms a paradox taken on the level of musical *alētheia*; the modern science killed no “human person” (*tertium genus*) but an objectively constructed “*individuum*” considered to be a *quartum genus*. That makes the reason why the Western science cultivates its own myth of rightness and innocence. The ontotheological construction of the world and God, which is given in the mode of paranoid cognition and the schizophrenic subject, founded the search for modern anthropomorphic God, the devil and witches.

French historians explored the demonization (Michel de Certeau, François Mallet-Joris) and repressed aspects of the Enlightenment (Robert Mandrou) through the instruments of psychoanalysis. They characterized the witch trials with the term “*les âges de la nuit*” (Certeau 1973, 13). The nihilistic history of modern science began through the discovery and classification of the witch-like individual. The world was divided into independent spheres determined by actions of various powers. The person was divided into independent spheres of knowledge based on even several conflicting substances that became autonomous vehicles (*subiectum*) of different activities. *Divide et impera*. The witch trials of modernity were objectively justified in terms of the action of this or that substance or hypostasis in man defined according to the schizophrenic intellect of modernity. The new *scibile* of witchcraft, from the point of view of hermeneutics, is given as an intimate substance (*potentia substantialis*), which revealed itself in a magical way, contingently manifested in the external world (*potentia accidentalis*).[[509]](#footnote-509) The hypostatized ability of magic and the satanic substance given in the objective mode passes from the inside of the person into the contingent reality (*exsistit*), for example, through the magical Sabbath operating here and now or by other magical activities. The satanic deeds given in the context of the hypostatized *scibile* could only be destroyed by the annihilation of the substantial carrier itself. The effect of the psychologically and humanitarily inclined modern inquisitors also discovered and classified this witchlike subject in a completely scientific and fully positive way. The witchlike individual became the first object of research of modern science, and the liquidation of this demonic *scibilia* was the first manifestation of the nihilistic humanism of the man as a corpse. Luther and Calvin’s Reformation continued in the slumber of the critical mind of *Modernorum*.[[510]](#footnote-510) Gandavus created the absolute divine psychology based on the Avicennist interpretation of *De anima*. Postmodern professor of philosophy, logic, metaphysics and ethics at the University of Marburg, Rudolf Gockel (Goclenius, †1628), established the first form of modern psychology. This commentator of *Isagogue* was the founder of the philosophical discipline called *Ontologia*. He was the well-known theorist of objectively given witchcraft, which at that time was classified according to the scientific manual called *Hexenhammer* (*Malleus maleficarum*, 1486). For these reasons, this postmodern evangelical humanist was also able to write the first modern treatise on psychology within the framework of the new classification of sciences and the causality of witchcraft researched at that time (*Psychologia*, 1594). The person becomes a specific corpse, the animal becomes a legally responsible subject, and demonic powers, which were studied in the framework of modern psychology, acquired an equally paranoid status. The construction of the world in the floors, as the natural and the supernatural order, necessarily produced both the divine omnipotence and the diabolical power, both of them placed beyond the philosophical rationality and real causality of the world. From 14th to the 19th century, the first scientifically classified knowledge about man arises as an objective simulacrum. The philosophical and scientific simulacra exercised fully positive effects in modernity and represented an authoritarian and ideological instrument, because they passed into an authoritarian discourse of modern science. Then it is no wonder that everyone could observe these non-existent *tertium ens* created by academic *illuminati* of the time. Any objectively causal witchcraft effect and its “exsistence” should be reported to competent authorities.

After the emergence of mechanistic theories in the 17th century, the cosmic *intellectus possibilis* of modernists was transformed into the *intellectus materialis* of postmodernism. The schizophrenic man of modernity ceased to carry in him the demonic or the cosmic substantial intellect with which he had to mythologically and objectively copulate in the scheme of modern gay science. In a further reversal into the opposite, man became the bearer of the animal material intellect. Humans became equivalent to animals. The witch trials ceased, and immediately afterwards the objective trials of animals began. They took place throughout Europe until the 20th century. British zoopsychologists record the same description of motivation for animal violence as for humans (Appleton 1898). At the beginning of the 20th century, the French psychologist Alexandre Lacassagne divided the criminal records of animals into six categories according to psychological motives common to humans and animals (Evans 1906, 235). Today’s evolutionary biology, behaviorism and neuropsychology, which are given as the first sciences about man, continue to take this direction opened by modernity. The thinking of the person is defined by the animalistic form of *intellectus materialis*. Another example of the reduction of man to an animal is given in the scientific view of the racist humanism. The theoretical and colonial racism was initially brought mainly by Anglo-Saxon and French eugenics as a modern anthropological *scibile*. Let us see as an example, the cities where the first International Eugenics Congress were held: London (1912) and New York (1921, 1932). Further example are the human zoological gardens that were organized in the major European countries in the years 1877–1912. Anglo-Saxon scientific racism and eugenics historically and philosophically preceded the racism of Nazi Germany. It was not Hitler at first, but German medicines and lawyers who demanded the introduction of euthanasia and eugenics. They wanted to fill the gap in objective studies of Western scientific powers in the then successful field of racially given science and the refinement of human race. Evolutionary genetics and biology, which defined the molecules of DNA as carriers of culture, successfully continue in this direction (ch. 5.1.1), as well as “liberal” euthanasia laws in the Western countries as Canada. Modernity is demonic in its very essence, because the objective science is fundamentally irrational. The conception of humanities in the age of metaphysical nihilism completed the previous epoch of the witchlike humanism of modernity and postmodernism. At the end of the work *Les mots et les choses*, Foucault objectively rightly remarked that the play of differences can create any type of “humanitarian” knowledge. Hermeneutics has stated that the scientific process of classification had already begun four centuries before Foucault’s post-structural *epistémé* in the school of *Nominales*. From the point of view of literary hermeneutics, it is interesting that the opposite of modern witchcraft is happening now. Semi-human beings of the third kind are placed in the literary imaginary world; after the completion of the plot, they achieve damnation or redemption. The fate of demons, vampires and witches marked by fate replaced the blurred meaning of human existence with the love or curse of humanity and half-humanity. The postmodern fiction of the fantasy type and computer games put demonic beings into the real world and into the existential relations. In the epoch of metaphysical nihilism and humanism, another “third world” of literary or virtual diacosmos arose, which indirectly testifies to the decline of man as a postmodern subject. The coding of culture in the molecule of DNA similarly demonstrates the objective form of humanism as an academic postmodern fantasy. The postmodern humanists turned man into an evolutionarily improved animal that is endowed only with a material intellect. In the epoch of the present metaphysical nihilism, they transferred the intellectual faculty even to mere brain functions. Such a decline in critical thinking could not have occurred in the school of the first Averroism. It knew the basic characteristics of the human intellect and proceeded from the full unity of the person associated with the adequate conception of the truth. This critical knowledge disappeared in the new type of ideological humanism, which prevailed in the nihilistic form of *dativus incommodi* during the totalitarian and belligerent 20th century. The postmodern man became first a demon, then an animal, and after the death of modern God only a totalitanism kind of a calculated and industrially produced corpse.

In the historical epoch of completely positive and nihilistic science, hermeneutics can finish its work. The *dativus ethicus* and *dativus incommodi* represent the last historical existential of objectivity in the explored hermeneutic mode of truth as *alētheia*. Hermeneutic archaeology explores the nature of the objective being in the Lichtung of Being itself. The truth and the untruth of thus determined metaphysics are musically unfolded in virtue of divine Muses. Nihilism does not even have an objectively determined metaphysics; the thinking given in the binary positivism of one and zero no longer requires any transcendence, not even that of the false kind. It is therefore objectively clear that hermeneutic interpretation in the epoch of nihilistic objectivity has no phenomenon *sui generis* to investigate. But it was necessary to rescue the primordial phenomenon given as an archaic event (*Ereignis*), which establishes a hidden and therefore objectively invisible historicity of being. Invisible phenomena determine visible phenomena. The history of objectivity, formed within the framework of the humanistic and nihilistic *via Modernorum*, is determined in a fully positivist manner. Therefore, objectivity, as a self-evident prerequisite of science, belongs to the category of research of special sciences, to the history of positive thinking and to the rank of objectively given philosophy. These positive sciences deepen the manifested *veritas* of objectivity, which is given in the original hermeneutic mode of epochal error (*Irrtum*). The end of metaphysics in the last times of Western neopositivism and neo-scientism and neocolonialism proves that everything is manifested in a positive and nihilistic manner in the field of the full openness of objectivity. Averroes’s metaphysics passed into full concealment, in order to let modern Gnostic products manifest their power in the full strength of the objective and nihilistic sense that the global community of Western *illuminati* constantly supervises. The last matrix must describe the transition of the objective history of thought into the epoch-making political history, so that a complete interpretation of objectivity is delivered in the triad of historiality, historicity and history. Metaphysics became a kind of political science, and not only from the point of view of authoritarian interventions of modernity. The commentaries on Aristotle’s political writings led to the first theory of political science in the school of the first and second Averroism in the Latin West. The last, sixth matrix describes the controversial nature of political philosophy, which shaped many historical disputes of the modern West.

# 6. Arrival of Political Averroism (Matrix VI)

The objective metaphysical blindness to reality turned into a civilizational program of the West carried out by modern religious, industrial and political revolutions. Olivi established the subject of the will, Luther the reformatory subject of salvation. Then followed the modern subject of inalienable rights and Nietzsche’s subject of the will to power that annulled the conquered metaphysics and morality. The epoch of perfected nihilism came the subject of instrumental rationality that carried the industrial revolution on its shrugged shoulders, the imperialist phase of capitalism included. Jünger’s eschatological *Arbeiter* (1932) executed this imperialism during the First and Second world wars. The planetary worker of the West stood under the sign of Bonaventura’s apocalyptic Beast and was engaged in the planetary accumulation of energy and human resources made out in the mode of total mobilization (*totale* *Mobilmachung*). Exhausted by two total wars, that last avatar of modern Western subject was replaced by dissident subject of the powers of Day and Night (Jan Patočka). Contemporary hedge funds dominate the world by the simulacrum of objective financial derivatives that are driven by artificial intelligence. This type of apocalyptic intellect of today represents the last victorious subject of the West, served by today’s “white collars.” They are a new kind of planetary worker for the one percent of corporate profiteers, fascists and banksters; they are amassing global power that once belonged to Western empires. The specific corpse of *Modernorum* became a neutral source of demiurgic energy produced as a calculable and manipulable *scibile* that by no means differs from other entities of the third kind. The instrumental intellect produced by objectively active Furies knows well that demiurgic human energy is contingent and mortal. Therefore, such a kind of *potentia accidentalis* is very volatile, almost as much as the world of stock exchanges. Because of this specific form of Rufus’s disobedience of matter, the human resources carrying this specific form of *materia spiritualis* must be manipulated more intensively and more quickly in the demiurgic process of the nihilistic transformation of everything into everything. The *intelligentia spiritualis* of global postmodern *illuminati* take care of this post-capitalist management of global resources. Their forefathers were in the group of “*sophistae Latini*” that at least received some kind of philosophical education. By conquering the world and assimilating it to the paranoid conception of truth and rationality, the Western demiurge subjected disobedient matter of all kinds and introduced a new form of slavery. Capitalist postmodernism once again introduced ancient slavery during the Industrial Revolution, because it had to import human resources from the conquered colonies into the new civilization of the West.[[511]](#footnote-511) Modernism and postmodernism created a new schizophrenic creature according to their paranoid thinking. The modern man consisted of several hostile substances and started to manage the world accordingly. This admirable creature of the third kind is industrious and enterprising; thanks to his Cartesian-given objective schizophrenic nature, it possesses an innate speculative tendency to narcissistic self-reflection. The objective intuition of this ambivalent being stares in fascination at its own speculative simulacrum, which is reflected in the mirror of ideologies and objective knowledge. It is no wonder that this paranoid self-presentation is accompanied by attacks of planetary destructiveness that have been performed in never-ending proxy wars. The West, driven by its modern appetite for the taming of matter of all kinds, cannot live without crusades that run each time under a new battle flag.

The fundamental clash over the nature of political action and the definition of the state between the school of the first and the second Averroism flared up just as inevitably as the previous disputes based on different conceptions of metaphysics. The influence of Aristotle’s corpus on the political order of medieval society is given, first of all, by Latin translations of *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. We know the first incomplete translations of *Ethics* dated about 1150 (Burgundio of Pisa). The Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris assigned lectures on Aristotle's ethical writings right since its foundation. Grosseteste translated the compilation known as *Nicomachea Commentaria* (books I and VI) from Neoplatonic sources (Eustratius, Michael of Ephesus, anonymous authors) about 1240. Albert the Great used Grosseteste’s translation for his two commentaries of *Nicomachean Ethics* under the title *Commentator Graecus*. Averroes’s commentary named *Ethica ad Nicomachum* made the basic reference for interpretations of *Ethics* from the year 1240 onwards. It was during this period that culminated the wave of translations and Neoplatonic commentaries: *Ethica Vetus* (books II–III), *Ethica Nova* (book I), *Hoferiana* (parts of II–X), *Borghesiana* (parts of VII and VIII). Averroes is the source of the new ethical and political theory of the West, because he freed ethical and political actions from the influence of Neoplatonism. After 1240, Albert and Bacon from the school of the first Averroism opposed the interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* as it appeared in the school of the second Averroism. Its first representatives were gathered around the publication of *Summa Halensis* under the leadership of Johannes Rupella and the young Bonaventure. Albert the Great commented for the first time on *Nicomachean Ethics* in the Aristotelian sense thanks to his lifelong offensive against the group called *doctores Latini* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). His commentary represents the first Aristotelian interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* in the Latin West, which was presented outside the influence of Neoplatonism (*Super Ethica*, 1250–52). He issued the second commentary in the following decade (*Ethica*, 1262). As far as the first and the second Averroism are concerned, the dispute about the status of *intellectus practicus* followed the similar dispute about the statute of *intellectus possibilis*, which have been analyzed in the previous matrices of objectivity.

Let us return to historical effects of the metaphysical dative that determines thinking according to the real causality of first substances. In the political sphere of action, whether there is (the first Averroism) or there is not (the second Averroism) an independent sphere of ethical and political rationality ruled by the practical intellect. The *Lichtung* of the truth and untruth of the first political theory in the Latin West emerged in the mode of *alētheia* in the years 1240–60. The true form of Aristotelian political theory presupposes from the causal ethical action of the person and political actions of citizens. The false form of political theory emerged as a series of ethical and political forms that arose through Oxfordian Fallacy. In the next round, the dispute over the definition of the practical intellect entailed rational actions of free citizens. In this second round of the dispute about *intellectus practicus*, a new conflict started between the first and the second Averroism that concerned the political actions outlined in the commentaries on Aristotle′s writing *Politics*. Guillelmus de Moerbeke completed the translation of *Politics* from Greek into Latin around 1260. Albert commented on it for the first time in its entirety in the work *Politica* (1264). The first Averroism interpreted the writing *Politics* in the line of the autonomy of human actions, as it is given in *Ethics* and joined political actions to the definition of practical intellect according to *De anima*. The second Averroism was not at all interested in Aristotle’s political works; or, it conceived them in the line of political Augustinism based on actions of biblical Adam. Political Augustinism understood political power as an inevitable and bitter remedy for the first sin and for the fall into evil (*remedium peccatum*). An example of this interpretation is offered by the so-called princely mirrors (*principum specula*). Following Seneca’s work *De clementia*, they were written for the education of rulers. Dominican monk Vincent de Beauvais (Vincentius Belvacensis) was the classical representative of the second Averroism that combined Neoplatonism summed up in the work *Speculum Maius* (1220–46) with the political Augustinism. His later princely mirror was written in Paris in the years 1260–64 under the title *De morali principis institutione*. Vincent offered an Augustinian interpretation of politics as an authoritatively prescribed drug that combats the contagion made by social consequences of the sin. The ruling power is necessary for this, so that people do not destroy each other.[[512]](#footnote-512) Based on this reasoning, the political theory of *Modernorum* precedes the postmodern theories of individual self-preservation. They are summarized in the social contract examined by Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*, 1651). In the second half of the 13th century, the politically interpreted Augustinism merged with the ontotheological construction of metaphysics given in Bonaventure’s school. As a result, a unitary political theory arose in the metaphysics of *Modernorum* that reduced secular and ecclesiastical power to the one truth. The result was the unification of secular and spiritual power under the sovereignty of *potestas ecclesiastica*. The second Averroism created a unified theory of political power, the legitimation of which was explained theologically and biblically. The new ontotheological structure of political power was formed within the framework of the one truth by theological representatives of the first and the second Averroism. Aquinas′s princely mirror in the writing *De regno* integrated the Aristotelian nature of political power into the theocratic structure that was later explicitly proclaimed in the papal bull *Unam Sanctam* (1302). The treatise *De regno* takes up the Aristotelian nature of man guided by the light of natural reason (*naturaliter insitum rationes lumen*). That kind of natural reason exists in every human being (*est autem unicuique hominum*) and makes out of man a social and political creature (*naturale autem est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum*; *De regno* lib. 1, cap. 1; ed. Leonina 42, 449.18‒26). According to Aquinas, the cited mirror of rulers understands political power theocratically (*vicario Romano Pontifici, cui omnes reges populi Christiani oportet esse subiectos*).[[513]](#footnote-513) The papal primacy in the secular world and politics runs according to position of the apostle Peter in the *New Testament* (Mt 16:18–19) that was understood as the first Roman Catholic pope. The first Thomist, Aegidius Romanus, in the treatise *De ecclesiastica potestate* (1302) defended the doctrine of the papal political and religious primate that inspired the bull *Unam Sanctam*. The role of Aegidius in issuing Tempier’s Decree of 1277 has not been explained clearly so far; but his influence on the publication of the bull *Unam sanctam* and his presence at the council in Vienne (1311–12) indicate his importance in political decision-making of the Church. The theocratic claim of the papacy was upheld in the doctrine of the so-called “two swords” (Lecler 1931, 1932). This theory of unified ecclesial and secular power was based on the metaphorical explanation that related to mention of two swords that were handed over to Peter in defense of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane (Lk 22:38). The theory of one truth acquired a fully political character. The official definition of political power was determined by political Augustinism, which was expressed in the bulls *Unam Sanctam* (1302) and *Patris Aeterni* (1303).[[514]](#footnote-514) The bull *Patris Aeterni* uses the same metaphors as Eastern Caesarpapism by making use of the Neoplatonist intellect as the Sun. The figure of the emperor presents the Moon which illuminates the city subordinated to him, by using rays of the Sun which is the power transmitted by the pope. That model recalls of Eusebius of Caesarea when he wrote the eulogy to Emperor Constantine around 337 (*Vita Constantii*). The emperor as the Sun was replaced by Western sovereignty of the pope. Hermeneutics consider the publication of those both decrees to be the same milestone in the development of political theory as was the publication of condemning decrees in March 1277.

Authentic Aristotelianism defended the autonomy of knowledge restricted according to generically different spheres of cognition. Theology is not a political science. The natural determination of man as a political being had a fundamentally different justification in Aristotelianism that was based on natural reason. It is clear, then, that Aquinas’s argument for the political primacy of the pope followed in the footsteps of his Semiaverroism and brought together two fundamentally different disciplines: the natural determination of man as a political being and the theological primacy of the pope. The first Averroism could not agree with the unitary view of theocratic political theory for philosophical reasons given in Aristotle’s moral and political writings. The clash of ideas of both schools regarding the statute of political power is confirmed in the works of Aristotelians in Paris, who lectured at their alma mater in the stormy years after 1277. The Parisian magister and Dominican Johannes of Paris (Johannes Quidort) criticized Olivi’s dualism of soul and body. Quidort was one of the first Parisian Thomists to attack the Franciscan correctoria of Aquinas, let us see his work *Correctorium corruptorii “Circa”* (1283). Master Quidort wrote the political work *De regia potestae et papali* (1302). The treatise places Aristotle against the theory of the one truth expressed by the universal primate of the pope that was confirmed in the bull *Unam Sanctam*. Hermeneutics follow the role of human nature because it forms the basis of the autonomous political order (*ex naturali instinctu, qui ex Deo est*).[[515]](#footnote-515) Quidort interprets Aristotle’s political nature of man against the papal unitary theocracy that Aquinas defended. The obligation to rule the world is not given either by authoritarian historical claims or by papal primacy, but it is hidden in the nature of man as a political being. Then it becomes clear that the rule of the French king was not based on the power of popes, but on the natural political authority that comes directly from God. The fundamental difference between Aquinas and Quidort shows that within the first Averroism there were two schools which understood the interpretation of Aristotelian political theory quite differently. Dante was the first philosopher that made an explicit reference to Averroes in order to join theoretical explanations in *Nicomachean Ethics* and in *De anima* with the project of the political unity of mankind under the one secular ruler in the writing *Monarchia* (1318). He considered the connection of philosophy and political practice to be the basic architectural principle of political philosophy. The concept of “*universitas humana*” inspired by Averroes and Siger of Brabant captured the whole of humanity through the ipseity of the person acting in a religious, philosophical and political manner (ch. 4.4.3). The new definition of the political community derived from Averroes’s conception of the possible intellect. Dante combined in the mode *quartum genus* universally understood wisdom of philosophy and the political action of humanity. Dante, after Aristotle, gave a political dimension to the human universitas, as a result of which he took up Albert’s commentary on Aristotle’s *Politics*, as well as Siger von Brabant’s lectures on Aristotelian conception of politics, which have not been preserved. Dante took over from the first Averroism the basic way in which the speculative intellect becomes practical through the extension into reality (*intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus*).[[516]](#footnote-516) The combination of the theoretical and the practical intellect forms a new kind of humanistic knowledge and political practice on the Earth, the definitive perfection of which can be found in God in eternity.

The dispute between the first and second Averroism acquired a political character due to the introduction of Western humanism and thanks to the new definition of the politics based on the rule of wise laws. The quoted bulls of Boniface VIII opened the dispute about the nature of political power that concerned the theory of the one truth translated into politics. On the other side stood the group of Aristotelians that defended the autonomy of politics within the framework of the first Averroism. We call this dispute between the two schools about the nature of political rationality to be the controversy about “political Averroism.” Papal power became a new being of the third kind in the Neoplatonic scenario of politics based on ontotheological *unanimitas*. The false unitary character of that religious-political hybrid produced by the bull *Unam Sanctam* was criticized by many philosophers of the first Averroism. Let us see the arguments of John of Paris exposed in the next chapter. These critics were joined by connoisseurs of philosophy and law coming from church circles. The Abbot Engelbert lived in the Benedictine monastery in Admont (Austria) and wrote the work *De ortu et fine Romani imperii* (about 1310).[[517]](#footnote-517) The work confirms the influence of Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics* in educated church circles at that time. The source of power lies in the moral quality of the ruler (*per electionem virtutis et probitatis promovebatur in reges*, p. 20–21) that is elected by the free decision of people (*ex populorum libertate*, p. 22). Abbot Engelbert follows the sovereignty of people according to Albert’s interpretation of “*regnabile*” explained in the next chapter that sets Albert apart from Aquinas. The source of the nature of political power resides in the assembly of equal, free and virtuous citizens and it is taken from Aristotle’s *Politics* and from *Nicomachean Ethics*. The philosophically educated jurists knew Aristotle’s political philosophy regarding “*animal sociale et politicum*” and interpreted the meaning of his ethical and political writings in accordance with the rule of the people, according to the sovereignty of the best citizens in the community (*plenitudo potestatis*). These connoisseurs of Aristotle were also joined by some professional jurists of the papal curia (*decretalistae*). Oldradus de Ponte worked at the Papal curia in Rome from 1310 until his death around 1337. His philosophical commentary on the laws (*Consilia*, about 1321) expounds Aristotelian reasoning regarding the origin and types of government.[[518]](#footnote-518) The chapter 69 resolves the question of whether the secular rulers should be subject to the pope. Oldradus does not mention in this chapter the reasoning of the bull *Unam Sanctam*, and his reasoning regarding the origin of political power corresponds to that omission. Oldradus defends the Aristotelian conception of *ius naturale* according to the first Averroism. The validity of natural law is given purely rationally and includes all human beings and their social institutions, including marriage and the family. The French king had kept his own sovereignty for centuries and therefore has no other monarch over him (*rex francie de facto non recognoscit superiorem*; *Concilia*, p. 101a). Moreover, no papal primacy could exist before the era of the *New Testament*. The rulers before Christ represented a living code of laws for his people (*lex animata*). Their power came directly from God, because they had the task of giving people a better kind of moral law (*deus de celo imperium constituit ut difficilius legem imposat et generi humano distribuat*; ibid, p. 101a). Thus, monarchical government is natural, given in accordance with natural law, and royal power is derived directly from God. In contrast to Albert and Dante, this thoughtful jurist claims that the monarchy cannot be a product of the natural law, because this form of government is given historically and, consequently, it is very limited (*de iure naturali nec fuit regna nec imperium*; ibid, p. 102b). Both examples show that the writing *Politics* was interpreted according to the Aristotelian intention in different environments, not only within the philosophical school of the authentic first Averroism, which included Albert, Siger and Dante. Marsilius of Padua radicalized the thoughts of these enlightened decretalists and jurists in the writing *Defensor Pacis* (1324) by taking the extreme form of conciliarism. Ockham’s political commentaries at the end of his life reacted to the work of Marsilius of Padua. He completed the defense of autonomous political power that the first Averroism opened by commentaries on *Nicomachean Ethics* and on *De anima* around 1240.

## 6.1 Twofold Interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*

The dispute over the practical intellect involves the quarrel between the first and second Averroism related to the nature of political rationality. The phrase “the speculative intellect becomes practical by the extension” (*intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus*) represents the same epochal *Lichtung* for the constitution of autonomous ethics and politics as was *intellectus possibilis* for the constitution of the Western unity of the person and the metaphysics. In the dispute about the statute of the practical intellect, the interpretation of CMDA plays a key role, which this time was applied to Aristotle’s ethical and political works. The difference between the first and the second Averroism with regard to *intellectus practicus* can be summarized in the following philosophical dilemma. The second Averroism asserts that the political sphere secondarily belongs to the ontotheological unity of modern theology. The highest unity of mankind is expressed by the theory of one truth that entails the hierarchical values. The first place occupied the universal and absolute papal primacy proclaimed in the Bull *Unam Sanctam* that determines the values in the political sphere. The first Averroism claims that political actions become an autonomous activity through the extended rationality of the speculative intellect. Through its connection with the will, the speculative intellect becomes a practical intellect, i.e. an intellect that actually acts in reality. It is thus clear that the nature of knowledge and action is tied to various activities of *anima intellectiva*, which are given in the real person according to Averroes′s interpretation in CMDA. Then the political action of the person (*tertium genus*) represents on the universal level a special form of the collective unity of rationally and ethically thinking humanity (*quartum genus*). The practical intellect received a statute similar to the definition of *intellectus possibilis*. This definition determined both the personal act of practical cognition and the universal species that determines the character of man in the community. Dante’s writing *Monarchia* defends this synthetic conception in connection with the theory of the intellect according to Siger’s interpretation of Averroes metaphysics. In this case, the determination of practical intellect and thus of political rationality followed the scientific cognition according to *Seconds Analytics*. The political philosophy presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” must analyze real causal actions of the practical intellect. Only then can it search for a scientific definition of political rationality made by the scientific proof presented as *demonstratio* in accordance with *Seconds Analytics*. The political nature of man is as difficult problem for philosophy as the determination of the receptive component of the intellect, which is both real and universal. Hermeneutics have a threefold task to do with regard to the practical intellect given personally and politically. First, it must determine the binding of the practical intellect to the theoretical intellect. The second step must narrow down the essence of political action in the person. The last step determines the holistic political unity of mankind, formed by the abstract definition of the practical intellect. As a result of an successful accomplishment of those three tasks, a new political science emerged in the first Averroism according to the Sicilian school, which differed both from the biblical Augustinism of *Modernorum* and from the theocratic political theory of Aristotelian Semiaverroists such as Aquinas and Aegidius. Their theocratic conception of politics was influenced by the metaphysical Neoplatonism of the Toledo school.

Albert was the founder of the political science in the first Averroism. Already during his master’s studies in Paris in 1240–45 he criticized Neoplatonic interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics* and *De anima*. The introductory part of *De homine* confirms the fundamental dispute between the first and the second Averroism (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). The dispute over the determination of the practical intellect concerned the key quotation in *De anima* that Averroes commented as the first. Aristotle connects the theoretical component of intellect to practical activities (νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός) and he distinguishes the two components as to different objectives of their activities (διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει, *De anima* 433a14‒15). According to Aristotle, the completion of human life is the existence according to the theoretical intellect, and not according to the practical one. A fundamental problem arose among the Latin followers of Avicenna and Averroes. Should the connection of the practical intellect with the theoretical be understood in the mode of conjunction or disjunction? If we insist on the distinction or even on the separation of the practical intellect from the theoretical, what is the aim of the activity of the practical intellect? Is this goal given in the definition of the practical good determined by the practical intellect as Aristotle and Averroes assumed it? Or is the goal of the practical intellect given in terms of theoretical consideration and cognition of the separated good as a substance of the third kind? The determination of the practical intellect took the direction of previous dispute over the Aristotelian or the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Corpus*. The modern definition of the practical intellect, with regard to the good as a permanent species, canceled original meaning of Aristotle’s definition that Averroes brought about anew. The second Averroism either insists on the dualism of both intellects, or, on the contrary, it mixed them in an undifferentiated manner. The dispute over the definition of the practical intellect, according to the quoted part of *De anima*, established a new political theory of the West. Averroes’s writing CMDA understands the connection of both intellects as follows.

“The intellect, through which action takes place and that thinks practically, differs from the contemplating intellect from the point of view of the perfection and the goal. The goal of the contemplative intellect is the cognition; the goal of the practical intellect is the action.” [[519]](#footnote-519)

The morally and politically active intellect is called by the term “*cogitativus operativus*” that corresponds to the Greek original (λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός). Therefore, both abilities differ in terms of activity, which corresponds in the first case to theoretical consideration and speculation (*finis enim speculativi est scire tantum*), and in the second case to practical action (*operativi autem operari*). Albert’s work *De homine* substantiates the reasoning of the first Averroism with regard to moral and political action only after he clearly outlined various activities of the intellect within the framework of the unique person (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). The treatise *De ho*mine defended the Aristotelian sense of the speculative intellect against the second Averroism by insisting on its extension (*speculativus per extensionem fit practicus*). This definition establishes the relation between the practical and theoretical intellect; it is not contained directly in *De anima*, but in the paraphrase *De anima* III.9, 433a1‒3 made by Jacob of Venice (*Translatio Vetus*). The work *De homine* commented on this translation before the introduction of Moerbeke’s translation of *De anima* dated to 1261–68. It already pointed out a different definition between both kinds of intellects (Queneau 1954). The key interpretation of the extension of theoretical intellect into the practical one is derived from the school of the first Averroism from the conception of the unity of the intellect according to CMDA. The meaning of Averroes’s interpretation and Albert’s paraphrase follows the original text of *De anima* 433a1–5.

“The speculative intellect becomes the practical one due to the extension (*speculativus per extensionem fit practicus*), as Aristotle confirms it in the third book of *De anima*, where it is said: «It makes a fundamental part of the intellect that it either avoids or imitates the things it gets to know; the intellect does not cause this directly, but through the object of its desire. Man then acts according to his desire, for example through intemperance.»” [[520]](#footnote-520)

The quoted reference to the third book of *De anima* is not in the original, but it was a paraphrase made after Averroes (CMDA III.47; 515.9‒12). Albert considers Averroes’s commentary on the connection of the theoretical and the practical intellect to be the authentic interpretation of *De anima*. The effect of the practical intellect covers the whole field of useful and harmful actions (*amplius extendente se intellectu et dicente intelligibilia fugere aut imitari*). But the intemperate human being (*inabstinens*) is similar to animals that follows impulses given by the sensual imagination and the desire (*secundum desiderium agit*). The quotation confirms that there is a difference between theoretical knowledge (*intellectus speculativus*), intellectual practice (*intellectus practicus*) and animal greed (*appetitus*). Moral and ethical action differs from the animal instinct of self-preservation and from theoretical consideration. The work *De homine* places the treatise on the practical intellect behind the analyses of the speculative intellect discussed above for CMDA (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Albert linked Averroes’s combination of both intellects (*speculativus per extensionem fit practicus*) to the interpretation of *Ethica Vetus*; it was a major step for a rational interpretation of *Ethics* separated from Neoplatonic mystical theology. The thesis “*speculativus per extensionem fit practicus*” was interpreted in Neoplatonism according to Avicenna’s metaphysics, which is determined by the exposure of the practical intellect from behind, from direction of the hypostatized good. The foundation of ethics begins with mystical contemplation and then moves on to reality. The following quote taken from *De homine* confirmes the rejection of such position; Albert does not agree with the philosophical position of the second Averroism.

“Now you have to ask yourself the following question: where does this expansion come from? Some say that it is given by the true definition given in the nature of good and evil. They refer to the Philosopher who said in *Nicomachean Ethics* that moral action does not lie in the contemplation of grace, but in the fact that we become good persons.” [[521]](#footnote-521)

Hermeneutics must once again repeat Averroes’s and Albert’s question that explores the nature of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one (*quas sit ista extensio*). The connection between theoretical and practical philosophy presents a fundamental problem. The postmodernist Kant clearly saw this point in *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* and he formulated a similar question as Albert did.[[522]](#footnote-522) By using the term “*ratio*” twice, the quotation indicates that the definition of ethical good and evil differs from the theoretical definition of the truth (*a ratione veri in rationem boni vel mali*). Neoplatonism transferred good actions into the mystical contemplation of the divine Good (*contemplandi gratia*), instead of clarifying the question of political and moral excellence in the act of personal existence as Aristotle claims it (*boni fiamus*). Albert fundamentally disagrees with the interpretation of ethics according to the second Averroism. The criticized thinkers first solve the theoretical contemplation of good and evil, from which they then deduce the principles of practical action. Theoretical considerations of *doctores Latini* completes moral action and political practice by determining *intellectus practicus* according to the exposure of the being from behind and according to Oxfordian Fallacy. As we already know from the previous matrices, this scenario was introduced into philosophy of Modernists via Avicenna. Aristotle takes the opposite approach; let us see Siger’s brilliant analysis of *De anima* (ch. 4.4.1). The actualized existence is established by the fact that the person is the one substance; Siger excluded even a plurality of formes in man. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the nature of the intellectual act from the act of the existence in mode “*ipse*” (*homo ipse intelligit*). Then Aristotle’s above-mentioned quotation from the work *De generatione animalium* II.3 (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον) quoted by Siger applies to ethics as well (ch. 4.4.2). Similarly, Albert saw the real meaning of *Nicomachean Ethics* in the actualized act of the personal virtuous life. The extension of the theoretical intellect in the practical took a fundamentally different meaning in the school of the first Averroism of Sicilian origin than in the Neoplatonism of *Modernorum*. They interpreted *Ethics* according to the dualism of Toledo school. This direction in the interpretation of ethics prevailed during Albert’s student years in Paris.

At the time of editing the treatise *De homine*, Albert could read the so-called *Guide de l’étudiant parisien* (1230–40). It summarized the meaning of *Ethics* in theoretical contemplation.[[523]](#footnote-523) We find a similar style in the commentary on *Ethics* published by Arnold of Provence, where Aristotle’s *phronésis* has an almost mystical character (Gauthier 1963). Furthermore, Albert was able to read the lectures on *Ethics* of an unknown Parisian magister, which we know under the name *Commentaire de Paris* (about 1235–40). One part of that treatise edited Gauthier in his commentary on the work *Ethica Vetus*. The higher form of the understanding does not need the senses (*cognitio sine phantasmate*) and allows a direct connection with God in the act of mystical contemplation.[[524]](#footnote-524) For hermeneutics, the quoted part of this commentary on *Ethica Nova* is of major importance. It clearly sets out the construction of intellect in two stages made with regard to the Neoplatonic and Augustinian contemplation of the good. The theoretical intellect has two components that are ordered according to the measure of perfection, i.e. according to the ability to recognize the Neoplatonic hierarchy of forms. This Averroism, given by a false understanding of CMDA, was upheld by the work *Summa Duacensis* published in the Avicennistic school of Philip the Chancellor. The hierarchically hypostatized *intellectus agens* and *possibilis* was made in the same pattern (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.2). The interpretation presented in *Liber de causis* according to the hierarchy of cosmic forms was adapted to the interpretation of Aristotelian *Ethics*. The writing *Commentaire de Paris* put the *intellectus agens* at the highest level; then follows the *intellectus possibilis*.[[525]](#footnote-525) The *anima intellectiva* then consists of two hypostases of the intellect, whereby the higher active intellect determines the lower receptive intellect. This writing and before it the so-called *Commentaire d’Avranches* (*Commentarium Abricense in Ethicam Veterem*, about 1235) integrated Avicenna’s teaching on the two faces of the soul (OBJ I, ch. 2.3.1), which we have commented on with reference to Gundissalinus’s interpretation of *De anima* (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Albert’s criticism concerns one important part of *Commentaire d’Avranches*. Following the example of Avicenna and Christian mysticism, its author sees the purpose of *Ethics* as a contemplative connection with the external substance (*superiori essentie per intellectum tantum*). The connection with the highest Good takes place in the act of contemplation and due to the mystical rapture of the soul (*contemplatione et affectu animi*).[[526]](#footnote-526) Albert’s opponents can be reliably identified by an important commentary on *Ethics* written around 1245 under the title *Pseudo-Peckham* (*Commentarium in Ethicam Nouam et Veterem*). This commentary corresponds to the profile of Albert’s criticism in several major points. The conception of *Ethics* corresponds to Avicennian Augustinism. The writing probably originated in the Franciscan school of the first *Modernorum* that made the editorial board of *Summa Halensis*. The treatise attributed to Pecham does not agree with Aristotle’s interpretation of virtue as an act of the animate body. The author professes the dualism of soul and body. Therefore, it accuses Aristotle of the erroneous division of ethical virtues. He binds the virtues only to the act of the soul substituting in the body (*Aristotiles non ponit hic diuisionem uirtutis nisi secundum quod inest anime unite corpori*).[[527]](#footnote-527) In the teaching of Latin sophists, the good received the same status as their view of *intellectus possibilis* or *intellectus agens*, which became a separate substance that acts on man from the outside. Modernists carried out the same interpretation of the work *Ethics* as it done in the case of the scripture *De anima*. The process of illumination received an ethical character instead of the theoretical cognition. The separated cosmic intellect as the external source of illumination was replaced by the analogous scenario of illumination. The practical intellect was illuminated by the highest external Good that made another *tertium ens* to complete the ethical explanation.

At the University of Paris, the chancellor and bishop Alvernus prohibited the teaching concerning the separated *intellectus agens* acting directly on the human soul (OBJ II, ch. 2.3). That interdict had a fundamental influence on ethical theories of Avicennist Augustinians. After the publication of this prohibition, their theories acquired a latent or overtly heretical character. Albert was engaged in issuing the pioneering work *De homine* at that time. His dispute with the school of second Averroism had therefore a fundamental importance for establishing the ethics as an autonomous science. Alber defended the definition of the practical intellect as a special kind of extension of the speculative intellect according to Averroes’s above mentioned commentary on *De anima*433a13–15 (*est cogitativus operativus*). The group of modernists defended the subsisting good with a sophistic appeal to *Nicomachean Ethics*; in reality, they followed the line of Porretans and *Nominales*. Modernity changed the position of the middle link of moral judgment in such a way that the quasi-substantial good received its own causality, which was tied to the nominally defined essence. As a result, the same system of interpretation was introduced in the definition of good as it was in the case of cognition according to Oxfordian Fallacy. The school gathered to publish *Summa Halensis* also published the work *Pseudo-Peckham*. They understood the nature of ethics according to the very specific division of sciences. The second Averroism interpreted the scripture *De anima* in a Neoplatonic way, which was inspired by the school of *Nominales*. Aristotle writes that cognition is given either by intelligible or by sensual cognition directed to this or that real object. The phrase about the sharing of intelligible and sensual cognition according to the studied matter (*secantur igitur sciencia et sensus in res*) already existed in *Ethica Vetus* and was repeated after the year 1230 in various commentaries on *Ethics*. Formulation delivers the original text exactly (τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, *De anima*431b24‒25). Aristotle’s division of science according to *De anima* follows the hyparchical position of first substances. They are actualized and establish the causality in reality and then in the cognition, according to the metaphysical dative. The first Averroism interprets the quoted saying in such a way that science follows the sensual cognition determined by the causality of real first substances. This unique cognition is then universalized within the framework of the scientific proof, which justifies the different research of the different sciences in terms of genre. On the other hand, the commentary of the first modernists on *De anima* 431b24–25 conceives the thing according to the scheme of the second Averroism, that is, as the being of the third kind. Therefore, modern science must classify these being of the third kind directly in reality, since they present the kind of *tertium ens* made by Porretans and by *Nominales*. This is also the point of view of the first modernist school in Paris around the year 1245, which is fundamentally criticized by Albert. The work *Pseudo-Peckham* took the good as a Porretan hypostasis (*res*) and turned it into a Neoplatonic substance of the third kind.

“Another way of division can be done according to the saying of the third book of *De anima*: ‘The thing are divided according to the senses and according to the cognition.’ According to such classification of things, the classification of cognition is given as well (*secundum diuisionem rerum erit diuisio scientiarum*).” [[528]](#footnote-528)

The good became a substance of the third kind (*res*) and according to *Arbor Porphyriana* founded the modern division and classification of ethics (*divisio boni*). The movement of modern difference (*sub ratione boni*) carried out a division of ethics from the highest genus (*bonum divinum*) to the level of *species specialissima*, which was a good given in everyday moral actions (*bonum humanum*). The modernists divided ethics according to the good as a Porretan “*res*” given as a hypostasis. As a result, they established their own theory of action and sophistically referred to Aristotle, as it was a custom in this syncretic school. The quotation conceives the meaning of Aristotelian *Ethics* as a hypostasis illuminated through the exposure from behind, from the direction of the subsistent good. The good can then be divided as an objective hypostasis according to individual sciences (*secundum diuisionem rerum erit diuisio scientiarum*). The good for Aristotle lies in action; but for modernists it is given as a hypostasis in the objective mode “*semel—semper*.” Modern ethics explore the good as an objective *res*, which acts as a quasi-substance at the level of universals shared within the framework of the Porphyry’s Tree. From the point of view of the further development of political theory, the division of ethics according to Neoplatonic conception of the good conceived in the mode *essentialiter* is very important. We find this conclusion in the work *Pseudo-Peckham*.

“Moral science, in its original sense, deals with the good, whether it is given in things or in our actions. Science performs the division according to the substance given in reality (*quo est*); then moral science or philosophy is substantially divided according to the division of good (*essentialiter secundum diuisionem boni*).” [[529]](#footnote-529)

The division of the good as a pseudo-substance (*secundum diuisionem boni*) allows the division of the ethics into individual parts and disciplines (*diuiditur moralis scientia uel philosophia essentialiter*). The good became the highest substance and founded the abstractly conceived ethics, which decomposes the generic good into different species. The good, being a hypostatized substance of the third kind, became a component of human existence. This analytical view of ethics starts from the reasoning of Oxfordian Fallacy according to Rufus. The modernists gave the good the status of being of the third kind and presented an ethical version of the Porphyry’s Tree, in which they shared the generic good and the associated specific forms of its cognition and volition, like any other universals. The Pseudo-Pecham’s commentary connected the final and the formal causality of the good by linking the predication of both kinds of causality to a mutual convertibility. The finality of the formally defined good received an essentially given causality.[[530]](#footnote-530) Ethics, as a true recognition of the good (*moralis scientia*), receives the determination of the essentially perceived good (*proprie de bono*), which is identified with human action (*de rebus prout sunt ab opere nostro*). This determination of ethics is based on the Porretan “exsistence” of the investigated “thing” (*de quo est*). The definition of ethics as a science concerns the essentially given good as *tertium ens* endowed with the act of subsistence and effective causality. The good became the highest genus as a new mythological substance. Taken in the new categorical predication of *Modernorum*, it ensures the division of the good into lower species. The good predicted in the mode *per prius* received a new form of efficient causality according to the version of Oxfordian Fallacy introduced by Grosseteste, Rufus and Kilwardby. The Neoplatonic One, given as a Good and as a final cause, acquired an effective causality, which replaced human action in the concept of modern ethics (*finis dicitur causa causarum ... in quantum movet suo modo*).[[531]](#footnote-531) Since the Good is the highest final cause, then this superordinate genus also includes in itself the effective causality that is given by actions of real substances and by the acting persons. The substantiation of Neoplatonist ethics as a science transformed the actions of the persons into a modern kind of pseudo-substances. It is equipped with an effective causality of the third kind, which apparently acts in the order of first substances. The humanism of man as a specific corpse generated a specific ethic, which corresponds to the new simulacrum of reality. In the school of the second Averroism, a new form of ethical and later also political Neoplatonism came into being. That mythology was finally authoritatively confirmed by the bull *Unam Sanctam*.

The source of the analytical version of ethics was Rufus’s commentary on the third book of *De anima*, which was probably written already at Oxford. Carried out by the first representative of *Modernorum*, the sophistic interpretation of *intellectus practicus* of *De anima III* brought about the definitive separation of the second Averroism from the first Averroism. That separation took place in the school of Philip of Chancellor and the school of Hales’s Franciscan disciples in Paris. This separation was confirmed by cited interpretations of *Ethics* published in years 1240–50. Rufus mixed the conception of the good as a subsistent species according to extinct *Nominales* with Aristotelianism according to Oxfordian Fallacy founded by Grosseteste (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Aristotle predicts the effective actuality only with regard to hyparchical first substances; however, Rufus proposed a different interpretation of *Seconds Analytics*. According to Rufus, the definition of the practical intellect is determined with regard to the hypostatized species of the good.

“Similarly, with regard to intellectual abilities, it is true that the intellect, through the same ability, first absorbs the species of good to the extent that this good is given in an actualized state. The intellect absorbs this actualized good and recognizes it, and so it becomes the practical intellect.” [[532]](#footnote-532)

The intellect recognizes the good in the mode *per prius* in the form of the actualized species (*primo recipiendo speciem boni*). The cognition of the good does not come from the activity of the person oriented towards the practical good, but from the contemplation of the hypostatized good as a “substance—species” of the third kind. The universally recognized species has in and of itself an actualized and causal character (*inquantum bonum actuale est*). Once again, the effect of the causally acting essence can be seen in the middle link of the deductive proof, which is a typical product of Oxford’s interpretation of *Seconds Analytics*. Rufus’s ethics does not require a uniquely acting person, because it explores theoretically the good as a hypostatized species. Made in the form of the causally effective and hypostatized *tertium ens*, the good defines the equally hypostatized practical intellect (*sic est intellectus practicus*). The exposure of the sense of ethical actions comes from behind, from species of the third kind defined according to *Nominales*. Taken the contemplation of the species of good in itself, it means that the practical intellect keeps the same nature as the theoretical intellect. It is evident, there was no independent ethics in the second Averroism. There is no deductive syllogism that could make foundations of an ethic as an independent science. Moreover, this sophistic practical intellect is completely separated from the imagination and the from sensual volition (*subiciet se ipsum et non subicietur ab imaginatione*).[[533]](#footnote-533) Rufus’ intellect considers the good in its specific simplicity (*bonum simpliciter*) through the ethical form of *potencia substantialis*. Then he realizes this good in actions (*secundum quod in homine est afficitur bono nunc*). The good is defined in an Avicennist scenario and determined as a hypostatized species in the act of self-reflection of the active intellect. Given as such, it can be afterwards recognized in a contingent manner by the senses. Rufus allows the influence of imagination only in the sensually given lower part of the volition; it makes the typical scheme of animal *vis aestimativa* according to Avicenna. The practical intellect is connected with the theoretical intellect by the porretan difference between the contingent and the eternal species. The Porretan mode of “exsistence” shows that the good as an eternal species is realized in random actions with the help of the practical intellect. The practical intellect forms a component of the theoretical intellect and does not require contact with sensual reality, because it determines the good through the act of self-reflection (*ipse intellectus se subiciat*).[[534]](#footnote-534) The good has no affective character given by desire and imagination, but has become the object of purely intellectual contemplation of the theoretical intellect. The practical intellect is exposed from behind according to Gundissalinus’s dualistic interpretation of *De anima*. It acquires the actualisation by contemplating the higher good. Then, the lower components of ethical cognition and the action given joins in, since they are established on the basis of sensual imagination and desire (*quod sibi unit imaginationem in appetendo*).[[535]](#footnote-535) Rufus’s practical intellect is reduced to the theoretical one and determines both the sensual imagination and the will through the exposure from behind made by the act of Avicennist self-reflection. Rufus, and after him the second Averroism, work with the reverse scheme of the practical intellect than the classical Aristotelianism. The interpretation of the ethics corresponds to the scheme of cognition made by Oxfordian Fallacy. The actualization of the practical intellect proceeds in the deductive scheme, in which the ethical good, as a specific *scibile*, descends from the higher forms to the lower contingent forms according to the scenario of *Liber de causis*. This dualistic definition of good and its recognition determines the reading of Aristotle’s *Ethics*. Let’s recall the two-stage structure of *Commentaire de Paris* that referred to *Ethica Nova* cited above. Rufus is the first known author of the newly emerging school of *Modernorum*, who used this two-floor structure for the ethics before 1240. It is clear from his definition of action that the practical intellect has no activities or the nature of its own. The practical intellect merely represents a new variation of the theoretical consideration that refers to contingent species of the good. Porretan good “exsists” as a substance and then put its effects in reality.

“The object of cognition of the practical intellect is the form of the thing or the thing itself. But not in the way in which it itself exists as a actualized being, but in so far as the intellect conceives it as a species which, through the given thing, extends itself into a kind of some activity (*res illa extendit se in operationem*). With regard to this definition, the thing is stated to be good. Then the good, as a actualized good, makes the object of the practical intellect.” [[536]](#footnote-536)

The first movement contains the complete univocal scenario of the second Averroism, which sophistically mixes the object of theoretical cognition and that of practical action. The key determination of the practical intellect is the activity of the theoretical intellect. It passes in the mode of the Porretan “*existere*” from the permanent species into its contingent existence (*extendit se in operationem*). Rufus’s extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical has nothing in common with the Aristotelian scenario. The founder of modernity represents the Neoplatonic transition from the objective species of good to its contingent occurrence in real actions. The object of action is the form of the thing (*forma rei*), which is not given in reality as the first substance (*res non in se prout ens est*). The practical intellect considers them through the actualized species of good (*per speciem suam*). The good, as a species, is not produced in the process of cognition and volition, but exists as an independent and self-sufficient form, which encroaches on the reality of the first substances. Rufus, from the point of view of the practical intellect, produced a hypostatized species of good, considered by the theoretical intellect. If this intellect determines human action by the good related species given to the contingent, then it is practical. This new being of the third kind is created by the extension of the hypostatized good into the changeable reality. Rufus’s conception of “*exsistere*” (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2) forms the basis of modern definition of the practical intellect. The specific hypostatized good “*exsistit*” outside of us in the real world; the practical intellect recognizes it directly and it shapes our contingent ethical actions accordingly. Rufus’s species reaches into the intellect as an effective cause with regard to the realizable good from the real thing and leads the practical intellect to action (*res illa extendit se in operationem*). The sophistically defined species of the good establishes the singular effects in man through objective universality. This connection of singular causality and universality in an actualized species as a actualized pseudo-substance forms an object of cognition of the practical intellect (*inquantum bonum actuale est obiectum practici intellectus*). The definition of the good in the school of *Modernorum* contains in Rufus’s scheme both the universality of the concept and the causality of the first substance (*sub hac ratione dicitur res bona*). As a result, the middle link of the practical syllogism was created. The ethics of *Modernorum* got a specific modern definition built on the good as *tertium ens*. Let us recall that this conception of the good as a substance of the third kind was, moreover, connected with the doctrine of universal hylemorphism which Rufus brought to Paris (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). The sophistic Aristotelian combined the good as a substance of the third kind with the effective causality, which he placed outside the individual ethical act of the free-acting person. As a actualized substance of the third kind, the good is endowed with its own effective causality.

Rufus became the founder of the objective theory of cognition and action, which the first Averroism rejected in principle. It is obvious from the present interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*, that the first fundamental dispute about the emergence of autonomous ethics and politics took place in the years 1240–45 at the University of Paris when Rufus arrived from Oxford to Paris. His analytical interpretation of the *Corpus* influenced Bonaventure’s school and the dominicans as Kilwardby. Rufus’s interpretation divided practical action into a kind of animalistic volition and Neoplatonic mysticism. That interpretation of ethics influenced the school publishing *Summa Halensis* as it was confirmed in the cited *Pseudo-Pecham*’s treatise and in Kilwardby’s commentary on *Ethics*, written during his studies in Paris (*Expositio super Ethica Noua et Vetere*, about 1245). The commentary is written in the style of the second Averroism made by Rufus. The edited part of Kilwardby’s commentary includes a similar division of ethics as the Paris commentary on *Ethica Nova* quoted above. Wisdom is understood in the Neoplatonic sense and it forms the highest level of the ethical consideration of God as the highest good (Buffon 2007, 421–22). In this division, the modernists divided Aristotle’s *phronésis* into the two floors of actions. Philosophically and mystically, *phronésis* referred to the Neoplatonic contemplation of God as the highest good and practically to the ethical cognition that determines practical action in the world. Such a Neoplatonic conception was unacceptable for connoisseurs of Aristotelian *Ethics* presented “*ad mentem Averrois*.” The sophistic interpretation of Aristotle’s Corpus abolished ethical responsibility of the person and led to the disintegration of the substantial unity of the person. Man ceased to exist as a unified substance at Oxford when the universal hylemorphism was introduced. The universal hylemorphism also came to Paris when Rufus and Kilwardby arrived there. At the University of Paris, this teaching was adopted by the school of Grammarians. These were Porretan logicians of the declining schools of *Logica Modernorum*. The cultural hegemony of the sophistry brought by Rufus helped these masters to jump up one academic level higher. Instead of teaching logical sophisms of the type *Insolubilia* and semantic exercises as *Obligationes* for beginners, they became metaphysicians and ethicists in the mode of analytical philosophy founded at Oxford. Alvernus criticized this group of Grammarians (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). In conjunction with the mendicants, as well as with Rufus, Kilwardby and Bonaventura, they founded the first faculty of modern philosophy at the University of Paris in 1255. But now, we write the year 1245, since Alvernus published the exegesis of *De anima* and Albert published the key part of the writing *De homine* in Paris, in which he commented upon CMDA according to the Sicilian school. The misinterpretation of ethics and practical intellect done according to *De Anima*III provided another reason why Rufus had to leave the University of Paris dominated by the first Averroism. His Neoplatonist and Porretan scheme of practical intellect was introduced after the year 1235 in Oxford. Sometime after the year 1240 it was taken up by Bonaventure’s school of the second Averroism. Such teaching was unacceptable for the connoisseurs of Aristotle’s *Ethics* as Albert, Bacon and Alvernus. Aristotelianism, imported from analytical Oxford, was linked to Porretan predication of categories. This sophistic interpretation confirmed to the representatives of the first Averroism in Paris that the interpretation of *Ethics* and *De anima* presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” decided the fate of Christian theology. Without a properly understood ethic, a theological conception of redemption and condemnation was not possible. Alvernus, Bacon and Albert contested the “*sequaces Aristotelis*” that were influenced by Neoplatonism of the Toledo school. Before Rufus’s arrival, the school of Philip the Chancellor formed the center of this interpretation. The first Franciscan magisters also belonged to this school at that time.

About the year 1240, Alvernus, Albert and Bacon realized that it was necessary to fundamentally protect the exposure of the being from the direction of the real substance recognized by the senses. This should have been done not only because of endangered metaphysics, but because of endangered ethics as well. In Rufus’s sophistical deduction, it disappeared the Aristotelian conception of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical. Thus, the whole scheme of cognition in *De anima* fell out as well, and with it the Aristotelian ethical theory. According to *Nicomachean Ethics*, right action is defined as a practically recognized middle between both extremes, and this middle member is recognized by wise people.[[537]](#footnote-537) Rufus’s analytical ethics did not need a wise person, because it was based on the logical deduction. The emergence of ethical modernism can be dated to the time around the year 1240, in the environment of the editors of *Summa Halensis*. It was in this environment that Bonaventure’s followers from the school of Philip the Chancellor and Oxford’s Porretans, educated by Grosseteste, such as Rufus and, after him, Kilwardby, came together for the first time. The modernist conception of ethics was based on Neoplatonic interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*. It began to spread successfully among poorly educated artistic students at the University of Paris. The graduates of the schools of *logica Modernorum* had only a philosophical formation based on Porretan logic and they did not know classical Aristotelianism. Bacon confirmed Rufus’s success among less educated Parisian students, who readily embraced the sophistic and cultural hegemony of modernity (*famosissimus apud stultam multitudinem*; OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Alvernus, Albert and Bacon had to react to the sophistic attack of second Averroists, who disinterpreted the original sense of *Ethics* and *De anima*. The previous matrices dealing with the emergence of objectivity described that evolution. The introduction of the writing *De homine* refused the science of these *doctores Latini* as a fundamental lack of understanding of *Seconds Analytics* and *De anima* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). As a prominent representative of the school of the first Averroism in Paris about 1245, Albert considered Rufus’s conception unacceptable because they interpreted *Ethics* and *De anima* according to Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. At that time, Albert was working as a *magister regens* at the University of Paris, which was a serious problem for Rufus. We have described his unsuccessful apology of *De anima*, presented in the work *Speculum animae*; he had to leave Paris and returned to Oxford (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.4). In addition to the struggle against the erroneous conception of science in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy, another serious reason arose, as a result of which Albert decided to make a commentary on the entire Aristotelian corpus (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Albert’s two commentaries on *Nicomachean Ethics* keep the central place in his interpretation of Aristotle. The argumentation of the work *De homine* considered the determination of the essence of man; the commentaries on *Ethics* extended it to include rational choice and ethical actions.

Now it becomes clear why the definition of the practical intellect as a special extension of the speculative intellect played a key role in the new interpretation of Aristotle’s *Ethics* since 1240 and later in the explication of the writing *Politics*. The Aristotelians Albert, Bacon and a decade later Aquinas had to defend the correct view of the extension of both intellects against modern Avicennists. The connection between the theoretical and the practical intellect took up Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle. Aquinas rejected the Commentator as an Averroist. Therefore he had a big problem by interpreting *Ethics* and especially *Politics*, since both works were presented “*ad mentem Averrois*” in the school of the first Averroism. The first Averroism linked the practice of the person with the determination of universal unity within the framework of humanity. In contrast to the modernists of that time and today, the representatives of the first Averroism knew the exact interpretation of *Second Analytics* and the other logical writings. These were authentically annotated in Boethius’s tradition. The center of classical categorical predication and Aristotelianism was Abelard’s school at the *École cathédrale de Paris*, which gave rise to the University of Paris. Blund’s school introduced a categorical predication in accordance with the critical interpretation of Avicennism between 1220–25. The criticism of the modern human being as a corpse, Grosseteste carried it out in the work *De anima et de potenciis eius* (1225) with the first explicit reference to the interpretation of Averroes. Alvernus edited Grosseteste’s interpretation for the new interpretation of CMDA after Scotus’s lectures in Paris, which founded the interpretation of the Sicilian school in 1230 (*De potenciis animae et obiectis*, 1230). This tradition of the correct interpretation of Aristotle in Paris, and also in Oxford, Bacon defends in the work *Distinccio tercia de anima* (1255) and from this position criticizes Oxford’s sophists (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Science of man was founded by the correctly formed deduction made in the form of scientific *demonstratio*. Real Aristotelians knew that the key to the constitution of ethics as an autonomous science, connected with the real world and the real ethical action of the person, consists in a practical syllogism in *Nicomachean Ethics* (E.N. 1147a25–b5). Aristotle clearly states that the practical judgment and the practical intellect shape the particular action (πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, E.N. 1147a3‒4). If ethics is to be truly conceived as a science within the framework of deductive *demonstratio*, then the correct delimitation of ethics depends on the determination of the nature of the middle link of the syllogism (*medium*). In it, the singular causality takes place at the level of the effect of the real world and the universal predication of this causality. Albert’s dispute about the principle “*ex inmediatis*” with Kilwardby in the years 1240–45 concerned the correct interpretation of ethics, not only the interpretation of works *De anima*, *Categories* and *Metaphysics* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). The good taken in the mode “for us” (πρὸς ἡμᾶς, E.N. 1107a1), it can be theoretically recognized and practically realized as the here and now realized mid-way between the harmful extremes (τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ, E.N. 1147b3). In the case of ethics and politics, it is about acting according to the *phronésis*, whereby the cautious person follows the right measure in action (*recta ratio*). In contrast to mystical interpretations of modernists, the school of the first Averroism clearly acknowledged that the first principle of cognition “*ex inmediatis*” must be taken from real causality that is based on real activities of the person. In the question of right actions, theoretical wisdom is explicitly put in the second place with regard to practical wisdom. Theorists such as Anaxagoras and Thales, according to *Ethics*, do not seek the primary human good (οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν, *E.N.* 1141b3‒8). Anyone who read *Nicomachean Ethics* critically and attentively could not overlook these facts, especially after the arrival of Averroes’s commentaries in the Latin West. The Commentator expressly pointed out that modern Avicennists had not read Aristotle, but their own sophistical fabulations (*Moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis*; OBJ I, ch. 2.5). The Sicilian school criticized a similar group of modernists in Paris that put its own sophistic fabulations instead of the true Aristotle’s teaching. The dispute between the two schools regarding the interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* was inevitable and the first round took place in the years 1240–50. Once again, the quarrel concerned sophistic interpretations of the Corpus, which the second Averroism had transferred from the field of metaphysics and noetics into the field of ethics. This gave rise to another reason why bishop Alvernus had given the title *sophistae Latini* to the members of this school and why Rufus had to leave Paris. From the previous interpretation, it becomes clear that the first modernist unsuccessfully defended the analytical ethics of *Modernorum*, not just analytical metaphysics and the theory of cognition. By dividing the good of the third kind within the framework of *Arbor Porphyriana*, the modernists created the first objective classification of ethics. Foucault’s poststructuralist interpretation of modern *epistémé* completed this sophistic interpretation of human sciences in the age of nihilistic humanism. The Porretan corpse is defined as a specific individual in the “*semel—semper*” mode. In order to determine actions of this non-existent being of the third kind, the freedom as a specific concept or as an a priori given *scibile* makes a sufficient condition, par example by setting up the hypostatized and ideological form of human rights. The division and sorting out of this or that ethical *scibile* characterizes both the postmodern Hegelian academician before Marx and the theoretical ideologist in the epoch of contemporary nihilism. Hannah Arendt criticized and rectified this postmodern error, which is given by a fundamental lack in the question of practical intellect. This Aristotelian thinker separated artisanal manufacturing from political practice and rejected the concept of liberal freedom as a specific myth of the West. The postmodern liberals of the Enlightenment led by their own solar intellect do not read Aristotle either; they introduced a political mythology of the individual apolitical will instead of examining political actions of citizens that are based on the real freedom in the polis.

Now, we can return to the quoted work *De homine*, which for the first time in the history of the Latin West integrally defends Aristotle’s and Averroes’ conception of the practical intellect. Albert rejected the scenario of ethics according to the second Averroism, which Kilwardby and Rufus unsuccessfully presented in Paris. In 1245, academically beaten Kilwardby returned to Oxford and Rufus followed him in 1250. Chancellor Alvernus let Albert's ethics made "*ad mentem Averrois*" to be the basis of Christian ethics at the University of Paris. The reception of the Sicilian Averroes was the main reason for the departure of Kilwardby and Rufus from Paris back to the bastion of modernism in Oxford. Albert grounded ethics in the actions and activities of the real person. Consequently, he rejected Rufus’s hypostasized species of the good that ruled out the causality of the person. According to Albert, such a kind of objective causality is absurd, since the definition of the practical intellect made of the essence has only a potential character. The objective definition of action, according to Rufus and Kilwardby, abolished the very possibility of how the intellect can be practical.

“The Philosopher says that the motive of action consists in the desired good. If the practical intellect is the source of the will, then a rational definition of the good in this intellect is not sufficient to determine real actions.” [[538]](#footnote-538)

The scenario of ethical knowledge follows the pattern of the first Averroism. The action is determined in relation to the real good that is wanted by a really existing person. The exposure of cognition can only come from the senses and, in the case of the practical intellect, only from the sensual desire (*nihil movet nisi in quantum est appetitivum*). Then the modernists are not right about the fact that the theoretical definition of the good (*in rationem boni tantum*) can by itself produce causal effects in the practical intellect (*non videbitur hoc sufficere*). The practical intellect integrates desire and will into its movement, because only this movement has the necessary actuality in itself (*intellectus practicus sit movens*). The sensual desire makes the practical intellect actualized and leads him to the realization of practically recognized good. Without the actualization from the senses, the intellect would have no practical cognition, since the human intellect is a pure *tabula rasa*, and its conclusions are merely universal and potential.[[539]](#footnote-539) Albert’s concept of *intellectus practicus* in *De homine*, q. 63, made a literal *revolutio* to Aristoteles, no means a modernist and sophistic revolution. Albert’s critical exegesis turned the speculations of modernists back to the actual interpretation of Aristotle’s work according to the Commentator. Modernist deduction abolished the practical intellect as a unique cause, which produces the effects in the order of the first substances. The next two critical questions of *De homine* concern the incorrectly positioned ethical intellectualism, which deals with the practical intellect from the Neoplatonist perspective of the Toledo school and prefers the theoretical view over the ethical one.[[540]](#footnote-540) Albert rejected both approaches as flawed and fundamentally revised them with reference to the Commentator’s interpretation of *Ethics*. The practical intellect must be exposed from the front, from the direction of real actions and due to the desire first given through the senses. Only this determination of moral actions, given by the exposure of the practical intellect from the front, entails the practical syllogism according to the principle “*ex inmediatis*” given in *Seconds Analytics* (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). Albert can now return to the original definition of the practical intellect as an extension of the theoretical intellect.

For the further development of political theory, the interpretation of the dual nature of cognition made by the theoretical and practical intellect keeps a major importance. Albert defended the autonomy of both types of intellect in accordance with *Nicomachean Ethics*. The subsequent postmodern dispute about the autonomy of the practical mind can be found in Kant’s *Critique of practical reason*. The autodetermination of the objectively given will in Kant’s second critique, however, follows Olivi’s nature of the will (ch. 5.1.1) made in the mode of “*ipse*.” Kant’s answer to the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one follows the scenario of *Modernorum* (*Satz a priori wodurch*… *Wille unmittelbar objectiv bestimmt wird*).[[541]](#footnote-541) Kant derived the scheme of causality for the practical reason from the theoretical intellect, which the first Averroism rejected in principle. The transcendental deduction of the practical intellect followed the same pattern as in *Critique of pure reason* that followed the deduction of theoretical intellect according to Scotus (ch. 5.4.4). According to the first Averroism, the theoretical intellect can never be immediately practical, because it has no possibility of acting directly in reality. For the act of direct causality, the potential theoretical intellect needs an associated diaphanum, which is the practical intellect. According to Albert, the extension of theoretical cognition into practice means that the theoretical and practical intellect are not determined by the same generic conception of the truth, because they do not have the same object of cognition. Again, Averroes’s conception of the truth as *proportio* is assumed to create the correspondence of the intellect with regard to the generic object of cognition. The aim of the theoretical intellect consists in cognition; but the practical intellect aims at the activity given in the completed fact or the completed work, whereby the work is given in a real and personal way. Both genres differ from each other in principle, and thus also the activity and the truth, which is given in both types of intellect. The extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical goes in the direction of real actions and personal volition. Albert respects the importance of both intellects, which is given in the thesis on the primacy of theoretical consideration according to Aristotle, interpreted by Averroes, and not by Avicenna. The declaration of war addressed to modern Avicennists concerns their erroneous view of ethics and it looks as follows.

“To the next, it must be said that good in the intellect is established after the truth (*bonum est post verum in intellectu*). The truth is found in the definition of universal species, the good, on the contrary, is given in personal actions. Therefore, the effectiveness of the theoretical intellect must be extended beyond what is peculiar to it as an intellect. The essence of the intellect, to the extent of being an intellect, is in the universality. If it should be practical, then it must extend its actions to the personal level that establishes the practice (*extendi ad particularia in quibus est ipsa praxis*).” [[542]](#footnote-542)

The first sentence about the primacy of truth over good in the human intellect has a decisive value for the further formation of political theory (*bonum est post verum in intellectu*). The interpretation gives the correct status of practical cognition according to Aristotle, and not according to Porretan primacy of the good as a hypostatized species. The primacy of truth pursued by the theoretical intellect must determine every cognition. But this does not mean that the recognition by itself produces the deeds, as academic modernists thought and still think today. The new interpretation of ethical rationality is based on the interpretation of the intellect in CMDA. Since the goal of neither intellect is the same, the nature of both intellects is different from each other (*proprium*). The primacy of theoretical intellect is given in the universality of cognition that is produced by intelligible species (*verum enim est in ratione speciei universalis*). The practical intellect, on the other hand, relates to particular actions and produces activities (*bonum autem in particularibus operum*). The species are universal and potential in mind, practical activities, on the other hand, are particular and actualized in reality. Albert clearly distinguished the twofold goal of intellect. The new architecture of both intellects constituted answers the above-mentioned original question about the nature of this extension (*quas sit ista extensio*). The theoretical intellect cannot leave the realm of universal thinking, because otherwise it ceases to be itself (*proprium enim suum ... est stare in universali*). The extension is necessary for the theoretical intellect to actively work in the field of particular actions that it cannot reach by itself due to its universal nature (*ultra id quod est intellectus proprium*). In contrast to moderns of his time, Albert knew the function of diaphanum in CMDA (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.4). Two generically different sortes of intellect must be related to each other, since theoretical sciences differs from the practical ones. If the theoretical intellect is to become practical (*si deberet esse practicus*), then it must expand into the intellectual form of a different kind, which determines moral and political practice (*necesse est extendi ad particularia in quibus est ipsa praxis*). Both components of the one and the same intellect given in the unique person harmoniously complement each other within the framework of extension, and there is no contradiction between them. The distinction between the two intellects follows the analysis of *tertium* and *quartum genus* in CMDA, which distinguishes the personal and universal status of *intellectus possibilis* (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). First, there is intellectus practicus as a tertium genus that in engaged in personal activities; the same intellect can be apprehended as *quartum genus* due to it general nature in man. As to the activity of practical intellect, the mediation passes through the primacy of cognition made out in theoretical intellect. The universal knowledge of good must be done as the first step (*bonum est post verum in intellectu*), since the rationality given by universal species (*in ratione speciei universalis*) mediates the activities of practical intellect to its goals made out due to the will engaged in the body. From the act of doing good in real actions, we can go to the theoretical cognition of the practical intellect. The utopias and ideologies of intellectuals arise in the theoretical intellect; historical practice is only given through the use of the practical intellect. Only a few people can combine both intellects into one. Karl Marx followed the thinking of the first Averroism because he anchored labor in the historically situated body. He knew very well that Hegelian academic utopia and theoretical utilitarianism of all kinds did not change the world. For a real change of the capitalist system into a more human form, the practical intellect must be applied. It was the founding of the *Communist International* that united the committed trade unionists and political activists in various states on the basis of the well-known proclamation *Communist Manifesto* (1848).

Albert’s writing *De homine* established the primacy of the realized deed over the hypostatized good, thereby abolishing the main argument of theological and political Augustinism. Albert put an end to Neoplatonist interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics*. The highest Good apprehended through *intellectus agens* ceased to be the fundament of practical intellect. The ethical correctness of modernity was given as Anselm’s *rectitudo*, which was realized through the mystically enlightened will (OBJ, ch. 1.2). The active form of intellect (*intellectus practicus*) driven by human will and desire was actualized by hypostatized forms of the good that contemplative intellect reflected. Albert defended the original meaning of Aristotle’s good for us, which ethics and politics should achieve according to the above-mentioned middle link of demonstrative practical syllogism. The practical syllogism predicts the ideal middle between the extremes thanks to the action based on the balanced judgment made by wise people (E.N. II.6, 1106b36‒1107a2). The new middle link (*medium*) of the practical syllogism is the wise man himself, and not some kind of good of the third kind, which is created by Porretan division of universals. Albert reversed the sequence of cognition in ethics and thus established it as a practical science according to Averroes’s interpretation. Albert’s definition of the practical reason as a specific kind of rational activity founded ethics and later also politics as autonomous sciences in the Latin West. The first Averroism refers to wise people given as the center of the practical syllogism in ethics. It defends the determination of the practical intellect from the real causality of the free person, and not from the theoretical principle of recognition. Referring to Averroes’s Commentary on *Metaphysics*, Albert explains why ethical and political action arises within an autonomous rational form (*forma compositionis*). The emergence of ethics as an independent science is set out in the following quotation. It defines the active nature of the practical intellect that is different from the abstraction made by the theoretical intellect.

“It also applies that the practical intellect has a form related to acting on the level of things (*practicus intellectus habet formam operativam rei*) and it joins real things through this form (*componitur cum re operata*). Aristotle says in the seventh book of *Metaphysics* that the health brought about in the sick person arises from the recognition of the health that lies in the soul of the doctor, and speaks of a ‘composite form’ (*forma compositionis*). That is why the form in the speculative intellect is not given in the direction of the individual thing, but it relates to this thing as it is represented through the abstraction (*non est ad rem, sed a re per abstractionem*). This is why it is called ‘abstracted form’ (*forma abstractionis*).” [[543]](#footnote-543)

The distinction between the theoretical and the practical intellect has a causal effect that brings the practical intellect directly to reality. Real effects are produced through the effective form of the practical mind (*formam operativum rei*). This type of action establishes practical cognition as a kind of the active form (*ad rem*) that makes unity with the real thing (*forma compositionis*). The theoretical intellect, on the other hand, takes up cognition from the real thing in the process of abstraction (*a re*). The generic difference made by the terms “*ad rem—a re*” is of major importance. The composition of the practical intellect, which is given by causal connection with the real thing, differs in this point from the process of abstraction. As a result, we obtain the twofold type of the recognized form, which determines the two kinds of cognition that is different in terms of genre. The abstract form (*forma abstractionis*), which is given “from” the thing in the direction of the universal and only potential predication. It is fundamentally different from the compositional form that is directly connected “to” the thing due to the action in reality (*forma compositionis*). Due to the relationship to the first substance as a causally acting being, the operations (theoretical, practical) of both intellects differed in a generic way. The theoretical intellect abstracts from the real thing; the practical intellect composes the real thing. The definition of action explicitly concerns the practical intellect, the form of which is set for the active manipulation of individual things (*practicus intellectus habet formam operativam rei*). The intellect creates through its activity the operative form, in which the intention and the completed work directly reach reality (*hoc componitur cum re operata*). Such kind of practical syllogism was called the predication “*in artificialibus*,” since the art of making (*ars*) makes the unity with the real thing. Albert’s example of this form of practical composition of the intellect and the thing is chosen according to Aristotle. Health is the practical intention and the goal of activity first given in the doctor’s mind (*quae est in anima medici*). Through his activity, the practical idea becomes a real form in the patient’s body (*sanitas quae inducitur in aegro*). This activity is a composition because the form originally given in the doctor is now transferred by *intellectus practicus* into the hylemorphic substance of the patient. Hermeneutics emphasize that this thesis creates a different kind of *dativus auctoris* that is fundamentally different from the modern dative. The first Averroism postulated the person as subject in relation to action as a being. It comes into the space of historial (*geschichtlich*) sense of actions that make the manifestation of Being (*Ge-Stell*). The person is the main actor of a historially determined practice (Marx), thanks to the practical intellect as *tertium genus* (Albert). Modernity carries out a completely false projection of *tertium ens* that is located in the space of mythologically conceived practice. Modernity first established the denudation of the person as a modern *individuum*, which in the mode of Oxfordian Fallacy is mistakenly labeled as a *quartum genus*. She then placed a further mythological denudation of real action in front of this individual. It is based on the essence of the objective good as *tertium ens*, which should act as *causa efficiens* of the hyparchic substance. The foundation of modernity in relation to reality generates a metaphysical paranoia. There is neither a reality nor a real author of actions. One abstraction replaces the other. Unfortunately, this paranoid individual and his mythological practice constitutes the postmodern subject of social contracts and human rights.

Albert confirms that the practical intellect reaches into reality, where it acts personally as a cause, because the composition affects the matter directly. The practical intellect does not produce a universal form given in thinking. The specific object of practical activity is a real work, in this case the cured patient. In ethics, there are good or bad actions. But these activities are unique actualized deeds and works, and not universal concepts. Thanks to this original activity of the intellect in the reality, the cognizing subject and the recognized object merge together in a specific activity that manifests an actualized object of action (*res operata*). The theoretical intellect is not capable of this kind of individual composition because it has a different kind of formal object of cognition (*forma vero quae est in intellectu speculativo*). Albert rejected the predication “*in artificialibus*” for the theoretical intellect and he assigned that task exclusively to the practical intellect. The nature of predication called “*in artificialibus*” formed the *Lichtung* of the truth and the untruth that separated the school of the first and the second Averroism about the year 1240. Albert left definitely the school of *Modernorum* gathered around Rufus, Bonaventure and Kilwardby. The form created in the process of abstraction does not relate to the thing as with the practical intellect (*non est ad rem*), but makes a kind of universal abstraction (*a re abstractionem*). The first Averroism, in contrast to modernity, knew well that the writing *Ethics* defines the entirely specific form of the truth concerning the practical intellect (ἀλήθεια πρακτική, E.N. 1139a26). The cognition of practical intellect is the correspondence with regard to the completed work and not with regard to the theoretically recognized thing. Due to the defense of the practical intellect and the truth, politics and ethics are possible as an independent form of human actions. They are bound to personal acts that Aristotle originally defined as “human excellence” (ἀρήτη). Arendt appreciated this political ability in her brilliant analyses of political practice and freedom. The work *De homine* laid the foundations for an independent ethics and politics within the framework of the scientific definition of the practical intellect according to *Seconds Analytics*. Following Averroes, Albert created the first theory of two components of the intellect, each of which has its truth, its form and its sphere of cognition. Dante as the founder of humanism took over that teaching in his above-mentioned work *Monarchia*, which presents the first humanistic form of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one. The political and spiritual unity of mankind, which was gradually realized within the framework of Christian cosmopolitanism, becomes an epochal new “*forma compositionis*.” The forgotten first Averroism of Albert, Siger, Bacon and Dante (and not that of theocratic theologian Aquinas) formed the basis of European humanism and autonomous political science. From the previous interpretation of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one, it becomes clear that the sophistic modernity did not have the means to scientifically defend the autonomy of human action within the framework of the unique free person.

Bacon provided a similar interpretation of the term “*extensione fit practicus*” about 1245 when he made the first criticism of the second Averroism. His commentaries on Aristotle’s practical philosophy are influenced by Averroes’s commentary on *Metaphysics*. Therefore, they differ from Albert’s interpretation of *De homine*, which had been influenced by the interpretation of CMDA. The definition of the practical intellect is given with regard to the self-reflection of the speculative intellect made through direct contemplation of the truth. In this way, the speculative intellect differs from the practical intellect that becomes actualized through mediation that obtains the desired good.

“As soon as the intellect sees and recognizes that truth that it passes on of its own accord, then the speculative intellect becomes practical by this extension (*intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus*). Without further mediation (*sine medio*) it longs for this truth (*ad diligendum ipsum*). The speculative intellect does not need a mediator for this, because it keeps this desire in itself to a sufficient extent (*sufficient sine medio diligitur*) and thus it becomes identical with the practical intellect (*speculatur ille idem practicus per medium*). It follows from this that the practical intellect conveys the action given by volition (*medium in via diligendi*), and the speculative intellect conveys the action given by contemplation (*medium in via speculandi*).” [[544]](#footnote-544)

The truth, by its very nature, is effective in reality (*verum quod suiipsius est communicativum*); but the practical truth can only be spread by actions. Therefore, the theoretical intellect is given by contemplative practice of truth; it has only a speculative character. The theoretical intellect expands into its practical form when recognizing the good (*speculativus extensione fit practicus*). The self-reflection of this so expanded intellect is an act of will and love and therefore cannot be a pure intellectual contemplation of the universal meanings exercised by the theoretical intellect (*speculatur ille idem practicus per medium*). The extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one secures the necessary causal and universally given intermediate link of the syllogism (*by medium in via speculandi*). The middle link of practical action contains in itself the actual and individual recognition given by causal volition (*est medium in via diligendi*). In contrast to the criticized modernists such as Rufus, Bacon precisely defines rationality according to the causality of the middle link of the syllogism (*medium*), which ensures scientific cognition according to *Seconds Analytics*. The theoretically considered truth and the practically desired good represent two different forms of cognition, which cannot be combined into one scientific syllogism, since they do not have the same manner of reasoning (*in via diligendi… in via speculandi*). Then, for the theoretical intellect, the middle link of the proof is secured by the extension, because the practical intellect can create a kind of the ethical syllogism. Therefore, Bacon asserts that the theoretical intellect does not need Rufus’s species of good or any other Porretan hypostasis for the constitution of the middle link of the practical syllogism. Since we love the person or we want something, a practical orientation arises in the intellect, which is generically different from intellectual cognition. As a result, the theoretical intellect is actualized, because it takes the actualization of the will from the practically given intelligible form, and the causality of such individual will. The introduction of real causality from the practical volition into the theoretical intellect introduced the scheme of exposure from the front, taken from the direction of really wanted things. Bacon as Albert rejected Rufus’s theory of the good as a hypostatized species, which acts at the same time universally and as a real cause. According to Bacon, the theoretical intellect cannot act ethically practically, because it cannot generate a practical syllogism out of itself. The singular volition given in the middle link of the practical proof differs from the universal abstraction in terms of genre. The extension of the theoretical intellect is active by becoming practical. In order for the practical intellect to be an ethical cognition and not just a blind desire in the manner of Olivi’s modern will, it must be an extension of the theoretical intellect. The solution of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one is based on Averroes’s metaphysics. It corresponds to Albert’s connection of both components according to CMDA.

Thomas Aquinas defended the autonomous ethics in his commentary on Sentences (1252–56), but not the autonomous political action. His criticism of ethical Avicennism is based on the *First Letter to Timothy* (“The law is not intended for the righteous, but for the bad and disobedient people.“) and interprets this passage according to Aristotle’s *Ethics*.[[545]](#footnote-545) Aristotle says that the right moral action is based on freedom and human excellence, and therefore the distance from evil deeds based only on the fear of punishment is not enough (E.N. 1179b12). Aquinas combines Aristotle’s ethics with the quoted passage of the Bible in order to emphasize the importance of autonomous morality, given even before the fall of man. The key function is the new emphasis on the moral law, which is represented by both the just person and the political community. The defense of natural law, which is based on the action of the just man as the highest form of positive law, is based on the same principle as Albert’s interpretation of *Ethics*. Thomas’s conception of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical follows Albert and Bacon’s line of the above-mentioned interpretation of *Ethics*. But his interpretation of ethical rationality rectified theological Augustinism.[[546]](#footnote-546) Aquinas needs to connect the faith according to Augustine with the practical intellect of Aristotle. He does not use the term “*per dilectionem operatur*” as Modernists, but in the scheme of the practical intellect according to the first Averroism. Aquinas rejected the causality of the hypostatized good given by the contemplation of Porretan species. Ethics is a personal act of the acting person and is defined according to Aristotle’s rational action that follows an intellectual object of the practical intellect given to the will. Bacon and Albert no longer needed Augustine’s and biblical reasoning to justify good action at all. Aristotle’s *Ethics* must be interpreted on the basis of the natural mind and reasoning. The exegesis of Aquinas was made about 1255 in the spirit of the first Averroism. However, the use of Augustin and the Bible shows that there were two different theories regarding the rule of justice and the natural excellence of the just man the first Averroism that were bound to *Nicomachean ethics*. The ethical theologian Aquinas followed the corrected line of Avicennism according to the Toledo school (ch. 4.5.1). He differed from the ethical philosophers of the Sicilian school. They interpreted the specific character of the practical intellect “*ad mentem Averrois*” according to CMDA (Albert, Siger) and according to the interpretation of *Metaphysics* made by the Commentator (Bacon). Both branches of the first Averroism confirms that ethical action and active faith keep autonomy based on the new form of the practical intellect. It differs from the theoretical intellect thanks to the autonomous acts and its specific goal of practical cognition. All three main representatives of the first Averroism confirmed as well that practice has received the scientific statute and the definition (*ratio*) not in relation to the highest Good, but to the good that is practically recognized and desired with regard to us (λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ, E.N. 1140b5). According to Albert, the new *medium* of ethics is made of real actions that follow this or that individually given good for us. This created a new starting point for scientific treatises of ethics according to Aristotle’s real intention that rejected the abstract division of the good as a *tertium ens*. About the year 1255, there was a split between the two schools on the question of ethics, because the respective interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics* differed fundamentally from each other.

“The essence of ethics is given in the middle statement of the proof. However, the center of virtue is determined in relation to us and it is not given as a simple in itself (*quoad nos et non simpliciter*). Therefore, there is no universally given middle premise of ethical syllogism.” [[547]](#footnote-547)

The quotation contains a fundamental critique of objectivist ethics made by modernists. Albert clearly states that there is no objective and universal limitation of the good acting as a cause in real actions; the practical intellect has a different structure from the theoretical one (*universalis propositio de medio virtutis accipi non potest*). Thomas’s lectures of 1270–71 (*Quaestiones disputatae de malo*) follow Albert’s interpretation of Aristotelian *Ethics*. The disputations held in Paris interpret the ethical syllogism according to *Nicomachean Ethics* and defend the rational structure of moral action (*movetur tantum secundum iudicium rationis*).[[548]](#footnote-548) Thomas’s terms “*electio*” and “*iudicio*” are taken according to *Nicomachean Ethics* interpreted in accordance with the first Averroism. Ethics was defined as happiness of real actions made out by the existing person, who rationally attain the happiness considered in various manners.

The treatises defending the rational interpretation of *Ethics* according to the Sicilian school made “*ad mentem Averrois*” were directed primarily against the ethical objectivists from modernist′s school. The brilliant essay *De summo bono sive De vita philosophi* (1270) by Boethius of Dacia and similar interpretations outlined the conflict with objective Avicennists. The mystics of the one hypostatized species of the good, on principle, could not recognize the principle of ethical autonomy. It was based on the existence of the person in the mode “*ipse*.” The hermeneutic analysis of ethics pointed to another fundamental reason of Tempier’s modernist decree of March 1277, which in articles 167−83 attacked the new conception of ethics, the relationship between natural and supernatural virtues, the ultimate goal of human life and sexual morality. The actualized interpretations of the decree presented a coherent interpretation of the above-mentioned articles by the system of autonomously conceived sexuality (*système du sexe*; Libera 1991, 194). Hermeneutics show that this interpretation must be supplemented by the conflict of principles between the first and second Averroism done in relation to the Aristotelian definition of autonomous ethics and ethical rationality. The difference between the two schools in the interpretation of autonomous ethical and political rationality points to the hitherto unexplored topic of “political averroism.” Its exploration made by hermeneutic archaeology concludes the emergence and establishment of objectivity in the Latin West. Aristotelian solution of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical enabled the transition of philosophical ethics to the newly defined political science. Autonomous political rationality was born only in the first Averroism of the Sicilian school, which interpreted the writing *Ethics* and *Politics* according to Averroes’s conception of “meta-physics.” The new conception of political rationality made of use of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical. After the translation of Aristotle’s writing *Politics*, Aristotelians integrated the unity of the political body into the unity of the divine order. Politics took on a new meaning with regard to the last destiny of man, which came into being in the years 1268–75 in the debates of republican Florence, papal Italy and philosophical Paris. Hermeneutics must therefore in the end explore the emergence of the new political rationality in connection with varoius projects of Aristotelian metaphysics. The defense of ethical action, which was presented after the Sicilian school “*ad mentem Averrois*,” formed the basis of the political science of the Latin West. The West surpassed the Falsafa in this point by establishing the independent political rationality based on the sovereignty of people.

## 6.2 Emergence of Autonomous Political Science

The humanists of the first averroism introduced a new interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*, which gave ethics an autonomous rationality and established it as an independent science. Aristotelicians explained in vain to the school of the first *Modernorum* that the practical intellect follows the kind of truth given in singular actions of the person. Being in direct contact with real things, the practical intellect is generically distinguished from the pursuit of beatitude according to the theoretical intellect, which is oriented only contemplatively and universally. Thanks to the existence of the practical syllogism, which predicts real effects given by the causality of the practical intellect, the ethics became an independent science situated outside the theoretical philosophy. In the first round of the dispute between the two schools in 1240–50, the nature of political activities was not explored as an independent discipline. The situation changed after the translation of Aristotle’s *Politics* that Guillelmus Moerbeke delivered to the Latin West in 1260. The previous anonymous translation had only edited the first two books from this work and it had only a minor influence on the political theory of the time (Martin 1951, 29). The dispute over the autonomy of moral action broke out again and with much greater intensity after the translation of Aristotle’s work on politics. After the reception of Aristotle’s *Politics*, the ethical determination of the practical intellect given in the first Averroism was extended to political practice. The dispute between the political Aristotelians and the representatives of the second Averroism reached the realm of political theories. The history of effects concerning the political teaching of the first Averroism refers to the topic of lectures on Aristotle’s politics made by Siger of Brabant, which have not yet been found. Mandonnet quoted it with references to Peter de Bosco.[[549]](#footnote-549) It is supposedly much better if the state is governed by just laws than if only honorable people do it (*longe melius est civitatem regi legibus rectis quam probis viris*). The state should be governed by just laws, because the government of the universal law, established on the political version of the practical intellect, is more just than a government based on the personal *phronésis*. The nature of politics was discussed between the school of the first and that of the second Averroism. The first Averroism brought about the first autonomous political philosophy according to Aristotle, because the political theory was separated from both ethics and metaphysics. The Falsafa had not created that kind of autonomous political theory. Its culmination was the emergence of the harmonious state in accordance with *Nicomachean Ethics* that outlined Alfarabi as the first European intellectual (OBJ I, ch. 2.1.1). The Falsafa created a political theory based on Aristotle’s *Ethics*. Done about three centuries before the Latin West, such definition of politics corresponds to the organization of society based on kinship that follows ethical imperatives taken from the Koran.[[550]](#footnote-550) That vision of just society and state corresponds to Aquinas’s apolitical definition of man as “*animal sociale*” that is determined by the pursuit of “*bonum commune*.” However, the ethical definition of society is not sufficient to justify a generically different political rationality that entails “*bonum politicum*.”

Latin modernists were not even able to create an autonomous social theory of society given at the level of Aristotelian ethics. The school of *illuminati* was dominated by the theory of one truth, which was based on political Augustinism, biblical ontotheology and papal primacy. Their sophistic metaphysics and theory of cognition were full of contradictions. Modernity did not create a coherent system of thinking until Scotus. The interpretation of political action in the school of *Modernorum* was based on Neoplatonic interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*, which was interpreted in the previous chapter. In such a world of thought, ethics could not emerge as an autonomous science that defines action, let alone as an autonomous political rationality. The theory of the one truth, given by the condemnation of 1277 and then by the bull *Unam Sanctam*, led to an objective insight into political power, which could be derived through the various forms of univocal deduction, division and classification of Porretan species. According to the Tree of Porphyry, the modern *Nominales* created a being of the third kind in the form of a diverse social body and a corresponding goal in the form of a specific good, which can theoretically be considered through the corresponding form of habitus. Political Augustinism divided the abstract people into different parts as a specific “*corpus*” (*corpus morale, politicum, naturale, mysticum*). This division proceeded from a generic source of power and rationality, which consisted in the divine law. This is divided into theologically, philosophically and ethically given subcomponents. The unitarian political theory of Augustine, Aquinas and Aquasparta knows that unity comes from God as the Giver of power and form and that this unity must be brought back to God again.[[551]](#footnote-551) The second Averroism and the Semiaverroism of Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus adopted the theory about the full harmony of church and state (*unanimitas*), which had already been known since Carolinian jurists (Jonas of Orleans, about †843). The theorists of the first Averroism such as the John of Paris quoted above (ch. 6.1) opposed the idea of theocratic *unanimitas* with philosophical theories of natural law, which defended a clear separation between the *lex divina* and the *ius naturale*.[[552]](#footnote-552) The political unity had to be defined in its generic autonomy. It is given by the form of the collective political good and practical political rationality that differs from ethical actions. The first Averroism brought a new solution to the dispute over the so-called twofold truth through the scientific distinction between ethics, philosophy and theology. Masters of the University of Paris in their declaration of April 1272 rejected such kind of the truth by the reference to the philosophical and scientific conception of the truth given in *Seconds Analytics*. There is one real person, and this person follows beatitude as a unique goal of life in various ways of acting, thinking and choice. With this declaration, the masters from the rue du Fouarre established the autonomy of political science within the framework of precisely defined generic nature of politics and the causality and the rationality that correspond to it. With regard to politics and eternal beatitude, Dante set out this twofold path to one goal in the scripture *Monarchia*. His Aristotelian model was the follower of the Guelphs and the Florentine philosopher Brunetto Latini. His book *Li Livres dou Tresor* written in exile in France (1261–70) defined the people as the source of political power and he limited the power of the ruler.[[553]](#footnote-553) The exiled Brunetto knew the writing *Politics* and, thanks to his stay in Paris, he is one of the important witnesses of the commentaries on *Politics* that corresponds to the line of Siger. Hermeneutics pointed out the key role of Siger in the dispute over autonomy and the human sciences, because as early as 1265 he put forward the most complete defense of the cognition and unity of the person according to CMDA. The writing *Politics* was translated at the same time and Siger commented on it in his lectures devoted to the interpretation of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The political philosopher and poet Dante appreciated Siger′s interpretation in the *Divine Comedy* and proclaimed him to be the best philosopher of his time. Therefore, it is a pity for the constitution of autonomous political science that modernity through *damnatio memoriae* destroyed this important part of Siger’s thinking. His comments on ethics and politics circulated as a *reportatio* of students. They were not preserved, among other things, due to the decline of the school of the first Averroism and due to the demonization of Siger (ch. 5.5). Dante and Ockham can be called Siger’s students from the point of view of political theory. The objectively manifested history of political thought is set out by the disputes concerning the bull *Unam Sanctam*, as well as the dispute of the Avignon pope John XXII and the rebellious Emperor Ludwig IV of Bavaria. During this period Ockham wrote his political works, especially the treatise *Dialogus*, which was written from the year 1333 until his death in 1348.

Albert’s commentary on *Politics* (*Politica*, ca. 1264) provides an excellent example that outlines the deduction of political rationality that relates to his second commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Ethica*, ca. 1262). Albert in the same time as Siger solved the fundamental question: Why is it better if the state is controlled by just laws than by honorable people? Albert presents the first complete interpretation of the writing *Politics* in Aristotle’s original intention, just as he had previously done for the writing *Ethics*. We do not yet know Siger’s treatises, which provide an interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. However, in the case of ethical writing of Aristotle, we followed Siger′s influence on the writing *Anonymus Giele* (ch. 4.3.1). Its presumed author was Boethius of Dacia that was a well-known commentator on *Ethics* in the line of Siger. If we take Siger’s interpretation of *Metaphysics*, and of *De anima* in particular, then it can rightly be assumed that this brilliant Aristotelian commented on *Politics* in a similar spirit to Albert. This is shown by the above-mentioned meaning of Siger’s lectures, which are aimed at the key position of the politically given law above the ethical or political excellence of the individual. Albert’s work was very important for the formation of the bond between the practical intellect and the form of political power that corresponds to that intellect. Albert’s commentary on *Politics* was the first in the series and, thanks to its quality, laid the foundations for subsequent political theories of the Latin West. The sophistic interpretations of the second Averroism only played second fiddle in the interpretation of Aristotle’s *Politics*. According to the second Averroism, the interpretation of ethics had a dominant character given by the original reception of this work in the environment of Avicenna’s metaphysics. Thanks to Albert’s timely interpretation, the reception of Aristotle’s political writings differed from the modern Porretan commentaries on *Politics*, which had not been written until 1277. Hermeneutics consider the polemical writings against Dante to be one of the first modern interpretations of *Politics*. The Dominican Guido Vernani considers Dante’s work *Monarchia*, based on Albert’s commentary on *Ethics* and *Politics*, to be an Averroist work. The basic direction of Albert’s interpretation of *Politics* is given by Aristotle’s references to *Nicomachean Ethics*. It shapes the interpretation of *Politics* by orienting the thinking towards the goal of accomplished life. The difference between the politician and the philosopher in the question of beatitude looks like this.

“The task of the politician is to achieve perfection in the field of ethics and the happy life in the political community (*perfectionem virtutis moralis et felicitatem civilem*). The task of the philosopher is to achieve perfection in the field of intellectual cognition and intellectual or contemplative beatitude.” [[554]](#footnote-554)

The happiness achieved through the actualization of the common good does not have the same character in the political community (*felicitatem civilem*) as the individual contemplative life of the philosopher (*felicitatem contemplativam*). The first Averroism returned to the original vision of *Ethics* and *Politics* that included the fullness of existence with the favor of gods and the favorable fate (εὐδαιμονία). Beatitude represents a common goal of theoretical and political actions and it forms the final unity of thought and practice. Consequently, the definition (*ratio*) of political action and theoretical contemplation cannot be the same, thanks to different forms of the intellect. From a philosophical point of view, there is one one final goal to achieve in the life of the person (*eadem est felicitas hominis et civitatis*).[[555]](#footnote-555) However, there are two different paths to reach the happiness of personal and political life. Therefore, the interpretation of *Politics* must follow the interpretation of *Ethics* and deal with both paths to salvation in a different manner (*de duobus sit inquirendum*). The distinction of politics, ethics and philosophy within the framework of happiness is given by the existential act of the person as a first real substance, which realizes the personal path to happiness in various ways. The ethical action of the individual is different from the political decision-making in the polis, where virtue has a different character. Heraclitus of Ephesus already explored this political virtue (*phronésis*). This first political philosopher combined the unity of the universe based on the cosmic logos with the unity of the community based on the law. The common law is made by citizens with regard to the divine law as the supreme source of wisdom (DK 22, B 114). Such a kind of quasi-divine law can create but the best citizens endowed with political virtue. They are the law to themselves, because they are the best in the polis (B 33, B 49). The best citizens recognize what is common to all and they defend the law as well as the city wall (B 44). Heraclitus considered the universally dominant logos in mystagogic, theoretical and practical manner. Aristotle’s writing *Politics* elaborates and systematizes Heraclitus’s teaching on the polemical character of the polis and on the unvisible unity of the logos.

The definition of politics made in reality must find the practical syllogism that includes the specific causality of political actions. Such theoretical examination defines the highest degree of earthly beatitude. Plato and Aristotle confirm that the life in the political community of free citizens makes the indispensable condition in order to attain the best theoretical life of the philosopher. Albert’s and certainly Siger’s commentary on *Politics* addresses the form of existential happiness that exists in the society of free and equal citizens gathered under the rule of law. Just man is the law for himself and also for the rest of the city. Aquinas’s previous interpretation of *Ethics* based on Aristotle and on the *New Testament* confirmed that fact. The law is not intended for the righteous, but for evil and disobedient people (*1 Tim* 1:9). Likewise, the writing *Politics* asserts that the citizens endowed with political and moral excellence do not require any law. The fully virtuous and wise citizens are themselves the law (αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος, *Pol*. 1284a15). Their absolute virtue and political prudence secure the community in a much better way than the rule of general laws can offer. It would be ridiculous to impose to them some law coming from the outside. A statesman as Solon or Lykurgos is made in the likeness of God (ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι, *Pol*. 1284a10–11). Such a person should control the polis of free and equal people from the title of his moral political and philosophical superiority. The autonomy and the determination of the law based on freedom takes into account exceptional cases of legendary legislators. Kant as an apolitical philosopher, however, universalized that exception in the realm of political practice for the determination of purely individual ethics, separated from political practice. The concept of “*Faktum der Vernunft*”put the law primarily in the auto-determination of the individual will.[[556]](#footnote-556) Kant’s connection of the law and the determining will through the “Fact of reason” corresponds fully to Arendt’s critique of the political liberalism. Modernity reduced the political freedom of antiquity (ἐλευθερία) to the freedom of the individual will (*liberum arbitrium*). Aristotle knows only the political freedom bound to the polis, not the individual free will. It came into being later, among apolitical Stoics, who lived after the disintegration of the Greek polis. Against the quoted Kant, Aristotle’s causality from freedom is given in a communitarian and political manner. Aristotle excludes the possibility that the person could realise the political virtue by living outside the normal society of the polis.

For the further development of political science, therefore, the second solution is important. It looks for political excellence beyond the excellency of legendary statesmen. The polis of free citizens really exists, although there are no citizens as was Solon, who stand out by almost divine virtues. If we do not have among ourselves legendary politicians of the past, then the community of equal and free citizens must rule over itself by the general law. According to Aristotle, the principle of isonomy is the basis of any just and legitimate government. The equal share of political power belongs to free people from the title of citizens. Due to the isonomy, they have the right to rule in any of the just regimes. Albert’s commentary on *Politics* provides this philosophical definition of politics in the term “*regnabile*.” The term “capable of governing” (*regnabile*) in the original of *Politics* III.13 relates to difficult passage that discusses the right of all citizens to participate in political activities (*Pol*. 1283a37–b15). According to Aristotle, the fundamental problem of real political formations, which cannot be eliminated, is based on the fact that none of the three studied regimes of real existing political rule (monarchy, timocracy, democracy) acquires the ideal isonomy.[[557]](#footnote-557) Because of imperfections of every researched just way of ruling (ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις), the basic principle must apply that no one of the citizens can be excluded from participation in political power. The discussed series of objections to a just government of one, several or all persons confirms the claim of all citizens of the polis that can demand in one way or another their share in the government in each of the three regimes studied.[[558]](#footnote-558) Since none form of the rule of those three studied regimes is ideal, the isonomy must strictly apply to all citizens, so that they could freely create their own government here and now, which they consider to be the best possible and feasible. For Aristotle, the primary source of power is not in the formally and essentially defined political regime, but in freely acting citizens, whose political freedom is given as a *causa sui*. Only the personal act of political freedom does not involve aporia: either citizens are free by acting freely, or they are not free.[[559]](#footnote-559) For the scientific determination of politics, Aristotle must preserve the causality of free political actions. Its full meaning without any formal restriction can be found only at the level of the person living in the political community of free citizens. Albert interprets the quoted text of *Politics* III.13 according to Aristotle’s intention. His commentary represents the original *Lichtung* of the rule of law that is built on the universal equality of free citizens.

“Aristotle explained the question, so that it was better to understand what he meant, in the following words: ‘The ability to rule is due to those citizens (*regnabile quidem igitur talis multitudo*) who are born (*nata est*) to form the best society that exceeds in virtue of political power.’ This ability is not from the person of the king, but from the political power in itself (*regnabile non a rege, sed regno*). The king reigns, but he does not possess this mandate by himself (*rex enim regnativus est, non regnabilis*).” [[560]](#footnote-560)

All citizens (*talis multitudo*) are free thanks to the fact of being born of free parents (*quae nata est*). Their political and by no means only moral virtue (*genus superexcellentes secundum virtutem*) disposes them to bear responsibility for the political power given to them (*ad praesulatum politicum*). This legitimizes the political freedom of citizens for the first time in the Latin West. In any political regime (Albert is referring here to the monarchy), political power is derived from the original form of power. This power lies with the political society as a whole. Each of its members acquires political freedom through the fact of birth (*talis multitudo, quae nata est… ad praesulatum politicum*). Political rights are given in the mode *per prius* by birth into the political community, not by the moral act of political virtue, which is only given in the mode *per posterius*. In Aristotle’s time, freedom was given by the birth of free citizens and today it is established by human rights, which are inalienably given by birth. Then it comes the key proposition of the new political philosophy. Albert summarizes the meaning of the quoted paragraph of *Politics* with reference to the previous part, which comments on the political regime of the monarchy as the best form of government. The isonomic share in the political power (*regnabile*) is not given by the ruler (*regnabile non a rege*), because the latter only exercises the power in the government (*rex enim regnativus est*). The monarch as “*regnativus*” refers primarily passively to his charge imposed to him. The source of active political power (*regnabile*) comes out of the political community through the citizens united in the political society. The king is not a *causa sui* in terms of his power, because only the free citizen possesses this kind of causality. The monarch does not have the authority to govern by himself, par example, in virtue of some Porretan hypostasis or of some kind of habitus (*non regnabilis*). The king exercises the legal tasks of a given government in the name of those who have political power by the fact of their birth in the political body (*regnabile est talis multitudo*). The original interpretation of *Politics* confirms that the right to rule (*regnabile*) cannot be taken away from free citizens, because the isonomy establishes their civil and political freedom. This isonomy ensures the full causality of political power in what is essentially proper to it. The freedom on the level of politically acting person does not include the aporias given above at the level of political regimes. According to Aristotle and Albert, the isonomy ensures that political causality coming from the individual civil liberties is preserved under all just regimes. Albert confirms Aristotle’s original interpretation. The king does not rule out of his own habitually given authority (*non regnabilis*), but out of the power of the law accorded to him by free people (*a regno*). Citizens chosen the monarchy freely as the best form of government. Albert’s commentary on *Politics* presents this freedom and sovereign ability of citizens to rule through the interpretation of the term “*regnabile*.” The quotation shows the difference between the two terms. Political power is determined in a natural manner, i.e., by the fact of birth as a free person and, consequently, is exercised by the entire political community (*regnabile*). Something else is the act of government in this or that political regime (*regnativus*) exercised in the three kinds of regimes, as described in the work *Politics*. The difference between the terms “*regnabilis*” and “*regnativus*” establishes a new political theory of the Latin West. Aristotle, through this difference, created the theoretical basis of the transfer of political power from the people to the ruler. Albert practiced this democratic doctrine. In the civil disputes in Cologne, he repeatedly led the local bishop to recognize the legitimate claims of townspeople (*Kleiner* a *Großer Schied* in the years 1252 and 1258). Protestant monarchists defined this delegation of power with reference to the treaties of *Old Testament* with regard to the elected king made according to Joshua’s treaty with the people of Shechem (*Josue* 24:19–25) or the desire of the Israelite people for the anointing of the king (1 Sam 12:1). The Calvinist jurist Johannes Althusius (†1638) shifted the emphasis from the status of the right constituted by Albert to parliamentary democracy. The key passage of the work *Politica methodice digesta* (1603) considers the ruler a mere administrator and the representative of political power.[[561]](#footnote-561) Althusius shifted the emphasis from the monarchist act of power preferred by Albert and by other philosophers of the first Averroism to the representative form of government, whereby the magistrate is temporarily entrusted by the power (*regni administratores et rectores universalis consociationis corpus*). Made in the new constellation of politics, Althusius’s writing spread the basic principle of the transfer of power from the people to the ruler. However, Albert’s notion of “*regnabile*” was confirmed as the fundament of that transfer. Albert’s interpretation of politics in the line of the first Averroism established the tradition of the modern rule-of-law state governed by the power of citizens. The transfer of power, given by delegation the original sovereignty of people, established the modern democracy combined with the rule of the universally acknowledged law. The source of ecclesiastical authority, its right and power is given from the divine law given outside the political community (*lex divina*). This explanation led to the separation of spiritual and secular power in the first Averroism. The theocratic group of the second Averroism and Thomism attacked that explanation and de facto abolished it by the bull *Unam Sanctam*.

Another important question is the causality of political action, which must differ from individual ethics. The hermeneutics of moral action according to *Nicomachean Ethics* has shown that the ethical practice of the acting person establishes the causality of the middle link, which is necessary for the constitution of the practical syllogism. The practical syllogism, designed by Albert and Aquinas for ethics, in the mode of operative form (*forma compositionis*) combines both the universality of the good and its individual actualization in reality, since it unites the intention with the accomplished work (ch. 6.1). The scientific approach given in *Seconds Analytics* requires that for politics should be found the scientific definition of political action made in the mode of *demonstratio*. Otherwise, politics would not be a generic scientific discipline different from ethics. Politics must receive its own definition based on the effective causality of acting citizens in the isonomy. Let us return to the above quotation, which connects all the links of the political scientific syllogism (*regnabile… talis multitudo… nata est… genus… ad praesulatum politicum*). The generic effect of political rationality is possible because the free citizens exist as a *causa sui*. The causality of the politically acting person as a free-born citizen is combined with the causality given in political society as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to seek the definition of the singular and universal causality of the free citizen, which establishes the *medium* of political syllogism. The first Averroism extended the practical syllogism given in *Ethics* into the interpretation of *Politics*. Siger’s lectures on the universal validity of the law in the political community that have not been preserved, prove this fact. Politics as a science must distinguish the virtuous action of the person in the realm of ethics from the virtuous action of the citizen in the realm of politics. Both actions can be resumed in universal principles; but, in contrast to the general philosophical contemplation, the practical intellect in action is directed to the achievement of real, ethical and political goals. The person is engaged in the political community as a citizen; being a political subject, he carries the political rationality as “*regnabile*.” This fact makes the political subject to be different from the ethical subject. Tha practical syllogism for politics must ensure the philosophically based rationality of political action. Albert’s commentary on *Ethics* has explained to modernists that the central position of virtue can only be given in relation to us (*quoad nos et non simpliciter*, ch. 6.1). The middle link of practical syllogism must combine the universality of the definition and the particularity based on causal effectiveness of real first substances. The morally acting person represents the middle link of the ethical syllogism, because it is effective in reality through the *intellectus practicus*. The same rule applies in order to determine the central position of political practice in relation to us. The rationally determined nature of political power must correctly define the middle link of the political syllogism according to the causality given in a hyparchical manner and exercised in the real political community. At this point, Albert’s commentary on *Politics* explicitly refers to the *Nicomachean Ethics* that repeatedly mentions the arduous search for the center of virtue because of our passions (*medium invenire difficillimum est*).[[562]](#footnote-562) The middle premise of the syllogism determining political action is occupied by the law and personal practice. Following Aristotle’s example, Albert expanded the ethical law to include the universal rule of what is just for all free and wise citizens. Let us recall the key phrase from Albert’s interpretation of *Ethics*, which refers to the common composition of practical intellect (*practicus intellectus habet formam operativam rei, et per hoc componitur cum re operata*, ch. 6.1). The law enacted collectively in the city is seen as a new *“res operata*.” This composition denotes the act of political rationality. It operates within the framework of collectively exercised practical intellect that is established by political practice of free citizens.

“From this Aristotle deduced following statement: ‘It is obvious that when citizens are looking for justice, they are looking for a middle position.’ As it is said in *Nicomachean Ethics*: ‘Finding a middle position is the most difficult thing, and, on the contrary, it is the easiest to deviate from it.’ The same applies to the creation of a law. That is why he says that the law is that middle member when he says: ‘The law is that middle.’ If you determine what is fair, then a middle position is found. Justice exists in the means of action, as it is said in the fifth book of *Nicomachean Ethics*.” [[563]](#footnote-563)

The universal center of political life is the jointly sought justice (*justum quaerentes*). By introducing the concept “*justum*,” the object of politics changed from the generic search of ethics based on the concept of “*bonum*.” Those who know the laws are able to exercise justice in the sense of the desired center of political action (*scientem leges*). The law determines justice for all citizens and thus forms the political center of action (*determinando enim justum, determinat et medium*). Referring to the original text of *Politics*, the quotation expressly notes that the law makes the center of justice on the universal level (*lex enim ipsum medium*). The law of the political body is different from the practical ethical syllogism, because its center is the acting person. Now, the rational activity of the entire community of citizens becomes the center. The free citizens are the law to themselves if they promulgate laws as a joint work of the political community. Then they are bound by their own collective and freely given rationality, which forms the political center of their common actions, and not just the ethical center of their personal actions. This determination of the political law established a new extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one. It does not determine the morality of the individual, but the political action of the entire community and the state. Siger’s theoretical intellect tied to the person (*homo ipse intelligit*) passed at first in the ethical activity of the person and now into political activity of lawmaking and law-abiding citizens. This rationality is now exercised by the causality of the law as the center of the political community (*lex enim ipsum medium*). Albert does not claim, like Claude Lefort in the age of metaphysical nihilism, that the center of power is empty.[[564]](#footnote-564) Lefort absolutized the aporia of politics in relation to the political power given to the type of government (ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις*, Pol*. 1283b13) and forgot to investigate their fundamental causality, which, on the other hand, Aristotelian Arendt accomplished. Albert would have objected that Lefort’s conception did not explore the meaning of political rationality as such (*regnabile*), since he investigates merely external representations of power (*regnativus*). In the first Averroism, the center of political power exists in the mode of autonomous causality that makes out a kind of political rationality. Scientific political philosophy must define this middle premise because there is a real political causality given by real freedom of citizens. Philosophical thinking must truly and scientifically accurately define all important human affairs, because they are given at the level of persons as real first substances.

The first Averroism of the Sicilian school about the year 1265 created political philosophy as a critical science that explored the political form of the practical intellect. The Toledo school represented by Aquinas was not able to do it. The center of power has its own rationality (*regnabile*), given by the politically exercised practical intellect. Political regimes can change, since the secondary effects of that basic causality are situated on the level of “*regnativum*.” Now it is necessary to consider the middle link of political syllogism that categorically states the singular causality of citizens as the first substances. The universal major premise is given as the law of the municipality; but in the valid deductive proof ist the middle premise ist the most important, since it brings abou the real causality in the proof. Only the practical intellect has its own causality given by free will (*liber est et causa sui*).[[565]](#footnote-565) The commentary on *Politics* follows the previous commentary on *Ethics* by defending the practical intellect. The middle link of the ethical syllogism is determined by the causality exercised by the practical intellect. The free person as a politically active citizen is not subject to anyone in the sense of instrumental dependence on external decision-making and is consequently a sovereign source of one’s own actions (*causa sui*). Albert knows from *Metaphysics* and from *Ethics* that only the politically free man is *causa sui* (ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, *Met*. 982b26). The commentary on *Politics* extends the causality of the practical intellect given in *Ethics* to the political action of free citizens. Aristotle, and after him Albert, give the highest priority to the free existence of citizens, given by their political activity. The political community based on justice transcends the ethical determination of the person through rationality created on the basis of commonly realized freedom.

“Aristotle justifies it by the fact that ‘the citizens consider the existence of free men based on politics, to be the best choice of all possibilities’ (*alteram quamdam esse a politica, et omnium esse eligibilissimam*). This means that they consider the existence of free people to be the best way of life. The free man is not subordinate to anyone and he is the cause of their own actions (*est causa sui*). That is why Aristotle says that those who characterize the politics in this way, they consider it in the best manner.” [[566]](#footnote-566)

The life of free people is determined at the highest level of freedom in the political community (*vitam liberi esse a politica*). The community based on just laws actualizes the freedom to the maximum extent, therefore politically free life keeps the highest value (*vita hominis liberi sit omnium eligibilissima*). The free causality established by practice of equal citizens constitutes the highest level of the political community (*hanc scilicet politicam, optimam esse dicunt*). Albert saw exactly the specificity in Aristotle’s *Politics* and their difference from *Ethics*. He interprets man as a political being, and not just a social creature, as the theocratic theologian Aquinas. The last measure of political action is represented by free citizens. They are guided not only by their passions (not even the good ones), but by jointly sought justice. It is expressed in the universal, rationally found and freely accepted law of political community (*lex enim ipsum medium*). The middle link of the proof endowed with its own actualized causality is the free person as a citizen. This gives a complete syllogism that established the politics as a true science. General laws (*maior*) are caused by political freedom (*medium*) and their connection produces an effective causality called political community (*ergo*). Therefore, the political law of the state differs in a generic way from the moral law given by God and by natural reason. The ethics is given at the level of the practical syllogism of the person. Political life represents the highest stage of earthly practical virtue. Politics retains its own causality, which is given by the free action of citizens as *causa sui* (*tertium genus*). At the level of politics as a universal concept (*quartum genus*), there is a generically unique political rationality that unites all human beings (Dante’s “*universitas humana*”). Albert’s commentary on *Politics* found political universality realized through the law of the community. This universality is a better guide than just a righteous person acting according to ethics. The jointly created and recognized law of the community is not influenced by passions of this or that individual. The just person can lean on the politically given law by interpreting it justly in the singular situation.[[567]](#footnote-567) Siger took the same position because, after the testimony that remained, he defended the equally conceived supremacy of the political law over ethical actions of the person (*longe melius est civitatem regi legibus rectis*). In accordance with the writing *Politics*, Albert confirms it is possible to achieve almost the divine universality that starts from the free citizen, then it goes to the political community and finally to the humanity as a whole.

“This argument is based on what is said in *Nicomachean Ethics*: divine is that which is peculiar to man; more divine is that which is given in the church; most divine is that which is given to the human species.” [[568]](#footnote-568)

The divine value of the law is first realized by the person in moral actions (*divinum, quod est hominis*). Much more, the universal power of the law can be seen in the city, where the practice of free citizens forms the center of power (*divinus quod est civitatis*). Finally, the full power of rational law relates to humanity (*divinissimum autem quod est gentis*). The theorists of law at the time defined “*ius gentium*” in the sense of universal law only at the level of natural law, which did not yet have the political power of positive law. This is why Dante’s attempt to create a cosmopolitan community at the level of a common government was so important. The universality of the law is growing thanks to the practice of wise people; the polis thereby participates in the divine order of the cosmos, as Heraclitus of Ephesus confirmed. The quoted passage from Albert’s interpretation of *Politics* inspired Dante’s term of “*universitas humana*,” including the superior position of the monarchy and the rule of a universal monarch.[[569]](#footnote-569) Let us recall the sequence of argumentation, which begins with the free causality of the citizen as the first real substance and continues to the universal monarchy. The act of moral understanding goes from the existing person (*tertium genus*) to the universal whole of humanity as an abstract species (*quartum genus*). The ethical actions of the person pass through the law into political practice and, finally, into the universal monarchy. The theoretical intellect, by extension through the free and legislative initiative of the citizens, became a practical intellect, which becomes causally effective in the state. His political power determines the rational and ethical actions of the entire political community, not just the moral actions of the person. Albert differs from Aristotle in that he used in the interpretation of *Politics* the universal meaning of the monarchy given in his previous interpretation of *Ethics*.[[570]](#footnote-570) Albert identified the figure of the king with those legendary legislators of antiquity, which was not Aristotle’s original position. Aristotle’s political writings, in the search for just constitutions, clearly separated the fundamental causality of isonomy from the plurality of political regimes. The forms of government are determined by the political freedom of citizens; they were adapted to different traditions and customs of Greek political communities scattered in the Mediterranean area of *Magna Graecia*.

The above-mentioned passages from the seventh book of *Politics* are missing in Thomas’s interpretation. Aquin personally managed to complete only the commentary on the first three books. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference in the interpretation of political rationality between Albert and his disciple. Aquinas did not define political freedom in the concept of “*regnabile*” as Albert. In his interpretation of *Politics*, there is no autonomy of political action, unlike Albert and Dante postulated it. Thomas simply takes the citizen’s foresight (*prudentia*) from *Ethics* that is oriented towards the communitarian form of the good, and then applies it in the same sense to the interpretation of *Politics*. In Aquinas’s interpretation, the freedom of citizens is replaced by sociality bound to the satisfaction of the instinct of self-preservation (*bene vivere, maxime est finis civitatis vel politicae*).[[571]](#footnote-571) Aquinas, unlike Albert, did not find a new kind of political practical syllogism that makes the political excellency effectively different from the moral justice. Aquinas did not introduce into politics an autonomous causality and rationality derived from the political freedom of citizens. This is why he is the founder of postmodern ideologies such as political liberalism based on the idea of the state as the creator of the common welfare (“welfare state”). This kind of political theory is based on the individualized instinct for self-preservation, not on the political activity of free citizens. Aquinas’s political individuum given as “*animal sociale*” is not a politically active person like the “*animal politicum*” given in the first averroism of the Sicilian school according to Aristotle (ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, *Pol*. 1253a2). Human nature, according to Aristotle, is distinguished from animal sociality because only man establishes the political community of free citizens. Aquinas ended up with an ethically given community (*bene vivere*) and therefore could not see the autonomy of political rationality given in the work *Politics*. This view is bound only to *Ethics* and corresponds fully to the level of Falsafa reached by the interpretation of *Ethics* and the just state according to Alfarabi. Understandably, after Aquinas, later Thomism also remained blind to the specific nature of political action and theory. In the 20th century, the Thomism developed the theory of the Christian welfare state, but not the theory of free political action, as did Aristotelian thinker Hannah Arendt. Her critique of solipsistic ideology concerns liberalism, which falsely constructs a political theory. Following the Sicilian school, Arendt abandoned the definition of politics summed up as a private existence that distrusts political power because of its instinct for self-preservation and private free will.[[572]](#footnote-572) Political postmodern liberalismus is a *contradictio in adiecto*. Well known critique of Arendt applies to the politics defined by Thomas Aquinas, but not to the Aristotelian political philosophy elaborated by Siger and by Albert. Aquinas does not establish the hermeneutics of political rationality in the scientific exegesis of political practice as Albert, Siger and Dante did it in the school of the first Averroism. Thomas’s practical syllogism has only an ethical character and not a political one. Albert and certainly Siger in the first Averroism of the Sicilian School accurately defined causality from the political freedom of citizens. In addition, the Thomistic political discourse is determined by the theory of one theological truth, which is given according to the Toledo school. This interpretation is evident in Aquinas’s work *De regno*, which defends the theocratic nature of the unified power. This line of political Averroism was canonized under the influence of the first Thomist Aegidius and by the papal bull *Unam Sanctam*. Thomistic conception of unified “*potestas directa*” has an effective political causality in the person of the pope as “*rex et sacerdos.*” This theory was defended by Aquinas’s pupil Tolomeo da Lucca (†1327), who completed Aquinas’s commentary on *Politics* (*De regimine principum*). Aquinas’s political semiaverroism in the realm of political rationality completes his Semiaverroism presented in the doctrine of the intellect as an autonomous form in the soul.

Albert and Siger confirmed that the free man is an indivisible substance endowed with political freedom in the Aristotelian sense of *causa sui*. Aristotelian conception of *causa sui* is bound to the real existence of the first substance. The *intellectus practicus* is extended in this way to the sphere of political rationality and action and it determines the freedom of citizens. The primary causality of the isonomy established by political freedom given by birthright determines the secondary phenomenon of the political regime that defined by the various kinds of constitutions. The causality from the politically given freedom of citizens is universalized by the just law. This is the reason why the causality from freedom differs from the Neoplatonic *causa sui* in Plotinus, where it expresses an absolutely separated autarky of the One (αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, *Enn*. VI.8.14.41). For Aristotle, the unlimited causality of the One makes a definition of tyranny, which means a complete decline of the common political space. Once again, the key hermeneutic question applies to the way in which (hermeneutic *Wie*) the sovereignty of the people and the autonomy of politics are given. For Albert, the exposure of the meaning of politics comes from the first real substance. It is represented by politically wise citizens formulating the common law. In the first Averroism, the increasing measure of universality goes from the bottom (free citizen) to the top (laws of the state). The consistent defense of the autonomy of political rationality fundamentally distinguishes Albert from Aquinas, because his interpretation of politics did not strive for autonomous political rationality. Aquinas was content with the sociality of the virtuous life according to *Nicomachean Ethics*, which he integrated into a unified conception of spiritual and temporal power. This political Thomism was defended in the later bull *Unam Sanctam*. In the postmodern 19th century, political Thomism was continued in the famous and controversial *Syllabus* and two encyclical of Popes Pius IX and Pius X against modernism and liberalism. They successfully continued the modernist line of Tempier’s confused condemnation of Aristotelianism of 1277. In the conception of the divine comedy enacted by Muses, it becomes clear that these encyclicals in fact condemned the modern liberal theories of politics based on the social instinct of self-preservation and the purely social conception of the state advocated by Aquinas and not by Albert.

The twofold interpretation of politics has shown that within the first Averroism there was a fundamental division of positions regarding political philosophy, which separated the theocratic and apolitical position of Aquinas from Albert’s and Siger’s political Aristotelian position. According to these connoisseurs of Aristotle, presented “*ad mentem Averrois*”, there are two reasons that justify the generic difference between politics and ethics. Both arguments have a fundamental character given “*ex inmediatis*” according to the principle in *Second Analytics*. The law of the community differs from the moral law thanks to the other form of extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one. The ethically given practical intellect is personal and given by the law of reason, by the Ten Commandments or by Jesus’s commandment of charity. The politically given practical intellect is given in the community thanks to the common just law of *res publica*, which is enacted by free citizens. The free and moral person who practices the good differs in a generic way from the free and politically prudent citizen who practices the justice given by the law. The predication of political action differs in a generic way in that the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical has a different character than in the case of ethics. The second difference concerns the middle causal link of political deduction. The political practical intellect is not the same as ethical practical intellect. The political action of the free citizen has the form of isonomic causality, which is based on the freedom exercised jointly and given by the law (*lex enim ipsum medium*). Therefore, in the conclusion of the reasoning, the free action of citizens who are equal establishes a different kind of rationality that makes the jointly generated rationality of the just law. The action based on the politically given freedom of the citizen has a different causality than the moral action of the person based on the free personal will. Politics and ethics are two generically different activities of practical reason and therefore require a specific way of interpretation established in two different books of Aristotle. But the goal of both actions is the same, namely the happiness of the free person acting morally and politically. The first Averroism interpreted the political and moral teaching of Aristotle in such a way as to emphasize the distinction of both spheres, the ecclesiastical and the secular. In a similar way, the magisters of the University of Paris argued in April 1272 with regard to the autonomy of philosophy and theology. In the same time, the critical thinking of the first Averroism separated ethics from politics and founded modern autonomous political science. The beaten Aquinas leaves the Paris University immediately after the publication of the decree. He lost twice, since his theocratic and purely social conception of politics based solely on self-preservation did not preserve the nature of political science. The isonomic action of citizens is separated from the necessity given by labor and production. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, Arendt rediscovered the authentic nature of political practice according to Aristotle. The republican political school of the first Averroism rejected the political claims of the bull *Unam Sanctam* on rational grounds and insisted on the autonomy of the political power related to the ruler, e.g., the French king or the German emperor. The political Averroism was inspired by the univocal ontotheology of second Averroism and political Thomism. Its best and most powerful representative was Aegidius Romanus after the year 1300. This Semiaverroist, who emerged from the school of the first Averroism, was the historically first Thomist and theocratical thinker. This is evidenced both by his sophistry regarding the interpretation of *De anima* and his attack on Averroes (ch. 4.3.2) as well as the theoretical conception of the bull *Unam Sanctam*, which is given in his work *De Ecclesiastica potestate* (1301). On the other hand, there was the above-mentioned group of Aristotelians of all kinds, which reached as far as the freethinking decretalists in the papal consistory, such as the above-quoted Oldradus de Ponte (ch. 6). Dante argued against the reduction of the two powers to the monarchical rule of the pope; he took inspiration from the autonomy of politics established by Albert and Siger. Dante’s rational formulation of politics according to Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics* is fundamentally different from the biblical and theological speculations of the second Averroism and from theocratic Semiaverroism of Aquinas and Aegidius. Dante’s *Monarchia* was inspired by the monarchist and universalist passages from Albert’s interpretation of *Ethics* in conjunction with the above-mentioned interpretation of *Politics*. The poet and thinker was expelled from his native city for defending the interests of Florence against pope Boniface VIII that was the author of the bull *Unam Sanctam*. Dante drew the right conclusions from Albert and Siger’s philosophy. Humanity achieves its earthly goal through philosophically inspired cognition (*ab humana ratione que per phylosophos tota nobis innotuit*; *Mon*. 3.15.9). We fulfill this goal of man and humanity through the moral and intellectual virtues (*illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales operando*; *Mon*. 3.15.8). In addition, the beatitude is achieved through two different lifestyles (*vita activa, contemplativa*). The Roman pope leads humanity to eternal life in accordance with the revealed truth (*secundum revelata humanum genus perduceret ad vitam ecternam*; *Mon*. 3.15.10). The universal monarch leads mankind to earthly salvation in accordance with the teaching of philosophy (*secundum phylosophica documenta genus humanum ad temporalem felicitatem dirigeret*; *Mon*. 3.15.10). The final unity of both paths to an accomplished life exists with regard to the destiny of man in God (*mortalis ista felicitas quodammodo ad inmortalem felicitatem ordinetur*; *Mon*. 3.15.17). Only the last destiny of man, with regard to God, completes the dualism of both paths, the politico-ethical and the religious one. Dante’s political writing argues in the style of the first Averroism and is directly inspired by Albert’s interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. Siger and the Florentine citizen Brunetto Latini followed a similar line around the year 1270; we do not know it for sure. Dante’s political theory is based on the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one according to Averroes’s metaphysics of the actualized first substance, which Albert took as the basis for the Aristotelian conception of the first science (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.3). Now it is clear why Guido Vernani, in the work *Contro Dante* (1329), considered Dante’s work *Monarchia* to be an Averroistic writing. He correctly saw the influence of Averroes’s philosophy in Dante’s work, but mistakenly understood it in the modernist sense of the then second Averroism. This modernist Dominican comprehends Aristotle’s *Politics* in the abstract univocal conception of the hypostasized good.[[573]](#footnote-573) Vernani accuses Dante of a dualism based on the two conceptions of salvation and defends the univoke conception of power within the framework of the one universal species of the rule (*regimen universale*), which can be divided into different subgroups (*regimen ecclesiasticum, civile*). His classification corresponds to the previous interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics* according to the second Averroism (ch. 6.1). In the ontotheological scenario of second Averroism, political practice and rationality cannot be defined separately. Moreover, from the perspective of the falsely constructed “Unified Science” of modernity, the correctly constructed deductions are “Averroist” because they insist on a generic distinction between the sciences according to a correctly made deduction. Following Albert, Dante confirmed this teaching and laid another building block to the foundations of humanism in connection with the already interpreted actions of the person according to Siger (ch. 4.4.3). The cosmopolitan Kant confirmed this line for postmodernism, but unfortunately beyond autonomous political rationality. Kant did not write a critique of political reason.

Arendt solved the key question of the philosophical justification of political rationality, i.e., the extension of the theoretical intellect into practical, with reference not to political rationalists as were Aristotle and Albert, but to postmodern Kant. His term “*erweiterte Denkungsart*” belongs to the three axioms that define the universalization of maxims in the work *Kritik der Urteilskraft* and it determines Kant’s notion of *sensus communis*.[[574]](#footnote-574) Arendt took the enlarging way of thinking as the basis for the political conception of freedom in the sense of the ancient *scholé*. She sees this activity, which determines the free person in the mode “free for world” as the unbiased ability of free people to recognize the world in the company of other free people according to Kant’s concept of “*uninteressiertes Wohlgefallen*”(Arendt, 1961, 210). The critical faculty of politics observes the world through the eyes of other people and can therefore find a common world of free citizens. Arendt tried to derive a new form of political rationality from Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft*; however, taking the matter as such she could not achieve success. Kant is not an Aristotelian, but a postmodernist. The result of the postmodern fallacy of political rationality, defined according to Kant’s transcendental philosophy in *Kritik der Urteilskraft* is the underestimated role of political law as a *medium*, which is indispensable for the rational definition of political practice. Aristotle and the republican first Averroism found and defined the autonomous rationality of the community, given by the common law. With reference to the extension of the practical intellect after Kant, Arendt reduced the political *intellectus practicus* to a new form of the theoretical intellect and turned freedom into a new form of the Porretan *scibile*. On the other hand, she defended the causality of the free-acting citizen in accordance with the political freedom established by Aristotle. Only Arendt was no longer able to combine this political freedom, brilliantly defended against postmodern liberalism, into a unity of the political syllogism, which is given as a common law of the community. In criticizing totalitarianism, Arendt clearly stated the failure of the abstract conception of human rights, which was mythologically constructed as a modern hypostatized species. As soon as the emigrants in Europe and the people in the colonies were no longer protected by real laws of the state, they ended up in the concentration camps as refugees from today’s failed states. In the 20th century, these “outlaws” ended up in extermination camps. Therefore, Albert’s and certainly Siger’s solution of the effectively causal political rationality is so far the most well-founded argument for an autonomous political science. The politics, on the other hand, received a repressive and negative character from the very beginning in the Augustinian political theory of theocratic *Modernorum*. In the second Averroism, the law given by the activity of the free and prudent citizen does not have a central position, but the mythological sin of Adam. Reduced to social justice, the politics administers a medicine for the social consequences of sin in the form of just repression and punishment (*remedium peccatum*). The excellence of politically free people has no autonomous position in the system of political Augustinism and also no special value. The school of *Modernorum*, moreover, in a Neoplatonic way, descended on the ladder of generality from the idea or species of the Good down to the level of the good given in the political action of the defined social body. The mixing of the theoretical and the practical intellect represents a typical error of modernism and postmodernism, which are determined by the thinking of Oxfordian Fallacy.

After the eclipse of the first substance, the eclipse of free political actions followed. With the introduction of the good as a specific *scibile* for ethics, the excellence of free action and practice disappeared that form the basis of Aristotle’s ethics and politics. The abstraction of ethical and political action supplanted the unique causality of the middle link of the political syllogism, which forms the basis of the scientific demonstration of ethics and politics. Aquinas enriched Augustinism with the meaning according to Aristotle’s ethics and, like Albert, rejected the conception of hypostatized good according to the second Averroism. However, Thomas did not understand the autonomous meaning of politics in the same depth as Albert and as Siger. This Semiaverroist, criticized by Siger, stopped halfway in the interpretation of the extension of the theoretical intellect in the practical one, as well as in the interpretation of *intellectus possibilis* according to CMDA. In the conception of the first averroism made by Aquinas and Aegidius and political semiaverroism, neither a specific political syllogism nor an autonomous extension of the intellect nor a theory of the transfer of power in the form of “*regnabile*” can arise. All that can be found in the first Averroism of Albert, Dante and Siger. Morality also determined politics in later Thomism. Political science had not a causally given middle link of deductive judgment, which ensured a scientific definition of political action and rationality. Semiaverroists from the school of the first Averroism reduced practical practice to sociality, exactly according to Seneca’s and Aquinas’s definition of man as “*animal sociale et politicum*”. Hermeneutics recall the fundamental meaning of that “*et*” in the mode of concealment (*a/lētheia*) of political rationality in the philosophy of Aquinas. Due to the conjunction between politics and sociality, his philosophy continues to justify the epochal error of the subsequent epoch of political liberalism, which was revealed and criticized by Hannah Arendt with reference to Aristotle’s actual political philosophy. But her brilliant analyses of the Aristotelian and early Roman conception of politics and authority no longer had knowledge of the entire Corpus given “*ad mentem Averrois*”, especially of *Second Analytics*, which, together with *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, founded a new kind of political rationality. The brief overview of Albert’s interpretation of *Politics* and Dante’s *Monarchia* has clearly explained the different nature of political action in the first and in the second Averroism and in Aquinas’s ethical Semiaverroism. With the help of these differences, hermeneutics has also established why Dante was a student of Albert and Siger in the realm of the political science, but not Aquinas.

## 6.3 Eclipse of Ethical and Political Practice

The interpretation of Ockham’s practical and political philosophy concludes the emergence of objectivity. A short chapter cannot cover the entirety of Ockham’s political thinking, which was shaped by complicated religious, ecclesiastical and political conditions in the context of the dispute between the Avignon pope John XXII and the rebellious emperor Ludwig IV of Bavaria. Therefore, in the end, we try to answer a single question: How does Ockham’s defense of ethical and political practice fit into the scheme of the first Averroism established by Albert, Siger and Dante? First of all, it is necessary to determine how Ockham solves the extension of the theoretical intellect in its practical form. The last representative of the first Averroism defended the practical syllogism against Oxford Scotists. Practical intellect cannot be subsumed under the theoretical intellect as the second Averroism did. Ockham’s defense of rational autonomous action is very interesting, since it is built on actively defended political freedom. The free practice of the person determined by the practical intellect is given in reality, in contrast to the necessity of conclusions given intellectually and purely universally. The Oxford Franciscan defended the authentic teaching of *Ethics* in relation to the one goal of life that includes the two paths leading to it.

“Contrary to this opinion, I argue that the practical intellect does not differ from the speculative one with regard to the goal, i.e. by the final cause, so that it should have a different final cause than the speculative intellect. The final cause is the same for both intellects and it is given *simpliciter*.” [[575]](#footnote-575)

The goal of the theoretical and the practical intellect is the same, because the final causality of the practical intellect does not differ in any way from the theoretical (*practica non distinguitur a speculativa fine*). However, the quotation emphasizes that the identity of the final causality is valid for both sides of the intellect only in the mode of *simpliciter*. It is a typical example of methodical approach to the intellect in Averroes’s mode *quartum genus*. In the real act of understanding, it is true that practical action follows a different object of cognition than the theoretical understanding. Ockham must establish the object of practical rationality against the univocal objectivism of *Modernorum*. The definition of just moral judgment (*recta ratio*) corresponds to the previous interpretation of Aristotelian *Ethics* (ch. 6.1). Ockham’s definition includes all basic attributes of interpretation according to the first Averroism: the actuality of the acting person, the orientation to the real work, the efficient causality.

“Right action is taken with respect to the center of action (*recta ratio*), which constitutes the object of virtuous action. Since moral actions refer only to real ends, it is true that the rightly given action exerts an effective causality with respect to the ethical activity.“ [[576]](#footnote-576)

A person’s performance determines the wise middle point between the extremes (*recta ratio*) made out in unique situations. In terms of theoretical reasoning, really and practically determined centre constitutes the object of practical action (*recta ratio est obiectum actus virtuosi*). The hermeneutic question, “how” the good is revealed in real actions, is determined by the exposure of ethics from the front, from the direction of the real acting person. The actual act of good is given thanks to the person acting freely in real conditions, where his actions give rise to a new reality of the world (*obiectum in esse reali*). The action does not go to the theoretical concept, but to the ethical work given as an personal deed (*ad actum virtuosum*). Ockham outlined a typical predication “*in artificialibus*” that Albert used to describe the activity of the practical intellect. The practical intellect is capable of causally influencing the real state of things in the world (*componitur cum re operato*, ch. 6.1). Ethics cannot be univocally objective, because it has its own object of cognition and its own type of causality, different from the theoretical intellect. The next part of the quotation, explicitly rejects the argument based on Oxfordian Fallacy for ethical reasoning. For the middle link of the deductive proof, Ockham cannot allow the causality of a Neoplatonic good that would subsist in man as *tertium ens* given as a habitus, a specific *scibile* or as another hypostasis. The existence cannot be multiplied according to changing needs of modern and postmodern sophists. Freely acting people establish the effective causality through moral deeds (*habet causalitatem effectivam respectu actus virtuosi*). Ockham confirmed the basic line of *Nicomachean Ethics*, which establishes the autonomous rationality of moral actions. The source of true moral action is the prudent man with his own *phronésis*, which reliably determines the changing middle position of the virtue (ch. 6.1).

Ockham can now reject Scotus’s intellectualist and objectivist ethics in a qualified manner. The modern and postmodern objectivists do not see the difference between the two forms of intellect. The objective intellect of *illuminati* cannot correctly define the extension of the theoretical intellect into reality, because it comprehended the causality in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy univocally for both intellects. The prudent person is different from the philosopher or the theorist of science, because he or she is true by the morally or politically correct good deed given freely and personally. Once again, the fundamental difference between the two intellects applies, which is determined in the mode of “*extensione fit practicus*.” Ockham accurately diagnosed the basic problem of Aristotelian Avicennism. Modernity abolished the autonomous extension of the practical intellect into singular actions given in reality. The main problem of modernity in the field of ethical and political rationality is based on the incorrectly defined habitus. Following the teaching of *Nominales*, the habitus forms a sophistic species of the third kind. The hypostatized habitus as objective species is univocally integrated into the practical syllogism, thereby establishing the *medium* of demonstrative deductive judgment. The middle link of the practical judgment contains an objectively based causality on the basis of the essentially and causally conceived habitus. The predication of the practical or political syllogism stands above the real action of the person in the mode of hypostatic objectivity. The introduction of habitus into the practical syllogism gave rise to a new version of Oxfordian Fallacy, which objectified ethics and politics. Ockham quotes Scotus’s introduction of the writing *Ordinatio I* (ed. Vaticana I, p. 228) and makes a fundamental criticism of such kind of ethics. Ockham directed the criticism mainly against Scotus’s conception of habitus that fundamentally deformed Aristotelian nature of the practical syllogism. The blindness concerning effects of first substances is now replaced by the blindness concerning moral and political actions of the person as the first substance existing *per se*. Scotus’s reading of Aristotle is fundamentally flawed at the moment when it is necessary to determine the habitus with regard to the actual extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one. Scotus defines ethics on the basis of the essence, which is at odds with the real practical syllogism of *Ethics* and *Politics*. In the treatise *De distinctione inter notitiam speculativam et practicam*, Ockham quotes Scotus’s *Ordinatio, liber I, prologus, q. 11*. This quote taken from Scotus should be cited first to make Ockham’s criticism understandable.

“Scotus asserts that ‘the definition of prudence must be derived from the habitus which is closest to the given activity, provided that this habitus is derived from real actions. The art is given with regard to feasibility (*ars se habet circa factibilia*) and is therefore given according to the habitus of experience (*ad habitum experimenti*). Action is given with regard to the possible act (*circa agibilia*); consequently, moral science is determined with regard to the habitus of prudence (*ad habitum prudentiae*). The habitus of art and ethical cognition is removed from the determination of action, because it is universal.’” [[577]](#footnote-577)

Prudence starts from the sum of habitually stored experiences (*de habitu activo proximo*) and is determined from the active action of the individual (*adquisitus ex actibus*). The first part of the definition of the practical intellect takes a course towards individual action, which seems to represent an Aristotelian scenario. The practical intellect adheres to cognition in the singular mode “*secundum quid*”; it proceeds from experience and is oriented towards real actions. But the practical syllogism is placed in a theoretical intellect and in not in the practical one as it is in *Nicomachean Ethics*. It makes an entirely different interpretation of the extension that makes the theoretical intellect change in the practical. Scotus created an essential definition of the practice, which follows the division of the good according to *Nominales* and Porretans. The definition made in the mode *per prius* is not determined by the actual course of actions. The habitus arises on the basis of the real practice made out by the person, and not vice versa. Ockham pointed out that fact in his previous criticism of Scotism (ch. 5.4.1). The quoted writing *Ordinatio I* essentializes and objectifies the potency of this or that activity (*factibilia, agibilia*). Scotus makes a theoretical deduction of prudence by deducing concrete action in reality from the general concept of habitus. According to Ockham, this is a fundamentally flawed approach in the case of the practical syllogism, since Scotus lets theoretical deduction control individual action in reality (*aequaliter diriget habitus universalis*; OTh 1, 318.13). In reality, the habitus and the concept of prudence arise on the basis of the repeated correct actions of prudent persons. This singular causality given in reality cannot be replaced by any theoretical deduction and by any concept; the practical rationality represents a deductive reasoning that is different in terms of genre. Scotus created an ethical version of Oxfordian Fallacy for the practical intellect, which complemented Rufus’s version of objective ethics. A key role in the recognition scheme is played by the objective conception of habitus, which replaced the former Porretan species of the third kind. Let’s take the first part of Scotus’s definition, which creates the new version of Oxfordian Fallacy for the practical syllogism (*ars se habet circa factibilia ad habitum experimenti*). The essence of the given activity (*ars*) is determined by the essential definition of activities (*factibilia*). The objectively defined feasibility is not determined by concrete actions of the person, but by the hypostatized habitus of experience (*habitum experimenti*). Objectiviste Scotus is not interested in real actions of persons, because their concrete actions are contained in the essential causality. Therefore, it is possible to translate the practical syllogism into the theoretical schema of cognition. Scotus created an ethical deduction from the objectively and habitually established universal form. Ockham correctly sees that Scotus’s error concerns the middle link of practical syllogism. The objective extension of the theoretical reason into the practical one is wrong, because it does not proceed from the real causality of the ethically acting person. The habitus, in the mode of the theoretical intellect, determines the universal and, consequently, only potential scope of the given activity of what can be objectively produced or carried out (*factibilia, agibilia*). The cited definition of artistic and ethical action proceeds from the universal species of the given knowledge (*ars, scientia moralis*). This objective genre then establishes meaning of actions, given in the objectively defined order of manual works (*factibilia*) or moral or political actions (*agibilia*). This objective species is not based on real causality of acting persons, since it makes a hypostatized habitus. Scotus created a logical deduction of the practical syllogism. First, the potential objective definition of activity (*scientia moralis*) is given, and this objective determination determines the potential category of human activity (*agibilia*). The resulting definition of ethics is given by the theoretical intellect and, moreover, by the exposure of being made from behind, from direction of hypostatized essences. Scotus begins with the objectively defined area of action (*circa agibilia*) and then creates the middle link of the deduction as a habitus that operates as causally effective species (*ad habitum prudentiae*). By combining these two abstract determinations, the objective definition of ethics is established (*circa agibilia se habet scientia moralis ad habitum prudentiae*). The substantially determined habitus of prudence represents a singular and universal medium that combines both universal concepts (*scientia moralis, agibilia*). We find this conception of habitus for the first time in Simplicius, whose version of “*esse ad*” used Gandavus for the definition of objective *habitudo* (ch. 5.2.3). Scotus’s objective determination of ethics and politics is given by the exposure from behind that takes direction of the non-existent being of the third kind. Once again, a conflict of principles took place between the objective and Aristotelian conception of ethics. By introducing the analytical and objective variant of the principle “*ex inmediatis*” into the practical syllogism, a non-existent causality of the objective *scibile* made out the practical version of Oxfordian Fallacy, which replaced free actions of the person.

Scotism has constructed ethics in a fundamentally flawed and sophistical way. First, deductive scientific proof has no causality given by the actions of a person as a real hyparchical substance. Second, the deduction is constructed on the basis of logical abstraction. It establishes a theoretical science that is generically distinct from Aristotelian ethics. Ockham asserts against ethical objectivism that there is one person, but two different objects of cognition: the universal-potentially given concept and the singular-real given practical act. The objectivist determination of action and production done in the framework of the one univocal truth abolished Aristotelian existential unity of the two different ways of cognition and the two specific objects for both intellectual activities of one and the same person. The unification of the practical intellect under its theoretical component within the framework of Scotus’s objective univocity was unacceptable for Ockham. Scotist’s ethics abolished the unique action that establishes the practical syllogism in the mode of real causality (*non potest haberi sine experientia singularium*; OTh 1, 318.21). The sophistic extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one destroyed the autonomy of ethics and politics. Modernity abolished the principle of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical, and with it also the practical predication “*in artificialibus*” that separates both paths of cognition. Albert’s analysis of *Ethics* has shown that the action determined by the practical intellect carries out an active recognition of the individual things (*practicus intellectus habet formam operativam rei*), whereby the intellect is directly connected with the completed work in reality by its causal activity (*hoc componitur cum re operato*, ch. 6.1). Ockham took the same point of view and he distinguished exactly an ethical and theoretical syllogism. Scotus’ practical version of Oxfordian Fallacy, on the other hand, sweept action and thinking under one hat. Taken by the formal perspective, Scotus made no mistake in the objective determination of the practical syllogism. Analytical philosophers took up the the “intellect” in a objectively correctly manner and they made practical “*extensio*”in the same sophistical manner. As far as the objectivist ethics, metaphysics and politics is concerned, all cats are black. However, the objective view is given in the mode of logical abstraction (*suppositio* of logic) ; it is not the case of actual moral acts of the person (*impositio* of metaphysics). Ockham first agrees with Scotists. In the predication given *simpliceter* the final causality is the same for both forms of intellect. Logically and formally, one can predict that habitus determines action, because both forms of cognition are based in the intellect. However, the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one cannot be reduced to an objective insight, a theoretical determinism or an ex-post given scheme of action. The following quote shows the source of Scotus’s fallacy.

“The universally understood habitus directs action directly (*immediate dirigit*), but by no means totally, but only partially (*partialiter tantum*). Indeed, outside of the universally conceived habitus, it is necessary for action to recognize the individual thing in reality (*notitia rei singularis*), which determines concrete action or to which a certain potentiality of acting is directed.” [[578]](#footnote-578)

The analytical deduction of ethics starts from the essence that acts as a real cause. This error presupposes that the habitus in the practical syllogism directly and effectively determines the actual action directed towards the practical goal (*habitus practicus immediate dirigit circa opus*). The causality operated by habitus can be direct, but being the partial one, it does not establish the first and therefore the most important cause of action. First, the real imposition of causality must be done on the level of first real substance. Habitus is no first substance, but only an abstracted notion in mind. Its causality is done “*immediate*” only in the logical and essentialist version of deduction based on the logical supposition. The ethic as a critical science must be built on the causality of the person that “*immediate*” produces activities as their first cause. The causality operated by habitus can be direct, but being the partial one, it does not establish the first and therefore the most important cause of action. First, the real imposition of causality must be done on the level of first real substance. Habitus is no first substance, but only an abstracted notion in mind. Its causality is done “*immediate*” only in the logical and essentialist version of deduction based on the logical supposition. The ethic as a critical science must be built on the causality of the person that “*immediate*” produces activities as their first cause, since it makes the only possibility of imposition that keeps metaphysical nature. This is the only form of imposition that preserves the complete (*totaliter*) metaphysical nature of causality necessary for a practical syllogism. Ockham defends the principle “*ex inmediatis*” according to the first Averroism and according to *Seconds Analytics*. The objectively conceived habitus does not in and of itself possess the full causality to control a concrete action. The abstractly given concept forms only a part of the total causality of the acting person (*partialiter tantum*). The universally conceived habitus arises thanks to personal activities related to this or that really given goals (*habitus universales requiritur notitia rei singularis quae debet dirigi*). The actuality of practical action in the mode of tertium genus exists only in virtue of the real person. The personal action is the only source of hyparchical causality that is absolutely necessary for the scientific definition of ethics and politics. Aristotelian ethics must follow the metaphysical dative in the elaboration of the practical *quidditas*. The scientific demonstration cannot be based on the objective kinds of tertium ens made in the mode of modern truth as mythological assimilation (*coaequatio*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Ockham built deductive ethical *demonstratio* on an opposing point of view than Scotus. The real action is taken in the hyparchical mode *per prius* and thus establishes the accidental habitus in the universal mode *per posterius* in the categorical predication. The objective habitus is merely a logical abstraction, which cannot exist before the actualized action. This is where the Aristotelian definition of habitus differs from its essential “exsistence.”

The above-mentioned criticism of Scotus’s definition of habitus is now also extended to the field of ethical action. Ockham argues against Scotists that the practical action starts from the person. The habitus cannot produce a universal being of the third kind, which is endowed with its own causal efficacy as Porretan species or Rufus’s *scibile*. In contrast to the sophistic intellectualists, Ockham emphasizes the fundamental thesis of *Nicomachean Ethics* that the act of ethical action (*praxim virtuosam et vitiosam*) must be in our power (*in potestate nostra*).[[579]](#footnote-579) There is twofold conception of cognition that the first Averroism defended against the univocal theory of the one objective truth. The extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical presupposes a different kind of true correspondence of the practical intellect and man-made reality than the univocally and necessarily given theoretical abstraction. Ockham’s *Ordinatio I* corrected by his own hand defends the line of the first Averroism, which is given by the twofold conception of the truth made by the theoretical and the practical intellect. The extension of the theoretical intellect into reality fundamentally changes the nature of truth, which Aristotle’s *Ethics* asserted. Both intellects are focused on beatitude as the ultimate goal, but do not achieve this object in the same way.

“According to the intention of the Philosopher, it is necessary to know that the end of practical knowledge is true, and this is to be pursued in rightly based action (*secundum rectam rationem intendi*). In the same way, the aim of theoretical science is true. But the ultimate end of speculative science is the truth, whereas the ultimate end of practical knowledge is not the truth but the work (*finis autem ultimus scientiae practicae non est veritas sed opus*).” [[580]](#footnote-580)

The active life is oriented towards the real work, which is given here and now in its actuality as a kind of deeds or products. The object given in this way cannot be understood in the mode of pure speculation, because it is true only in the practical predication “*in artificialibus*” related to the real activity of persons (*opus*). The truth of free action follows the line of correct ethical reasoning (*recta ratio*). Acting in the changing unique circumstances is fundamentally different from the universal truth. The theoretical intellect determines the universal truth, but not the singular work. The true ethics and politics are shown by real actions. Free practice represents the causal nexus, which cannot be replaced by an abstraction of Scotist’s objective habitus. That is why the objective view of ethics is not true as Aristotelian correspondence. Scotism defined the action of the person from behind, from general definitions. The middle link of the practical syllogism is set up outside the real causality given in virtue of personal actions. Ockham reminds Scotists that the real goal of practical action does not consist in theoretical consideration, but in acts or in works. Moreover, the work and actions of the prudent person are distinguished by the fact that they testify to personal freedom.

“I argue against the above-mentioned opinion; following classical authors, I distinguish freedom from activity conceived as principle of naturally processes and determine it to be a kind of randomness and independence (*quaedam contingentia vel indifferentia*). It is clear from this that freedom is not compatible with necessity. Secondly, I argue against the attempt to define freedom by the will as a necessary and active principle.” [[581]](#footnote-581)

Human action is free in contrast to necessarily given natural agencies (*principium naturale activum*); the free man has the possibility to act and not to act (*quaedam contingentia vel indifferentia*). The possibility of acting through freedom is not linked to natural and logical necessity, which presuppose a form of determinism (*libertas non stat cum necessitate*). This problem was opened by Olivi, and after this in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (ch. 5.1.2). In the third antinomy, Kant deals with the paradox of human freedom, which cannot be objectively demonstrated in the causal order of nature. Finally, *Critique of Practical Reason* found a new kind of causality in the free subject. Kant subordinates practical reason to the theoretical deduction of causality based on moral law as *causa sui*. A much more important criticism concerns the problem of the hypostatic modern will. Ockham argues against Olivi’s and Scotus’s reduction of practical freedom both to voluntarist irrational intimacy and to objective necessity determined by the theoretical intellect (*salvandi aliter libertatem in voluntate*). Olivi’s will became yet another substance of the third kind in man. The mixture of *potentia substantialis* and *accidentialis* in the modern will as *tertium ens* brought about a new theoretical principle. It substitutes for fundamental role of personal activity that makes the principal cause of free actions in the first Averroism. Ockham recognized the fundamental fallacy of modern and contemporary ethics. Both of them establish the practical syllogism on the kind of demonic logic created by *Oxfordian Fallacy*. Grosseteste established the demonic logic of the necessary coming of Antichrist by questioning the primacy of Aristotelian necessity. It is based on the reality of causally acting first substances and is then reflected in metaphysical necessity, which is determined by imposition (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). Modern logic was made in the subjective mode „*semel—semper*“ and it is located in modern God as the supreme subject. Similarly, the reality of free action based on the real person, was replaced by an impersonal logical abstraction. The age of nihilism began at the moment when the freedom of the abstract „man—corpse“ replaced the freedom of real persons. Modernity created a new *dativus auctoris* for free action through the rule of abstraction. Ockham was the last Aristotelian of his time to identify and denounce this kind of nihilistic replacement of the real person by the modern abstraction (*Ge-Stell*) in the context of the logical supposition of Scotism. The quotation rejects Scotus’s conception of freedom because he had created a new practical syllogism founded on the false necessity (*in alio principio necessario activo*). Ockham argues against Olivi’s and Scotus’s reduction of practical freedom to both voluntaristic irrational intimacy and objective necessity determined by theoretical intellect (*salvandi aliter libertatem in voluntate*). Olivi’s will has become a being of the third kind, in which coexist the potency and the actuality of action. Both chief exponents of the second Averroism, and after them the postmodern Kant, developed the concept of the freedom of the will given in the direct insight of the theoretical intellect into the one way or another hypostatized *potentia essentialis*. The modern *illuminati* from Rufus to Kant to Hegel attributed this concept to eradicate the real freedom of the real person. Ockham clearly sees that modernity has determined only the simulacrum of freedom, because it has omitted to derive it from the real causality of free people. The free action of the person cannot be transferred to a theoretical hypostasis, because the person as a whole acts as *causa sui* in ethics and in politics. In the case of Olivi, the agent of free actions is the intimate hypostatic will; in the case of Scotus, it is the hypostatized objective habitus. Kant has direct objective insight into *a priori* given legislative form of free will. All these variations of Avicennistic and Porretan essence define only the objective form of the practical syllogism, which in the middle link of the proof has no real causality of freedom based on the morally acting real person and on politically acting real citizens. Real causality exists only at the level of the acting free person, which, according to *Metaphysics*, is a *causa sui*. This causality, given by the *opus* as a first real substance, cannot be replaced by any modern or postmodern essence. Then an objective intellectualistic ethics and politics are created, but not a scientifically based rational ethics and politics.

The problem of the objectivist deduction of ethics from an *intellectus speculativus* is based on false clarity of that deduction. The academic *illuminatus*, guided by subjective Furies, considers his theoretical intellect to be the fundament of action. The phenomena are necessarily given in nature, and the cognitions have only a general character in theoretical cognition. On the other hand, according to Albert, Ockham and certainly according to Siger’s lost commentary, the *intellectus practicus* is linked to ethical actions and to political practice of free people. The real person acts in ethics and in politics as *causa sui*. According to the law on the Excluded Third, there can be no other *causa efficiens* acting in the same mode. The first Averroism seeks the singularly given human good, which exists here and now in the completed work, since this work manifests the causality of existentially given extension of the practical intellect. Ethical or political activities take place in reality, where they form a unity with the personal agent as the first substance (*tertium genus*). Authentic Aristotelianism derives the practical form of predication within the framework of the moral and political syllogism from this hyparchical condition of human action. This gives rise to the theoretical insight that determines the essence of the practical intellect in the mode of the *quartum genus* according to CMDA. According to Ockham, Olivi’s concept of the free will lacks the critical mind; in the case of Scotus, the logically correct mind lacks the real freedom of the person. These two modernists lived in the age of the eclipse of the first substance, and they fulfilled this eclipse in ethics and politics. Aristotelianism confirms that all areas of human knowledge and action are linked to the action of the person as primary substance. Ockham was the last Aristotelian from the school of the first Averroism, who acknowledged this fundamental fallacy of *Modernorum* and correctly diagnosed it. A theorist of the first Averroism as Albert, Siger, Dante and Ockham has before him firstly the actions of free people and only then can he create the theoretical science. In the correctly formed practical syllogism, the free action of the person replaces the hyparchical function of the first substance. That is why the causality of the freely acting person has a primary character. The rationality given in the act of moral or political as “*recta ratio*” plays the role of the second substance from which the universally given predication unfolds. Modernism turned this order all the way around, as it was and it is an old habit among *sophistae Latini* since the analytical interpretation of *Seconds Analytics*. A criticism similar to Ockham was repeated in the epoch of nihilistic metaphysics by the young Hegelian left thinkers as were Ruge, Bauer and Marx against Hegel’s work *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821). The academic Hegelians began to practically reshape the world through mere thinking. Marx criticized that tendency in the writing *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* (1844) to be the main deviation of German idealistic philosophy that degenerated into an ideology.[[582]](#footnote-582) German idealism abolished political practice through Hegel’s Avicennism, which absolutized the historical movement of the absolute spirit into the metahistorical essence and gave this essence a historical causality in the nihilistic version of Oxfordian Fallacy. In the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, Marx repeated Ockham’s critical position against modernity. Marx reworked the exposition of moral and political actions on behalf of freely acting persons. In Scotism, the moral and political action became a *tertium ens*, since the recognition of practice came by the illumination made from behind. The statement *per prius* begins at the sophistic simulacrum of reality and progresses by logical deduction “*ex inmediatis*” according to Rufus’s and Kilwardby’s causal principle. Scotus changed the real actions into theoretical concepts (*factibilia, agibilia*) and then he took them into practical syllogism as the causality of real substances. The modern habitus of free actions has become a hypostasis at the level of „*potentia substantialis*.“ This *tertium ens* is necessary to replace the free action of the person by the modern rule of abstraction made in the mode of new *dativus auctoris*. Ockham diagnosed this paranoia of theoretical reason (*Irre*) correctly; his critique could no longer stop the runaway train of modern progress run by Mr. Nobody. Real freedom has disappeared from thought on the *via Modernorum* and has been replaced by the mythological concept of freedom. On the contrary to absolutely free personal actions, the freedom as modern habitus operates absolutely necessarily, in the mode of „*semel–semper*“. The acting person as *causa sui* was replaced by theoretically given extension that operates as an objective *scibile* in practical syllogism. Scotus created a practical form of Rufus’s term “*concretum*” to replace the living person as the author of free actions. He created a sophisticated version of objective practical syllogism (*per modum concretum*; OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The procedure of the Modernorum abolished the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical and thus also abolished the autonomy of the practical and political understanding. In the case of practical syllogism, Scotus repeated the scenario of the epochal eclipse, in which the effective causality of the Sun was replaced by the theoretical species (ch. 5.3.2). Modernity transferred the eclipse of the first substance given in modern metaphysics to the realm of ethical and political action. The hermeneutics of the person contest the analytical theory of practice (Ricoeur 1990, 109–66) and took up the same problematic in the criticism of contemporary Oxfordian Fallacy (Danto, Anscombe, Davidson, Parfit) that characterizes the epoch of accomplished metaphysical nihilism. After the exclusion of personal form of the practical intellect, there is the “objective freedom” given as Hegelian speculatively recognized necessity, or as the univocal causality of analytical philosophy.

Ockham, as the last representative of the critical Aristotelianism of the Sicilian school, observed precisely the basic problem of modernity given in the mode of *dativus incommodi*. His analytical contemporaries in Oxford defined freedom to be a universal concept of the objective individual as *tertium ens*. In doing this, they abolished actual freedom of the acting person. The freedom of the person as the first substance ceased to exist in reality for science and philosophy, because it was replaced by the objective definition of merely potential activity and habitus. Unfortunately, this caused the phenomenon of real causality from freedom to disappear (*causa sui*). That real freedom is given in the world only from the effective freedom based on the extension of the theoretical intellect into reality. In reality, then, it acts as a practical intellect. Modernism is “practically” paranoid. It has no ethical and political truth as a correspondence in the mode “*in artificialibus.*” It abolished Aristotelian practical intellect because of the objectively erroneous deduction. As a result, it nullified the scientific conception of practice according to *Seconds Analytics* and replaced it with sophistic simulacra produced by the analytical philosophy of practice according to Oxfordian Fallacy. Ockham is not modern, but true. Neither the theoretical intellect nor the causally established nature can act indifferently with regard to the necessity. Necessity is determined in theoretical thinking by the logical and metaphysical form of the theoretical intellect and in the nature of real causality of first physical substances. Both forms of necessity make the compelling cause in correctly given theoretical proof or as effectively given cause in nature. Both types of necessity are based on logical and metaphysical deduction determined by the theoretical intellect. The person guided by the practical intellect can act freely and does so by acting in reality in a unique manner. Its ethical and political rationality (*recta ratio*) determines the right action here and now and makes the extension of the theoretical intellect into reality. The person acts completely autonomously, that is, in a contingent and independent manner (*contingentia vel indifferentia*). By the truth of ethics and politics, the free act (*opus*) is based on the right action of the prudent person and the citizen (*intellectus practicus*). Ockham reminds Scotus and the whole of modernism for the last time and in vain that the theoretical intellect has no possibility to act out of itself in particular situations. The theoretical intellect thinks only universally and in the order of logical and metaphysical necessity, and cannot perform anything in reality. In contingent reality, he acts only through his extension made as the practical intellect. The theoretical intellect by its actions does not create any real effective causality; it is given exclusively by the free will of the person and by personal actions. This extension establishes a different generic faculty of recognition and correspondence. They keep their own realm of actions based on ethical and political rationality. The predication “*in artificialibus*” determines the categorical genus of ethical and political rationality. Both types of practical syllogism are given differently in the search for the middle among the extremes given ad hoc (*recta ratio*). Hermeneutics has shown several times that the speculative intellect of modernity, starting with Rufus, narcissistically considers the meaning of being in itself as if in a mirror or in the medium of one’s own original production. The first Averroism correctly saw that the theoretical intellect intervenes in practice only by renouncing its basic attribute of the theoretically given necessity and generality. Ethical and political action therefore represents “the nice risk” as Aristotle would say. The theoretical investigation of ethics and politics is only possible in the second step, given by conceptual abstraction (*quartum genus*). This abstraction intends the real action of the existing person as the first substance (*tertium genus*). Ockham’s conception of freedom has nothing in common with Olivi’s and Scotus’s freedom as a Neoplatonic habitus of the third kind; much less with postmodern nihilistic freedom defined as a theoretical, ideological, evolutionary, revolutionary, natural or capitalist necessity.

The reduction of the practical syllogism to the theoretical deduction produced fatal consequences in the history of the Latin West. Modernism and postmodernism have forgotten the true extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical one. The objective ethical and political speculation of modernity is placed outside the autonomous character of the practical intellect and it has become a supplement of theoretical thinking. Hannah Arendt criticized as a fundamental error of modernity this deformation of politics into economic speculation for the sake of self-preservation or the politics reduced to intimate character of *liberum arbitrium*. Hermeneutic explanation has shown that critical thinkers have rejected the ethical form of Oxfordian Fallacy. In the objective metaphysics of Olivi and Scotus, the person lost real freedom because human being ceased to be the first real substance. After the eclipse of the first substance, the modern individual received an objective simulacrum of freedom as an intellectual surrogate for the original real freedom. The path of *Modernorum* led from Scotism to the postmodern ideology of liberalism in two steps. The first step established the romantic intimacy of personal free will as a substance of the third kind (Olivi). The second step led to the deterministic conception of history as a nihilistic movement of the various forms of the *scibile* (Scotus). Ockham’s defense of ethical and political practice adhered to Albert’s and Siger’s conception of the extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical that Dante defended in the writing *Monarchia*. The real freedom in Averroes’s mode of *tertium genus* is not primarily a theoretical concept, which is considered modern objectively or postmodern ideologically in the totalitarian conceptions of this or that end of history. The practical version of Oxfordian Fallacy given by modernists opened the path of totalitarian political ideologies. After the eclipse of the practical intellect, the theoretical intellect of *Modernorum* considers human actions through the autonomous *intellectus agens*. Modernity established its supposed superiority by adding causal effectiveness to the theoretical intellect through objectively conceived habitus and through some form of ideology. Kant maintained the primacy of theoretical science over practical reason through the categorical imperative and the universalization of maxims. As a result, he founded objective ethics in the enlightened postmodernism. Kant’s oponents objected that the principle of universalization and formalization, which is given within the framework of the categorical imperative, can lead to immoral and unjust actions in a concrete case. Hegel criticized Kant’s “ethical tautology” in his study of 1803.[[583]](#footnote-583) Hegel transformed Kantian objective ethics into the history of absolute knowledge. Marx criticized this erroneous thinking of German idealism in the work *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1836). Modernism, from Scotus to dialectical Hegel, more or less forgot that actual freedom is given only in the real actions of persons. The thinking of metaphysical nihilism in the 20th and 21st centuries contemplate narcissistically itself in the mirror of its own *scibilia*. The extermination camps have technically and effectively shown that the objectively conceived “concrete individual” finally becomes completely superfluous in the absolute movement of the idea given by the instrumental rationality based on the instinct of self-preservation. In the self-preservation logic of the class-given interest and the ideologically based movement of history towards the immanently determined goal, it is necessary to destroy all kinds of disobedient matter. The epoch of practical nihilism caused the death of the postmodern subject after the death of modern God. Ockham’s critique of modern ethics outlined a modern version of *dativus incommodi*, which involved the eclipse of free persons. Aristotle would say that after the loss of freedom there is no difference between “*animal sociale*” of man and animals. Therefore, postmodernism had one common procedural law for both sorts of “animals” (ch. 5.5). Two World Wars and totalitarianism replaced “man” as theoretically postulated and objectively considered *scibile* with the ideally correct logical practice that actualized former kinds of Oxfordian Fallacy. Arendt restored the autonomy of political rationality according to Aristotle. This courageous political activist and brilliant thinker tied up in Aristotle’s nature of politics to critical thinkers of real practice (e.g., Niccolò Machiavelli and Alexis de Tocqueville) in order to promote the political legacy of the first Averroism.

The renewed interpretation of Aristotle’s *Ethics* in the spirit of the first Averroism determined Ockham’s interpretation of political practice that was necessarily marked by conflictual events of his time. His political work came about in the situation of the struggle between papal and secular power. We reduce such a complicated task to the search for the basic form of political rationality. The previous critique of Scotism exposed but the defense of practical rationality in ethical actions. Political rationality, however, must include the creation of common laws and the new middle of the practical syllogism given by political practice of citizens. Hermeneutics seek a parallel to Albert’s term “*regnabile*” in the political work of Ockham (ch. 6.2). This concept justified the modern form of the constitutional state with the power of people that is separated both political regimes made in the form of “*regnative*” and from the ecclesiastical authority determined by the divine law. The basic guide is the work *Dialogus*, which is written from about the year 1333 to the death of the master in 1348.[[584]](#footnote-584) Ockham was looking for the true center of ecclesiastical and secular power in the situation of the authoritarian and ideological struggle between pope John XXII and King Ludwig IV of Bavaria. After the successful escape from Avignon, Ockham once again had Albert′s and Siger’s above-mentioned question on the table, which founded the autonomous political philosophy outside sophisms of *Modernorum*. The state should be governed by just laws and not just the right judgment of honorable and fairer citizens (*recta ratio*). Therefore, it is impossible that the personal decisions of politicians and popes, let alone the problematic Avignon popes such as John XXII, who, a large part of Latin Christians considered a heretic, are used as a fundamental measure of the relationship between ecclesiastical and secular power. In the times of the political and ecclesiastical struggles established after the publication of the bull *Unam Sanctam*, Ockham follows a different problem than that which Albert or Siger was confronted with in the previous generation. The Franciscan magister asks where secular and ecclesiastical power come from and how they are handed down. The translation of spiritual and secular power done in the *Imperium Romanum* can be solved philosophically only by enlightening the fundamental nature of political power.

The first transfer of political power comes from God to man in the form of the mandate to govern and it is given immediately after the creation of the world: “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and every creature that crawls upon the earth.” (*Genesis* 1:28). Ockham clearly states that this divine task to rule (*imperium*) concerns the mankind as a whole and cannot be taken without the consent of all people. Let’s look at the new form of the metaphysical dative, which establishes the translation of political power from God to man.

“For the whole of human society, what God said to the first people applies: ‘Populate the Earth and subordinate it to you and rule over the fish in the sea.’ Therefore, human society on the Earth must not be deprived of the right to rule without its express consent.” [[585]](#footnote-585)

The quotation mentions the whole of humanity (*pro tota communitate mortalium*) that receives the right and the power to rule the world. The inalienable right (*non debet privari iure suo*) to political power (*super imperium*) is accorded to all people due to natural faculties bestowed by the act of creation. This deduction of the natural right to rule is established according to the argument of “*destructio primis*” (OBJ I, ch. 1.3). For the rejection of tyranny, a single free person from the whole of humanity would be enough to confirm the natural right to political power by refusing the tyrany. The argument of CMDA on this point is worth recalling (OBJ I, ch. 2.4.3). In order to constitute rationality in the whole of “*species humana*” a single human being is sufficient who has the real ability to think critically and philosophically. Let’s hope that this will continue to be the case. Ockham, as the last representative of the first Averroism, along with Albert, Siger and Dante, is another author of the Christian-based idea of the universal and inalienable right of man to political power. We have the right to rule from God, and this irrefutable decision given at the beginning of creation cannot be changed in any way. Conceived in such a manner, all political power comes directly from God; it is tied to natural faculties of man given in the framework of practical actions in the creation. Ockham found the first instance of the universally conceived mandate to rule, which each person carries in himself. In the mode of abstraction, this universal species creates a univocal unity of political rationality within the framework of humanity as a genus; let us see Dante’s concept of “*universitas humana*” (ch. 4.4.3). The political unity of mankind is given from this original, God-given command. This *primum mobile* of the practical intellect, which is activated causally from the biblical command to take care of the Earth, represents the place of origin of the activity of the practical intellect. Its universal definition as Averroes’s *quartum genus* presents the generic unity of mankind that is defined as a specific kind of *intellectus practicus*.

Ockham found the source of power from which derives the universal predication of political rationality. Politics was initiated by the divine mandate that established the original natural form of government. There is the suverenity of all humanity exercising a primary power over creation. La translation of that power is based on the medieval version of *translatio imperii*. In this scheme, there is no church and not even a kind of religion, which completely called into question the argumentation according to the bull *Unam Sanctam*. Let us recall a similar view of Aristotelian John of Paris, which establishes the autonomous political order from God-given nature (*ex naturali instinctu, qui ex Deo est*, ch. 6.1). However, the conception of nature in the term “*ex naturali instinctu*” is not the same as with Hobbes at the time of political nihilism. Hobbes creates a theory of the state from the instinct of self-preservation. This irrational power, made in the mode of the impersonal *scibile*, forms the fundamental subject of all postmodern political theories. Against Hobbes’s absolute value of the biological instinct of self-preservation, John of Paris and Ockham would say that domination in the political community is given by the extension of the theoretical intellect into free practice. The person is not a postmodern frightened animal guided by the instinct of self-preservation. Man establishes political society by the unique extension of the theoretical intellect into the practical. The naturally given mandate to rule determines the autonomous character of political power bound to the human community as a whole. The transfer of power, given with the consent of mankind, establishes the state as a political institution, because all rulers derive their power from the decision of human community. The humanity preserves the original mandate of power given by God and it transfers that power secondarily to other political subjects. The primary transfer of power proceeds from the people to the ruler, which corresponds to Albert’s view of “*regnabile*” (ch. 6.2). The master then solves the student’s question of how it is possible to transfer power from one empire to another.

“I answer that the legal power (*potestas*) to make the transfer of the empire lies principally in one way or another in the entire human society (*est apud universitatem mortalium*); only they have received the power to establish a state (*potestas constituendi imperium*) in an absolute sovereign manner (*principalissimum*). Therefore, if the political community wants it, then it can transfer the Roman Empire from one nation to another.” [[586]](#footnote-586)

The ability to constitute political entities and empires (*potestas transferendi imperium*) lies primarily in humanity as a whole (*principalissime est apud universitatem mortalium*) and it is therefore naturally given. The people, as sovereign, by the act of their legislative will, transfer the power of the former Roman Empire to other subjects (*potestas transferendi imperium*). The text explicitly says that if the people want to do this, they can do it in a sovereign way (*vellet posset*). No other condition is necessary than the will of the citizens; they follow their free actions to constitute a political society. The same applies to the transfer of power from the former Roman Empire to other state subjects of the Middle Ages. For example, as a sovereign, the Roman people can transfer political power to the pope (*potestatem suam transferre possunt in papam*).[[587]](#footnote-587) But in this case the power of the pope is given politically. That is, by no means in virtue of papal authority, but from the mandate of the Roman people or on those kinds of representatives elected by people (*auctoritate Romanorum vel electorum*). Therefore, the people can take power back from the pope and hand it over to someone else or it can rule directly. Roman political institutions and offices, which the people have determined for themselves, remain outside the papal political power.[[588]](#footnote-588) Likewise, when the pope removes rulers from the throne, he does so from the title of the political power vested in him by the people, but not from his ecclesiastical power.[[589]](#footnote-589) The mandate to govern given to the human community since the creation of the world also answers the question whether the ruler is entitled to rule by the fact of merely gaining power. Ockham must solve Albert’s question whether the monarch is “*regnativus*” or “*regnabilis*” (ch. 6.2). If the mere use of power gave him full legitimacy, then the king would rule by himself or by divine mandate. The Magister rejects this variant in the dialogue in principle with reference to the natural right to rule, which pertains to all people. For example, in the case of the Roman Empire, this original power belongs to the Roman people.

“The ruler determines the exercise of power only with the consent of the Roman people (*auctoritate populi Romani*). (…) Therefore, the state does not come from the papal power. *Student*. But they claim that the Roman Empire is given not by the will of the Roman people, but thanks to the exercise of power made by the ruler. *Master*. Then it must be said that the exercise of power is determined by the ruler only with the consent of the Roman people (*exercitus non facit imperatorem nisi auctoritate populi Romani*).” [[590]](#footnote-590)

The legitimacy of the ruler does not derive from the mere exercise of power (*exercitus non facit imperatorem*). The example of Roman *res publica* shows that the delegation of power and the manadat to rule are transferred to the ruler solely by the Roman people (*auctoritate populi Romani*). Secular power does not come from the pope, whose authority is established in a different way (*imperium non est a papa*). The student tries in vain to refute this decision with references to various historical circumstances and to papal decrees, including the *Constantine donation*, which at that time was perceived as a legitimate document. The master’s answer is clear. Neither the ruler nor the pope can give that what does not belong to them, because only the authority of the people authorizes to exercise the power. The conclusion of the whole discussion about the source of political power is quite unambiguous: “*Ergo a populo est imperium*” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 2, cap. 27; p. 106.9). Ockham responds to followers of the papal primate that the rulers receive power solely from the people, because it has the natural right to political power, and no one else. The papal coronation or anointing of the ruler cannot add anything to the act of the sovereign transfer of political power given by the act of the valid election of the ruler, nor can it cancel it.[[591]](#footnote-591) The denial of the unitary claims of the bull *Unam Sanctam* or of pious monastic falsifications such as the *Donation of Constantine* is based on the political sovereignty of the people, which is inalienable and forms the natural right of man given by God.

At the same time as Dante’s *Monarchia*, Ockham rejected all classical biblical exegeses that support the papal claim to political power. For example, the metaphor about the ruler, who shines like the Moon through the reflection of the light from the pope as the Sun, or the theory of the two swords, which legitimizes the spiritual supremacy over the secular. The translation of political power from the emperor to the pope cannot be carried out, because the secular and the spiritual power differ from each other in fundamental ways. If the pope rules as a secular ruler, it is done only on the basis of the people’s mandate. The spiritual *auctoritas* and the secular *potestas* are two generically different forms of power, because the rationality and causality of each other is of a different nature. Ockham distinguishes two modes of cognition made out by twofold extension of the theoretical intellect. Following *Second Analytics*, the deduction based on specific causality cannot be transferred from one genre to another. Ockham based power on the sovereignty of the people and therefore rejected any transfer of political power that had a different genus. The pope cannot delegate to the sovereign a power which he himself does not possess. And the reason is even twofold, because even the sovereign does not possess this power by himself, but by virtue of the mandate to rule which he has received from the sovereign people. Ockham thus theoretically settled all cases of disputes between the pope and temporal rulers, such as the sovereign of France.[[592]](#footnote-592) The state existed long before the era of the New Testament, and God did not hand over political power to Peter or his followers. Ockham realistically states that the Roman Empire arose with the power of the sword, subjugated the rest of the peoples by force and, consequently, can be extinguished by the same violence.[[593]](#footnote-593) The question of coercive power proves that the empire and the papacy do not have the same form of power. A theocracy is also not possible in Christianity. The power of the Church was given to the New Testament priesthood chosen by God. Such mandate is not hereditary as was the case with Aaron’s priesthood in the Old Testament. The papal power has no political coercive power, either out of itself or out of the Church Council, because the form of its power is different.

Therefore, Ockham defends the claim of the pope, who, by a divine mandate, keeps absolute and sovereign authority over the Christian people from the title of a protector of the faith. This task was handed over directly to Peter and his followers and forms part of their inalienable spiritual authority over the entire Christian people.[[594]](#footnote-594) Peter and his followers form that rock on which, according to the *Gospel of Matthew*, the authority of the Church was established (Mt 16:18). The Church Council made of the entire Christian people does not have such authority, because Peter received from God the commission to lead the Church directly, without the delegation of the council or the communion of apostles. The Christian people can recall a heretic pope by the Council, or the Christian ruler can do this in the name of the Christian people. Marsilius of Padua seized the authority of the pope in the model of the political mandate to rule; he conferred the sovereignty of the coercive power (*vis coactiva*) on the Christian people and the ecclesiastical council. Ockham gave the ecclesiastical “*plenitudo potestatis*” exclusively and directly to the pope, and therefore rejected Marsilius’s conciliarism. Ockham argues against Marsilius on behalf of the direct transfer of power to Peter and his followers. The reason relates again to *Second Analytics*. Marsilius made an error in the generic definition of practical rationality, which was erroneously applied to the completely different nature of papal power. The causality of papal power is given by the transfer of power from God to the pope, and not from God to the council, and then to the pope. In fact, the mandate given by God to the pope that enabled him to act has the same nature of *lex divina* (but not the same genus) as the mandate given by God to all humanity that received the right to rule the Earth. Now it is evident why Ockham fundamentally and unequivocally rejected the figure of conciliarism that Marsilius elaborated in his work *Defensor Pacis* (1324). According to Ockham, the power of the Christian people is subordinated to the papal sovereignty given by God (Lagarde 1937, 431–43). The reason for the rejection of conciliarism is at hand. This theory belongs to the generic sphere of political rationality, where the society of free citizens as a sovereign *causa sui* entrusts the ruler with the exercise of power. Political power passes from God to all mankind and further to the concrete people. The political community, according to its sovereign decision, transfers its inalienable power to the ruler, or it retains it and can rule in any other way. In politics, the conciliarist view applies, because the source of power is in the assembly of the people itself. The mandate of the power that has the pope belongs to the generically different sphere. It is the power of ecclesiastical authority, where the model of *causa sui* belongs to God and then directly to the pope. Due to different nature of papal *causa sui* is evident, on the other hand, that political power by the very nature of the matter, does not belong to the papacy. Peter did not receive any political power from Christ, among other things because Jesus renounced the exercise of a political coercive power in his earthly life.[[595]](#footnote-595) The pope has no direct political claim to power. The pope has no direct political claim to power. Marsilius claimed the same, but his theory was based on a false foundation as far as the genus of both types of power was concerned. His unified theory of ecclesiastical and secular power was in fact of the same kind as the bula *Unam Sanctam*, but the order of precedence was just reversed. Ockham made it clear that the Christian people had no right to supreme spiritual power, because its *causa sui* was given to the pope as ecclesiastical authority directly by God as *lex divina*. Since both types of power are different as ti their genus and from the point of view of causality, the Church Council has no ecclesiastical power over the pope, and the pope has no political power over the rulers. Ecclesiastical power is not founded on the same principle as is the case with the political community. The source of the key papal power to bind and untie lies directly with God, and the transfer of this power is carried out in a sacramental way to Peter and his followers. No community of Christians or a Council can neither delegate nor withdraw this divine commission from the pope. According to Ockham, the community of Christians has no papal power, because neither the Christian people nor the Council are a *causa sui* with regard to the papacy. An explicit criticism of Marsilius’s work *Defensor Pacis* can be found in the third part of the work *Dialogus* written after 1338. The theological part of Ockham′s critique of Marsilius analyses the papal primacy and rejects arguments about the superiority and infallibility of the General Council of the Church. The coercive power in matters of faith and morals is entrusted to Peter and his followers directly by God and outside the legal force of the Church Council. Marsilius created a unitarian theory that gave all power to the Church people. According to Ockham, Marsilius abolished the autonomy of the spiritual sphere coming directly from God as the original causality for the power of the pope. Ockham considers the translation of papal authority to the church council or the reverse process to be an evident heresy. The people of God or the Council of the Church have never had Peter’s power of keys; they cannot hand it over either. Similarly, the ruler did not and does not have power out of himself, since the natural right to rule belongs to the people. Theories of conciliarism mistakenly build on the political extension of the practical intellect; however, papal power belongs to the theological extension of the practical intellect. Both acts of practice are different in terms of genre, because they differ fro0m the point of view of the founding causality given as the original mandate of power. The brilliant criticism of Ockham rejected both the spiritual claims of the politically based conciliarism and the ecclesiastical claim to political power wrongly issued in the bull *Unam Sanctam*.

The brief digression into the nature of political and papal power showed that in the work *Dialogus* Ockham fully defended the basic line of Albert′s and Siger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s writing *Politics*. Ockham follows the same *ratio* of political theory introduced by Albert’s interpretation of Aristotle’s *Politics* that made the fundamental difference between the terms “*regnabilis*” and “*regnativus*.” The autonomy of political practice is due to the generic distinction between ecclesiastical and secular power as far their effective causality is generically different. Each kind of power has its own rationality and justification; both come from God as the ultimate source of all power. According to Albert’s political theory, if the pope exercises political power as an executive body under the designation “*regnativus,*” then he receives a mandate to rule given through the term “*regnabile*.” The ultimate source of this power is entirely in the hands of the people. Ockham specified this difference in an excellent manner to establish three layers of the hierarchically arranged architecture of reasoning: the nature of causality that generates the power; the legal mandate that gives the right to exercise that kind of power; the legitimacy of acting person that received that mandate through *translatio imperii*. First of all, there is the original source as the rule of God that established the specific nature of spiritual or secular power. Secondly, in the mode of legitimate mandate to rule, there is the act of valid or invalid administration of power, which in the case of spiritual power is delegated by God to the pope, or in the case of political rule to the totality of mankind. Thirdly, the legitimate or illegitimate act of the power thus transferred is analyzed within the framework of this or that concrete person of the pope or ruler. The executive act of power has its own mandatory legal force (*vis coactiva*), which the people can exercise politically and the pope spiritually. The rule of divine and human law is given in a different way each time. In the case of political power, this legitimacy goes from God to the human community as a natural law or as the supremacy of power, which the people can pass on to the ruler by delegation. The rule of divine law, on the other hand, is completely separate from political power, because its delegation from God goes directly to the pope. The final source of spiritual and secular law is God as the final cause. In the case of a heretical pope, the coercive function is assumed by the general council, the Christian people or the Christian ruler, who act in the name of the Christian people. However, the reason for this must be absolutely compelling when the exercise of the office is nullified due to the person of the pope in question. He is the *causa sui* as the pope, and not the Christian people. The people can depose the temporal ruler at any time, since the ruler has been granted power by the people. The whole theory of ecclesiastical and political practice has a clearly given Aristotelian character. The rationality is derived from the practical syllogism that establishes fundamentals of politics. The general law is universal, but the middle link of practical syllogism is that what matters. The effective cause is tied to the concrete and acting person in the mode of *tertium genus*. These are historically given rulers and popes. If the determination of power is given abstractly, then the specific universal instances (*humanity, Roman people, kingdom, papacy*) are defined in the mode of *quartum genus*. The act of secular or papal power is given in two ways; its autonomy is justified by the generic rationality that corresponds to the practical extension in question. Consequently, we are dealing with two different types of practical syllogism, which are based on the causality of the singular actions of this or that pope and emperor in the existential mode *tertium genus*. Both bearers of the generically different type of power are fallible and sinful and can be condemned *in extremis* for their actions and deposed either by the Council of the Church or by the political community. The rationality given in the mode of *quartum genus* determines the general ecclesiastical power of this singular pope, and the second rationality, in turn, the general secular power of this singular ruler. This completes the practical syllogism, since it has both the universal premisse *maior* and the particular premisse *minor* for the correct practical conclusion in matters of politics, faith and morals. This brilliant distinction made by the last representative of the first Averroism, both kinds of modern objectivists rejected it. Radical theocrat Aegidius defended the interests of the unitary papal power; radical conciliarist Marsilius defended the interests of the unitary power of people. Both zealots for an objectivist model of action in the mode of one univocal truth made the mistake of abolishing the causality of the free-acting person in the middle link of the practical syllogism. The person is given on the one hand, with regard to the *recta ratio* of spiritual authority and, on the other hand, with regard to the *recta ratio* of secular power. Ockham knew very well that the free person is a sovereign *causa sui*. The pope can also become a heretic, which for him was probably the pope John XXII. But papacy and empires are universal concepts, the ratio of which is given outside the acting persons. This distinction in the mode *tertium* and *quartum genus* had been introduced by Averroes in order to distinguish personal acts from general definitions.

The hermeneutics of political theory has shown that Ockham is also an authentic representative of the first Averroism on this point. Moreover, he was equipped with a real prudence. His judicial excommunication was forgotten, thanks to his universal mastery and diplomacy, which he used for the benefit of the German emperor and the local church clergy. His brilliant polemic with the victorious school of *Modernorum* opposed both the papal claim of omnipotence and Marsilius’s conciliarism. In the act of modern *damnatio memoriae*, this last representative of the first Averroism received the objective label of the so-called nominalist. This philosophical error definitely reveals the historical meaning of objectivity in its truth and untruth. The windmills of academic and ecclesiastical modernism were diligently turning for whole centuries; they produced so many sophisms that even the donquichotic attack of the last representative of the first Averroism could not stop them. After Ockham’s death, the meaning of the above-described gigantomachy between the first and second Averroism passes into objectively given Lethe. The historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of the first and second Averroism first became an obscure historicity (*Geschichte*) of philosophy and finally ended up as a positivist history of objective thought. The history led by academic Furies frenetically celebrates the victorious type of instrumental rationality of the West, which is based exclusively on philosophical errors and the animalistic instinct for self-preservation of the victorious elites. Gigantomachy about substance, interpreted according to Heidegger’s *a/lētheia*, is now definitely presented in the end of the philosophical struggles of the first and second Averroism. The hermeneutic archaeology revealed the whole of sense in the mode *de fine*. The thinking of *via Modernorum* passed through all studied matrices of objectivity. The investigation of newly created metaphysics made by Scotus and contested by Ockham concludes the donation of objectivity. The story starts in the Late antiquity and it passed through the Falsafa to the Latin West. Hermeneutic nature of this donation was shaped by the existentials interpreted as various forms of *dativus obiectivus*. Objectively, it is certainly true that the history is written by the winners and that is based on their ideological or authoritarian positions. The new form of metaphysics solved or annulled the disputes of the previous generation by the epochal abolition of both schools that defended the philosophical heritage of Averroes. After their decline, the dispute over the so-called Averroism became meaningless. The truth of this struggle was presented from the point of view of the transformations of Heidegger’s *alētheia* that gradually revealed the epochal errors of modernity tied to the eclipse of the first substance in metaphysics. In ethics and politics, the free-acting person was damned as well. The nihilistic course of metaphysics was interpreted as a hidden event of Being itself (*Ereignis*) that presented the interpreted epochs and matrices of thinking through the modified forms of metaphysical being. The fateful turn of Aristotelian being, the meaning of which was completely forgotten by the eclipse of the first substance (ἐποχή), is given by the turn of metaphysics to the objective form of being. The objective wandering of the subsequent epochs of modernism and postmodernism creates a new form of the history of thought, which is bound in a nihilistic manner (*Irre*) to gigantomachy between the first and the second Averroism. After the historically victorious entry of modernity, any special science can explore the objective realm of *tertium ens*. The objective truth about man and the world, manifested in the mode of subjective certainty and evidence, can be sought through analytical philosophy, cognitively conceived neuroscience, or the mimetic-culturally given evolutionary potential of DNA. The special sciences no longer need to know anything (*nihil*) about the essential determination of objectivity, because they are as proficient in the objective determination of being as a fish in water.

Franciscan conception of the sovereign, intimate and demiurgic will opened the secularization of the West and became the spiritual basis of Calvinist capitalism. Bonaventura’s mystical-erotic appetite for matter met the hypostatized appetite of Olivi’s intimate demiurgic will. The objectification of *Song of Songs* had great success in capitalist mythology, because it created the ideology of the new crusade. Olivi became one of the first intellectual victims from the ranks of *Modernorum*. He was sacrificed on the altar of modernism, thereby following the fate of anti-modern Siger of Brabant, who had been his real teacher. Franciscans destroyed Olivi’s well-visited tomb in Narbonne in 1318. Under the influence of religiously obsessed Furies, they devastated the grave of the founder of Western nihilism, not knowing what they were actually doing. Olivi was rightly revered as a benefactor and a mystic, and it was in this twofold spirit of Christian mysticism and philosophical nihilism that he also founded capitalism. From the modern carrier (*subiectum*) of the absolutely given will arose the reformatory subject of redemption and condemnation, and subsequently also the secular subject of capitalism. This historical development conceals the final answer to the question of the desired form of *dativus finalis*. The modern will based on the conception of truth as *rectitudo* acquired a redeeming character. Avicennian modern God made out as *Dator formarum* became effectively dead in the philosophy of Scotus, leaving behind him a rational ontotheological structure. Martin Luther, an Augustinian monk, introduced the basic themes of modernists into postmodern theology. The substantially divided human being is united through the will and through an external form of redemption. Luther linked the two key problems of the *Modernorum*, i.e., the certainty and the fullness of truth, by establishing a new theological subject of the West. The divine *rectitudo* of salvation meets the human *certitudo* of sin. Their union is given by the personal act of faith; the will of the sinner is enlightened by God. Justification proceeds thanks to the sovereign act of divine selection (*sola gratia*) and is accepted thanks to the act of the sinner’s personal will and faith (*sola fide*). Luther interpreted the mystery of salvation according to the *Epistle to the Romans* (*iustus ex fide vivit*, Rom 1:17). The illumination of the sinner comes from the outside, through the undeserved divine grace. The necessary *certitudo* of divine salvation is ensured to the sinner by the transition from the worldly floor of the rejected existence to the redeemed level of divine action. The right to this existential transition is secured by Christ’s redemptive sacrifice. There is no mediator between the sinner and God. The reformation placed the personal act of faith outside the mediation of the Catholic Church, a thoroughly modern gesture. The second Averroism positioned cognition outside the correspondence of the senses and outside Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis*; Olivi gave substantial free will outside the practical intellect. This provides the final answer to the question of how the demiurgic will created *Weltanschauung* of postmodernity within the Reformed theological view that concerns the totality of being (*dativus modi*). The subject of reformation created in the epoch of postmodernity replaced the original Catholic subject determined through the Avicennism of modernity. In the Reformation, the thesis “*operatio sequitur esse*” holds true with respect to justified existence. Protestantism completed the metaphysical nihilism of the second Averroism by giving it a redemptive character. Capitalist “*operatio*” follows the act of divine redemption, which radically changes the everyday life and existence of the former sinner. The activity of the capitalist subject necessarily leads to the subjective certainty of salvation (*certitudo*) at the end of life. Sovereign God grants the salvation by his redemptive justice (*rectitudo*). The moral accumulation of wealth generates a capital that makes the truth as *certitudo*. The subjective faith generated by capital and deeds relies on the redemptive divine *rectitudo* in the name of fully subjective right based on the reformed modernity. The postmodern subject thus secured for himself the humanly possible right to divine justification according to the ethics of early capitalism. With this historically fully given capitalism, the postmodernism has completed the historiality of the modernity. At the beginning of modernism, the idea of purgatory arose in a similar way to secure the right to eternal self-preservation of merchants (OBJ II, ch. 1.6). This gives the final answer to the further existential dative, which determines how the objectively defined being has become an instrument of modern scientific technology (*dativus instrumenti*). Scientific and technical instrumental rationality became the only secular instrument of salvation after the death of modern God. Luther’s Reformation completed Bonaventura’s spiritual path given in the work *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*. The fully capitalist subject founded by Calvin gained a definite assurance of salvation by combining the two floors of Bonaventure’s “*regula agentis in/creati*”on the secular level. Max Weber described the free subject of the West founding Calvinist capitalism. That subject actualized the original vision of the second averroism in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. Postmodernity received a new itinerary of redemption based on all kinds of capital.

After Marx’s groundbreaking work, “*das Kapital*” became a new God, because the modern God was already dead. That is why all postmodern roads no longer lead to Rome, but to Wall Street. Witty Muses staged a new round of divine comedy. The schizophrenic “White man” has become the new savior of humanity, incessantly dragging his burden in the Golgotha called the City of London. Kipling as the postmodern Homer of Anglo-Saxon imperialism celebrated this new Messiah (“Take up the White Man’s burden”; OBJ II, ch. 3.5). The poetic justice of imperialist capitalism is guided by demonic Furies. It is hidden under the objective ideological mask (πρόσωπον, *persona*) of the “man—corpse.” It offers a sad answer to the question of how the objectively defined *tertium ens* became an instrument of modern science and technology (*dativus instrumenti*). The intimately free and irrational will is now fully engaged in the mode of capitalist production and imperialist conquest of the world. The world has become the secondary and accidental aspect of the free will, today given almost globally. Olivi created a capitalist version of the objectively determined “third world,” from which the contemporary Third World emerged. This version of the Neoplatonic simulacrum was originally given in Jamblichus’s diacosmos and in the Islamic Falsafa. In the era of postmodernism, the Christian purgatory became an economic concept. The contemporary Third World symbolizes all the misery of thinking and deeds of Western objectivity based on labor camps from the 19th to the 21st century. Their final transformation, in the age of nihilism, completes the modern definition of man as a specific corpse, conceived in the mode of instrumental rationality, which became a new kind of “*totum virtuale*.” The new subject is given by the formal definition of the power given *ex nihilo*, because it represents a being of the third kind, which is defined as a Porretan concrete individual. This remarkable collection of objectively defined substances holds together through the self-preservation power of the demiurgic will, given as “*conatus*” of Spinoza. The actualized neoliberal round of this redemptive nihilism was started by the one-sided interpretation of Friedrich Hayek of the “invisible hand” given in the only sentence made by Adam Smith. This economic moralist and practically thinking Scotsman addressed the economic “*appetitus*” of the capitalist subject within the framework of moral philosophy (*The Wealth of Nations*, 1776). The economic morality of Adam Smith, which was the foundation of capitalism, was replaced in the epoch of complete neoliberalism by the financial derivatives, which dominate the fictitious debt, which is growing exponentially through compound interest. This also provides the answer to the question of how objectively conceived knowledge destroys man in the world wars through objectivism, instrumental rationality, the nihilism of technology, as well as through the vulgar economism of contemporary corporate fascism (*dativus ethicus*). The metaphysics of the substantial will, founded by Bonaventura and Olivi directed thinking along the path of Western metaphysical nihilism. The epoch of contemporary technoscience completes the paranoid greed of the crusades led by the first modernists. Its actualized stage is guided by global corporations and the ideology of vulgar neoliberalism. This new nihilistic product, according to Marx’s aphorism, became the new opium of culturally degraded middle class. The working class already ended up as “*animal laborans*” described by Arendt; it will be replaced by robots and artificial intelligence in the next round of post-capitalist production. This nihilistic “*universitas humana*” is heading towards another global war. The ruling class of new *illuminati* uses the collectively given instrumental rationality as a fundamental instrument (*dativus instrumenti*). Then, in the act of objective and global *Mobilmachung*, the “human resources” will be demanded to sacrifice their life. It will be done in the name of future and therefore as yet really non-existent peace. After the use of the right technical means, future peace must come to conquered Earth with the same logic of necessity as the future Antichrist should come in Grosseteste’s time.

# 7. Objective Oedipus Complex

The thousand-year dispute of metaphysics, determined by Plato or Aristotle, can be illustrated with an interesting example. The geological formation of Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands or Yellowstone Park on Snake River were formed due to the fact that under the terrestrial, about 100 km thick solid layer (lithosphere) at a depth of about 400 km there is a magma hearth, which is fed with the heat coming from the outer core of the Earth (so-called hotspot). The magma hearth does not change its position over millions of years. Only the upper layer of Earth′s plates shifts, in that case the Pacific or North American lithospheric plate. The stable magma hearth in the Earth’s core causes mobile outer plates to melt in ever new points of contact. At that place, it forms an upper caldera placed only a few kilometers below the surface. The upper chamber of the supervolcano periodically erupts due to the overpressure of the lower hearth after hundreds of thousands of years, forming either new islands or a huge crater as in the Yellowstone Park District. Hermeneutics do not study the geological layers of the supervolcano, but the slow motion of philosophical thought, the resulting product of which is an objective vision of the world and corresponding scientific cognition. The matrices of objectivity have shown that hidden gigantomachy between Plato and Aristotle is repeated over and over again over the course of millennia. The original event concerning Plato’s and Aristotle’s gigantomachy of substance glows deep in Lethe of Being; from there, new configurations of the sense of being have been constantly emerging. Generations and centuries passed; geniuses established new eruptions of thought that form the Western metaphysics and its dynamic landscape. The archaic dative of mysteries became the principal dative of the first philosophy; then, it changed into the metaphysical dative and finally it has become the objective dative. The archaeology of the Apollonian and musical truth as un-concealment (*a/lētheia*) shows how the thinking in the metaphysics responded to the challenge of the being as a substance. The first gigantomachy of substance between the Academy and the Lyceum took place in the Late Antiquity; it passed to the Falsafa; then, to the early Scholasticism. The last series of philosophical disputes about the determination of substance took place in the thirteenth century and created the contemporary form of objectivity.

The interpretation of six matrices established the set of events of previous eruptions (*Ereignis*) in the triad of historiality, historicity and history. Each time there was a new donation of metaphysical being, until the present stage of metaphysical nihilism has been reached. The introductory sentence of reflection claimed that the hermeneutic study of objectivity should not be objective, but true, because only in this way is it wise. The present work set itself the task of carrying out an impartial investigation of great struggles of hitherto unknown gigantomachy of substance led by followers of the first and second Averroism. The matrices of objectivity described the individual battles and their actors, following the well-known example of Herodotus’s work *Histories*. The sense of objectivity was presented in the mode of archaic exploration (ἱστορία). Herodotus and hermeneutics followed the signs given by the Apollonian semantics of Delphi and made their interpretation. In the same way, Herodotus created the first history, and Socrates created the love of wisdom. The hermeneutics of objectivity created the totality of knowledge in the mode of Herodotus’s archaic *demonstratio* (ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις, *Hist*. 1.p.1). The Father of history gave a never-ending task to defenders of the apodictic interpretation of the past. The hermeneutic triangle makes sense of human actions that creates the whole of epochs (τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων). The task of apodictic exploration is evident, since it is twofold: to see what really happened and to judge it according to *alētheia* of Muses. First, that most important sense of human historiality and historicity must not be buried by the passage of time chronos (τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, ibid). Second, that the most important actors must not be deprived of the just part of imperishable glory of mortals (ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, *Hist*. 1.p.4). In apodictic research, following the example of Herodotus, described the immortal deeds of Platonists and Aristotelians, so that none of them lost their deserved part of immortal glory. By describing the archaic scheme of tragic guilt (*manía*), Herodotus followed the power of hubris and pleonexia, which were in progress at the very beginning of the Greco-Persian Wars. Following the example of Pythian oracles, his writing apodictically interpreted the archaic dispute between the Medes and the Persians, which exerted a decisive influence on the history of the Greco-Persian Wars. Hermeneutics, with the help of the reconciled Furies (Aeschylus’s *Eumenidae*), ensured the immortality of human thought (κλέος, *gloria*). The accusation (*kategoría*) of the philosophical gigantomachy and the categorical unconcealment of this dispute (*alētheia*) were accomplished in the congregation of wise mortals on the hermeneutic agora. Lovers of Western wisdom follow the path of the first philosophy that ended tragically through Socrates’s search for the Apollonian truth. The concept of the wise and therefore tragic exploration of the so-called objectivity had not yet existed in a dramatic narration of that hereditary sin. In the introduction of the first part, hermeneutics interpreted the original *hýbris* and *manía* of modernism in an apodictic way. Plato’s allegory of the cave analyzed in the introduction of the work, created a tragic form of guilt, which has been passed on from one generation of academics to another in the form of ideal madness of thought. In times after Plato, academics can live in the cave without reality; however, certainly not without ideas. Gigantomachy began at the Aristotelian Lyceum, when the Platonic world of ideas was condemned as a non-existent parallel world of manic academic mind. The study of this philosophical tragedy, and later also tragicomedy, found the original form of the archaic and metaphysical *Lichtung*, from where the objectivity entered the history of Western thought through the gigantomachy of the first and second Averroism. Hermeneutics outlined the philosophical narrative (μῦθος) that concerns the history of both now extinct schools. According to Herodotus we had to find the complex system of hidden causality that caused that kind of gigantomachy. The root cause of this polemic was the irreconcilable nature of the truth and untruth of metaphysics. It was the reason why the representatives of Aristotelianism and *Modernorum* fought against each other (δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι, *Hist*. 1.p.5). The causality of Aristotelianism is fundamentally different from the causality of modernity; it was the cause of the last gigantomachy of substance so far. Dating to Homer’s time, the rhapsodic immortality inserted in the history of thought requires that every participant in that kind of Trojan War for the substance, since he should receive a deserved share of immortal glory. The distinction of the share of immortality given by evil and also good deeds (κρίσις) is determined by the living philosophical community. Their wise representatives preserve the meaning of this gigantomachy for today in freely exercised *scholé*. The commencement of hermeneutics given in the mysteries (*Anfang*) makes it possible to investigate the beginning of metaphysics (*Beginn*). This twofold rule (ἀρχή) of archaic thinking obliges the present archaeology of objectivity to engage in the dispute of two forms of metaphysics. The struggle for the historical form of truth means that the responsive thinking of hermeneutics (Heidegger′s *Andenken*) remains alert to effects of Being. The wise man is looking for what the history of thinking is really about and what is just a game of simulacra led by academically educated Furies. Thanks to this critical exegesis of the original form of philosophy, hermeneutic archaeology became a component of timeless gigantomachy that concerns the very nature of the truth. One of these battles of the philosophical Trojan War is also the deceptive maneuver of metaphysics founded by Plato, who summed up the whole truth of gigantomachy in the concept of the ideal substance. We have analyzed this untrue synecdoche in the mode “*pars pro toto*” in the incorrectly given *modus ponens* of modern logic and objectivity. The interpretation following the hidden effect of Apollonian semantics fought alongside these true thinkers, who lost the gigantomachy. In the course of positive history made by *dativus obiectivus*, the objective form of substance has won the battle. But from the point of view of the original form of truth, the real winners have the right to a full measure of humanly possible immortality. Taken in the tragic mode of reversal to the contrary, zheir loss shows the actual struggle of philosophy for Apollonian and Socratic form of truth.

The present version of apodictic research is methodically inspired by the nature of history that was coined by French historian Michel de Certeau. The French historian Jules Michelet (†1874) wrote in the introduction to the work *Histoire de France*that the dead, whom he raised to historical existence, return to their graves to be less sad. In contrast to Pythias, seers and necromancers, the historian performs a special kind of necromancy; he brings to life the dead actors of long-gone disputes as well as abstractions such as “France” or “people.” He lets these abstractions and dead persons speak through history and give them the conceptual form of existence in the world of living people (Certeau 1975, 47–53). The hermeneutic necromancy interpreted the struggles between the first and second Averroism in such a way that it awakened the more or less famous actors of the long-past disputes about metaphysical meaning of being. We brought them from the realm of shadows to historical existence. The hermeneutics of objectivity created the musical history of modernity by swapping the order of the victors and the vanquished according to the biblical proverb about the last, which will be the first: Muhammad Ibn Rushd, Pierre Abelard, William of Auvergne, Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, Dante Alighieri, William Ockham. The basic truthfulness and justice in the sense of the philosophical *alētheia* we owe above all to Averroes and his authentic Latin successors from the school of the first Averroism. Their work has been revealed in a new form. Through this exorcism, archaic hermeneutics allowed the original timeless power of historical memory (Mnemosyne) to speak in our presence. The exegesis of matrices done within the framework of hermeneutic interpretation showed various manners through which the meaning of Being entered the history of thought. It was done through philosophical disputes connected with the gigantomachy of substance. Again, the initial thesis applies that the hermeneutic view of the past is not objectively true, but in a manner of the Apollonian truth. On their journeys into the realm of the past, the present and the future, the seers and shamans got to know effects of that truth; they brought the semantics of the power of memory to wise and unwise contemporaries (*Iliad* 1.70). Archaic hermeneutics descended into the realm of the dead and followed the Parmenidian signs that show the path of Apollonian understanding that is very ambiguous (πλακτὸν νόον; DK 28, B 6.13). This complicated journey followed the traces of historicity in the mode of Lichtung of the truth and the untruth. The truth of Muses is hidden in the ambiguous signs given for the wise thinker that investigate the realm of two-headed people (δίκρανοι, B 6.12). The interpretation of the shadow world of objectivity once again returned to the real philosophy through the Gate of Day and Night (B 1.34). Odysseus, Parmenides and even the metaphysical Aristotle followed the path of the real astronomical Sun. After the completed run through the shadow world of objectivity, hermeneutics can tell the whole story of gigantomachy according to *alētheia* of Muses. We are obliged to do so under threat of punishment coming from the hands of goddess Dike. This inventive and punishing divine power (Δίκη πολύποινος, B 1.37) guards the truth of the cosmos and its eternal order to pass through the Gates of Day and Night. The Sun goes in one direction only; such is the form of divine justice.

The interpretation has shown how increased blindness to the nature of the first and the second substance. Modernity started in the primary abandonment of Being in the first metaphysics (*Seinsverlassenheit*) to the oblivion of being of the real substance in the modern metaphysics (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The substance is no longer stated *per prius* in the original, hyparchical mode according to the writing *Categories* and *Second Analytics*. Aristotle took the sensual perception of the real substance and as the founding event of metaphysical being (τό τί ἦν εἶναι) and he created the first version of the metaphysical dative. The second substance stated in a categoric manner establishes the meaning of being with regard to the real existence of the first substance that exists here and now (τόδε τι). The first substance possesses original being in virtue of *dativus possessivus*. The causality of the first substance acts in scientific proof due to the principle “*ex inmediatis.*” The proof scientifically states the secondary recognition given in the universal mode and therefore given only in mind. Modernity transformed the Aristotelian *dativus possessivus* given in the hyparchical mode into the subjective *dativus auctoris* given in the mode “*absolute*.” The subject replaced the categorical sense derived from the first substance by its own authority (*dativus* *auctoris*). Plato and his students became the founders (*auctores*) of academic mythology given as a kind of ideological worldview. The Neoplatonic worldview taken out of the Platonic cave replaced classical Aristotelianism. Under the leadership of academically trained Furies, modernism produced a new form of parousia, since meaning of being is revealed beyond first substances. Authoritarian modernity no longer has to worry about the first real substance after the creation of the academic Rome given by the murder of Socrates being a new Remus. Every academic, like Romulus, correctly argues due to his academic power that the truth given by the twelve birds is objectively truer than Remus’s original and first seeing of only six birds. The progress given on the basis of the twelve birds is an undeniable human *factum* ; it erased the divine sign given by only six birds. Socrates′s search for Pythian truth has been forgotten. After the extinction of archaic wisdom, only objective knowledge of the essence defined by subjective “seeing” is sufficient for modern academics. Hermeneutic research follows the eschalogical character of investigation given *de fine*, but through the circular path of the Sun. We observe the “victorious” truth of the now destroyed ancient Rome and the deficit of contemporary thought from a hidden archaic commencement. Therefore, hermeneutics, taking the path of the Sun to follow cunning Odysseus, have not been stopped by the singing of sirens and by false signs of academic Furies that are under Dike’s rule anyway. According to Parmenides philosophy, the wrong interpretation remains in the realm of simulacra and goes aimlessly back and forth (παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος, B 1.16). The postmodern troglodytes no longer leave the cave, in which they have become completely at home. The troglodytes decorated the familiar environment of the cave full of digital, mathematically determined treasures illuminated by artificial light of made out of metaphorical mind supported by computer simulations. Manic philosophy, built on metaphysical nihilism, has become the handmaid of digital knowledge. Guided by the solar intellect, objective mythology secures for modernity the virtual odyssey of thought within the framework of absolute speculation that is made by thought experiments proposed *ad hoc*. Postmodern *illuminati* transformed gigantomachy of substance first into a divine comedy of modernity and today only into a postmodern cabaret. The first Dadaist cabaret named Voltaire was founded in Zurich in 1916. Muses brought together the poets such as Tristan Tzara and the revolutionaries as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. This Russian Marxist and visionary of real history edited in the municipal library (let us remind of ancient *Musaion* in Alexandria) his main work *Imperialism as the highest stage of Capitalism* (1916). The combination of Dadaism, revolutionary Marxism and the first World War is no coincidence. By combining the twofold revolutionary poetics, the last stage of tragicomic comedy of the 20th and 21st centuries began under the leadership of belligerent Furies.

The hermeneutic exploration of objectivity is based on the ambivalence of the Greek verb “to see” and “to know.” Wise people truly recognize those phenomena that appear in their true form. Writers of Greek tragedy were active before the emergence of metaphysics; they knew the mysteries and respected the power of oracles. The first form of modernity was born before their eyes. They were horrified of stupidity that made a dominant characteristic of that new tyrannical class. Sophocles′s tragedy *Oedipus Tyrannus* was staged around 430 BC. The climax of the tragedy describes the meeting between Oedipus and Tiresias in the royal palace. Tiresias points out to Oedipus that he does not have to look for Laios’s murderer in a complicated manner; it is enough to have a meeting with himself (v. 362). This verse contains in nuce the tragedy of modernity; the blind contemporaries meet each other in the objective mode of knowledge and do not make the real sense of it. The objectively omniscient tyrant throws the blind seer out the palace of Thebes. That deed sealed his fate and the fate of modernity as well. The tyrant sees objectively everything, but he knows nothing important; the clairvoyant sees nothing, but knows everything important. The inventive and courageous tyrant acts in the name of his superior knowledge and skill (τέχνη τέχνης ὑπερφέρουσα, v. 380–81). The tragedy knows well that the actions of this blinded objectivist and the first modern technocrat are of his own that this tyrant is the author of his own destiny. When Oedipus blinds himself out of grief, the choir clearly states that he committed all evil out of himself and by no means outside of himself (κακὰ ἑκόντα κοὐκ ἄκοντα); he is responsible for the evil caused by his own actions and his own intentions (αὐθαίρετοι, vv. 1229‒31). Oedipus makes the archetype of a tragic modernist. He rejected the warning of the blind seer Tiresias, who has insight into his fate. The connoisseurs of this tragedy have well noticed that the main theme is Oedipus’s inability to recognize himself and thus fulfill the main commandment (“Know thyself!”) coming from Delphi (Lefèvre 1987, Schmitt 1988). Oedipus’s tragedy offers an important historical meaning for hermeneutics. Archaic Furies received for the first time in the history an academic education. At this time, the school of young Platonic modernists began to teach in Athens. They hidden themselves sophistically under Socrates’s search for wisdom. The modern Oedipus was the technician of power and he saw the world through the glasses of metaphysics. But what he should have to see were the signs given by the divine order. In this objective blindness founded on knowledge of a Theban technocrat, the fate of modern tragic existence is hidden. After solving the riddle of the Sphinx, the king of Thebes objectively knows what is human being; he does not see how he personally lives. Because of Oedipus’s stupidity and because of his hubris, the plague broke out in Thebes, which has now been replaced by global destruction of biosphere. The irony of Muses can be seen in the changed titel of the drama, since the contemporary sophists changed the “tyran” into the “king”. Also, the tyranny became the king of modern age. From Sophocles to Euripides, the tragic writers correctly saw and diagnosed the tragic blindness concerning their oligarchic contemporaries, the first Sophists and the school of young Platonists. The expulsion of the seer from the palace carried out by a brilliant and almost divine technician of power and knowledge, shows the founding event of the modern castration of archaic truth. Plato was the first metaphysician to carry it out. The modern antihero Oedipus plays a similar role in the drama of modernity as Gilgamesh in the original wise myth, which comments on the true position of mortal beings. But unlike Gilgamesh, modern man is unable to find the truth of mortal existence. The blinded Oedipus became wise and realized the tragic truth of his existential wandering (*Irre*). At the moment when the tyrant knows the whole truth about his life, he blinds himself. He knows everything essential about his destiny and does not need to know anything else.

The last writers of Greek tragedy in Athens correctly saw and identified the place of contemporary knowledge (*ortus scientiarum*) in the then-emerging metaphysics of Plato and his school. They decribed truly tyrannical and tragic features of this technical form of the “first philosophy.” The interpretation of the Western gigantomachy of substance is based on Pythian reading of this objective Oedipus complex. The tragic blindness of modernity can be explained according to the saying of Heraclitus that was interpreted in the introduction of the essay: “Character — to man — a demon” (ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων; DK 22, B 119). This saying referrs to the emergence of modernity and it must be read from both sides, that is, as truthfully as Apollo’s sayings given by the Delphic oracle. Hermeneutics relates Heraclitus’s statement to the demonic character of being determined by objective Avicennist and Cartesian “*cogito ergo sum*.” The tragedy of modernism must be taken *de fine*. The postmodern blindness of reality is definitively given in of Cartesianism and it can summed up in the following sentence: “*cogito ergo aspecto*.” This statement sums up the sense of the whole essay; it represents an oracle given in the form of truth as *a/lētheia* of Muses. Therefore, we must read it in the manner of archaic hermeneutics, that is, from both sides. The tragic reading is modern, based on the exposure of being made from behind. The thinking does not go to the reality of first substances, but to the intuition of the objective meaning that exists only in thinking and in the demiurgic will (*aspectus* of Olivi). This dogmatically and authoritatively taken aspect of being (Rufus’s *scibile*) establishes the blind vision of modernity. In place of the first substance directly seen in the first Averroism, modernity places the objective being of the third kind as the victorious idea of the West. The sophistic interpretation of *Second Analytics* started the eclipse of the first substance. The metaphysical difference between the presentative “seeing” and the perfective “knowing” turned the metaphysics into the dark abyss (χάος) of blind academic ignorance (ἀπαιδευσία, *docta ignorantia*). The authors of Greek tragedy took such kind of knowledge rightly for demonic kind of understanding. Apollo, Dike and Furies dwell together in this original darkness of the commencement. The uncritical thinking of modernism, which has fallen into the abyss of objective Oedipus complex, does not pay attention to Apollonian signs. It does not follow the path of the hidden Sun that even in the realm of the dead wanders only in one direction. The confused path of the modern two-headed people wandering in the ideological and mythological realm of modern idols caused a tragic, and later also tragicomic blindness of thinking. The last-mentioned act of the divine comedy was taken care of by the scholastic and postmodern version of the objective Oedipus complex, which is given as a neurotic complex described by Freud (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). The chaotic cognition of todays metaphysics and deconstruction exposes the meaning of being from behind, from the direction of potential intellectual forms and not from the direction of actualized first substances. Objectivity was set up in this perplexes way of thinking (παλίντροπός κέλευθος, *perversio*). The thinking responds to hidden historicity revealed by oracles of Dephi in a tragic, that is in a demonic manner. Like this started the epoch of the eclipse of the first substance, given in the line of Plato, Avicenna and Rufus. The Oedipus complex produced by the objective form of metaphysics that sees neither the identity of the first substance, nor the ipseity of the person, nor the right path to God. The paranoia of the present intellect lies in the fact that it is absolutely logical and therefore absolutely correct. This blind intellect is not objectively able to distinguish the meaning of being in the metaphysical abstraction, which gives the inviolability of being as a true correspondence of wise thinking and the real thing. Modern paranoia has led us to the last times (*novissimum*) of blind academic know-it-all. The modern *illuminati* are blinded by the light of their own knowledge. They produce that light by themselves through objective forms that make signs on the chaotic path of their solar intellect. Hermeneutic archaeology therefore searches for the hidden origin of these objective and speculative simulacra, which determines the nihilistic present in the mode of the hidden commencement (ἀρχή). The ideological tyranny of modernity and postmodernity is given by the objective version of the Oedipus complex. It symbolizes the concealment of the being in a logical manner, also in a completely tragicomic way. Veritative and positive seeing are so sure of itself in the act of narcissistic and speculative self-portrayal that it does not need to see how the first real substance and the real person are adequately revealed for thinking.

The blind objectivity of the West, following the example of the blinded tyrant of Thebes, embarked on the path of thought called *via Modernorum*. The wise blind man became the traveller; he left Thebes to take the path of epochal wandering. Modern age followed him, being blind as well and unfortunately unwise, since we took the path of metaphysical lunacy (*Irre*). The wise man, following the pattern of Homer’s archaic witness (ἴστωρ), first saw important events and then “historically” testified to what he had seen (*Iliad* 23.486–87). The fool and the sophist do this in the sense inverse. They tragically convince themselves that what they mistakenly know, they also see in reality. The change in historicity, i.e., in the difference “seeing—knowing” produced the objective history of the West, which was created by the new subject. This subject took as his own the Oedipus complex, but not the wisdom of Oedipus. After the excommunication of the first Averroism, thinking is content with mere knowledge and ceased to see reality in its original depth of being. Archaic thought and Socrates as the wisest of all people, they claim that the knowledge of humans lies in the fullness of correct vision, and by no means in a kind of technocratic knowledge. Herodotus acknowledged exactly the unity of events given in the centuries-old conflict between the Greeks and the Persians. He followed the same kind of the truth that Pythias in Delphi had seen and proclaimed. Herodotus knew that Apollonian mystery in Delphi synoptically saw the unity of hidden events in the mode of Pythian un-concealment (*a/lētheia*). The first historian confirmed the fulfilled Delphic prophecies as historical proof of truth in the mode of *alétheia*. But now it was a new form of knowledge called “history” that apodictically verified these prophecies. Socrates did the same during his public ministry in Athens with regard to the famous oracle of Pythia, which proclaimed the truth as divine *alétheia* about his person. The tragedy of anti-historical modernity is based on the fact that objective knowledge does not have to see anything of the original archaic truth. Modernism, enthroned by the archaic tyrant Oedipus, does not want to meet its own face in order to know the nature of its own fate. The musical truth about the present epoch therefore got a tragic and finally a tragicomic character. The prophetic synoptic vision of Kalchas was written by Homer in the mode of what was, what is and what will be; it turned into the modern vision of the essence, which is constantly present in its objective parousia. Modern thinking does not respond to hidden invitation of Being; instead of it, modernists try to adapt the objective being to their paranoid and tragic image. The fate of blind fools always runs first in the mode of forgetting and repressing, as long as tragedy and catharsis do not come. The blindness of thought, given by the historical Lethe of the first Averroism, was replaced by subjective knowledge. Modernity follows its own signs given by objective meaning of being made in the mode of *rectitudo* and *certitudo*. This objective truth is upheld in the history of modern philosophy. Western thought unified itself with modernism in the Averroist mode of *copulatio*. Fertilized in this way, modernity gave birth to and then killed modern God. After the objective murder of God, we live in the epoch of the reign of the objectively blind Oedipus, who capitalizes his Napoleonic complex in a global and neoliberal manner.

The transformation of archaic vision into metaphysical knowledge founded a specific kind of metaphysical lunacy of the West (*Irre*). The transition from the principal dative of the first philosophy to the metaphysical dative caused the vision of the whole of *phūsis* to disappear completely, leaving but knowledge of the isolated idea or of the substance. The further epochal change finally caused the Aristotelian first substance to disappear by introducing the objective dative. The whole of the world acquired only a “subject—object” character. After the disappearance of archaic *phūsis*, the metaphysical primacy of the first substance disappeared from modern philosophy. Heidegger related the foundation of Western science and technology to the nihilistic form of metaphysics. Following Heidegger’s example, hermeneutics shows that the metaphysics of objective Oedipus complex observes the world as badly as the slaves of objectivity think it. The interpretation of *Second Analytics* has shown that the specific blindness of modernism and postmodernism created an erroneous representation of the world. The Aristotelian truth as a correspondence was changed into mythological representation of the objective truth. The new form of truth manifests itself in the subject’s thinking as evidence of his own certitude and rightness. The objective vision is not primarily determined by relation to reality, but in relation to the modern subject of cognition. The objective vision made in the mode of correctness and certainty replaced the original imposition of meaning from real first substances. Modernity sees only that which it conquers and can manipulate through instrumental reason. This kind of blind knowledge is based on an oedipal complex of objectivity that generates a modern and utterly tragic form of power. The deontology of the objective truth is placed in front of the tragic blind subject in the mode of *Ge-Stell*. The tragedy of *Modernorum* is set in motion by instrumental rationality that is blind by its nature based on the objective complex of Oedipus. Sent by the punitive goddess Dike, the Erinyes of the epoch named " *novissimum* " have become subjective and nihilistic. Aristotelian sense of the real substance, which was sought in the first science, was transformed into the subjective truth as correctness. The meaning of being is given by the demiurgic Creator, and in the postmodern phase of metaphysical nihilism, only by the mortal creator. The disobedient reality became a pure contingency placed outside the realm of a permanent and objective rationality. Therefore, it is necessary that the first substance is assimilated in the cognitive and voluntaristic trajectory of understanding (*aspectus*) that produces the modern subject. The being of the third kind exists *ex nihilo*, since it has its beginning only in the non-existent God of *Modernorum*. After the death of the modern god, only the mortal in the nihilistic stage of metaphysics actualized the objective meaning of being. The person objectively no longer exists; as the first substance, it also disappeared to make way for bizarre collections of *tertium ens*. Made on the level of hermeneutics of objectivity, the analysis of modern gigantomachy explains why the thought of *Modernorum* opened the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. It came to blindness that concerns the vision of the first and also of the second substance. They are today given in the binary form. The nihilistic stage of postmodernism started after the year 1300 when it came to a decisive eclipse of classic metaphysics. The Latin *illuminati* fell under the intellectual spell of Neoplatonism and accepted Avicenna’s metaphysics, which Averroes had rejected as a fundamental error. The Commentator became a twofold heretic in the Falsafa and also in the Scholasticism. The consequences of that *fuga mundi* were tragic. Philosophy lost the truth as the correspondence of intellect and reality and began to create a new form of academic mythology. The ontological understanding of modernity (*Vor-blickbahn*) goes from the subject to its own object, which is a modern kind of *Ge-Stell*.

The philosophical gigantomachy between Avicenna and Averroes over the fate of true thought has profoundly marked the theological history of the Christian and Islamic West. The reaction to the emergence of objectivity transmitted through Neoplatonic antiquity was given in theology through two quite different ways. Islamic scholars of the 11th and 12th centuries considered the death of God to be a worse evil than the advent of Avicennist modernity. Therefore, they destroyed the Falsafa as an independent manner of thinking that takes the philosophical path. Their uncritical discernment did not see the thinking of Ibn Rushd, who offered a minimalist but true thinking of God as the Aristotelian first cause. The Latin West did not destroy philosophy, but transformed it into a mythological speculation based on modern ontotheology. The school of *sophistae Latini* took up the flag of mythology and launched an objective crusade to destroy the truth of the Philosopher and the Commentator. Latin modernists triumphed over the first Averroism two centuries later, however, in a much more tragic manner than Islamic theologians. God of Latin *Modernorum* ended up as an anthropological idol that gradually lost all reasons for its objective academic existence. Hegel’s logic of history came into being as a reaction to the fatally impossible modern God and established objective knowledge in an absolute way. The new type of absolute speculative logic began with the creation of the concept ex nihilo and ended with the conceptual simulacrum of history, which manifests itself apocalyptically at the end of the gnostic narrative about the beginning and end of thinking. Enlightenment through the historically accomplished reflection of the absolute subject completes the process of creating the meaning of the Being and the modern God, whose logos is given by the ontotheological movement of the absolute spirit. Nietzsche and the Hegelian left then sent the modern God, modified by Hegel, to a well-deserved rest in the metaphysical Lethe.

After the death of modern Demiurg, a kind of *Ge-Stell* had to be created in order to safeguard the nihilistic sense of being. The contemporary *individuum* began to actualize the meaning of history in an objectively absolute way to replace *horror vacui* of dead metaphysics by new version of demiurgic activity. The theoretical intellect was dead, also the will of power took its place. The imperial appetite of the White man has ushered in a new phase of global imperial wars waged by anonymous subjects under the banner of totalitarian ideologies of the 20th and 21st centuries. In recent times, the death of objective philosophy has become an inescapable *factum*. It is programmed into the progress of artificial intelligence. At the end of modernity, this kind of intelligence goes on victoriously without its blind and less intelligent creator. He created the objective third world in which he would lose in the end. Nowadays, Furies started to master the artificial intelligence in order to conquer modern individuals that are feeble-minded by their propre nature. Free individuals can never be defeated, but they no longer exist in the nihilistic computer brain. Freedom has no logic, the algorithms only have the logic of Antichrist. The path from flawed philosophy to victorious technology makes objectively and correctly part of victorious strategy of progress that characterizes *via Modernorum*. The path of technical *illuminati* in the guise of a nihilistic neuro-humanist and technician of artificial intelligence is conducted in the neurotic mode of repression of any form of wisdom by turning the wisdom into the opposite. Therefore, together with Furies and in the mode of victorious Platonic irony, it is necessary to praise victorious forms of nihilistic metaphysics for making this decisive methodological step of positive science into the abyss. True seeing of the world cannot be replaced by objective knowledge; the cognition given outside of reality is in itself blind. The modernity of the present West knows with the certainty of the Cartesian blind man what an objective being is. Due to the metaphysical Oedipus complex, contemporaries do not need to see how the existing world is being revealed in its real nature. The divine comedy of Oedipus’s last wandering at the end of tragedy is given by the fact that the objectively blind academic *illuminatus* leads the totally blind technocratic scientist.

The philosophy of the will as a substance has sent the mystical *appetitus* of the Latin West on the path of modernity called “capitalism.” Its subject is marked by Olivi’s real distinction between the intimate will and the external world; thus he became the absolute and intimate demiurge of objective being. There is no extension of theoretical intellect into a practical one, but a kind of *unio mystica* of the will of power with its inner object given as *scibile, factum* and *concretum*. The extension enabled the theoretical intellect to operate in the real world as a practical intellect. The separation made by the new kind of demiurgic will leads to the creation of the third world of illusions. The postmodern nihilistic process of making sense of the objective being in the real world emerges from this intimate world of the subject. He dwells in the Platonic cave with the digital Raven of Elijah. The last epoch, tragicomically given under the sign of Bonaventura’s numerical Beast (*in numero nominis bestiae*), accomplishes the making sense by assimilating all kinds of meaning in the mode of digital *coaequatio*. The totality of being is appropriated by the subject in the mode of objectivity in virtue of *dativus possessivus* and *dativus auctoris*. The existing being is bound to the demiurge (*Ge-Stell*) as *aspectus* of the individual (and not personal) free will that makes possession of the world (*dativus possessivus*). This modern capitalist will is given in the mode *absolute*, i.e., outside the real world (*dativus auctoris*). Both datives clearly show that the objective meaning of the world is determined by the excentricity of modern subject that takes place outside the hyparchical causality of first substances. Due to the global mobilization of objective material and human resources, the capitalist demiurge has enough power to produce objective *scibilia* in never-ending new forms. This production of *tertium ens* gave capitalism its present excentric character based on the fetishistic nature of commodities and capital (K. Marx). The metaphysics of capitalism has revealed the hermeneutic manner “how” the demiurgic will and its secular act of selection (*electio*) created the epoch of modern scientific-technical production given under capitalism (*dativus instrumenti*). The nihilist form of the will is tied to the eclipse of the first substance. That event of Being (*Ereignis*) created the system that destroys man in the world wars: due to objectivism, instrumental rationality, nihilism of technology and vulgar economism of contemporary corporate fascism (*dativus ethicus*).

The archaic hermeneutics is guided by Pythian reading of modern oracle hidden in the cloud databases. They reveal the tragic and therefore divine connection with the beginning of modernity. Since the 12th century, academic Furies mastered the informatics based on the first versions of Oxfordian Fallacy made by the school of Porretans and *Nominales*. The described aspects of the demiurgic will and desire create the secular *religio* of the present epoch. Due to objective effects of the history of modernity, it connects us (*religare*) with the beginning of modernity elaborated by Bonaventure and Olivi. The unveiling of the musical form of *alētheia* enables the critical and hermeneutic reading of modernity (*relegere*). Once more, let us sum up main modalities of post-capitalist production of objective being made out in the age of metaphysical nihilism.

* The production runs in the mode of Porretan “*exsistere*” and gives the capital the mythical primary authority based on the ideology of perpetual growth (*augere*). Capital, as a new kind of the second categorical substance, has become the most expanding *tertium ens*; that is why capital acts as the foundation of the imperialist version of *dativus possesssivus*.
* The mythological foundation of the capital is masked by objective nature of scientific cognition made in the framework of Oxfordian Fallacy. Objective science based on the modern logic of Antichrist creates the objective kind of diacosmos in order to enable the expansion of capital. Therefore, the capital masked as a technoscience has become the real subject of nihilistic capitalism (*dativus auctoris*).
* Modern science has become power; the source of this power is not in objective knowledge itself, but in capital as the cause and subject of science. Mathematically applied science ensures the logical infallibility of the nihilistic production of monetized virtual debts. This production of digitized nothingness secures the fundamental “ortus scientiarum” of economic neoliberalism, which controls and manipulates objective science (*dativus instrumenti*).
* The multiplication, distribution and classification of virtual capital in global banks and corporations creates a secular capital superstructure as an ideological form of the *tertium ens*. Living nihilistic banksters have replaced the dead modern God. Banksters as objective divine beings stand outside of good and evil. Today they form the dominant divine class of Furies that characterizes this kind of New Age. The banksters have bought off the middle class of politicians, scientists, teachers, bureaucrats, etc. They jointly organize the ideological celebration of redeeming capital (*mysterium salutis*) that they jointly produce (*dativus finalis*).
* The last already non-divisible support of those universal *scibilia* is the capitalist subject of production, consumption and one’s own reproduction (*individuum*). The total mobilization of these individual human resources in the age of complete nihilism is a difficult task of capitalism. Chaotic individuals must be spent according to carefully made planning; they are permanently replaced by new class of productive and reproductive units (*dativus incommodi*).
* The *Arbor Porphyriana* as the fundamental structure of the New Word Order is built on the basis of modern *volitio* and *electio*. The greed of *volitio* is directed to the world in order to create the accumulation of capital. The mysticism of *electio* moves the instrumental rationality to be a new kind of activity made by Furies. Both types of capitalist habitus are constituted within the framework of “*totater Mobilmachung*” (E. Jünger) of capitalized human resources. Individuals who are not selected within the framework of irrational pleonexia of the one percent to celebrate the globally implemented conjunction of capital (ὄργια, *conferentia*), they are to be destroyed as disobedient matter (*dativus ethicus*).
* Global mobilization of individuals ensures, as a primary task, objective recognition of all manipulable matter that is transferred to a digitalized form (*totum virtuale*). Biopolitics is based on biometrics (biometric measurements, DNA tests, psychological tests, scans of all kinds, wiretaps, computer simulations of behavior, manipulation of masses by artificial intelligence). The final “voodoo capitalism” creates through biometrics concrete signs for all obedient individuals to walk along *via Modernorum* towards the final nihilism. Biometric signs of the new biopolitics are a measure of victorious progress (*dativus mensurae*).
* The roots of the global Tree of Porphyry are nourished by human capital of the so-called Third World. It makes the basic manner of progress in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. Labor camps of all sorts, sweatshops, refugee camps and hybrid wars replaced Jamblichus’s diacosmos and then the *ālam al-mithāl* of Islamic falsafa and the purgatory of Christianity (*dativus modi*).

Bonaventura’s “*itinerarium mentis*” is now given as an irrational journey of capital (*Irre*), After the still unfulfilled arrival of Antichrist, the capital forms the driving power of contemporary objectivity. The production of objectivity by capital takes place through the basic modes of *dativus obiectivus*, and it has clearly established historical stages. First, there was a class of *intelligentia spiritualis* as Oxford that is now situated at the top of the corporate Jacob’s ladder. Medieval academic *illuminati* created a new brave world of modernity based on the new demiurgic subject created as modern God and modern individual. The production of redeeming capital became the ultimate ontotheological determination of modern humanity through the concept of secular salvation. That salvation was previously granted in the framework of the Reform as Luther’s “*sola fide*.” After the death of modern God, the salvation of the capitalist subject is provided in the mode of financial nihilism by banksters. They perform God’s work, and, being a kind of a new deity, they cannot ever be punished by secular power. Banksters produce the digital nullity of debts and speculative bets on a non-existent future, out of which local wars, hybrid conflicts and the destruction of the planet emerge. Capital is given first metaphorically ethically (Olivi), then salvifically (Calvin), then economically ideologically (Marx), then socially (Bourdieu), then in the form of virtual debt (financial derivatives, quantitative easing), and finally mystically evolutionarily encoded in DNA as a cultural mimetic (Dawkins). In the era of corporate fascism, the digitized individual has become the new entity that determines the current era of financial and global nihilism.

The religion of modernity found its fundamental confirmation through the hermeneutic vicious circle of “*religio*.” We have exposed the attachment to the original beginning, from which grow the authority and domination of modernity over the world. The new *dativus obiectivus* established the present historical form of the objectivity, which is named with the obvious term “Anthropocene.” The entire planet Earth is gradually turning into a nihilistic *tertium ens*. Through the metaphysical displacement of the real being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), the Western subject has unleashed an objective tragedy that is unfolding before our eyes. First of all, the first substance and then actions of free citizens were ousted from metaphysical thinking. The history of fascist, totalitarian, corporate and narcissistic postmodernism confirmed, through the positivist facts of history, the historically given nihilism of metaphysics objectively established according to Oedipus’s tragic fate. The instrumental understanding transferred the totality of being to the scientific and technical unity made by mathematical abstraction or by digital difference between the objectively given one and zero. The postmodern neopositivist and linguistic paradigm abolished metaphysics in the end. The binary difference, which is the basis of the actualized cloud of ignorance, reveals the final stage of non-existent metaphysics in the context of cloud computing, which forms the demonic ethos of today’s *Modernorum*. This sophisticated blindness of the West hermeneutically explains why technical and political nihilism created the epoch of the two World Wars, the totalitarian movements and the global destruction of the Earth in the epoch called the Anthropocene. The hermeneutics of objectivity date this epochal change in history to the second half of the 13th century, when the modern history of the West came into effect. The archaeology of objectivity established who man was and who he became in the epochal *Lichtung* of untruth. Since this *Lichtung* of Being reveals the truth as well, we can awaken from the objective sleep of nihilistic reason. We may one day find the original way in which God himself passed by us in the mode of Apollonian archegetic semantics. Then we can walk in the footsteps of God and build up a new global community of *Magna Graecia*. After the disappearance of simulacra called “God of *Modernorum*” that kind of modern *tertium ens* has definitely passed into the world of the dead. The cult of a dead modern God is now artificially maintained by postmodern ideology, objectivist theology, and mystical pseudometaphysics. Therefore, archaic hermeneutics must return to the hidden theological activity of Muses that have migrated to the Lethe hidden in the historiality of Being. The lover of wisdom must be where the hidden wisdom works. In the historiality of Heidegger′s *Geviert* made by Gods and Mortals, of Heaven and Earth the truth of Muses dwells in the original divine version of *dativus archaicus* and the subsequent version as *dativus principalis* of the first philosophy. Consequently, the Aristotelian definition of humanism made in the metaphysical dative still applies as well. Only a single wise and living person is enough to establish universal species called *Homo sapiens*. The critical hermeneutics of the Western path to objectivity avoid the view of the world determined by objectivity, which globally and fatally determines the contemporary history of thinking. Therefore, it was necessary to find an interpretation of objectivity outside the framework of today *intelligentia spiritualis*, which is embodied in the objective knowledge of contemporary thinkers and medievalists. Therefore, the final thanks are due to all friends that took part in the creation of this work. It was published in the private publishing house by taking a collectively managed publishing project of our little *Mouseion*. Taken from the point of view of presented arguments, any other publication of this book made out beyond the archaic truth of Muses would have been a *contradictio in adiecto*.

### Abbreviations

**ABMA** William of Ockham: *Dialogus. Latin Text and English Translation. Edited by John Kilcullen, John Scott, George Knysh, Volker Leppin, Jan Ballweg, Karl Ubl, Semih Heinen*. The treatise *Dialogus* is quoted according to the digital edition *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi* (www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/).

**CCSL** *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*. Ed. Brepols, 1953—.

**CMDA** *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima Libros*. F. Stuart Crawford (ed.). Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.

**DK** *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* *I—III*. Herausgegeben von Hermann Diels und Walter Kranz. Curych: Weidmann 1952.

**GA** Heidegger, Martin. *Gesamtausgabe*. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main (1975—).

**Hegel** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969—1971 (Theorie-Werkausgabe).

**KdRV** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The first edition in 1781 (Berlin: Akademieausgabe,

1904, Band IV.) is quoted as „A“. The second edition in 1787 (Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1911, Band III) is quoted as „B“.

**KdPV** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Berlin: Akademieausgabe 1913, Band V, 1–163.

**KdU** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Berlin: Akademieausgabe 1913, Band V, 165–485.

**KSA** Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*. Hg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari. München und New York 1980.

**LCDA** Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba. *Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle*. Translated

and with introduction and notes by Richard C. Taylor with Therese-Anne Druart, subeditor. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009.

**OBJ** *Hermeneutik der Objektivität I—III*. In the text, the tome and the chapter are quoted.

**PL** *Patrologiae latinae cursus completus*. Ed. Migne, 1844—1864.

**RRP** *The Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project*, University of Stanford (http://rrp.stanford.edu). Richard Rufus of Cornwall.*In Aristoteli Analytica posteriora* (ed. Rega Wood); *Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (eds. Rega Wood & Neil Lewis, 2013); *In Aristotelis De anima. Redactio brevior. Liber 1–3*. (Eds. Christopher J. Martin, Neil Lewis, Rega Wood 2007).

**SZ** Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 171993.

**WA**  *The Works of Aristotle I—XII*, ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford, 1908—52.

### Index locorum

The index contains the work (or volume and *quaestio*), the page and the line of the critical edition that is indicated in the biography.

### Subject and Name Index

### Bibliography

The list contains the authors and works of the three combined volumes. Quotations from Greek texts without explicit indication of the critical edition are taken from the digital edition *Thesaurus Linguae Graeciae*, The Packard Humanities Institute, *The Perseus Project and others*, 1999–2007.

Václav Umlauf

Hermeneutics of Objectivity III.

Tragicomedy of Scholastic Modernity

Published by Hermaion Editions

Adresa....

Proofreading X. Y.

Typesetting X.Y

Graphic design X.Y

Printing X.Y

[www.hermaion.cz](http://www.hermaion.cz)

**ISBN .......**

1. “Eine Rasse solcher Menschen des Ressentiment wird nothwendig endlich klüger sein als irgend eine vornehme Rasse, sie wird die Klugheit auch in ganz andrem Maasse ehren: nämlich als eine Existenzbedingung ersten Ranges...” (*Zur Genealogie der Moral*I.10; KSA 5, 272) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. “Bien sûr, l’histoire depuis longtemps ne cherche plus à comprendre les événements par un jeu de causes et d’effets dans l’unité informe d’un actualized devenir, vaguement homogène ou durement hiérarchisé ; mais ce n’est pas pour retrouver des structures antérieures, étrangères, hostiles à l’événement. C’est pour établir les séries diverses, entrecroisées, divergentes souvent, mais non autonomes, qui permettent de circonscrire le “lieu” de l’événement, les marges de son aléa, les conditions de son apparition.” (Foucault 1971, 58) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. “Das Fragen hat als Fragen nach... sein *Gefragtes*. Alles Fragen nach ... ist in irgendeiner Weise Anfragen bei... Zum Fragen gehört außer dem Gefragten ein *Befragtes*. In der untersuchenden, d. h. spezifisch theoretischen Frage soll das Gefragte bestimmt und zu Begriff gebracht werden. Im Gefragten liegt dann als das eigentlich Intendierte das *Erfragte*, das, wobei das Fragen ins Ziel kommt.” (SZ 5) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. “Dieses wunderbare Wort >Ver-sammlung< kennen wir freilich nur noch in einer arg beschränkten und gewöhnlichen Bedeutung. Jetzt dagegen denken wir es in dem geklärten Sinne der Lese, wobei wir vor allem darauf achten, daß jetzt die Sammlung nicht das bloß dazukommende Zusammenbringen ist, sondern die ursprüngliche Gesammeltheit des Aufzubewahrenden meint, aus der alles Sammeln entspringt und in der es gehalten bleibt, d. h. ver-sammelt, d. h. aus ursprünglicher Sammlung gesammelt und in sie geborgen ist.” (GA 55, 268–69) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. “Bonaventure’s thought would provide the point of departure for a sizeable group of masters during the next generation. Among the characteristic doctrines of this group were: 1- plurality of forms; 2- universal hylomorphism; 3- the soul’s being a *hoc aliquid*; 4- the two faces of the soul; 5- the simplicity of the soul (although they had some difficulty in reconciling this with a theory of plurality of forms). In addition, they added an insistence on the formula that the rational soul was the substantial form of the body.” (Dales 1995, 106) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. “Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligere praeter alterum, intellectu resolvente; et iste intellectus considerat ea quae sunt rei essentialia, sicut potest intelligi subiectum sine propria passione. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut intellectu resolvente plene et perfecte, aut intellectu deficiente et resolvente semiplene. Intellectu resolvente semiplene, potest intelligi aliquid esse, non intellecto primo ente. Intellectu autem resolvente perfecte, non potest intelligi aliquid, primo ente non intellecto.” (*In I Sent*., d. 28, dub. 1; *Opera omnia* 1.2, 504a‒b) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. “Unde licet anima secundum Augustinum connexa sit legibus aeternis, quia aliquomodo illud lumen attingit secundum supremam aciem intellectus agentis et superiorem portionem rationis; indubitanter tamen verum est, secundum quod dicit Philosophus, cognitionem generari in nobis via sensus, memoriae et experientiae, ex quibus colligitur universale in nobis, quod est principium artis et scientiae.” (*Sermones selecti de rebus theologicis*, Sermo IV.18; *Opera omnia* 5, 572a) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. “Uno modo abstractio est, quæ ortum habet a *natura rei*; et sic abstrahitur universale a particulari, et forma a materia, quoniam utrobique est compositio et diversitas. Alio modo est abstractio, quæ ortum habet ab *intellectu nostro*. Intellectus enim noster cum intelligit aliquid completum, de necessitale dupliciter intelligit sive sub duplici ratione, scilicet per modum ipsius *quod est* et ipsius *quo*.” (*In I Sent*., d. 27, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, resp.; *Opera omnia* 1.2, 476a) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. “Le problème de l’abstraction, à vrai dire, ne se pose même pas : il ne s’agit pas de faire sortir d’une espèce individuelle une espèce universelle, il s’agit de faire tomber la lumière des vérités éternelles sur les espèces sensibles pour en faire sortir une *vérité*, ce qui est autre chose.” (Rohmer 1928, 150) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. “Quid igitur de illa excellentia Trinitatis sive specialiter sive generaliter novimus, quasi multae sint tales trinitates, quarum aliquas experti sumus, ut per regulam similitudinis impressam vel specialem vel generalem notitiam, illam quoque talem esse credamus.” (*De Trinitate* 8.5.8; PL 42, 953B) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “Secundum sententiam omnium doctorum Christus est doctor interius, nec seitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum, non loquendo, sicut nos, sed interius illustrando; et ideo necesse est, ut habeat *clarissimas* Species apud se, neque tamen ab alio acceperit. Ipse enim intimus est omni animae et suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species intellectus nostri tenebrosas…” (*Collationes in Hexaëmeron* 12.5; *Opera omnia* 5, 385a) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “Species autem innata potest esse dupliciter: aut *similitudo tantum*, sicut species lapidis, aut ita *similitudo*, quod etiam quaedam *veritas* in se ipsa. Prima species est sicut pictura; et ab hac creata est anima nuda. Secunda species est impressio aliqua summae veritatis in anima, sicut verbi gratia animae a conditione sua datum est *lumen* quoddam directivum et quaedam *directio* naturalis.” (*In I Sent.* d. 17, a. 1. q. 4, resp.; *Opera omnia* 1.1, 301b) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. “Si enim « veritas, ut dicit Anselmus, est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis », et rectitudini non potest aequari nisi rectum; cum intellectus noster aequatur veritati, necessario rectificatur. Tunc autem aequatur, quando actualiter se convertit ad veritatem. Veritas enim in actu definitur, quod « est adaequatio rei et intellectus ».” (*In II Sent.*, proem.; *Opera omnia* 2, 4a) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. “*Tertio modo sentire* idem est, quod speciem existentem in materia praeter materiam mediante organo corporeo suscipere; et sic accipit Philosophus in secundo de Anima, cum dicit, quod « sensus est susceptivus specierum in materia praeter materiam ».” (*In II Sent*., d. 8, p. I, a. 3, q. 2, resp., ad 4; *Opera omnia* 2, 222b) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. “Item, quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto prius; sed forma quanto universalior, tanto simplicior: ergo tanto prior.“ (*In II. Sent*., d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2; *Opera omnia* 2, 439a) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. “Item, intellectus, si verus est, intelligit, sicut est in re; alioquin, si non respondet ei ita in re, sicut intelligit, falsus est et vanus; sed tam rationalis philosophus quam etiam metaphysicus dicit, differentias extrahi de potentia generis: ergo oportet, quod ita sit in re, quod formae minus universales exeant in esse a formis magis universalibus; aut consideratio logici et philosophi est omnino vana.” (*In II. Sent*., d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3; *Opera omnia* 2, 439a) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. “Dicendum, quod *res* accipitur *communiter* et *proprie* et *magis proprie*. Res, secundum quod *communiter* dicitur, dicitur a *reor*, *reris*; et sic comprehendit omne illud, quod cadit in cognitione, sive sit res exterius, sive in sola opinione. *Proprie* vero dicitur res a *ratus*, *rata*, *ratum*, secundum quod *ratum* dicitur esse illud quod non tantummodo est in cognitione, immo est in rerum natura, sive sit ens *in se*, sive *in alio*; et hoc modo res convertitur cum *ente*. Tertio modo dicitur res *magis proprie*, secundum quod dicitur a *ratus*, *rata*, *ratum*, prout *ratum* dicitur illud quod est ens *per se* et fixum; et sic res dicitur solum de creaturis et substantiis per se entibus.” (*In II Sent*. d. 37, a. 2. q. 3, dub. 1; *Opera omnia* 2, 876a) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. “Omne quod intellectus capit, vel est ens, vel capit sive imaginatur per comparationem ad ens; ideo omnis significatio et veritas orationis significantis vel fundatur *simpliciter* super ens, ut si dicatur : Petrus est, vel *in ordine* ad ens. Unde propositio de praeterito fundatur super ordinem eius ad praesens; similiter propositio de futuro, sicut propositio negativa, ut si dicatur: Caesar non est; aliquod enim ens est, quod non est Caesar, et sic de aliis; similiter si dicatur: chimaera non est hircocervus.” (*In I Sent*. d. 46, art. unicus, q. 4, ad 4; *Opera omnia* 1.2, 829b) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. “In proof of this, consider the word ‘goat-stag’ (τραγέλαϕος). It has significance, but there is no truth or falsity about it, unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added, either in the present or in some other tense.” (*De Int*. 16a16‒19; trad. Edgehill, WA 1) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. “Ergo in genere substantiae est unum aliquod, quo mensurantur omnia in illo genere. Sed illud non potest esse principium *extrinsecum*, cum secundum huius maiorem et minorem participationem intrinsecam res illius generis magis et minus sint…” (*In II Sent*., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, item 2; *Opera omnia* 2, 94a‒b) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. “Nam materia secundum sui *essentiam* est informis per possibilitatem omnimodam; et dum sic consideratur, ipsa formarum *capacitas* sive *possibilitas* est sibi pro forma. (…) Immo etiam impossibile est, materiam informem existere per privationem omnis formae.” (*In II Sent.* d. 12. a. 1, q. 1, resp., ad 1, 2; *Opera omnia* 2, 294a) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. “Quia enim materia omnino est ens in potentia, ideo per sui essentiam nullum habet actum, nullam formam, ergo nullam distinctionem; si nullam distinctionem habet et non est nihil, oportet ergo, quod sit una sine multitudine, et ita *numero una*.” (*In II Sent*. d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 100b) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. “Therefore, the nature of that subject that receives the substantial forms, that is to say, the subject called prime matter, is the nature of the potential, that is to say, being potential is the essential differentia of prime matter [as a subject]. Therefore, prime matter has no proper form nor does it have a nature existing in actuality, but its essence is to be only potential. It is for this reason that it can receive all forms.” (*De substantia orbis* I; ed. Hyman, p. 50.49‒51.54) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. “Et ideo, quamvis ens in potentia simpliciter inter non-ens et ens actu sit medium, non oportet quod duratione sequatur unum et praecedat alterum.” (*In II Sent.* d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6; *Opera omnia* 2, 294b) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. “Necesse est ergo, quod habeat causam dicentem positionem; sed non positionem omnimodam, cum etiam dicat privationem: ergo aliquid, quod non est omnino aliquid, nec omnino nihil, sed quod est medium inter aliquid et nihil; hoc autem dicit Augustinus *materiam*.” (*In II Sent*., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1; *Opera omnia* 2, 89a) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. “Augustinus in duodecimo Confessionum docet salis aperte, et in libro de Vera Religione dicit, quod est quasi medium inter aliquod et nihil, et Philosoplius in primo libro de Generatione dicit, quod est ita simplex sicut punctus.” (*In II Sent*., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3; *Opera omnia* 2, 102a) [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. “*Rursus*, quia est ens omnino in potentia, ideo de se est infinita et ad formas infinitas…” (*In II Sent*. d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 100b) [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. “Facta est ergo illa materia in forma *confusionis* ante formam *dispositionis*. In forma *confusionis* prius omnia corporalia materialiter simul et semel sunt creata, postmodum in forma *dispositionis* sex diebus sunt ordinata.” (*In II. Sent*, d. 12, cap. V; *Opera omnia* 2, 291b) [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Aristotle presents ὄρεξις as a common determination within the framework of predication “*pros hen*“ (μίαν τῶν αἰσθήσεων) for all perceptive animal beings (ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ... τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων). This generic univocity is given per prius and, through the specific difference per posterius, also extends to the determination of animal species, because animal beings are endowed with three different kinds of desire (ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, De anima 414b2–3). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod compositum ex materia et forma est ens completum, et ita venit ad constitutionem tertii; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum generaliter, sed tunc, quando materia terminat omnem appetitum formae, et forma omnem appetitum materiae; tunc non est appetitus ad aliquid extra, et ita nec possibilitas ad compositionem, quæ praeexigit in componentibus appetitum et inclinationem.” (*In II Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp., ad 6; *Opera omnia* 2, 415b) [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. “Alio modo potest intelligi sic, ut essentiae formarum sint in materia in potentia non solum *latentes*, sed *entes* *in potentia*, ut materia habeat in se seminales omnium formarum rationes sibi a primaria conditione inditas ‒ et illud concordat et philosophiae et sacrae Scripturae ‒ et per actionem agentis educerentur in actum.” (*In II Sent.*, d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. I, resp.; *Opera omnia*2, 198a) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. “Et ita non differunt forma *universalis* et *singularis* *per abstractionem* a materia, et *concretionem* in materia, sed differunt *per additionem* unius ad alteram et per magis completum et minus completum. Cuius signum est, quia in coordinatione generum et specierum forma *speciei* est completissima et compositissima. Forma vero *generis* respectu illius est *ens in potentia*, et fit magis *in actu* per differentiam sibi superadditam.” (*In II Sent*. d. 18, a. 1. q. 3, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 440b) [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. “Hoc est medium *metaphysicum* reducens, et haec est tota nostra metaphysica : de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de consummatione, scilicet illuminari per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum. Et sic eris verus metaphysicus.“ (*Collationes in Hexaëmeron I*; *Opera omnia* 5, 332b) [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. “Potest iterum connotare bonitatem in *potentia*, sicut exemplar connotat rei entitatem, non quia sit, sed quia Deus potest eam facere; et sic nihil est in Deo, nisi quod cognoscit notitia approbationis, quia sic cognoscit omne bonum, quod *est* vel quod *potest facere*, et illius habet exemplar; et ideo illud tantum est in Deo.” (*In I Sent*. d. 36, dub. 3, resp.; *Opera omnia* 1.2, 631b) [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. “Et propter hoc materia artificialis de artificialibus predicatur, quia ipsa est tota veritas rei artificialis; forma enim artificialis non est nova natura vel essentia, set est dispositio solum, ut extentio, circulatio, vel aliquid hujusmodi, unde convenienter dicitur « anulus est aurum ».” (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*, ed. Steele, OHI 11, 75.16‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. “Quartus modus universalium esse non potuit, scilicet quod esse(t) quoddam universale quod esset in pluribus actu et non (in potentia), quia in eodem potentia precedit actum, set posito posteriori ponitur prius, et ita posito actu ponitur potentia.” (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*; ed. Steele, OHI 11, 154.13‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. This interpretation does not agree in principle with the opinion that Bacon′s criticism is aimed at the representatives of so-called “Latin Averroism, which began about 1262 under leadership of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia” (Hackett 1997b, 141). However, the author claims in the quoted section that Bacon’s attack on Rufus was in fact also directed against Bonaventure, which this study confirms as well. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. “Vitatis scandalis, ut tenemur, Regulae, quam vovimus, sine cuius observatione salvari non possumus et veritatem perspicaciter videamus et impleamus professionem et totis viribus puritatem custodiamus…” (*Epist*. 1.5; *Opera omnia* 8, 469b) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. “In *Quasi lignum vitae*, issued 14 April 1255, Alexander spelled out the papal conception of the magisterium, a conception deeply antithetical to that of the masters. Alexander annulled the legislation against the friars and, de *potestatis plenitudine*, ordered the masters to reinstate the Dominican professors into their *consortium*. Next, he ordered the chancellor to offer the magisterial title as an enticement to naturally gifted students. The pope then restated the position that the chancellor should actualized the license to men whom he finds worthy on the basis of the investigation prescribed in *Parens scientiarum*. Thus, in two consecutive sentences, Alexander used the terms “magisterium'' and “licentia” in analogous positions, as if they were synonymous. It is clear that Alexander knew that he was advancing beyond the earlier distinction between the license and the magisterium.” (Bernstein 1978, 302) [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The work *Codex Barcinonensis* (Archivo general de la Corona de Aragón, Cod. *Ripoll 109*) contains a compendium of key texts of the Paris Faculty of Arts, which comment on *Corpus aristotelicum* from the years 1230–40. For Guillelmus’ interpretations of the *First* and *Second Analytics* as well as of the organon other than ms. Ripoll 109, see Andrews 2008, 100–103. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. In this context, let us recall the following step taken by Bonaventure as General of the Franciscan Order, which he took up after the General Congregation in 1266: “After the general chapter of Paris, at Pentecost of 1266, Bonaventure wrote a letter to each of the provincials. He bitterly complains that even those responsible in the order had lost their focus on the real goal: ‘They spend themselves for worthless things, that is for earthly goods, and allow the holiness of the souls which are their most precious goods to perish.’ Here Bonaventure refers to his experiences during his numerous journeys. He had observed that the Friars Minor liked to take on tasks which by right belonged to the parish clergy, whose hatred they thus aroused.” (Hammond 2013, 46) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. “Cum sit [anima] incorruptibilis, non indiget multiplicari, cum una numero conservari possit. − Et haec fuit positio Commentatoris super librum de Anima (...) Quantumcumque autem hanc opinionem coloret, pessima est et haeretica.  Est enim contra *christianam religionem*, dum aufert meritorum retributionem, quae non esset, si omnium anima una esset. − Et etiam contra *rectam rationem*.  Planum est enim, quod anima intellectiva, ut intellectiva est, est perfectio hominis, secundum quod *homo*.” (*In II. Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1, q. 1, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 446b−447a) [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. “Anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri, quod habet intra se *fundamentum* suae existentiae et *principium materiale*, a quo habet *existere*, et *formale*, a quo habet *esse*. De brutali autem non oportet illud dicere, cum ipsa fundetur in corpore.” (*In II Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 414b‒415a) [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. “Cum igitur principium, a quo est *fixa existentia* creaturae in se, sit principium materiale; concedendum est, animam humanam materiam habere. Illa autem materia sublevata est supra *esse* extensionis, et supra *esse* privationis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis.” (*In II Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 415a) [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus est impassibilis et impermixtus; dicendum, quod Philosophus removet ab intellectu materiam, secundum quod consideratur sub *privatione* et sub potentia ad transmutationem secundum *esse*; non removet materiam *universaliter*, immo ponit, cum dicit, quod in intellectu est natura, qua est *facere*, et qua est *fieri*.” (*In II Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp., ad 2; *Opera omnia* 2, 415a) [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. “Quemadmodum enim sensibile esse dividitur in formam et materiam, sic intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia hiis duobus, scilicet in aliquod simile forme et in aliquod simile materie.” (CMDA III.4; 409.654–62) [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. “If there is some primary stuff, which is not further called the material of some other thing, this is primary matter (τοῦτο πρώτη ὕλη). E.g., if earth is ‘made of air,’ and air is not fire, but ‘made of fire’, then fire is primary matter, not being an individual thing (τὸ πῦρ ὕλη πρώτη οὐ τόδε τι οὖσα). For the subject or substrate is distinguishable into two kinds by either being or not being an individual thing (τῷ εἶναι τόδε τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι). Take for example as the subject of the attributes ‘man’, or ‘body’ or ’soul, and as an attribute ‘cultured’ or ‘white’.” (*Met*. 1049a24‒29; WA 8, trad. Ross) [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. “Anima autem non tantum est forma, immo etiam est *hoc aliquid*.” (*In II Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp., ad 5; *Opera omnia* 2, 415b) [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. “Quamvis igitur anima non sit aliis formis simplicior quantum ad partes *constitutivas*, quia tales partes habere spectat ad complementum et perfectionem; hoc enim facit, rem *esse per se*; simplicior tamen est quantum ad privationem partium *quantitativarum*.” (*In II Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp., ad 5; *Opera omnia* 2, 415b) [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. “Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est, et tamen habet appetitum ad suscipiendam animam.” (*In II Sent*., d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp., ad 6; *Opera omnia* 2, 416a) [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. “Et hoc videtur dicere Philosophus, «quod vegetativum est in sensitivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono» [*De anima* 414b31], et hoc in rationali. Sicut tetragonum in pentagono; sed nunquam Deus facit tetragonum sine trigono, nec pentagonum sine tetragono et trigono.” (*In II Sent*., d. 1, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, item 4; *Opera omnia* 2, 41b) [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. “« In perpetuis non differt esse et posse », sicut vult Philosophus, ergo nec actus et potentia, multo minus nec potentia activa et passiva; sed anima est perpetua et eius intellectus: ergo non est differentia potentiae possibilis ad agentem.” (*In II Sent*., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, sed contra, ad 1; *Opera omnia* 2, 567b) [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. “Unde si aliquando dicat Philosophus, quod « nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu » et quod « omnis cognitio habet ortum a sensu » ; intelligendum est de illis quæ quidem habent *esse* in anima per *similitudinem abstractam*; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae. Et propterea valde notabiliter dicit Philosophus, quod in anima *nihil scriptum* est, non quia nulla sit in ea notitia, sed quia nulla est in ea pictura vel *similitudo abstracta*.” (*In II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; *Opera omnia* 2, 904b) [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. “Ce que S. Bonaventure, Matthieu d’Aquasparta et Roger Marston ont lu dans ses écrits, c'est une explication de la *scientia certitudinalis*; le point d'application de leur réflexion a toujours été la *certitudinalitas scientiae* de sorte que la doctrine augustinienne de l'illumination, essentiellement faite pour rendre raison de la vérité des jugements nécessaires, s'est trouvée aux prises avec une tâche pour laquelle elle n'était pas faite, lorsqu'elle s'est vue mise en demeure d'expliquer l'origine des concepts.” (Gilson 1934, 323) [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. “Intellectus *agens* aut *intelligit*, aut *non*. Si non: ergo non debet dici intellectus nec potentia intellectiva. Si *sic*; cum intellectus non possit intelligere aliud a se, nisi speciem illius habeat in se et penes se, et omne illud quod est susceptibile speciei, sit aliquo modo possibile: ergo intellectus agens est aliquo modo possibilis: ergo non dividitur per essentiam a possibili.” (*In II. Sent*., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, item 6; *Opera omnia* 2, 568a) [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. “Appropriatur autem intellectus agens *formae* et possibilis *materiae*, quia intellectus possibilis ordinatur ad *suscipiendum*, intellectus agens ordinatur ad *abstrahendum*; nec intellectus possibilis est *pure passivus*; habet enim supra speciem existentem in phantasmate se *convertere*, et convertendo per auxilium intellectus agentis illam *suscipere*, et de ea *iudicare*. Similiter nec intellectus agens est *omnino* *in actu*; non enim potest intelligere aliud a se, nisi adiuvetur a *specie*, quae abstracta a phantasmate intellectui habet uniri.” (*In II. Sent*., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, resp., ad 4; *Opera omnia* 2, 569a) [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. “Quia enim diversae sunt differentiae intellectus, quae etsi respiciant totum compositum, una tamen magis respicit animae *complementum*, alia vero *materiale principium*; hinc est, quod una non solum tenet rationem potentiae, immo etiam *potentiae habitualis*; altera vero tenet *pure* rationem potentiae. Et hinc est, quod una dicitur convenire animae *secundum se*, altera vero in *comparatione ad corpus*, et una semper esse *in actu*, altera vero non...” (*In II. Sent*., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 570a) [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. “Tres sunt errores cavendi in scientiis, qui sacram Scripturam et fidem christianam et omnem sapientiam exterminant; quorum unus est contra *causam essendi*, alius contra *rationem intelligendi*, et tertius contra *ordinem vivendi*. Error contra causam essendi est de aeternitate mundi, ut ponere mundum aeternum. Error contra rationem intelligendi est de necessitate fatali, sicut ponere, quod omnia eveniunt de necessitate. Tertius est de unitate intellectus humani, sicut ponere, quod unus est intellectus in omnibus. Isti errores significantur in Apocalypsi in numero nominis bestiae.” (*Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti*, collatio VIII.16, *Opera omnia* 5, 497b) [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. “Unde non ita proprie contradictiones recipiebant in propositionibus de futuro huiusmodi sicut in praesenti et praeterito. Iuxta quorum opinionem Aristoteles hoc loco proprie contradictionem his assignat propositionibus, quæ de praesenti vel de praeterito fiunt et ab his quae de futuro sunt, removet.” (*Glossae super Peri ermeneias*, cap. 3; ed. Geyer, p. 419, 9–13) [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. “The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless youths; for they have cast out Hermodoros, the best man among them, saying: « We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere, and among others.»” (DK 22, B 121) [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. “Statuimus et ordinamus quod nullus magister vel bachellarius nostre facultatis aliquam questionem pure theologicam, utpote de Trinitate et Incarnatione sicque de consimilibus omnibus, determinare seu etiam disputare presumat, tanquam sibi determinatos limites transgrediens, cum sicut dicit philosophus non geometram cum geometra sit penitus inconveniens disputare.” (*Chartularium* I, no. 441, p. 499) [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. “Pour le P. Mandonnet, la conclusion est évidente : le statut du 1er avril 1272 est le « manifeste » du « parti » d’Aubry, et c’est un « coup droit » contre le « parti de Siger ». Rien, dans le texte, n’autorise cette interprétation, et tout, dans le contexte historique, l’exclut.” (Gauthier 1984, 23) [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. “Avant la fin du XVIIIesiècle, l’*homme* n’existait pas. Il n’a ni puissance de vie, ni fécondité du travail, ni épaisseur historique du langage. C’est une toute récente créature que la démiurgie du savoir a fabriquée de ses mains, depuis deux cents ans.” (Foucault 1966, 319) [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. “In this conception, "philosophy" is not a name for a discipline which confronts permanent issues, and unfortunately keeps misstating them, or attacking them with clumsy dialectical instruments. Rather, it is a cultural genre, a "voice in the conversation of mankind" (to use Michael Oakeshott’s phrase), which centers on one topic rather than another at some given time not by dialectical necessity but as a result of various things happening elsewhere in the conversation (the New Science, the French Revolution, the modern novel) or of individual men of genius who think of something new (Hegel, Marx, Frege, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger), or perhaps of the resultant of several such forces.” (Rorty 1979, 264) [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. “Le verbe doit non seulement être verbe de quelqu’un; il doit déborder vers l’autre ce qu’on appelle le sujet parlant. Ni les philosophies du neutre ni les philosophies de la subjectivité ne peuvent reconnaître ce trajet de la parole qu’aucune parole ne peut totaliser. Par définition, si l’autre est l’autre et si toute parole est pour l’autre, aucun logos comme savoir absolu ne peut comprendre le dialogue et le trajet vers l’autre.” (Derrida 1967, 145). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. “Quoniam autem contingit contemplari Deum non solum *extra nos* et *intra nos*, verum etiam *supra nos*: *extra* per vestigium, *intra* per imaginem et *supra* per lumen, quod est signatum supra mentem nostram,quod est lumen Veritatis aeternae, cum « ipsa mens nostra inmediate ab ipsa Veritate formetur »…” (*Itinerarium mentis in Deum* V.1; *Opera omnia* 5, 308a) [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. “Differunt autem *causa* et *ratio causalis*, quia *causa* dicit principium productivum, *ratio* vero *causalis* dicit regulam dirigentem illud prin­cipium in sua operatione. Similiter per hunc modum differt *semen* et *ratio seminalis*.” (*In II Sent*. d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 436a) [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. “M: Quia materia prima uniuersalis simplicior est omni materia et est finis ultimus omnis materiae; similiter forma uniuersalis simplicior est omni forma et ipsa forma est coniuntrix omnis formae. D: Resolutio omnium in haec est in actu, aut in opinione? M: Non in actu, sed in opinione.” (*Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* I.6, ed. Bäumker, p. 8.1‒5) [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. “Regula autem agentis *increati* est forma exemplaris sive idealis, regula vero agentis *creati* est forma naturalis; et ita *rationes causales* sunt formae ideales sive exemplares, *rationes* vero *seminales* sunt formae naturales. Rationes causales et seminales uno modo, se habent sicut generale et speciale.” (*In II Sent*. d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; *Opera omnia* 2, 436b) [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. “*Excessivum* autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo quodam modo, erigendo se supra se ipsum.” (*De scientia Christi*, q. 7, resp., ad 4; *Opera omnia* 5, 40a) [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. “Ad primum itaque me convertens, optarem exponere hoc in loco quid sit mens hominis, quid corpus, quomodo hoc ab illa informetur...” (*Regulae ad directionem ingenii* XII.3; ed. Tannery 10, 411.17‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. “Et sicut est particulariter in semine, ita est universaliter in luce agentis intellectus respectu universitatis totius ordinis sibi subjectae materiae: ipsa enim lux sua scientia est, et sua ars est certa ratione omnia ad esse intelligentis producens, et omnia construere faciens in intellectu possibili.” (*De intellectu et intelligibili* II.1.3; ed. Borgnet 9, 508a‒b) [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. “Si cette illumination est une action spéciale, elle prend aussitôt un caractère surnaturel.“ (Gilson 1934, 329) Gilson emphasizes not dichotomy like Lubac, but on Bonaventure′s “*tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam*.” (*De scientia Christi* IV; *Opera Omnia* 5, 23b). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. “Ordo *sapientiae* hoc requirebat, ut, sicut *esse* gratuitum est alterius generis quam *esse* naturale, sic in diversis temporibus homini conferretur; et sicut elementa mundi prius tempore sunt *creata* et *distincta* quam *ornata*, propter ordinem sapientiae commendandum; sic etiam fieret circa hominem, qui est minor mundus.” (*In II Sent*., d. 29. a. 2, q. 2; *Opera omnia* 2, 703b) [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. “Res tripliciter sunt in Deo, videlicet ut in principio producente, et sic sunt in ratione potentiae; ut in exemplari exprimente, et sic sunt in ratione notitiae; et ut in fine conservante, in ratione voluntatis.” (*In I Sent.*, d. 36, a. 2. q. I, resp.; *Opera omnia* 1.2, 624a) [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. “Et iterum Augustinus libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum dicit, quod « ratio est, etiamsi nunquam aliquid per illam fiat »; sed constat, quod ratio in mente artificis vivit, non quia res extra producitur: vivit enim, etiamsi res corrumpatur, et exterius esse omnino nihil facit ad vitam. Et ideo patet, quod non solum praesentia vel futura vivunt in Deo.” (*In I Sent*., d. 36, a. 2. q. I, resp.; *Opera omnia* 1.2, 624b) [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. “Et quoniam sola voluntas est domina sui actus et sola est se ipsam movens, ideo ipsa sola est, cuius est active uti. Aliis autem potentiis contingit uti materialiter et passive, quia habent *referri*, et non *referre*.” (*In I Sent*., d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp., ad 2; *Opera omnia* 1.1, 31b) [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. “Hanc autem necessariam habitudinem percipit non solum in rebus entibus, verum etiam in non entibus. Sicut enim, homine existente, sequitur: si homo currit, homo movetur; sic etiam, non existente. Huiusmodi igitur *illationis necessitas* non venit ab existentia rei in *materia*, quia est contingens, nec ab existentia rei in *anima*, quia tunc esset fictio, si non esset in re: venit igitur ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna, secundum quam res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem secundum illius aeternae artis *repraesentationem*.” (*Itinerarium mentis in Deum* III.3; *Opera omnia* 5, 304b) [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. “Es erhellt: im Angriffskrieg versagt das Feudalsystem; man muß die Dienste des Ritters gegen Geld kaufen. Das ist der erste Ansatz zum Eindringen des Kapitalismus in das Kriegswesen. Man kauft sich die benötigen Reiterdienste gegen Geld und das Versprechen von Anteil am Gewinn, an der Beute. Noch mehr finden wir das Eindringen von kapitalistischen Prinzipien bei den übrigen Mannschaften, die neben den Ritter zur Verwundung kamen. Das waren die Bogen- und Armbrustschützen. Sie sollten durch einen Regen von Pfeilen die anstürmenden Ritter überschütten und so demoralisieren. Sie waren von Anfang an gegen Geld gedungene freie Arbeitskräfte. Dasselbe gilt vom Train und vor allem von den Banden zügelloser Söldner, den *ruptuarii*, wie die Quellen sie nennen, Werbertruppen, die so sehr raubten und mordeten, daß die Kirche widerholt, wenn auch vergeblich, ihre Verwendung verbot.” (Brentano 1913, 40–41) [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. “Besonders interessant für unsere Betrachtung ist der kapitalistische Charakter und die kapitalistische Organisation der kriegerischen Unternehmungen der Genuesen schon im 11. Jahrhundert; am 1. Kreuzzug haben sie sich beteiligt, indem sie eine Aktiengesellschaft (Maona) ins Leben riefen, welche 12 Galeeren ausrüstete und demjenigen, der sich beteiligte, einen Anteil an der zu erwartenden Beute, je nach seiner Beteiligung, versprach. Wer sich nur als Krieger beteiligte, sollte weniger erhalten, als wer eine Kapitaleinlage machte.” (Brentano 1913, 93) [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. “Es wäre also untubar und falsch, die ökonomischen Kategorien in der Folge aufeinander folgen zu lassen, in der sie historisch die bestimmenden waren. (...) Das Kapital als Handels- oder Geldkapital erscheint eben in dieser Abstraktion, wo das Kapital noch nicht das beherrschende Element der Gesellschaften ist.” (*Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, kap. 3; MEW Auflage 13, 638) [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. “More significantly, the English, particularly Locke, took the argument a major step further by justifying the seizure of land that was indeed occupied, and perhaps even cultivated, on the actualized that the occupants had failed to use the land productively and profitably enough, by the standards of English commercial agriculture. For both John Davies and John Locke, in their various ways, the critical issue is not simply occupancy but relative value. The Irish farmer or the Indian hunter-gatherer, indeed, the Indian cultivator, may occupy and work the land, but he has failed to add sufficient exchange value to it by means of improvement. In effect, the English had redefined vacancy by redefining *waste,* and the context in which they took that fateful step in imperialist ideology is, again, their own domestic economy.“ (Wood 2002, 162–63) [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. “Während jedoch Nietzsches Verhältnis zur Aufklärung, und damit zu Homer, selber zwiespältig blieb; während er in der Aufklärung sowohl die universale Bewegung souveränen Geistes erblickte, als deren Vollender er sich empfand, wie die lebensfeindliche, »nihilistische« Macht, ist bei seinen vorfaschistischen Nachfahren das zweite Moment allein übriggeblieben und zur Ideologie pervertiert. Diese wird zum blinden Lob des blinden Lebens, dem die gleiche Praxis sich verschreibt, von der alles Lebendige unterdrückt wird.” (Horkheimer&Adorno 2000, 63) [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. “Wie die alten Völker ihre Vorgeschichte in der Imagination erlebten, in der Mythologie, so haben wir Deutsche unsre Nachgeschichte im Gedanken erlebt, in der Philosophie. Wir sind philosophische Zeitgenossen der Gegenwart, ohne ihre historischen Zeitgenossen zu sein.” (*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung*; MEW Ausgabe 1, 383) [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. “Daß ein lebendiges, natürliches, mit gegenständlichen, i.e. materiellen Wesenskräften ausgerüstetes und begabtes Wesen auch sowohl *wirkliche* natürliche *Gegenstände* seines Wesens hat, als daß seine Selbstentäußerung die Setzung einer *wirklichen*, aber unter der Form der Äußerlichkeit, also zu seinem Wesen nicht gehörigen und übermächtigen, gegenständlichen Welt ist, ist ganz natürlich. Es ist nichts Unbegreifliches und Rätselhaftes dabei. Vielmehr wäre das Gegenteil rätselhaft.” (*Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* 23; MEW Ausgabe 40, 577) [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. “Die unmittelbare Form der Warenzirkulation ist W–G–W, Verwandlung von Ware in Geld und Rückverwandlung von Geld in Ware, verkaufen, um zu kaufen. Neben dieser Form finden wir aber eine zweite, spezifisch unterschiedne vor, die Form G - W - G, Verwandlung von Geld in Ware und Rückverwandlung von Ware in Geld, kaufen, um zu verkaufen. Geld, das in seiner Bewegung diese letztre Zirkulation beschreibt, verwandelt sich in Kapital, wird Kapital und ist schon seiner Bestimmung nach Kapital.” (*Das Kapital* 1.2.4.1; MEW Ausgabe 23, 162) [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. “Es scheint das Richtige zu sein, mit dem Realen und Konkreten, der wirklichen Voraussetzung zu beginnen, also z. B. in der Ökonomie mit der Bevölkerung, die die Actualized und das Subjekt des ganzen gesellschaftlichen Produktionsakts ist. Indes zeigt sich dies bei näherer Betrachtung [als] falsch. Die Bevölkerung ist eine Abstraktion, wenn ich z. B. die Klassen, aus denen sie besteht, weglasse. Diese Klassen sind wieder ein leeres Wort, wenn ich die Elemente nicht kenne, auf denen sie beruhn, z. B. Lohnarbeit, Kapital etc. Diese unterstellen Austausch, Teilung der Arbeit, Preise etc.” (*Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, kap. 3; MEW Auflage 13, 631) [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. “Adhuc autem in ista disputatione, eo quod volumus loqui nisi ad sapientes, nihil volumus fingere, sed omnia ad veritatem rei cogere virtute demonstrationis: scitum autem est, sicut in duodecimo primae philosophiae dictum est, quod coactum est ad disputationem.” (*De unitate intellectus*, cap. III; ed. Borgnet t. 9, 441a) [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. For the exposition of 30 points of contention, see *Johannis Pechami Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, ed. Spettmann. The *Questio* 4 is opened by the enumeration (*et ostenditur quod sic*, pp. 38–45). It is followed by the part “*contra*” (pp. 45–49) and “*responsio*” that includes the overall line of reasoning (pp. 49–52). Finally, the summary of the argument is provided by “*solutio obiectorum*” (pp. 52–59). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. For the analysis of Pecham’s conception of soul and intellect and the analysis of those 30 arguments in dependence on Bonaventure, see Spettmann 1919, 79–83. A detailed analysis of Pecham’s conception of cognition is provided by the already cited study on the theory of abstraction in Franciscan schools (Rohmer 1928, 178–84). Gilson’s study of Augustinian illumination analyzes the successors of Pecham, such as Aquasparta and Marston, and expounds their rejection of Aristotelian theory of abstraction (Gilson 1936). [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Pecham probably knew these contemporary works of the first Averroism, which dealt with the unity of the intellect. These are Albert the Great: *De unitate intellectus* (1263); Siger of Brabant: *Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima* (1265); Roger Bacon: *Distinccio tercia de anima* (1255); Thomas Aquinas: *Quaestiones disputatae De anima* (1267) *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Dei* (1268), *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus craeturis* (1269), *Quodlibet II* (1269), *De unitate intellectus* (1270). All these writings were critical of the second Averroism, especially of thesis about the plurality of substances in man. For a similar listing of the actors, topics and the writing related to the so-called “*moment de 1270*” let us see the cited study (Wéber 1976). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. “Intellectus est substantia immaterialis. Sed non est plurificatio nisi per materiam.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, item 14; ed. Spettmann, p. 41.8‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. “Item dicit idem Commentator quod definitio intellectus materialis est, quia est id quod est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum materialium universalium, et non est in actu aliquid entium, antequam intelligat ipsum.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, ad 8; ed. Spettmann, p. 40.13‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. “Item intellectus est substantia immaterialis. Sed non est plurificatio nisi per materiam. Ergo intellectus non habet materiam. Quod sit immaterialis, id est carens materia, probat Commentator. Quoniam si haberet formam in materia, tunc haberet intelligibile in potentia sicut res sensibiles materiales et non posset intelligi nisi per abstractionem. Unde PhiIosophus, III. *De Anima*: “In habentibus materiam potentia unumquodque intelligibilium est.” Quod falsum est.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, ad 14; ed. Spettmann, p. 41.8‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. “Dico imaginariam quae imprimitur in sensu, deinde in spiritu. Per quam res videtur praesens, et cogitatur absens. Et re praesente est ratio cognoscendi sensibiliter, re absente per motum a sensu factum est ratio cognoscendi spiritualiter vel imaginarie. Et haec species ita est in anima, quod non res cuius est. Lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis. Alia est species intellectualis, sive quæ est in acie intelligentiae, sive quæ est in thesauro intellectualis memoriae.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 9, resp.; ed. Spettmann, p. 85.6‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. “Alia est species intellectualis, sive quæ est in acie intelligentiae, sive quæ est in thesauro intellectualis memoriae. Et haec intenditur sex modis. Est enim quaedam secundum quosdam species abstracta, quaedam innata, quaedam impressa, quaedam expressa, quaedam relicta, quaedam collecta.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 8, resp.; ed. Spettmann, p. 85.12‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. “Ad septimum dicendum quod universale non est in anima, sed similitudo eius; sed sicut singulare in natura non est sine universali, ita nec species singularis sine specie universalis. Recipit ergo intellectus species particularium. Aliter nunquam praedicaret universale de singulari. Cognoscit ergo particularia, sed non cognoscit ea per intellectum hic et nunc.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, resp., ad 7; ed. Spettmann, p. 54.32‒37) [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. “Et ideo per inclinationem essentiae potentiae superiores partim inclinantur cum sua radice; quamvis nulla potentia possit aliam attrahere, quia cuilibet praescriptus est modus suus naturalis, ut video, quod propter cognitionem uniri appetat, cum limpidius cognoscat separata quam coniuncta corpori anima. Sed praedicta non potest habere nisi in corpore.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 11, resp.; ed. Spettmann, p. 102.15‒23) [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. “Igitur in omni substantia creata pono substantialem potentiam et accidentalem, existimans quod sicut accidens non est nisi mediante substantia, ita nec operatur nisi mediante ea.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 31, resp.; ed. Spettmann, p. 203.10‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. The course of one of the important debates from 1276 is recorded first-hand. In *Quodlibet X*, Magister Henry of Ghent described the meeting, which was presided by the papal envoy Simon de Brion in the presence of Bishop Étienne of Paris. Brion took aside hesitant Magister Henry (who moderately defended the plurality of forms) and ordered him to teach the plurality of substantial forms in man (Wéber 1991, 115–18). [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. “Sed non est anima horum genus, sed totum, partes enim hae animae sunt, sed non ut in quantitate, sed ut in aliqua potestate et virtute.” (*Liber de divisione*; PL 64, 888B) [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. “Er [Pecham] sucht seine Auffassung etwas näher darzulegen, indem er mit einer dem Boëthius entnommenen Unterscheidung die Seele mit ihren Vermögen als ein *totum virtuale* bezeichnet. Dieser Begriff eines dynamischen Ganzen stehe in der Mitte zwischen dem *totum universale* und dem *totum integrale*.” (Spettmann 1919, 65) [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. “Philosophus dicit quod sicut se habet anima ad corpus totum, ita partes animae ad partes corporis. Ergo cum partes animae tales esse non possunt nisi potentiae, potentiae non erunt accidentia animae, cum accidens non sit pars substantiae. Item anima habet essentiam et virtutem. Nec virtus est eius accidens, cum a virtute dicatur anima totum virtuale. Sed essentia habet partes in se integrantes, scilicet materiam et formam. Ergo et virtutes habebit subiecto correspondentes.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 31, contra 6,7; ed. Spettmann, p. 200.28‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. “Ad tertium dicendum similiter quod una scientia est in doctore et discente obiective, non formaliter, quia habitus est alius et alius, et alia numero grammatica in me et in te. Tamen lux manifestans principia omnium actuum est una in omnibus. Quia igitur mens discipuli excitatur ad istam lucem per doctorem, ideo dicitur una scientia, et tamen nata ista de illa.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, solutio, ad 3; ed. Spettmann, p. 53.34‒55.4) [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. “Partant de ce point de vue, la pensée apparaît à Jean Peckam comme une passion commune à une multiplicité d’intellects. Tous subissent les premiers principes qui sont connus par eux-mêmes, et cette unité dans la passivité des sujets suppose l’unité d’un principe agent.” (Rohmer 1928, 178) [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. “Et nota quod veritas dicit habitudinem rei ad exemplar aeternum, quo omnia ostenduntur, sicut bonitas habitudinem ad finem. Et ideo veritati creatae attribuitur ratio manifestandi, ut cum dicitur, quod est indivisio a propria specie.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 41, resp.; ed. Spettmann, p. 220.4‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. “Ad nonum quod quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto est improportionabilius in cognitione composita, sed non in cognitione simplici, in qua necesse est fieri resolutionem ad ultimam et certissimam rationem cognoscendi.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, ed. Spettmann, q. 5, solutio, ad 20; p. 71.7‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. “Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum Augustinum lux increata ipsa ostendit omnia, nec tamen se ipsam ostendit obiective. Cuius exemplum est in specie rei visibilis corporalis, quæ ostendit id, cuius est species, nec tamen ostendit essentiam suam, nisi ut est alterius similitudo.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 22, solutio, ad 3; ed. Spettmann, p. 175.28‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. “Sed illa quæ sunt essentialiter in intellectu, non videntur per aliam similitudinem nisi quod ipsa potentia cognitiva assimilatur ipsi cognoscibili, ut possit ipsum videre, quod per se est praesens intellectui.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 23, resp.; ed. Spettmann, p. 175.37‒40) [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. “Item res et intentio essentialiter differunt. Et impossibile est idem esse rem et intentionem. Sed quod est in intellectu formaliter, est intentio, quod movet intellectum obiective, est res. Ergo impossibile est rem cognosci ab intellectu nisi per intentionem.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 9, contra, ad 8; ed. Spettmann, p. 83.6‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. “Veritas particularis quaedam est complexa, quaedam incomplexa. Veritas incomplexa, quæ est vera rei entitas, cognoscitur per speciem, sicut res cuius est veritas. Veritas enuntiabilis cognoscitur effective per lucem aeternam, obiective per species simplicium terminorum enuntiabile constituentium, completive per relationem ad lucem incommutabilem iuxta illam auctoritatem Augustini praetactam «Secundum illam iudicamus etc.»” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, ed. Spettmann, q. 42, resp.; p. 221.15‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. “Et potest haec obiectio fieri contra dictum modum ponendi universale esse in intellectu. Et est sophistica. Et est dissolutio huius talis. Quaedam sunt quæ seipsis distinctionem habent et numerum essentialiter, ut sunt partes quantitativae diversorum continuorum, distinctos situs habentes in suis subiectis, ita quod subiecta quanta diversa seipsis distinguuntur, non per accidens sibi…” (*Anon. Giele* I.5; p. 36.60‒65) [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. “Item, si aliqua una esset scientia docens vel demonstrans quod quid est in singulis rebus, illa esset scientia realis; sed scientia docens modum demonstrandi et venandi quod quid est in singulis rebus, ipsa est modalis; differunt igitur, etc. Intelligendum tunc quod non est possibile esse unam scientiam aliquam communem docentem sive demonstrantem quod quid est in singulis rebus…” (*Anon. Giele* I, Commentum I; p. 33.15‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. “Si igitur intelligere operatio separata, ex ea non probatur substantiam intelligentem esse actum corporis. Item, in positione hac implicantur contradictoria: dicit enim quod nos intelligimus ex modo quo intelligere sit passio in materia, quia dicit quod intelligimus per intellectum qui est actus corporis; et haec contradictoria primo dicto quod dicit intelligere passionem esse separatam; ideo positio haec stare non potest.” (*Anon. Giele* I.6; p. 38.49‒55) [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. “Intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia hiis duobus, scilicet in aliquod simile forme et in aliquod simile materie...” (CMDA III.4; 409.654–62) [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. “Intelligere aliquid commune est animae et corpori et indiget anima ad explendum hanc operationem corpore sicut obiecto.” (*Anon. Giele* I.6; p. 39.84‒85) [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. “Ita quod, qui cumque quaerit intellectum nobis copulatum sicut formam secundum substantiam, non potest ad hoc devenire nisi ponat, sicut, posuit Alexander, intellectum esse virtutem generabilem et corruptibilem.” (*Anon. Giele* I.6; p. 39.85‒89) [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. “Unde Averroes *tertio huius* dicit quod licet intellectus agens et possibilis sint aeterni, speculativus tamen corruptibilis et generabilis est, quia non sibi sufficiunt agens et possibilis, sed et phantasmata necessaria sunt: unde intellectus speculativus generatur in phantasmatibus, ita tamen quod iste intellectus naturaliter, quantum ex se est, semper intelligit, sicut illae substantiae separatae, quantum ex se est, semper movent: unde exiguntur phantasmata, etc. Et ideo haec dicta sunt quia non unitur intellectus phantasmatibus sicut visus coloribus. Per hoc solvuntur omnes rationes.” (*Anon. Giele* I.6; p. 40.18‒27) [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. “Ita quod abstractio qua fit materia universale non oportet quod sit abstractio cuiusdam rei ab alia re, ut in mathematicis, sed est abstractio eiusdem secundum esse, ita quod abstractum habeat esse illo a quo abstrahitur. Isto modo materia potest fieri universalis.” (*Anon. Giele* I.9; p. 45.50‒54) [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. “Unde [intellectus] non intelligit nisi a phantasmate corporis sicut ab obiecto, non quia intellectus communicet intelligere corpori sicut subiecto.” (*Anon. Giele* II.4; p. 72.39‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. “Praeterea, si tu dicas quod unum fit ex intellectu motore et corpore moto, quaero utrum homo sit nomen corporis tantum, aut aggregati ex intellectu et corpore animato, aut intellectus tantum. Et quocumque modo dicas, impossibile est quod homo intelligat dummodo non sit unum ex intellectu et corpore, sicut unum ex materia et forma.” (*Anon. Giele* II.4; p. 73.81‒86) [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. “Et inde verum est quod operationes animae cognoscibiles sunt et causa est sic: ex hoc sequitur cognitio cuiusdam alterius entis; nam passiones non sunt aliquod ens per se subsistens, sed sunt ens in alio et non sunt ex his quæ nata sunt per se subsistere: propter quod quoddam aliud ens demonstrant. Ita quod, si non essent hae operationes animae, nihil sciremus de ea: et ideo animam cognoscimus non secundum se, sed secundum quod refertur ad ista. Unde dicimus quod anima est quæ facit hoc, ut audire, videre, intelligere etc.” (*Anon. Giele*, q. 1; p. 24.23‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. “Minor patet per Aristotelem *decimo Ethicorum*: actiones sapientiae et scientiae non sunt in homine secundum quod homo, sed sunt in homine secundum aliquid divinum in eo. Unde ibidem dicit Aristoteles quod causa hominis non debet esse humana, nec appetitus eius, quamvis ipse homo sit, sed debet esse appetitus eius et causa ut transferatur ad divina secundum quod possibile est, etc. Nam homo, ut ibidem dicitur, licet sit parvus quantitate, tamen est magnus potestate. Praeterea *primo Ethicorum* dicit Aristoteles quod felicitas hominis non est de <genere> laudabilium, sed honorabilium ; sed scire felicitas est hominis, secundum Aristotelem in *quarto Ethicorum*.” (*Anon. Giele* 1.5; p. 29.28‒38) [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. For the entire debate, see Introduction to the critical edition of *De intellectu* (ed. Spruit, Brill, 2011), especially the passage about Siger’s lost works (pp. 18–24). For the content of the work, see Steenberghen 1977, 360–63. The later dating of the lost writing around 1277 is clear from Nifo’s remarks that Siger sent this treatise to Aquinas in response to *De unitate intellectus* (1270). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. The anonymous comments on the central part of the scientific evidence (*Anal. Post*. 79b39–b2), whereby this sentence provides the key: “Iterum, illud de quo est scientia oportet quod habeat passiones: scientia enim est generis subiecti partes et passiones considereans: *libro Posteriorum*.” (M 1.1.2; pp. 138.20–23). The note mentions the principle *inmediate*, that is, the definition of the real, as *subiectum* given substance of the proof (τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, *Anal. Post*. 75b1‒2). [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. “Quarto exigitur quod cognitio subiecti primo occurrat intellectui circa naturam illam et in scientia illa, quia cognitio subiecti in scientia est principium omnium aliorum, quia principia fundantur in ratione subiecti; item cognitio subiecti est principium cognitionis propriae passionis, cum subiectum ponatur in ratione eius: ideo subiectum debet esse tale quod eius cognitio primo occurrat intellectui in scientia illa.” (O 1.1.2, p. 138.22‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. “Primi philosophi sit considerare de ente secundum quod ens, pertinet etiam ad ipsum considerare de eo quod est actus entis. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est substantia et actus corporis sensibilis, et sic pertinet ad considerationem naturalis…” (M I.2, p. 142.29‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. “Philosophus autem primus considerat ens inquantum ens; et omne ens quod refertur ad sub­stantiam sensibilem est de consideratione physici.” (O 1.2, p. 142.23‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. “Commentator septimo Metaphysicae dicit quod materia metaphysicae considerationis est, secundum quod ens est vel substantia quaedam; secundum tamen quod est subiectum alicuius transmutationis, sic est physicae considerationis.” (O 1.2, p. 143.32‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. “Et loquendo de tali universali, dico quod posterius est, quoniam illud quod sequitur ipsa particularia ex operatione intellectus est posterius particularibus; universalia sunt huiusmodi: dicuntur enim universalia  
     quia actu intellecta; et intellectus agens est qui agit universalitatem in rebus; unde universale in actu est aliquid aggregatum ex natura rei ei intentione superaddita…” (M 1.9, p. 164.24‒29) [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. The manuscript O exactly summarizes the position of the manuscript M at this point: “Item, conceptus ipsius intellectus est intellectu concipi ente sicut sensatio in sensu; sed universalia conceptus quidam sunt: dicit enim Themistius quod genus est conceptus sine hypostasi, quia ei nihil respondet in re, ex tenui similitudine singularium collectus; item Commentator undecimo Metaphysicae; universalia sunt in intellectu collecta ex singularibus, ab anima faciente ea intentionem unam.” (O 1.8; p. 157.11‒14). [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. “Et iterum, cum agens sit nobilior patiente, necesse est quod sit aliquid nobilius intellectu possibili; et ideo oportet quod illud sit intellectus agens, qui per se movet ipsum intellectum possibilem agendo de potentia universali actu universale.” (M 1.10, p. 168.44‒47) [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. “Sed quomodo hoc contingat, intelligendum quod secundum Quosdam in phantasmatibus, quæ se habent ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, non est ratio universalis in actu, sed in potentia. Tunc igitur intellectus agens, ab huiusmodi intentione vel ratione universali in potentia circumscribens principia individuantia, facit quod illud quod erat potentia universale est actu universale: et ita intellectus agens per se agit universale, universale autem factum in actu movet intellectum possibilem; propter quod Quidam dixerunt universale praeexistere in rebus operationi intellectus.” (M 1.10, p. 168.48‒56) [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. “Sed contra: illud quod generatur per se est aggregatum ex materia et forma, quia non forma per se, quoniam tunc esset aggregatum; nec materia, quoniam tunc haberet aliquam materiam; sed universale non est aliquod aggregatum per se; ergo per se non generatur; intellectus ergo agens non agit universale per se.” (M 1.10, p. 168.57‒61) [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. “Ratio autem Thomae est haec, quod intelligere fit secundum ipsum intellectum; sed intelligere attribuitur non solum intellectui sed etiam homini ipsi; hoc autem non contingeret si anima intellectiva haberet esse separatum a materia et corpore. Unde et Philosophus in *secundo* De anima*,* quia anima est qua intelligimus, concludit eam esse actum et perfectionem corporis.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, pp. 81.92‒82.97) [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. “Sed intelligendum quod difficultas aliqua in cognitione animae potest esse ex parte substantiae animae vel ex parte nostra. Non autem est difficultas cognitionis ex parte animae, quoniam quod multum habet de natura entitatis maxime cognoscibile est; anima est huiusmodi; et ideo ipsa multum est cognoscibilis; et ideo non est ex parte substan­tiae animae difficultas in cognitione eius, sed ex parte nostra, quoniam non possumus devenire in cognitionem principiorum operationum nisi ex cognitione passionum et operationum…” (M 1.7, p. 155.23‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. “Item, intelligendum quod aliquando agit per medium ut per instrumentum; agit enim intellectus agens in possibilem per principia prima; unde agit conclusiones in intellectu possibili per principia prima; tamen prima principia agit in ipsum sine medio. Quia ergo intellectus refertur ad rem et naturam rei quæ sunt multiplicata in particularibus, particularia autem referuntur ad intellectum per accidens, quia natura illorum est intellecta per aliquid quod est in intellectu, ideo verum est dicere quod intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus: verbi gratia: scientia refertur ad scibile; si autem aliquis generaret scientiam sub ratione scientiae, generaret scibile in actu.” (O 1.10, p. 170.91‒101) [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. “Et hoc est concedendum, quod rationes intelligendi manent, ipso intellectu non considerante actu. Istae autem rationes intelligendi sunt illud quo intellectus considerat secundum actum, et se habent ad intellectum et ad considerare secundum actum…” (O 2.19, p. 229.79‒82) [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. “Ad aliud dico quod non est simile, quia intellectus movetur ab intelligibilibus; intelligibilia autem, secundum quod intelligibilia, non sunt entia in actu, ut universalia, sed in potentia tantum; quare universalia secundum quod sunt in rerum natura, non possunt agere intellectum possibilem in actu; ideo, ut educatur de potentia ad actum, exigitur aliquid actu, cuiusmodi est intellectus agens.” (O 2.18, p. 226.57‒62) [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. “Et dico quod forma prius est substantia secundum esse et naturam, quia omnia alia habent rationem substantiae per formam: esse et subsistere sunt in materia et composito per formam: materia enim subsistit per formam; item compositum non habet esse nisi per formam per quam participat istud; si ergo hoc est primo substantia, in quo reperitur primo ratio esse et subsistendi, tunc hoc erit forma, et ita forma est prius substantia secundum naturam.” (O 2.1; p. 197.52‒58) [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. “(...) sed perspicuum in superioribus est incorruptibile, in inferioribus corruptibile; quare. Item, nec est penitus diversae rationis, quia perspicuum utrobique recipit lumen ut suum actum, et lumen non est alterius rationis et alterius penitus, quia eodem sensu judicamus utrumque: sed reperitur perspicuum in inferioribus secundum proportionem quamdam in superioribus. Unde per prius dicitur de perspicuo in superioribus, et per posterius in inferioribus.” (O 2.27; p. 250.23‒29) [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. “Intelligendum quod perspicuitas idem est quod transparentia et passio quaedam secundum quam perspicuum recipit lumen, et perspicuum non est nisi potentia receptiva luminis; et ideo lumen est actus perspicui. In superioribus autem et inferioribus perspicuum non est penitus unius rationis, quoniam corruptibile et incorruptibile non sunt unius rationis penitus; sed diaphanum in superioribus est incorruptibile, in inferioribus autem corruptibile; ideo etc.” (M 2.27, p. 250.18‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. This argument of the so-called “averroistic” unity of the intellectus possibilis can be found in Aegidius: “Nam si esset unus intellectus possibilis numero, tunc intellectus speculativus esset aeternus et ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis, quia, ex quo recipiens est aeternum et agens aeternum, necesse est, ut receptum sit aeternum.” (*De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* 1; ed. Olszewski, p. 113.153‒56) [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. “Sed arguatur quod intellectus speculativus non numeretur numeratione hominum, et etiam quod intellectus possibilis non sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus, per rationes quas ponit Commentator contra seipsum.” (O 3.7; p. 314.51‒54) [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. “Item, species existentes in phantasmatibus nostris existunt sub conditionibus individuantibus; secundum quod actu sunt intelligibiles, necesse est quod sint actu abstractae a phantasmatibus. Si sic, intellectus non potest, nobis uniri per formam, videlicet per speciem intelligibilem quam vocat Commentator formam intellectus speculativi.” (O 3.7.6; p. 316.13‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. “Commentator ponit quod intellectus possibilis sit, unus numero omnium et quod sit, aeternus sicut species humana. Ex hoc arguitur quod nullus hominum nunc existentium possit intelligere: quia non intelligimus nisi ex hoc quod species quae sunt in phantasmatibus recipiuntur in intellectu possibili; et sequitur hoc quod, quia est unus numero intellectus et recepit omnes species intelligibiles, erit plenus formis.” (O 3.7.4; p. 316.1‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. “Item, non tenent viam Commentatoris, quia, quamvis Commentator ponat intellectum possibilem esse substantiam separatam secundum esse, non tamen ponit intellectum intelligere, sed homines per intellectum.” (O 3.7; p. 317.30‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. “De isto contradicebant Aristoteles et Avicenna. Dixit autem Avicenna quod, cum intellectus non intelligat, non manent species intelligibiles; et ex hoc motus fuit quod, praesente activo passivo, necessario fit actio: et posuit in sphaera activorum et passivorum intelligentiam motricem, ad quam convertens se intellectus, intelligit; et quando divertit se intellectus ab illa intelligentia, non intelligit. Sed illud est contra Aristotelem, et est idem cum positione Platonis.” (O 3.11; p. 324.18‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. “Ista autem species se habet ad intellectum possibilem sic videlicet sicut movens instrumentale, quia quod quid est extra est movens principale, et ipsum non est simul cum intellectu qui movetur, nisi per similitudinem. Et ideo ista species non est illud quod principaliter intelligitur, sed est illud quo intelligitur quod quid est, cuius est species seu similitudo. Et verum est quod ista similitudo ex consequenti potest intelligi, et hoc erit accessorie, ut dicit Commentator.” (O 3.10; p. 321.27‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. “Aliqui dixerunt quod intellectus agens est, habitus intellectus possibilis, et diversificati sunt: Quidam enim dixerunt quod est habitus acquisitus et Quidam ut innatus. Sed neutri verum dixerunt, quia non potest esse habitus innatus, quia sic intellectus possibilis non esset sicut tabula nuda; item, nec potest esse habitus acquisitus, quia omne quod recipitur in intellectu nostro, tantum est potentia intelligibile, et cum intellectus possibilis sit tantum in potentia, non vadit ad actum intelligendi de se.” (O 3.16, p. 332.18‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. “Nulla lex est vera, licet possit esse utilis.” (Aegidius Romanus, *De erroribus Philosophorum*; ed. Mandonnet, p. 11.15) [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. “Et ideo credo esse dicendum quod intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis sint diversae potentiae animae; tamen sunt potentiae eiusdem substantiae animae. Quod patet, quia, secundum Commentatorem, duas operationes animae experimur in nobis, abstrahere intelligibilia et percipere intelligibilia, quae differunt inter se; et etiam obiecta istorum differunt, quia obiectum virtutis abstrahentis est phantasma singulare, obiectum recipientis est phantasma abstractum: et ideo differunt istae potentiae. Et quod sint potentiae eiusdem substantiae animae patet…” (O 3.17; p. 334.25‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. “Et quando dicitur quod primum principium est quod naturaliter venit ad habentem, et etiam Commentator dicit quod prima principia speculabilia sunt nobis innata, dicendum quod principia respectu conclusionum et principiatorum sunt nobis innata; non tamen simpliciter sunt innata. Et etiam hoc dicit quia non fiunt nobis nota ex alio, sicut conclusiones.” (O 3.20; p. 337.25‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. This point of view corresponds to Aquinas’s view of 1267: “Intellectus autem possibilis recipit species alterius generis quam sint in imaginatione; cum intellectus possibilis recipiat species universales, et imaginatio non continuat nisi particulares. Et ideo in intelligibilibus indigemus intellectua agente, non autem in sensibilibus alia potentia activa; sed omnes potentiae sensitivae sunt potentiae passivae.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De anima*, a. 4, ad 5; ed. Marietti, p. 296b) [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. “Sicut una et eadem natura est, quæ consideratur cum condicionibus et sine condicionibus, ita una et eadem species esse poterit, quæ informabit phantasiam et intellectum, et tunc intellectus copulabitur nobis per formam suam. Et ista est sententia Commentatoris, quia vult, quod intellectus copuletur nobis per intentiones imaginatas, quæ sunt quasi forma ipsius. Et quia intellectus copulatur nobis per formam suam, sequitur ex hoc, quod ipse intellectus quodammodo sit forma nostra, licet non eodem modo, sicut aliae formae sunt formae nostrae.” (*De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* 2; ed. Olszewski,p. 122.379‒85) [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. “Quia non unitur [ie. intellectus] nobis, secundum quod huiusmodi phantasmata respicit, sed magis sic a nobis separatur, quia quamdiu species est in phantasia, non est forma intellectus possibilis, ut autem a phantasia est separata et abstrac­ta, sic efficitur forma intellectus possibilis. Tamen accidit intellectui, ut est unitus nobis, respicere phantasmata, quia isto modo magis est separatus quam unitus.” (*De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* 3; ed. Olszewski,p. 128.523‒29) [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. “Praeterea, Commentator dicit, in II Metaphys. quod si substantiae abstractae non possent intelligi a nobis, tunc natura otiose egisset, quia fecit illud quod est naturaliter in se intellectum, non intellectum ab aliquo. Sed nihil est otiosum sive frustra in natura.” (ST I, q. 88, a.1, arg. 4; ed. Leonina 5, 364) [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. “Sed tamen Averroes, in Comment. tertii de anima, ponit quod in fine in hac vita homo pervenire potest ad hoc quod intelligat substantias separatas, per continuationem vel unionem cuiusdam substantiae separatae nobis, quam vocat intellectum agentem, qui quidem, cum sit substantia separata, naturaliter substantias separatas intelligit.” (ibid, a. 1, ad 4; ed. Leonina 5, 365). [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. The treatise conducts the debate with an imaginary opponent in the style of classical *disputatio*. This genre of quodlibetal discourse was analyzed after the year 1277 in a study on the argumentative approach of Henry of Ghent (*Quodlibeta, Summa*; König-Pralong 2008). Henry’s view of the debate given in the first person was analyzed by Porro 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. “Uno modo aliquid dicitur esse actus corporis prout est subiective in corpore, ut videre eb actus oculi, et haec potentia videndi subjective est in oculo. Alio modo aliquid dicitur esse actus corporis prout est in corpore obiective, sicut anima. Et ita anima bene exercet suas operationes in corpore obiective et non subiective.” (*Quaestiones* 1.2; ed. Bazán, p. 392.40‒44) [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. See the passage in Aegidius Romanus which corresponds in meaning: “Hoc pro tanto dictum est, quia intelligere non fit sine phantasmate et sine organo corporali, non quod ipse intellectus phantasmate indigeat ut subiecto, sed ut obiecto.” (*De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* 3; ed. Olszewski, p. 135.675‒78) [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. “Unde verum est si in cognoscendo animam a posteriori procedimus de obiectis ad operationes, et ultra de actibus ad potentias, et tunc de potentiis ad substantiam. Iste modus enim facilis est. Et tunc dico ad auctoritatem «propter haec utraque» etc., quod Philosophus intellexit a posteriori modo.” (*Quaestiones* 1.5; ed. Bazán, p. 398.55‒59) [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. “In oppositum est Philosophus et omnes alii qui volunt quod corpus animatum sit subiectum huius libri, et non anima.” (*Quaestiones* 1.3; ed. Bazán, p. 393.21‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. “Et dicis quod anima est simplex et potentiae sunt multae, so ergo non potest facere potentias, dico: quamvis anima per se non possit facere potentias, tamen mediantibus organis potest facere potentias et hoc est per accidens.” (*Quaestiones* 2.4, ed. Bazán, p. 409.49‒52) [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. “Avicenna enim dicit: completum et incompletum non diversificant essentiam; sed materia est tamquam incompletum, forma est tamquam completum; ergo materia et forma non diversificant essentiam, sed sunt tantum una essentia.” (*Quaestiones*2.10; ed. Bazán, p. 418.6‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. “Ad primum, cum dicitur opinione Avempace et Avicennae quod lumen requiritur propter colorem et non propter medium, dico quod opinio eorum est falsa. Ergo dictum illorum non valet.” (*Quaestiones*2.18; ed. Bazán, p. 432.33‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. “Alii dicunt, quod lux non habet esse firmum et ratum in natura, sed est tantum intentio: sicut enim dicitur, quod species coloris per aerem ad pupillam delata, in aere non habet esse naturale, sed spirituale (unde et per eamdem partem aeris species albedinis et nigredinis deferuntur), ita etiam intentio corporis lucidi in aere relicta est lumen. (…) Et haec opinio valde probabilis est.” (*Super Sent*., lib. 2, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 334) [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. “Hoc etiam patet per Commentatorem et per Themistium, dicentes quod intellectus non est virtus organica: quia intellectus et anima intellectiva idem sunt, et omne organicum est corruptibile, ergo anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis.” (*Quaestiones*3.3; ed. Bazán, p. 471.37‒40) [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. “Commentator voluit quod anima intellectiva esset separata a corpore quod non valet.” (*Quaestiones* 3.6, p. 477.43‒44) [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. “Propter quod sicut universale numquam secundum esse potest separari, quin habeat esse in aliquo particulari, sic numquam potest intelligi ab intellectu nisi in phantasia alicuius particularis rei.” (*Expositio super libros De anima*, 3.39, f. 75rа; Zitat nach Olszewski 2012, p. 44) [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. “Quod autem potentia materiae primae sit quoddam essentiale, ratio huius est quia illud est essentiale alicuius quod immediate concomitatur essentiam illius; sed potentia immediate concomitatur essentiam materiae primae; ergo materiae primae potentia est essentiale, quod essentiale est medium quoddam inter substantiam et accidens, quod tamen nec est materiae primae substantia nec accidens.” (*Quaestiones*2.35; ed. Bazán, p. 456.27‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. “In oppositum est Philosophus in *tertio De anima* dicens: «necesse est inteligentem phantasmata speculari», idest quandocumque aliquis vult intelligere aliqua, necesse est prius speculari phantasmata illius quod debet intelligere: sed phantasmata non potest speculari sine organo corporali; ergo anima intellectiva non habet in hoc saeculo propriam operationem sine corpore.” (*Quaestiones* 3.4, ed. Bazán, p. 473.25‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. “Et dicis quod omnes venae radicantur circa cerebrum, nego. Et tu probas auctoritate Medicorum, dico quod omnes venae concurrunt circa cor, et ilii sunt magis et spiritualiter quam circa cerebrum.” (*Quaestiones* 2.40; ed. Bazán, p. 465.49‒51) [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. “Dicente Commentatore: ‘Virtus cogitativa apud Aristotelem est distinctiva individualis et est in medio cerebri.’ Haec est etiam sententia Avicennae VI. Naturalium et AIgazelis.“ (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 7, resp.; ed. Spettmann, p. 75.32‒35) Next, we find the same statement: “Damascenus etiam dicit, II. lib., cap. 20, quod imaginativum per sensus suscipiens materias tradit cogitativo et discretivo, et inde traditur memorativo, cuius organum est posterior ventriculus cerebri. Item Avicenna dicit VI. Naturalium...” (ibid, q. 29, p. 197.6‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. “Et dicis quod anima intellectiva exercet suam operationem sine organo corporali, nego. Ad probationem dico quod anima intellectiva bene exercet suam operationem sine organo corporali subjective, non tamen objective, quia necesse est intelligentem phantasmata speculari…” (*Quaestiones* 3.4; ed. Bazán, p. 473.44‒50) [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. “Ad secundum, cum dicitur: si intellectus esset in pura potentia, tunc intellectus differret a materia prima, nego. Et tu probas quia, sicut intellectus est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sic materia prima est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes formas, dico quod non est simile, quia materia prima est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes formas naturales et particulares, sed intellectus est potentia ad recipiendum omnes formas intelligibilis et spirituales et intentionales, et intellectus est materia prima ad hoc. Hoc non obstante maxime differunt.” (*Quaestiones*3.5; ed. Bazán, p. 475.52‒60) [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. “Ad hoc quod dicit quod materia prima est simplicior quam materia animae, quia in anima est contracta, dico quod non omnis additio vel contractio minuit simplicitatem, sed illa quæ est per rem materialem. V. g. intellectus, cum acquirit cognitionem rei ignotae, determinatur per speciem intelligentem nec tamen propter hoc minuitur eius simplicitas. Forma igitur materiae rationalis animae, quia simplex est, materiae animae simplicitatem non minuit, sed perficit.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 1, solutio, ad 20; ed. Spettmann, p. 11.14‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. “Amplius: species intelligitur, cum iam unita intellectui spoliata est a conditionibus materialibus omnino et unita intellectui secundum se. Ergo omnis talis species aequaliter se haberet ad omnes, si esset intellectus unus.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, solutio, ad 20; ed. Spettmann, p. 48.21‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. “Et dicis quod hoc esset impossibile quod anima intellectiva esset individua, nego, imo non est impossibile. Et tu probas: si anima intellectiva esset individua, tunc non posset causare speciem universalis, quia quidquid recipitur per modum recipientis et non recepti recipitur, et ita, quia anima est particularis, species universalis etiam est, dico ad hoc quod, quia anima est particularis, ergo ista species universalis est particularis, tamen in quantum ista species est similitudo plurium, sic est universalis.” (*Quaestiones*3.6; ed. Bazán, p. 478.68‒75) [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. “In oppositum est Philosophus in littera, dicens quod «aliud est magnitudo», idest individuum, «et magnitudinis esse», idest quidditas rei, sive universale.” (*Quaestiones*3.7; ed. Bazán, p. 479.24‒26) [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. “Esse naturale sequitur esse magnitudinis. Sed esse magnitudinis corporis gloriosi est sublimatum super omnem magnitudinem corporum caelestium per dotem subtilitatis. Ergo et esse naturale eiusdem consequens magnitudinem est sublimatum super omnem proprietatem naturalem cuiuslibet corporis.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 19; ed. Spettmann, p. 152.28‒32) [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. “Et nota tamen quod non est ita intelligendum quod species rei et intellectus sunt idem, quod intellectus intelligat speciem rei; sed intellectus intelligit primo et principaliter quidditatem rei mediante specie, et tunc, ex quadam relucentia intellectus, intellectus intelligit speciem rei.” (*Quaestiones* 3.8; ed. Bazán, p. 482.43‒47) [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. “Universale non est in anima, sed similitudo eius; sed sicut singulare in natura non est sine universali, ita nec species singularis sine specie universalis. Recipit ergo intellectus species particularium. Aliter nunquam praedicaret universale de singulari. Cognoscit ergo particularia, sed non cognoscit ea per intellectum hic et nunc.” (*Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 4, solutio, ad 7; ed. Spettmann, p. 54.33‒37) [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. “Praeterea, hoc quinto sic arguitur ratione Commentatoris, qui vult quod intellectus agens sit separatus a nobis dicens: si intellectus agens nobis coniunctus esset, tunc ipse esset individuus, et si esset individuus, tunc ipse non posset causare universalitatem in rebus; et quia intellectus agens causat universalitatem in rebus, ergo intellectus agens est separatus a nobis. In oppositum est Aristoteles in littera, dicens...” (*Quaestiones*3.12; ed. Bazán, p. 489.33‒38) [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. Spettmann's monograph (*Die Psychologie des Johannes Pecham*, 1919) clearly distinguishes the different positions on the unity of person, soul and intellect between Aristotelians and Avicennists, and between Aquinas and Siger, who remains an Averroist even in this precise study. On the one-sidedness of Kilwardby at Oxford, who by his own words never understood the argument for the unity of the substantial form in man, see, e.g., Larsen 2011, 30–38. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. “Ad aliud dico quod non est simile, quia intellectus movetur ab intelligilibus; intelligilia autem, secundum quod intelligilia, non sunt entia in actu, ut universalia, sed in potentia tantum; quare universalia secundum quod sunt in rerum natura, non possunt agere intellectum possibilem in actu; ideo, ut educatur de potentia ad actum, exigitur aliquid in actu, cuismodi est intellectus agens.” (O 2.18, p. 226.57‒64) [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. “At vero quando intellectus se convertit supra ipsum esse essentiae et videt quod illud sit commune multis, tunc dicit quod illud esse sit quid universale. Ideo cognitio essentiae est intentio prima. Dico 'prima' quia est obiectum intellectus secundum lationem primam. Cognitio autem universalis est intentio secunda. Dico 'secunda' quia est obiectum intellectus non secundum lationem primam, sed prout reflectit se supra illud quod cognovit et nunc videt esse commune multis.” (*Quodlibet* II, q. 6; ed. De Conninc, p. 62b‒63a) [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. The rehabilitation of Siger as the first intellectual of the West and his vocation as a philosopher was carried out by R. Imbach and F.-X. Putallaz (*Profession: philosophe. Siger de Brabant*, 1977). Alain de Libera later analyzed problematic parts of the decree of 1277 by using in the model “*le* *système du sexe*” (Libera 1991, 181–245) and developed the concept of “*l′averroïsme éthique*” (Libera 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. “Essa è la luce etterna di Sigieri, / che, leggendo nel Vico de li Strami, / silogizzò invidïosi veri.” (*Paradiso* 10.136–38) [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. The citation of Arendt’s “*notre héritage n’est précédé d’aucun testament*” in the introduction of the essays on modernity (*Between Past and Future*) is taken from the collection *Feuillets d’Hypnos* (1946). René Char wrote it in the years 1943–44, when he was fighting against fascism in the French Résistance. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. “Dicendum enim quod intellectivum non radicatur in eadem anima simplici cum vegetativo et sensitivo, sicut vegetativum et sensitivum radicantur in eadem simplici, sed radicatur cum ipsis in eadem anima composita. Unde cum intellectus simplex sit, cum advenit, tum in suo adventu unitur vegetativo et sensitivo, et sic ipsa unita non faciunt animam simplicem, sed compositam.” (QIIIDA*,* q. 1; ed. Bazán, p. 3.58‒64) [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. “Per hoc patet ad illud quod dicit Averroes quod Aristoteles opinatur vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum esse unam animam in subiecto. Verum est: unam compositam, non autem unam simplicem.” (QIIIDA*,* q. 1; ed. Bazán, p. 3.65‒68) [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. “(…) intellectus enim, qui Primum Agens, est in fine bonitatis et simplicitatis et perfectionis. Intellectus autem noster non est in fine bonitatis, simplicitatis et perfectionis cum sit ei admixta potentia. Est intellectus noster potentia unumquodque intelligibilium et etiam intelligit cum phantasmate.” (QIIIDA*,* q. 2; ed. Bazán, p. 5.36‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. “Propter quod dicitur a Quibusdam quod duplex est materia, intelligibilis et non, scilicet materia sensibilis. Sed contra hoc est Aristoteles. Dicit enim quod materia quæ est intelligibilis est illa eadem sensibilis. Unde, licet in mathematicis sit materia sensibilis intelligibilis, nihilominus illa quantum ad suum esse est sensibilis.” (QIIIDA*,* q. 6; ed. Bazán, p. 19.44‒47) [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. “Positio ergo Aristotelis et Averrois est quod in quo nulla est transmutatio, in eo nulla est materia secundum ipsos. Et hoc est verum.” (QIIIDA, q. 6; ed. Bazán, p. 20.77‒79) [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. “Dicit enim Aristoteles in principio *octavi* *Physicorum* quod omne agens faciens de novo est transmutatum. Si ergo Prima Causa aliquid facit de novo, oportet quod sua voluntas sit nova et quod transmutetur. Sed sua voluntas est sua actio. Oporteret ergo quod sua actio esset nova et transmutaretur, si aliquid faceret de novo. Et propterea, cum hoc sit inconveniens, eo propter hoc ipse dicit mundum esse aeternum.” (QIIIDA, q. 2; ed. Bazán, p. 6.55‒61) [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. “Transmutatio enim omnis est de opposito in oppositum, quæ non possunt simul esse. Omnis ergo transmutatio est in tempore, ex quo opposita, inter quæ est transmutatio, non possunt esse simul.” (QIIIDA, q. 3; ed. Bazán, p. 9.23‒26) [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. “Hoc autem non ostedunt, sed unum falsum supponunt: quod species humana non possit esse facta sempiterna a Deo nisi facta sit in aliquo individuo determinato et aeterno, sicut species caeli facta est aeterna.” (*De aeternitate mundi* 2; ed. Bazán, p. 120.52‒55) [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. “Et si [Agens Primus] voluit ab aeterno intellectum fieri aeternum, intellectus factus est aeternus, quia aliter volitum suum non fieret secundum formam voluntatis suae. Qui ergo voluerit scire utrum intellectus factus sit de novo vel factus sit aeternus, oportet eum investigare formam voluntatis Primi. Sed quis erit qui eam investigabit?” (QIIIDA, q. 2; ed. Bazán, p. 7.70‒75) [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. “Nihil implicans in se contradictionem possibile est esse. Creatio est huiusmodi. Ergo non potest esse. Probatio minoris: unde per creationem ponitur esse aliquod novum factum et novum verum, ponitur apud creationem esse mutatio quaedam, quia sicut dicitur *nono Metaphysicae*, in immobilibus quod aliquando verum semper verum; et ideo aliquando esse verum et aliquando non esse verum est nisi in his quæ mutationi sunt adiuncta.” (*Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, q. 20, item 6; ed. Marlasca, p. 84.26‒32) [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. “Et si tu quaeras: si voluit intellectum fieri aeternum, quare magis voluit sic quam quod factus esset de novo, dico quod sic voluit, quia voluit. Voluntas enim eius non dependet a rebus sicut voluntas nostra, quæ licet non possit cogi a rebus, tamen trahitur et excitatur a rebus. Voluntas autem Primi nec a rebus cogitur nec trahitur.” (QIIIDA, q. 2; ed. Bazán, p. 7.76‒80) [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. “Dico autem quod, licet non sit necessaria positio Aristotelis, sicut ostensum est, ipsa tamen est probabilior quam positio Augustini, quia non possumus inquirere novitatem vel aeternitatem facti a voluntate Primi, scilicet quod non possumus cogitare formam voluntatis suae.” (QIIIDA, q. 2; ed. Bazán, p. 7.81‒85) [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. “Et sic intellectus, quantum est de natura propria, est factum aeternum et de novo. Propter hoc positio Aristotelis probabilior est quam positio Augustini. Si igitur credatur Aristoteli, planum est quod non est credendum Augustino. Si vero credatur Augustino, erit aequaliter.” (QIIIDA, q. 2; ed. Bazán, p. 8.94‒99) [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. “Unde nota quod duplex est universale: quoddam est universale quod est intentio pura universalis abstracta, non praedicabilis de particularibus extra; aliud est universale quod non est intentio pura, sed est forma realis, existens in pluribus, praedicabilis de eisdem.” (QIIIDA, q. 18; ed. Bazán, pp. 68.10‒69.13) [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. “Nam, ut dictum est, unum quod convertitur cum ente non praedicat dispositionem additam ipsi enti, convertibile existens cum eo in suppositis. Unum autem quod est principium numeri significat dispositionem additam rei substantiae, ut rationem primae mensurae, quod est de ratione quantitatis, ut apparebit X° *huius*; ex quo sequitur quod unum istud non est convertibile cum ente in suppositis.” (*Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* IV, q. 2, comm. 2; ed. Maurer, p. 137.15‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. “Primo autem probat quod scientia ista considerat ens inquantum ens per hoc quod scientia ista considerat causas primas et prima principia, ut probatum est I° *huius*; haec autem sunt principia et causae entis inquantum ens.” (*Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* IV, proem.; ed. Maurer, p. 135.5‒8) [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. “Ideo quaeritur hic utrum entis secundum quod ens sint causae et principia. Et quod non videtur, primo auctoritate Avicennae *primo Tractatu*. Dicit enim expresse quod ens secundum quod ens causas et principia non habet.” (*Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* IV, q. 1; ed. Maurer, p. 135.3‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. “Item, unum et ens praedicata de aliis entibus, solum praedicant naturas ipsorum; ex quo patet quod sunt substantialia praedicata de entibus. Et hoc in principio huius operis fuit ostensum, quamvis Avicenna diceret oppositum, sicut recitat hic Commentator. Una autem causa deceptionis Avicennae fuit, quia non distinxit inter unum quod convertitur cum ente et unum quod est principium numeri, cum tamen multum differant.” (*Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* IV, q. 2, comm. 2; ed. Maurer, p. 137.9‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. “Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod unaquaeque res causata est ens per dispositionem additam essentiae suae. Et secundum eos res et ens significant duas intentiones. Et fuit haec opinio Avicennae, ut superius arguebatur. Fuit etiam opinio Alberti**.** Et ratio eius ad hoc est quia res est id quod est per essentiam suam et non per causam aliam. Res tamen est per aliam causam, ut homo est homo per se et non per aliam causam; homo tamen est per causam aliam: esse enim hominis est ex alio, ut ex Primo. Quare differt homo et esse hominis.” (*Quaestiones in metaphysicam*, introductio, q. 7; ed. Maurer, p. 32.67‒74) [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. “Deinde dixit: *et quomodo est formare per intellectum* [πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν, *De anima* 439a13]*.* Idest, et prius est perscrutandum quomodo est formare per intellectum, utrum sit actio aut receptio; scire enim actiones anime prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam.” (CMDA III.1; 380.37‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. “Dicit Commentator super hunc *tertium* quod ‘scire actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam’. Ergo actio intellectus facit nos scire substantiam eius et sic, per consequens, si est generabilis aut non.” (QIIIDA, q. 4; ed. Bazán, p. 12.67‒70) [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. The phenomenological hermeneutics, which provided the basis for the fundamental understanding of the first substance named *Dasein*, experienced a fundamental Aristotelian impulse in the summer semester of 1922 (see GA 62). Because of his admission to the University of Marburg, Heidegger worked out the so-called *Natorp-Bericht* as an associate professor of philosophy. The passage entitled *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)* presents the program of new hermeneutics, which was completed in the work *Sein und Zeit* (1927). [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. “Veritas est quod intelligimus cum phantasmate abstractione formae intelligibilis, sed in ipso actu intelligendi non utitur intellectus organo. Unde sub phantasmatibus sensibilibus intellectus accipit quidditates rerum insensibiles, quod non faceret imaginatio vel sensus.” (QIIIDA, q. 4; ed. Bazán, p. 14.10‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. “Si tu quaeres: qualiter ergo experimur acceptionem formae com­munis in nobis fieri ab intellectu? Numquid est igitur haec ei propria operatio? Dico quod quodammodo est ei propria operatio, et dico quod hoc experimur, quia intellectus noster est quodammodo sicut aliquid compositum ex materia et forma: in toto enim potentia percipitur operatio quæ debetur formae unde forma est, et etiam quæ debetur materiae unde materia est.” (QIIIDA, q. 4; ed. Bazán, p. 14.16‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. “Nos enim conscii sumus ex virtutibus corporis intellectum. Et percipimus operationes quæ in nobis sunt vel fiunt ratione virtutum corporis et materiae, et similiter nos percipimus operationes quæ fiunt in nobis ratione intellectus. Unde ipse est intellectus noster, per quem experimur huiusmodi acceptionem universalem fieri in nobis. Intellec­tus enim noster apprehendit se ipsum sicut operari. Si ergo accipiantur praedicta, liquebit intellectum esse immaterialem et sic ingenerabilem.” (QIIIDA, q. 4; ed. Bazán, p. 14.22‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. “Intellectus perficit corpus, non per suam substantiam, sed per suam potentiam, quia, si per suam substantiam perficeret, non esset separabilis. Averroes attendens hoc insecundo dixit: cum non utatur corpore, non potest ipsum perficere per suam substantiam, quod attendens Aristoteles dixit insecundo quod intellectus nullius corporis est ad substantiam actus, id est, nullius partis corporis, ita quod legatur transitive.” (QIIIDA, q. 7; ed. Bazán, p. 23.38‒44) [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. “Consequenter quaeritur qualiter intellectus nobis copulatur, utrum scilicet sit unus intellectus in omnibus, non numeratus numeratione hominum, vel sit intellectus plurificatus et numeratus secundum numerationem hominum.” (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán, p. 25.3‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. “Item ratio Commentatoris ad illud. Si intellectus numeraretur numeratione hominum, intellectus esset virtus in corpore. Intellectus non est virtus in corpore. Ergo non numeratur numeratione hominum.” (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán, p. 26.10‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. “Ex his praenotantis concluditur quod intellectus, cum sit immaterialis, in eius natura non est quod multiplicetur secundum numerum.” (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán, p. 26.28‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. “Haec videtur esse positio Avicennae, scilicet quod intellectus multiplicetur a principiis corporis.“ (QIIIDA, q. 9, p. 27.39‒40) ... “Et ideo arguit Averroes quod, si intellectus multiplicaretur secundum multiplicationem hominum individuorum, esset virtus in corpore.” (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán p. 27.52‒54) [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. “Unus est intellectus diversorum: eo una enim est substantia intellectus, et similiter una potestas. Ex quo intentionum imaginatarum est una ratio, manifestum quod ipsius est una potestas.” (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán, p. 28.60‒63) [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. „Sensus enim copulatur nobis per partem eius quæ est materia. Sed intellectus copulatur nobis per partem eius quæ est forma. Unde, quia sensus copulatur nobis, ideo sensata copulantur nobis. Non sic de intellectu, sed e converso: non enim per hoc quod intellectus copulatur nobis, ideo intellecta copulantur nobis, sed quia intellecta copulantur nobis.“ (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán, p. 28.65‒70) [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. „Sed si intellectus humanus multiplicetur multiplicatione corporum humanorum erit individuatus per materiam, nam differentia secundum numerum formarum in eadem specie non invenitur nisi in formis per materiam individuatis, ut superius apparuit. Ergo secundum hoc species intelligibilis in intellectu recepta non erit principium cognitionis universalis sed tantum singularis, et non differet secundum hoc intellectus a sensu vel imaginatione. Quae omnia cum falsa sint, multiplicabitur intellectus hominum multiplicatione corporum humanorum per materiam sic individuatus.“ (*Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, q. 27, item 9; ed. Marlasca, p. 110.65‒72) [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. “Unde nota quod, sicut intellectus, quantum est de natura sua, est in potentia ad intentiones imaginatas (sic enim in potentia est ad hoc, ut copuletur nobis), per hoc quod copulatur actu intentionibus imaginatis, cum se haberet in potentia ad illas, per hoc copulatur nobis in actu. Et propter hoc, cum huiusmodi intentiones imaginatae numerentur secundum hominum numerationem, ideo per intentiones imaginatas intellectus numeratur in nobis.” (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán, p. 28.70‒76) [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. “Intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia hiis duobus, scilicet in aliquod simile forme et in aliquod simile materie.” (CMDA III.5; 409.654–62). [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. “Sumit enim ibi oppositum suppositionis Averrois. Cum enim dicitur quod intellecta non continuantur nobis nisi per hoc quod intellectus continuatur nobis, falsum est, immo intellectus non continuatur nobis nisi per hoc quod intellecta nobis.” (QIIIDA, q. 9; ed. Bazán, p. 29.97‒101) [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. “Alii dicunt, et videtur esse positio Alberti, quod intellectui nostro est innata aliqua cognito, ut scilicet primorum principiorum, quæ neminem latent, ut puta de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio, et similia; non quod ipsa sint intellectus agens, sed sunt instrumenta intellectus agentis, per quæ educit intellectum possibilem ad actum. Sed ista positio non valet.” (QIIIDA, q. 12; ed. Bazán, p. 39.102‒107) [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. “Oportet ergo immediatorum principiorum cognitionem esse ante demonstrationem, ex quo est cognitio talis in omni demonstratione supposita, eo quod non nisi ipsa causa existente incipit demonstratio.” (*Analytica posteriora* II.5.1; ed. Borgnet 2, 228a) [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. “Ideo dicit Philosophus, quod principia scimus in quantum terminos cognoscimus. Si autem inductio per se stabiliret intellectum, pro certo impossibile esset evadere conclusionem. Quamvis autem intellectus sit primorum principiorum, quæ necessaria sunt et perficiunt et nobilitant suum posse: tamen modos habet, sicut et aliae virtutes tam morales quam intellectuales.” (*Ethica* VI.2.18; ed. Borgnet 7, 434a) [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. “Et licet dicat Aristoteles quod intellectus agens est id quo est «omnia facere ut ars ad materiam sustinuit», differenter tamen agunt intellectus et ars. Nam ars per se sufficit ad ponendum formam in materia. Non sic intellectus, sed eget intentionibus imaginatis. Hoc dicit Averroes.” (QIIIDA, q. 12; ed. Bazán, p. 39.9‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. “Dico et credo quod intellectui nostro non est innata aliqua cognitio intelligibilium, sed est in pura potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, nullius intus habens innatam cognitionem, sed ex phantasmatibus intelligit quidquid intelligit.” (QIIIDA, q. 12; ed. Bazán, p. 40.14‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. “ldeo credo et dico quod intellectus, etiam secundum quod noster est, particulare particulariter non intelligit, nec primo nec ex consequenti. Intellectus enim noster non est talis ut intelligat per organum**,** sed separatus est secundum utramquepartem suae virtutis, et secundum possibilem et secundum agentem; communicat tamen operanti perorganum.” (QIIIDA, q. 18; ed. Bazán, p. 66.55‒61)  [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. “Unde, cum intellectus in potentia se habeat ad intentiones imaginatas, determinate respicit intentiones imaginatas hominum, eo quod omnes intentiones imaginatae hominum unius rationis sunt. Ideo intellectus unicus in omnibus est et secundum substantiam suam et secundum suam potestatem.” (QIIIDA, q. 11; ed. Bazán, pp. 34.101‒35.5) [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. “Dicit Aristoteles quod anima est locus specierum, scilicet intellectiva. Sed non est locus specierum nisi per actum intelligendi. Quare videtur quod ad actum intelligendi requirantur rationes receptae in intellectu possibili.” (QIIIDA, q. 14; ed. Bazán, p. 46.7‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. “Experimur autem in nobis duas operationes abstractas. Prima operatio abstracta est receptio intelligibilium universalium abstractorum. Alia operatio abstracta, quam in nobis experimur, est abstractio intelligibilium, cum prius essent intentiones imaginatae. Per hoc ergo quod in nobis experimur has duas operationes fieri, scimus quod necesse est in nobis duas virtutes esse, quibus mediantibus fiant istae operationes. Scire enim actiones animae prius est apud nos quam scire eius substantiam.” (QIIIDA, q. 14; ed. Bazán, p. 47.28‒36) [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. “Sed hic nobis dicendum est quod universale non est universale ante conceptum et actum intelligendi, saltem prout est agentis ipse actus, intellectus rei qui est in possibili, cum sit possibilis sicut subiecti, est ipsius agentis ut efficientis. Unde universale non habet formaliter quod ipsum sit tale a natura quæ causat actum intelligendi, sed, ut prius dictum est, hic conceptus et actus est unde universale habet quod sit tale. Sic ergo universalia, secundum quod talia, tantum sunt in anima...” (*De aeternitate mundi* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 126.92‒98) [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. “Commentator solvit: intellectus copulatur humanae speciei, et intellectus copulatur huic individuo humanae speciei. Et intellectus copulatio humanae speciei essentialior est quam copulatio quæ est huic individuo, propter hoc quod humana species aeterna est et quia intellectus qui ei copulatur aeternus est. Copulatio autem intellectus huic individuo humanae speciei minus essentialis est. Unde etiam individuum separatur, licet intellectus a specie humana numquam separetur.” (QIIIDA, q. 14; ed. Bazán, p. 52.78‒84) [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. “Simpliciter autem et respectu speciei semper intelligit hoc universale, nisi species humana deficiat omnino, quod est impossibile…” (CMDA III.20; 448.142‒44) [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. “Quoniam cum sapientiam esse in aliquo modo proprio hominum est sicut modos artificiorum esse in modis propriis hominum, existimatur quod impossibile est ut tota habitatio fugiat a Philosophia, sicut opinandum est quod impossibile est ut fugiat ab artificiis naturalibus.” (CMDA III.5; 408.610‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. “(…) secundum intentionem Philosophi species humana sit aeterna sicut et eius perfectio quæ est anima intellectiva. Et ita videtur quid iudicandum sit de anima secundum apparentia de ipsa: cum enim in opere eius non dependeat ex hoc corpore sicut ex organo corporeo in quo habeat esse, intelligere debet corrumpi, hoc corpore corrupto, sed manere; quia tamen non habet opus sine corpore, nec manet sine corpore nec totaliter videtur a corpore separari.” (*De anima intellectiva* 6; ed. Bazán, p. 98.58‒65) [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. “Et cum dicitur: intentiones intellectae sunt unius intellectus, dico quod, licet intentiones intellectae sint unius intellectus simpliciter in se, tamen sunt secundum quod copulatur isti et non absolute. Similiter alii copulatur. Unde in se intellectus, quantum est de sua natura, eodem modo copulatur omni homini.” (QIIIDA, q. 15; ed. Bazán, pp. 57.18‒58.23) [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. “Adhuc de intellectu agente et possibili intelligendum quod non sunt duae substantiae, sed sunt duae virtutes eiusdem substantiae. Hoc sentit Aristoteles cum dicit in hoctertio quod in unoquoque genere est aliquid quo est omnia facere et aliquod aliud quod est in potentia omnia. In anima intellectu agente et possibili recipimus et abstrahimus ad libitum nostrum. Quare videntur esse virtutes eiusdem substantiae, scilicet intellectus nostri.” (QIIIDA, q. 15, a. 3, solutio, ad 3; ed. Bazán, p. 58.42‒48) [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. “Nam, etsi alie sunt essentie intellectum participantes, non tamen intellectus earum est possibilis ut hominis, quia essentie tales speties quedam sunt intellectuales et non aliud, et earum esse nichil est aliud quam intelligere quod est quod sunt; quod est sine interpolatione, aliter sempiterne non essent. Patet igitur quod ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus intellectiva.” (*Monarchia* 1.3.7; ed. digitalis *Dante Project*) [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. “Et sicut se habet pars ad totum, sic ordo partialis ad totalem. Pars ad totum se habet sicut ad finem et optimum: ergo et ordo in parte ad ordinem in toto, sicut ad finem et optimum.” (*Monarchia* 1.6.1; ed. digitalis *Dante Project*). [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. “Sed praedictis adiciendum est quod uno modo per vivere intelligimus vel possumus intelligere esse primum viventis corporis, et sic dicit Philosophus,secundo De anima, quod vivere viventibus est esse; alio modo per vivere habemus intelligere praedicta opera vitae et animae. Et vivere, utroque modo dictum, est ab anima. Sed non manifestatur vivere primo modo dictum, quod est esse viventium, nec etiam anima in corporibus animatis, nisi per vivere quod est opus animae et vitae.” (*De anima intellectiva* 1, ed. Bazán, p. 72.15‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. “Videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Anima enim est principium vitae per suam essentiam, dicit enim philosophus, in II de anima, quod vivere viventibus est esse.” (STII-II, q. 179, a. 1, arg. 1; ed. Leonina 10, 421) [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. “Omne quod agit et operatur agit per suam formam, et agit aliquid per illud quod est ab eo in esse separatum. Nunc autem, non tantum anima intelligit, sed etiam ipse homo per animam intellectivam. Ergo anima intellectiva est hominis forma et perfectio, et non ab eo in esse separata.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 77.9‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. “Anima intellectiva non cognoscitur nisi ex eius opere, scilicet intelligere. Intelligere autem est quodammodo unitum materiae et quodammodo separatum. Nisi enim intelligere esset unitum aliquo modo ad materiam, non esset verum dicere quod homo ipse intelligit.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 80.67‒70) [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. “Per quem autem modum anima intellectiva sit unita corpori, et separata ab eodem, dicunt praecipui viri in philosophia Albertus et Thomas quod substantia animae intellectivae unita est corpori dans esse eidem, sed potentia animae intellectivae separata est a corpore, cum per organum corporeum non operetur.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 81.78‒82) [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. “Hi sunt pueri duorum ordinum studentium, ut Albertus, et Thomas, et alii, qui ut in pluribus ingrediuntur ordines, quum sunt viginti annorum et infra.” (*Compendium studii philosophiae*, cap. V; ed. Brewer, p. 426) [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. “Certes igitur sum, quod melius esset Latinis, quod sapientia Aristotelis non esset translata, quam tali obscuritate et perversitate tradita, sicut eis qui ponuntur ibi triginta vel quadraginta annos (…) Et quoniam labores Aristotelis sunt fundamenta totius sapientiae, ideo nemo potest aestimare quantum dispendium accidit Latinis, quia malas translationes receperunt philosophi. Et ideo non est remedium plenum ubique.” (*Compendium studii philosophiae*, cap. VII; ed. Brewer, p. 469) [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. “Ratio autem Alberti, quod substantia animae intellectivae debet esse unita corpori dans esse eidem, est ista: quia, cum in homine potentia vegetandi et sentiendi pertineant ad eamdem formam et substantiam ad quam potentia intelligendi, certum est autem substantiam ad quam pertinet potentia vegetandi et sentiendi dare esse materiae et corpori, ergo et substantia ad quam pertinet potentia intelligendi dabit esse materiae et corpori; sed substantiam ad quam pertinet potentia intelligendi dicimus animam intellectivam; anima igitur intellectiva dat esse materiae et corpori.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 81.83‒89) [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. “Ratio autem Thomae est haec, quod intelligere fit secundum ipsum intellectum; sed intelligere attribuitur non solum intellectui sed etiam homini ipsi; hoc autem non contingeret si anima intellectiva haberet esse separatum a materia et corpore. Unde et Philosophus in *secundo* De anima*,* quia anima est qua intelligimus, concludit eam esse actum et perfectionem corporis.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, pp. 81.92‒82.97) [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. “Nam ex tali unione intellectus ad nos, quam Commentator ponit, non sequitur, quod homo intelligat, sed magis quod intelligatur.” (*De plurificatione possibilis intellectus* 3; ed. Olszewski, p. 127.506‒509) [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. “Quaerimus enim hic solum intentionem philosophorum et praecipue Aristotelis, etsi forte Philosophus senserit aliter quam veritas se habeat et sapientia, quæ per revelationem de anima sunt tradita, quæ per rationes naturales concludi non possunt. Sed nihil ad nos nunc de Dei miraculis, cum de naturalibus naturaliter disseramus.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, pp. 83.44‒84.48) [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. “Supponit enim quod potentia vegetandi et potentia sentiendi pertineant ad illam substantiam ad quam pertinet potentia intelligendi, quod non est verum secundum Philosophum et Themistium eius expositorem, et inferius inquiretur.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 83.40‒43) [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. “Thomas etiam intentum non arguit, sed solum quaerit eius ratio quomodo compositum materiale intelligeret, ut homo, si anima intellectiva in essendo sit separata a materia et corpore.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 84.49‒51) [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. “Ex quo etiam patet falsum esse quod dicunt, quod intellectus non est actus corporis, sed ipsum intelligere. Non enim potest esse alicuius actus intelligere, cuius non sit actus intellectus: quia intelligere non est nisi in intellectu, sicut nec visio nisi in visu; unde nec visio potest esse alicuius, nisi illius cuius actus est visus.” (*De unitate intellectus*, cap. 3; ed. Leonina 43, 304.190‒96) [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. “Ubi dicit Themistius aliam rationem esse de intellectivo quia est substantia quaedam dignior sensitivo, veniens ab extrinseco; sensitivum autem, quod non est sine vegetativo, unius est substantiae cum vegetativo.” (*De anima intellectiva* 8; ed. Bazán, p. 109.17‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. “Unde quia intellectus in intelligendo est operans intrinsecum ad corpus per suam naturam, operationes autem intrinsecorum operantium, sive sint motus, sive sint operationes sine motu, attribuuntur compositis ex intrinseco operanti et eo ad quod sic intrinsece operatur, immo etiam apud philosophos intrinseci motores, vel intrinsece ad aliqua operantes, formae et perfectiones eorum appellantur.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 85.80‒85) [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. „Et secundum modum quem dicit Thomas, homo intelligeret non tantum secundum intellectum, sed etiam secundum corpus, sicut et est ipsum videre anima visiva et corpore oculi, propter hoc quod modus unionis animae visivae ad corpus oculi est sicut figurae ad ceram, et formae esse tribuentis ad materiam.“ (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 86.101‒106) [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. The following summary of Aquinas’s teaching sets out the procedure of exposing creation only from God downwards and even in the mode of Porretan “*exsistere*”: “Quindi discende a l'ultime potenze / giu d'atto in atto, tanto divenendo / che piu non fa che brevi contingenze” (*Paradiso* 13.61‒63) Aquinas would certainly have rejected this poetic license. The objectivist solution given by the exposure of being from behind belongs only to Bonaventure’s school of second Averroism. This is given by the comitation of objective exemplars into creation (ch. 4.1.3). [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. “Iam autem hoc dicetur quando assignabitur qualiter anima intellectiva est unita corpori et qualiter ab eo est separata. Et iterum, apparet hominem ipsum non intelligere ex causa quam assignat: quia, si sic, non solum homo ipse intelligeret, sed pars materialis huius compositi, adeo quod intelligere esset in corpore et in organo, ut etiam prius dictum est.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 84.51‒56) [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. “Et dico quod intellectus nobis actu copulatur eo quod intelligit ex intentionibus imaginatis: quia nobis actu copulantur intentiones, ideo intellectus, cum eas intelligit, actu nobis copulatur, ita quod non copulatur nobis per partem eius quæ est materia, sicut sensus est actus corporis per partem eius quæ est materia. Nec intelligo dicere quod intellectus in sui natura aliquam habeat copulationem. De natura sua solum est in potentia ut nobis copuletur. Nisi enim de natura sua esset solum in potentia ut nobis copuletur, copulari autem deberet nobiscum, necesse esset forma et actus corporis nostri per suam substantiam. Et necessarium est ei qui ponit unum intellectum in omnibus, quod hoc sit per intentiones imaginatas.” (QIIIDA, q. 15; ed. Bazán, p. 56.60‒71) [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. „Die Analytik stellt die ontologische Frage nach dem Sein des *sum*. Ist dieses bestimmt, dann wird die Seinsart der *cogitationes* erst faßbar.“ (SZ 46). [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. “Nec est intelligendum quod homo ideo intelligat, quod intellectus sit motor hominis: intelligere enim in homine motum naturaliter praecedit; nec etiam homo intelligit quia intelligibilia phantasmata sint nobis unita; sed quia, sicut prius dictum est, cum intellectus intelligendo sit operans sine motu, est operans in operando unite se habens ad corpus per suam naturam.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, pp. 86.11‒87.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. “Et est attendendum quod, cum homo denominetur intelligens ab opere intellectus, et a substantia eius habet denominationem. Quod enim denominatur ab eius accidente, et ab eius substantia. Quoties autem est denominari et dici, toties est esse, ut dicit Philosophus, *quinto Metaphysicae*.Unde per intellectum homo est homo, et sic denominatur.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 87.20‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. “Ad tertium dicendum quod sine dubio propria operatio hominis est intelligere, et in hoc felicitatur, ut dicitur *decimo Moralium.* Nam intellectus a quo est intelligere suprema est virtus in homine et propria homini. Sed ad hoc quod intelligere sit homini propria operatio, non oportet quod ipsius hominis compositi substantia a qua est intelligere uniatur alteri parti compositi ut figura cerae, sed sufficit quod modo praedicto.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 87.26‒32) [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. “Unde Philosophus innuit quod definitio animae in communi, qua dicitur quod sit actus corporis, magis est multipliciter dicti quam generis. Et Themistius elicit quod anima definita est in universali, sicut potest definiri universaliter quod non est universale.” (*De anima intellectiva* 3; ed. Bazán, p. 88.40‒44) [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. “Circa nonum a principio propositorum sensit Rabbi Moyses quod operatio intellectus esset substantia eius, ita quod intellectus ante intelligere eius in actu vel in habitu, non habet substantiam nisi in potentia...” (*De anima intellectiva* 9; ed. Bazán, p. 111.3‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. “Averroes enim non posuit corpus communicare in hoc quod est intelligere ita quod esset subiectum eius, nec intelligendo intellectum egere corpore ut corpore subiecto, sed magis sicut obiecto, cui naturaliter intellectus unitur. Intelligere enim dixit commune ex modo quo non est sine phantasmate; et, ideo Socratem dixit communicare intelligere quod Plato non communicavit, et quo intelligere non intellexit secundum quod intellectus intelligit ex phantasmatibus Socratis; et sic vitare voluit ne Socrate sciente aliquid oporteret illud scire Platonem, cum non oporteat intellectum intelligentem ut in hoc corpore et non sine huius corporis phantasmate in alio corpore intelligere ex phantasmatibus eiusdem corporis.” (*Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, q. 27, solutio; ed. Marlasca, p. 112.136‒46) [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. “Sed ista positio in fide nostra est haeretica, et irrationalis etiam sic apparet. Intellectu enim existente forma corporis, sicut vult Aristoteles universaliter de anima, satis planum est qualiter oportet intellectum numerari et multiplicari multiplicatione humanorum corporum; sed qualitercumque hoc quis ponat, apparet intellectum non posse unum esse numero hominum omnium.” (*Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, q. 27, solutio; ed. Marlasca, p. 112.147‒52) [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. “Si l’homme pouvait n’être que machine, et avoir avec cela de la consciosité, il faudrait être de votre avis, monsieur; mais je tiens que ce cas n’est point possible au moins naturellement. Je ne voudrais point dire non plus que l’*identité personnelle* et même le *soi* ne demeurent point en nous et que je ne suis point ce *moi* qui ai été dans le berceau, sous prétexte que je ne me souviens plus de rien de tout ce que j’ai fait alors.” (*Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain*1.27.9, editio digitalis) [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. “The other way of retention is, the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight. And thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet—the object being removed. This is memory, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas.” (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* 2.10.2; ed. Nidditch & Yolton, p. 150) [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. The mercenary, who had set fire to a village and slaughtered its inhabitants, refused to confess and accept the punishment. According to the teaching on the numerically uniform intellect for all people, St. Peter had thought through him and directed his actions. The mercenary therefore had nothing to do with the arson and the murders and did not have to go to confession. The whole school of the first Averroism rejected similar absurdities, see *Quaestiones De anima III*, q. 21, ed. Bazán, p. 511.45–51. This was the main pastoral reason for issuing Tempier’s decree of 1277. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. “Episcopo Parisiensi. ... quod Parisius...quidam errores in projudicium ejusdem fidei de novo pullulasse dicuntur. Volumus itaque tibique auctoritate presentium districte precipiendo mandamus quatinus diligenter facias inspici vel inquiri, a quibus personis et in quibus locis errores hujusmodi dicti sunt sive scripti, et que didiceris sive inveneris, conscripta fideliter nobis per tuum nuntium transmittere quamcitius non omittas.” (*Chartularium I,* no. 471, p. 541) [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. “Magnarum et gravium personarum crebra zeloque fidei accensa insinuavit relatio, quod nonnulli Parisius studentes in artibus proprie facultatis limites excedentes quosdam manifestos et execrabiles errores, immo potius vanitates et insanias falsas in rotuIo seu cedulis, presentibus hiis annexo seu annexis contentos quasi dubitabiles in scolis tractare et disputare presumunt…” (*Chartularium I,* no. 472, p. 542) [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. “Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus indiuiduantibus; et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia indiuidua que sunt extra animam, prout equaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet [natura humana in intellectu] ad omnia indiuidua, intellectus adinuenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi; unde dicit Commentator in principio De anima quod 'intellectus est qui agit in rebus uniuersalitatem'; hoc etiam Auicenna dicit in sua Methaphisica.” (*De ente et essentia*, cap. 3; Leonina 43, 375.90‒102) [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. The quoted passage is important for the development of Thomas’s theory of cognition and signification: “... non sicut partem significationis nominis, quia subjectum non includitur in significatione nominis significantis accidens concretive, ut dicit Commentator, In *Metaph*., Text 14., quamvis Avicenna, VI *Natural*., part I, cap. II, contrarium senserit.” (*Super Sent.,* lib. 1, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; ed. Mandonnet, p. 440). [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. “Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime, cum dixit quod primus Philosophus demonstravit primum principium esse, et processit in hoc in suo *Liber de scientia divina*, per viam quam existimavit esse necessariam et essentialem in illa scientia et peccavit peccato manifesto in illorum sermonum…” (*Aristotelis Stagiritae de physico auditu libri octo*, lib. I; ed. Juntina secunda 1562, fol. 47 G‒H) [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. “Quia autem id cui conuenit ratio generis uel speciei uel differentie predicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio uniuersalis, scilicet generis uel speciei, conueniat essentie secundum quod per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis uel animalitatis; et ideo dicit Auicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia sed differentie principium; et eadem ratione humanitas non est species, nec animalitas genus.” (*De ente et essentia*, cap. 3; Leonina 43, 374.3‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. “Et nisi esset hoc genus entium quod scivimus in scientia anime, non possemus intelligere multitudinem in rebus abstractis, quemadmodum, nisi sciremus hic naturam intellectus, non possemus intelligere quod virtutes moventes abstracte debent esse intellectus.” (CMDA III.5; 410.667‒72) [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. “Unde esse earum non est absolutum, sed receptum et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis, sed natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et finitae superius. Sunt enim finitae quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius, quia earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatem alicuius materiae recipientis eas. Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus, cui unitur.” (*De ente et essentia*, cap. 5; Leonina 43, 378.47‒59) [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. “Vnde Commentator dicit in III De anima quod si natura intellectus possibilis esset ignota, non possemus inuenire multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad inuicem secundum gradum potentie et actus, ita quod intelligentia superior que magis propinqua est primo habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis.” (*De ente et essentia*, cap. 4; Leonina 43, 377.170‒77) [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. “Et hoc completur in anima humana, que tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus. Vnde intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, que tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III De anima dicit; et ideo Philosophus comparat eam tabule in qua nichil est scriptum. Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum : ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in uno composito, quamuis illud esse prout est anime non sit dependens a corpore.” (*De ente et essentia*, cap. 4; Leonina 43, 377.178‒92) [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. “Et ideo tertia opinio est Avicennae, Tract. de anima*,* cap. VII, part. V et VI, qui ponit intellectum possibilem in diversis diversum, fundatum in essentia animae rationalis, et non esse virtutem corporalem, et cum corpore incipere, sed non cum corpore finiri. Unde quantum ad intellectum possibilem, ejus opinio est quam tenemus secundum fidem catholicam, quamvis erret cum aliis de intellectu agente, ut dictum est.” (*Super Sent*., lib. 2, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 1, solutio; ed. Mandonnet, p. 424) [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. “Unde concludit quod illud quod est in nobis de intellectu, quodammodo est corruptibile, et quodammodo est incorruptibile : quia ex parte illa unde multiplicantur phantasmata, accidit corruptio ; sed ex parte intellectus possibilis est incorruptibilitas. Unde sequitur etiam ex hoc quod post corporum corruptionem nulla diversitas animarum remaneat. Sed haec ratio ostenditur esse frivola multipliciter.” (*Super Sent*., lib. 2, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 1, solutio; ed. Mandonnet, p. 427) [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. “Haec igitur sunt quæ in destructionem praedicti erroris conscripsimus, non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorum philosophorum rationes et dicta. Si quis autem gloriabundus de falsi nominis scientia, velit contra haec quæ scripsimus aliquid dicere, non loquatur in angulis nec coram pueris qui nesciunt de tam arduis iudicare; sed contra hoc scriptum rescribat, si audet; et inveniet non solum me, qui aliorum sum minimus, sed multos alios veritatis zelatores, per quos eius errori resistetur, vel ignorantiae consuletur.” (*De unitate intellectus*, cap. V; ed. Leonina 43, 314.431‒41) [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. “Preterea noverit ipse, quod philoso­phorum studia minime reprobamus, quatinus mysteriis theologicis famulantur; set profanas vocum novitates, que contra philosophicam veritatem sunt in sanctorum injuriam citra viginti annos in altitudines theologicas introducte, abjectis et vilipensis sanctorum assertionibus evidenter.” (*Iohannis Pecham*, Junii 1, 1285; *Chartularium* I, no. 523, p. 634) [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. “Vel illa novella quasi tota contraria, que quicquid docet Augustinus de regulis eternis, de luce incommutabili, de potentiis anime, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materie, et consimilibus innumeris, destruit pro viribus et enervat, pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo? Videant antiqui in quibus est sapientia, videat at corrigat Deus celi.” (*Iohannis Pecham*, Junii 1, 1285; *Chartularium* I, no. 523, pp. 634‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. “He entered into a well-documented controversy with Archbishop Peckham after Peckham’s renewal in 1284 of Kilwardby’s Oxford condemnations. The controversy culminated two years later when Knapwell was charged with heretical opinions by a provincial synod presided over by Peckham. Knapwell took his case to Rome. There he was met by a newly elected Franciscan pope who condemned him to perpetual silence. According to one chronicler, at least, Knapwell retreated to Bologna and began to teach again, only to end his life in despair and ‘very great misery’.” (Jordan 1982, 294‒95) [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. “Quod autem Augustinus non sic intellexerit omnia cognosci *in rationibus aeternis*, vel *in incommutabili veritate*, quasi ipsae rationes aeternae videantur, patet per hoc quod ipse dicit in libro *Octoginta trium Quaest*., quod *rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quæ sancta et pura fuerit, asseritur illi visioni*, scilicet rationum aeternarum, *esse idonea*; sicut sunt animae beatorum.” (ST I, q. 85, a. 5, resp.; ed. Leonina 5, 322) [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. “Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.” (ST I, q. 85, a. 7, resp.; ed. Leonina 5, 325) [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. “Vel hoc modo quod illud etiam intelligatur esse particeps operationis, sicut organum virtutis visivae simul cum virtute visiva videt, quia videre est compositi, et sic intellectus omnino sine corpore intelligit, quia haec operatio non perficitur mediante organo corporali ; vel ita quod illud sit objectum operationis, sicut visus non potest videre sine colore, et hoc modo etiam intellectus in statu viae non potest intelligere sine phantasmate, quod se habet ad intellectum sicut color ad visum, ut Philosophus in III De anima, text. 30, dicit.” (*Super II Sent*., dist. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6; ed. Mandonnet, p. 484) [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. “Primo, ponit consequentiam, qua demonstrationis materialis definitio concluditur ex praemissis, dicens quod si scire hoc significat quod diximus, scilicet, causam rei cognoscere etc. necesse est quod demonstrativa scientia, idest quæ per demonstrationem acquiritur, procedat ex propositionibus veris, primis et immediatis, idest quæ non per aliquod medium demonstrantur, sed per seipsas sunt manifestae… et iterum ex notioribus, et prioribus, et causis conclusionis.” (*Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum*, cap. 2. lec. 4, par. 10; ed. Leonina 1, 152) [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. “Dicit ergo primo: superius dictum est quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, et quod demonstratio *ex causis rei* procedit et *primis et immediatis*. Quod intelligendum est de demonstratione propter quid.” (*Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum*, cap. 13, lect. 23, odst. 2; ed. Leonina 1, 229‒30) [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. “Dicit ergo primo quod *diuerum est esse et id quod est*, que quidem diuersitas non est hic referenda ad res de quibus adhuc non loquitur, set ad ipsas rationes seu intentiones.” (*Expositio De ebdomadibus*, lect. 2; Leonina 50, 270.36‒39) [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. “Possunt ergo huiusmodi rationes sic abstractae considerari dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata, et hoc non invenitur in eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu. Alio modo secundum quod comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes; quae quidem res sunt in materia et motu. Et sic sunt principia cognoscendi illa, quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam.” (*Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate*, q. 5, a. 2, resp.; ed. Leonina 50, 143.109‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. “But the great argument with Platonism that Thomas takes on from Aristotle is that we cannot assume that things must exist as we think them. Our ability to formulate a notion of substance which does not include matter and motion is no warrant for asserting there exist immaterial substances. The point of distinguishing separation from abstraction is precisely here. The distinction arises in the context of talking about mathematicals and, like Aristotle, Thomas does not think that our abilility to fashion concepts which do not include sensible matter, as the concepts of line and triangle and circle do not, commits us to the existence of these things in the way they are talked of in mathematics.” (McInerny 1990, 147) [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. “Omnis enim forma, in quantum huiusmodi, universalis est; nisi forte sit forma subsistens, quæ, ex hoc ipso quod subsistit, incommunicabilis est.” (*Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 2, a. 6, resp.; ed. Leonina 22/1, pp. 65.53‒66.57) [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. “Ad octavum dicendum, quod licet effectus non possit excedere causam suam, tamen cau­sa potest excedere effectum; et ideo licet ab una causa possint procedere plures effectus, tamen non potest unus effectus a pluribus causis immediate procedere.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia* *Dei*, q. 3, a. 17, ad 8; ed. Marietti, p. 89) [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod materia non est individuationis principium nisi secundum quod est sub dimensionibus signatis exsistens. Et sic etiam scientia naturalis a materia abstrahit.” (*Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate*, q. 5, a. 2, resp., ad 1; ed. Leonina 50, 143.122‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. “Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc nomen donum vel datum, praeter relationem ex qua dicitur donum vel datum, dat intelligere rem quamdam quae datur; quamvis forte non sicut partem significationis nominis, quia subjectum non includitur in significatione nominis significantis accidens concretive, ut dicit Commentator**,** quamvis Avicenna, contrarium senserit.” (*Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, lib. 1, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; ed. Marietti, p. 440) [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. “Ad secundum dicendum quod forma intelligibilis est quiditas rei. Obiectum enim intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in III de anima. Quiditas autem compositi universalis, ut hominis aut animalis, includit in se materiam universalem, non autem particularem, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Unde intellectus communiter abstrahit a materia signata et condicionibus eius…” (*Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate*, q. 5, a. 2, resp., ad 2; ed. Leonina 50, 143.126‒144.133) [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. “Dicit enim praedictus Averroes quod homo differt specie a brutis per intellectum quem Aristoteles vocat passivum, qui est ipsa vis cogitativa, quæ est propria homini loco cuius alia animalia habent quandam aestimativam naturalem. Huius autem cogitativae virtutis est distinguere intentiones individuales, et comparare eas ad invicem: sicut intellectus qui est separatus et immixtus, comparat et distinguit inter intentiones universales. Et quia per hanc virtutem, simul cum imaginativa et memorativa, praeparantur phantasmata ut recipiant actionem intellectus agentis, a quo fiunt intelligibilia actu…” (*Summa contra Gentiles*II.60; ed. Leonina 13, pp. 419‒20). [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. “Respondeo. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt creationem aliquid esse in rerum natura medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Et quia medium neutrum extremorum est, ideo sequebatur quod creatio neque esset creator neque creatura. Sed hoc a magistris erroneum est iudicatum, cum omnis res quocumque modo existens non habeat esse nisi a Deo, et sic est creatura.” (*Questiones disputatae* *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, resp., ed. Marietti, p. 43) [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. “Actionem dico non quæ in aliquod patiens transeat: quia in Deo nihil potest esse patiens, cum non sit ibi materia; ad id autem quod est extra Deum, non est in Deo realis relatio, ut ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod consequatur relatio realis in Deo actionem manentem in agente: cuiusmodi actiones sunt intelligere et velle in Deo.” (*Questiones disputatae* *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 214) [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. “Sciendum est ergo, quod cum realis relatio intelligi non possit, nisi consequens quantitatem vel actionem seu passionem, oportet quod aliquo istorum modorum ponamus in Deo relationem esse.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 214) [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. “Intelligens autem in intelligendo ad quatuor potest habere ordinem: scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 215) [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. “Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. A re quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum, conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem: propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 215) [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. “Differt autem a specie intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 215) [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. “lpsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu; unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est.” (ST I, q. 75, a.2, s.c.; ed. Leonina 5, 196) [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. “Differt autem ab actione intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum. Intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 215) [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. “Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 215) [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. “Huiusmodi ergo conceptio, sive verbum, qua intellectus noster intelligit rem aliam a se, ab alio exoritur, et aliud repraesentat. Oritur quidem ab intellectu per suum actum; est vero similitudo rei intellectae. Cum vero intellectus seipsum intelligit, verbum praedictum, sive conceptio, eiusdem est propago et similitudo, scilicet intellectus seipsum intelligentis.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 215) [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. “Et hoc ideo contingit, quia effectus similatur causae secundum suam formam: forma autem intellectus est res intellecta. Et ideo verbum quod oritur ab intellectu, est similitudo rei intellectae, sive sit idem quod intellectus, sive aliud.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 215) [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. “Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem**,** qua aliquis se in actu considerat animam habere, sic dico, quod anima cognoscitur per actus suos. In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere, et vivere, et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere, et alia huiusmodi vitae opera exercere; unde dicit philosophus in IX *Ethicorum*: «Sentimus autem quoniam sentimus; et intelligimus quoniam intelligimus; et quia hoc sentimus, intelligimus quoniam sumus».” (*Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 10, a. 8, resp.; ed. Leonina 22/2, 321.219‒29) [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. “Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit quod hic homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa operationes intellectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur corpori forma.” (ST I, q. 76, a. 1, s.c., ed. Leonina 5, 209) [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. “Homo autem intelligit, et non nisi per intellectum: unde et Aristoteles, inquirens de principio quo intelligimus, tradit nobis naturam intellectus possibilis. Oportet igitur intellectum possibilem formaliter uniri nobis, et non solum per suum obiectum.” (*Summa contra Gentiles* 2.59.12, ed. Leonina 13, 415) [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. “Ergo*,* si intelligere est simile ei quod est sentire, et partem intellectiuam oportet esse inpassibilem passione proprie accepta, set oportet quod habeat aliquid simile passibilitati, quia oportet huiusmodi partem esse susceptiuamspeciei intelligibilis et quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi speciem set non sit hoc in actu, et sic oportet, sicut se habet sensitiuum ad sensibilia, similiter se habere intellectum ad intelligibilia, quia utrumque est in potencia ad suum obiectum et susceptiuum eius.” (*Sentencia libri De anima*, lib. III, cap. 11; ed. Leonina 45, 202.80‒90) [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. “Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu. Quantum ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat.” (ST I, q. 89, a. 5, resp.; ed. Leonina 5, 380) [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. “Ecce quomodo mediat [i.e. Siger] inter Latinos et Averroicos; ab Averroicis enim accepit intellectus impartibilitatem, immaterialitatem et unitatem, a Latinis autem quod sit forma constituens hominem.” (*De intellectu*, lib. 3, cap. 16, f. 30rb; siehe Haase 2007, 327) [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. “*Sed dicebat* quod intellectus, id est potentia intellectiva, non habet organum; sed ipsa essentia animae intellectivae unitur corpori ut forma. ‒ *Sed contra*, effectus non est simplicior sua causa. Sed potentia animae est effectus essentiae eius, quia omnes potentiae fluunt ab esse eius. Nulla ergo potentia animae est simplicior esse animae. Si ergo intellectus non potest esse actus corporis, ut probatur in III *de Anima* [comm. 6], neque anima intellectiva poterit uniri corpori ut forma.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De anima*, q. unica, a. 2, ad 4; ed. Marietti, p. 286) [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. “Non enim dicimus animam huma­nam esse formam corporis secundum intellectiuam potentiam, que secundum doctrinam Aristotilis nullius organi actus est : unde remanet quod anima, quantum ad intellectiuam potentiam, sit immaterialis et immaterialiter recipiens et se ipsam intelligens. Vnde et Aristotiles signanter dicit quod anima est locus specierum “non tota sed intellectus”.” (*De unitate intellectus*, cap. III; ed. Leonina 43, 307.378‒86) [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. “Si autem contra hoc obiiciatur, quod potentia animae non potest esse immaterialior aut simplicior quam eius essentia: optime quidem procederet ratio si essentia humanae animae sic esset forma materiae, quod non per esse suum esset, sed per esse compositi, sicut est de aliis formis, quæ secundum se nec esse nec operationem habent praeter communicationem materiae, quæ propter hoc materiae immersae dicuntur. Anima autem humana, quia secundum suum esse est, cui aliqualiter communicat materia non totaliter comprehendens ipsam, eo quod maior est dignitas huius formae quam capacitas materiae; nihil prohibet quin habeat aliquam operationem vel virtutem ad quam materia non attingit.” (*De unitate intellectus*, cap. III; ed. Leonina 43, 307.387‒401) [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. “Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae; sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum. Non enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma; sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae.” (ST I, q. 77, a. 1, resp.; ed. Leonina 5, 236‒37) [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. “À la différence d’Albert réservant tout l’influx illuminateur au seul intellect agent (trop peu distinct de l’intellect créateur), Thomas attribue la causalité dont bénéficie l’intellect possible deux instances en synergie mais bien distinctes : l’intellect agent personnel qui assure le dégagement du sens intelligible latent dans les formes sensibles, et l’ensemble des réalités qui sensibles ou suprasensibles ‒ sont objet de connaissance intellective et à ce titre exercent en synergie avec l’intellect agent personnel, un milieu causal relai de l’illumination noétique transcendante diffusée par la Pensée créatrice.” (Wéber 1991, 367) [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. “Now if thinking is analogous to perceiving (τὸ νοεῖν ἀνάλογόν ἐστι τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι) (for the soul, as we also said earlier, makes judgments and becomes acquainted with [things] through both of these), then the intellect, too, would be in some way affected by the objects of thought, just as perception is by the objects of perception, and here too ‘would be affected’ has to be understood in just the same way [as with perception] (τὸ πάσχοι δ' ἂν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀκουστέον παραπλησίως).” (*In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis* 94.5‒8; trad. Schroeder, pp. 77) [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. “Unde, et sicut dicit Commentator super prologum *De anima*, hanc quaestionem semper «debemus ponere in directo oculorum nostrorum».” (*De anima intellectiva*, Prologus; ed. Bazán, p. 70.9‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. “Quorum Averroes posuit intellectum possibilem, secundum esse, separatum a corpore. Vidit tamen quod nisi esset aliqua unio eius ad hunc hominem, actio eius ad hunc hominem pertinere non posset. Si enim sint duae substantiae omnino disiunctae, una agente vel operante, alia non dicitur operari. Unde posuit intellectum illum, quem dicebat separatum omnino secundum esse a corpore, continuari cum hoc homine per phantasmata, hac ratione, quia species intelligibilis, quæ est perfectio intellectus possibilis, fundatur in phantasmatibus a quibus abstrahitur.” (*De spiritualibus creaturis*, q. unica, a. 2, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 375) [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. “Nec intelligo dicere quod intellectus in sui natura aliquam habeat copulationem. De natura sua solum est in potentia ut nobis copuletur.” (QIIIDA, q. 15; ed. Bazán, p. 56.60‒61) [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. “Sic ergo habet duplex esse: unum in intellectu possibili, cuius est forma; et aliud in phantasmatibus, a quibus abstrahitur. Phantasmata autem sunt in hoc homine, quia virtus imaginativa est virtus in corpore, id est habens organum corporale. Ipsa ergo species intelligibilis est medium coniungens intellectum possibilem homini singulari.” (*De spiritualibus creaturis*, q. unica, a. 2, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 375) [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. “Sed haec continuatio nullo modo sufficit ad hoc quod hic homo singularis intelligat. Ut enim Aristoteles dicit in Lib. III de anima, phantasmata comparantur ad intellectum possibilem sicut color ad visum. Sic igitur species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus abstracta, est in intellectu possibili, sicut species coloris in sensu visus; sic autem est in phantasmatibus intelligibilis species sicut species visibilis est in colore parietis.” (*De spiritualibus creaturis*, q. unica, a. 2, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 75) [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. “Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum.” (ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 3; ed. Leonina 5, 197) [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. “Similiter dicendum esset quod vegetativum et sensitivum sunt in intellectivo, ut trigonum et tetragonum in pentagono. Est autem tetragonum quidem a trigono simpliciter alia figura specie, non autem a trigono quod est potentia in ipso.” (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. I; ed. Leonina 43, 300.819‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. “Patet etiam quod Auerroys peruerse refert sententiam Themistii et Theophrasti de intellectu possibili et agente; unde merito supra diximus eum philosophie peripatetice peruersorem. Unde mirum est quomodo aliqui, solum commentum Averrois videntes, pronuntiare praesumunt, quod ipse dicit, hoc sensisse omnes philosophos Graecos et Arabes, praeter Latinos.” (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. V; ed. Leonina 43, 314.389‒96) [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. “Nihil operatur nisi per aliquam virtutem quæ formaliter in ipso est: unde Aristoteles, in II de anima, ostendit quod quo vivimus et sentimus, est forma et actus. Sed utraque actio, scilicet intellectus possibilis et intellectus agentis, convenit homini: homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et recipit mente intelligibilia in actu; non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus nisi eas in nobis experiremur. Oportet igitur quod principia quibus attribuuntur hae actiones, scilicet intellectus possibilis et agens, sint virtutes quaedam in nobis formaliter existentes.” (*Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 2, cap. 76, n. 18; ed. Leonina 13, 482) [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. “Sed ne aliquis dicat, quod id quo intelligimus non dicit hic intellectum possibilem, sed aliquid aliud, manifeste hoc excluditur per id quod Aristoteles in tertio de anima dicit, de intellectu possibili loquens: dico autem intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima.” (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. I; ed. Leonina 43, 293.212‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. “Si autem dicas quod principium huius actus, qui est intelligere, quod nominamus intellectum, non sit forma, oportet te inuenire modum quo actio illius principii sit actio huius hominis.” (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. III; ed. Leonina 43, 303.41‒44) [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. “Quorum unus Auerroys, ponens huiusmodi principium intelligendi quod dicitur intellectus possibilis non esse animam nec partem anime nisi equiuoce, sed potius quod sit substantia quedam separata, dixit quod intelligere illius substantie separate est intelligere mei uel illius, in quantum intellectus ille possibilis copulatur michi uel tibi per fantas­mata que sunt in me et in te.” (*De unitate intellectus,* cap. III; ed. Leonina 43, 303.46‒53) [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. “Intelligo autem intellectum esse perfectionem quantum ad suam potestatem, quia perficit corpus quoad suam cooperationem.” (QIIIDA, q. 7; ed. Bazán, p. 22.12‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. “Probatio: potentia a qua egreditur operatio non est simplicior sua substantia; si igitur intellectus per suam substantiam perficiat corpus, eius operatio non potest esse nisi in corpore; quare in operando necessario utetur corpore, cum potentia, a qua egreditur operatio, non sit simplicior sua substantia, nam actus, qui per substantiam suam est actus corporis, est actus organicus; quare etc.” (QIIIDA, q. 7; ed. Bazán, p. 23.18‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. “Quidam volunt quod substantia animae intellectivae sit hominis forma, potentia tamen animae intellectivae sit separata, non materiae perfectio nec organum habens. Et ad hanc positionem inducitur ex hoc sic ponens: unde enim homo intelligit oportet esse hominis formam; unde autem intelligit separatum est, non habens materiam et organum cuius sit perfectio, sicut sentire et amare, est potentia a materia separata. Sed haec positio stare non potest. Cum enim intellectiva anima sit hominis forma et perfectio, sicut rei veritas est, non potest esse potentia et operatio separata.” (*Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, q. 26; ed. Marlasca, p. 105.65‒74) [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. “Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.” (ST I, q. 75, a. 2, arg. 1; ed. Leonina 5, 196) [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. “Ideo aliter dicendum est, quod anima intellectiva est corporis perfectio et forma, non sic tamen quod potentia eius sit separata, immo cum eius substantia sit actus et perfectio ipsius materiae sic etiam et eius potentia.” (*Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, q. 26; ed. Marlasca, p. 106.106‒109) [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. “Quod patet ex hoc quod dicit in III de anima, incipiens tractare de intellectu possibili: *de parte autem animae, qua cognoscit anima et sapit, considerandum est* etc.; et iterum: *dico autem intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit anima*. Si autem intellectus possibilis esset substantia separata, impossibile esset quod eo intelligeret homo: non enim est possibile, si aliqua substantia operatur aliquam operationem, quod illa operatio sit alterius substantiae ab ea diversa.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De anima*, q. unica, a. 2, resp.; ed. Marietti, p. 287) [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. “Ideo cum tam agens quam speculativus intellectus comparantur ad possibilem intellectum, agens erit simpliciter forma, et speculativus erit non simpliciter forma, sed ut instrumentum: nisi enim ita ponamus, non evademus objectionem inductam contra Avicennam, quia cum agens sit una et simplex essentia, non potest esse causa distinctarum specierum in speculando: et ideo speculativus est ut instrumentum ejus ad distinguendum intellectum possibilem.” (*In III De anima*, tract. 3; ed. Borgnet 5, 387a) [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. “Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint due contrarie veritates, et quasi contra veritatem sacre scripture sit veritas in dictis gentilium dampnatorum, de quibus scriptum est: *Perdam sapientiam sapientium* [1 Co 1:19], quia vera sapientia perdit falsam sapientiam.” (*Chartularium I*, no. 473, p. 543) [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. “If someone asks: «Now that you have discussed in detail the teachings of these [philosophers], do you [also] say decisively that they hold unbelief (*kufr*) and that the killing of someone who upholds their convictions is obligatory?” We answer: Pronouncing them unbelievers must be done in three questions. One of them is the question of the world’s preeternity and their saying that the substances are all pre-eternal. The second is their statement that God’s knowledge does not encompass the temporally created particulars among individual [existents]. The third is their denial of the resurrection of bodies and assembly of bodies [on Judgment Day]. These three teachings do not agree with Islam in any way.»” (Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut* 376.2–10; trad. Griffel 2009, 101) [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit.” (ST I, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1; ed. Leonina 4, 183) [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. “Sic ergo puto quod intellectus cognoscat rei substantiam per speciem collectam, quæ non facit intuitionem, sed est quodam modo terminus arguitivae cognitionis.” (*Quaestiones disputatae De cognitione*, q. 5; ed. Delorme, p. 271). On the problem of abstraction in Franciscan schools around 1300, see Aurélien, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. “Per intellectum cognoscimus nos cognoscere singulare, sed cognoscere cognitionem singularis dependet ex cognitione singularis, ergo per intellectum cognoscimus singulare.” (*In II Sent*., dist. 24, a. 3, q. 4, ad 4; zit. nach Simonin 1930, 298) [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. “Materia et forma sunt rami voluntatis. Praeter hoc autem impossibile est aliquid dicere, donec scias scientiam materiae et formae et voluntatis.” (*Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* I.7‒8., ed. Bäumker, p. 10.20‒23) [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. “Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth.” (Arendt 1962, 267) [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. “Das Kriterium für Ideologie und Utopie ist die Verwirklichung. Ideen, von denen es sich nachträglich herausstellte, dass sie über einer gewesenen oder aufstrebenden Lebensordnung nur als verdeckende Vorstellungen schwebten, waren Ideologien; was von ihnen in der nächsten gewordenen Lebensordnung adäquat verwirklichbar wurde, war relative Utopie.” (Mannheim [1929] 1995, 178‒79) [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. “On this scale Olivi clearly count as a voluntarist. As we have seen, he explains freedom of choice in terms of the will’s capacity to be a self mover. For Olivi, the scholastic power of liberum arbitrium (free decision) is entirely a power on the side of will, and this may seem dramatically different from how other scholastics understand liberum arbitrium.” (Pasnau 1999, 18) [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. “In memoria autem ponimus species illas ad quas conspiciendas convertitur intellectus tanquam ad sua objecta. Convenit tamen memoria cum intellectu in susceptibilitate expressionum intellectualium.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, resp., ad 4; ed. Jansen, t. II, 485) [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. “In hominibus vero est aliter, quia ipsae potentiae habent duplicem materiam, spiritualem scilicet et corporalem, et ideo, sicut ipsae principalius existunt in sua materia spirituali et secundario in materia corporali, sic et ipsi actus et species principalius existunt in materia spirituali, secundario vero in corporali; non enim sunt in materia spirituali absolute, sed prout habent ordinem et colligantiam ad materiam corporalem.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, resp.; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 513) [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. “Quia sicut formae posteriores quae habent naturalem ordinem et consequentiam ad priores non possunt recipi in materia, nisi prius sit informata formis prioribus, sic nec actus possunt recipi in organis, nisi prout sunt informata...” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, resp.; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 513) [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. “Ipsa [sc. materia] sic est ens quod eius actualitati non repugnat esse in potentia et esse indeterminatum; sed potius hoc convenit sibi essentialiter, esse scilicet in potentia, non respectu sui, sed respectu aliorum quae in ea possunt fieri.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 16; ed. Jansen, t. I, p. 309) [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. “Est autem haec diffinitio potestatis facta secundum usum, non secundum proprietatem potestatis: quidquid enim aliquomodo potest, hac diffinitione potestetais potest; ut lignum potest incidi, et homo potest incidere…” (*Liber de voluntate*; PL 158, 490A) [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. “Quando igitur dicit Anselmus quod voluntas non movet se nisi per suos habitus seu affectiones: nomine habitus oportebit intelligi non solum habitus superadditos, sed etiam ipsam essentiam libertatis, prout est ad aliqua obiecta sibi connaturalia quasi per modum habitualem determinate, quamvis ad verificationem verbi praedicti adhuc amplius oporteat addi.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, ad 28; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 376) [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. “Unde et ab Anselmo, in libro De libertate arbitrii*,* iustitia per quam intelligit rectitudinem virtutum et gratiae ponitur esse in potestate liberi arbitrii, ita quod potest eam servare et deserere. Quod non posset esse verum, si a gratia et virtutibus haberet moveri et regi et ita quod ipsum non posset eas movere et regere seu voluntatem ut ipsis informatam.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp., ad 27; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 374) [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. Let us see, for example, Aquinas’s thesis, which incorporates Albert’s conception of the extension of the speculative intellect according to CMDA into the practical one (*intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus*; ST II-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; ed. Leonina 8, 45); or, Pecham's view valid for the active intellect according to the second Averroism (*intellectus agens extensione fit practicus*; *Quaestiones tractantes De anima*, q. 6, contra; ed. Spettmann, pp. 72.37‒73.1). [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. “Actus qui est velle est perfectio ipsius potentiae, et ita ante ipsum erat in potentia etiam es­sentiali ad hanc perfectionem in se recipiendam: dicendum quod divisio ilia, prout fuit data ab Aristotele, non fuit data in hoc respectu.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp., ad 9; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 347) [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. “Secundum omnem enim statum, scilicet, gloriae, innocentiae, gratiae et poenae possunt mentes nostrae reflecti immediate super se absque adiutorio alicuius phantasmatis, immo potius ad hoc phantasmata eas impediunt quam iuvent, sicut in quaestione an anima possit se intelligere per se et immediate plenius habet tangi. Nec curo si Aristoteles et eius sequaces contrarium dicant.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp., ad 20; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 365) [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. “Omnis enim actus trahit a sua causa effectiva rationes suae essentiae essentialissimas et nobilissimas. Summae autem rationes quæ sunt in actibus mentis nostrae sunt ratio vitae seu vivi et simplicitatis et intellectualitatis et consimiles.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, item 3; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 412) [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. “Sicut intellectus per prima principia, quæ sunt actus ejus, exit de potentia ad cognitionem conclusionum respectu quarum fuit in potentia et ita idem educit se de potentia ad actum, sed non secundum idem, ita voluntas est in actu et determinata respectu boni communiter vel ultimi finis, per cujus actum exit de potentia volendi hoc vel illud propositum cum consilio rationis.” (*Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 4, resp.; ed. Longpré, p. 41) [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. “Praeterea, si sunt ab alio quam a nobis, non poterunt fieri in nobis ab aliquo agente cuius virtus et aspectus non attingit intimissime interiora nostrae mentis, quia nihil nobis intimius quam actus nostrae mentis et quam intrinseca principia eorum; in tantum enim sunt nobis intimi quod non possunt videri nobis nolentibus ab alio quam a Deo.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, item 4; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 413) [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. “Si enim omnis forma substantialis, in quantum talis, est aliquo modo virtus activa vel saltem habet aliquam potentiam activam a se originatam et respectu sui quasi instrumentalem: impossibile est quin summa omnium formarum creatarum hoc habeat. Sed forma substantialis mentis nostrae in qua potissimum gradum tenet forma substantialis nostrae voluntatis seu libertatis est summa inter formas substantiates creatas.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 411) [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. “Et hoc modo falsum est consequens praedictae conditionalis, et quantum ad hoc non est verum quod causa eodem modo se haberet ad esse sui effectus et ad eius non esse.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp., ad 7; ed. Jansen, t. II, 345) [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. “Licet enim secundum se et secundum suam virtutem effectivam non se habeat aliter ad ipsa, tamen secundum facere et non facere multo aliter se habet ad ea.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp., ad 7; ed. Jansen, t. II, 345) [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. “Ratio enim essendi a causa vel non essendi potest significare virtutem effectivam et sufficientem ipsius causae. Et hoc modo verum est consequens primae conditionalis. Vel potest significare ordinem ipsius effectus et factionis eius seu exitus secundum quem se habet ad suam causam seu potius secundum quem est a sua causa, quia ille ordo potius dicit esse ab quam esse ad. Et hoc modo falsura est consequens praedictae conditionalis, et quantum ad hoc non est verum quod causa eodem modo se haberet ad esse sui effectus et ad eius non esse.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, solutio; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 345) [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. “Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem.” (ST I, q. 82, a. 3, ad 2; ed. Leonina 5, 299) [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. “Illi enim actus quos intime sentimus esse a nobis et quos summe sentimus esse in potestate nostra dicere quod non sunt a nobis est negare omnem sensum intimum et certissimum nobis. Si autem non sunt a nostra forma substantiali per se et immediate sive immediantibus aliquibus potentiis a se originatis, tunc quasi omnino per accidens dicentur esse a nobis, quia tunc aut erunt solum ab obiectis aut ab aliquibus accidentibus non plus radicatis in nobis quam lumen infusum aeri radicetur in aere.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, item 4; ed. Jansen, t. II, 413) [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. “Nos enim manifestissime experimur in nobis quod mens nostra tam per cogitationem quam per amorem reflectitur seu convertitur ad se directe et immediate tanquam ad obiectum sui ipsius directum et immediatum. Sed nulla virtus potest se reflectere immediate super se, nisi habeat libertatem.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 324) [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. “Voluntas dicitur habere libertatem primo et per se, quia id quod operatur tanquam a se et non quasi ab alio applicata et mota, sed potius ipsa se ipsam applicat ad opus. Secundario vero dicitur libera, quia potest in utramque partem oppositorum; hoc autem idcirco dixi secundario, quia in hoc non habet libertatem nisi ex eo quod hoc sibi convenit per hoc quod operatur quasi a se et non ut ab alio applicata.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp., ad 27; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 358) [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. “Sicut etiam in sequenti quaestione ostendetur, voluntas, saltem prout est libera, nihil penitus recipit ab intellectu et eius actu nec exigitur ad eius actum nisi pro sola repraesentatione obiecti. Praeterea, cum Aristoteles dictum suum non probet, sed solum supponat: credere dictum hominis infidelis abs­que omni probatione in periculum fidei christianae et contra rationem expresse videtur esse actus magnae infidelitatis et magnae dementiae.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp., ad 12; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 354) [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. “Non habeo autem in proposito pro inconvenienti, immo pro magna veritate quod praesente causa sufficiente et in quantum tali effectus possit non esse; sed bene haberem pro inconvenienti, si causa sufficiente et dante esse suo effectui simul, dum dat, posset effectus non esse.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57, resp. ad 7; ed. Jansen, t. II, 344) [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. “Totus enim vigor formalis ipsius voluntatis dilatatur ad obiectum quadam dilatatione spirituali et unitur et quasi imbibitur ipsi obiecto, et sic de aliis modis se habendi spiritualibus quos sensibiliter in actibus et habitibus nostrae mentis experimur.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58; solutio, ad 10; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 432) [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. “Et etiam si in ipso actu posset poni realis distinctio inter suam essentiam et inter huiusmodi ordinem seu similitudinem quam habet cum obiecto, sicut est realis distinctio inter essentiam voluntatis et suos aspectus: tunc esset quasi totum simile hinc et inde, quia essentia ipsorum actuum absque tali ordine et similitudine cogitata omnino est unius rationis et naturae in omnibus actibus voluntatis; quoniam, in quantum talis, non est nisi quaedam similitudo analoga ipsius voluntatis participans formam seu naturam ipsius voluntatis per quandam analogiam…” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58, solutio, ad 2; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 417) [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. “Alio vero modo, quia si rationi divinae voluntatis convenit libertas proprie et per se, si voluntas intellectualis super omnia imitatur eam tanquam quaedam emanatio eius sibi simillima: ergo imitatur et participat libertatem ipsius super omne aliud genus entis quod sit vel esse possit.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 57; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 333) [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. “Quod ideo dico quia iustum pretium rerum quandoque non est punctaliter determinatum, sed magis in quadam aestimatione consistit, ita quod modica additio vel minutio non videtur tollere aequalitatem iustitiae.” (ST II-II, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1; ed. Leonina 9, 148) [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. “Predictorum autem radicalis ratio est quia periculum tollens usuram, debet apud lucrantem ex eo includere dominium et usum rei periclitans.” (*De emptionibus et venditionibus, de usuris, de restitionibus*, ed. **Todeschini**, p. 81) [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. “Ulterius sciendum, quod licet contractus meretricius sit respectu suae materiae vitiosus, nihilominus ipsa fidelitas, quæ includitur in observantia pacti, non est vitiosa, sed bona. Licet etiam mulier corpus vendat sive locet ad usum nefarium, locat tamen rem suam; et ideo vere facit pretium locationis corporis sui: atque ita absque ejus consensu non licet illud alteri dare, immo est sibi solvendum.” (*Postilla in libros Geneseos*, cap. 38; ed. Antverpiae 1573, p. 146a) [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. “Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a *Property* in his own *Person*. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The *Labour* of his Body, and the *Work* of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his *Labour* with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his *Property*.” (*Second Treatise of Civil Government* V.27, ed. Macpherson, p. 19) [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. “Thus modern property lost its worldly character and was located in the person himself, that is, in what an individual could lose only along with his life.” (Arendt 1958, 70) [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. “Ipsa igitur, in quantum est potens libere agere et in quantum non est ad hoc potens, non est alia et alia secundum substantiam et speciem, sed solum alio et alio modo se habens.” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 58; solutio, ad 9; ed. Jansen, t. II, p. 429) [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. “Quod enim intellectus agens primo et immediate agat aliquid sive aliquam dispositionem vel virtutem circa phantasmata ipsa, qua phantasmata quæ prius erant potentia intelligibilia fiant actu intelligibilia sive in actu moventia intellectum possibilem, non videtur.” (*Quodlibet* V, q. 10; ed. Wulf, p. 36) [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. “Omnis dispositio possibilis esse in phantasmate vel in phantastico est singulare et modum singularis habens, cum tali autem dispositione non potest phantasma movere intellectum, ideo videtur dicendum quod huiusmodi actio vel operatio intellectus agentis non est positiva sic quod faciat aliquam dispositionem positivam et formalem subjective in phantasmate.” (*Quodlibet* V, q. 10; ed. Wulf, p. 37) [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. “Primus conceptus communissimus, et communis ad conceptum vanum, quo concipitur saltem modo privatorio id, cui nihil natum est respondere in re, ut est conceptus fictitius chimaerae vel hircocervi, et ad conceptum verum, quo concipitur modo positivo…” (*Quodlibet* V, q. 2; ed. Venetiis 1613, p. 228) [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. “(…) quod primus inquam conceptus communissimus et communis ad illum conceptum et ad istum, est conceptus quo concipitur res a reor reris dicta, quæ continet sub se rem imaginariam, quæ est purum non ens, quia neque ens per essentiam, neque natum esse per existentiam.” (*Quodlibet* V, q. 2; ed. Venetiis 1613, p. 228) [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. “Res enim quaecumque sive existens sive non existens, si habet esse in deo secundum exemplarem rationem, non solum dicitur quod est res dicta a reor reris, sed etiam quod sit natura et essentia aliqua, et ideo dicitur res a ratitudine.” (*Quodlibet* V, q. 2; ed. Venetiis 1613, p. 229) [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. “Quod est quia oportet ut sit res esse in primis, deinde vivum, postea homo.” (*Liber de causis* I, ed. digitalis Pattin‒Zimmermann, § 7) [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. „Quod si aliquis dicat: possibile est ut sit generata ex re alia, dicemus: si possibile est ut substantia stans per essentiam suam sit generata ex re alia, procul dubio est substantia illa diminuta, indigens ut compleat eam illud ex quo generatur.“ (*Liber de causis* XIV; ed. digitalis Pattin‒Zimmermann, § 182) [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa.” (*Liber de causis* XIV; ed. digitalis Pattin‒Zimmermann, § 124) [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. “In formis creans specificis, ut specificae sunt, ratio individuationis ipsarum, qua determinantur in suppositis, et quæ est ratio constitutiva suppositi, est negatio qua forma ipsa, quæ ex se est specifica in esse rationis, ut est terminus factionis, facta est individua omnino in supposito.” (*Quodlibet* V.8; ed. Venetiis 1613, p. 246) [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. “Quæ quidem negatio non est simplex, sed duplex, quia est removens ad intra omnem plurificabilitatem, et diversitatem, et ab extra omnem identitatem, ut dicatur ita haec, quod tantum haec, non habedo scilicet, intra se possibilitatem ad esse aliud et aliud, sicut habet forma speciei, et iterum tantum haec, quod non fit alioqua aliarum suae speciei.” (*Quodlibet* V.8; ed. Venetiis 1613, p. 246) [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. “Qui enim se figuram percipere ait, nil aliud eo indicat, quam se rem determinatam, et quo pacto ea sit determinata, concipere. Haec ergo determinatio rem iuxta suum esse non pertinet; sed e contra est eius non-esse. Quia ergo figura non aliud quam determinatio, et determinatio negatio est, non poterit, ut dictum, aliud quam negatio esse.” (Spinoza, *Opera* IV; ed. Gebhardt, p. 240.10‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. “Die Bestimmtheit ist die Negation als affirmativ gesetzt, ist der Satz des Spinoza: *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. Dieser Satz ist von unendlicher Wichtigkeit; nur ist die Negation als solche die formlose Abstraktion; der spekulativen Philosophie muß aber nicht schuld gegeben werden, daß ihr die Negation oder das Nichts ein Letztes sei; dies ist es ihr sowenig als die Realität das Wahrhafte.” (Hegel 5, 121) [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. “Et haec duplex negatio omnino formaliter ratione, formae determinat qua determinatione supra essentiam formae constituitur suppositum absolutum quod vere dicitur hoc aliquid, quasi tantum hoc, et non aliud, nec intra se, nec extra, et sic nullo modo aliud quid.” (*Quodlibet* V.8; ed. Venetiis 1613, p. 246) [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. “Si enim homo ex puris naturalibus sine omni speciali illustratione divina poterit attingere ad cognitione primorum principiorum speculabilium, similiter er ex puris naturalibus sine sine omni speciali illustratione divina poterit attingere ad cognitioneme omnium conclusionum sequentium post principia.” (*Summa*, a. 1, q. 2, solutio; ed. Wilson, p. 31.49‒54) [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. “Cognitione igitur intellectiva de re creata duplex potest haberi cognitio: una qua praecise scitur sive cognoscitur simplici intelligentia id quod res est; alia qua scitur et cognoscitur intelligentia componente et dividente veritas ipsius rei.” (*Summa*, a. 1, q. 2, solutio; ed. Wilson, p. 36.155‒58) [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. “Quia igitur verum dicit intentionem rei in respectu ad suum exemplar, quæ non est prima, sed secundaria, ens autem dicit intentionem rei primam et absolutam, id quod est ens et verum in re bene potest apprehendi ab intellectu absque hoc quod intentio veritatis eius ab ipso apprehendatur. Intentio enim veritatis in re apprehendi non potest nisi apprehendendo conformitatem eius ad suum exemplar; intentio vero entis apprehenditur in re absoluta sine omni tali respectu.” (*Summa*, a. 1, q. 2, solutio; ed. Wilson, p. 39.205‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. “Non sunt in cognitione intellectus nostri ut obiecta cognita et operata ab intellectu, sed ut obiecta agentia intellectum et facientia ut intellectus noster sit intellectus secundum actum, per quod se ipsa faciunt esse in esse cognito intellectus, quod non facerent nisi ex se secundum actum essent entia vera, respectu quorum intellectus quodam modo est ens in potentia, sic enim ista eadem entia respectu entis quod Deus est, sunt diminuta entia, non tamen sic diminuta sicut sunt entia operata ab intellectu nostro, quia illa nullo modo nata sunt habere aliquod esse verum extra intellectum praeter esse cognitum quod habent in intellectu.” (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, solutio; ed. Macken, p. 31.39‒47) [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. “Sed quod per tale exemplar acquisitum in nobis habeatur a nobis certa omnino et infallibilis notitia veritatis, hoc omnino est impossibile triplici ratione, quarum prima sumitur ex parte rei de qua exemplar huiusmodi abstractum est, secunda ex parte animae in qua huiusmodi exemplar susceptum est, tertia ex parte ipsius exemplaris quod a re in anima susceptum est.” (*Summa*, a. 1, q. 2, solutio; ed. Wilson, p. 43.282‒87) [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. “Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quæ sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.” (ST I, q. 2, a. 1, resp; ed. Leonina 4, 28) [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. “Unde relatio quæ est inter ipsa genus et species non fundatur supra istas res a ratione, sed per naturam quam habet una istarum rerum respectu alterius fundatur relatio supra illas. Sed dicitur res naturalis, cum a natura talium rerum causetur.” (*Quaestiones super Prædicamentis*, q. 47; ed. Andrews, p. 68) [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. “Sed solummodo secundum rationem differunt illa tria in Deo, et sunt idem respectus secundum rem, differentes solo nomine, quo dicitur creativus, creaturus et creans.” (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 1, ad arg.; ed. Macken, pp. 8.34‒9.36) [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. “Nulla est ibi habitudo neque intelligitur. In quibus enim non est alterum in altero, ut habitudo in substantia, hoc quidem aliud, illud autem aliud, ut ad invicem aliquo modo se habeant, quomodo possibile est in istis ipsum “ad aliquid” considerari, nisi secundum aliquam analogiam, sicut et causas dicimus ibi et causata?” (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 1, ad arg.; ed. Macken, p. 17.47‒51) [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. “Deus secundum tertium modum relationis, qui consistit in commensurationibus, essentia sua refertur ad creaturam quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, quoniam sua essentia, ratione qua est essentia simpliciter, est unica mensura omnium creaturarum et id quo simpliciter quantitas et gradus essentiae earum habet cognosci, et hoc per se et ex se. Quod tamen ipsa essentia divina ut mensura per se, cognoscitur determinate quantitas essentiae creaturae secundum gradum determinatum, hoc non est nisi in quantum continet perfectiones earum, secundum quod haec patebunt in sequente quaestione.” (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 1, ad arg.; ed. Macken, p. 24.27‒36) [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. “Necesse est ponere ideas plures in Deo, quibus in notitia sua habet praesentialiter, ut in mundo archetypo, singula praesentia ab aeterno, et quæ numquam futura erant in existentia, possibilia tamen fieri, et quæ erant futura, et hoc in esse suo quidditativo quod sunt per suam essentiam per divinam scientiam constitutam.” (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, solutio; ed. Macken, p. 34.18‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. “Primo modo nihil est obiectum per se divini intellectus, nisi ipsa divina essentia ut est intelligibile quoddam habens rationem veri, quoniam, ut dicit Philosophus in XII *Metaphysicae* secundum expositionem Commentatoris: “Intellectum est perfectio intelligentis, scilicet in quantum movet ipsum ad suam perfectionem quæ est intelligere. Et sic, *si aliud* a sua essentia esset per se obiectum informans divinum intellectum actu intelligendi, *tunc substantia sua non esset nobilissima omnium, quia nobilitas non est ei nisi quia perficitur per aliud: quod aliud necesse est ut sit nobilius eo.*”” (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, solutio; ed. Macken, p. 27.28‒36) [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. “Circa primum istorum modorum, qui consistit in proportione secundum formam, sciendum est quod communicantia in forma possunt communicare ea, puta similia, quadrupliciter: uno modo simpliciter et absolute, nulla praerogativa secundum formam existente in uno super alterum; alio modo in altero eorum existente secundum formam aliqua praerogativa, et hoc tripliciter: vel secundum rationem intentionis, vel secundum rationem imitationis, vel secundum rationem productionis.” (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 1, ad arg.; ed. Macken, pp. 20.32‒21.40) [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. “Modus essendi diversus non necessario infert diversitatem praedicamentorum realem, cum eadem essentia possit in diversis temporibus et suppositis diversos modos essendi habere, et essentia unius generis et maxime generis generalissimi habet modos essendi diversissimos in diversis speciebus…” (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 28; ed. Jansen, t. I, p. 486) [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. “Ut sunt nomina primae impositionis, dic­itur VII *Metaphysicae* [Met. 1028a18‒20] 'accidentis esse est inesse'; et hoc de accidente reali de quo loquitur ibi. (…) Alio modo 'adesse' vel 'abesse' est nomen secundae impositionis et sig­nificat praedicationem eorum quæ sunt extra essentiam subiecti vel alterius generis a subiecto, sicut 'praedicari de' dicit propriam praedicationem essentialium quæ sunt in eodem genere cum subiecto.” (*Quaestiones in Librum* Porphirii Isagoge*,* q. 35, n. 8; ed. Opera philosophica [OPh] I, 221.7‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. “Dicitur ad quaestionem quod decem praedicamenta possunt dupliciter considerari: uno modo in quantum sunt entia; alio modo in quantum considerantur a ratione, sive in quantum aliqua proprietas causata ab intellectu eis attribuitur. Primo modo de eis considerat metaphysicus; subiectum enim eius primum est ens in quantum ens.” (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 2, no. 5‒6; OPh I, 258.11‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. “Sed cum ista decem non sint subiectum unius scientiae realis, scilicet metaphysicae, nisi in quantum est in istis unum primum ad quod alia attribuantur, ut habetur IV *Metaphysicae*; et in quantum considerantur a ratione nullum est ad quod attribuantur, quomodo sunt unum subiectum?” (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 2, no. 8; OPh I, pp. 259.14‒260.12) [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. “Hic potest dici quod illa non est interpretatio albi, quia 'album' tantum significat formam sub uno modo significandi. Sed hoc totum 'albedo ut concernens' significat formam sub duobus modis oppositis, quia 'albedo' significat formam sub uno modo, et 'ut concernens' dicit alium modum oppositum.” (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 8, no. 33; OPh I, 324.7‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. “Sed ens inquantum est ens est obiectum primum intellectus, per Avicennam; igitur est univocum (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 4, no. 13; OPh. I, 276.16‒17)… Item Avicenna dicit: qui dicit ens, non dicit substatiam nec accidens.” (ibid, no. 14; OPh I, 277.5‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. “Item, omnis multitudo est reducibilis ad unitatem, per Auctorem *De causis*. Sed substantia et accidens sunt multa quia diversa, ut patet per Aristotelem X *Metaphysicae* dicentem quod 'omne ens est omni enti idem vel diversum'. Ergo illa multa reducuntur ad aliquod unum. Nihil videtur illud nisi ens; ergo etc.” (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 4, no. 8; OPh I, 274.15‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. “Quia, ut dicit Aristoteles in principio VII *Metaphysicae*, 'substantia est primum omnium entium cognitione', quod non intelligitur de prioritate temporis sed naturae, scilicet quod cognitio eius est perfectissima. Auctoritas Avicennae potest concedi vera, sic quod accipit 'ens' pro uno significato quod est primum, scilicet substantia.” (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 4, no. 53; OPh. I, 290.5‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. “Vel forte quod duplex est ratio a qua hoc nomen 'substantia' imponitur, scilicet subsistendi et substandi. 'Ens' autem imponitur ab actu essendi. Sed actus essendi videtur ratio simplicior quam actus substandi. Et ideo 'ens' primo occurit intellectui quoad rationem a qua est nominis impositio, quia est simplicissima. Sed quoad essentiam significatam, 'substantia' intelligitur quando 'ens' primo intelligitur.” (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 4, no. 54; OPh I, 290.11‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. “Igitur nullum esse habet secunda substantia in prima. Secundum igitur istam expositionem absolute dicetur 'destructis primis, nullum aliorum destrui' [*Cat*. 2b5‒6]. Hoc confirmatur per hoc quod Aristoteles, loquens de secunda substantia et accidentibus, dicit 'omnia alia a prima' [*Cat*. 2b4‒5]. Sed haec, in quantum habent esse in prima, non sunt alia. Igitur non loquitur de illis in quantum habent esse in prima substantia.” (*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 13, no. 19; OPh I, 370.4‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. “...ergo haec conclusio est peripatetica, quam proinde recipiunt unanimiter Thomistae, et Scotistae contra Nominales cum D. Tho. de Ente, et essentia c. 4. et opusc. 55. et 56. Scoto 2. d. 3. q. 1. et 7. Met. q. 13. Probatur quoque evidenti ratione ipsam declarando. Nam per universalia in essendo hic intelligimus solum naturas communes, per quas individua a parte rei conveniunt, et assimilantur, sed tales naturas reperiri ipsas experientia docet, nam per humanitatem Petrus convenit cum Paulo, non cum Bucephalo, per animalitatem convenit cum Bucephalo, non cum lapide, ergo etc.” (*Disputationes Metaphysicae* 8.1.1, editio digitalis Renemann et. al.) [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. “De secundo articulo est dicendum, in quo expresse sibi contradico, non concipitur Deus in conceptu communi analogo sibi et creaturae, sed in conceptu communi univoco sibi et creaturae, ita quod ens et bonum et sapientia dicta de Deo et creatura univoce dicuntur de eis, et non dicunt duos conceptus.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 21; ed. Vaticana XVI, 232.14‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. “(…) et secundum Philosophum III *De anima*, 'anima de se est sicut tabula nuda' etc.; et dico quod nullum conceptum 'de alio' potest intellectus nudus facere in se, quia dicunt *aliqui* quod conceptum 'de se' potest, quia sibi semper praesens est; ergo si ille conceptus dictus de Deo analogus sit, alius a conceptu dicto de creatura, ad hoc quod sit in intellectu nostro oportet ponere aliquam causam aliam ab intellectu; illa autem causa non potest esse aliquid quod est motivum intellectus nostri pro statu isto, ut probabitur; ergo nihil erit causa eius, et ita nihil intelligemus de Deo, nisi Deus velit imprimere sicut sibi placet.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 26; ed. Vaticana XVI, 234.6‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. “Nam sicut nobis per se notum est quod totum sua parte sit maius, sic videntibus ipsam divinam essentiam per se notissimum est Deum esse, ex hoc quod sua essentia est suum esse. Sed quia eius essentiam videre non possumus, ad eius esse cognoscendum non per seipsum, sed per eius effectus pervenimus.” (*Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 1, cap. 11, n. 4; ed. Leonina 13, 25) [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. “Item, contra Philosophum arguo, si dicatur praedicto modo. Experimur quod quando cognoscimus causam in universali, naturaliter desideramus scire in particulari, et etiam quando cognoscimus effectum, desideramus scire causam; ergo intellectus cognoscens Deum in universali, naturaliter desiderat scire in particulari.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 42; ed. Vaticana XVI, 241.7‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. “Si conceptus entis infiniti sit conceptus perfectissimus quem de Deo concipimus, quomodo devenimus in cognitionem eius?” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 54; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 245.1‒3) [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. “Unde si Deus destrueret solis substantiam et conservaret eius lumen, eodem modo multiplicaretur species luminis ad intellectum et esset activum in intellectu sicut si esset in substantia, et eodem modo tunc intellectus suffoderet ad speciem substantiae sicut modo. Sed hoc posito non posset suffodere ad speciem substantiae, quia non est ibi, cum substantia destruatur, per positum. Ideo nec nunc suffodit ad speciem substantiae quando accidens est in substantia et multiplicatur species substantiae.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 54; ed. Vaticana XVI, 245.17‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. „*Transzendenz ist ein immanenter, innerhalb des ego sich konstituierender Seinscharakter*. Jeder erdenkliche Sinn, jedes erdenkliche Sein, ob es immanent oder transzendent heißt, fällt in den Bereich der transzendentalen Subjektivität. Ein Außerhalb derselben ist ein Widersinn, sie ist die universale, absolute Konkretion.“ (*Cartesianische Mediationen und Pariser Vorträge*; Husserliana I, ed. Strasser, p. 31.32‒36) [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. “Quod autem haec idea realitatem objectivam hanc vel illam contineat potius quam aliam, hoc profecto habere debet ab aliqua causa in qua tantumdem fit ad minimum realitatis formalis quantum ipsa continet objectivae. Si enim ponamus aliquid in idea reperiri, quod non fueri in ejus causa, hoc igitur habet a nihilo...” (*Meditationes de prima philosophia*, meditatio III; ed. Tannery 7, 41.20‒26) [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. “Ideo dico quod intellectus noster cognoscit Deum esse ens infinitum, summum bonum, et huiusmodi, isto modo: nam conceptus entis includitur in conceptu creaturae; intellectus igitur in concipiendo hoc ens, ut album aut lapidem, ascendendo et abstrahendo potest cognoscere intentionem entis, ibi sistendo; (...)” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 56; ed. Vaticana XVI, 246.14‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. “Habitus autem dependet ab obiecto et intellectu, et intellectus suus non est eiusdem rationis cum intellectu nostro, et ideo nec habitus suus cum habitu nostro; unde habitus suus est infinitus, noster autem finitus.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 63; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 248.16‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. “Ad aliud, quando arguitur quod 'infinitum unde infinitum, est ignotum', dicendum quod duplex est infinitum, scilicet infinitum in actu et infinitum in potentia. Infinitum in potentia est nobis ignotum et non a nobis cognoscibile, quia intellectus intelligens hoc post hoc, numquam intelliget infinitum in potentia.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 60; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 247.24‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. “Conceptus simplex qui concipitur una intellectione et uno actu intelligendi, est duplex, scilicet conceptus simpliciter simplex et conceptus non simpliciter simplex. Conceptus autem simpliciter simplex est ille conceptus qui non est resolubilis in alios conceptus priores; conceptus autem non simpliciter simplex est ille qui est resolubilis in conceptus priores, ut conceptus hominis resolvitur in conceptum generis et differentiae.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 68; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 250.1‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. “Igitur prius acquiritur cognitio confusa quam determinata, praecipue cum intellectus noster procedat de imperfecto ad perfectum. Et hoc verum est. Sed tamen non sequitur quod confusum sit nobis primo cognitum cognitione confusa. Unde patet quod totus ordo cognitionis confusae praecedit totum ordinem cognitionis distinctae secundum prioritatem originis.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 79; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 254.14‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. “Secundum quod praemitto est quod aliud est aliquid esse confusum cognitum, et aliud est esse confuse cognitum; et aliud est confusum cognoscere et confuse cognoscere.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 69; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 250.13‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. “Et sic ens, licet sit confusum cognitum, non tamen confuse cognoscitur, quia non habet per quod potest distingui in plura aut priora; et ideo ens non potest indistincte et confuse cognosci.” (ibid; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 250.15‒27) [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. “Circa solutionem secundae quaestionis, quæ quaerit 'quid sit primum cognitum a nobis', sic est procedendum: primo est videndum quid sit primo cognitum primitate originis et generationis; secundo, quid sit primo cognitum primitate perfectionis; tertio, quid sit primo cognitum primitate adaequationis.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 66; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 249.16‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. “Secundo dico quod ens est primum, ordine originis et generationis, quod cognoscitur cognitione distincta. Probatio: ens non potest cognosci nisi distincte, quia non est resolubile in plures conceptus priores: sed ad hoc quod aliquid distincte cognoscatur cognitione distincta, oportet quod ens praecognoscatur, quia in omni conceptu est ens.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 75; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 252.26‒31) [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. “Et confirmatur: metaphysica, licet sit ultima ordine doctrinae, tamen est prima ordine distinctae cognitionis, sicut vult Avicenna, ubi supra; sed metaphysica est de ente et de aliis communibus; igitur ens erit primo distincte cognitum. Unde geometria cognoscit de linea quod sit longitudo sine latitudine; nec oportet geometricum scire utrum sit quantitas, sed hoc habet metaphysicus dicere, cuius est certificare principia aliarum scientiarum. Unde metaphysica est prima in ordine distinctae cognitionis, sed est ultima in ordine doctrinae.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 76; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 253.6‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. “Sicut igitur potentia simpliciter in rebus nihil includit actualitatis et actus non includit essentialiter potentiam, ita ille conceptus potentialis ad quem ultimo stat resolutio, non includit conceptum actualem, nec e contra; et manifestum est quod resolutio stat ad ens; ergo oportet quod ens non includatur in illo actuali ad quod stat resolutio in ‘quid’; et iterum, cum illi conceptus sint primo diversi, ens non includitur essentialiter in utroque illorum.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 101; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 262.22‒27) [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. The hermeneutics of historiality (*Hermeneutik der Geschichtlichkeit*) explain the emergence of modernity on the basis of new conception of human nature. It is based on the unhistorical movement that established the history of modern times at the zero point, from where the forms of objective deduction diverged. The purely conceptual movement of nature can be found in the main theories of the social contract, namely in the concept of *perfectibilité* (J. J. Rousseau). By starting the social, political and civilizational evolution from the zero point, through the transformation of the conceptual nature, Kant creates the epoch of the postmodern Enlightenment, in which man produces every sense of the being out of himself (Umlauf 2010, ch. 6.1). [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. “Substantia habet aliquid formale quod non est formaliter entitas sed modus entis, quia aliter, si illud esset formaliter ens, conveniret in ente cum alia differentia, et non eodem distingueretur sed alio, ‒ set sic ultra in infinitum.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1‒2, no. 122; ed. Vaticana XVI, p. 272.1‒2) [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. “Sed oppositum 'accidentis per accidens' non repugnat subiecto pro aliquo instanti; et ideo voluntas volens *a* in hoc instanti et pro hoc instanti, potest nolle *a* in eodem et pro eodem. Et est haec possibilitas logica respectu extremorum non repugnantium.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 1‒5, no. 50; ed. Vaticana XVII, p. 495.10‒14). [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. “Intellectus divinus videt veritatem alicuius complexionis factam et operatam a voluntate (quam veritatem immediate sibi repraesentat essentia sua), quæ non relucet sub ratione factibilis in essentia nisi postquam determinatum sit a voluntate divina.” (*Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 1‒5, no. 65; ed. Vaticana XVII, p. 501.21‒25) [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. “Si dicas quod lux increata cum intellectu et obiecto causet istam veritatem sinceram, haec est opinio communis, quæ ponit lucem aeternam sicut 'causam remotam' causare omnem certam veritatem.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4, no. 260; ed. Vaticana III, p. 159.7‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. “Aut lux aeterna, quam dicis necessariam ad habendum sinceram veritatem, causat aliquid prius naturaliter actu, aut non. Si sic, aut igitur in obiecto, aut in intellectu: non in obiecto, quia obiectum in quantum habet 'esse' in intellectu, non habet 'esse' reale sed tantum intentionale, igitur non est capax alicuius accidentis realis.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4, no. 260; ed. Vaticana III, p. 158.3‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. “Ad intellectum primi dico quod omnia intelligibilia actu intellectus divini habent 'esse intelligibile', et in eis omnes veritates de eis relucent, ita quod intellectus intelligens ea et virtute eorum intelligens necessarias veritates de eis, videt in eis sicut in obiectis istas veritates necessarias.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4, no. 262; ed. Vaticana III, p. 160.8‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. “Illa autem in quantum sunt obiecta secundaria intellectus divini, sunt 'veritates', quia conformes suo exemplari, intellectui scilicet divino, et sunt 'lux', quia manifestae, et sunt immutabiles, ibi, et necessariae. Sed aeternae sunt secundum quid, quia 'aeternitas' est condicio exsistentis, et illa non habent exsistentiam nisi secundum quid.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4, no. 262; ed. Vaticana III, p. 160.13‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. “Quantum ad tertium modum, videmus in luce aeterna sicut in causa obiecti in se: nam intellectus divinus producit ista actu suo in 'esse intelligibili', et actu suo dat huic obiecto 'esse' tale et illi tale, et per consequens dat eis talem rationem obiecti ‒ per quas rationes post movent intellectum ad cognitionem certam.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4, no. 266; ed. Vaticana III, p. 162.14‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. “Dico autem 'proportionaliter repraesentare' quando ratio illius repraesentantis non est formaliter in Deo, sed aliquid proportionale illi rationi…” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 300; ed. Vaticana III, p. 182.17‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. “Quantum ad tertium articulum dicitur, secundum Boethium *De hebdomadibus*, quod «diversum est 'quo est' et 'quod est'», quia illud quo aliquid est dicitur 'ratitudo' eius, quo autem ipsum est 'quod est' vel 'quid' dicitur 'aliquitas' eius.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 302; ed. Vaticana III, p. 184.14‒17) [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. “Modus ponitur iste: secundum Avicennam V *Metaphysicae*, 'humanitas est tantum humanitas'; ergo ratio humanitatis non est res rata, ‒ ergo oportet quod aliquo alio extra rationem formalem humanitatis sit ens ratum.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 303; ed. Vaticana III, p. 185.3‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. “Arguitur etiam quod illud quo formaliter est ratitudo eius, sit respectus vestigialis, et hoc primo sic: quidquid includitur in per se intellectu alicuius in quantum tale, est illud quo ipsum est tale, vel idem formaliter quod ipsum in quantum est tale; sed respectus vestigialis includitur in ratione cuiuslibet entis rati; ergo etc.” (*Ordinatio I*, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 304; ed. Vaticana III, p. 185.8‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. “Si arguitur contra istam opinionem, per Averroem XI *Metaphysicae*, quod 'relatio habet debilissimum esse', ergo non est nec potest esse formaliter ratitudo entis rati, ‒ dicitur quod duplex est relatio: quaedam accidentalis, quaedam substantialis. Et accipitur ista distinctio relationis a Simplicio *Super praedicamenta*, ubi vult quod aliqua 'in' non constituunt praedicamenta, sicut alia, pro eo quod aliqui respectus sunt essentiales sive substantiales, aliqui non sed accidentales. Dicunt igitur quod dictum Commentatoris verum est de relatione accidentali, non de substantiali.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 308; ed. Vaticana III, p. 187.6‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. “Si secundo modo intelligatur ens ratum, dico quod homo est ex se ens ratum, quia formaliter ex se non repugnat sibi esse: sicut enim cuicumque aliquid repugnat, repugnat ei formaliter ex ratione eius, ita cui non repugnat formaliter, non repugnat propter rationem ipsius; et si homini de se repugnaret esse, per nullum respectum advenientem posset ei non repugnare.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 36, q. unica, no. 50; ed. Vaticana VI, p. 291.1‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. “Nihil secundum ipsum formaliter est activum relatione, quia relatio non est principium agendi; ergo ratitudo non est relatio. Item, secundum ipsum nulla creatura in quantum rata differt specie ab illo 'esse' quod est Deus; sed ipsum 'esse' quod est Deus, secundum omnem opinionem est absolutum…” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 320‒321; ed. Vaticana III, p. 194.1‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. “Quia lapis in quantum lapis, participat ipsum 'esse', ita quod lapis, positus in entitate rata, de necessitate et 'per se secundo modo' habet respectum participationis, sine qua ipsum 'esse' includit contradictionem, sicut subjectum esse sine propria passione, vel fundamentum necessarium relationis esse sine relatione, posito termino illius relationis.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 326; ed. Vaticana III, p. 197.5‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. “In primo instanti naturae est ens quod est ipsum 'esse', scilicet Deus: in secundo, est lapis ens ratum, absolutum, quod nec intelligitur tunc participans nec non-participans, in tertio, est ipsa participatio, respectus quidam, consequens ad ipsum lapidem.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. unica, no. 326; ed. Vaticana III, p. 197.10‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. “Ex hoc ergo manifesto, scilicet quod intellectus potest intelligere universale, accipio hanc propositionem: 'intellectus potest habere obiectum actu universale, per se sibi praesens in ratione obiecti, prius naturaliter quam intelligat'. Ex hoc sequitur propositum, quod in illo priore habet obiectum praesens in specie intelligibili, et ita habet speciem intelligibilem priorem actu.“ (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, no. 349; ed. Vaticana III, p. 210.3‒8) [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. “Sed intelligere obiectum sub ratione universalis et singularis requirit duplicem rationem repraesentativam vel repraesentandi, et est respectu duplicis rationis 'repraesentabilis' formaliter; ergo idem manens idem, non repraesentat sic et sic: ergo phantasma, quod de se repraesentat obiectum sub ratione singularis, non potest repraesentare ipsum sub ratione universalis.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, no. 352; ed. Vaticana III, p. 212.2‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. “Cum ultra deducis quod intellectio 'non est motus rei ad animam', non sequitur, quia impressio speciei est quidam motus rei ad animam, quatenus res habet 'esse' in illa specie; intellectio etiam sequens impressam speciem, est motus rei ad animam, quatenus per intellectionem obiectum habet 'esse' in anima actualiter cognitum, quod prius tantum habuit 'esse' habitualiter.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, no. 387; ed. Vaticana III, p. 235.10‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. “Die Farbe der dinglichen Rückseite ist nicht als eine ganz bestimmte Farbe vorgezeichnet, wenn das Ding uns noch unbekannt ist; (...) ‚eine Farbe’ ist aber doch vorgezeichnet, und eventuell noch mehr.” (*Erfahrung und Urteil*, ed. Landgrebe, p. 105). [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. “Et si velis quaerere aliquod esse verum huius obiecti ut sic, nullum est quaerere nisi 'secundum quid', nisi quod istud 'esse secundum quid' reducitur ad aliquod esse simpliciter, quod est esse ipsius intellectionis; sed istud 'esse simpliciter' non est formaliter esse eius quod dicitur 'esse secundum quid', sed est eius terminative vel principiative…” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 36, q. unica, no. 46; ed. Vaticana VI, p. 289.6‒14) [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. “Da aber Erfahrung *ein Erkenntnis der Objekte durch Wahrnehmungen* ist, folglich das Verhältnis im Dasein des Mannigfaltigen, nicht wie es in der Zeit zusammengestellt wird, sondern wie es *objektiv in der Zeit ist*, in ihr vorgestellt werden soll, *die Zeit selbst aber nicht wahrgenommen werden kann*, so kann die Bestimmung der Existenz der Objekte in der Zeit nur durch ihre Verbindung in der Zeit überhaupt, mithin *nur durch a priori verknüpfende Begriffe*, geschehen.” (KdRV, B 219; alle kursiv markierten Hervorhebungen sind meine) [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. “Alle Erscheinungen stehen, ihrem Dasein nach, a priori unter Regeln der Bestimmung ihres Verhältnisses untereinander in einer Zeit.” (KdRV, B 220) [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. “Das Gemüt könnte sich unmöglich die Identität seiner selbst in der Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Vorstellungen, und zwar a priori, denken, wenn es nicht die Identität seiner Handlung vor Augen hätte ...” (KdRV, A 108) [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. “Beweis: selbst die Schwächsten der Schwachen, die Metaphysiker und Scholastiker werden über ihn noch Herr, — sie spinnen um ihn herum, in ihn hinein, bis er ihr Abbild, eine Spinne wird. Nunmehr spinnt er die Welt aus sich heraus, nunmehr wird er zum ewigen Metaphysikus, nunmehr wird er „Geist“ „purer Geist“… der christliche Gottesbegriff — Gott als Krankengott, Gott als Spinne, Gott als Geist — ist der niedrigste Gottesbegriff, der auf Erden erreicht wurde: er stellt den Höhepunkt der décadence in der absteigenden Entwicklung der Gottesidee dar.” (*Nachgelassene Fragmente*, Mai–Juni 1888; KSA NF-1888, no. 17[4]) [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. “Dico quod intentio Commentatoris est, III De anima, quod sunt duae intelligentiae distinctae realiter quæ non sunt in homine sicut perfectiones in perfectibili sed solum sicut motores corporis, sicut ponit intelligendam moventem caelum coniungi cum caelo sicut motorem cum mobili. Et ipse in hoc negandus est a christianis.” (*Ordinatio* II, q. 20; OTh 5, p. 442.17‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. “Qui vult tenere opinionem Commentatoris potest dicere quod intellectus possibilis est prima perfectio hominis et intellectio, quæ est actus secundus, est ultima perfectio hominis. Et tunc potest dici quod intellectus possibilis est in quolibet homine per specialem unionem sive assumptionem, quam unionem vocat Commentator 'copulationem'. Et propter istam unionem potest homo sufficienter dici intelligens [et] rationalis.” (*Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, a. 7; OTh 8, 239.47‒53) [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. “Et haec videtur esse intentio Commentatoris quia ponit quod intellectio causatur a phantasmate effective et intellectu, et per consequens quod unum phantasma potest esse in uno homine et non in alio. Et in illo in quo non est illud phantasma, deficit causa partialis requisita ad intellectionem, et per consequens in illo non potest esse intellectio phantasmatis.” (*Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, a. 7; OTh 8, 240.71‒76) [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. “Circa secundum sunt duae difficultates: una, supposito quod intelligamus illo intellectu tamquam per formam corporis vel potentiam intellectivam; alia est, supposito quod intellectus sit in nobis solum sicut motor corporis et non sicut forma.” (*Quodlibet* I, q. 11; OTh 9, 66.18‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. “Si dicis quod talis diversitas potest contingere propter diversam copulationem intellectus cum phantasmatibus, contra: propter diversam copulationem non possunt contraria esse in eodem subiecto primo, quia phantasmata non se habent nisi effective ad illa quae recipiuntur in intellectu: sed praedicta contraria sunt in intellectu subiective, igitur etc.” (*Quodlibet* I, q. 11; OTh 9, 67.33‒38) [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. “Et quando dicitur quod intellectus agens facit de intelligibili in potentia intelligibile in actu, dico quod haec propositio non invenitur a Philosopho, nec a Commentatore, sed ista: quod intellectus agens facit de intellecto in potentia intellectum in actu. Et hoc est verum, quia facit intellectionem per quam aliquid est in actu intellectum quod prius fuit in potentia intellectum.” (*Reportatio* II, q. 12‒13; OTh 5, 305.4‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. “Hoc tamen teneo, quod nullum universale, nisi forte sit universale per voluntariam institutionem, est aliquid exsistens quocumque modo extra animam, sed omne illud quod est universale praedicabile de pluribus ex natura sua est in mente vel subiective vel obiective, et quod nullum universale est de essentia seu quidditate cuiuscumque substantiae.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 2, q. 9; OTh 2, 291.18‒292.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. “Potest tamen persuaderi, quia ad omnem motum localem et alterationem sufficiunt dispositiones corporis et illa quæ experimur in nobis, sicut manifeste patet, scilicet cognitio et volitio.” (*Quodlibet* I, q. 11; OTh 9, 68.50‒53) [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. “(…) homo in primo instanti in quo est, non haberet intellectum sibi copulatum et unitum quia tunc non habet phantasma quod abstrahitur a rebus.” (*Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, a. 7; OTh 8, 238.30‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. “Assumptum patet secundum Philosophum, III De anima, ubi dicit quod aliter est intellectus in potentia ante addiscere vel invenire quam post. Quia ante est in potentia essentiali, et post, quando per aliquem actum aliquis habitus derelinquitur, tunc est in potentia accidentali ad actum consimilem. Igitur intellectus per habitum generatum ex actu est in potentia accidentali. Unde nunquam experitur aliquis se esse in potentia accidentali respectu cognitionis nisi post intellectionem.” (*Reportatio* II, q. 12‒13; OTh 5, 271.12‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. “Secundum Philosophum III De anima: 'Anima est sicut tabula nuda in qua nihil depingitur.' Sed si esset habitus principiorum secundum inchoationem, non esset sic, quia a natura sua haberet habitum, licet secundum esse imperfectum.” (*Reportatio* III, q. 12; OTh 6, 394.7‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. “Sed illud quod reducit intellectum de potentia essentiali ad accidentalem non potest esse habitus. Tum quia habitus praesupponit actum, et per consequens praesupponit intellectum reductum de potentia essentiali. Tum quia habitus non est nisi respectu complexorum…” (*Reportatio* II, q. 12‒13; OTh 5, 283.4‒8) [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. “Item, omnia illa quae possunt salvari per speciem, possunt salvari per habitum; igitur habitus requiritur et species superfluit.” (*Reportatio* II, q. 12‒13; OTh 5, 272.3‒4) [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. “Immo ista sunt nomina primae intentionis quia quando supponunt personaliter, supponunt tantum pro rebus et verificantur de nominibus rerum quando illa nomina supponunt pro suis significatis et non pro se ipsis nec pro aliis a suis significatis. Unde ista non est vera 'homo est singularis' nisi pro re et non pro aliqua intentione secunda.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 23, q. unica; OTh 4, 67.1‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. “Nam huiusmodi nomina 'homo', 'animal', 'leo', et universaliter omnia nomina primae intentionis significant primo et principaliter ipsas res extra, sicut haec vox 'homo' significat primo omnes homines, et 'animal' significat primo omnia animalia, et sic de alis. Et ideo termini quando supponunt pro rebus supponunt significative et personaliter.” (*Expositio in librum Peri hermeneias Aristotelis*, § 12; OPh 2, 502.18‒23) [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. “Confirmatur, quia si illa natura quæ est in Sorte vere est communis, igitur cum destructo Sorte destruatur quodlibet essentiale sibi, sequitur quod aliquod commune vere destruatur et adnihiletur; sed certum est quod remanet aliquod commune ex quo remanet individuum. Et ex tali contradictione contingit inferre distinctionem realem, secundum eos.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 2, q. 6; OTh 2, 183.15‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. “Et si dicatur quod Sortes supponit pro uno composito ex natura et differentia individuali, quod compositum sustentat naturam, hoc non valet, quia sicut inferius ostendetur, nullum est tale compositum.” (*Summa logicae* I.7; OPh 1, 26.93‒96) [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. “Sed nullam naturam individuam sustentat, quia quaelibet natura individua includit talem differentiam, secundum istos, et ita unum compositum ex natura et differentia individuali sustentaret unum compositum ex natura et differentia individuali, quod est absurdum.” (*Summa logicae* I.7; OPh 1, 26.98‒101) [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. “Sed nullum tale commune movet potentiam sensitivam: tum quia non est in re, ‒ sicut ostensum est prius ‒, tum quia sensus tantum est particularium et nullo modo universalium.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 35, q. 3; OTh 4, 452.17‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. „Similiter, secundum istos, nihil movet intellectum possibilem ad intellectionem immediate nisi species intelligibilis et intellectus agens. Et tamen ista non sunt praecise obiectum intellectus possibilis immo alia sunt aeque per se obiecta.“ (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 35, q. 3; OTh 4, 452.9‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. “Sed rei absolutae importatae per passionem non est alia causa realis nisi extrinseca, propter simplicitatem ipsius. Igitur definitio, quæ est medium, sumitur a causa extrinseca, et per consequens non est definitio formalis de qua iste loquitur.” (*Ordinatio* I, prologus, q. 5; OTh I, 164.2‒6) [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. “Circa primum dico quod suppositum est ens completum, incommunicabile per identitatem, nulli natum inhaerere, et a nullo sustentatum. Per primum, scilicet per 'ens completum', excluditur omnis pars tam essentialis quam integralis, quia neutra est ens completum.” (*Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, a. 1; OTh 9, 328.11‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. “Item, si species ponatur necessario requiri ad cognitionem intuitivam sicut causa eius efficiens, cum illa species possit conservari in absentia obiecti, posset causare naturaliter cognitionem intuitivam in absentia rei, quod falsum est et contra experientiam.” (*Reportatio* II, qq. 12-13; OTh 5, 269.16‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. “Necesse est ut lux non sit necessaria nisi in essendo colores moventes diaphanum nisi secundum quod dat diaphano formam quæ recipit motum a colore, scilicet illuminationem.” (*Reportatio* III, q. 2; OTh 6, 69.10‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. “Item, color exsistit in obiecto visibili pure materialiter, in oculo autem exsistit immaterialiter; sed in medio exsistit aliquo modo immaterialiter et spiritualiter. Cum igitur natura procedit per media determinata, et purum materiale non agit in immateriale, igitur obiectum sensibile non immediate agit in sensum sed species in medio, quia potentia visiva cognoscit immaterialiter, et per consequens nihil materiale potest eam immediate immutare.” (*Reportatio* III, q. 2; OTh 6, 45.3‒10) [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. “Item, commento 10 [CMDA III.10; 423.14‒424.17], dicit quod necesse est ut proportio quae est intentionis ad intentionem, scilicet individualis ad universalem, sit sicut proportio virtutis comprehendentis alteram illarum ad virtutem comprehendentem alteram.” (*Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, q. 6; OTh 2, 487.4‒7) [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. “Color non exsistit in potentia [visiva] immaterialiter, quia si ibi reciperetur ita reciperetur in materia et extenderetur sicut in obiecto. Et eodem modo est de colore in medio, quia ibi exsistit pure materialiter sicut in obiecto et non intentionaliter nec spiritualiter. Tamen potest dici quod in potentia [visiva] exsistit immaterialiter, vel quia forma recepta in potentia est alterius rationis a forma exsistente in obiecto.” (*Reportatio* III, q. 2; OTh 6, 66.14‒67.2) [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. “Et si Deus suspenderet actionem solis respectu illius luminis, tunc non posset sol causare calorem, quia non potest illud causare nisi mediante lumine.” (*Reportatio* III, q. 2; OTh 6, 55.12‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. “Unde absolute loquendo non requiritur necessario ad cognitionem intuitivam alia praesentia nisi quod possit actum intuitivum terminare. Et cum hoc stat quod obiectum sit nihil, vel quod sit distans per maximam distantiam.” (*Reportatio* II, qq. 12‒13; OTh 5, 259.10‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. “Eodem modo per cognitionem intuitivam possum iudicare rem non esse quando non est. Sed ista cognitio non potest esse naturalis, quia talis cognitio nunquam est, nec conservatur naturaliter, nisi obiecto praesente et exsistente. Ideo ista cognitio intuitiva naturalis corrumpitur per absentiam obiecti.” (*Reportatio* II, qq. 12‒13; OTh 5, 259.19‒23) [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. “Haec propositio fuit vera ab aeterno 'Deus praedestinavit Petrum', igitur non potest esse falsa; igitur est necessaria. Nego consequentiam, quia multae propositiones fuerunt verae ab aeterno quæ modo sunt falsae, sicut ista fuit vera ab aeterno 'mundus non est', et tamen modo est falsa. Ita dico: licet ista fuerit vera ab aeterno 'Deus praedestinavit Petrum', tamen potest esse falsa et potest numquam fuisse vera.” (*Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia divina*, q. 1, ad 4; OPh 2, 510.96‒102) [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. “Et haec quidem quæ iam diximus, locum aliquem haberent etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dari nequit, non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana.” (*De jure belli ac pacis*, *Prolegomena*11; ed. Molhyusen, p. 7) [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. “Und wir können nicht redlich sein, ohne zu erkennen, daß wir in der Welt leben müssen - 'etsi deus non daretur'. Und eben dies erkennen wir - vor Gott! Gott selbst zwingt uns zu dieser Erkenntnis. So führt uns unser Mündigwerden zu einer wahrhaftigeren Erkenntnis unserer Lage vor Gott. Gott gibt uns zu wissen, daß wir leben müssen als solche, die mit dem Leben ohne Gott fertig werden. Der Gott, der mit uns ist, ist der Gott, der uns verläßt (Markus 15:34)! Der Gott, der uns in der Welt leben läßt ohne die Arbeitshypothese Gott, ist der Gott, vor dem wir dauernd stehen. Vor und mit Gott leben wir ohne Gott.” (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Brief vom 16.07.1944; *Widerstand und Ergebung*, ed. Bethge, p. 393.21‒27) [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. “Das Wesen der Aufklärung ist die Alternative, deren Unausweichlichkeit die der Herrschaft ist. Die Menschen hatten immer zu wählen zwischen ihrer Unterwerfung unter Natur oder der Natur unter das Selbst. Mit der Ausbreitung der bürgerlichen Warenwirtschaft wird der dunkle Horizont des Mythos von der Sonne der kalkulierenden Vernunft aufgehellt, unter deren eisigen Strahlen die Saat der neuen Barbarei heranreift.” (Horkheimer&Adorno 2000, 45–46) [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. “It is this *historico-physiological character of the evidence*, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs *but also expresses subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views concerning this state of affairs*, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado.” (Feyerabend 1993, 52; the italicized parts are in the original) [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. “It is only those educated people who did believe in diabolism, therefore, who imposed distinctively learned notions upon the substratum of popular belief. This latter group of intellectuals was significant because of the effect they had on judicial proceedings. Even if they were numerically unimportant in 1300 (and they probably were), they seem to have increased dramatically by 1500. In any event, it is their ideas that call for separate attention.” (Kieckhefer 1976, 75) [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. Above-mentioned Sicilian king Friedrich II. von Staufen (1194–1250) supported at his court the Sicilian school of translators, which differed from the Toledo School. This enlightened ruler was the first in Europe to explicitly ban the trials by ordeal because they were irrational. His person and deeds later became a well-known object of demonization. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. “De Wier à Cyrano de Bergerac, on dira par exemple, qu’on ne doit croire, dans les aveux des “sorciers”, que ce qui est “possible”. Mais comment déterminer, pour l’homme ou pour les choses, le possible ?” (Certeau 1973, 29) [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. The maid Catillon Repond, the last European “witch,” was burned in 1731 in Fribourg, Switzerland. In Switzerland, the Protestant Inquisition condemned a total of 10,000 people out of a total number of about 60,000 throughout Europe. Protestant Freiburg stood out in terms of the torture of witches, and in the years 1429–1731, 500 victims were brought to justice in this city alone. Among them, 70–80 % were women, and execution followed in 60 % of cases (Kieckhefer 1976, 106-47). [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. The United States, as the most developed democracy in the West, banned the slave trade due to the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1865. Some high Eastern civilizations (India, China, Persia) officially banned slavery as early as the 3rd century BC. In Christian Europe it was first done in Venice during the 10th century. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. “Nam si eciam nunc in statu nature corrupte, uidelicet multiplicata iam hominum malicia, essent omnia communia, dissiparentur omnia et dissolueretur res publica. Si eciam homo homini non preeeset pre defectu iustitie, genus humanum sese mutua cede laceraret.” (*Vincentii Belvacensis De morali principiis institutione*, ed. Schneider, p. 18.30‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. “Huiusmodi ergo regni ministerium, ut a terrenis spiritualia essent discreta, non terrenis regibus sed sacerdotibus est commissum, et precipue summo sacerdoti successori Petri, Christi uicario Romano Pontifici, cui omnes reges populi Christiani oportet esse subiectos sicut ipsi Domino Ihesu Christo. Sic enim, ut dictum est, ei ad quem ultimi finis pertinet cura subdi debent illi ad quos pertinet cura antecedentium finium, et eius imperio dirigi.” (*De regno* II.3; ed. Leonina 42, 466.110‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. “Boniface VIII spoke of the role of the emperor and characterized him in these words: ‘(Rex Romanorum) est sol sicut monarcha, qui habet omnes illuminare et spiritualem potestatem defendere, quia ipse est datus et missus ad laudem bonorum et ad vindictam malefactorum’.” (Ullmann 1949, 7) [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. “Non sic autem fideles laici sic habent ex jure divino, quod subsint in temporalibus uni monarchae supremo, sed ex naturali instinctu, qui ex Deo est, habent, quod civiliter et in communitate vivant, et per consequens, ut ad bene vivendum in communi rectores eligant diversos quidem, secundum diversitates communitatum.” (Johannes Quidort, *De Potestate Papali et Regia;* zit. nach Ullmann 1949, 16). [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. “Et huic sententie concordat Averrois in comento super hiis que *De anima*. Potentia etiam intellectiva, de qua loquor, non solum est ad formas universales aut speties, sed etiam per quandam extensionem ad particulares: unde solet dici quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus, cuius finis est agere atque facere.” (*Monarchia* 1.3.9, ed. digitalis *Dante Project*) [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. Engelbertus Admontensis. *De ortu et fine Romani imperii liber*, ed. Kaspar Brusch, Basileae, 1553. The pagination corresponds to the digitized manuscript in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (Project ID: VD16 E 1211). [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. Chapter LXIX (*De maioritate et obedientia*) is cited according to *Concilia*, Liber I (Romae, 1478), which is archived and digitized at the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (Project ID: BDR-BV035794233-61976). The pagination of chapter 69 corresponds to the digitized pages of the manuscript (image number 101–104) in two columns (a, b). [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. “Et intellectus per quem agitur (et est cogitativus operativus) differt a speculativo in perfectione et fine. Finis enim speculativi est scire tantum, operativi autem operari.” (CMDA III.49; 517.10‒12) [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. “Et consuevit dici, quod speculativus per extensionem fit practicus, propter illud verbum Aristotelis in tertio de Anima, ubi dicit: «Amplius extendente se intellectu et dicente intelligibilia fugere aut imitari, non movetur, sed secundum desiderium agit, ut inabstinens.»” (*De homine*, q. 63, a. 4; ed. Borgnet 35, 543b) [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. “Sed tunc quaeritur, Quas sit ista extensio? Et dicunt quidam, quod sit a ratione veri in rationem boni vel mali, secundum quod videtur Philosophus dicere in *Ethicis*, quod opus ethicum non est contemplandi gratia, sed ut boni fiamus.” (*De homine*, q. 63, a. 4; ed. Borgnet 35, 543b) [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. „Wie ist nun hier praktischer Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft mit dem theoretischen eben derselben in Ansehung der Grenzbestimmung ihres Vermögens zu vereinigen?“ (KdPV 50) [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. “Notandum quod uirtus intellectualis est per admirationem formarum a Primo et Eius contemplationem, consuetudinalis uero per asseruationem et dominationem potentiarum inferiarum uel motuum carnalium…” (ms. *Ripoll* 109, zit. nach Buffon 2007, 118) [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. “Le reste de l’œuvre permet d’affirmer que l’auteur du *Commentaire de Paris* semble envisager la possibilité pour l’homme de s’unir à Dieu par une certaine 'contemplation amoureuse', fruit de l’activité conjointe d’une connaissance intuitive (*cognitio sine phantasmate*) et d’une connaissance affective (*cognitio cum affectu*).” (Zavattero 2007, 317). [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. “Anima secundum partem speculatiuam habet duplicem naturam, unam secundum quam comparatur ad superiora et hec uocatur intellectus agens, aliam habet secundum quam comparatur ad inferiora et hec uocatur intellectus possibilis et secundum intellectum agentem semper est in anima ueritas, secundum possibilem non, similiter ex parte intellectus practici sunt iste diuerse nature: una que respondet intellectui agenti et hec uocatur superior pars intellectus practici, alia respondet intellectui possibili et uocatur inferior pars intellectus practici, et pars superior semper est ad bonum, inferior non…” (*Lectura in Ethicam novam du Commentaire de Paris*, Le prologue; ed. Zavattero, p. 24.169‒25.179) [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. “Ad quod dicendum est quod uirtus intellectualis est uirtus secundum quam coniungitur anima superiori essentie a qua nata est perfici. Coniungitur autem superiori essentie per intellectum tantum contemplatione et affectu animi. Virtus intellectualis inchoatur a contemplatione et perficitur in affectu. Est enim in contemplatione summi boni cum dilectione eiusdem et quia sola operatione ipsius intellectus, quantum est de uirtute hominis, perficitur, 'merito' intellectualis nuncupatur.” (*Commentarium Abrincense*, Bibl. Munich, ms. 232, fol. 91r-91v; ed. Buffon 2007, 122) [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. “Ad ultimum dico quod Aristotiles non ponit hic diuisionem uirtutis nisi secundum quod inest anime unite corpori. Hec autem uirtus uel est consuetudinalis siue ciuilis, uel purgatoria uel intellectualis. Virtus uero purgati animi est uirtus que quidem inest anime tantum post separationem anime a corpore. Virtus uero exemplaris est uirtus incausata que est ipsum Primum. Et ideo de hiis duabus non facit hic mentionem. Non enim diuidit hic uirtutem uniuersaliter, set eam que est anime in coniuncto.” (*Pseudo-Peckham*, Lectio 22, q. 2, § 16; ed. Buffon 2007, 293) [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. “Aliter potest haberi diuisio hoc modo, ut habetur in tertio De anima: «secantur sensus et scientie in res», et ideo secundum diuisionem rerum erit diuisio scientiarum.” (*Pseudo-Peckham*, prologus, § 3; ed. Buffon 2007, 220‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. “Est ergo moralis scientia proprie de bono, siue de rebus prout sunt ab opere nostro. Et ideo, cum scientia essentialiter recipiat diuisionem secundum diuisionem eius de quo est, diuiditur moralis scientia uel philosophia essentialiter secundum diuisionem boni.” (*Pseudo-Peckham*, Prologus, § 3; ed. Buffon 2007, 17) [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. “Item, uerum accipitur a causa formali, bonum uero a causa finali. Set finalis est causa causarum et omnes alias causas antecedit, et ita formalem. Quare et bonum antecedit uerum.” (*Pseudo-Peckham*, Prologus, q. 1, § 17; Buffon 2007, 31) [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. “Ad aliud dicendum quod finis dicitur causa causarum non quia precedat secundum esse, set quia precedit in mouendo eo modo quo mouet, et quia ipsa habita quies est. Est ergo prior aliis tempore in quantum mouet suo modo, et est prior dignitate et completione in quantum finit et terminat motum et indigentiam omnium.” (*Pseudo-Peckham*, Prologus, q. 1, § 24; Buffon 2007, 230) [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. “Et similiter ex parte virtutis intellectivae, intellectus per eandem virtutem, primo recipiendo speciem boni inquantum bonum actuale est, apprehendit et cognoscit bonum actuale, et sic est intellectus practicus.” (*In De anima III*, 10.17; ed. RRP, 10.17.Q2) [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. “Dicendum quod intellectus, eo quod coniunctus est imaginationi, aliquo modo afficitur et inficitur ex affectionibus imaginationis et sensus. Unde ipse intellectus non de se sed secundum quod in homine est afficitur bono nunc et in ipso delectatur. Cum igitur offerantur intellectui bonum nunc et bonum simpliciter, imitatur quandoque bonum nunc, quia ipso afficitur.” (*In DA III*, 10.18; ed. RRP, 10.Q3) [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. “Intellectus non potest cogi ab imaginatione, eo quod superadditur ei ut eius perfectio. Si igitur imaginationi subiciatur, subiciet se ipsum et non subicietur ab imaginatione. Sed constat quod in subiciendo se peccat. Igitur se ipso peccat, cum ipse intellectus se subiciat.” (*In DA III*, 10.18; ed. RRP, 10.Q3) [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. “Intellectus igitur appetitivus non de se, sed secundum quod sibi unit imaginationem in appetendo, mediante imaginatione movet organa corporea et consequenter ipsum animal localiter.” (*In DA III*, 10.17; ed. RRP, 10.Q2) [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. “Obiectum intellectus practici est forma rei sive res non in se prout ens est, sed inquantum per speciem suam apprehenditur ab intellectu secundum quod res illa extendit se in operationem; sed sub hac ratione dicitur res bona; igitur bonum inquantum bonum actuale est obiectum practici intellectus.” (*In DA III*, 10.17; ed. RRP, 10.Q2) [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. “Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i. e. the mean relative to us (ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς), this being determined by a rational principle (ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ), and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it (ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν).” (E.N. II.6, 1106b36‒1107a2; AW 9, trad. Ross) [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. “Dicit enim Philosophus, quod nihil movet nisi in quantum est appetitivum. Cum ergo intellectus practicus sit movens, non videbitur hoc sufficere, quod extendat se in rationem boni tantum.” (*De homine*, q. 63, a. 4, sed contra 1; ed. Borgnet 35, 544a) [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. “Nec fit ibi extensio ad particularia, nec ad appetitum, eo quod speculativus nihil actuale considerat, ut dicit Philosophus.” (*De homine*, q. 63, a. 4, solutio; ed. Borgnet 35, 544b) [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. “Quare potius dicatur extendi a vero in bonum, quam e converso? (...) Quare in practicis non sit reflexa intelligentia sicut est in theoricis?” (*De homine*, q. 63, a. 4, sed contra 2, 3; ed. Borgnet 35, 544a) [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. „Die praktische Regel ist also unbedingt, mithin als kategorisch praktischer Satz a priori vorgestellt, wodurch der Wille schlechterdings und unmittelbar (durch die praktische Regel selbst, die also hier Gesetz ist) objectiv bestimmt wird. Denn reine, an sich praktische Vernunft ist hier unmittelbar gesetzgebend.“ (KdPV 31) [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. „Ad aliud dicendum, quod bonum est post verum in intellectu: verum enim est in ratione speciei universalis, bonum autem in particularibus operum. Et propter hoc necesse est extendi intellectum ultra id quod est intellectus proprium: proprium enim suum in quantum est intellectus, est stare in universali: sed si deberet esse practicus, necesse est extendi ad particularia in quibus est ipsa praxis.“ (*De homine*, q. 63, a. 4, solutio, ad 2; ed. Borgnet 35, 544b) [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. “Secunda est, quod practicus intellectus habet formam operativam rei, et per hoc componitur cum re operata: dicit enim Aristoteles in VII *Metaphysicae*, quod sanitas quæ inducitur in aegro, est a sanitate quæ est in anima medici, et dicitur *forma compositionis*. Forma vero quæ est in intellectu speculativo, non est ad rem, sed a re per abstractionem, et ideo dicitur *forma abstractionis*.” (*De homine*, q. 63, a. 4, solutio, ad 6; ed. Borgnet 35, 545b) [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. “Et quando videt et cognoscit illud verum quod suiipsius est communicativum, tunc intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus, et movetur tunc sine medio ad diligendum ipsum. Set non est necesse esse medium, quia sufficienter sine medio diligitur, quia speculatur ille idem practicus per medium. Ideo ex consequenti est medium in via diligendi per medium in via speculandi...” (*Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis,* lib. II; ed. Steele, OHI 10, 35.16‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. “Praeterea, apostolus dicit, 1 Tim., 1, 9: lex non est justo posita. Sed philosophus dicit in fine Ethic. quod haec fuit necessitas constituendi reges et alios principes, ad leges condendas habentes vim coactivam ad virtutis actus, quam sermo persuasivus sapientum non habet. Ergo si omnes justitiam in qua conditi sunt, servassent, praelatio non fuisset.” (*Super II Sent*., dist. 44, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 4; ed. Mandonett, p. 1121.19–24) [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. “Sed quia veritas prima, quæ est fidei obiectum, est finis omnium desideriorum et actionum nostrarum, ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Trin. inde est quod per dilectionem operatur. Sicut etiam intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus**,** ut dicitur in III de anima.” (ST II-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; ed. Leonina 8, 45) [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. “Cum enim substantia virtutis sit medium: medium autem virtutis determinatum sit quoad nos et non simpliciter: universalis propositio de medio virtutis accipi non potest.” (*Ethicorum* I, tract. I, c. 2; ed. Borgnet 7, 3a) [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. “Cum actus peccati et virtutis sit secundum electionem, electio autem est appetitus praeconsiliati, consilium vero est quaedam inquisitio; necesse est quod in quolibet actu virtutis vel peccati sit quaedam deductio quasi syllogistica**;** sed tamen aliter syllogizat temperatus, aliter intemperatus; aliter continens, aliter incontinens. Temperatus enim movetur tantum secundum iudicium rationis; unde utitur syllogismo trium propositionum; quasi sic deducens: nulla fornicatio est committenda, hic actus est fornicatio, ergo non est faciendus.” (*De malo*, q. 3, a. 9, ad 7; ed. Leonina 23, 87.253‒64) [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. “Pierre Dubois [Petrus de Bosco] nous déclare qu’il avait entendu Siger, à Paris, déterminer cette question de la *Politique* d’Aristote: qu’il est de beaucoup préférable pour l’État d’être régi par de justes lois que par des hommes honnêtes.” (Mandonnet 1911, 141). [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. “The traditional Arab social structure was exclusively based on kin. The individual lived as a member of the kin group, and for it. The verse of Durayd ibn al-Simmah (d. 630 AD) is quite clear: ‘I am but one of [the tribe of] Ghazlyah, if it strays, I stray, and if Ghazlyah leads the right way, I lead the right way’ (…). The kin bond is vivified by kin solidarity (*casabiyah*), which is ‒ according to ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 AD) ‒ the fundamental bond of human society and the basic motivat­ing force of history.” (Parolin 2009, 26) [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. “It was His single supreme ordinance ‒ the *lex aeterna* ‒ which permeated and directed this plurality (*multitudo*), in order ‘that all things be most orderly’ (*ut omnia sint ordinatissima*). Conversely, all multiplicity had its source in this oneness, in the Absolute One (*omnis multitudo derivatur ab uno*), to Whom it ultimately returns and to Whom it remains eternally subordinated (*ordinatio ad unum*), according to the words of St. John (Jn 17:11).” (Chroust 1947, 427‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. “Thus John of Paris claimed outright that ‘*whereas in the Church oneness is required by divine law, the faithful laity, moved by a natural instinct, … should live in different states*’. For ‘*only within each particular realm need there be unity*’ in the sense of oneness.” (Chroust 1947, 444) [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. The book is dedicated to Dante; however, Dante put Brunetto as political opponent of Dante’s faction of Ghibellines in hell for sins against nature. The key quotation taken from the quoted passage of *Politics* III.10 runs as follows: “Seignourie sont de trios manieres: l’une est des rois, la segonde est des hons, la tierce est des communes, laquele est la trés meilleur entre ces autres.” (*Li Livres dou Tresor* II.44.1, ed. Baldwin&Barrette, p. 179) [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. “Et ratio est, quia politici contendunt ad perfectionem virtutis moralis et felicitatem civilem: Philosophi autem contendunt ad perfectionem virtutis intellectualis et felicitatem contemplativam sive intellectualem.” (*Politicorum Libri* VII, c. 2; ed. Borgnet 8, 634a) [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. “Quia ergo omnium confessio est, quod eadem est felicitas hominis et civitatis, quaecumque illa sit, relinquitur quod de duobus sit inquirendum.” (*Politicorum Libri* VII, c. 2; ed. Borgnet 8, 632a) [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. “Die praktische Regel ist also unbedingt, mithin als kategorisch praktischer Satz *a priori* vorgestellt, wodurch der Wille schlechterdings und unmittelbar (durch die praktische Regel selbst, die also hier Gesetz ist) objectiv bestimmt wird. Denn *reine, an sich praktische Vernunft* ist hier unmittelbar gesetzgebend.” (KdPV 31) [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. “Objections may be urged (ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις) against all the aspirants to political power (πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν).” (*Pol*. 1283b13‒14, trad. Jowett, WA 10). [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. “Primo igitur diffinit quid sit regnabile, id est, regno aptum, dicens: *Primo autem determinandum*, est scilicet, *quid sit regnabile, et quid aristocraticum, et quid democraticum*.” (*Politicorum Libri* III, c. 10; ed. Borgnet 8, 309a) [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. “Men are free ‒ as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom ‒ as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.” (Arendt 1961, 153) [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. “Et manifestat intentionem quaestionis, ut melius intelligatur quid intendit, ibi, *Regnabile quidem igitur est talis multitudo, quae nata est ferre genus superexcellens secundum virtutem ad praesulatum politicum*. Et dicitur hic regnabile non a rege, sed regno. Rex enim regnativus est, non regnabilis…” (*Politicorum Libri* III, c. 10; ed. Borgnet 8, 309b) [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. “Ejusmodi universalis huijus symbiosis ac regni administratores et rectores universalis consociationis corpus, seu totum et universum populum, a quo constituti sunt, repraesentant, ejusque personam gerunt in iis…” (*Politica methodice digesta*, cap. 18; ed. Amhem 1617, p. 199) [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. “Difficillimum autem est venire ad medium, maxime propter hoc, quia operationes et passiones nostras in singularibus sunt circumstantiarum, qui nulli uni communes sunt cum alio.” (*Ethicorum* II, tract. II, c. 11; ed. Borgnet 7, 193a) We will find a similar passage right away in the introduction of the given chapter (ibid, 191a). [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. “Ex hoc concludit, ibi, *Quare palam, justum quaerentes, medium quaerunt* : et sic dicit in *Ethicis*: «Medium invenire difficilimum est, facillimum autem declinare a medio»: et ideo assumendum esse scientem leges. Et dicit, quod est illud medium, ibi, *Lex enim ipsum medium*: determinando enim justum, determinat et medium: quia justum medium est, ut dicit in quinto *Ethicorum*.” (*Politicorum Libri* III, c. 10; ed. Borgnet 8, 307a) [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. According to Lefort, the symbolic representation of democracy is interesting in that it does not allow stable representation with the help of any visible substance, for example, a king or the body of a totalitarian leader. Modern democracy differs from all political formations in that it silently recognizes the place of power as empty, because it is not possible to fill a totalitarian representation permanently and once and for all, but only by way of representation (*la politique*). Lefort’s classic statement is: “Le lieu du pouvoir devient un *lieu vide*.” (Lefort 1986b, 25) [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. “Homo autem dominus operationum suarum non est nisi per voluntatem. Intellectu enim bene compellitur ad concedendum verum ex principiis demonstrationum, sed in voluntate penitus liber est et causa sui. Oportet igitur quod etiam virtutes quae intellectuales dicuntur, secundum quod sunt de numero laudabilium bonorum, a voluntate sicut a causa procedant.” (*Ethica* II, tract. 1, c. 1; ed. Borgnet 7, 150a) [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. “Et dicit rationem, ibi, *Putantes*, id et, quia putant *vitam liberi alteram quamdam esse a politica, et omnium esse eligibilissimam*, id est, quia putant quod vita hominis liberi sit omnium eligibilissima: et liberi vita est, quae nulli subjacet, sed sui causa est. *Hi autem*, id est, alii, *hanc* scilicet politicam, *optimam* esse dicunt.” (*Politicorum Libri* VII, c. 2; ed. Borgnet 8, 638b) [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
567. “Et hujus ratio est, quia homo bonus in lege peritus applicat particularibus quod lex praecipit in universali.” (*Politicorum Libri* III, c. 10; ed. Borgnet 8, 308a) [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
568. “Et fundant se super hoc quod dicitur in principio *Ethicorum*, quod «divinum est hoc, scilicet quod est hominis: divinius quod est civitatis, divinissimum autem quod est gentis.»” (*Politicorum Libri* VII, c. 2; ed. Borgnet 8, 634b) [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
569. “Amplius, humana universitas est quoddam totum ad quasdam partes, et est quedam pars ad quoddam totum. Est enim quoddam totum ad regna particularia et ad gentes, ut superiora ostendunt; et est quedam pars ad totum universum. Et hoc est de se manifestum.” (*Monarchia* 1.7.1, ed. digitalis *Dante Project*) [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
570. “Rex ergo erit secundum naturae ordinem, qui omnium bonorum adeptione virtutem regnandi adeptus est secundum ultimum et optimum talis potestatis.” (*Ethicorum* VIII, tract. III, c. 2; ed. Borgnet 7, 541a) [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
571. “Primo quidem quantum ad bene vivere: ad quod unusquisque affert suam partem, sicut videmus in qualibet communitate, quod unus servit communitati de uno officio, alius de alio, et sic omnes communiter bene vivunt. *Hoc igitur*, scilicet bene vivere, maxime est finis civitatis vel politiae et communiter quantum ad omnes et sigillatim quantum ad unumquemque. Secundo utilis est vita communis etiam propter ipsum vivere, dum unus in communitate vitae existentium alii subvenit ad sustentationem vitae et contra pericula mortis.” (*In Libros Politicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, lib. 3, lect. 5, no. 4; ed. Marietti, p. 137) [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
572. “This definition of political liberty as a potential freedom from politics is not urged upon us merely by our most recent experiences; it has played a large part in the history of political theory. We need go no farther than the political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who more often than not simply identified political freedom with security. The highest purpose of politics, ‘the end of government,’ was the actualized of security; security, in turn, made freedom possible, and the word ‘freedom’ designated a quintessence of activities which occurred outside the political realm.” (Arendt 1961, 149) [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
573. “Nam Aristoteles 7. Polyt. cap. *utrum autem* manifeste dicit, quod eadem est felicitas unius hominis, et totius Civitatis; et dicit, quod hoc omnes communiter opinantur; nam, qui dicuntur unum hominem esse felicem propter divitias, dicuntur Civitatem, si fuerit dives, esse felicem.” (*Contro Dante* 1; ed. Jarro, p. 4) [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
574. “Folgende Maximen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes gehören zwar nicht hierher, als Teile der Geschmackskritik, können aber doch zur Erläuterung ihrer Grundsätze dienen. Es sind folgende: 1. Selbstdenken; 2. An der Stelle jedes andern denken; 3. Jederzeit mit sich selbst einstimmig denken. Die erste ist die Maxime der *vorurteilsfreien*, die zweite der *erweiterten*, die dritte der *konsequenten* Denkungsart.” (KdU 294). [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
575. “Contra istam opinionem ostendo quod practica non distinguitur a speculativa fine, id est per causam finalem, ita scilicet quod habeat distinctam causam finalem a causa finali speculativae, sed idem simpliciter potest esse causa finalis utriusque.” (*Ordinatio* I, liber I, prologus, q. 11; OTh 1, 304.15‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
576. “Ideo dico quod recta ratio est obiectum actus virtuosi; et ex hoc quod requiritur ad actum virtuosum tamquam obiectum in esse reali, sequitur quod habet causalitatem effectivam respectu actus virtuosi…” (*Quaestiones*, q. 7, a. 4; OTh 8, 394.443‒46) [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
577. “Ad istud dicit Scotus quod 'definitio prudentiae debet intelligi de habitu activo proximo, qualis est habitus adquisitus ex actibus. Unde sicut ars se habet circa factibilia ad habitum experimenti, ita circa agibilia se habet scientia moralis ad habitum prudentiae, quia habitus artis et scientiae moralis sunt remoti ad dirigendum, quia universales…” (*De distintione inter notitiam speculativam et practicam*; OTh 1, 317.14‒19) [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
578. “(...) dico quod habitus universalis immediate dirigit, non tamen totaliter sed partialiter tantum, quia praeter habitus universales requiritur notitia rei singularis quae debet dirigi, vel circa quod debet aliqua potentia operari.” (*Ordinatio*, liber I, prologus, q. 12; OTh 1, 356.15‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
579. “Ista autem praxis dividitur in praxim virtuosam et vitiosam, quia utraque istarum est in potestate nostra. Praxis autem virtuosa potest sic describi: praxis virtuosa est operatio exsistens in potestate voluntatis, nata elici conformiter rationi rectae ad hoc quod sit recta.” (*Ordinatio* I, liber I, prologus, q. 10; OTh 1, 293.1‒5) [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
580. “Tamen pro intentione Philosophi sciendum quod finis ‒ qui debet secundum rectam rationem intendi ‒ scientiae practicae est veritas, sicut est finis scientiae speculativae. Sed finis ultimus scientiae speculativae est veritas, finis autem ultimus scientiae practicae non est veritas sed opus.” (*Ordinatio* I, liber I, prologus, q. 11; OTh 1, 323.12‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
581. “Arguendo contra praedictam opinionem, primo ostendam quod secundum usum auctorum libertas, secundum quod distinguitur contra principium naturale activum, est quaedam contingentia vel indifferentia; ex quo sequitur quod libertas non stat cum necessitate. Secundo arguam in speciali contra modum salvandi aliter libertatem in voluntate quam in alio principio necessario activo.” (*Ordinatio*, liber I, dist. 10, q. 2; OTh 3, 335.16‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
582. “Wie die alten Völker ihre Vorgeschichte in der Imagination erlebten, in der Mythologie, so haben wir Deutsche unsre Nachgeschichte im Gedanken erlebt, in der *Philosophie*. Wir sind *philosophische* Zeitgenossen der Gegenwart, ohne ihre *historischen* Zeitgenossen zu sein. Die deutsche Philosophie ist die *ideale Verlängerung* der deutschen Geschichte.” (Marx 1, 383) [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
583. “Aber die analytische Einheit und Tautologie der praktischen Vernunft ist nicht nur etwas Überflüssiges, sondern in der Wendung, welche sie erhält, etwas Falsches, und sie muß als das Prinzip der Unsittlichkeit erkannt werden.” (*Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften*, Kap. II; Hegel 2, 463). [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
584. We quote the work *Dialogus* after the critical edition of *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, which is published in digital form: *William of Ockham: Dialogus. Latin Text and English Translation. Edited by John Kilcullen, John Scott, George Knysh, Volker Leppin, Jan Ballweg, Karl Ubl, Semih Heinen*. The division of the text follows the edition plan divided into three parts (*Dial*. 1–3) and two treatises, which contains both the second (2.1–2) and the third part (3.1–2). Then follows the number of the book and the chapter, as well as the pagination of the critical edition under the abbreviation „ABMA.“ [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
585. “Unde pro tota communitate mortalium dixit dominus ad primos parentes: 'Replete terram et subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris.' Ergo communitas mortalium non debet privari iure suo super imperium absque consensu suo.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 1, cap. 31; ed. ABMA, pp. 122.66‒123.69) [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
586. “Respondetur quod potestas transferendi imperium uno modo vel alio principalissime est apud universitatem mortalium, sicut apud ipsam est principalissime potestas constituendi imperium. Quare si universitas mortalium vellet posset Romanum imperium de quacumque gente transferre in aliam.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 1, cap. 29; ed. ABMA, p. 115.28‒33) [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
587. “Papa auctoritate papali sibi data a Christo non intromittit se de imperio vacante imperio, sed quod intromittit se ‒ si rite faciat intromittit se ‒ auctoritate Romanorum vel electorum, ad quos vel ad cunctos electores spectat principaliter supplere defectum imperii vacante imperio, qui potestatem suam transferre possunt in papam.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 1, cap. 22; ed. ABMA, p. 83.8‒13) [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
588. “Nam non poterant sibi dare omne ius quod habebat imperator Romanus nec omne ius quod habebant senatores vel prefectus urbis. Et ita iura particularia personarum vel congregacionum seu collegiorum aut communitatum particularium non poterant transferre in papam.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 1, cap. 30; ed. ABMA, p. 118.18‒21) [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
589. “Ad quartam rationem respondetur quod papa non potest deponere imperatorem ratione papatus sicut nec ratione papatus potest deponere regem Francie. Sed sicut Zacharias papa regem Francorum auctoritate populi regni illius deposuit...” (*Dialogus* 1, lib. 6, cap. 10; ed. ABMA, p. 33.63‒70) [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
590. “Respondetur quod exercitus non facit imperatorem nisi auctoritate populi Romani. (...) Ergo imperium non est a papa. Discipulus: Per istam racionem imperium non est a populo Romano sed ab exercitu. Magister: Respondetur quod exercitus non facit imperatorem nisi auctoritate populi Romani.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 1, cap. 28; ed. ABMA, p. 112.10‒15) [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
591. “Sed electus in imperatorem seu regem Romanorum non est pro regno Romano subiectus pape cum pro regno Romano non sit vasallus pape. Ergo administrare debet licet non presentaverit eleccionem suam pape.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 2, cap. 29; ed. ABMA, p. 200.36‒40) [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
592. “Ergo nullam potestatem accepit beatur Petrus a Christo super Romanum imperium quam non accepit super Franciam et alia regna. Quare si ex potestate data beato Petro a Christo papa potest transferre Romanum imperium de gente in gentem poterit eadem potestate transferre regnum Francie de gente in gentem.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 2, cap. 20; ed. ABMA, p. 75.32‒36) [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
593. “Romanum autem imperium acquisivit ius et dominium super alia regna per potenciam gladii. Ergo et per potenciam gladii potuit perdere idem ius et dominium.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 2, cap. 5; ed. ABMA, p. 136.78‒82) [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
594. “Christus dedit caput communitati fidelium; sed non nisi beatum Petrum. Ergo Petrus fuit constitutus a Christo caput universorum fidelium.” (*Dialogus* 3.2, lib. 1, cap. 14; ed. ABMA, p. 153.14‒16) [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
595. “Christus autem omnes divitias necessarias ad iurisdictionem coactivam exercendam quo ad dominium penitus abdicavit, victu et vestitu contentus. Adiutorio etiam divitum ad eandem iurisdictionem exercendam minime utebatur. Ergo coactivam iurisdictionem in quantum homo mortalis non habuit.” (*Dialogus* 1, lib. 6, cap. 3; ed. ABMA, p. 9.42‒49) [↑](#footnote-ref-595)